Miks Brasliņš

mb09143

Antr5006

Self, Experience and Agency

The study of self, experience and agency is a very broad and complex undertaking
that features a number of schools of thought that offer different conceptualizations
and models for these phenomena. Furthermore, these are very abstract and ‘meta’
kind of subjects, the research on these often involve challenging and reflecting upon
the established modes of knowledge creation and epistemological approaches. This
sort of study deals with questions that really do not have one conclusive model that
provides an perfect explanation. Therefore, it is somewhat impossible to give a full
account of how personhood, experience and agency are linked. However, there are
various plausible perspectives that grant better insight on the matter. I will look at
some of the ideas offered by five different thereoticians in an effort to see how they
view the self, experience and agency. Moreover, I will attempt to contrast and locate
similarities in their arguments in order to synthesize my own understanding of the
connection between the self, experience and agency. The essay is organized according
to the three major themes. Each section contains a presentation of the main ideas on
the subject, as well as analysis. Of course, it should be noted that these phenomena are
intrinsically linked which makes it difficult to discuss one topic without refering to
the others to some extent. Therefore, each section will focus on using the other topics
to explain the main theme of section.

The Self

A good place where to start with analysing a concept is its broadly accepted
definition, however, in this case it is the first major problem, namely, how is the self,
subject, person and individual conceptualized? How do these conceptualiztions differ
cross-culturally? The same question stands true for experience and agency which I
will tackle later on in the essay. I will first look at H.L. Moore’s “A genealogy of the
anthropological subject”, as it provides a comprehensive overview of how the theories
on selfhood were developed.
Anthropologists have tried to clarify the concepts of selfhood by distinguishing
between what is culturally determined and what constitutes characteristics that are
universal to human beings in general. (Moore, 2007:25) Early anthropologists, G.H.
Mead and Irving Hallowell, consider self-awareness, self-identity and self-continuity
as the universsal foundations that are necessary for culture and humans to function.
(ibid.) Hallowell saw, ‘[the] self and society as interdependant and mutually defining.’
(ibid.) Mead and Hallowell propose somewhat similar understandings of the relation
between the self and culture, and the significance of self-reflection. In Hallowell’s
‘behavioural environment’ the self, ‘was always structured in terms of a world of
objects other than the self’. (ibid.) Mead suggests that the self is more or less a
product of interaction within a certain environment, moreover, culture and language,
‘provide the means through which the self becomes self-aware as part of a process of
taking, internalizing and recognizng the position of the other.’ (ibid.) The early
conceptualizations emphasize the role of culture in the formation of the self as well as
its understanding, however, it is interesting to consider to what degree culture affects
the way people perceive themselves, experience the world, think and feel. (2007:27)
Can a culture’s metaphysics and understanding of the self, personhood and individual
influence the way people actually experience the world, can it create new
psychological states and ways of feeling? Moore notes that there is an ongoing
difficulty of determining how cultural representations intersect with personal
experience, and how one influences the other. (ibid.) Cultural psychology attempts to
explain this by proposing that the human psyche is shaped by,

[..]culturally constituted particulars of a form of life and that it changes over

time. Thus, both the concept of self and self-making are culturally variable.’
(2007:31)
Nonetheless, that which can summarized from earlier anthropologists and what also
can be considered a good starting point for understanding what constitutes the self is
Moore’s neatly worded definition of what are human universals,

[..] An existential sense of self – based on self-identity, self-awareness and

self-continuity – however it is made, manifest in terms of subject/object
relations, experience, desire, motivation, feeling, agency and emotion [..]
(2007:29)
More recent anthropological theories are critical of the overemphasis earlier
theoreticians placed on the importance of culture and structure, as it undermines
selves by making them subsumed by culture. Strathern, for example, suggests that the
way culture and the self interact is by the former serving as resource for the latter,

