formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken
1. IN A MATTER OF THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE DECEASED
BRIGIDOALVARADO, CESAR ALVARADOVSRAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., ET.AL.
FACTS: Brigido Alvarado executed a will, “Huling Habilin”, disinheriting Cesar Alvarado, an illegitimate
son. This will revoked previously executed holographic will awaiting probate.
On December 29, 1977, a codicil entitled “Kasalatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya naNasasaad
sa Huling Habilin” was executed changing some dispositions to generate cash for the testator’s
glaucoma. Both the will and the codicil was not read by the testator but instead read to him aloud by
Bayani Ma. Rino, who drafted the will. Upon probate, it was contested by the herein petitioner on the
ground that it was not executed and attested as required by law for he is not blind at the time it was
executed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Brigido was blind for the purpose of Art. 808.
2. If so, was the double-reading requirement was complied with.
HELD: Brigido was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. His vision on both
eyes was only of counting finger at “3 feet”. He could no longer read either printed or handwritten
matters as of December 14, 1977 or had poor eyesight. The Supreme Court declared that the rationale
behind Article 808 is the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes. Clear that Article 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who
are incapable of reading the will. This includes the illiterate. Moreover, since Brigido was incapable of
reading the final draft he comes to
the scope of the term “blind”.
On the second issue, Article 808 was not strictly complied. Instead by the notary public and the
instrumental witnesses, it was the respondent lawyer who read once not twice followed by the notary
public and witnesses, albeit silently. Supreme Court ruled that with four persons following the reading
word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured
that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the type written documents.
FACTS: On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled “Huling
Habilin” wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a
previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna.
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present when the said notarial will was
executed, together with three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the testator did not
read the will himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma.
Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same aloud before the testator, the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, the latter four following the reading with their own respective
copies previously furnished them.
Thereafter, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling
Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing some dispositions
in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator’s eye operation.
Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was read in the same manner as with the
previously executed will.
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he
said that the will was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or
mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence
of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary;
and that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
ISSUE: W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to probate despite allegations of defects
in the execution and attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of execution and the
double-reading requirement under Art. 808 of the NCC was not complied with.
HELD: YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be
strict compliance with the substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the
into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet)
when the will and codicil were executed, but he can be so considered for purposes of Art. 808.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance where the purpose of the law has been
satisfied: that of making the provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of reading the will
himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his wishes.
Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental
witnesses, and the notary public.
Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read
corresponded with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place.
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the testator.
With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the reading word for word with their own copies,
it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the
terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading
the will to himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may
be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its
purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.
2. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ,
(deceased)
Apolonio Taboada vs Avelino Rosal | Succession – Substantial Compliance
FACTS: Dorotea Perez left a will. The will has two pages. On the first page, which contains the entire
testamentary dispositions, were the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses and that of Dorotea
Perez. The signatures of the three instrumental witnesses were on the left margin while Perez’ signature
was on the bottom. On the second page, which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgement,
were the signatures of the three attesting witnesses and that of Dorotea Perez. The attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in the will. Taboada petitioned for the admission to probate of
the said will. The judge who handled the petition was Judge Ramon Pamatian. He denied the petition.
Taboada filed a motion for reconsideration but Pamatian was not able to act on it because he was
transferred to another jurisdiction. The case was inherited by Judge Rosal who also denied the MFR on
the grounds that a) that the testator and the instrumental witnesses did not all sign on the left margin of
the page as prescribed by law; that the testator and the witnesses should have placed their signature in
the same place b) that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will –
this, according to Judge Rosal violated the requirement that the attestation clause shall state the number
of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as
an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will
to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will should be admitted to probate.
HELD: Yes. The law must be interpreted liberally.
Further, there is substantial compliance with the law. It would be absurd that the legislature intended to
place so heavy an import on the space or particular location where the signatures are to be found as long
as this space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent with good faith.
The failure to include in the attestation clause of the number of pages used in writing the will would have
been a fatal defect. But then again, the matter should be approached liberally. There were only two pages
in the will left by Perez. The first page contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions and signed
by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The
other page which is marked as “Pagina dos” comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment.
Further, the acknowledgment itself states that “This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages
including this page.”
3. SEANGIO v. REYES G.R. Nos. 140371-72 27 November 2006
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio. This petition was opposed by the petitioners on the ground that Segundo left a holographic will,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause, among others. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will,
the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will. The petitioners instead filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will.
Then private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground
that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of
the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE: WON t he document executed by Segundo be considered as a holographic will?
