See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/303169056

An overview of self-determination theory: An organismic dialectical perspective

Article · January 2002

CITATIONS READS

1,212 2,060

2 authors:

Richard M Ryan Edward L Deci

Australian Catholic Univ., Strathfield, Australia University of Rochester
365 PUBLICATIONS   123,319 CITATIONS    291 PUBLICATIONS   103,916 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Diversity Higher Education View project

Sieving the essential ingredients to an effective science education View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Richard M Ryan on 10 January 2017.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

1: Overview of Self-Determination Theory:
An Organismic Dialectical Perspective

Richard M. Ryan
Edward L. Deci
Unwersity o/ Rochestu

In the classical, Aristotelian, view of human development, people arc assumed to

possess an active tendency toward psychological growth and integration.
Endowed with an innate stT·h~ng to exercise and elaborate their interests, indi-
viduals tt:nd naturally to seck challenges, to discover new perspectives, and 10
actively internalize and transform cultural practices. By stretching thei.r capaci-
ties and expressing thei.r talents and propensities, people actualize their human
potentials. Within this perspective, active growth is complemented by a tendency
toward synthesis, organization, or relative unity of both knowledge and person-
ality. Moreover, the integration of that which is experienced providt-s the basis for
a coherent sense of self- a sense of wholeness, vitalit}\ and integrity. To the
degree that individuals have attained a sense of self, they can act in accord "~th,
or be "true" to, that seU:
T his general view of an active, integrating organism with the potential to a.ct
from a coherent sense of self can be found in psychodynamic and humanistic
theories of personality and in cognitive theories of development. For example,
psychoanalytic theorists posit inherent activity and a synthetic function of the ego
(Freud, 1927; Nunberg, 1931; Meissner, 1981; White, 1963), and humani.~tic psy-
clJOlogists postulate an actualizing tendency (Angyal, 1963; Maslow, 1955;
Rogers, 1963). Similarly, many cognitive d<:vclo pmcntal theories emphasize an
organizational or imcgrativc tendency as an endogenous feature of the organism,
proposing that development is clmracterized by an overarching organization
function through which new self-extensions are brought into coherence with
other cognitive stmctures (Piagct, 1971; 'vVerncr, 1948).

Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by a n:st~a.rch gram from the
National Institute of Mental Health (MH-53385).

Copyrighted materia
4 HA£'\l)BOOK OF SEJ..F -D t::TERMlKA'l' l OK

lo Vat]•ing degrees, some recent theories have continued 10 embrace such

ao;sumptions (e.g,, Ford, 1992; Locvinger & Blasi, 1991; Kuhl & Fuhrmann,
1998), recognizing the intrinsic propensities of people to engage i.n active, curios-
ity-based exploration and to integrate new experiences to the self.
Oc~pite its longevity and seeming popularity, the assumption of innate ten-
dencies toward growth and integration is not without its critics. Among the more
staundl oppom:nts of constructs concerning growth and integration have been
operant behaviorists who assume there is no inherent direction to development
and suggrs t that beha.,.;oral regulation and personality arc a function of rein-
forcement histories and current contingencies (e.g., Skinner, 1953). For them, any
appearance of an inner organization to personality is attributable not to a pre-
sumed integrative tendent:y but rather ro the fact that the relevant contingencies
people encountered in their environmems were organized and systematic.
Similar!)\ contemporary soci al-cognitive approaclu;s portray personality not
in tcmts of a sell~unifying system, but rather as a collection of selves or sclf-
sc-.hcmas that arc activated by cues. Personality is viewed as a repository for
schemata related to various goals and identities, each of which can be elicited by
features of the social contexts (Bandura, 1989; Higgin~, 198i; Markus & Nurius,
1986; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Unlike their operant predecessors, sur.h soc-.ial-
cognitivc theories do not deny the idea of a synthetic tendency in development,
but instead periphcralizc it, focusing on the uni1k'CI properties within isolated gnat
schemata or regulatory structures rather than among such schemata or structures.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the concept of endogenous tcnden-
cit"-~ toward psychological growth and unity in development seems to Oy in the
face of everyday behavioral observations. Ambient e~;dence could readily sup-
port the \~cw that people arc no more characterized by tendencies toward growth
and integrity than by propensities to be controlled, fragmemcd, and stagnated in
development. Everywhere, we S(:C signs of divided functioning, of inner conOict
and a lack of concern \\~th responsibility and community. These widespread
symptoms arc echoed i.n psychological theories (e.g., Broughton, 1987;
Greenwald, I 982). ln fact, Gergen (I 993) ~;ewed tl1c metaphor of a core or true
self that grows and struggles for unity as a post-romantic view that should be
replaced by the acceptance of a postmodern perspective in which the self is more
aptly described as fragmented, saturated, and diversely populated by identities
that arc imputed by the social world.
It s<,em.~ indeed that the field of psychology is quite widdy divided on the
issues of inherent tendencies toward psychologic-ill growth, a unified self; and
autonomous, responsible bcha\~Or. Whereas some theorists sec our nature as
including a self-organizing, growth promoting tendency, others see us as wholly
lacking such an endowment, and thus as mere conditioned or reactive reflections
of our surroundings. importantly, each position seems to have some prima facie
C\~dcncc in i~~ favor.
This set of issu"s concerning the degree to which there are inherent tenden-
cies toward growt11 and integration is important not only theoretically, but also

Copyr ghlcd materia

 Ove rview of Se{f-Determination Theor_y 5

practically. Insofar as practitioners believe people have a natural tendency toward

gammg
' ' 'mtegnty
• an d enhancmg
• t11c1r · ·• t11cy WI·u oncnt
· human potcnwus, · 10 sup-
porting and facilitating that endogenous tendency across a variety of settings,
including homes, schools, work organizations, and therapy clinics. In contrast,
insofar as practitioners assume no such inner tendency toward growth, self-con-
struction, and inner coherence, then educ.ational, d1erapeutic, and other practi-
cal intervention srrategies will focus on exogenous means of training, shaping,
conrrolling, and directing behavior towards ends deemed to be of v.Uue.

The Organismic Dialectic: An Integrating Perspective

The primary agenda of self-determinmjon theo•y (SOT; Occi & Ryan,

1985b; Ryan & Deci, 2000b) has been to provide an account of the seemingly
discrepant viewpoints characterized, on the one hand, by the humanistk, psy-
choanalytic, and developmental theories that employ an organismic metatheory
and, on the other hand, by the beha\~oral, cognitive, and post-modern theories
that do not. Ln other words, recognizing that there is compelling evidence in favor
of human tendencies toward active engagement and development and that there
is, as wcU, manifold indication of fragmentation and conditioned responses, SOT
provides a framework that imegratcs the phenomena illuminated by these dis-
crepant viewpoints.
SOT begins by embracing the assumption d1at all individuals have natural,
innate, and constrU<:tivc tendencies to develop an ever more daborated and uni-
fied sense of self. That is, we assume people have a primary propensity to forge
interconnections among aspects of their own psyches as well as with other indi-
viduals and groups in their social worlds. Om-.ing on terms used by Angyal
( 1963), we characterize this tendency toward integration as involving both auton-
omy (tending toward inner organization and holistic self-regulation) and homon-
omy (tending toward integration of oneself widt others). Healthy devclopmcm
involves the complementary functioning of these two aspects of the integrative
tendency.
However, although SOT accepts d1is general integrative tendency as a fim-
damental aspect of human life, the theory also suggests that this tendent.')' cannot
be taken for granted. On the contrary, SOT posits that there are clear and ;,v cci-
fiablc social-contextual f.'lctors that support this innate tendency, and that there
are other specifiable factors that thwan or hinder this fundamental process of
human nature. Accordingly, SOT predicts a broad array of developmental out-
comes, ranging from a relatively active and integrated self to a highly fragment-
ed and sometimes pa.o;sive, reactive, or alienated sdf, as a function of social·t!nvi-
ronmcntal conditions.

Copyrighted materia
6 HANDBOOK 01'" SELf'·DETERM l !l:i\T I Or\

Another way of stating this is that the foundations of SDT reside i.n a dialec-
tical view which concerns the interaction between an active, integntting human
nature a nd social con texts that either nurture or impede the organism's active
nature. Social environments can, according to this perspective, either facilitate
and enable the growth and integration propensities with which the human psy-
dtc is endowed, or th(.-y can disntpt, fo=tall, and frngmcntthesc processes result-
ing in behaviors and inner experiences that represent the darker side of human-
ity. As such, psychological growth and integration in personality should neither
be taken as a given, as something that will happen automatic.-'llly, nor should it be
a~sumcd not to exist. Instead, it mus1 be vit.-wcd as a dynamic potential that
requires proximal and distal conditions of nurturance. ln this, we fully agree '>iUl
Allport ( 1961) who suggested rhat unity in personality is a matter of degree and
should not be exaggerated. We add, however, that whatever the attained unity of
Ute psyche, the imporumce of Ute issue of integration wiutin personality cannot
be over emphasized when one is attempting to understand the processes of
hc.'lld1y psychological and social development. As we.ll, the issue is important for
examining applied questions rclatt~d to cllcctive parenting, education, work,
health care, C.'<er<:isc regimens, cn~iromneotalism, religiosity, psychotherapy, and
other signific;mt human endeavors.

Basic Needs and Social Conte.><ts

Approadtes to describing environments that support versus dnvan cflcctive

or hcaldty functioning ha,•e been numerous in the social, personality, and dcvcl-
opmcnta.l literarures. In SDT, the descriptions arc organi1.cd with respect to the
concept of basic or fundamental psyd1ological needs. The theory pos.its three
such needs, each of which Ita~ shown itself to be essential for integrating a vari-
ety of empirically illuminated phenomena. T hese needs- the needs for compe-
tence, rclatcdnc.~, and autonom)<--provide the basis for categorizing aspects of
the environment a~ supportive versus antagonistic to integrated and vital human
functioning. Soda! environments that allow satisfaction of the three basic needs
arc predicred to support ~-uch healthy functioning, wherea~ factors associated '>ith
need thwarting or conflict arc predicted to be :mtagonistic. Thus, the concept of
basic needs pi"O\~des a critical linking pin within dte organismic dialectic and is
Ute basis for making predictions about the conditions U1at promote optimal ver-
sus nonoptimal outcomes in terms of both personality dcvclopmcm and the qual-
ity of behavior and r.xperit:ncc "~thin a specific situation.
Tie 11ature qf needs. Among the fundamental p mperties Utat separate the ani-
mate from the inanimate is the dependence of the animate on nutriments. Li\~ng
beings must engage in continual exdtangcs with their cnviroumcntto draw from
it those necessities d1at allow Utcm to preserve, maintain, and euhaoce their func-
tioning. Stated differently, living utings have nmls that must be fulfilled if tht}' arc
to persist: and tluivc (Jawb, 1973).