Individuals take up sets of notions and/ or cultural materials and use them to
make sense of changing circumstances. This process of interpretation and
engagement produces new combinations of ideas and theories of relatedness.
The result is a creative self that speaks in cultural idiom. (2007:31)
The creative self is an important concept. In essence culture and its conceptualizations
of what the self and personhood are provide the ‘source model’ around which it is
possible to organize one’s experience of self-consciousness, agency and personal
identity. (ibid.) Culture serves as a tool for making meanings and developing ideas,
desires, motivations and experience. (ibid.) What is important that the self is not put
in a specific frame by culture, while culture does influence the self through
interactions with cultural categories and the formation of relations with others,
however, these do not determine the self, there is space for resistance, chaange and
creativity. (ibid.) Another important point that deserves attention is that,

This self is also one that is complexly constituted, bound up with sets of
competing and partial discourses, able to reflect on and combine socio-centric
and ego-centric aspects of the self and to deploy the resulting repertoires in
performative and strategic ways. (ibid.)
This reconceptualization is useful as it broadens the previous narrow perspective on
what constitutes the self, individual and personhood. It also introduced other
important aspects that should be taken into consideration when discussing the self,
namely, that a person can actively shape his or her self, namely, the aspect of agency
which I will discuss in further detail later on.

Before moving to the following section that covers the experiential aspect of
the self I would like to briefly go over Iris Jean Klein ethnography titled ‘Mothercraft,
statecraft, and subjectivity in the Palestinian intifada’. It is a compelling study because
it challenges the viewpoint in anthropology that I just discussed which conceptualizes
the self/ individual as a, ‘singular site and self-sufficient author of self-hood’. (Klein
2000:100) Iris Jean Klein proposes that ‘other-influence’ is just as important in the
formation of self-hood. She refers to Battaglia who describes the self as, ‘a
representational economy: a reification continuously defeated by [..] entaglements
with other subjects histories, experiences, selfrepresentations.’ (ibid.) Iris looks at
interesting example of the aforementioned phenomenon. She examines the case of
Palestinian young men and their sisters and mothers, how the men and women form a
unique collaborative sort of self-practice, ‘a representational entanglement of multiple
individuals and their actions at the level of self-embodiment and the „subjective”
manipulation of the other-influence. (p. 101) The practice of the self is closely linked
with the relationships (in this case familial) with other people. Moore’s idea of
multiple/condradictory positioning and subjective is useful in understanding this
concept, which Iris calls “cross-subjective self-enactment”. One example that explains
how this works is the way children learn their gender roles by interacting with their
opposite gendered sibling. Klein’s ethnography shows how,

Young men became moral persons [..] with their mothers and sisters – who in
the process became “mothers of heroes” and banat (politically active girls), all
in an collaborative, cross-subjective exercise of self. (2000:102-103)
This approach to the analysis of self illuminates that the self relies on draws influence
from an intersubjective web of relationships which, in turn, challenges the ‘skin-
bounded individual’ undestanding of the self.

Experience
In the previous section I looked at the development of the conceptualization of the self
and the importance theoreticians placed on the link and interdependency between the
self and culture. The ethnographic example I looked at in the end of the last section
already crossed over into a more present day conceptualization of the self that
provides a more elaborate understanding of the experiential and agency aspects. Now
I will focus more on the former which is the domain of phenomenology. Furthermore,
I will also look at the concept of embodiment.

It is important to speak of culture and its influence, however, it is just as

important not to forget that the world is experienced through the body, which serves
as the existential ground of culture and self,

The field of embodiment, in its lived emotional-cognitive sense, is seen as a

mediator between, on the one hand, patterns and structures which can be
observed on a societal level and, on the other hand, individual life in its
intersubjective shaping of everyday meaning. (Knibbe 2008:50)
In this context it is important to mention the work of both Merleu-Ponty and Pierre
Bourdieu who attempt to break down dualities and explain, each in their own way, the
relation between experience, body and culture.
 Merleau-Ponty argues that perception is indeterminate and that it serves as the
starting point and that, ‘there are no objects prior to perception.’ (Csordas, 1990:9)
Furthermore, he states that perception begins in the body and that objects are the end-
product of reflective thinking and abstraction. (ibid.) Merleu Ponty offers the concept
of the body being pre-objective, it exists and is there with the specific way it functions
to perceive and make things into objects,

