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social sciences
Article
Resettlement of Northern Muslims: A Challenge for
Sustainable Post-War Development and
Reconciliation in Sri Lanka
Mohammad Agus Yusoff 1 , Athambawa Sarjoon 2, * ID
and Zawiyah Mohd Zain 3
1 History, Politics and Security Research Center, Faculty of Social Sciences & Humanities,
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, UKM Bangi 43600, Malaysia; agus@ukm.edu.my
2 Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya 20400, Sri Lanka
3 Collage of Law, Government and International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia,
UUM Sintok 06010, Malaysia; zmzain@uum.edu.my
* Correspondence: sarjoona@gmail.com; Tel.: +94-773-080-654




Received: 29 March 2018; Accepted: 21 June 2018; Published: 26 June 2018


Abstract: This study drew on important insights from a quarter-century history of forcefully
evicted Muslims in Sri Lanka’s northern province by examining the nature of their displaced
life and their permanent resettlement in their traditional villages, particularly in the post-civil
war context. Reviewing the literature and primary sources, this paper argues that the forceful
eviction of northern Muslims was unfortunate and the persistent sidetracking of their permanent
resettlement violated their right to live in their traditional villages. Successive governments have
failed to propose a sustainable mechanism to resettle these Muslims as part of the resettlement plans.
Post-war resettlement initiatives hardly considered the permanent resettlement of these Muslims
in their traditional villages. In addition, the issue of resettling northern Muslims became highly
contested due to lack of proper policies and plans of the government authorities, as well as moral
and institutional support from the Tamil community and their polity, opposition, and criticisms from
the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist forces, and fragmentation within Muslim politics, together with
the protracted nature of the displacement. This study suggested that the continued neglect of their
resettlement would challenge the sustainability of post-war development and ethnic reconciliation in
Sri Lanka.

Keywords: ethnic conflict; northern Muslims; forceful eviction; post-war resettlement; development;
Sri Lanka

1. Introduction
One of the most cited and protracted civil wars in Asia came to an end with the military victory of
Sri Lankan forces against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE was a rebel force that
fought for the liberation of Tamils in the hope of establishing a Tamil-dominated state in north-eastern
Sri Lanka. The three-decades-old civil war displaced over half a million people and killed thousands
of innocent civilians, particularly during its final stage (2006–2009). Nevertheless, within a short
period, the Sri Lankan government authorities were able to resettle most of these displaced people with
limited external support, except for a few thousand families. Normalcy was restored in the war-torn
north-eastern region together with infrastructure facilities and livelihood opportunities improved
(Yusoff et al. 2015). However, the government’s post-war resettlement and development initiatives
were seriously challenged by internal and external oppositions and challenges.
The allegations made by the international Tamil diaspora community on human rights violation
and killing of innocent civilians during the last stage of civil war by the military forces were the major

Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106; doi:10.3390/socsci7070106 www.mdpi.com/journal/socsci

Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 2 of 20

issues that brought the Sri Lankan government under international pressure for war-related human
rights violations (Yusoff and Sarjoon 2016; Yusoff et al. 2015). Serious shortcomings in the post-civil war
resettlement to a certain extent challenged the expected outcomes of the process. Among the highly
noticeable shortcomings was the resettlement of forcefully evicted northern Muslims at the peak civil
war in 1990. Although the end of the civil war created high hopes among the northern Muslims that
their displacement would come to an end and they would be able to return to their traditional villages,
no concrete plan or program was initiated by successive post-war governments. These displaced
Muslims have voiced their grave concerns and wanted the government to recognize their displaced
status and facilitate their return and resettlement in their traditional villages. However, the authorities
continued to neglect these issues.
This study attempts to draw the important aspects of the 27-year history of the forcefully
evicted northern Muslims and examine the nature and the challenges pertaining to their permanent
resettlement in their traditional villages, particularly in the post-civil war context. This study found
that the northern Muslims are a vulnerable and mostly marginalized community victimized by the
ethnic conflict, civil war, and post-civil war development in Sri Lanka. Many countries facing civil
and post-civil war challenges have successfully launched initiatives for post-war relief, recovery,
and resettlement. However, the case of the northern Muslims after the civil war in Sri Lanka remains a
story of failure that undermined international recognition and sustainability of Sri Lanka’s post-war
resettlement. This study aims to evaluate the resettlement process of forcefully evicted northern
Muslims in Sri Lanka’s post-war development and ethnic reconciliation initiatives.
Studies have focused on the resettlement of internally displaced people (IDP) due to violent
ethnic conflict and civil war in Sri Lanka (see Saparamadu and Lall 2014; Fernando et al. 2009).
However, the majority of them have emphasized the displacement and refugee life of Tamils and their
resettlement. Several studies have reported the concerns and grievances associated with the displacement
and resettlement of northern Muslims (Haniffa 2014; Imtiyaz and Iqbal 2011; Badurdeen 2010; Brun 2009;
Shukla 2009; Thalayasingam 2009). However, most studies have focused on the economic and social
perspectives of refugee life, such as issues pertaining to their life in temporary settlements and their
relationship with host communities, among others. Early studies have rarely explored the development,
post-war development, and ethnic reconciliation dimensions of their resettlement. This study attempts
to fill this research gap by addressing development-oriented and ethnic reconciliation-related issues
and challenges in resettling the forcefully evicted northern Muslims in their traditional villages.

2. Methodology
This research is qualitative in nature and has used primary and secondary data for analysis.
Books, journal articles, newspaper cuttings, and reports from government, non-governmental
and international organizations were the major secondary sources used to assess the historical
background, status, and other issues related to the displacement and resettlement of northern Muslims.
Interviews, personal communication, and focus group discussions (FGDs) were the major sources
of primary data. The interviews and personal communication were conducted with respondents
identified through purposive sampling among political activists (5), educationists (6), civil actors (8),
media personnel (2), and the public (9). These respondents were selected based on their previous
work experience in the subject area or because of their familiarity with the issues of displacement
and resettlement. Most of the respondents were from the Muslim community due to the lack of
a Tamil population that serves as a host community in Puttalam district. The Tamils’ opinions,
however, were obtained through personal communications with civil activists (3) from Jaffna district.
Primary data were also collected from three FGDs conducted mainly in Puttalam district, where most
of the displaced northern Muslims are still living in temporary settlements and with host communities.
As a result of many constraints, this study could not incorporate field visits to resettlement villages
in the northern province, but incorporated the perspectives and challenges face by the Muslims who
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 3 of 20

returned to their traditional villages. The field visits for interviews and FGDs were organized for a
six-month period starting from July 2017 to January 2018.
The findings of this study are presented as discussions, quotations, summaries, description,
and interpretative arguments developed by reviewing and analyzing the abovementioned sources.
However, for ethical reasons, this paper maintains the anonymity of informants. The discussion in
this paper is largely connected to the major variables, which influence the resettlement of northern
Muslims in the post-civil war context. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3
summarizes the major findings of this study in different thematic sub-topics. This section examines
the trends of displacement and resettlement throughout the course of the civil war in Sri Lanka in
general and reviews the forceful eviction of northern Muslims, their displaced life in host communities,
and initiatives for resettlement in their traditional villages. Apart from reviewing the post-war
resettlement process, this section examines the major factors that challenge the resettlement of northern
Muslims in the post-civil war context. Section 4 discusses the variables that challenge the northern
Muslims’ resettlement process from different angles. Section 5 summarizes the major findings of the
study and presents recommendations.