Copyr ghtcd materia

 Overview of Selj~Determi11ation Theory 7

The concept of need~ is relatively noncontroversial in the field of biology, a

field that focuses primarily on the sunival and reproduction of the physical struc-
ture of the organism. One can verify empirically that there are certain specifiable
requircmcnL~, such as hydration, for organisms to survive and thrive.
Withholding such an clement will lead reliably to detetioracion of growth and
intcgrit)\ whereas making it available will lead to maintenance or enhancement.
As such, the concept of needs is important because it supplies a crite1ion for spec-
ifying what is essential to life. At the same time, the concept says something about
organismic narure because it is rca~onable to argue that organisms arc "built for"
the satisfaction of needs- that is, that they have evolved functional structures and
sensitivities that can lead to sustenance and integrity (see, e.g., Dcci & Ryan,
2000).
The concept of needs has received tar less attention and acceptance regard-
ing essential psychological nuuiments than essential physiological ones. SDT
maintains, however, that there arc necessary conditions for the growth and well-
being of people's personalities and cognitive structures, just as there arc for their
physical development and functioning. These nutriments arc referred to within
SDT as basic PSJ•chologicallleetlr. By this SDT definition, basic need~ arc universal-
that is, they represent innate requirements rather than acqu.ircd motives. As such,
they arc expected to be evident in all cultures and in all developmental period~.
Although they may have different expressions or dilli:rcnt vehicles thn:>ugh which
they are satisfied, their core character is unchanging. Clearly, this is a very restric-
tive definicion, which is why the list of psychological needs within SDT is thus f.•r
so short, including only competence, relatedness, and autonomy. In humans, the
concept of psychological need> further suggests that, whether or not people arc
explicitly conscious of needs as goal o~jccts, the healthy human psyche ongoing-
ly strives for these nutriments and, when possible, gravitates toward situations
that provide them.
Compete11ce refers to feeling eflective in one's ongoing interactions with the
social environment and experiencing opportunities to exercise and express one's
capacities (Dcci, 197 5; Harter, 1983; White, 1959). The need for competence
leads people to seek challenges that are optimal for their capacities and to per-
sistently attempt to maintain and enhance those skills and capacities through
acti~ity. Competence is not, then, an atTained skill or capability, but rather is a felt
sense of confidence and cffectancc in action.
Relatednt.s.r refers to feeling connected to others, to caring for and being cared
for by those others, to having a sense of belongingness both 'vith other individu-
als and wiih one's community (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1979; Harlow,
1958; Ryan, 1995). Relatedness reflects tl1c homonomous aspect of the integra-
tive tendency of life, the tendency to connect "ith and be intcgralw and accept-
ed by others. The need to feel oneself as being in relation to others is thus not
concerned with the anainment of a certain outcome (e.g., sex) or a formal status
(e.g., becoming a spouse, or a group member), but instead concerns the p>-ycho-
logical sense of being with others in secure communion or unity.

Copyr ghtcd materia

8 HAN DB OO K OF SF.I.F'-Df.TF.RMINi\TION

Finally, autonomy refers to being the perceived origin or source of one's own
behavior (dcCharms, 1968; Dcci & Ryan, 1985b; Ryan & Connell, 1989).
Autonomy conce rns acting from interest 'md integrated values. \Vhcn
autonomous, individuals e.x perience their behavior as an expression of the self,
such that, even when actions arc influenced by outside sources, the actors concur
with those influences, feeling both initiative and value with regard to them.
Autonomy is often conftu;ed with, or melded together \Vith, the quite different
concept of independence (which means not relying on external sources or influ-
ences), hut the SDT '~ew considers there to 1M: no necessa.ry antagonism between
autonomy and dependence. Indeed, one can quite autonomously enact values
and behaviors that others have requested or forwarded, pro"ided that one con-
gruently endorses them. On the other hand, one can of cou rse rely on oiJJers lr>r
directions or opinions in such a way that autonomy is not experienced, as is the
case with mere compliance or conformity. In short, indcp~Jldcnce \o'Crsus depend-
ence is a dimension that is seen within SDT as being largely orthogonal to the
issu e of auronomy versus hct<:ronomy (Ry-·ill & Lynch, 1989; Ryan, 1993).
Needs and motivts. Our concept of basic psychological need~ is quite diflerent
from the broader idea of personal motives, desires, or strivings. Although people
may formulate motives or stri,~ngs to satisfy ha.~ic needs, it is also clear that there
are many motives that do not tit the critclion of being essential for well-being and
may, indeed, be inimical to it. In other words, some motives may di;'tract people;
from acth.iries that could provide basic need fulftllment and thus detract from
their wdl-bcing. Even when people arc highly cflicacious at satisfying motives,
the motives may still be detrimental to well-being if they interfere with people's
autonomy or relatedness. Th.is is an extremely importa.nt poior, lx:cause it makes
clear that attaining one's goals cflicaciously is not enough to ensure psychological
well-being. A~ such , many motives and goals that organize behavior must be
viewed dynamically either as being peripheral to psychological need satisfaction
or as being need substitutes that developed as compensations when basic needs
were thwarted (Dcci, 1980; Ryan, Sheldon, Ka.~scr, & Deci, 1996).

Summary

To summ;uizc, SOT embraces both an organismic and a dialcctic u framt:-

work for the study of personality growth and developmcnL As an organismic
view, SDT conceive.~ of humans as active, growth-oriented organisms, d1at
innatdy seck and engage challenges in their cnvironmcnrs, attempting to actual-
ize their potentialities, capacities, and sen~ibilities. However, this organismic ten-
dency toward actuafu-acion represents only one pole of a dialectical interface, the
other being social environments whic.h can either fi1cilitatc the indi.,.iduals' syn-
thetic tendt!ncies, or alternativdy wither, block, or ovcrwhdm them.
The concept of psychological needs pro,~dcs the basis for describing char-
acteri.~cics of the environment that support versus undermine the organism's

Copyr ghtcd materia

 Overview of Self·Dtttrmination Theory 9

attempts to master or engage each new situation. ' )o the extent that an aspect of
the social context allows need fulfillment, it yields engagement, mastery, and syn-
thesis; whereas, to the extent that it thwarts need fulfillment, it diminishes the
individual's motivation, gl'(n,1h, integrity, and well-being.
Within SDT, the specification of needs and the study of need-related behav-
ioral dynamics ha~ been pursued a~ an empirical endeavor. Tbe specification of
needs, along with a stringent functional definition of what qualifies as a psycho-
logical need, has led to quite exacting, if sometimes coumcr-iotuitivc predictions
about human behavior and the eflccts of social contexts. That is, by evoking
needs and appl}~ng appropriate criteria, SDT research has been able to pinpoint
and examine f.'lctors in social environments that f.'lci.lit.'lte self-motivation and
well-being, and those that thwart initiative and positive experience across diverse
settings, domains, and cultures.

The Basic Components of Self-Determination Theory

SDT has evolved ovc::r the past three tkcadcs in the form of mini-theories,
each of which relates to specific phenomena. The mini-theories are linked in that
they aU share organismic and dialectical assumptions and all involve the concept
of ba~ic psychological needs. When coordinated, they cover all types of human
behavior in aU domains. Titus, together, the mini-theories constitute SOT.
Specification of separate mini-theoric.~ was, historically, a consequence of build-
ing a broad tltcory in an inductive fashion. That is, our approach has been to
research phenomena, constntct mini-theories to account for them, and then
derive hypotheses about related phenomena. Throughout this process, basic
assumptions and approaches remained constant, so d1e mini-theories were logi-
cally coherent and readily intcgratable each with the others. As such, each rep-
resents a piece of the overall SDT framework
In our writings, various aspccl~ or propositions of the mini-theoric:-~5 have at
times been presented "~th the terminology of the relevant mini-theories, but
often they have simply been presented under the rubric of SDT. At this time,
SDT comprises four mini-theories. Cognitiv• tvaluation thebr;y, rbc first:, was lonnu-
lated to describe the cfTect5 of social contexts on people's intrinsic motivation
(Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1980). It desctibes context ual dements as autonomy
supportive (informational), controlling, and amotivating, and it links these types
of contextual clements to the different motivations. Organismic inugration tJ~t.my
(Deei & Ryan, 1985b; Ryan & Connell, 1989) concerns imcrnalization and inte-
gration of values and regulations, and was formulated to explain the develop-
ment and dynamics of exu'insic motivation; the degree to which individuals'
experience autonomy whilt: engab>ing in extrinsically motivated behaviors; and
the proccs.~es through which people take on dtc values and mores of their groups

Copyrighted materia
10 HANDBOOK OF SELF- DETERMINATION

and cultures. Causali!J> urienJations lltto')' (Deci & Ryan, 1985a) was formulated to
describe indi\~dual differences in peoplc:'s tendencies to orient toward the social
environment in ways that support their own autonomy, CQntrol their behavior, or
are a.motivating. This mini-theory allows for prediction of e:~:perience and behav-
ior from enduring orientations of the person. Finally, basic needs lileory (Ryan &
Deci, 2000b) was formulated to explain the relation of motivation and goals to
health and well-being, in part by describing associations of value configurations
and regulatory styles to psychological health, across time, gender, situations, and
culture. \>Ve address each mini-theory in turn.