[..] Consciousness projects itself into a physical world and has a body, as it
projects itself into a cultural world and has its habits: because it cannot be
consciousness without playing upon significances given either in the absolute
past of nature or in its own personal past, and because any form of lived
experience tends toward a certain generality whether that of our habits or that
of our bodily functions. (1990:10)
Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s view implies that the creation of cultural objects is guided
by intentions and the specific peculiarities of the body and its inherent abilities. The
main advantage of Merleau-Ponty’s theory is that it allows to look at, ‘open-ended
human process of taking up and inhabiting the cultural world, in which our existence
transcends but remains grounded in de facto situations.’ (ibid.)This sort of puts a twist
on culture influencing the as discussed in the previous section, because taking the
body as a starting point would to some degree entail that a certain lived experience
and context, as well as the body’s natural limitations and way of functioning are also
essential components to consider in the formation of the self. The first thing that
comes to mind is sexuality as something that as a lived experience has a profound
effect on shaping the perception of the self and the world around oneself.

I move on to Pierre Bourdieu whose goal is similar to Merleau-Ponty’s,

namely, to, ‘move beyond analysis of the social fact as opus operatum, to analysis of
the modus operandi of social life.’ His major contribution to the understanding of
experience and embodiment is the concept of habitus, which is defined as,

[..] A system of perduring dispositions which is the unconscious, collectively

inculcated principle for the generation and structuring of practices and
representations. (1990:12)
Most importantly the habitus serves the function of mediating between society and the
embodied individual, furthermore, this happens very systematically, as there is a,

[..] Principle generating and unifying all practices, the system of inseparably
cognitive and evaluative structures which organizes the vision of the world in
accordance with the objective structures of a determinate state of the social
 world: this principle is nothing other than the socially informed body with its
tastes and distastes, its compulsions and repulsions, with, in a word, all its
senses. (ibid.)
What the habitus entails is that it is created through a social process, and it is neither a
creation of individual agency, nor it is something that is dictated by structures. The
best way to describe it would be as an interplay between the two. Moreover, it is
something that is done unconsciously, varies on the context and changes over time.

This section gave insight into the importance of experiencing the world from
an embodied position and the ideas of two theoreticians who tried to explain the link
between culture and the embodied experiential self. First of all, these theories are
important elaborations that expand the understanding of how the self is formed
beyond the self/culture interdependency view. It is evident that the way people
experience the world, the way the body functions and how the consciousness projects
itself unto the world has an important impact on the way culture is formed around
them. Bourdieu’s habitus is a difficult concept to wrap one’s mind around, however, it
does give insight into the way embodied experience are connected to the reproduction
of certain cultural practices. This is achieved unconsciously, guided by the senses and
needs of the self in a way that it does not contradict or seem senseless within the
cultural/societal structure an individual is a part of, nor to the individual him or
herself. Mainly though, all of this is compelling because it identifies the embodied
experience and all that comes with it (desire, motivation, feelings, emotions, etc.) as
something alongside cultural categories that has a profound influence in the way the
self is formed and expressed.

Agency

It is difficult to discuss the self and how it is formed through experience without
dealing with the question of agency. The embodied experience aspects can actually
serve as the basis for agency. Before continuing on I will briefly explain Ortner’s
conceptualization of subjectivity and how it ties together experience and agency.