3. Major Findings
The ethnic conflict and civil war in Sri Lanka have affected the Muslim community, particularly
those living with other communities in the north-eastern region, in different ways, although these
Muslims were not combatants in the civil war. The effects ranged from killing, forceful eviction,
displacement, and loss of property, livelihood, and land to socio-cultural and psychological issues.
The forceful eviction of Muslims from the northern province had disastrous impact and is a harsh
reminder of the history of ethnic conflict and civil war in the country. The expulsion of these Muslims
is generally considered the origin of IDP problems in Sri Lanka. In Muslim history, this event has been
identified and remembered as a type of “ethnic cleansing” and a violation of their rights to live in
their traditional villages. The resettlement of these Muslims has been highly ignored by successive
governments. Although the post-civil war resettlement and development initiatives are success stories
and viewed as examples for many similar countries, the permanent return and resettlement of northern
Muslims in their traditional villages remain unsuccessful, as confirmed in this study. The major
findings of this study are presented under the following thematic sub-topics.

3.1. Brief Note on Civil War Displacement and Post-War Resettlement and Development in Sri Lanka
The protracted nature of the civil war in Sri Lanka (1983–2009) caused many human displacements
internally and externally. In many phases of the civil war, thousands of families living mainly in the
villages in the north-eastern region and the region’s border villages opted or were forced to leave their
homes and head to safe areas due to intense military conflicts between the government forces and the
LTTE fighters. The displacements were further worsened by the race to extend the territorial control
by competing forces in the war zones. The second half of the 1980s up to the 1990s saw an increase in
the number of displacements in the north-eastern region. The displacements were mostly temporary
in nature, except for a few cases.
IDMC (Internal Displacement and Monitoring Center) found that since mid-2006 until September
2007, a dramatic escalation in the civil war between Sri Lankan government forces and the LTTE
resulted in over 4000 deaths and the displacement of thousands of people. By the end of 2006, at least
520,000 people were victims of conflict-induced displacement in a country with a population of
20 million, which made the event one of the largest displacement crises in South Asia in absolute terms
and in proportion of the displaced population. Over 300,000 people were displaced in the offensive
from 2006 onwards, with Tamil and Muslim minorities in the districts of Batticaloa, Trincomalee,
and Jaffna being the most affected groups. The Muslim community, roughly 60,000 residents of Muttur,
Toppur, and surrounding villages, were forcibly displaced by the fighting between the government
forces and LTTE in July 2006 over the issue of opening the Mavil Aru sluice gate (see Yusoff et al. 2014a;
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 4 of 20

ICG International Crisis Group). The same number of Tamils were displaced in Sampur and surrounding
villages due to the above incident and following insurgencies.
The last stage of the civil war (2006–2009) resulted in extensive casualties, with the death of
thousands of civilians and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. An estimated
number of over half a million innocent civilians, who were mostly from Tamil and Muslim communities
in the north-eastern region, were displaced from conflict-stricken areas to safer ones during the last
stretch of the civil war from 2006 to May 2009. In the northern province alone, over 300,000 people
were displaced, with most of them housed in a state-run refugee camp called Manik Farm located
between Vavuniya and Mannar districts (Saparamadu and Lall 2014).
With utmost effort, government authorities successfully carried out the relief, recovery,
and resettlement of the internally displaced population in the last stage of the civil war. Through special
projects, such as the “Northern Spring” and “Eastern Reawakening”, thousands of displaced
people were resettled in their traditional areas and provided with basic infrastructure and
livelihood development (see Saparamadu and Lall 2014; Kumar 2011). In the northern province,
resettlement commenced in 2009 under the “Northern Spring” program, which was launched to
resettle more than 280,000 new IDPs who were trickling in from the Vanni area during the final
stages of the battle since 2008. The “Northern Spring” development program focused on three main
aspects, namely, security, resettlement, and infrastructure development. Implementing the program
entailed specific steps, such as de-mining the areas reserved for resettlement and reconstruction
and building up basic infrastructure amenities for electricity, water supply, sanitation, agriculture,
irrigation, livestock development, inland fisheries, health, solid waste disposal, education, athletics,
and transportation. Rehabilitating former LTTE cadres, especially child soldiers, was a separate plan
(Shamini 2012). However, the project poorly focused on accommodating the return and resettlement
of forcefully evicted northern Muslims who have been living in temporary shelters and relocated
villages for more than two decades. The end of the civil war created hope among the northern Muslims
that permanent resettlement in their traditional villages would be facilitated. However, no post-war
government has initiated any firm policy and project in this regard.
Forced evictions constitute violations of human rights and are generally discriminatory or lead to
discrimination; therefore, states have a responsibility to ensure the protection of rights and lives and the
return of the displaced (see United Nations 2014). Many international experiences suggest that any attempt
at resettlement and development in a post-war or post-conflict context must reconcile the grievances of all
parties affected by the conflict and war regardless of the nature of the impact and parties. The impact
may be serious or otherwise, and the victims may be direct or indirect parties to the conflict, but all
victimization and grievances must be recognized and reconciled (see Achieng et al. 2014; Asplet 2013;
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees). Only then would post-war development
or resettlement initiatives be sustainable. However, the case of the Muslims was not well accepted and
recognized as forced displacement due to the intense civil war between the Sri Lankan government and
LTTE. Apart from the Muslims’ vulnerable position in ethnic politics and civil war, the policies of internal
displacement and resettlement of successive governments influenced on the persistent sidetracking
of northern Muslims’ resettlement during and after the civil war. Government policies and projects
on war-related displacement and resettlement were highly focused on the Tamils and had limited
accommodation for the Muslims. The northern Muslims faced severe challenges in receiving relief
according to international laws and norms, in obtaining refugee recognition and being accommodated
in resettlement programs (see Haniffa 2015; Haniffa 2014). Although the northern Muslims experienced
a quarter century of displaced life in refugee camps and relocated villages, no concrete plan was
formulated by any pre- or post-war government to resettle them in their traditional villages, and only
a small percentage was able to return and resettled. This scenario clearly indicated that the northern
Muslims are the most vulnerable victims in the ethnic conflict, civil war, and post-war development in
Sri Lanka. The following section analyzes the brief history of forceful eviction, nature of displaced life,
and resettlement of the northern Muslims.
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 5 of 20

3.2. Forceful Eviction of Northern Muslims, Displaced Life, and Resettlement

A critical area in relation to Muslims in post-war Sri Lanka is the resettlement of the forcefully
evicted Muslim community in the northern province. For this group of Muslims, the end of the civil
war offered them hope to return to their lands and rebuild their community. However, no concrete
plan was initiated by successive post-war governments in this regard, although they have initiated
several settlement projects during the post-war period.