RULING: YES. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in
or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundo’s document, although it may initially come
across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed
by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa
can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in
itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo
in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle
that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law,
must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain
and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or
public policy that it cannot be given effect. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even
if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary
act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
4. CONDE V. ABAYA G.R. No. 4275 23 March 1909
FACTS: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, died. Paula
Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by
Casiano Abaya, moved the settlement of' the said intestate succession. Roman Abaya, brother of
Casiano, was appointed as administrator claiming himself as the nearest relative of the deceased. Roman
Abaya moved that the court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other
persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of
said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him.
Paula Conde, in reply, claims that her right was superior and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in
consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have
preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her together
with the corresponding products thereof. The trial held that the administrator of the estate of Casiano
Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the
petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the
inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she
is the only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman
Abaya.
ISSUE: Is an action for acknowledgment by a natural child transmissible as a portion of his inheritance
to his ascendants or descendants?
HELD: NO. As a general rule, the right of action of a child to enforce recognition of its legitimacy lasts
during the lifetime of such child, but the right of a natural child to compel acknowledgment of its status
continues only during the life of the alleged parents. The right of action for a declaration of legitimacy is
transmitted to the heirs of the child only when - the latter dies during minority or while insane, or in case
the action has already been instituted. On the other hand an action by a natural child can only be brought
against the heirs of the parents in the event of the death of the parents during the minority of the child, or
upon the discovery of a document, after the death of the parents, expressly acknowledging such child.
This right of action which the law concedes to this natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or
descendants. Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That the
right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118, may be transmitted
to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2) That the right of action for the
acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers, can never be transmitted, for the reason
that the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. It is evident that the right of
action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by
inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there
would have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and
conditions of article 118 of the code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the child's
inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be present,
since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime, being personal and exclusive in
principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible of transmission, would and should have been
extinguished by his death. Therefore, where no express provision like that of article 118 exists, the right
of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by
his death, and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.
5. PAMPLONA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-33187 31 March 1980
FACTS: Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, they
acquired adjacent lots 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba,
Laguna. The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6) children,
namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto. Ursulo Moreto died
intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina,
Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto. Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her
heir plaintiff Victoria Tuiza. La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs,
namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza. Alipio Moreto
died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff Josefina Moreto. Pablo Moreto died
intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the
other plaintiffs herein. On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna. On July 30,
1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the
consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married
to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of
sale contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781 square meters and covered by
transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega,
although the lot was acquired during their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was
cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title no. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano
Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte.
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia
Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale,
pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son
of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496 about one
meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano
Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square meters which was the subject matter of their
sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale
although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot
No. 1496. From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged their house
and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said house about one and one-half meters
from the eastern boundary of lot 1496. On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the
plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery
on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as
the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already
dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The
spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and
hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the nullity of
the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 as regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed; to
declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the
one-half portion thereof sold to the defendants. After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by
agreement of the parties, it was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the
defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot
No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot
No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale transaction.
ISSUE: Does Moreto have the right to sell the property without the consent of the wife’s heirs, considering
that the subject property is part of the conjugal partnership and that the sale was made when the wife
was already dead?
RULING: YES. The Court held that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already
dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto,
the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil
Code is applicable. The Court held that there was a partial partition of the co- ownership when at the time
of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the
petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of
petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery. The Court rejected CA’s
pronouncement that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid as to the other half for the very simple
reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal
estate, a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro
indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated
the boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without objection, protest or complaint by the
other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and
possession, the Court ruled that a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial,
was created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents
herein from asserting as against the vendees petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale
executed by said vendor Flaviano Moreto. Lastly, equity commands that the private respondents, the
successors of both the deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to
impugn the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00
and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica
Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of
Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and
transferring the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the
herein private respondents. Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents
received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and
obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New
Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private
respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to
the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-
half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation. The records reveal that the area of
781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the
complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled
to a segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are
also entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the relocation
survey.
6. GUERRERO v. BIHIS G.R. No. 174144 17 April 2007
FACTS: On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero
and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan Hospital in Tondo, Manila. On May 24,
1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent in Branch 95
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-20661.
Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was not executed and
attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the
requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her
children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence. On January 17, 2000,
after petitioner presented her evidence, respondent filed a demurrer thereto alleging that petitioner's
evidence failed to establish that the decedent's will complied with Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil Code.