Cognitive Evaluation Theory

lntrinsicallv• motivated behaviors arc those whose motivation is based in the

inhercm satisfactions of the behaviors prr se. rather than i.n contingencies or rein-
forcements that are operationally separable form those activities. Intrinsic moti-
vation represents a prototype of self-determined activit)\ in tbat, when intrinsi-
cally motivated, people: engage in activities freely, being sustained by the experi-
ence of interest and enjoyment. Thus, as it is dassically defined (see Ryan & Dcci,
2000a}, intrinsic moliV'<lriOn is noninstrumcmally focused, instead originating
autotclically from satisfactions inherent in action, whereas exuinsic motivation is
focused toward and dependent on contingent outcomes that are separable from
d1c action per se. DeCbarms ( 1968) used Heider's (1958) concept of perceived
locus of causality ro dc,scribe the two types of motiva tion: with cxtriJlsic motiva-
tion, deCharms suggested, people pcrec:ivc the locus of initiation and Tej,"l..lation
of their behavior to be external to chemselves, whereas with intrinsic motivation,
they perceive the locus to be witl1in themselves. SOT bas followed dcCharms'
perspec:tive only in part. We agree w~tl1 him that intrinsically motivated actions
invariantly entail an internal perceived locus of causality, and that inL1insic moti-
vation tends to be undermined when factors conduce tOward a n external per-
ceived locus of causality. However, our view of extrinsic motivation is more dif-
ferentiated, as we shall describe in our coverage of Organismic Integration
Theory.
The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction provided the basis for the first cxperimems
in the field. Specifically, research beg-<~n witb the question of bow cxtri.nsic
rewards would affect people's inuinsic motivation for an interesting acti~ity. In
other words, if someone engaged in an activity freely without being rewarded
and found it highly interesting a.n d enjoyable, the person would clearly be intrin-
sically motivated. If he or she were d1en offered an extrinsic reward for doing dtc
activity, what would happen to the person's intrinsic motivation?
The initial studies (Deci, 1971 , 1972a, 1972b; Kruglanski, Friedman, &
Zcevi, 1971; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973) all found that tangible rewards-

Copyr ghtcd materia

 Overvie w ~f St{{-Determination Th ro ry II

whether concrete, such as money (Dcci), or symbolic, such as good player awards
(Lepper ct al.)-dccreascd intrinsic moti\~llion so long as they were expected and
their receipt required engaging in the activity. However, the initial Dcci studies
also showed that positive feedback-or what is sometimes referred to as verbal
rewards or praise- enhanced rat11er than undermined intrinsic motivation.
The undermining of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic rewards ha~ been a
controversial issue from the llrnc the initial studies were published, in par1
because d1e finding appeared to fly in the face of operant UlCOry which had a
strong presenc,e in empirical psycholoj,>y at that time. In spite of the controversy
and some f.·uall)' flawed attempts to deny the undermining phenomenon (e.g.
Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996), a meta-analysis of 128 experiments confirmed
that e.xpcctcd tangible rewards whic:h rcquit·c c~ng-.<ging in the target activity do
indeed undermine intrinsic motivation for that activity, whereas verbal rc:wards
tend to enhance intrinsic motivation (Dcci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999).

Perceived Causality and Perceived Compe tence

Cognitive C\".lluation theory (CET: Dcci, 1975; Deci & Ryan , 1980), which
expanded upon deCharms' analysis of perceived locus of causality, was initially
formulated to account for reward eflccts on intrinsic motivation, as well as vari-
ous other result~ that extended these phenomena. The theory suggest~ that the
needs for competence and autonomy arc integrally involved in intrinsic motiva-
tion and that contcxuml events, such as the offer of a reward, the provision of
positive feedback, or the itnposition of a deadline, arc likely to affect intri.nsic
motivation to the extent that they arc experienced as supp<lrting versus thwarting
satisfaction of these needs.
Mo re specifically, Deci and Ryan (1980) suggested that t11erc arc two plimary
cognitive processes through which contextual factors affect intrinsic motivation.
Change in puceivtd locrJJ t{ causali!r relates to the need for autonomy: when an
event prompts a change in perceptions toward a more external locus, intrinsic
motivation will be undermined; whereas, when an event prompts a change
toward a more internal perceived locus, intrinsic motivation will be enhanced.
Tan~:,>iblc rewards, which were typically found to decrease intrinsic motivation,
were theorized to have their effect by prompting a shift toward a more external
perceived locus of causality for the rcw·Mdcd activity. The second process,
change in p~rceived competence, relates to the need for competence: when an cvem
increases perceived competence, intriruic motivation will tend to be enhanced;
whereas, when an event diminishes perceived competence, intrinsic motivation
wiU be undermined. According to CE"I; however, positive feedback is predicted
to enhance intrinsic motivation only when people feel a sense of autonomy with
respect to the acti~ity for which they perceived themselves to be competent, a
proposition upheld in various studies (e.g., Fisher, 1978; Ry;-m , 1982).

Copyr ghtcd materia

12 HANDBOOK OF SF.I.F-DWI'ERMINATION

As initially presented, CET further specified that contextual events or cli-

mates contain both a tontmlling aspect and an il!formational aspect and that it is the
relative salience of these two aspect5 of social contexts that determines the effects
of the context on perceptions of causality and competence, and thus on imrinsic
motivation. The controlling aspects of social environments are those that repre-
sem pressure toward specified outcomes, and thus conduce to a shift toward a
more external perceived locus of causality. features of the social environment
that have contJ'Oiling salience undermine intrinsic motivation. The information-
al aspect of social contexts pertains to cffcctancc-relcvant inputs. Specifically,
informational events and communications provide feedback that supports peo-
ple's experience of competent engagement. In discussions of CET, the concept
ofjimrtitmal signijitanu is used to convey t}u: idea that individuals will actively con-
strue social-contextual inputs in terms of their informational and controlling
meanings, and that it is the relative salience of informational versus controlling
components that \\~II, in large part, determine subsequent imrinsic motiv.uion.
For example, an event such as the offer of a tangible reward (which studies have
found to be controlling) is, on average, said to h;we a controlling functional sig-
nificance; whereas, the functional significance of positive feedback is, on average,
said to be informational. Accordingly rewards arc predicted to undermine imrin-
sic motivation in mart)' circumstances, whereas positive performance feedback is
c>.:pcctcd to enhance it.
T he bulk of the experimental studies on imrinsic motivation has focused on
the undermining of intrinsic motivation whe.n the controUi.ng aspect of an cvem
is salient. Thus, in addition to the studies of expected rewards, others have shown
that threats of punishment (Deci & Cascio, 1972), deadlines (Amabile, DeJong, &
Lepper, 1976), impol;Cd goals (M'ossholder, 1980), surveillance (Lepper & Greene,
1975; Plant & Ryan, 1985), competition {Dcci, Betley, Kahle, Abram'S, & Pa rae,
1981), and evaluation (Smith, 1975; Ryan, 1982) all decr-eased inu·insic; motiva-
tion, presumably because they were c.xpericnccd as controls. Relatively little
attention has been given to events that enhance inninsic motivation through a
shift toward a more internal perceived locus of causality. However, Zuckerman,
Porac, Lath in, Smith, and Dcci ( 1978) and Swann and Pittman ( 1977) reported
that providing choice about what to do or how to do it enhanced intrinsic moti-
vation, and Koestner, Ryan, Bernicri, aud Holt (1984) showed that empathy and
noncontrollingness can help maintain intrinsic motivation.
Fu rthermore, most feedback studies have focused on positive fi.o.edback, v,ith
only a few assessing the effects of negative feedback on intrinsic motivation.
However, Dcci and Cascio (1972) found negative feedback t.o undermine intrin-
sic motivation, and Valier-and and Reid (1984) found the undermining by nega-
tive feedback to be mediated by a dccrea~e in perceived competence.

Copyr ghtcd materia

 Ovuview of Sfij- Delermina tion Theory 13

Social Contexts and Internal Events

CET was elaborated in the early 1980s in two important ways. First, it was
suggested that although events such as rewards, deadlines, or positive feedback
tend to have a particular timctional significance, the imerpersonal dimmc with-
in which they are admini$tered can significantly influence it. Thus, for example,
Ryan ( 1982) showed that, whereas positive feedback is typically experienced a~
informational, if it is administered within a pressuring climate, emphasizing for
e.xarnple that people "should do well," the positive feedback tends to be experi-
enced as controlling. Similar!)\ Ryan, Mims, and Koestner (1983) showed tlrat
although tangible rewards lend to be e:·q>ericnccd as controlling, if they are
administered in a non-evaluative context tltat supports autonomy, tltey tend not
to be undermining. Furthermore, subsequent studies showed that l.imit setting
will have a significantly different effect depending on whether the interpersonal
context is information:\! or controlling (Koestner, Ryan, Bcrnicri, & Holt, 1984)
and that competition can also be experienced as either informational or control-
ling, depending on tlte interpersonal climate (Reeve & Dcci, 1996).
1ltc second important extension of CET concerned internal initiating
events. Specifically, Ryan (1982) suggested that people can initiate and regulate
tl1eir actions in different ways that arc relatively independent of the social con-
text. For example, people can become ego-involved i.n an activity and its out-
come. That is, their feelings of self-worth can become hinged to their perform-
ance such that they do the activity to prove to themselves that they arc good at
the activity and thus worthy individuals. Ryan contrasted this with task-involvc-
rnem in which people are more involved witlt the task itsel f rather tl1an witlt its
implications for tlrcir own feelings of worth. He suggested that when the initia-
tion and regulation of behavior is ego-involved the fimctional significance will be
controlling relative to when the initiation and regulation is task-involved, and
result~ confirmed this reasoning (Plam & Ryan, 1985; Ryan, 1932). i\ recent
meta-analysis of exp erimental studies confirmed the CET proposition concern-
ing the effects of ego versus task i.nvolvemcnt on subsequent intrinsic motivation
{Rawsthorne & Elliot, 1999). More gcncmlly, CET holds that self-controlling
for·ms of regulation will be as.~ociated with diminished intrinsic motivation,
whereas m.orc autonontous fo nus of sc:Jf.. rcgulation will nlninlain or enhance
intrinsic motivation.

