South African Journal of Philosophy

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‘Atomism and Holism’ with special reference to a

key issue in social-political philosophy

Danie F.M. Strauss

To cite this article: Danie F.M. Strauss (1999) ‘Atomism and Holism’ with special reference to
a key issue in social-political philosophy, South African Journal of Philosophy, 18:1, 74-89, DOI:
10.1080/02580136.1999.10878179

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74 S. Afr. J. Philos. 1999, 18(1)

'Atomism and Holism' with special reference to a key

issue in social-political philosophy 1
•
2

Danie F.M. Strauss

Faculty of the Humanities, University of the Orange Free State, P.O. Box 339,
Bloemfontein 9300, South Africa

Received August 1998; revised August 1998

Introductory remarks
Since Democritus introduced his atomistic philosophy of nature this term was used in a
rather restricted and in a broader sense. In the former sense it indicated the attempt to
explain the material world in terms of last indivisible elements ('atoms'). In the latter
(ontological) sense it was also employed to designate different forms of pluralism, or
ways of understanding reality from its supposed last units, building blocks or- in the case
of human society- individuals. Since 1825 Saint-Simon and his followers (among them
Aguste Comte) employed the term individualism in order to capture the social philosophy
of the 18th century as a whole - the view in which society was broken apart in isolated
individuals. 3
In opposition both to mechanistic monism and vitalistic dualism as biological theories
the term holism was introduced by J.C. Smuts in 1926. In this narrow sense it aimed at a
dialectical synthesis which can do justice to the supposedly highest concrete totality (in
the case of Adolf Meyer: Ganzheit). An expanded connonation is given to holism when it
is used in the sense of a universalism which, in opposition to (sociological) individualism,
wants to account for the meaningful coherence and mutuality within societal institutions,
i.e. for wholeness/totality as an essential trait of societal collectivities (as introduced by
the German philosopher, sociologist, and economist, Othmar Spann, in the 1920s). 4
In this article we will restrict ourselves to some issues entailed in the field of social and
political philosophy. The classical example of a thorough but still unsuccessful struggle
with the inherently dialectical implications of atomism (individualism) and holism (uni-
versalism) is given in the thought of Rousseau who tried to combine both these perspec-
tives in his (hypothetical) account ofthe genesis of a post-contractual society.

Some preliminary remarks

When the terms atomism and holism are substituted by those of individualism and univer-
salism, it should be kept in mind that the latter two terms are also sometimes used to des-
ignate the opposing emphases on universality and individuality - the key issue in the
controversy between realism and nominalism.
In this presensentation the terms atomism and holism will first of all be used in a broad
sense in order to capture the rich history of philosophical conceptions as well as contem-
porary stances within the various academic disciplines.
S. Afr. J. Philos. 1999, 18(1) 75

Without entering into a detailed account, it is worth mentioning that the scope of this
broad understanding rests upon the following background considerations:
1. There is no single epoch or period in the history of philosophy that escapes from the
grip both of atomistic and holistic views;
2. The various academic disciplines (the natural sciences and the humanities) manifest
the same fate- both with regard to the way in which they developed and with respect
· to the current state of theoretical reflection at work within each one of these dis-
ciplines; and
3. The relative merit of atomistic approaches (such as mathematical set theory - arith-
meticistic atomism; atomistic theories in physics, biology, psychology, history,
sociology, economics, legal science) requires an assessment of the relative merit of
holistic approaches (such as the holistic affinities of mathematical inutitionism; holis-
tic theories in physics, biology, psychology, history, sociology, economics, legal
science - compare systems theory). By looking at political philosophy in particular
the impasse and shortcomings of the radical opposition of these two stances will be
subjected to a critical evaluation in terms of the ideas of Rousseau.