In a resolution dated July 6, 2001, the trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of
the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the
witnesses at the testatrix's, residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O.
Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
ISSUE: Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary public
acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
HELD: No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that
it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. This formal requirement
is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot
be accepted for probate.
The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerce the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare
before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they executed and subscribed to the will as their own
free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for the
criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed
without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is
of a certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or
designated as devisees or legatees in the will A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his
favor to perform notarial acts. It is issued "within and for" a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary
public's authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a notary public is authorized to perform notarial
acts, including the taking of acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of
his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial
act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. Since Atty. Directo was not a
commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment
of the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could
not have validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's last will and
testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.
7. TEOPISTA DOLAR v. FIDEL DIANCIN G.R. No. L-33365 20 December 1930
FACTS: The will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was denied probate in the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo on the sole ground that the thumbmarks appearing thereon were not the thumbmarks of the testator.
Disregarding the other errors assigned by the proponent of the will, we would direct attention to the third
error which challenges squarely the correctness of this finding. The will in question is alleged to have
been executed by Paulino Diancin at Dumangas, Iloilo, on November 13, 1927. A thumbmark appears at
the end of the will and on the left hand margin of each of its pages in the following manner: "Paulino
Diancin, Su Signo, Por Pedro Diamante." The witnesses to the will were the same Pedro Diamante,
Inocentes Deocampo, and Juan Dominado. The will is detailed in nature, and disposes of an estate
amounting approximately to P50,000.
ISSUE: WON disputed will is valid despite the fact that there’s a thumbmark instead of a signature in the
will?
HELD: YES. The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied not only the
customary written signature but also by the testator's or testatrix' thumbmark. Expert Testimonyas to the
identity of thumbmarks or fingerprints is of course admissible. The method of identification of fingerprints
is a science requiring close study .Where thumb impressions are blurred and many of the characteristic
marks far from clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the features enumerated by experts as showing
the identity or lack of identity of the impressions, the court is justified in refusing to accept the opinions of
alleged experts and in substituting its own opinion that a distinct similarity in some respects between the
admittedly genuine thumbmark and the questioned thumbmarks, is evident .This we do here.
There is another means of approach to the question and an obvious one. The three instrumental
witnesses united in testifying concerning the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. It was
stated that in addition to the testator and themselves, on other person, Diosdado Dominado, was present.
This latter individual was called as a witness by the oppositors to the will to identify Exhibit 8. He was
later placed on the witness stand by the proponent on rebuttal, and thereupon declared positively that he
was the one who prepared the will for the signature of Paulino Diancin; that the thumbmarks appearing
on the will were those of Paulino Diancin, and that he saw Paulino Diancin make these impressions. The
testimony of a witness called by both parties is worthy of credit. We reach the very definite conclusion
that the document presented for probate as the last will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was, in truth,
his will, and that the thumbmarks appearing thereon were the thumbmarks of the testator .Accordingly,
error is found, which means that the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the
will ordered admitted to probate, without special finding as to costs in this instance.
8. YAP TUA v. YAP KA KUAN G.R. No. 6845 1 September 1914
FACTS: In 1909, Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to
probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. It appears that the will
was signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez. The judge
ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed and admitted to
probate. The court further ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the will, upon the giving
of a bond, the amount of which was to be fixed later. In 1910, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu appeared
and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in the matters of the said will and desired to
intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent them in the cause. The court
appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. In his motion, he alleged the following: First.
That the will dated the 11th day of August, 1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on the
29th day of September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons: (a) Because the same had not been
authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes. (b) Because at the time of the execution
of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same,
due to her sickness. (c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal
influence upon the part of persons who were to receive a benefit from the same, and because the said
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no intention of executing the same. Second. That before the execution
of the said will, which they alleged to be null, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had executed another
will, with all the formalities required by law, upon the 6th day of August, 1909. Third. That the said Yap
Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu were minors and that, even though they had been negligent in presenting their
opposition to the legalization of the will, said negligence was excusable, on account of their age. Upon
the foregoing facts the court was requested to annul and set aside the order allowing and admitting the
will to probate.
ISSUE: Did Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of
all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909?