3.2.1. General Remarks on Northern Muslims and Their Displacement

Sri Lanka’s northern province is predominantly a Tamil region, where Muslims formed a distinct
and the largest minority community, scattered all over the province. According to the 1981 census,
50,831 Muslims lived in the five districts of the northern province and accounted for 5.3 percent of
the total provincial population (DCS Department of Census and Statistics). Over half of the Muslims
lived in Mannar district. Similarly, large concentrations of Muslims lived in the city of Jaffna and
the town of Mullaitivu. Agriculture, fishing, and businesses were the main sources of livelihood
for these Muslims (Hasbullah 2004). Although the Tamils formed the majority in the northern
province, Muslims and Tamils coexisted without serious societal or communal conflict. Muslims had
maintained a close relationship with Tamils, mutual trust in trade and business and in their cultural
practices (Authors interview with Muslim IDPs in Puttalam, 20 July 2017). However, due to intense
Tamil–Muslim tension in the eastern province and Muslim political mobilization that accompanied the
establishment of a distinct Muslim political party in the middle of the 1980s, Tamil–Muslim relations
in the north were affected. As a result, the leaders of the LTTE instigated the eviction of the northern
Muslims from the entire province.
The mass forced eviction of the northern Muslims was unexpectedly carried out in the third week
of October 1990. The LTTE announced over loudspeakers in the streets of the Muslim settlements in the
northern province that the Muslims must leave their homes, villages, and towns without their valuables
or face death. The ultimatum was that Muslims should leave the region in 48 h from 22 October 1990
(Imtiyaz and Iqbal 2011). Within a few days, Muslims were chased out of their homes where they had
lived for centuries (Jeyaraj 2015). Muslim organizations and activists reported varying numbers of
displaced northern Muslims in 1990, ranging from 80,000 to 100,000. However, no official estimates of
Muslims expelled from the northern province exists. This number ranged roughly between 70,000 and
85,000, considering that the entire Muslim population in the northern province reached 50,831 in 1981
(Jaffna district, 12,958; Mannar district, 27,717; Vavuniya district, 6505; and Mullaitivu district, 3651)
(DCS Department of Census and Statistics) and the annual population increase in the country.
The LTTE, which at the time controlled most of Jaffna peninsula, ensured that the fleeing Muslims
left behind all household items, furniture, or in some cases, land deeds. Therefore, the Muslim
community was forced to leave all their properties, which they had long earned through hard work
and had served them well. Estimates of the economic loss of the northern Muslims as a result
of their forced eviction vary. Although no human casualties were reported, around 5000 million
Sri Lankan rupees in properties and livelihood were estimated to have been lost (Shukla 2009;
ICG International Crisis Group). However, according to Mohideen, a Muslim civil activist who
conducted an extensive study, the losses in residential properties, commercial and industrial
establishments, agricultural lands, religious institutions, gold and jewelry, and livestock amount
to approximately US$112 million (MVN Minority Voice Newsroom). In the Muslims’ political
history, the forceful eviction has been recorded and remembered as “ethnic cleansing”. In addition,
Muslim politicians considered the eviction of the Muslim community from the entire province as a
political strategy of the LTTE and Tamils to establish a mono-ethnic Tamil state in the region.
To a certain extent, the above assumption is true. The expulsion of Muslims was followed by
the emergence of a new national Muslim political party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC),
in the middle of the 1980s. The SLMC emerged to protect the Muslim community, particularly those
living in the north-eastern region, from the military impact of the civil war and to prevent Muslim
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 6 of 20

youths from resorting to violence and taking up arms to defend their community (Yusoff et al. 2017).
However, the LTTE leaders suspected the formation of a new Muslim party as it would undermine
the LTTE’s goal of establishing a monoethnic Tamil state in the north-eastern region. This fear was
further intensified when the SLMC and Muslims in the north-eastern region called for an autonomous
political unit as a power-sharing mechanism for Muslims and seriously advocated such proposal
(Yusoff et al. 2014b). The November 1988 election held for a merged north-eastern provincial council
and the February 1989 parliamentary election proved that SLMC was emerging as a powerful force in
Sri Lanka’s ethnic and electoral politics. The forceful eviction of northern Muslims occurred after one
year, i.e., in October 1990. Meanwhile, civil society institutions among the Tamils hardly expressed
their opposition to the eviction or voiced sympathy toward the Muslims. All these proved that the
forceful eviction was a planned move of the LTTE’s polity for the sake of Tamils’ self-determination.
However, from the Tamils’ point of view, the northern Muslims were evicted to protect them from
the impact of the civil war. Recently, when a Tamil National Alliance parliamentarian revealed that
the forceful eviction of northern Muslims was “ethnic cleansing” and a mistake committed by the
LTTE and that he did not approve of the Tamils’ silence over it, another parliamentarian from the same
alliance counterargued that the move was a careful act to save the Muslim community from the war
(Hasbullah 2016; Hiru News 2015). The latter view was highly welcomed by Tamil politicians, critics,
civil actors, and the public. Until the 2002 famous media conference, the LTTE barely issued an official
apology for the forceful eviction of the northern Muslims and never publicly gave a clear explanation
for their expulsion.
The expulsion of Muslims from the northern province proved to be ethno-politically motivated,
and the LTTE justified it along this notion. A month after the expulsion, the LTTE’s official organ
Liberation Tigers claimed that the LTTE had lost “faith” in Muslims following the mass killing of Tamils
by Muslims (quoted by Rajah 2017). The same organ also claimed that “by refusing to align with the
Tamils and the LTTE . . . and by seeking to destroy the LTTE and the Tamil people, the Muslims had
committed a historical blunder and treachery” (Ibid). Two years after the expulsion, Rutramkumaran,
the LTTE’s then-US-based legal adviser, justified the expulsion and claimed that the entire Muslim
community in Sri Lanka was working to sabotage the Tamil secessionist movement (Rajah 2017, p. 84).
Although the LTTE received tremendous criticism for this terrible act of ethnic cleansing, the LTTE
leader Pirabakaran, who should have taken responsibility for this act, was conspicuously silent on the
subject for a long time. A political activist of Mannar district who is living in a relocated village in
Puttalam district said that the eviction carried out purely to make the north a monoethnic region and
to establish a monoethnic Tamil state. According to him,
“LTTE was very keen in evicting the Muslims from the north without any property or
money they had earned in their traditional villages arguing that they were earned from
Tamils homeland. They took the keys of stores and shops owned by the Muslims few days
in advance. They re-ensured the eviction of these Muslims with empty hands or limited
essential food items even at many check points on the cross roads. In many areas, they did
not give us sufficient time to leave. By evicting us in inhumane ways, how can they justify
this eviction as for our safety and security? (Authors interview in Puttalam, 25 July 2017).”
Haniffa (2010) argued that, in general, Tamil nationalists view Muslims as fellow ethnics and
traitors to the Tamil cause. However, for Muslims, Tamil nationalism meant a constant threat of
violence, undermining their livelihood and steadily deteriorating relations with neighboring Tamil
communities. Tamil nationalism had little real interest in incorporating Muslim representation or
addressing Muslim concerns, particularly their return to their traditional villages. As far as the Muslims
were concerned, the forceful eviction forever sealed the enmity between them and the Tamil people.
Given the relatively low political importance of Muslims in Sri Lanka in general, and Muslims
of the northern province in particular, the plight of the northern Muslims has received very little
attention at the time of the expulsion and in subsequent years. The government at that time did
not show any interest in providing protection for these Muslims in their traditional villages or
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 7 of 20

safeguarding the property they left behind, even though over 85 percent of the evicted Muslims
lived in government-controlled areas of the north. These Muslims were remembered by other Muslims
and politicians only on the anniversaries of their displacement and during elections. At any other
time, their issues, including their return to their ancestral homes, were marginalized topics for public
debates and discussions.