The position of the State and its relation to the individual

Some historical perspectives
The Greek atomists were superseded by the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle which
were predominantly holistic. Their immence influence dominated most of medieval.phi-
losophy until it was challenged by the atomistic affinities of late scholastic nominalism
(John the Scot, William ofOckham and their followers).
The new spirit of the Renaissance accomplished the important Copernican revolution
in epistemology by ascribing supremacy no loger to the 'object' but to the creative powers
of the thinking subject. Thus the acceptance of an objective metaphysical order was
replaced by the creative power supposedly seated in subjective human reason. Modernism
is a fruit of this transitional period- although in passing we have to emphasise that nomi-
nalism as the all-pervasive current undergirding this transition provides modernism with a
more complex face than is normally portayed by recent 'postmodern' descriptions of it.
The motive of logical creation indeed characterises the autonomy-ideal and the first
manifestations of the modern natural science-ideat.l The effect of this motive of logical
creation on our theme is direct. Atomism in this context entails a total demolition or
break-down of our given world in order to reconstruct it from thought-elements. Since the
Renaisance modern thought explored various options in this regard- varying from 'mov-
ing body,' 6 'to perceive' (Berkeley), 'sensations' (Kant) and 'sense-data' (Ayer) - to
mention just a few philosophers.
Social philosophy during this phase at first pursued the avenue of an atomistic recon-
struction of society. The initial social contract theories wanted to reconstruct human soci-
ety in terms of its 'atoms' -the individuals. Harbermas captures this practice when he
remarks:
Hobbes wants to reconstruct the classical theory of the state after the example of
modern science. In doing this he wants to provide social philosophy with a foun-
dation in the contemporary physics (Habermas 1971 :88).
76 S. Afr. J. Philos. 1999, 18(1)

This does not imply that modern social philosophy merely explored the atomistic op-
tion in its reflection on human society. Once we move to a person like Roussseau it be-
comes clear that the situation is more complex.

The simultaneous and contradicting role of atomism and holism in the thought of
Roussseau
Rousseau lived in the 'Enligthenment'- a period in the development of modern philoso-
phy generally seen as characterised by a shameless glorification of the capacities of con-
ceptional human thought. Rousseau is not at all fully absorbed by this rationalistic
'Zeitgeist'. In important respects he anticipated romanticism - the new movement that
reached its zenith at the turn of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century.
Perhaps Rousseau is best known for his reflection on radical democracy. In this regard,
however, he also demonstrates his indebtedness to the preceding development of modern
thought. The central freedom-motive, that became prominent during the Renaissance
period, wanted to emphasize human freedom and autonomy. Rousseau captures this basic
humanistic attitude with his statement: 'freedom is obedience to a law which we prescribe
to ourselves' (Rousseau, 1975:247).7
Rousseau's dependence on the mentioned science-ideal is particularly clear from the
fact that he advanced his own theory of the social contract. 8 Social contract theory did not
undertake to give a historical account of the emergence of an ordered society (with a
state), but is solely intended to give a hypothetical rational explanation of its existence.
Rousseau's theory of the state demonstrates a strange mixture of atomism and holism,
intertwined with the underlying struggle between the science-ideal and the ideal of a free
and autonomous personality. Rousseau indeed values human freedom very high - as
could be seen from his opening statement in Chapter 1 of Book 1: 'Man is born free but
everywhere he finds himself in chains' (1975:236). Taking away the freedom of the
human will amounts to eliminating all morality from human actions (1975:240). Even the
difference between human beings and animals is no longer sought, as Enlightenment
rationalism did, in the human understanding, but in the ability to act freely. In his treatise
on the origin and inequality between human beings, Rousseau writes:
Nature commands every animal, and the brute obeys. The human being experi-
ences the same impulse, but recognize his freedom to acquiesce or to resist; and
particularly in the awareness of this freedom the spirituality of humankind mani-
fests itself.... but in the capacity to will, or much rather to choose, and the experi-
ence of this power, one encounters nothing but purely spiritual acts which are
totally inexplicable through mechanical laws (1975:47).
An important implication ofthis ideal of autonomous freedom is that all forms of force
are rejected in principle. Force does not create law (1975:238). Although the human
being is born in a state of equality and freedom, it may happen that humans are alienated
from their freedom- to their own benefit (1975: 236). This implies that anyone is obliged
only to obey a legitimate authority (1975: 238). Naturally no human being possesses any
power over any other human being - which implies for Rousseau that all relations of
authority and subordination are based on conventions (1975:239). In the first and most
S. Afr. J. Philos. 1999, 18(1) 77