Relatedness

As noted, we theorized that intrinsic motivation is integrally connected to tlte

needs for competence and autonomy, and research has indicated that aspects of
the social context whiclt influc:nct: perceptions of competence and autonomy do

Copyr ghlcd materia

14 H.-\NDilOOK OF SEl.F -DlnERM INAT I ON

indeed aflcct intrinsic motivation. There remains, howc.:ver, the question of how
the need for relatedness is involved in intrinsic motivation. We have empha~ized
that all three needs are essential for growth and development, so one would
c:..'Pecr relatedness to play a role in intrinsic motivation. Indeed, evidence frorn
studies with infants indicates that exploratory behavior (i.e., intrin~ically motivat-
ed curiosity) tends to be in evidence to the degree that th<: children are sc.curcly
attached to a primary caregiver. FOr example, Frodi, Bridges, and Grolnick (1985)
found that S{~curiry of attachment, which implied relational satisfaction, wa~ asso-
ciatt:d with exploratory belut\~ors. In other words, when the infams experienced
a general sense of satisfaction of the relatedness need, tltt')' were more likely to
display imrinsicall}• motivated exploration.
A se rendipitous finding from a laboratory expcrimcm by Anderson,
M anoogian, and Reznick ( 1976) indicated that when children worked on an
interesting anivity in the presence of a previously unknown adult experimenter
who ignored them, the children rusplayed a very low level of intrinsic motivation,
suggesting therefore that thwarting of the need for relatedness can have a dcletc-
tious r.Jfcc:t on intrinsic: motivation. Still, c~dencc which closely links competence
and amonomy to intrinsic motivation is considerably more plentiful than tltat
linking relatedness to intrinsic motivation, and there do ap!J(:::tt' to be many soli-
tary types of activities I(H' which people maintain high intrinsic mntivation in
spite.: o f not n'lat.in g to othe rs while doing them. Accordingly, we.: (Dcd & Ryan ,
2000) have suggested that relatedness typically plays a more rusr.al role in the pro-
motion of intrinsic motivation than do competence and autonomy, although
there ;tre some interpersonal activities for which satisf:tcticm of the need for relat-
edness is crucial for maintaining inu-insic motivation.

Organis mic Integration Theory

A~ noted, CET focuses on the effects of social-contr_xtual variables on intrin-

sically motivated behaviors. It tlws applies primaril)' to activities that people find
interesting, optimally challenging, or ac~thetically pleasing. Activities that are not
so CXIJ(:rienced will not he intrinsically motivated and are thus unlikely to be per-
formed unless there is an extrinsic reason for doing them. Still, socializing agents
fn~qucntly find it necessary to promote these uninteresting behaviors, so they face
the issue not only of how to prompt the bcha~iors but, even more importantly,
bow to promote self-regulation of the behaviors so they ";n persist over the long
term.
Because early discussions of intrinsic motivation contrasted it "'~th extrinsic
motivation, and becallSc extrinsic motivation has frequently been shown to relate
negatively to intrinsic motivation, many commentators (begin,ning with

Copyrighted materia
 Overview of Self-Determination Th eo ry 15

deCharrns, 196tl) have characterized extrinsic mvtivati<m "' hc ing nonau-

tonomous- as being antithetical to sdf·dctcnnination. Indeed, t-cscar-ch docs
m:.kc clc:.r that extrinsic motivation in the form of working ro attain tanj,>iblc
rewards is generally nonautonomous, for it tends to undermine intrinsic motiva-
tion (Dcci et aJ., 1999). Nonetheless, we h:tve assumed from the time we began this
research that it is possible ro be autonomously rxninsically motivated, and
research "~thin organismic imegra6on theory Ita.~ examined that issue extensively.

Internalization

Organismic integration theory (Oil) is based on the assumption that people

arc natm<~lly inclined to imegratc their ongoing experiences, a'ISuming they have
the necessary nutriments to do so. According!)~ we postulated that if external
prompt~ arc used by significant others or salient reference groups to cncoum!,'"C
people to do m1 unintcrcst1ng activity- an activity lor which thC)' arc not intrin-
sically motivated- the individuals will tend to internalize the activity's initially
external regulation. That is, people will tend to take in the regulation and intc·
graw it with their sense of self. To the: extent that this occurs, the individuals
would be autonomous when enacting this extrinsically motivated behavior.
Accordingly, in line with our active-organism mct:ttheory, we view the phenom-
enon of intcrnali7.ation as a natural process in whi<:h people work to actively
transform external regulation into self-regulat1on (SchaJcr, 1968), becoming more
integrated as they do so.
An important clement of OJT is that, unlike most other theories of inter-
nalization (e.g., Bandura, 1996), it views internalization not in terms of a dichoto·
my but rather in terms of a continuwn. The more fully a regul:ttion (or the vaJue
underlying it) is internalized, the more it becomes part of the integrated self and
the more it is the basis for self-determined behavior. From this persp<:ctive, then,
it is possible for individuals to internalize regulations 1\~thout having them
become part of the self. Regulations that have hecn taken in b)• an individuaJ but
not integ•·ated ''ith the self would not be the basis for autonomous self-regulation
but would instead function more as contmUers of bcha\rior. Thus, extrinsicaJiy
motivated behaviors for which the regulations have been internaJized to differing
degrees would differ in their relative autonomy. Those for which the rq:; ulations
h;we been well integrated would be the basis for autonomous extrinsically moti-
vated behavior, whereas those for which the regulations have been less fully inter-
nalized would be the basi~ for more controlled forms of extrinsic motiv:ttion.
Accordingly,Orr proposes a taxonomy of types of regulation lo r extrinsic
motivation which differ in the degree to which they represent autonomy. Fi!,'l.lrc
1-1 present~ the O IT taxonomy, arranged from lcfr to right in rcrms of the c.xtem
to which the motivation l(>r a behavior <:manatt:s from the sdf (i.e., is
aulonontous).

Copyr gh!cd materia

 -
C>

=
>
7,

-c:::
Typo of
Motivation
Amotivation 1 Extrinsic Motivation IIntrinsic Motivation c
"'
.,
~

- ---------~--------
~

Type of Non·
I1 . ..
External lntrojected
Identified Integrated 1 Intrinsic ;r.

Regulation regulation I Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation I Regulation .-..

~

•
-
~

I I ~
-;
"'
"--"'
'7.
>
....
Quality of
Behavior
Noneolf-deterrnlned Self-dotorrnlned -z
0

Figure 1.1. The Self-Determination Continuum, with Types of Motivation ond Types of Regulation.
()

~
-=-
a.
~

~
 Overview of Self-Determination Theo r.v 17

At the left end is amotivation, the state of lacking the intention to act When
people arc amobvatcd, c;tl,er U!ey il~ not UC! arall or tllCYact pas~ivcly-rllilf i~,
they go through the motjons "~th no sense of intending to do what they are
doing. Amotivation results from feeling either that they are unable to achieve
desired outcomes because of a lack of contingem:y (Rotter, 1966; Seligman,
1975) or a lack of perceived competence (Bandura, 1977; Deci, 1975) or that
they do not value the activity or the outcomes it would )~cld (Ryau, 1995).
The other five points on the continuum refer to classifications of motiv-dtcd
bcha\~Or. Each of these describes a theoretically, experientially, and functionally
distinct type of regulation . At the right end of the continuum is intrinsic motivation,
which we have already discussed as the state of doing an activity out of interest
and inherent satisfaction. It is the prototype of autonomous or self-determined
behavior. Extrinsically motivated behaviors, which an~ characterized by four
types of regulation, fall along the self-determination continuum between amoti-
vation and intrinsic motivation.
External reguulfi11n is the least autonomous form of extrinsic motivation ~md
includes the classic instance of being motivated to obtain rewards or avoid pun-
ishments. More generally, external regulation is in evidence when one's reason for
doing a behavior is to satisfy an external demand or a socially constructed con-
tingency. External regulation has an external perceived locus of causality, is tfw
type of regulation that is central to operant theory (e.g., Skinner, 1953), and is the
form of extrinsic motivation dtat was contrasted ' vith intri.n sic motivation in the
early discussions of the topic (e.g., deCharms, 1968).
lntr~er.ltd regulation involves an external regulation ha.,ing been internalized
but not, in a much deeper sense, truly accepted as one's own. It is a type of extrin-
sic motivation that, ha,~ng been partially imcrnalizccl, is within the person bm is
not cons.iden:d part of the imeg rated self. I ntr<tiection is a form of internalized
regulation that is theorized to be quite controll.ing. Introjection-based behaviors
are performed to avoid guilt and shame or to attain ego enh:mcemems and feel-
ings of worth. In other words, this type of regulation is based in contingent self-
esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995). Studies by Ryan ( 1982) and others have shown that,
when ego-involved in an outcome, which is a form of introjected regulation, peo-
ple tend to lose intrinsic motivation for dte t:u-gct activiry, thus indicating that this
type of regulation is, in lact, quite controlling.
Regulntio11 through idmtijic"tion is a more seU~detcrmincd form of extrinsic
motivation, for it involves a conscious valuing of a behavioral goal or regulation,
an acceptance of the behavior as personally important. ldcntitication represents
an important aspect of dte process of transforming external regulation into true
self-regulation. When a person identifies \vilh an action or the value it expresses,
they, at least at a conscious level, are personally endorsing it, and thus identifica-
tions are accompanied by a high degree of perceived autonomy. That is, identi-
fications tend to have a relatively internal perceived locus of causality. H owever,
SDT suggests that some idcntificati<ms can be relatively compartmentalized or