3.2.2. Displaced Life with Host Communities

Most of the evicted northern Muslims found shelter and resettled in Puttalam, Kurunegala,
and Anuradepura districts of the northwestern, north-central, and other provinces. Their number has
now swelled to 250,000, according to many sources. The displacement of the northern Muslims in
Puttalam was largely expected to be temporary, and the belief was that they would return to their
homes shortly. Most of these Muslims arrived with little clothing and cash walking over long distances
for as long as three days in certain cases, and even elders, youngsters, and small children came on
foot. In their sorrowful journey, they did not receive any help except for a few cases in certain places
(Authors interviews with IDPs in Puttalam, 24 July 2017). The locals (not only the Muslims, but also
the Sinhalese) welcomed the Muslims from the north into their homes, gardens, and schools and
provided them with clothes and food. In this process, the locals became hosts. For the first month
or soon after, assistance from the host population was essential for the survival of the IDPs, and the
role of the host community was recognized by the northern Muslims with almost unlimited gratitude
(Brun 2009). However, after a few months, several issues arose between the IDPs and the host
communities. When international non-government organizations (INGOs) took an active role in
providing relief activities and other basic services, the hosts were excluded. The hosts were not
consulted when the IDPs were moved to welfare centers, and they were not included in any
decision-making regarding the handling of the IDPs (Brun 2009). These discrepancies led to difficulties
and issues between the displaced Muslims and the host communities in due time.
For a quarter of a century after their flight and nine years after the end of the civil war in May 2009,
most of these Muslims continued living in what were intended to be temporary relocation sites.
In Puttalam, most displaced Muslims lived for many years by doing odd jobs. Decent jobs, especially for
youth, were scarce. They are still viewed by the locals as second-class citizens. Dwindling water and
land resources, as well as few jobs, have heightened the tension between Puttalam’s native population
and the Muslim arrivals (Irinnews.org 2013). The refugees lived in dismal conditions, and they faced
numerous problems in their daily lives. Life in refugee camps has demoralized men, women, children,
and the elderly and affected them physically, psychologically, socially, economically, and educationally
(Asees 2015). Many of their traditional family structures have broken down, with women and men
being forced to leave their families in search of livelihood or to go abroad in several cases, leaving the
care and protection of children to elderly relatives or older siblings. According to Shukla (2009),
41 percent of the displaced population is made up of children who know no home other than the
refugee camps and relocated settlements.
With the arrival of these Muslims, existing resource shortages were exacerbated in the districts,
particularly in Puttalam. Conflicts continued to erupt between the displaced and host communities
over limited resources and jobs in the area (Shukla 2009). These displaced Muslims were discriminated
in their access to existing resources and opportunities to rebuild their lives. Job competition
resulted in scarcity and loss of opportunities for the host population, and an environment of tension,
hostility, and sometimes violence arose between the displaced Muslims and the host population
(IDMC Internal Displacement and Monitoring Center). The conditions induced most of the displaced
Muslims to be dependent on the relief provided by the government authorities and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) rather than engage in activities that foster self-reliance (Imtiyaz and Iqbal 2011).
Although the Muslim community of Puttalam responded to the emergency in 1990, the need to
continue to support the population for more than two decades seriously drained the resources of the
community and affected the relationship between the host community and the displaced Muslims.
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 8 of 20

3.2.3. Ceasefire Agreement, Temporary Peace, and Resettlement of Northern Muslims

With the victory of the United National Front (UNF) coalition in the December 2001 general
election, the UNF government signed a ceasefire agreement (CFA) with the LTTE in early 2002.
Although the north-eastern Muslims were victims of ethnic conflict and civil war, Muslims were
not given the opportunity to sign the CFA. However, in April 2002, the SLMC leader Rauff Hakeem
and the LTTE leader V. Prabakaran, after consultation, signed an agreement promising that the
displaced Muslims would be allowed to return to their homes in the LTTE-controlled northern province,
including with other promises (Yusoff et al. 2014a). Unfortunately, the LTTE and Tamil parties failed
to make the necessary arrangements and assistance to bring these Muslims back to their traditional
villages. Neither the LTTE nor any major Tamil party clearly discussed any meaningful resettlement of
the forcefully evicted Muslims in their election manifestos or in major speeches and reports.
Although the northern Muslims have been clamoring for complete resettlement, this was
challenged partly due to the LTTE’s stronghold on the affairs of most areas in the northern region
and their continued opposition, and partly due to the inefficiency of government authorities,
especially during the so-called peace process (2002–2006) and in post-civil war context. These Muslims
were compelled to live in refugee camps and relocated villages in abject conditions without being
granted official refugee status. The few who returned between 2002 and 2006 were not provided with
sufficient basic amenities by the government for their resettlement, particularly permanent housing and
livelihood improvement. They laid claim to their properties that, in the interim, have been occupied
by other displaced people. Further suffering occurred due to resource shortages and lack of support
structures. This situation induced many who had returned to their traditional villages to return back
to their displaced places. The repeated pleas of the Muslim community to the authorities for enhanced
security and protection have fallen on deaf ears even with the presence of Muslim ministers and
members of parliament on the government side.
The government and the NGOs did not establish any concrete program to facilitate the
resettlement of displaced Muslims. Assistance for displaced Muslims was scant. One rare case
was the US$34.2 million World Bank-funded Puttalam Housing Project completed in December 2011.
The project originally targeted 7885 houses, but only 4891 houses were handed over to IDPs and
mostly targeted displaced northern Muslims, along with 519 non-IDP households in the adjacent
community. This housing project intended to support the integration of IDPs in Puttalam by upgrading
and improving the habitat, water, and sanitation facilities of IDPs and selected non-IDPs. The project
aimed to provide housing for eligible IDPs in refugee camps and a limited number of non-IDPs in the
host communities (see The World Bank 2012). However, in the FGDs, it was revealed that the selection
of beneficiaries was mostly influenced by politicians, and many of them were loyal to influential
politicians on the government side. Poor families and supporters of opposition political parties and
general critics were mostly marginalized benefitting from this project (FGDs with displaced Muslims
in Puttalam, 23 July 2017). This situation rendered the displaced Muslims vulnerable in resettling in
displaced villages or returning to their traditional villages.

3.3. Post-War Development and the Question of Northern Muslims’ Resettlement

In Sri Lanka, post-war plans for development remained problematic, although targets were
achieved on time. Many programs were designed and implemented in the war-torn north-eastern
region, which helped restore normalcy and rebuild basic infrastructure facilities in the region.
However, most programs were designed with the objective of receiving continued support from
the international community, which was expected to sustain the United People Freedom Alliance
government in power. In addition, the resettlement programs mostly targeted internally displaced
Tamils during the last phase of civil war. For the forcefully evicted northern Muslims, the post-war
governments did not propose any comprehensive plan for permanent resettlement and livelihood
improvement in the long run. The following sections identify the major characteristics and the
challenges in post-war resettlement of these Muslims in their traditional villages.
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 9 of 20