basic convention, the social contract, the confusing interaction of atomism and holism
surfaces.
The predominant contract theories postulated a hypothetical first contract in order to
provide a rational explanation for the existence of a political society. This trait at once
gives expression to the requirement of the science-ideal, namely to reconstruct society
from its simplest elements, the individuals (the 'atoms' of society). Thomas Hobbes holds
the opinion that in establishing the first contract (he calls it a covenant) no unanimity is
required (Hobbes 1651 :228-229).
Rousseau realises that such a supposition would threaten the freedom of the minority
not agreeing with the majority. He asks the question how hundred people, having the
desire to be subjected to a master, could have the right to impose that on ten people not
wanting to be in that predicament. Consequently, he states that the majority vote itself is a
product of convention, requiring unanimity at least once ( 1975:243, 31 0).
Nature provides the human being withjorce and freedom as the primary instruments in
service of self-maintenance. The threat to the continued existence of the individual in the
state of nature could only be met if, through the formation of an aggregate, a sum of
forces is brought together big enough to overcome the threat. Everyone participating in
the establishment of the contract has to transfer all rights to the community as a whole.
Since everyone gives himself/herself fully, the condition is equal for all (1975:243-244).
Here Rousseau clearly deviates from a crucial point in the contract theory of John
Locke. Locke sees the state of nature, just as Rousseau does, as a natural condition where
everyone is free and independent (Locke 1966:164 ). The rights of the individual on life,
liberty, and property are, according to Locke, however, absolute and inalienable. Conse-
quently, they can never be given up or transferred by means of the social contract. Gov-
erned by reason as the law of nature (Locke 1966: 119) the individuals may (i) do what
they find fit in service of their survival; and (ii) may exercise the power to punish crimes
against the law of nature (Locke 1966:181 ). Only these two 'rights' are sacrificed when
the social contract is established (Locke 1966: 181-182). All other natural human rights
are simply continued. Individuals enter into the contract with the aim of the 'mutual pres-
ervation of their lives, liberties and estates' (Locke 1966: 180).
These ideas certainly influenced Rousseau. However, when, in his Contrat social, he
explicitly mentions that, within the state, the social contract forms the basis of all rights, it
is clear that he expressly deviates from the contract theory of Locke. This deviation is
ultimately motivated by the humanistic science-ideal. The state of nature is something of
the past, and therefore the individual should give up his/her original rights in order to, on
the basis of the social contract, receive it back in the higher form of equality which is
morally sanctioned through convention and law (1975:249).
The physical and independent existence allocated by nature to all is replaced by a par-
tial and moral existence. Along this line the capacities of the human being are taken away
and then given back in such a way that he/she cannot use them without the help of other
human beings (1975:261).
Participating in the contract is completely voluntary. Since everyone is born free as his/
her own lord and master, no one could be subjected without his or her consent. If, at the
78 S. Afr. J. Philos. 1999, 18(1)

moment of accepting the contract, there are opponents present who are not willing to con-
form, it does not terminate the contract, but it simply means that they are excluded from it
( 1975:31 0). Opponents are foreigners and not citizens.
Through the contract everyone gives himself/herself to all. At the same time he/she
gives him/her to no one, for there is no participant in the contract who does not acquire
the same right as the one given to others over himself/herself( 1975:244).
The social contract finally boils down to:
Everyone of us places collectively his/her person and all his/her power under the
final guidance ofthe general will (volonte genera/e), and we receive each member
as an inseparable part of the whole (1975:244).
The public person emerging from this uniting of all individuals is known as the repub-
lic or the body politic. If it is passive, its members call it the state, and when it is active, it
is the sovereign. A collective name for those united in it is people (peuple), while every-
one in particular is known as citizen (as a part of the sovereign power). Subjection to the
laws of the state is designated with the name sujets ( 1975 :244-245).
Different from Thomasius, Pufendorf and others advocating the idea of the social con-
tract, and in accordance with the conceptions of Hobbes, Rousseau does not accept a sec-
ond contract, a so-called contract of subjection through which the relation between
government and subjects is ordered ( 1975 :304). By virtue of the nature of the contract
every act of the sovereign (i.e., of the general will) at once is binding or beneficial to all
citizens. Such an act of the sovereign is not an agreement between someone more impor-
tant and someone less important, but a convention of the whole body with everyone of its
members (1975:255). It is clear that the whole-parts relation serves as a substitute for the
relation of super and subordination (the relation between government and subjects). Pre-
cisely for this reason Rousseau considers an agreement of subjection an impossibility.
Everyone erecting similar institutions has, as it were, to change the human nature: every
individual, who is, taken separately, a complete and lonesome whole, has to be trans-
formed into a part of a larger whole to which the individual, in a certain sense, owes its
life and existence (1975:261).
HOffding discerns in this transition a basic trait in the thought of Rousseau:
The basic type in the thought of Rousseau is given in the opposition between the
immediate, original, closed-off, total, free and simple on the one hand, and the
derivative, relative (relation-determined), divided, dependent and coherent on the
other hand (1923: I 01 ).
The opposition, which, for Rousseau, coincides with that between nature and cultvre, is
introduced in order to provide a yardstick enabling one to distinguish between true and
false culture (cf. HOffding 1923:114).
The contract is reached between isolated and autonomously free individuals- each per-
son is to be seen as a separate unity. From this collection of individuals (atomistically
construed) a supra-individual whole emerges (holistically) replacing the separated indi-
viduality of each person and which, as a moral person, 9 possesses its own unity, identity,
life and will:
S. Afr. J. Phi los. 1999, 18(1) 79