Ortner views subjectivity as an ensemble of modes of perception, affect,

thought, fear and other factors which animate acting subjects. He also takes into
account the cultural and social formation which evoke such modes of experiencing the
world. He also sees it as the basis of ‘agency’, the way people act upon the world
while being acted upon. These are certain desires and intentions that form with a
matrix of subjectivity of (culturally constituted) feelings, thoughts and meanings.
These serve as the driving force behind peoples’ actions. (Ortner 2005:47) This
conceptualization nicely brings together the embodied experience of various states of
mind/affect and also takes into account the cultural structure that elicits these kinds of
reactions. An interesting question is whether peoples’s agency is largely shaped by
the cultural formations that shape their experience, wants and desires? In this context
it is worthwhile to look through Laura M. Ahearn’s article “Language and Agency”
which deals with various schools of thought on the subject of agency, as well the
question of social transformation. She starts with the definition of agency and refers to
Karp’s definitions of ‘actors’ and ‘agents’,
[..]an actor refers to a person whose action is rule-governed or rule-oriented,
whereas an agent refers to a person engaged in the exercise of power in the
sense of the ability to bring about effects and to (re)constitute the world.
(Ahearn, 2001:113)
In my opinion, this is a good differentiation which defines agency by the ability to go
against the status-quo. However, it also raises the question that was dicussed in the
first section, namely, how does the cultural ‘source model’ of agency affect the way it
is carried out? In the following paragraph I will look through some of the main
approaches and their criticisms.

One approach is to treat agency as an equivalent to free will. This is

charateristic in certain philosophical theories, however,

The main weakness in treating agency as a synonym for free will is that such
an approach ignores or only gives lip service to the social nature of agency and
the pervasive influence of culture on human intentions, beliefs, and actions.
(2001:114)

Another approach draws paralels between agency and resistence. This is especially
pravalent in feminist theories. However, it should be noted that there is no such thing
as ‘pure resistence’ and motivations are always a lot more complex and contradictory.
(2001:116) Another viewpoint entails the absence of agency, like in Foucault’s theory
which proposes a model of agency that is a matter of plurality, mobility, and conflict.
Society is pervaded by a number of omnipresent impersonal discourses, which
influence power relations. Ahearn argues that while Foucault’s theory offers space in
power relations for action/resistence, the approach does not deal primarily with
agency. (ibid.) Moving on, those who take the practice theory view agency as follows,
 Giddens consistently links agency to structure through his discussion of rules
and resources. Central to Giddens' theory of structuration is the understanding
that people's actions are shaped (in both constraining and enabling ways) by
the very social structures that those actions then serve to reinforce or
reconfigure (2001:117 - 118)
The ideas provided by Giddens are somewhat similar to the idea of habits proposed by
Bourdieu which was discussed in the previous section. The problem with structuration
theory is firguring out how social transformation occurs within the constant loop,
‘consisting of actions influenced by social structures and social structures (re)created
by actions.’ (2001:118) On the other hand, Bourdieu’s theory does not account for
creation of new cultural phenomena because, ‘of the (pre)dispositions the habitus
embodies in its many forms and structures.’ (ibid.) Ahrean gives a good explanation
of this and how habitus can account for the reproduction of certain power relations,

Of the infinite thoughts, meanings, and practices that the habitus can produce
at any given historical moment, there is only a minimal probability that any
will ever be thought or practiced because individuals are predisposed to think
and act in a manner that reproduces the existing system of inequalities. (ibid.)
Bourdieu’s habitus does not offer much room for resistence or social transformation
because people are unconsciously reproducing culture. Giddens, on the other hand,
believes that, ‘that subjects are always at least partially ‘knowing’, and thus able
to act on and sometimes against the structures that made them.’ (2005:33) The
example about Palestinians given in the beginning shows that under certain
circumstances of oppression people are willing to actively go against the established
norms/culture. This sort of shows that even though people reproduce cultural
practices, if they experience on an embodied level discomfort about their
circumstances, they are likely to try and actively seek to challenge or attempt to
change societal norms and values. Of course they make use of the cultural resources
that are available to them, but with the context changing these cultural resources can
be reinterpreted in new ways, as the creative self theory suggested. Ahrean suggests
that it is not always up to conflict and resistence for cultural transformation to occur,
it suffices for different cultures to interact with one another. (2001:120) Of course
cultural change can occur on its own as well, Bourdieu’s habitus may appear strict,
but as previously discussed and as Ortner claims,’people are loosely structured.’
(ibid.) This leaves space for active agents to enact change, in essence, there is the
possibility for the creative self-making.