HELD: YES. While it is true that some of the witnesses testified that the brother of Tomasa, one Lorenzo,
had attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he will, upon the other hand, there were
several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at the time of the execution of the will, to
influence her mind in any way. The lower court having had an opportunity to see, to hear, and to note the
witnesses during their examination reached the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence showed
that no undue influence had been used. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the
mental condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time
perhaps twenty-four hours before the execution of the will in question. Several witnesses testified that at
the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and asked
for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The
lower court found that there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time
she signed this will. Also, the mere fact that she executed a former will is no proof that she did not execute
a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance with the provisions
of law, up to the very last of moment her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke
any and all of her former wills and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to
expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the charge that she did not make the new will.
In another assignment of error there is involved in the statement that "The signature of Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong, in her first will was not identical with that which appears in her second will.” Several witnesses
testified that they saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the witnesses testified that she had written
her full name. The Court is of the opinion that if Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her
name to the will, with the intention to sign the same, that the will amount to a signature. It has been held
time and time again that one who makes a will may sign the same by using a mark, the name having
been written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the
person to make and execute a will, then certainly the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be
accepted as a clear indication of her intention to execute the will. With reference to the fourth assignment
of error, it may be said that during the trial of the cause, the protestants made a strong effort to show that
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not
sign their names in their presence nor in the presence of each other. Upon that question there is
considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that the will was signed by the witnesses in
one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was
presented as proof and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or
two steps below the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located
upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was
possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute that
one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must
sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless,
the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where
it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon
the will. Upon a full consideration of the record, the Court finds that a preponderance of the proof shows
that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all
her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909.
9. EUTIQUIA AVERA v. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. 15566 14 September
1921
FACTS: In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will of one
Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez. Upon the date appointed for
the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified that
the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full
possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who
wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was
their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.
When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony
tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was so
debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about. Judge found that the testator at the time
of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly
executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate. From this judgment an appeal was taken in behalf
of the persons contesting the will.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single
attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two; and
2. Whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator
and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the
left margin.
HELD:
1. NO. (But in this case, it was admitted to probate, read below). All three witnesses must be produced.
While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will may be proved by the testimony of only one of the
three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291, this court declared after
an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of
the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court. In the
present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses were not
produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for the probate of this
will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5,
1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that the
attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the probate would not be contested, repaired to the
court with only one of the three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested,
incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that
he might produce all the attesting witnesses. Although this circumstance may explain why the three
witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule expounded in
the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would probably be
compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the will had not been proved by a
sufficient number of attesting witnesses. It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the
appellant in the lower court either upon the submission of the cause for determination in that court or
upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial. Accordingly it is insisted for the appellee that
this question cannot now be raised for the first time in this court. We believe this point is well taken, and
the first assignment of error must be declared not be well taken. This exact question has been decided
by the Supreme Court of California adversely to the contention of the appellant, and we see no reason
why the same rule of practice should not be observed by us. Estate of McCarty, 58 Cal., 335, 337.
2. NO. The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan
40 Phil., 476, 479, where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the
signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said: The object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o
will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative
of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest
any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law,
such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.
10. NAYVE v. MOJAL AND AGUILAR G.R. No. 21755 29 December 1924
FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Albay ordered the probate of the will, holding that the document
in controversy was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law. The
defects attributed to the will are: (a) The fact of not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses
on each and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the document not being paged
with letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages actually
used of the will; and (d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the
presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in the presence
of the testator and of each other.
Attestation Clause: "In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the town of Camalig, Albay,
Philippine Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and eighteen, composed of four sheets,
including the next: "ANTONIO MOJAL " (Signed and declared by the testator Don Antonio Mojal to be his
last will and testament in the presence of each of us, and at the request of said testator Don Antonio
Mojal, we signed this will in the presence of each other and of the testator.) "PEDRO CARO "SlLVERIO
MORCO "ZOILO MASINAS"
ISSUE: WON the will is valid
HELD: YES. Where each and every page upon which the will is written was signed by the testator and
the witnesses, the fact that the signatures on each page do not all appear on the left margin thereof does
not detract from the validity of the will. Paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters is within the spirit
of the law, and is just as valid as paging with letters. The number of sheets or pages of which the will is
composed must be stated in the attestation clause (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405); but
where such a fact appears at the end of the will so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of its
sheets, then the failure to state in the attestation clause the number of the pages of the instrument does
not invalidate it. The attestation clause must state the fact that the testator and the witnesses reciprocally
saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not
stated therein. But the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will can
be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the document itself, and the
omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate the will.
11. TESTATE OF THE LATE REV. P. ELEUTERIO PILAPIL v. PILAPIL CALIXTO AND OTHERS
FACTS: P. Eleuterio Pilapil, the parish priest of Mualboal of Cebu Province, died on December 6, 1935.
