Tanada vs Tuvera

146 SCRA 446

Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming
the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all
unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication,
and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first
that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise
provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that
the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement.

RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

People vs Que Po Lay

94 PHIL 640

FACTS: Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks
and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within
one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim
that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant,
and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect.

Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published
in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention
says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular
issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

ISSUE: whether the circular should be published first to have the force and effect of law.
1 of 11
HELD: Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the
absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the
statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation
of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and
theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until
November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular,
particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette
or after November 1951.

DM Consunji vs CA
G. R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001

FACTS:

Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending
physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of the
14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the
platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block
and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria
Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to
receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in
the State Insurance Fund.

HELD:

The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was unaware of
petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil
complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum
dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel.

2 of 11
 Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more
than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater
than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted
therefrom.

Cui vs Arellano
G. R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961

FACTS:
Before the school year 1948-1949 Emeterio Cui took up preparatory law course in the Arellano University. After
Finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from school year
1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourt
year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano,
brother of mother of plaintiff, was the dean of college of law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff
enrolled for last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay tuition fees because his uncle
Dean Francisco R. Capistrano, having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and
chancellorship of the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter
university. Plaintiff, during all the time he has studying law in Defendant University was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were retured to him after the end of semester and when his scholarship
grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fess paid by the plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by
the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in college of law or the fourth year,
is in total P1,003.87. After Graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To
secure permission to take the bar, he needed the transcript of his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff
petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he paid back the P1,003.87
which defendant refunded him. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to
defendant the said sum under protest.

ISSUE: Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former waived his right to
transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship in cash, is valid or not.

HELD:
Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools provides that “When students are given full or
partial scholarship, it is understood that such scholarship are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to These scholarship should not be subsequently charged to recipient students when they decide to quit
school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarship should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a
school.
Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. The defendant uses the scholarship
as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. The practice of awarding scholarship to attract students and keep
them in school is not Good custom nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some
private institution as in Arellano University.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of
the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim. It is so ordered.

3 of 11
University of the East vs Jader
G. R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000

FACTS:
In 1987, Romeo Jader was a graduating law student at the University of the East. He failed to take the regular
examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade (INC). He enrolled for the second semester
as a fourth year student, and filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade which was approved by the
Dean.
In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth year students should
be allowed to graduate. Jader’s name appeared on the tentative list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies and later
he gave blowout celebrations. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination and took review classes. However,
he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations because his academic requirements were not complete because it
appears that his INC rating was not removed.
Consequently, he sued UE for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, and sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the UE’s negligence.
He prayed for an award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that
the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely
inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to where he or she had already complied
with the entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will
graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for
a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

Miciano vs Brimo
50 PHIL 867

FACTS: A will of a Turkish testator (Joseph Brimo) provided that his Philippine estate is disposed of in accordance
with the Philippine Law. The testator further provided that whoever fails to comply with this request (that his estate be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law) would forfeit his inheritance. The Appellant (Andre Brimo), one of the
brothers of the deceased Joseph Brimo, opposed the Appellee (Juan Miciano)'s partition scheme of the estate which denies
his participation in the inheritance.

ISSUE: Whether the Turkish Law or Philippine Law be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo's estates. Will Andre
Brimo forfeit his inheritance?

RULING:

The court held that the provision of a foreigner's will that his properties shall be distributed according to
Philippine law and not his national law is NOT LEGAL because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 16 of the civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions. Testator’s estate shall be distributed according to his national (Turkish) law. He cannot provide otherwise.
The appellant's inheritance will not be forfeited because the provision is not legal.

4 of 11
Pilapil vs Ibay Somera

174 SCRA 653

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were
married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling
initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain
William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution
directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and
Chia” was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done
after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby made permanent.

NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint
filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this
rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for
adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same
considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

5 of 11
Roehr vs Rodriguez
G. R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on
December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros
Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine. Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said
decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang. Wolfgang filed another
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted
by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge
Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their
children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for reconsideration.

Ruling: Yes. A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after the same has
become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts
and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final
and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and
support.

Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment
of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang
to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the
extent of Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in
setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best
interests of the children.

6 of 11
Garcia vs Recio
G. R. No. 138322, October 2, 2002

FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly
dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina,
herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and
“Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In
1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned
of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his
prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial
court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and
recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce obtained
abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore,
before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an
Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding
alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly
because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its
admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce
terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of
divorce the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage.
Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
commits the offense of bigamy”. This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted.
Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other
evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not be declared null
and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack
of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

7 of 11
Nikko Hotel Manila vs Reyes
G. R. No. 154249, February 28, 2009

Facts:
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The party
was being held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also the
executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly known as Amay Bisaya).
Reyes was not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the party. When she
ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the latter, in a discreet voice, to
finish his food and leave the party. Reyes however made a scene and began shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called
to escort Reyes out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his version, he said that he was invited by
another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing to get his food, Lim approached him and ordered
him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr. Filart however when he was calling
for Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of the party like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes as it
ruled that Lim abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the right
to ask Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it respectfully.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been employed by the hotel for more
than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is very unlikely for her to make a scene in the
party she was managing. That would only make her look bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified in court that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so very
close to him – so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim intended that only Reyes shall hear whatever
is it that she’s going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes. They do not know each
other personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so that Reyes himself is a prominent person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine of volenti non
fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being turned away, and thus being
embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting
Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence to support
any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages.

8 of 11
Sps. Quisumbing vs Meralco
G. R. No. 142943, April 3, 2002

FACTS:

The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows
Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were
assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard
operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that
the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of
the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that
the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour,
inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of
P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due process, lack of regard
for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be
entitled for damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential of
P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Moral
damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due
process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for
public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done
in strict observance of the rights of the people. “Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately
disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board”.
During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present.
Petitioner’s claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was premised only upon
Lorna’s testimony. These are compensation for an injury that will put the injure position where it was before it was
injured.

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs CA

219 SCRA 16

Facts:
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old,
met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two
got really close and intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the
semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s
parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for
the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in no
time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of

9 of 11
marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later
sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have
violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD:
Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of promise to marry
her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by
Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful
scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was a
virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her.
Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to
morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking
advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is
meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was
meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and there was
carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except
if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual
damages may be recovered.

Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs CA

217 SCRA 16

FACTS:
Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation
Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. The Check was dishonored by reason of “Account
Closed.” Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check from the records of the SEC that the
president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao". Albenson, through
counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao to replace and/or make good the
dishonored check. Failing to do so, Albenson filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It appears, however,
that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E.L.
Woodworks. No effort from the father Eugenio Baltao to disclose to Albenson of such information. Because of the alleged
unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which bounced for a measly amount of
P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners
Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee. Private respondent, anchored his
complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. Petitioners Albenson contending that the civil case

10 of 11
filed in the lower court was one for malicious prosecution. Citing the case of Madera vs. Lopez (1981), they assert that the
absence of malice on their part absolves them from any liability for malicious prosecution.

ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed cause for the Damages against Albenson Enterprise based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
Code.

RULING:
NO. Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What
prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure
to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private
respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the following results: from
the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the President of Guaranteed (the recipient
of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed
that E.L. Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao";
verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the check
belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".

11 of 11