Copyr ghtcd materia

18 HA ND BOOK OF SELF-DETERMINATION

separated from one's other belie(~ and values, i.n which ca'>C they may not reflect
the person's ovc:rarching values in a given situation. Nonetheless, relative to
external and imrojccted regulations, beha\·i or that stems from identifications
tends to be relatively autonomous or self-determined.
fnltgratrd rtgulation provides the basis for the most autonomous form of extrin-
sically motivated beha~or. It results when identifications h;JVc bt~cn evaluated
and brought into congruence with the personally endorsed values, goals, and
needs that arc already pan of the self. Research has shown extrinsically moth•at-
cd behaviors that a.rc integrated 10 be associated wid1 more positive cxpericuccs
than the less fully internalized forms of extrinsic motivation. Integrated extrinsic
motivation also shares many qualiti<:s with intrinsic motivation. Nonetheless,
although behaviors governed by integrated re1,'Uiations arc performed volitional-
ly, they are still considered exttinsic because they arc done to attain personally
important out,·omcs ratl1cr than for d1cir inherent interest and enjoyment. In
other word~, d1cy arc still instrumental to a separable outcome whose value is well
integrated with the self.
It is important to recognize that the relative autonomy continuum is intend-
ed descriptively, to organize types of regulation "ith respect to tbc concept of
sdt:dctcrmination. We do not suggest that it is a developmental continuum ptr se,
nor that pcopk must progress through each stage of internalization with respect
to each rc~tulation. Rather, it is possible for people 10 take in :> regulation :u any
point along this continuum, assuming they have relevant prior experience and
tl)(' immcdi:•tc interp~:rsonal climate is sufficiently supportive (Dcci & Ryan,
1991; Ryan , 1995). We assume that the range of bcha~ors that can be assimilat-
ed to the self does increase over time as a function of greater cognitive and ego
development (e.g., Loe\~nger & Blasi, 1991; Piaget, 1971 ), and there is e~dence
that children's general rcgulato•y style tends to become more internalized with
age (e.g., Chandler & Connell, 1987).
Ryan and Connell (1989) developed an approach to assessing regulatory
styles, and thus the relative autonomy of one's regulation for a beha\~Or or class
of beha,~ors, treating regulatory ~tyles as bcha~or-specific indi~dual differences.
They then used the approach to show that these different types of regulation lie
along a cominuum of relative autonomy. SpecificaUy, they found d1at dlC differ-
ern regulatory styles were intercorrclatcd according to a quasi-simplex pal'lcrn,
correlating most strongly with those other styles that were theoretically closest to
them in tcnm of the underlying relative autonomy continuum.
The Ryan and Connell appmach has been extremely useful for c.~amining
Off in va1ious applied domains, such a~ education (Mist~randino, 1996; Ryan &
Connell, 1989), child rearing (Grolnick & Ryan , 1989), health care (Williams,
Grow, Freedman , Ryan, & Dcci, 1996; \\~lliams, Rodin, Ryan, Grolnick, & Deci,
1998}, intimate relationships (Blais, Sabomin, Bouche•; & Vallerand, 1990), reli-
gious bcha~or (Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993), physical exercise (Chatzisarantis,
Biddle, & Meek, 1997), political behavior (Koestner, Losier, Vallcrand, &

Copyr ghtcd materia

 Overview of Self-Determination Theo~'f 19

Carducci, 1996), and environmentally friendly activity (Green-Demers, Pcllctict;

& Menard, 1997). Cnnsistentl)\ the research has shown varied advantages 10
being autonomously motivated, relative to controlled, including more volitional
persistence, better relationships in one's social groups, more effective perform-
ance, and greater health and weU-bcing.

Promoting Integrated Regulation

Because extrinsically motivated behaviors are not inherently interesting,

people arc unlikely to do them if the behaviors arc not instrumental for a desired
outcome. Thus, initially, such behaviors are typically prompted by significant oth-
ers, whether with a simple request, the offer of a n:ward, or th<: fact that the oth-
ers demonstrate d1cir valuing of the activity by performing it regularly. T hat is,
the dynamic involved in prompting such behaviors involves a significant other or
group endorsing an action ;md in some way conveying their endorsement to the
target individual. The indi,~dual, in turn, out of feeling related to the other per-
son or the group, or out of the desire for such relatedness, will likely engage in
the behavior with the expectation of gaining implicit or c:xplicit approval for
doing so. This sug,s;csts that the need for relatedness to others is centrally impor-
taut for internalization. orr proposes that supports for feelings of relatedness
arc, indeed, crucial lor promoting internalization. In fact, a study by R}·an, Stiller
and Lynch ( 199<~) showed that children who felt securely connected to, and cared
for by, their parents and teachers were the ones who more fully internalized the
regulation for positive school-related beha,iors. It seems that, whereas relatedness
is less central than the other two needs for maintaining intrinsic motivation, it is
very much central for promoting internalization.
Still, relatedness alone is not enough to ensure a full imcrnalization of extrin-
sic motiv.ttion. As well, people will need to feel competent with respect to behav-
iors valued by a significant other if they arc to engage in and accept responsibil-
ity for those behaviors. Thus, 0 11' suggest~ that support for competence will con-
tribute to the facilitation of internali7.ation aod the subsequent self-regulation of
e:~:trinsicaUy motivated activities. I f people do not feel competent to perform a
target behavior, they arc unlikely to internalize regulation of the behavior; in fact,
they \\~U likely lind an excuse not to do the behavior at all, even in the presence
of the significant other.
Finally, from the perspective of OIT, perceptions of autonomy play an
extremely important role in the processes of internalization and integration. i\s
already noted, internalization can take the form of intl'(\jection, resulting in con-
trolled regulation, or i1 can involve a much fuller internalization and integration.
According to the theory, support for autonomy is the critical factor for dc!Cmtin-
ing whether the internalization that is promoted by supports for relatedness and
competence will be only partial (a~ in intl'<)jection) or will be much fuller (a.~ in

Copyr gh!cd materia

20 HA NDBOO K OF S f: LF-OETEHII NAT IOI\

integration). Thus, although some intecnalization may occur \.vithout autonomy

support, the type of internalization that will result in persistence, flexibility, and
.vitality--those bc.ing the factors that characterize self-determination-will be in
C\~dcncc to the degree that supports for autonomy are present. Stated dillcrcnt-
1)\ to integrate the regulation of a behavior, people must grdSp its meaning for
themselves personally, and they must synthesize that meaning ''~th other aspects
of their psychic makeup. This type of engagement with the activity and with the
process of internalization is most likely to occur when people c..xpericnce a sense
of choice, volition, and freedom fi-om ~1ernal demands. Accordingly, autonomy
support is the ba~is for people's actively transforming a value and regulation into
tht~r own.
To summarize, external regulation is likely to occur when people feel com-
petent enough to perform d1e requisite action, assuming there are salient conse-
quences such as implicit approval from signific;mt others. Furtht!r, \vith supports
for relatedness as well as competence, introjection is a likely outcome. Only when
the social climate also provides support for autonomy is there likely to be intc-
gnttion of the rcleV'dnt regulation , thus pro~ding the foundation for subsequent
sclfdcterm.incd behavior.
Various studies have provided evidence for tl1is reasoning. For example,
G rolnick and Ryan ( 1989) fou11d greater .internalization and integration of
school-related values among cltildrcn whose parents were more supportive of
autonomy and relatedness, and William.~ and Dcci (1996), using a longitudinal
dcsi~:.rn, demonstrated grt:ater int ernalization of biopsychosocial values among
medical students whose instructors were more supportive of autonomy.
Dcci, Eghrari, Patrick, and Leone (1994) performed a laboratory experiment
with an unin teresting acti~ty in which they manipulated the presence versus
absence of three supportive factors--a meaningfu.l rationale, acknowledgement
of the person's perspective, and provision of choice rad1cr than pressure. The
researchers found intemalization, as measured by subsequent behavioral persist-
ence, 10 be a function of th e number of facilitating factors. However, they also
found that with relatively little support, whatever internalization occurred was in
the form of introjection, whereas \\~th relatively more suppon, the internaliza-
tion was likely to involve integration.

Causality Orientations Theory

Scll~dctcrmination theory, with its various mini-theories, has devoted con-

siderable atJcmjon 1·o the influence of social contexts both on motivation, bchnv-
ior, and experience in a particular situation and on the development of person-
ality over time. Whereas CET is concerned primarily "~th the effects of specific

Copyr ghicd materia

 Ooauiew of Self-Determillatioll Theory 21

motivntion.
soc:al conlelo:l Oil and cxpclicncc, orr
b~lluvior, i~ G(lll~trned more
with the differentiation of extrinsic motivation in accord with imcrnalization and
on the influence of soc.ial contexL~ on the internalization of extrinsic motivation.
More specifically, OIT posiL~ that different regulatory styles for extrinsically moti-
vated beha,~ors ;ue developmental outcomes, and researchers have used those
styles as individual differences to predict performance and well-being.
Throughout the development of SDT, we have assumed that a person's
motivation, bcha,~or, and experience in a particular situation is a function both
of the immediate social context and of the person's inner resources that have
developed over time as a function of prior intentctions with social contexts.
Causality orientations theory wa~ developed a~ a descriptive account of these
inner resources- that is, of relatively stable individual differences in one's moti-
vational orientations towan:l the social world. Based on it, we developed an indi-
vidual diflcrcnce mca~ure, the Gencr,d Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS)
that has been used for predictive purposes in numerous studies (D<:ci & Ryan,
I 985a).
The causality oticntations approach is intended to index a~pccts of person-
ality that arc broadly integral to the regulation of behavior and experience. lt
specifics three oticotarions that differ in the degree to which tl1cy represent self-
determination- namely, the autonomous, controlled, and impersonal causality
orienmtions-and people arc assumed to have each of these orientations, to
some degree. The autonOTI!J orientation involvo:s re&rulating behavior on the basis of
interest~ and self-endorsed values; it serves to index a person's general tendencies
toward intrinsic motivation and well integrated extrinsic motivation. The ctm-
trolletl orimlalion involves 01ienting toward controls and directives concerning how
one should behave; it relates to external and imrojected regulation. The imperson-
al llrie11tation involves focusing on indicators of incffectance and not behaving
imcntionally; it relates to amotivation and lack of imcmional action.
Individuals get a score on each of the three oticntations reflecting the
strcngtlt of each general tendency for themselves. In the initial research by Dcci
and Ryan ( I 985a) the autonom)' orientation was found to relate positively to self-
actualization, scJf:esteem, ego dt:vclopmcnt, and other indicators of well-being.
A~ expected, the controlled orit:ntation wa.< not positivdy a<sociated with well-
being but instead wa< related to public sclf-consciousnt:ss and the Type-A coro-
nary prone behavior pattern, indicating that the focus tends 10 be outwa•'d and
pressured. The impersonal orientation was related to self-derogation, low self-
esteem, and depression .
Koestner, Bernieri, and Zuckerman (I 992} explored the relation of the
autonomy and controlled orientations to integration in personality, hypothesizing
tltat autonOrn)\ relative, to conlrol, would be associated with greater integration.
T hey began by creating two groups, one of individuals who tended to be more
autonomous and one of individuals who tended to be more controlled, ba~ed on
a compa1ison of their standardized scores for the two orientations. The

Copyr ghtcd materia

22 HAND BOOK O f' SEL.f'-I)ET ERMINAT ION

researchers then examined the consistency mnong behaviors, tn1its, and attitudes
wid1in d1e two group~. Results indicated iliat autonomy-oriented indi~iduals dis-
played a strong positive relation among behaviors and self-reports of traits or atti-
tudes, whereas control-oriented individuals displayed weak or even negative rela-
tions among these ~-..rious personality aspects. Thus, the studies drew an empiri-
cal link between the conccpL~ of auwnomy and integration by showing greater
congruence among personality, awareness, and behavior for autonomy-oriented
than for control-oriented individuals.
Numerous investigators have related general causality o•icntations 10 specif-
ic regulatory styles, to behavioral outcomes, to aspects of personality, and to well-
being indicators, and much of that research is described in vdrious chapters of
this volume.