Immediately the association produces, in the place of the particular person of

every participant, a moral and collective body, composed out of just as many
members as the voices ofthe gathering, which derives from this act its unity, com-
munal self, life and will (1975:244).
This remarkable result of the social contract anticipates the transpersonalist trait of
romanticism - where the superindividual 'people' is put in the center of attention (com-
pare the thought of Schelling, Fichte and Hegel). 10
What appears here is the fundamental tension in Rousseau's conception of the state,
that between individualism/atomism versus universalism/holism. But before we analyze
the fundamental antinomy in Rousseau's thought, we need to reflect on the underlying
perspectival issues at stake here.

Ontological and epistemological considerations

Every form of theoretical thought is always confronted with the basic question: how do
we conceive of the coherent diversity within reality? The many one-sided isms known
throughout the history of philosophy, including atomism and holism, are all examples of
distorted answers to this basic question. Whenever a particular aspect of reality is elevated
(absolutised, deified) it functions as the final point of orientation from which everything
else is explained. A consistent atomistic or individualistic approach, for example, wants to
explain all complexities within reality from the perspective of a discrete multiplicity of
entities. In the case of human society, atomism proceeds either from autonomous and self-
contained individuals (compare Rousseau's conception of the state of nature), or from
individuals in interaction.
In order to understand properly what is at stake in ismic positions we have to realise
that concept formation in a theoretical context explore certain modes of explanation, that
theoretical reflection inevitably explains reality through the point-of-entry of diverse
modes of relatedness. The numerical mode (aspect) is the first and most basic facet of
experiential reality. It provides us with the intuition (insight) of discrete quantity and this
modal point of entry was already noticed by the Pythagoreans in their (reductionistic)
claim: everything is number. The discovery of incommensurability (in 450 B.C. by Hip-
pasos of Metapont) altered the choice of a basic denominator by translating their prob-
lems into spatial terms (the geometrization of Greek mathematics). Our spatial intuition
provides us with a basic awareness of continuous extension. The concepts whole, coher-
ence and totality appeal to this original and irreducible meaning of the spatial aspect. 11
Atomism (individualism) thus represents a mode of thought 'over-exploring' the uni-
que meaning of a numerical multiplicity. Its counter-pole is found in the holistic or uni-
versalistic perspective. The latter over-emphasizes the spatial whole-parts relation
(mostly within the context of a biotic whole with its parts). 12 That the whole-parts relation
inherently belongs to our spatial intuition follows from the folowing considerations.
Something continuously extended (such as a one-dimensional line) is connected in all its
parts, these parts 'hang-together', they cohere without any interruptions. Clearly, these
terms are actually all synonyms for our basic awareness of continuity: being-connected,
80 S. Afr. J. Philos. 1999, 18(1)

coherence. But if all the parts are connected their sum-total constitutes a genuine whole-
explaining why also the whole-parts relation merely serves as a synonym for our intuition
of continuity as its expresses itself within the meaning of the spatial aspect.
A holistic view of human society always attempts to elevate some or other societal col-
lectivity, or even society as such, to the highest and all-encompassing societal whole, con-
taining all other societal spheres as subordinate and indivisible parts of this whole (in
terms of systems theory: as subsystems).