No will has been presented after his death, at least until early February 1939. A part of the will states that:
ART. SECOND: I hereby certify that this Last Will and Testament, which confirms, affirms and assures
the legitimacy of documents for my buyers granted consists of two items; contains sixteen provisions and
is written on three pages; x x x x x x x x x
Also at the bottom of the pages (1) and (2) are respectively the notes: "Go to 2. Pages", "go to 3. Pages".
ISSUE: Is the will NOT valid because the attestation clause does not state the number of pages upon
which the will was written?
RULING: NO. The will is valid. First translation: The court held that this deficiency was cured by the will
itself, which stated that it consisted of three pages and in fact it had three pages. Second translation: The
court held that the law has been substantially complied with inasmuch as in the body of the will and on
the same page wherein the attestation clause appears written it is expressly stated that will contains three
pages each of which was numbered in letters and in figures.
12. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA v. ALIPIO ABAJA G.R. No. 147145
FACTS: Alipio Abada (Abada) died sometime in May 1940, while his widow died sometime in 1943. Both
died without legitimate children. Respondent Alipio Abaja (respondent) filed before the RTC a petition for
the probate of the last will and testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his
natural children Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova. Respondent is the son of Eulogio Abaja. Nicanor
Caponong (Caponong) opposed to the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he died. He
further alleged that assuming a will was really executed, the same should be disallowed on the ground,
among others, that it was not executed and attested as required by law. The nephews, nieces and
grandchildren of Abada also opposed based on the same grounds that Caponong alleged. The RTC
allowed the probate of the will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Caponong primarily based the arguments on Article 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code. Article
804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Article 806.
Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary
public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
ISSUE: WON the will was executed and attested in accordance with the law?
RULING: YES. Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Old Civil
Code (Civil Code of 1889) and the Code of Civil Procedure, which governed the execution of the wills
before the enactment of the New Civil Code. Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new
provisions. Relevant provision: Article 795. The validity of the will as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the time it is made. Caponong pointed out that nowhere in the will can
one discern that Abada knew the Spanish language. This contention must fail, as there is no statutory
requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. This is
a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Respondent testified that Abada used to gather
Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in
Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language. The Code of Civil
Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil procedure, the intervention
of a notary public is not necessary in the execution of any will. Therefore, Abada’s will does not require
acknowledgment before a notary public. Moreover, a scrutiny of Abada’s will shows that it has an
attestation clause. Caponong argued that the attestation clause does not indicate the number of
witnesses. On this point, the Court applies the rule on substantial compliance. While the attestation clause
does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed
it. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to
have been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should,
in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate,
although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect.
The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus: They do not allow
evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in
the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its
meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp
limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.
13. CANEDA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 103554 28 May 1993
FACTS: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life,
executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses. The
said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition
before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and testament. The
testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Petitioners, claiming
to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition for the intestate proceeding of
Mateo’s estate, had their said petition consolidated with the first petition aforementioned and opposed
the probate of the testator's will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate, claiming
that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since
it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will
in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another. The contested attestation clause are reproduced below: We, the undersigned
attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective
names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO;
has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment,
each page numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and
Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and
on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us.
The attestation clause is subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three
attesting witnesses.
ISSUE: Is the absence of the statement \that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another’ in the attestation clause fatally defective?
RULING: YES. Under the third paragraph of Article 805, an attestation clause, the complete lack of which
would result in the invalidity of the will, should state (1) the number of the pages used upon which the will
is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof
in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by
the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily
result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. The Court stresses that
under Article 809, i.e., the substantial compliance rule, the defects and imperfections must only be with
respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections
would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in
compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however, the manner of proving the due execution and
attestation has been held to be limited to merely an examination of the will itself without resorting to
evidence aliunde, whether oral or written. The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation
clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or
language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to
be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. The rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which
can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence,
will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being
assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result
in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
14. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR.
SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR,
and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR v. COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS
LABRADOR G.R. No. 83843-44 5 April 1990
FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died leaving behind a parcel of land and the following heirs,
namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed
Labrador, and a holographic will.
Sagrado Labrador (deceased but substituted by his heirs) filed a petition for the probate of the alleged
will of the late Melecio Labrador. Subsequently, Jesus Labrador and Gaudencio Labrador filed an
opposition on the ground that the will has been revoked by implication of law, alleging that before the
death of Melecio, he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio.