Conclusion
Overall, this is a very complex subject to analyze. It is apparent that the self,
experience and agency are intrinsically linked to one another. Early theories viewed
the self as being soley constituted by internalized cultural structures and institutions,
later theories emphasized that people are capable of actively shaping their selves and
that they are not completely subsumed by culture. Instead they use cultural aspects as
‘source models’ around which to build their experience of self-consciousness, agency
and personal identity. Of course, one should not attribute too much importance to
culture alone, as Merleau-Pontys shows that the embodied experience and the
particular way the body functions and perceives reality has a profound effect in
shaping culture. Moreover, Bourdieu shows the way cultural practices are reproduced
due the particular way humans unconsciously take over and internalize the social
structures. The habitus is created through a social process, and it is neither a creation
of individual agency, nor it is something that is dictated by structures. Agency is
based on the inner states and experience of reality and it is also shaped by the cultural
milieu and conceptions of what agency is. Many authors emphasize that agency is the
ability to enact change and break free from structural/cultural constrictions.
Bourdieu’s habitus model implies that people unconsciously reproduce structures and
power relation, but Ortner emphasizes that people are ‘loosely structured’ and there
are situations which allow to change existing cultural/structural paradigms. These
include dissatisfaction with existing conditions on an experiential level which leads to
resistance towards the status quo, also intercultural contact and interaction speed up
the way culture is reproduced.

Bibliography
 Ahearn, L. 2001. 'Language and agency', Annual review of anthropology:
 Csordas, T. J. (1990) 'Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology',
Ethos 18(1)
 Jean-Klein, I. 2000. 'Mothercraft, statecraft, and subjectivity in the Palestinian
intifada', American Ethnologist 27(1)
  Knibbe, K. and Versteeg, P. 2008. 'Assessing Phenomenology in
Anthropology', Critique of Anthropology 28(1)
 Moore, H. L. 2007. A genealogy of the anthropological subject, in The subject
of anthropology : gender, symbolism and psychoanalysis. Cambridge, UK ;
Malden, MA: Polity
 Ortner, S. 2005. Subjectivity and cultural critique. Anthropological theory, 5

Appendix

Summaries

Csordas Text

Hallowell’s idea of the “self as culturally constituted” changed the existing paradigm
which focused on personality structures. A key aspects in Hallowell’s theory are
perception, practice, the ability to recognize oneself as “an object in the world of
objects” through self-awareness. The latter is considered vital for the functioning of
society and a foundational aspect of human personality structure. Hallowell’s theory,
however, didn’t account for the constant reconceptualization of the self. (p. 6)

Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu attempt to collapse the notion of dualities using

embodiment as a methodlogical concept. Merleau Ponty regards the body as “a setting
in relation to the world” and consciousness as “the body projecting itself into the
world.” Bourdieu, on the other hand, sees the “socially informed body” as the
“principle generating and unifying all practices” and consciousness as a “form of
strategic calculation fused with a system of objective potentialities.” (p. 8)

Merleau Ponty believes that humans don’t have any objects prior to perception,
namely, they are a result of reflexive thinking. In order for his approach to work,
Merleau Ponty invented the concept of pre-object. He wished to change the premise
that perceptions start with objects, it actually ends in objects. Furthermore, culture and
cultral objects are formed based on intentionality and a process of objectification,
which starts from the body.

Bourdieu collapses the dualities of body-mind and sign-significance using his concept
of habitus. He defines it as, “a system of perduring dispositions which is the
unconscious, collectively inculcated principle for the generation and strutcturing of
practices and representations.” Habitus generates practices and structures and also
conditions their perception. (p. 11)

Moore’s Text

There are two key challenges in understanding the person, self and individual in
anthropology. Firstly, to distinguish the link between what is culturally conditioned
and universal human traits. Secondly, an in-depth cross-cultural analysis of the
conceptualization of the person, self and individual, the interrelatedness of these ideas
in various contexts.