Basic Needs Theory

The concept of basic psychological needs has played an important, though

ofi(:n implicit, role in SOT and each of its mini-theories fi-om the time the work
began. The relatively recent formalization of this mini-theory was done to dari-
ty me meaning of ilie concept and to detail its dynamic relation to mental heald1
and well-being.
To qualify as a need , a motivating force must havt~ a direct relation to well-
being. Needs, when satisfied, promote well-being, but when thwarted, lead to
negative consequences. Furtl1er, bc;cause needs arc hypothesi?..cd to be universal,
this relation between satisfaction and well-being must apply across ages, genders,
and cultures. Of cou.rsc, ilie means through which needs arc satisfied (versus
thwarted) V'ill)' as a function of age, gender, and culture. T hus, in an extreme
ca.~, it is possible for the same behavior to be need satisfying for one group m1d
need tl1warring for another. Still, the underlying process in which need satisf.'lc-
tion promotes health is theorized to be the same across all these grc>ups.

Well-being

Recent research on well-being has been plentiful, although the concept of

well-being ha.• been treated in two diflcrent ways by different researchers (see
Ryan & Deci, 2001). One approach focuses on hedonic or subjective well-being
and essentially equates it with happines.~ (e.g., K.ahncman, Diener, & Schwarz,
1999), whereas d1c other approach focuses on cudaimonic well-being and equates
it with being fully functioning (e.g., RyfT & Singer, I998). Although ilicrc is sub-
stantial intersection of the two concepts, we endorse the cudairnonic conception,

Copyrighted materia
 Overview of Selj~Detumination Theory 23

and much of our recent research has served to establish a clear empirical link
between satisfaction of autonomy, competence, and relatedness need~, on the on<-
hmtd, :md cudaimonic weU-bdng, on the other. ln so doing, we have not used a
specific measure of cudaimonic well-being, but have instead used several meas-
ures of positive anect and mental health to index the general organismic concept
that im•olves people detecting the degree of their own vitalit); psychological flex-
ibility, and deep inner sense of wellness (Ryan & Frc:derick, 1997; Ryan, Deci, &
Grolnick, 1995).

Research on Basic Needs Theory

Research on basic needs theory has thus far fallen into du'Ce categories. First,
diary procedures have been used tO examine whether daily variations in need sat-
isfaction predict daily nuctuations in well-being. In other words, this research has
considered the "ithin-pcrson relations between e.xperienecd need satisfaction
and well-being over time, as well as the more standard between-person relations.
Second, studies have explored the relation between the pursuit and attainment of
specific goal contents, on the one hand, and well-being, on the other. Whereas
most theories do not diHcrcntiate goal contents, suggesting simply a posit1vc rela-
tion between the attainment of valued goals and well-being, basic needs dtcory
suggest~ that there will be a positive relation between goal attainment and well-
being only for tl10se goals that satisfy basic psychological needs. In fact, pursuit of
some V'.Uent goals may be neg-atively related to well-being if the goals distract
people from satisfaction of the basic needs. ll1ird, we have begun to examine
need satisf.'lction across cultures, hypothesizing that need satisfaction will relate to
well-being regardless of culture.

Need Satisfaction and Well-being

In two studies (Sheldon, Ryan, & Rcis, 1996; Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe,
& Ryan , 2000), multilevel modeling was used to relate variations in need satisfac-
tion to well-being. At both the between-person (i.e~ .• individual-diJTercnc:c) lt:vd
and the within-person (i.e., daily-lluctuation) level, measures of basic-need satis-
faction related to positive affect, vitality, and the inverse of negative affect and
symptomatology. These studies confirmed both tltat general satisfaction of each
basic need contributed to general well-being and that daily satisfaction of each
basic need explained daily fluctuations in well-being ov'Cr time.
In other, between-person, studies, V Kasscr and Ryrm ( 1999) found that sat-
isfaction of d1e needs for autonomy and relatedness in the daily l.ives of residents
of a nursing home were positively related to their well-being and perceived
health. '[\,•o studies (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2000; Uardi, Leone, Kasser, & Ryan ,

Copyrighted materia
24 HANOBOOK OF St:f.F-OF.TF.R~!! NAT !O N

1993) have further found that employees' report~

of satisfaction of their ba~ic
needs in the workplace related to self-esteem, general h~.alth, vitality, and the
inverse of anxiety and somatization. Tlms, 1vithin the specific settings of nursing
homes and workplaces, the Cl~dencc supports the hypothesis tltat satisfaction of
the needs for autonomy, competence, and rdatcdnc.ss will predict· psychological
health.

Aspirations and Basic N eeds

The relation of goal content~ 10 well-being ha~ been examined in a st:ries of

studies by Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996) and otltcrs, concerning people's aspira-
tions or life goals. Research on these issues is also discussed in tbc chaptet· by
Kao;ser in this volume. Kasscr and Ryan suggested that there arc two types of
aspirations, namely, intrin.sic aspirations, which provide relatively direct sati~l~tction
of the basic needs, and txtrinsir a.!pimli01u, which are more related to obtaining
external signs of worth and arc less likely to provide direct need satislltction.
Examples of intrinsic aspirations arc affiliation, personal growth, and communi-
ty comribution, and examples of extrinsic aspirations (at least 1vithin the
American culture) an' wealth, fanw, and image. Kasscr and Ryan argued that,
because of the hypochcsizcd L<nks of intrinsic aspirations to basic need satisf.'lc-
tion, pursnit and attainment of those aspirations, relative to extrinsic a5pirations,
should be more strongly asso<:iatc:d with well-being. \\'herca.~ people might lecl
happy about attaining their extrinsic aspirations, the U\CO!)' suggests that pursuit
and attainment of extrinsic aspiration will not contribute to cudaimonic well-
being.
Kasser and Ryan (1996j had individuals rate how important, in terms of
their own lives, they considered each of a set of life goals. Using items related 10
three intrinsic aspirations (a fliliation, personal growth, an d community) and tl1rcc
extrinsic aspiration.~ (wealth, fame, and image), tht.'Y calculated how strong each
aspiration wa.5 relative to all other-s. The critical issue in this program of research,
then, is not so much tltc actual sm:ngth of an '"'Pirarion, but rather, where it
stands rclatil•c to the others: is it, for e.xample, unusually strong and thus out of
b<tlancc wid1 the others?
Kasscr <utd Ryan ( 1993, 1996) found tltat the relative strength of intrinsic
aspirations was significantly positively related t.o well-being indicators, such a~
sell~actualization and ~~tality, and were significantly negatively related to anxiety,
depression, and phy~;cal symptoms. ln contrast, the index for t.hc extrinsic aspi-
rations showed the opposite pattern of relations. One of tl·ac st~adics in the series
used clinical indicators, finding that a strong relative extrinsic aspiration fo r
wealth related positively w conduct disorders and neg"dt.ively to global social func-
tioning and social productivity. These studies converged on the finding tlmt plac-
ing high in1portancc on extrinsic outcomes, relative to intrinsic ones, was related

Copyrigh!cd maleria
 Overview of Self-Determinat ion Theory 25

to poorer '"'ell-being. Furthcrnl.ort~, the r·cJScru·ch sh o w ed thnt t.hc effect..-; o n well·

being of the relative strengths of a>piration• wao not accounted for by people's
feelings of eflicacy with respect to attaining the goals.
The aspirations studies reviewed thus far examined the relative importance to
individuals of diffe•·ent. aspirations or life goals, whereas other smdies have shown
that the attainment of intrinsic versu.~ extrinsic aspirations also relates differential-
ly to well-being. For e.xample, Kasser and Ryan (200 I) found that perceived cur-
rent attainment of intrinsic aspirations wa~ positively associated with weU-being,
but rated cur rent attainment of extrinsic aspirations was not. Sheldon and Kasser
(1998) found that well-being was enhanced by the actual attainment of intrinsic
goals, whereas attainment of extrinsic goals provided little benefit. Together,
these results suggest that pursuit and attainment of valued !:,'<l<us does not ensure
well-being. The content of the goal itself makes a diflerence, and we theorize that
this is because some goals (which we label intrinsic) provide more need satisfac-
tion, whereas others (which we label extrinsic) provide less need satisfaction. In
fact, the pursuit and attainment of extrinsic aspi.rations may act11ally detract from
need satisfaction by keeping people focused on goals that <trc not directly need
related.
Nun sub.rtitutu. A<".«>rding to basic needs theOI)\ exuinsic aspirations, which
c<tn be highly motivating, are likely to develop as substitutes for basic needs (Deei,
I 980) under developmental conditions in which need satisfaction is relatively
unavailable. A~ such, they can pro\·i de collate•~•) satisfaction, but they do not pro-
vide the direct satisfaction of basic needs that are necessary for promotion of
well-being.
Kasse•; Ryan, Zax, and Same roll' ( 1995) sn1died teena&ret'S and their moth·
ers to test this reasoning by e.xamining the developmental antecedent~ of placing
high relative importance on extrinsic aspirations. They found, using bod1 teens'
perceptions of their mothers and also the mothers' self-reports of their parenting
styles, that when the mothers were democratic, noncontrolling, ;md warm (thus
being supportive of basic need satisfaction), the teens placed significantly less rel-
ative importance on extrinsic aspirations. The results suggest that parenting styles
that thwart children's need satisfaction le."'d the children to develop extrinsic aspi-
mtions, such as wealth, d1at are visible indicators of "wonh" and may represent
substitutes for basic need satisfitction. These, in turn, are expected to perpetuate
the lack of need satislaction and exacerbate the negative, ill-being consequen ces.
Williams, Cox, Hedberg, and Dcci (2000) studied h.igh school students to
test the hypotheses (a) that need-thwarting parental styles would lead to stronger
relative extrinsic aspirations and (b) that this pattern of aspirations would pro-
mote risl·:y behaviors that could further interfere ,~;th basic need satisfaction and
health. Results of the study yielded a signi lkant relation between the students'
perceiving their parents as controlling and the students' having strong relative
extrinsic aspirations. Fu.rtllcr, students with less autonomy-supportive parent~ and
stronger extrinsic aspirations repotted more health-compromising behaviors,

Copyr ghlcd materia

26 Hi\ NDIIOO K ot· !> f:t.F·l)Wn: RMINATION

including the usc of tobacco, alcohol, a nd marijuana. It docs appear, therefore,

that social contexts that thwart need satisfaction can lead w goals that arc com-
pensatory and may involve serious risks to physical and psychological well-being.