Sagrado filed for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado
allegedly had already acquired by device from their father under a holographic will executed on March
17, 1968 being premised on the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious. The Trial Court allowed
the probate of the holographic will and declared null and void the Deed of Sale. The CA modified the
decision by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being undated. It is principally alleged that
the holographic will is dated, although the date is not in its usual place.
ISSUE: WON a holographic will still considered as “dated” when the date is not located in its usual place?
HELD: YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will.
The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. The
will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Art. 810. It is worthy of
note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will: And this is the day in which
we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968... The intention to show 17
March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the
paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement by a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador
who plainly knew that he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such
partitioning as the testator’s instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio was fully aware of
the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a
means to control the disposition of his estate.
15. RODELAS v. ARANZA, ET AL. G.R. No. L-58509 7 December 1982
FACTS: This case is about the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla which was opposed
by the Bonillas. They allege among others that the alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy
thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect. The will was not probated.
ISSUE: WON a holographic will be proved based on photocopies of the same?
RULING: YES. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will.I t
is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.
16. CODOY v. CALUGAY G.R. No. 123486 12 August 1999
FACTS: Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seno Vda. Ramonal, filed with the RTC for probate of the
holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. Respondents claimed that deceased
was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, there was no fraud,
undue influence and duress and the will was written voluntarily. Egneia Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed
an opposition to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that same is
even illegible. It gives the impression that a third hard of an interested party executed the holographic
will. Codoy and Ramonal argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after every
disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, the dates and
signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done.
The lower court denied the petition for probate of the document. On Appeal, the decision of the lower
court was reversed. The CA held, citing J.B.L. Reyes, “xxx even if the genuineness of the holographic
will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be interpreted
as to require compulsory presentation of 3 witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may been present at the execution of the
holographic will, none being required by law, it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. xxx but it can not
be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments,
precisely because of the presence of at least 3 witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by
law essential to their validity. Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present and the rule
requiring production of witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.”
ISSUE: WON Article 811 of the Civil Code mandatory?
RULING: YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that “shall” in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute is mandatory. Laws are enacted to achieve
a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief it aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to
achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. The
paramount consideration is to determine the true intent of the deceased. We cannot eliminate the
possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic
will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will as in the handwriting of the
deceased. It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that
they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. The Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate
and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of a contested holographic will. Moreover, the
will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept
it even before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased
with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison
was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to
compare the documents, which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will,
and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the formal lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. A visual examination of the holographic will convince
us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The
signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing
and erasures on the will. Comparing the signature in the holographic will and the signatures in several
documents such as the application letter for pasture permit, the strokes are different. In the letters, there
are continuous flows of the strokes evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of a
holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the
deceased.
17. SPOUSES ROBERTO & THELMA AJERO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND
G.R. No. 106720 14 September 1994
FACTS: The decedent names as devisees Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente
Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero and
their children. The petitioners filed a petition for the allowance of decedent's holo will. Private Respondent
opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in
decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by the
decedent; and the will was procured by pets through improper pressure and undue influence. Dr. Jose
Ajero also opposed the petition. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in
Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court admitted the holo will to probate. On appeal, the
said decision was reversed and the pet for probate was dismissed. The CA found that the holo will failed
to meet the requirements for its validity. I held that the decedent did not comply with Arts 813 and 814. It
alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated.
It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated
by decedent.
ISSUE: WON the respondent court correct in disallowing the probate of the will?
RULING: NO. Refer to Art. 839. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether
the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was
executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the
necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the
will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code
shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not
its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
18. AZAOLA v. SINGSON G.R. No. L-14003 5 August 1960
FACTS: When Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died, petitioner Francisco Azaola filed a petition for the
probate of the former’s holographic will, whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as
against the nephew of the deceased Cesario Singson. Witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw
the holographic will one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as the same was handed
to him and his wife. Witness Francisco testified also that he recognized all the signatures appearing in
the holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said statement, witness presented
the mortgage, the special power of attorney, and the general power of attorney, besides the deeds of
sale and including an affidavit and two residence certificates to show the signatures of the testatrix, for
comparison purposes. The opposition to the probate was on the grounds that (1) the execution of the will
was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife,
and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was
actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears
on the will. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent
must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON Article 811 mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting
and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party?