Early anthropology believed that the understanding of the self goes hand in hand with
the capacity for self-reflection. Language and culture play a vital role in shaping
personhood. Moreover, it is important to look at how cultural representations intersect
with personal experience, how one influences the other.

While metaphysics may differ cross-culturally, the existential sense of self, based on
self-identity, self-awareness and self-continuity, is considered to be a human
universal. However, there different theoretical conceptualizations to what extent
culture affects the formation of the psyche or whether there exist underlying universal
psychological mechanisms. Cultural psychology proposes self-making is variable,
namely, that culture provides ‘source models’ of the self, which provide the
foundation for organizing one’s sense of self, motivations, etc.

Self-reflection cannot be attributed to language alone, one must consider that various
feelings, desires, motivations also come from an embodied engagement with the
world. For example, gender identity is an embodied form of engagement with the
world. Body praxis is a form of self-reflection that doesn’t require language. One
mustn’t assume the body solely determines cognitive structures.

Culture does not determine agency, it does give the patterns to make it intelligible. It
is important to note that one does not reproduce a cultural world by acting in it, one
needs to materially engage it.

One must consider the role of power in the formation of a sense of self. Mageo talks
about cultural lexicons which determine the ontological premises of being human,
quintessential aspects include social relations and morality. There exists a certain
hierarchy of discourses, which determine the proper/improper of interacting, thinking,
these allow a person to judge one own and others’ behaviour. The way one comes to
terms, understands and adapts to these discourses is also an important aspect of the
formation of the self.

People can actively and creatively shape their own subject positions in accordance to
what discourse they chose to follow – the self-stylized/self-made self. Identity
involves both individual and social elements, it is the sense of self gained from
identification.

There are multiple aspects at work simultaneously, while culture and socialization do
play a vital role, they are not the only contributing factors. A person derives
satisfactions by identifying with a variety of subject positions in different discourses
and social practices, and this is due to conscious, subconscious (bodily practices) and
unconscious motivations.

Iris Jean Klein’s Text

1. Iris Jean-Klein refers to the criticism of how anthropology has approached

selfhood, namely, that the individual is, ‘singular site and self-sufficient author of
self-hood’. (p. 100) The author suggests a different kind of perspective that
emphasizes other people and events that have an important formative role. She refers
to Battaglia who describes the self as, ‘a representational economy: a reification
continuously defeated by ...entaglements with other subjects histories, experiences,
selfrepresentations.’ (ibid.) 2. Iris looks at interesting example of the aforementioned
phenomenon. She examines the case of Palestinian young men and their sisters and
mothers, how the men and women form a unique collaborative sort of self-practice –
‘a representational entanglement of multiple individuals and their actions at the level
of self-embodiment and the „subjective” manipulation of the other-influence. (p. 101)
The practice of the self is closely linked with the relationships (in this case familial)
with other people. Moore’s idea of multiple/condradictory positioning and subjective
is useful in understanding this concept, which Iris calls “cross-subjective self-
enactment”. 3. The family is a place where a man, for instance, develops his gender
identity and moral status through relationships with those of the other gender. This is
a process that goes both ways. The brother helps form and maintain his sister’s gender
identity by exercising his gender role, according how it is accepted in their culture, for
example, being protective and honorable towards her. Useful concepts for
understanding this idea include Joseph’s “relational selves” and “connective
identities”. 4. The example her ethnography provides shows the way conception of
self is reinvented through political activism and nationalist movement. Senior men
were losing their gender authority because they did not actively resist the regime, this
opened up the window for young men to attain their manhood by actively
participating and conducting “heroic deeds”. However, it is fascinating that in order to
do this they resisted patriarchal control and its reproduction, to do that they also
needed the involvement of their mothers in sisters to recognize and support their new-
found stance, which was actively contributing to the transformation of Palestinian
society. 5. The boys could challenge their fathers’ authority by contesting the domains
of their fathers’ authority, namely, over traditional domestic economy: women,
youths, and children. This resulted in the mothers and sisters offering their support to
the aspiring boys, as it served their interests as well.