Misunderstanding the simultanuous presence of atomism and holism in Rous-

seau's thought.
In this universalistic (holistic) sense Rousseau envisages a new supra-personal totality
emerging from the social contract, in spite of the fact that his construction of the social
contract is done on the basis of an atomistic (individualistic) conception of the state of
nature! In his penetrating Ph.D. dissertation, Mekkes unfortunately over-emphasizes the
atomistic element in Rousseau's thinking where he writes:
But the construction of this 'personne publique' remains purely mathematical in-
dividualistic. Genuine universalism could never conceive of the 'collective per-
son' as the product of a contract between naturally autonomous individuals. It
much rather starts with the whole, with the totality ( 1940:278).
Mekkes did not realise that the social contract represents, in Rousseau's thought, the
transition from atomism (individualism) to holism (universalism). As soon as the contrac-
tual agreement is reached, Rousseau indeed initiates a new holistic conception which only
accepts a whole fully encompassing the former individuals as indivisible parts 13 of this
new totality (the volonte gemirale).
The continuity between the state of nature and the post-contractual state is provided by
the theme of autonomy. This theme can assume both an individualistic and a universalis-
tic form. In spite of the fact that the individualistic construction of the state contradicts the
universalistic result of the social contract, the underlying theme of autonomy provides the
(misguided) impression that the individual remains subject to his or her own will alone.
As we shall presently argue, however, the holistic outcome of the social contract inevita-
bly harbours a severe threat for the freedom of the individual.

How far does the power of the general will stretch?

The first striking feature of the sovereign concerns the following: although public consul-
tation is competent to bind all the citizens to the sovereign, it can never bind the sovereign
to itself(l975:245). It would flatly deny the nature ofthe body politic to assume that the
sovereign could make a law which it cannot transgress. 14 With regard to that which is
external to the sovereign, it becomes an individual. Nonetheless, Rousseau does not ask
himself how the supposed transgression of a self-imposed law could be reconciled with
his equally basic autonomy-ideal: freedom, after all, is described by him as the obedience
to (and not: transgression of) a law imposed by an individual upon himself/herselfl
The principle of the majority, which, similar to the sovereign collective moral body,
finds its ground in the social contract, in the final analysis should act as the binding
S. Ali-. J. Phi los. 1999, 18( I) 81

power. This presupposes that all qualities of the general will should be present in the
majority ( 1975:311 ). Therefore, the voice of the majority binds allY
The question one may ask is whether there does not exist a private domain (be it of a
personal or collective nature) which in principle falls outside the jurisdiction the binding
general will? One cannot make an appeal to the state of nature, since Rousseau considers
all rights in the post-contractual state to be based upon the social contract. The sentence
preceding the last utterance is significant:
for the state, with regard to its members, is master of all their goods through the
social contract ( 1975:34 7).
The implication of this statement becomes clearer where Rousseau pays attention to the
limits of the sovereign power. If the state is a moral person which lives by uniting all its
members, and if the most important task is to preserve itself, then it follows for Rousseau
that it should possess a universal compulsory force enabling it to have power over every
part thereof to the greater benefit of the whole:
Just as nature gives to every human being an absolute power over all its members,
so the social contract endows the body politic with an absolute power over all its
members; and it is this power which, directed by the general will, as I have said,
bears the name of sovereignty ( 1975:253).
At this point the all-powerful consequences of the holistic result of the social contract
openly emerges: through the contract the sovereign (the body politic) is empowered to do
anything, since, by virtue of the social contract, it possesses an absolute power over all its
members! These members, after all, are nothing but inseparable parts of the whole -
which implies that the sovereign only disposes over itself. The question is: can one find,
in this self-determination, any guarantee for the ideal of freedom and autonomy in Rous-
seau? The answer is: not at all, for the cardinal subsequent question is: what happens to
the minority when it does not agree with the majority? Let us investigate Rousseau's
approach to this problem still further.
We have seen that Rousseau considers the voice of the greatest number- the voice of
the majority- as the embodiment of the qualities of the general will. On the one hand it is
seen as infallible and on the other hand as an expression of the own will of everyone
( 1975:31 0). If no particular groupings are formed and every citizen exercised his or her
voice, then, for Rousseau, one always gather from this the pure and correct general will -
supposed to be at once also each one's own will. Only when people obey their own will
are they free. Those, therefore- alongside other persons, as long as they form the minor-
ity - who do not obey the general (majority) will, are actually disobedient to their own
will - and consequently unfree. Rousseau does not hesitate for one moment to draw the
absolutist and totalitarian conclusion from these premisses: the social contract contains
the implicit undertaking that 'whoever refuses to obey the general will would be com-
pelled to do so by the whole body':
This means nothing less than that such a person would be forced to be free. 16
Although the political philosophy of Rousseau pretends to guarantee public freedom and
equality in the post-contractual state, the ultimate result in principle therefore does not
82 S.Afr.J.Philos.l999, 18(1)