3.3.1. No Proper Initiative or Plan in Resettling Northern Muslims

The post-war period has seen a wide range of large-scale development initiatives in the northern
province, including infrastructure projects under the “Northern Spring” program. Although the
government authorities initiated programs to resettle IDPs due to civil war, many initiatives focused on
Tamils and not the Muslims who had severely suffered for over two and a half decades. As Asees (2015)
pointed out, the end of the civil war in May 2009 brought hope for the resettlement of Muslim IDPs,
but the Sri Lankan government and the international community prioritized the Tamil IDPs. Except for
the World Bank-funded Puttalam Housing Project, assistance in resettling the displaced northern Muslims
has been scant.
Only a few thousands displaced Muslim families were able to return and resettled in their
traditional villages. Approximately 50,831 Muslims were living in five districts in the northern
province, according to the 1981 census. At the time of eviction, their population was estimated to range
from 75,000 to 100,000 in 1990. However, the 2012 census indicated that only 32,796 Muslims were
living in the entire northern provinces (DCS Department of Census and Statistics). This number may
have increased now, but no complete record is available to confirm their number. The current estimated
population of the northern Muslims is roughly 250,000, but only less than 30 percent have returned
to their traditional villages. As an educationist argued, government authorities, NGOs, civil forums,
and researchers faced difficulties in estimating the exact number of resettled families in their traditional
villages due to several reasons. Their permanent stay in resettlement villages was highly challenged
by ad-hoc living styles, seasonal jobs and lack of livelihood availabilities, strong bonds with host
communities, and permanent settlement of their second and third generations in displaced and host
communities. All these factors made their returned life uncertain in their traditional villages, which,
in turn, prompted many of them to live there on ad-hoc basis in different seasons (Authors interview
in Puttalam, 28 August 2017).
The resettlement of evicted Muslims in Jaffna district became a serious challenge. In the
Jaffna peninsula, over 2000—out of the nearly 8000 Muslim families originally from there—returned
and registered for official resettlement schemes soon after the end of the war. However, by 2015,
only approximately 600 of these families remained amidst immense social and economic difficulties
(Kadirgamar 2015). Later, many returned to their traditional villages with little support from the
central and provincial governments. According to the 2015 reports of the Jaffna District Secretariat,
8939 Muslims live in Jaffna district (District Secretariat, Jaffna 2016), which is mainly an urban
community. However, Jaffna Muslims lack even the most basic infrastructure, such as water supply
and drainage systems. Without a credible resettlement policy, government authorities provided
little support for these families to return. However, Jaffna Muslims face different problems in
their permanent resettlement. As an activist argued, although Muslims have had opportunities
to return to Jaffna since the 2002 peace negotiation, they have sold most of their lands and properties
before the end of civil war, expecting that the war will not be over soon. This situation resulted in
land shortages for Muslim families when they registered for resettlement in the post-war period.
Therefore, blaming Tamil politicians and officers for not offering sufficient lands and other kinds of
support for Muslim resettlement is irrational given that Tamils too are facing serious land shortages
for resettlement (Personal communication with a Tamil civil activist in Jaffna, 16 November 2017).
According to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998),
conditions should be prepared and properly set for people in a satisfactory manner before they
return to their homeland (United Nations 2001). In the post-war context, the Sri Lankan government,
as the only existing competent authority, has a responsibility to establish conditions and provide
means to allow IDPs to return safely and voluntarily with dignity to their homes. They may also
resettle voluntarily in other parts of the country. However, in the case of resettlement or return of
northern Muslims, the government still fall short in providing basic facilities, such as rehabilitation of
divisional secretary offices, hospitals, maternity homes, schools, cooperative outlets, agrarian service
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 10 of 20

centers, and post offices; restoration of clean and safe drinking water; and cleaning and construction of
new wells.

3.3.2. Moral, Institutional, and Political Support from Tamil Community and Polity
As mentioned earlier, Muslims in the northern province had been living with Tamils peacefully,
sharing common features, and having mutual understanding for centuries. This was also the case
in the eastern province. Although Muslims claimed they are a separate ethnic group, they still
share many common features with the Tamils. The two groups share similarities in terms of language,
cultural norms, and traditions (see McGilvray 1998; Imtiyaz and S. R. Hoole 2011). However, the intense
ethnic conflict and civil war heightened the differences between them (see Ali 2004). Although Tamil
politicians articulated that Muslims are ethnically Tamils who share many ethnic features, they did not
oppose the LTTE’s decision to evict the entire northern Muslims forcefully and did not sympathize
with these Muslims for many years. Until the existence of the LTTE and their dominance over the
societal and political spheres, no Tamil political party or representative has invited these Muslims back
to their homes or initiated any project to resettle them. Even in the absence of the LTTE, neither the
northern Tamil political leaders nor the northern provincial council they control have made meaningful
initiatives to resettle these Muslims. When these Muslims attempted to clear their lands—now
transformed into jungles—Tamil political leaders imposed various roadblocks.
The harrowing eviction of northern Muslims and its consequences are seldom discussed in Tamil
politics in Jaffna and other parts of the northern province. Although a few Tamil opinion-makers
provide circuitous justifications for the eviction in private, most claim that they are helpless in the face
of the Tigers’ decision. Even with the absence of the Tigers today, most Tamils remain indifferent, if not
unwelcoming, to the return of the Muslim community. This situation reflects weakened Tamil–Muslim
relations and a Tamil public sphere where little has been done to rebuild them (Kadirgamar 2015).
Jeyaraj (2015) argued that in an environment where reconciliation is being talked about nationally and
globally, the need for rapprochement exists between Tamils and Muslims in the north. Strong and
sincere efforts to extend the hand of friendship should be made to the displaced northern Muslims
and support their permanent resettlement.
Considerable debates transpired among Tamil politicians regarding the eviction of northern
Muslims. Those who silently accepted what the LTTE did to the Muslims now argue that the eviction
was for the sake of the Muslim community. However, their support for the resettlement of displaced
Muslims to their traditional villages was more limited than what they justify the forceful eviction.
It was obvious that Tamil politics was under the control of the LTTE. Therefore, Tamil politicians
could not openly support the return or resettlement of Muslims. However, with the absence of the
LTTE and with the establishment of a representative provincial government by the popular Tamil
political force (Tamil National Alliance), Tamil politicians have more space and mechanism to voice or
support the resettlement of northern Muslims through public campaigns and budgetary allocations.
However, they poorly responded in this regard. The return of Muslims to Jaffna proved a bitter
poor experience. Only a few registered Muslims were able to return, and they faced difficulties in
regaining their lands and rebuilding their damaged houses, properties, and other basic facilities.
They continued to appeal to be included in the Indian government-assisted housing schemes and other
government assistance, but Muslims were hardly accommodated by the northern provincial council.
Strong allegations of an unsympathetic local Tamil bureaucracy blocking these grants from reaching
Muslim IDPs have been noticed (Kadirgamar 2015).
Criticisms and opposition arose when the Chief Minister of the northern province, CV.
Wigneswaran, reported in 2016 and argued that Muslims were not discriminated in the matter of
resettlement but highly accommodated in resettlement projects in Jaffna. According to him, out of the
4307 families who obtained lands between 2013 and 2016, 73.02 percent were Muslim, 25.66 percent
were Tamil, and 1.32 percent were Sinhalese (Balachandran 2016). However, this report was opposed
and criticized by Muslim civil actors. In a response to the Chief Minister’s report, the Muslim Council
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 11 of 20

of Sri Lanka (MCSL) challenged Wigneswaran’s report, arguing that the statistics provided in terms
of number of families who were offered lands for resettlement was misleading. The president of
the MCSL, MN. Ameen, pointed out that by 2013, only few Tamils were left to be resettled, as the
government and the international community prioritized Tamil resettlement since the end of civil war
in 2009. Hence, in the settlement program that took place after 2013, the percentage of Muslim families
appeared to be high. Thousands of Muslim families must still be resettled in their former homes in the
northern province (Newsin.asia 2017).
In 2017, a Muslim minister representing the northern province, who is also an IDP, attempted to
resettle displaced Muslims in Mullaitivu district through a state-sponsored resettlement scheme.
However, Tamils opposed this scheme, arguing that the move is intended to alter the ethno-demography
of the area and to destroy hundreds of acres of forests planted and preserved by the LTTE. A social media
post in which a Mullaitivu local government employee claimed that Mullaitivu will soon become
Muslim-Tivu (island) sparked outrage among Tamil residents in the district (Tamil Guardian 2017).
The lack of Tamils’ support for the return and permanent resettlement of northern Muslims shows
the lack of trust and relationship between the two ethnic groups even though they share many common
features and practices. Earlier Tamil leaders had been arguing that Muslims are not a separate ethnic
group but are Tamils. During civil war and even in the post-war period, they argued that the LTTE
evicted the northern Muslims to save them from the impact of civil war. Now they claim that Muslims
and Tamils should unite to voice and achieve their rights collectively. However, the Tamils showed
little interest in speaking out about Muslim community issues. From the intense civil war and due
to the emergence of SLMC, the division between Tamils and Muslims has widened. In the post-war
context, Muslims faced significant oppositions and challenges in promoting their ethnicity and in
engaging in their religious and cultural practices. However, Tamil leaders barely expressed support
for the Muslim community.