Ahearn’s Text

1. The author of the text takes a look at the various schools of thought on the subject
of agency and the problems of its definition. Of particular interest is how it is
conceptualized and the relationship between the influence of structure and culture
versus a person’s ability to bring about change. Within this context, Karp’s view is
significant, as she distinguishes between an ‘agent’ and ’actor’, which are two aspects
of the same person, however, the former is engaged in the exercise of power and has
the ability to (re) constitute the world, while the latter’s actions are rule-governed or
rule-orientated.

2. One of the tendency is to treat agency as a synonym of free will. Action theorists
and philosophers argue that agency needs a concomitant mental state like intention
and presence of self. The drawback of this perspective is that it does not take fully
into account the social nature of agency and culture’s influence on human intentions,
beliefs, and actions.

3. Others draw paralels between agency and resistence. This is a characteristic trait of
the feminist movement, in which there is usually either an overemphasis on the
resistence aspect or showing the pervasiveness and systematicity of male dominance.
In other forms of social/economic oppression there is also the emphasis on resistence
as agency, however, there is no such thing as ‘pure resistence’ and motivations are
always a lot more complex and contradictory.

4. Foucault’s theory proposes a model of agency that is a matter of plurality, mobility,

and conflict. Society is pervaded by a number of omnipresent impersonal discourses,
which influence power relations. This view proposes that there are not only
constraints of power, but also place for resistence and action. However, Foucault’s
theory does focus more on pervasive discourses rather than agency.

5. Practice theory is defined as “a theory of the relationship between the structures of

society and the culture on the one hand and the nature of human action on the other.”
Namely, human actions are central, but not in isolation from social structures that
shape them.

6. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is important in this context. It is “a generative

process that produces practices and representations that are conditioned by the
“structuring structures” from which they emerge.” In other words, human actions
shape culture while their actions are shaped culture. The habitus gets reproduced, but
there is, albeit within certain constraints, the possibility to change the way the habitus
is reproduced, meaning, social reproducation can become social transformation.
Sahlins demonstrates that cross cultural interactions can facilitate the process of social
change.

Ortner’s Text

1. The author views subjectivity as an ensemble of modes of perception, affect,

thought, fear and other factors which animate acting subjects. He also takes into
account the cultural and social formation which evoke such modes of experiencing the
world. He also sees it as the basis of ‘agency’, the way people act upon the world
while being acted upon. These are certain desires and intentions that form with a
matrix of subjectivity of (culturally constituted) feelings, thoughts and meanings.

2. Early structuralist theories (Durkheim, Levi-Strauss) attempted to exclude the

subjectivity aspect of human beings, emphasising the importance of structure and the
effect of culture. It’s the idea that freedom of the subject is illusory and thinking is
medium for the pure play of structure. Post-structuralists take a different approach and
attempt to dissolve man. Here they look at the ideological specifity of the illusory
quality of man.

3. Authors such as Bourdieu and his idea of habitus at least opens up a window for
subjectivity in the sense of feelings. Giddens and Sewell, on the other hand,
emphasize the agency aspect of social subjects. They argue that individuals often go
against culture and existing social patterns. Individuals have at least ‘partial knowing’
and a degree of reflexivity, which allows them to influence at least to some degree
what is happens to them within a certain context. This is particulary evident in cases
where people try to resist the unfair conditions thrust upon them by the existing power
relations in society.
4. One must look at Geertz’s concept of subjectivity-oriented theory of culture. It
holds on to the classic American concept of culture, but also looks at it from the
viewpoint of cultural process, in which meaning and subjectivities are constructed
through symbolic processes embedded in the social world. The latter view is
important, as it portrays culture as something that shapes meaning for actors. Cultural
events can evoke certain structures of feeling and perceiving that affects the way
people act. In a sense the way people feel, reflect and act shapes the cultural structures
around them.