HELD: NO. We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was
not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted as to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a
holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the
existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be
witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of
course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator." There may be no available witness acquainted with the testator’s hand; or even if so familiarized,
the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of
Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of
Article 811 prescribes that - "in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to." As can be seen,
the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same
thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for
resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
19. NATIVIDAD NAZARENO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 138842 18 October 2000
FACTS: Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15,
1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad,
Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case,
while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents. After the
death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch XV,
where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-28. Upon the reorganization of the courts in 1983, the
case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite. Romeo was appointed administrator of
his father’s estate. In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had
executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad.
Among the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3- B which is registered under TCT No. 140946.
This lot had been occupied by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and by Maximino, Jr. since 1969. Unknown to
Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr., for which reason the latter was issued
TCT No. 293701 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
Romeo sought the declaration of nullity of the sale made on January 29, 1970 to Natividad and that made
on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration.
Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party complaint against the spouses Romeo and Eliza.They
alleged that Lot 3, which was included in the Deed of Absolute Sale of January 29, 1970 to Natividad,
had been surreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing for himself a new title (TCT No. 277968) in
his name. They alleged that Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses Romeo and Eliza to third persons. They
therefore sought the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and the cancellation of his title, the eviction of
Romeo and his wife Eliza and all persons claiming rights from Lot 3, and the payment of damages. Romeo
presented evidence to show that Maximino and Aurea Nazareno never intended to sell the six lots to
Natividad and that Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He presented the Deed
of Partition and Distribution dated June 28, 1962 executed by Maximino Sr. and Aurea and duly signed
by all of their children, except Jose, who was then abroad and was represented by their mother, Aurea.
Petitioners make capital of the fact that in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12932, which was declared final by this Court
in G.R. No. 107684, the Court of Appeals upheld the right of Maximino, Jr. to recover possession of Lot
3-B. In that case, the Court of Appeals held: As shown in the preceding disquisition, Natividad P.
Nazareno acquired the property in dispute by purchase in 1970. She was issued Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 162738 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. When her parents died, her mother Aurea
Poblete-Nazareno in 1970 and her father Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. in 1980, Natividad P. Nazareno had
long been the exclusive owner of the property in question. There was no way therefore that the aforesaid
property could belong to the estate of the spouses Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete. The mere
fact that Romeo P. Nazareno included the same property in an inventory of the properties of the deceased
Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. will not adversely affect the ownership of the said realty. Appellant Romeo P.
Nazareno’s suspicion that his parents had entrusted all their assets under the care and in the name of
Natividad P. Nazareno, their eldest living sister who was still single, to be divided upon their demise to all
the compulsory heirs, has not progressed beyond mere speculation. His barefaced allegation on the point
not only is without any corroboration but is even belied by documentary evidence. x x x x
ISSUES:
1. Should the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the ownership of Maximo, Jr. over the lot under
consideration be binding to the estate of Maximo Sr.?
2. Should the lots in question be a proper subject of collation?
RULING:
1. NO. To be sure, the abovecited case decided by the Court of Appeals was for recovery of possession
based on ownership of Lot 3-B. The parties in that case were Maximino, Jr., as plaintiff, and the spouses
Romeo and Eliza, as defendants. On the other hand, the parties in the present case for annulment of
sale are the estate of Maximino, Sr., as plaintiff, and Natividad and Maximino, Jr., as defendants. Romeo
and Eliza were named third-party defendants after a third-party complaint was filed by Natividad and
Maximino, Jr. As already stated, however, this third-party complaint concerned Lot 3, and not Lot 3-B.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. Though Romeo
represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality
from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr.
over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to
recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.
2. YES. As Romeo admitted, no consideration was paid by him to his parents for the Deed of Sale.
Therefore, the sale was void for having been simulated. Natividad never acquired ownership over the
property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being without consideration and title to Lot
3 cannot be issued in her name. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the
six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of
Natividad because the latter was the only “female and the only unmarried member of the family.” She
was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, she intended
to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad. There was thus an implied
trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states: There is also an implied trust when a
donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he
nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof. There being an implied trust,
the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which states: Every
compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
20. RIVERA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. Nos. 75005-06 15 February 1990
FACTS: A prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. Jose Rivera,
claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration over Venancio's estate which was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose
was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but
in fact left two holographic wills which was eventually admitted to probate. Zenaida and Venancio Rivera,
Jr., siblings of Adelaido, authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father. The
existence and also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera. In his own
petition, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; he also denied the existence of the holographic
wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic
wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were spurious.
After joint trial, it was found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio
Rivera who was married to Maria VITAL. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married
to Maria JOCSON, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido.