3.3.3. Opposition from Radical Nationalist Forces

The resettlement of northern Muslims was also challenged by radical nationalist forces within the
Sinhalese-Buddhist community. A small number of Muslim families were resettled in their traditional
villages in Mannar district through the patronage of Muslim politicians. Former resettlement minister
Rishad Bathiudeen negotiated with certain Islamic organizations, who agreed to provide houses
for marginalized Muslim IDPs. In 2012, Muslims in Marichukatti began their resettlement with the
support of a Qatar foundation (Al-Jassim). Certain Buddhist hardliners and media groups began to
claim that the resettlement was illegal and an incursion into the Willpattu forest, although Muslims
held deeds to these lands (Asees 2015).
Similarly, when political representatives of northern Muslims attempted to resettle these displaced
Muslims in their traditional villages with the support of government authorities and foreign aid
(mostly received from Islamic countries), Sinhalese nationalist forces opposed the move by arguing
that those areas belong to the national wildlife area. Moreover, they claimed that Muslims destroy
the national forest, nature, the environment, and illegally own government land. The opposition
of Sinhalese nationalist forces, such as Bodu Bala Sena and Ravana Balaya, to the resettlement of
Muslims in Musali divisional secretariat (DS) division, which was closer to Wilpattu National Park
in Mannar district, was the major contested case in this regard. Although the land allocated for
resettlement did not belong to the forest area, according to these forces, minister Rishad Bathiudeen
was said to be responsible for the illegal clearing of the forest and building Muslim settlements
there. This opposition ultimately brought the minister under investigation (see ColomboPage 2015;
Perera 2015). Despite evidence supporting the inhabitance of Muslims in many villages near Wilpattu,
these forces continuously urged government authorities to declare the traditional Muslim-inhabited
areas as an incursion into the Wilpattu Conservation Forest.
Given the pressure from extreme nationalist forces and certain environmentalist groups,
government authorities issued new gazettes declaring thousands of acres of lands owned by Muslim
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 12 of 20

settlers close to Wilpattu in Musali DS division as forest reserves. Among them, Gazette No. 1779/15 of
10 October 2012, which claimed 6042 hectares of Marichukaddi/Karadikkuli forest reserve, and Gazette
No. 1759/2 of 21 May 2012, which claimed 2108 hectares of Vilathikulam Forest Reserve, challenged the
return and ownership of lands by evicted Muslims during resettlement. The issuance of a new
gazette notification (No. 2011/34) by President Maithripala Srisena on 24 March 2017 added many
Muslim-inhabited villages as part of Mavillu Conservation Forest and supported the opinions and
claims of these nationalist forces in terms of the nature of the northern Muslims’ resettlement
(see ColomboPage 2017; Warunasuriya 2017). The issuance of the new gazette also notified the
position of the new government on the resettlement of northern Muslims. The President Serisena,
who earlier claimed that not an inch of Wilpattu land has been encroached on by Muslims, was later
convinced by Buddhist nationalist forces to sign a new gazette challenging the ownership of lands by
these Muslims and their resettlement in their ancestral villages.
Many Muslim civil societies were up in arms over the new gazette notification (No. 2011/34)
and stated that its issuance was a violation of the “right to return” of these patriotic citizens whose
only crime was opposing the division of the country by the LTTE. They urged the president to revoke
the gazette. According to Minister Rishad Bathiudeen, “There are no Muslim families living within
Wilpattu reserves. The areas being talked about are out of the boundary of the reserve and legally
taken” (Nizam 2017). In a press brief, Muslim parliamentarians and civil society leaders alleged that
the latest Wilpattu controversy is based on a political agenda and that even during the three decades of
conflict in Sri Lanka, Muslims continuously sided with the government. However, they are currently
being targeted by the side they once supported (Nizam 2017).
According to many Muslims, the Wilpattu National Park or its buffer zone, which extends to
1.5 km2 , has no settlement (FGD with displaced Muslims in Puttalam, 29 August 2017). Few old villages
existed, including Marichukkaddi, Karadikuli, Palakkuli, Mullikulam, and Kondachchi, for centuries.
A settlement had been there even before 1916 (Nizam 2017). The LTTE chased these settlers away in
1990, and most of them were living in refugee camps. They returned to the area in 2013 after 23 years.
However, government authorities, in response to the claims of extreme nationalists, failed to protect
these traditional settlements of Muslims in these areas. Their lands became a forest during their
protracted displacement. The opposition of the extreme nationalist forces ultimately contributed to the
loss of thousands of acres of land these northern Muslims owned, further complicating the process of
finding lands for their resettlement.
The resettlement of Muslims in villages near the Vilpattu area was facilitated by the then-UPFA
government through houses that were built with the sponsorship of foreign (mostly Arab) donors.
The protracted displacement of the families of this area has produced second and third generations of
families with no land ownership. However, they must be accommodated in the resettlement schemes
in this area, which necessitates more potential residential lands (Authors interview with two civil
activists and residents of Marichukatti, in Puttalam, 29 August 2017). Therefore, considering this
matter on humanitarian grounds, government authorities have the ultimate responsibility to resolve
the issues of contested lands and settlement to facilitate the complete return and resettlement of
these Muslims.

3.3.4. Issue of Ownership of Lands and Properties

Thousands of northern Muslims who were forcefully evicted and left without their belongings,
including land-ownership documents, are now facing serious problems in resettling in their birthplaces
and reclaiming ownership of their lands and properties. They are landless in certain villages because
portions of land that belonged to Muslims were taken over by the army and navy for security reasons.
In certain villages, displaced Tamils were already resettled in lands that used to belong to Muslims.
After the Muslims were evicted, their lands, houses, and other buildings were destroyed, and those
lands became overgrown with shrubs, trees and secondary forest, leaving no evidence of any previous
human habitation (Rajasingham 2013). When these Muslims attempted to acquire the deeds to
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 13 of 20

their lands and to settle there, they faced difficulties from local bureaucrats, public, and politicians.
Families who decided to return to Jaffna and Mannar districts faced similar problems with Tamil
returnees over issues of land, the destruction of their homes, and livelihood and income generation.
Similarly, northern Muslim returnees complained that government and humanitarian actors, who are
largely staffed by Tamils, were not sensitive to their needs and were unwilling to assist them
(Fonseka and Raheem 2011). Thus, northern Muslims experienced delayed resettlement for many
months as authorities refused to provide clearance certificates and identified government lands.
Despite their significant political clout with two/three MPs and one cabinet minister, northern Muslim
returnees encountered difficulty in securing equity in terms of assistance.
The Rajapaksa regime also made further initiatives to make northern Muslims landless in their
birthplaces. Such initiatives made amendments to the Forest Ordinance and declared a large extent of
lands in the northern province as forest reserves through global positioning system mapping even
without consulting the DSs of those areas. Many Muslims who lived in Musali South were not allowed
to return to their lands, as their lands were not identified as private properties in this mapping process
due to their displacement (Ahamed 2016).