materially differ from the conception of the state found in the political philosophy of Tho-
mas Hobbes. 17
Because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Sovereign; he that
dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contended to avow all the
actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest ( 1651 :231 ).
One may phrase the similarity and the difference between the conceptions of Hobbes
and Rousseau as follows: though Rousseau presents his theory in the form of a theory of
the constitutional state under the rule of law (German: Rechtstaat), materially (i.e., con-
cerning the true nature of the state) he advocates an absolutistic and totalitarian state (Ger-
man: Machtstaat). Hobbes, on the contrary, straightaway defends a theory of a 'Macht-
staat' as a 'Machtstaat'.
In the final analysis, therefore, Rousseau's revolutionary democratic construction of
freedom inevitably ends with Machtstaat consequences. If law is merely seen as some-
thing flowing from the general will that can manifest itself within the state only, then it
stands to reason that in principle the distinction between state-law and non-state-law (i.e.,
law that is distinct from state-law) is cancelled. The implication is that the internal law of
every non-political societal life-form- such the internal law of the school, the firm, mar-
riage, the family, the church, and so on- is then reduced to being subjected to the general
will. The conception of the state advanced by Rousseau does not have any guarantee that
could safeguard anyone of these legal domains which are distinct from that of the state.
Law remains state-law.
Remark:
In this context we leave aside the fact that this legacy already surfaced in the 13th
century. In their polemical Defensor Pacis, presented to the Emperor in 1326, Jean
of Jandum and Marsili us of Padua declared that all forms of authority come from
the people. The implication is the same: then law could also only be an expression
of the general1vi/l. Only the majority making a law, could change it, terminate it
or interpret it (Kates 1928:37). Kates furthermore points out that the influence of
the authors of Defensor Pacis was particularly prominent in England. Thomas
Cromwell, for that matter, arranged for the translation of this writing and made
sure that it was distributed in the Royal Court:
'The whole history of the English Reformation is a chronicle of the attempt of
the State to assert its right to determine for its subjects the form and substance
of religious practice and belief (1928:42).
The implications of the conceptions ofMarsilius of Padua for the medieval view of the
church- which, as a supra-natural institution of grace was denatured to a mere (atomistic
- DFMS!) collection of believers in subjection to the state- caused the excommunication
of Jean of Jandun in 1327 by Pope John XXII.
The way in which Rousseau assigned an absolute authority to the (holistic) general will
on the basis of his social contract indeed gave birth to the state-Leviathan, i.e., the state as
all-destructive mythical monster (compare the Book Job in the Old Testament), ultimately
the outcome of the contractual construction of human society according to the require-
ments of the classical science-ideal. In the final analysis Rousseau could not any longer
s. Air. J. Phi los. 1999, 18( 1) 83

avoid drawing the antinomic conclusions entailed in his ultimate starting point- by say-
ing that those who are not willing to submit themselves to the general will, should be
forced to be free. We are therefore fully justified in the approval of the assessment given
by mekkes in 1940: with the culmination point of the humanistic democratic ideal at once
its deepest down-fall is given ( 1940:315)!