ISSUE: WON Jose Rivera can contest the validity of the supposed holographic wills of Venancio Rivera?
HELD: NO. Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question.
Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did
not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera,
Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient. In the
probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting
and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required. The respondent court
considered the holographic wills valid because it found them to have been written, dated and signed by
the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity
of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had not
been questioned.
21. CAPITLE v. ELBAMBUENA G.R. No. 169193 30 November 2006
FACTS: A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to Cristobal Olar (Olar) covering a
parcel of agricultural land in Nueva Ecija. Respondents alleged that on petitioners’ request, petitioners
were allowed to occupy the lot to pursue a means of livelihood. Since 1990, however, petitioners did not
pay rentals despite demand therefor, and neither did they heed the demand to return the possession of
the lot, drawing respondents to file a Petition for Recovery of Possession and Payment of Back Rentals
before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Petitioners, on the other hand,
claiming that they have been in possession of the lot since 1960, presented a "Waiver of Rights" executed
by Olar wherein he renounced in their favor his rights and participation over the lot; a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" wherein Olar acknowledged that he co- possessed the lot with petitioner Capitle since 1960;
and a Pinagsamang Patunay from the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman and
barangay chairman of Valle certifying that they (petitioners) are the actual tillers and possessors of the
lot. Petitioners further claim that since 1959, Fortunata was already separated from Olar and she even
remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit from Olar. DARAB ruled against petitioners. The CA ruled
that Olar’s death substantially passed all his rights and interest in and over the subject property to his
legal heirs by operation of law. In the case at bench, to herein respondents-appellees: to Fortunata
Elbambuena, being his surviving wife, and to Rosalinda Olar, his son’s surviving spouse. This is as it
should, considering that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent. And since Fortunata and Rosalinda’s relationship with Olar was in this case never put in issue,
their being legal heirs of the deceased gave them unqualified right to participate in all proceedings
affecting the subject property.
ISSUE: WON the waiver of rights made by the deceased deprive the legal heirs of their participation in
the proceedings over the subject property?
letters of administration should be issued in favor of her and her cousins as the only living collateral
relatives of the decedent.
ISSUES:
1. Is the will invalid for failure to conform to the formalities required by law?
2. Is the will invalid because it was procured through undue influence and pressure? 3. Did the court err
in not granting the letters of administration to the petitioner?
RULING:
1. NO. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the
totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the
attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument
is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an
omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will
is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the “doctrine of liberal interpretation”
enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code.
2. NO. The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict
the presumption that the testator was of sound mind. Not one of the oppositors’ witnesses has mentioned
any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a
manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not
necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. 3. NO. The petitioner and her siblings are not
compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed
of her properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the
decedent’s estate. Note: The Supreme Court ruled that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure
questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding
on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. SC only affirmed CA’s decision.

HELD: Petitioners concede that although Olar’s death passed all his rights and interest over the lot to his
legal heirs, his intent of not bequeathing them to his estranged wife but to a relative, who helped him in
tilling the lot and who took care of him, should be accorded respect over the intent of the law on hereditary
succession. The Court does not agree. Petitioners’ argument that it would be absurd for Olar to bequeath
his property to his estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped him in tilling the property and
took good care of his needs, is a virtual admission that their possession was not in the concept of owners,
they having merely helped in tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that Olar was the actual possessor
and tiller. Even assuming that petitioners were indeed the actual tillers of the lot, their petition for the
cancellation of the CLOA issued in favor of Olar would not bind respondents as they were not impleaded.
Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir, mere
estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the
deceased spouse. Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of Olar’s son. The two are thus
real parties-in-interest who stand to be injured or benefited by the judgment on the cancellation of the
CLOA issued in Olar’s name.

22. PAZ SAMANIEGO- CELADA v. LUCIA D. ABENA G.R. No. 145545 30 June 2008
FACTS: The RTC had declared the last will and testament of Margarita S. Mayores probated and
designated Lucia Abena, her life-long companion, as the executor of her will. It also ordered the issuance
of letters testamentary in favor of Lucia. Paz Samaniego-Celada, the first cousin of Margarita, questioned
the order of the court. Paz alleged that the will was not signed in the presence of instrumental witnesses
and in the presence of one another. She also argued that there was an indication that the pages of the
will were not signed by the testator on the same day and there was a discrepancy in the numbering of
pages. She alleged that the will was procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time
of the execution of the will, the testator was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon Lucia for
support, thereby affecting her freedom and willpower to decide on her own. Finally, she claimed that the