3.3.5. No Collective Political Voice for Resettlement Due to Fragmentation of Muslims Politics
The fragmentation of Muslim politics has also negatively influenced the process of northern
Muslim resettlement. When Muslims were forcefully evicted, the SLMC under its founder-leader,
MHM. Ashraff, voiced their grievances and their settlement. As a leader of a Muslim political party
and a minister in charge of rehabilitation and reconstruction (1994–2000), Ashraff helped to settle
temporarily these Muslims in camps and relocated villages with basic amenities. Members in FGDs
remembered the valuable contributions of Ashraff and the parliamentarian representing them during
the initial stage of their displacement. Although Ashraff could not propose initiatives to resettle them in
their traditional villages due to the intense war, he was the one who initially proposed to resettle these
Muslims in relocated model villages in Puttalam and other districts temporarily. Many first-generation
displaced Muslims still find that move a great relief to their eviction (FGDs 01 and 02 in Puttalam,
23 July 2017). However, with the sudden demise of Ashraff in September 2000, the party became
fragmented (Yusoff et al. 2017). Although SLMC’s new leader and representative of Vanni electoral
district worked with the World Bank housing project for the Muslims, the dissolution of parliament
and the regime change in 2004 meant that they could not participate in the implementation of the said
housing project.
When a representative of the northern Muslim left SLMC in 2004 and worked against its interests,
the new SLMC leaders progressively abandoned their interests on issues regarding the northern
Muslim community, particularly that of their resettlement. After the demise of its founder-leader, the
SLMC received popular support and political strength in the successive general elections, which made
the SLMC able to decide the central government. However, the SLMC failed to influence any
government in resettling northern Muslims permanently in their traditional villages and in proposing
any relevant program. When an opposing politician, who broke away from the SLMC and formed
his own Muslim party, the All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC) became a cabinet minister for
resettlement, attempted to resettle these Muslims with the support of foreign aid mostly received from
the Arab world, the SLMC leaders hardly supported his initiatives.
The resettlement initiatives undertaken by the ACMC leader were highly criticized and opposed
by Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalists, but no Muslim party or leader supported the leadership of
the ACMC. At the beginning of the eviction, no Muslim political parties existed except the SLMC.
However, from 2000, many new Muslim parties and forces have emerged and have been influencing
Muslim and national politics. For the resettlement of northern Muslims, most of these parties,
except the ACMC, which is headed by an evicted northern Muslim, have done little except reporting
about the anniversary of these Muslims’ eviction to the media. In certain parts of the northern province,
Muslim politicians exploited the situation of the returning population.
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 14 of 20

Displaced Muslims are concerned that their life and return to their traditional villages become
more complicated partly because of fragmented Muslim politics. Many educationists and civil activists
agreed that the opposition politics of the SLMC and the ACMC produced further divisions within their
community, thereby affecting the success and sustainability of their resettlement. This may lead to the
marginalization of families and villages in resettlement initiatives and to complicate resettlement in
certain areas (Collected information from FGDs in Puttalam, July–August 2017). Obviously, the ACMC
has continued to work against the interests of SLMC. With the demise of SLMC’s prominent northern
leader and parliamentarian, Noordeen Mashoor (1963–2010), the SLMC has progressively lost its focus
on the north. These factors may have influenced the SLMC’s lack of support for the resettlement
initiatives of northern Muslims.
Kadirgamar (2015) rightly pointed out that on the matter of these Muslims’ settlement, the politics
of patronage led to handouts for some, but the marginalized continued to suffer as they faced what
was a mockery in the name of resettlement. Muslim politicians who represented the people of the
northern province overcompensated or provided aid to their family and party loyalists. The poor
and the neutrals continued to face serious challenges in returning to their homeland and getting basic
facilities in their resettlement villages. MVN (Minority Voice Newsroom) argued that the expulsion of
these Muslims remained marginal within the discourse of ethnic conflict and the many peace processes
due to a combination of factors, namely, the lack of community mobilization and insufficient attention,
failure to obtain recognition at national and international levels through publicizing the issue by
Muslim politicians. Moreover, the northern Muslims’ interests became secondary to the interests of
many Muslim political parties.

4. Discussion
As a second minority group, Muslims became the victim of ethnic conflict and civil war in Sri
Lanka, although they had never been a competing or conflicting party. The expulsion of the Muslims
from the northern province was one of the greatest injustices meted out to them. They have been
experiencing tremendous hardships, disadvantages, and oppression in their displaced life over a
quarter century, and therefore, their displacement should be ended. As citizens of Sri Lanka, they must
be allowed to return and be resettled in their own traditional villages assisted by the government,
politicians, and civil forces. In the history of Muslim and ethnic politics in Sri Lanka, the expulsion of
northern Muslims has been annually remembered as a cruel and inhumane episode synonymous with
“ethnic cleansing”. Hasbullah (2004, p. 234) argued, the Muslims who lived for centuries in the northern
province have the right to return and resettle in their traditional villages. Continuously neglecting
to help them resettle is a denial of their right to live in their lands. Therefore, the resettling of these
Muslims, including other Muslims and Tamils displaced by the civil war, not only will resolve their
grievances but also would empowers their lives, livelihood, and relations among different ethnic
groups in post-war peacebuilding and reconciliation in Sri Lanka.
However, resettling people who have been displaced for years is more complicated than
resettling those who have been displaced for a short time. The northern Muslims have been
experiencing a protracted displaced life. Most of them are wary of leaving their current residence
because they lack the means to resettle. They have been displaced for a long time and have
tried to build a life in their resettled areas that they may opt to settle there. Many of them have
strongly established their livelihoods and families in the displacement villages, and their children
are comfortable with the available educational and vocational facilities. This situation is especially
true for the generation born and brought up in displacement. However, vulnerabilities exist within
the northern Muslim community with different aspirations for their return and the complex nature
of protracted displacement. Although certain northern Muslims may have established houses and
businesses in displacement sites, others who do not own property and do not have sustainable
livelihoods are considering returning to their traditional villages. Without access to permanent
accommodation, public facilities, and livelihood opportunities, coming to a judgment on their view
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 15 of 20