Need Satisfaction Across Cultures

According to the basic needs perspective, a need is by definition universal

and dlUs the relation between need satisfaction and well-being must apply in all
cultures. There can, however, be considerable variability in the values and goals
held within diiTerent cultures such that the means through which people satisfy
basic needs will differ among cultures. ln oth er words, the relations between spe-
cific behaviors and satisfaction of underlying nee<l~ may be diJierent in diflerent
culturt·s lx-causc the behaviors come 10 have di!fcreOL meanings in accord with
cttlturally endorsed values and practices. Recent research on motivation has
begun to explore the relations between need satisfaction and well-being across
cultures.
l.n some studies, investigators have examined issues in Asian or European
cuh~trcs !hat had prc~iously been studied in North America. Ily finding rcsuhs
that are similar 10 those from American samples, these studies provide initial evi-
dence in s upport. o f the cross-cultural validity of propositions from basic needs
1hcory. For example, Hayarnizu (1997) used th e sciJ:rcgulation questionnaire to
as.~css 1hc motivation of junior high school studcrus in Japan and found that the
autonomous forms of motivation were as.~ociated with positive coping whcn:as
1he controlled forms wen· associawd 1\~th maladaptive coping, thus replicating
findin!,'S from the United States by Ryan and Connell (1989}. Similar results were
also found in J apanese children by Yamauchi and Tanaka ( 1998).
Chirkov and Ryan (200 I) found that Russian and Amt:rican students who
experienced their parents and teachers as more autonomy supportive displayed
greater well-being than those who experienced them as less autonomy support-
ive. Although d1ere were mean level differences in the amount. of p1:rceived
autonomy suppo11, with Russians perceiving less, bod1 the constructs and the
relations between autonomy suppon and well-being were comparable across cul-
tures. The importance of 1his and oth er Russian replications of SDT smdies in
the United States is that traditionally Russia has been an authoritarian, or verti-
cal culture, which has led some d1corists (e.g., J.\.1iUcr, 199i) 10 argue that al!lono-
rny should nol rnancr there. However, showing p aralld functions of autonomy
support versus control suggests that such cultural or h.iswrical backdrops do not
ocga•c this basic dynamic of human narurc.
A reccm study of workt:t'S in Bulgarian smtc-owned companies operating in
accord with central-planning principles invesLigated the relations among social
comc.xts, need satisl:•etion on the job, and well-being (Dcci, Ryan, Ca~;,rnc, Leone,
UsunO\\ & Kornazhcva, 200 I). Rcsuhs of dtis siUdy indicated construct compa-

Copyrighlcd materia
 01•erview ~f Self-D etermination Theory 27

rability between Bulgarian ~Uld American samples and supported the model in
which contextual supports predict basic need satisfaction, which in rurn predicts
work engagement and well-being. In other words, employees in both Bulgaria
and the United States who reported greater satisfaction of the competence,
atllonomy, and relatedness needs while on the j ob were more motivated and t\-i-
denced greater psychological health.
Other research has examined t·hc relation of aspirations to well-being in dif-
ferent. cultures. fo r example, Ryan, Chirkov, Little, Sheldon, limoshina, and
Dcci ( 1999) found in Rus.~ian college students that those individuals whose life
goals were focused more on relationships, growth, and commurlity than on
wealth , image, and fame evidenced greater well-being. Of cottrse, aspiring for
specific outcomes such as accumulating wealth can have dillercnt meaning for
basic need satisfaction in different cultures, so we would not necessarily e>:pcct an
invarianr re.lation between aspirations and well-being across cultures (although we
would expect invariance in the relation between need satisfaction and well-being).
Thus, it is interesting that the results for these Russian college students largely
replicated those for Americans, even though the two cultures arc so difTcrt'..nt.

Swnmary

Self-determination theory focuses on the dialectic between the acm·c,

growth-oriented human orga nism and social contcxls that either support or
undermine people's attempts to master and i.n tcgratc their elo.'j)eriences i.n to a
coherent sense of self. The concept of basic psychological needs for competence,
autonomy, and relatedness serves to define those contextual factors that tend to
support versus undermine motivation, pcrform<trtcc, and well-being. SOT was
formulated in terms of four mini-theories that share the organismic-dialectical
metatheory and the concept of basic needs. Each of the mctatheorics was dcvd-
oped to explain a set of motivationally based phenomena that emerged from lab-
oratory and field research and focused on diflcrent issues. Cognitive evaluation
theory addresses the effects of social contexts on intrinsic motivation; orb<anismic
integration theory addresses the concept of internalization especially with respect
to the development of extrinsic motivation. Causality orientations theory
describes individual differences in people's tendencies toward sell:determim:d
bcha~~or and toward orienting to the environment in ways that support their sell:
determination. And basic needs theory daborates the concept of basic needs a nd
its relation to life goals and daily behaviors, specifying tJ1e essential mlc of needs
to psychological health and well-being.

Copyrighted materia
28 HANDBOOK OF SHF-I)I'.TERMIN:\TION

About this Book

In this volume, researchc:rs summarize their own contributions to the fie.Jd of

motivation and self-determination. Some chapters represent sp ecific extensions
of SDT by lormulating th<:oretical models that systematize relations among SDT
variables, elabor-.o~te a piece of the theory, or apply the concepts to new phenom-
ena. Other chapters use the concepts and measures of SOT to shed important
light on various applied problems or areas, helping to provide solutions lor pro-
found problems facing society. A final set of chapters adds si~,'nificantly to the
exp lication of SOT by relating iL' concepts to the concepts of other theoretical
perspe<:tive.s or liclds of research. Each of these chapters describes exciting, pro-
grammatic, research that is helping to pi'O\-ide a comprehensive and meaningful
system of psychological thought.

References

Allport, G. ( 196 1). Polkrn and grmullt in pns•na/ity. New York: Holt, Rineha.n &
\\limton.
Amabile, T. M., DtJong, W., & Lepper, M . (1976). Elfc<:ts of externally imposed
d eadlines on subsequent intrinsic motivation. Journal rif Pmonali!J and &cial l 's;ocholt)?:J, 34,
92-98.
Anderson , R., Manoogian, S. ·r., & Reznick, j. S. (1976). 'I11c undermining and
cnh;mcing of intrir.sic motivation in prc.cbool children. ] oumal rif Pmonali!J• rmd Social
Psy·chology, 31,915-922.
Angyal, A. (1965). Nturoru and tr<atmmt· A holistic thtoT)•. New York: Wiley.
&ard, I~ 1', Dcci, E. I.., & Ryan, R . M. (2000). The rela tion of intrinsic: need sati~­
tactjon to pcrformanc.c and wcll-bcing in two \''ork settings. Unpublished manuscript,
Fon:lbam.
&ndura, A. (1977). Sdf-cnicacy: Toward a unil}'ing theory of bcha\'ioral cbangc.
P.!Jcholngital & .itw, 84, 19 1-2 15.
Bandura, A. (1969). Human agency in social cognitive theory. Ameritan. PJY&tologitt, 41,
1175-11 84.
Randura, A. ( 1996). St!ft./Jitaf?t: The ex~ rif ton/rtJI. New York: Frcc:man.
Baumeist~r, R ., & u:ary, M. R. (1995). T he ne<:d to belong: Desire for intcrpenon-
al a ttacluncms as a fundamenml human motivation . PJ)·chologicdl Bullttin, 117, 497-529.
Blais, M . R ., Sabourin S., Boucher, C., &. Vallernnd, R . (1990). Toward a motiva-
tional model of couple happiness. Joumal of /}rsonality and Sccial PJ)~hology, 59, I021-103 1.
llowlby,J. (1979). The moJ.ing and brtaki11g rif '!ffictioual bontb. London: T avistock.
Broughton ,]. M. ( I 987). Criticalthr.()rits rif ps;~howgital dtt•dbpmmt. New York: Plenum.
C handler, C. L., & ConneU,J. P' . (1987}. Childn:.u's inrrimic, extrinsic and imernal-
ized motivation: A d~wlopmcntal study of cl1ildren's rca.~ons filr likt:d and disliked behav-
iours. Britirh]ounwl rif ~lbpmn~IIJ.I Psyvlrology, .$, 35i-365.

