Merill Lynch Futures vs.

CA

FACTS:

Merill Lynch Futures, a non-resident foreign corporation headquartered in Delaware, USA entered into a
futures customer agreement with the spouses Lara pursuant to which orders to buy and sell futures
contracts were transmitted by the spouses to ML Futures through the facilities of Merill Lynch Phils.
Eventually, the spouses became indebted to ML Futures in the amount of USD84,836.27 which the latter
asked them to pay. The spouses however refused to pay because the transactions were reportedly a
nullity because Merill Lynch Phils. had no license to operate as a futures broker. ML Futures filed a
complaint against the spouses for the recovery of the said amount praying that judgment be rendered
ordering the spouses to pay the peso equivalent of USD84,836.27 over and above damages and
attorneys fees. The spouses filed a motion to dismiss averring inter alia that complaint states no action
since ML Futures is not a real party in interest and in support thereof, referred in said motion to
documents establishing that they had been dealing not with ML Futures but with Merill Lynch Pierce
Fenner & Smith, copies of which were attached to the motion. ML Futures raised no issue as to the
authenticity of the documents. The RTC took account of the documents and ruled to sustain the motion
to dismiss. The CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not error may be ascribed to the trial court in taking account of the documents in the
determination of the motion on the ground that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue respecting
which proof may and should be presented

DECISION:

No. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on
affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be
heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. There was, to be sure, no affidavit or deposition
attached to the Lara Spouses' motion to dismiss or thereafter proffered in proof of the averments of
their motion. What the spouses did do was to refer in their motion to documents which purported to
establish that it was not with ML FUTURES that they had theretofore been dealing, but another, distinct
entity, copies of which documents were attached to the motion. It is significant that ML FUTURES raised
no issue relative to the authenticity of the documents thus annexed to the Laras' motion. There being
otherwise no question respecting the genuineness of the documents, nor of their relevance to at least
one of the grounds for dismissal, it would have been a superfluity for the Court to require prior proof of
their authenticity, and no error may be ascribed to the Trial Court in taking account of them in the
determination of the motion.