Concluding remarks
The further development of political philosophy during the last two centuries continued to
fluctuate between the two extremes of atomism and holism - although it should be
emphasized that the rather young legacy of reformational philosophy effectively moved
beyond this dilemma by introducing a structural analysis of the state in its relation to the
rest of society that in principle transcends the inherent shortcomings present in these two
isms. The acknowledgement of the principle of sphere sovereignty opens up new and
fresh ways to understand both the uniqueness and the interlacement of diverse societal
collectivities. However, a more articulated account of this contribution falls outside the
scope of our present considerations.It will also take us too far to reflect on the amazing
widespread effect these two isms accomplished in practically all academic disciplines -
disciplines such as mathematics, 18 physics, chemistry, biologyl 9 and even the science of
history, linguistics, 20 sociology/ 1 economics, 22 and legal science. 23 A thorough under-
standing of the nominalistic roots of postmodernism, ith its emphasis on fragmentation,
may also benefit from an analysis of the opposition between atomism and holism (cf. Strauss,
1993- some relevant sources are mentioned in the bibliography).

Notes
I. Paper read at the UPE Filosofie-Kongres/UPE Philosophy Congress; 19-22 January, 1998.
2. This article is based on an excerpt from the Paper presented at the mentioned Philosophy
Conference.
3. The rise of logical atomism (a term introduced by Russell in 1920) ought to be mentioned
in this context too. Just like the empiricistic tradition since Locke, Berkeley and Hume
proceeded from the 'atoms' of sensation called perceptions, logical atomism considered
elementary propositions to be basic and not further analyzable- they are the logical atoms
of the world.
4. Methodological individualism eventually emerged as its negative counterpart.
5. Hobbes is a key-figure in this regard.
6. The basic denominator chosen by Hobbes.
7. Subsequently, references to this work will be given merely by mentioning the date and the
page number.
8. Also Husser! speaks about the rationalistic science-ideal of early humanism ( 1954: 119).
9. Cf. 1975:281. In other words, an entity that obeys the law which it posits for itself.
I 0. Popper, in this regard, speaks about the romantic collectivism containing 'the germ of
nationalism' with its characteristic doctrine that the 'various nations must be conceived as
personalities' ( 1966-11:52).
II. The apparently 'purely arithmetical' definitions of both Dedekind and Cantor deal with the
84 S. Afr. J. Philos. 1999, 18( I)

idea of sets of numbers as infinite totalities, implying that the unique character of the
spatial aspect is essential in the attempt to reduce space to number- an obviously circular
argument! Paul Bernays says this in another context with regard to the totality character of
continuity: '[it] undeniably belongs to the geometric idea of the continuum. And it is this
characteristic of the continuum which would resist perfect arithmetization' (Bernays
1964:283--4: cf. Bernays 1976:74).
12. The classical position is already given in Aristotle's Politica (1253 a 19-20- cf. Hicks
1894: 149). However, it is also possible to accentuate the numerical element in the
structure of the biotical aspect, as in the case of Spencer's organicistic atomism
( 1968:22, 50, 54-55, 60).
13. 'partie indivisible du tout'- 1975:244.
14. ' ... il cest contra Ia nature du corps politique que le souverain s'impose une loi qu'il ne
puisse enfreindre' ( 1975:245).
15. ' ... Ia voix du plus grand nombre oblige toujours tous les autre' ( 1975:31 0).
16.' ... ce qui ne signifie autre chose sin on qu'on le forcera tre libre' ( 1975:246)!
17. Note that although Hobbes does not connect his conception with any form of holism, the
outcome of his atomistic approach is still exactly the same as in the case of Rousseau.
18. The dominant trend in modern mathematics (axiomatic formalism) proceeds from an
atomistic starting point, aiming at an arithmeticistic understanding of continuity
(Weierstrass, Dedekind, Cantor, Hilbert). Intuitionism, on the contrary, wants to
honour the integral coherence of continuity (its holism) by proceeding from the
'intuition' of a whole preceding its parts (Brouwer, Weyl). The ironical outcome of
these differences is that while axiomatic formalism pretends to be atomistic
(arithmeticistic), by trying to reduce all notions of continuity completely to notions of
number, it finally turns out to be fully dependent uopn the use of the actual infinite
(the at once infite as I prefer to call it)- showing that they had to borrow a key-
element of set theory from the (supposedly reducibnle) spatial aspect of reality,
namely, its time order of simultaneity. The correlate of this time order is given in
spatial figures which ought to be present at once in order to constitute coherent
lvho/es/totalities. Paul Bernays, the well-known co-worker of David Hilbert (foremost
mathematician of the 20th century), once remarked that it is exactly the totality
character of continuity that would resist a perfect arithmetization of the continuum
['Und es ist auch dieser Charakter, der einer vollkommenen Arithmetisierung des
Kontinuums entgegensteht'] (1976:74). He also correctly writes: 'the idea of the
continuum is a geometrical idea which analysis expresses in terms of arithmetic'
(1976:74). In one of his last presentations he amphatically rejects mathematical
atomism: 'The arithmetizing monism in mathematics is an arbitrary thesis. The claim
that the field of investigation of mathematics purely emerges from the representation
of number is not at all shown. Much rather, it is presumably the case that concepts
such as a continuous curve and an area, and in particular the concepts used in
topology, are not reducible to notions of number (Zahlvorstellungen)' (1976:188).
S. Afr. 1. Philos. 1999, 18(1) 85