of settlement is irrational and can increase challenges for their resettlement. These complex matters
related to their resettlement require special attention from government authorities, ethnic majorities,
and international actors.
The lack of proper assistance and basic amenities poses a serious challenge to the resettlement of
northern Muslims and of the residents who have already settled in their traditional villages. In 2011,
although many Muslims living in camps in Puttalam and other areas have registered to return to their
traditional villages, they did not go or were afraid to go because of many reasons. According to the
FGDs, many Muslims immediately registered to return as they feared that they may not be able to do so
in the future. They registered, hoping that government authorities could make necessary arrangements
and facilities, such as identifying and allocating lands for their resettlement, initiating housing projects
and expanding livelihood opportunities. Many second and third generations of displaced families
do not have lands, houses, and jobs in the north, and they were afraid that the lack of infrastructure
would mean their family members would not have access to basic education, healthcare services and
livelihood activities.
From 1990, the northern province was monoethnic for more than two decades, and many Tamils
had forgotten that it once had a substantial Muslim presence. Amidst the many other problems
that have emerged after the end of civil war, the political leadership in the north is adjusting slowly
and sometimes reluctantly to the prospect of the Muslims’ return. However, no consensus has been
reached by the Tamil political leaders in the north about the eviction of Muslims and their resettlement.
Muslim villages were decimated, and their homes were destroyed during their long displacement.
Furthermore, families have expanded, and returning Muslims need land, infrastructure, and livelihood
assistance (Haniffa 2014). Tamil politicians must accept all these facts and ensure that their community
welcome the evicted Muslims as fellow residents of the north. Such actions could encourage the
Muslims to consider the locals as their brothers, sisters, and neighbors. Therefore, all these issues must
be seriously considered in the resettlement of these Muslims.
For the displaced northern Muslim community, scant information and arguably little discussion
exist on the available choices of return or local integration. Conditions in return sites are poor,
and limited assistance means that many northern Muslims may require time to rebuild their lives
and gradually return. In addition to families who are landless or are occupying land without proper
documentation, new families exist among the displaced (i.e., those families who were born and grew
up in displacement and are not able to make any land claims). The extent of assistance for such families,
including the provision of state land, is unclear (Fonseka and Raheem 2011, pp. 72–73).
Many studies and commissioned investigations found that the evicted northern Muslims are in a
vulnerable position in terms of their displaced status and opportunity to return to their traditional
villages with official sponsorship. As argued earlier, their forceful eviction and the delay of their
permanent resettlement are violations of their right to own and live in their traditional lands.
The Lesson Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), appointed by President Rajapaksa on
15 May 2010 to understand the cost of war and public grievances, positively reported the grievances
of displaced northern Muslims and the importance of their resettlement in their traditional villages
with state sponsorship. In its final report (2011), the LLRC acknowledged that displaced northern
Muslims have been living in “dire conditions” for more than two decades and experiencing trouble
integrating and noted that “the treatment given to the Muslim community of the northern province has
led them to believe that they are at the bottom of the list of priorities of the government, INGOs, NGOs,
and the donor community” (MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Irinnews.org 2013). The same report
concluded that Muslim IDPs remain one of the “key post-conflict challenges” with “significant impact”
on reconciliation prospects. The LLRC agreed that durable solutions must be found to address these
long-standing issues concerning the evicted northern Muslims, which would sow seeds of disharmony
and dissension if they remain unaddressed (Irinnews.org 2013). However, except for establishing
committees and commissions, no meaningful initiative has been undertaken by government authorities
to permanently resettle the forcefully evicted northern Muslims who have been living in displaced
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 16 of 20

and relocated villages for about a quarter of a century. They may be one of the longest IDPs in the civil
war context.
Therefore, developing a credible and immediate policy on the resettlement of northern Muslims in
their traditional villages is highly needed. In Sri Lanka, clear laws and policies regarding the definition
of “IDPs”, “return”, and “resettlement” according to international standards and norms are lacking.
Surveys, census, and policy plans have failed to record these forcefully evicted northern Muslims as
IDP families who want to be resettled in their traditional villages. Given that their displacement is
complicated, as part of the post-war state reform process, government authorities must accommodate
them in the categorization of IDPs and resettlement schemes by adopting new or revising existing
laws and policies.

5. Conclusions
The end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009 created high hopes among displaced northern Muslims
that their lives as refugees would end. However, post-war development and resettlement initiatives
poorly accommodated the concerns and grievances of these forcefully evicted Muslims and their
permanent resettlement in their traditional villages. The Sri Lankan government and international
actors mostly prioritized internally displaced Tamils and sidetracked the resettlement of forcefully
evicted northern Muslims. The few initiatives for the resettlement of these Muslims undertaken by
the minister from the same Muslim community, who oversaw resettlement, faced serious challenges
and opposition from different fronts and sources, particularly from extreme nationalists representing
Sinhalese-Buddhist and political forces among Tamils.
The Muslims had been living with the Tamils in the northern province for centuries. They may
have been living in other districts in recent decades, but the north is their traditional homeland.
Returning to their homeland is their right that must be accepted and fulfilled by government
authorities and concerned parties in the post-war development and resettlement processes.
Government authorities have promised in many international forums the permanent resettlement of
forcefully evicted northern Muslims. Similarly, many commissions and international organizations
have recommended that Muslim concerns and grievances must be accommodated in any kind of
post-war development, including the resettlement of northern Muslims. However, no meaningful
initiatives have been undertaken by the government to implement the recommendations for ensuring
the permanent resettlement of the evicted Muslims. Unfortunately, the Muslim community and their
politicians have done little for the permanent resettlement of these Muslims, except for annually
remembering and occasionally expressing support for them. Therefore, government authorities,
recognizing the factors identified in this study and abiding with the conditions and requests of the
international community, should develop a comprehensive plan to resettle these displaced northern
Muslims in their traditional villages as part of post-war development and reconciliation processes.
Without meaningful initiatives to permanently resettle these forcefully evicted northern Muslims,
who are in displacement for about a quarter century, in their traditional villages, remembering their
eviction is meaningless for forging a pluralistic future and rebuilding relations between ethnic
groups and communities, which is highly lacking in post-war Sri Lanka. A new plan for
post-war resettlement, ethnic reconciliation, and political solution that is recognized nationally
and internationally must be formulated and implemented. It must accommodate diverse concerns
and grievances, including socio-economic ones, on the permanent resettlement of the northern
Muslims. This step can ensure the sustainability of development and reconciliation programs
in post-civil war Sri Lanka. The permanent resettlement of norther Muslims in their traditional
villages can resolve their war-related grievances and integrate them with other major ethnic groups,
particularly the Tamils and Sinhalese living in the northern province. Therefore, discourses and
debates on reconciliation, development, and political solution in post-war Sri Lanka must go beyond
focusing “Tamils-Sinhalese problems”. In these processes, other minorities who have been victimized
and suffered due to ethnic conflict and civil war but marginalized in peace-building and settlement
Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 106 17 of 20

discourse must be considered and accommodated. For the permanent resettlement of the northern
Muslims, policy reforms, plans, and the commitment of political and administrative elites are important
prerequisites. Honesty, sensitivity, and understanding from all communities and stakeholders must
be practiced in post-war development and reconciliation to deal with minority issues, including the
permanent resettlement of northern Muslims.

Author Contributions: M.A.Y. contributed through overall supervision, revision and editing of the manuscript.
A.S. conceived the idea for review literature, wrote the manuscript and edited the revised versions.
Z.M.Z. facilitated by analyzing the relevant literature and through revision. All authors read and approved the
final manuscript.
Funding: This study is self-funded by the researchers.
Acknowledgments: Authors thank the reviewers for giving insightful comments and suggestions to improve the
paper to the present level.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Abbreviations
The following Abbreviations are used in this manuscript.
ACMC All Ceylon Makkal Congress
SLMC Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
UNF United National Front
UPFA United People Freedom Alliance
TNA Tamil National Alliance
IDPs Internally Displaced Peoples
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
INGOS International Non-Governmental Organizations
DS Divisional Secretary
LLRC Lesson Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
FGDs Focus Group Discussions
CFA Cease-Fire Agreement
MCSL Muslim Council of Sri Lanka

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