Intuitionism, on the other hand, embarks on a seemingly purely holistic path with its
emphasis on the basic intuition of wholeness but ends up with a restricted
arithmeticism that does not allow for the employment of the actual infinite and even
rejects the universal validity of the principle ofthe excluded middle.
19. In reaction to the dominant machine model (already introduced by Descartesa) the
later neo-vitalist, E.W. Sinnott writes thatform 'is a continuous entity and cannot be
divided into pieces' (The problem of organic form, London 1963: 199). However,
when no part is separated, the original entity will mature normally without, by itself,
developing into more than one individual. Thus living entities display an internal
order and harmony which keep the 'equal potential' of each part in its proper place
when the organism is not disturbed, and when it is divided at an early stage, each part
will explore its full regenerative potential. Consequently, Driesch calls a living entity
a 'harmonic equipotential system' (1920:135 ff.). No machine possesses parts that
have this capability (1920:132-133, 410, 512). In a different context M. Polanyi
explains that it is not even possible to account for the nature of a machine as a
maschine purely in physical or chemical terms: 'The complete knowledge of a
machine as an object tells us nothing about it as a machine'(1969:330). In Polanyi
1967 and 1968 we find more extensive arguments in favour of the irreducibility of
'life'. Driesch accounts for the internal order and harmony displayed by living entities
by introduing his notion of an immaterial vital force, an entelechie (Philosophie des
Organischen, Leipzig 1920:139 ff.). This vital force is capable of 'suspending'
physical laws, such as the second main law ofthermodynamics (the law of non-
decreasing entropy)(l920:434 ff.).
20. Antal advances a completely atomistic understanding of the meaning nuances of a
word. He emphasizes the word as a unit of signification to such an extent that the
multiplicity of possible meaning nuances of a word is denied and transposed to the
denotata (Antal, L.: Questions of meaning, Den Haag 1963:53, 54, 58).
Representatives of the semantic field theory [Coseriu, Geckeler, Trier, cf. Schmidt,
L.: Wortfeldforschung (Ed.), Wege der Forschung, Darmstadt 1973], on the other
hand, consider the meaning nuances of a word to be integral parts of a genuine whole
(Can.:: he it).]]
21. Variants of action theory [G.H. Mead, P. Berger, T. Luckmann, T. Parsons, M. Weber
and A. Schutz- compare the representative statement of Max Weber: Concepts such
as 'state,' 'club' ... signifies specific kinds communal human actions ... , that could be
reduced to 'understandable' ('versUindliches') actions, and that means that it can,
without an exception, be reduced to the actions of the individual human beings
(Einzelmenschen) concerned (Weber, 1973:439)]- and so-called methodological
individualism (Popper, Hayek and Watkins) tend to think atomistically about society,
whereas functional approaches (system theory- Parsons, Buckley, Luhmann,
Alexander, MUnch) are more inclined to think about society in terms of a whole with
parts.
22. Classical and neoclassical economic theory is straight-forwardly individualistic
86 S. Air. 1. Philos. 1999, 18(1)

(atomistic) while the economic orientation ofOthmar Spann, a prominent German

economist and sociologist from the first halfofthe 20th century, is a full-blown
unversalism (holism).
23. Theflction theory of a legal personality is individualistic (von Savigny); the organ
theory of von Gierke is holistic.

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