Copyr gh!cd malcria

 Overview of Self-Determination Theory 29

Chaczjsarantis, N. L. D., & Biddle, S.J. H., & l\.feek, G.A. (1997). A self-d erermina·
tion theory approach to the study of intentions and tl1e intention-behaviour rclation~hip
in children'> physical activity. BritishJounw.l '!}' lie<litll l'SJ•dwlog)', 2, :H3·360.
Chirkov, V. 1., & Ryan, R.M. (200 I). Parent and tcachcr automony support in Russian
and U.S. adolescen!l . .]ournn/ r!f Cross·Cultmal PJ]·dwlogy, 32, 618-635.
dcCharms, R. (I 968). Pemma/ causation: The inlmtal qjjicti~t dttmninan/s rif behao-ior. New
York: Academic Press.
Dcci, E. L. (197 1). Effects of externally mediated reward• on intrinsic motivation.
Joumal Q( Personali!f and &cia/ Psyhowg)', 18, 105· 115.
Dcci, E. L. (I 972a}. Effects of contin!,'Cnt and non-<:ont:ing(:nt rcwa.r ds and controls
on int1insic motivation . Organizationai/Jehmior arui Human Perfomw.tu:t, 8, 2 17-229.
D eci, £. L. (1972b). Intrinsic motivation, extrinsic rcinforccmcm, and inequity.
:Journal ~! Pmonali!JI and Social Psylwl.ofJ•, 22, 113· 120.
Deci, E. L. (1975). lnlrinsic motWation. New York: l'lcnum.
Dcci, E. L (1980). The P"J-chology ~( st!fddLrtninatiotL Lexington, MA: D.C. H eath.
Deci, E. L., Betley, G., Kahlc,.J., Abrams, L., & l'orac,J. ( 1981 ). When trying to win:
Competition and intrinsic motivation. P.'I'SOnali!)' and !i<Jcial PJ]·rhology Bullrtin, 7, 79-83.
Deci, ~:. L, & Cascio, W. F. (1972, April). Changu in inlrinsic motioation as a.fonction r!f
nrgaiWe fttdbark and threats. Presented at the Eastern Psychological Association, Hoswn.
Deci, E. L., Eghrari, H., .Patrick, B. C., & Leone, D. R. (1994}. Facilitating internal·
ization: T he self-determination theory perspective. }mmw.J r!f Pmonali!J, 62, 119- I42.
Dcci, E. L , Koestner, R. , & Ryan, R. M. ( 1999). A meta-analytic review of experi-
ments examining the cflccts of extrinsic rewards on intritt5ic motivation. P~"tdtologiral
Bullrtin, 12.5, 627-668.
Dcci, E. L., & Ryan, R. J'vl. (1980). The empirica.l exploration of intrinsic motiva-
tional processes. In L. Bcrko\\itz (Ed.), Adua11cu in rxptrimm/Jll social ps;-rhology (Vol. 13, pp.
39-80). New York: Academic Press.
Deci, £~. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985a). The general causality orientations scale: Self.
determination in personality. Joumal r!f Re.rrarch in Personali!)', 19, I 09- 134.
Deci, E. l.., & Ryan, R . M. (1985b). Intrinsic motivation and st!fdrtmninatioll itr illunn11
bthavi11r. New York: Plenum.
Oeci, E. L., & Ryan , R. M. (1991 ). A motivational appmach to self: hliCb'T'J tion in
personality. In R . Dicnstbicr (Ed .), Nthr11Ska S)'lllpooium on motwatio11: ll>L 38. Pmprrril~ts on
molzi:alion (pp. 23i-286). uncoln, NE: Univ-ersity of Nebraska Press.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. lvl. ( 1995). Human autonomy: The basis tor true sclf-e.st('Cll\.
In lvl. Kcrnis (Eel.), lijficary, ogrnry, anrl .~e!festum (pp. 3 1-49). New York: Plenum.
Dt~ci, E. L., & Ryan, R . M. (2000). ll>e " what" and "why'' of goal pursuits: Human
need s ;zntlthc self-dt~termination of be havior. PJ)·dtological lnquil)•, II, 227-268.
Dct:i, E. L., R)'anl R. ~~r.~ Gagne, rvf., Lc:onc, D. R., Usmtu,; J. , & Kornazhcva, B. 1~
{200 I). Need satislaction, motivation, and well-being in the work organizations of a for-
mer Ea"crn Bloc country. PmMality ami Social Pv ·d10/ogy Bulltlit~ 27, 9:10-~11·2.
Eisenberger, R., & Cameron, J. (1996). Detrimental •~fleets of reward: Reality or
myth ? Amnican Ps;·chologist, 51, 1153-1166.
Fisher, C. 0 . (1978). The effectS of personal comml, competence, and extrinsic
rc»,lfd systems on intrinsic motiv-ation. Organizationnl &ltm,;or nnd Human Ptr.formonu, 21,
273-288.
Fmdi, A., Bridges, L., & Grolniek, W.S. (1985). Correlates of mastcry-rdatL'<I bchav·
ior: A short term longitudinal study of infants in thei.r second year. Child Dn:elopment, 56,
1291-1298.

Copyr gh!cd malcria

30 HANDBOOK OF SU F·D ETf:R~fl NAT I ON

Ford, ~·1. E. ( 1992). A>/otillali!lg humn11s: (.oafs, nuotions, and pmonal ngmg brliifs. Nc\viJury
Park, CA: Sage.
Freud, S. (1927). "lltL tgo and tltt id. London: I nstitutc for l'~·choanaly~ and Hogarth
Press.
Gergen, K. J. (1993). Tilt saturtlltd u!f. New York: Basic J\ook.,.
Cn:en-Dcmcr.s, 1., Pelletier, .L. C., & Menard, S. (1997). 1l>c impact of behavioral
difliculty on tiH: saliency of the a.•sociation hetwc<:n scli:deterrnincd motivation a nd envi-
ronmt:nt;tl behaviors. Cmutdia11 joumnl of &hm~ourol Scima, 29, 15 7-1 66.
Gn:t:nwald, A. G. (1982). Ego ta,k analysis: An imegrmion of ~:arch on ego-
involvcnwnt and ~elf-awan;nc~s. In A. H . Hastorf & A. M. l:l<."n (F.ds.), Cognitit"' social p;y-
cholog)•, (pp. I 09-1 'f 7). New York Elst"\i er.
Grolnick, \V S., & Rpm, R. !If. (1989). Pan:nt St)•lc.' associatt:d witl>childn:n's sdf-
n:gulation and competence in school. Journal of f::Uucatioflal Psyd10/ogy, 8 f , 1+3-1 ~­
Harlow, H. f: (1958). lnc nntttrc of love. A.mtricmt Ps;·dwlogist, 13, 673-685.
Haner, S. ( 1983). Dcvelopmcmal perspectives on the sel.f: system. In E. M .
H cthcrinl,'lon (Ed .), HrmJbook of clti/tf Pf!<hofog-,: l•ol 4. Sorit~li.<tttion, persunali!y am/ social tfnvl·
apmmt (4th cd., pp. 275-386). New York: Wiley.
Hayam.izu, 'I: (1997). Between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation: Examination of
reasons fo r aca demic study based on the tht-ory of iotcrnali?.ation. Jnpanae f"!JchologicaJ.
Researclt, .~9, 98-108.
Heider, E ( 1956). 77, p.r;Yholog}' of interpersonal rtlatwnr. New York: Wiley.
Hjggins, E. T (1987). Sdf-discrcpanc)• llwooy A theory relating sdf and alli:ct.
l's;<"lt •logiatl 1/a<i<ltl, 9·1, 3 19-3·1().
llao·di, B. C:., !...-,me, D., K as.<;er, ·r, & Ryan, R. M. ( 199:~). F.mployct: and supt:rvisor
ratings of moti vution: M aio cfl(,cL• and dis.crcpancir-< associated with job satisfat~·ion and
acljusuncnt in n t1cl.ory scuing. Journal of Applird S«ial Ps;·cholllg}!, 2.1, 1789-1£105.
Jaooh, E (1973). ThL logir t!f lift: A history 1{ lu:mlitp. New York: l'anthcon.
Kalmcrnan, D., Dic.ner, K , & Schwao·1., N. (Eds), (1999). Well-htiiJ8: T!,.foundntiotu· of
!trdanic psyy/wlogy. Now Yo rk: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kasscr, T , & Ryan, R . M . (1993). A dark side nf the Aonerkan dn:am; Cnrrdat~-' of
financial succe53 as a central life aspiration. J oomml of Ptrsonali!J ami S«ia/ Psychology, 65,
4 10422.
Kasscr, T , & Rvan, R . t\•f. (1996). Fu.nher c.xamining 1he American dream:
Dilfcrcmial correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals. Per.ronnlitp and Sori.11l Pf>-dwlv Bullttin
22, 80-87.
KtL'ISCr, T , & Ryan, R. M. (2001 ). Be careful wh:ot you wish I(JJ·: Optimal function-
ing and the relath•c anainmcni of intrinsic and extrinsic goals. l.n l~ Schmuck & K . M.
Sheldon (Eels.), l.ijeguals and well-b<ing (pp. 116-131). Gottingcn: Hogrefe and Huber.
Kasscr, '1:, R)'an, R. M ., Za.x, l\1. , & Samcron; A.J (1995). The relations of mater-
nal and social cn'-'iromncnts to late adolescents' materialistic and prosocial values.
[)n.~lopmmtal Ps;·drolog1•, 3 1,907-9 14.
Kas.cr. V., & Ryan, R .l\>1. \ 1999). 11tc relation of psychological needs for autonomy
a.nd relatedness to vitality, wcll-lx:ing. and mortality in a nursing home. ]Oumai t!f Applied
Stx:ial Ps;•dtoiQg)', 29, 935 -954.
Koc.stner, R., Bcrnicri, E, & Zuckerman, M. (1992). Sclf-dc>erminatinn and consis-
tcnry l.><:t\\'ecn auitudc11, tmill, and behaviors. PetSimnliy· and Soria/ P.<yt/thlhg)• Bllliltin, 18, 52-
59.

Copyrighted materia
 Overvitw of Selj-Determilllllion TlleorJ' 31

Koestner, R., Losier, G. E, \'allcrand, R. J., & Carducci. D. (1996). ldcmified and
intro]t"ded rorrm of UIM"!.]ruJrnnf
I'>OI:t:cal :nlcrnal;,_,.l;un: f·:XItntliug self-llclerrniMU61\
'If Pmonnli!J anti &n;./ P!)Vholv. 70, I 025-1 036.
Kot.-stner, R., Ry:m, R . :II., Bcrnicri, E, & Holt, K. (1984). Setting limits on children's
behavior: The differential effeets of ~ontrolling \T.TSus informational styles on intrinsic
moti,'3tion and rn-ati\ity.}lumal ~ l'f®.•ali!J, 52, 233-248.
Krugtanski, A. \\:, Friedman, 1.. & Zecvi, G. ( 1971 ). The effects of extrinsic incemive
on some qualitati\T. aspects of task pcrfornmnre.}luma/ ~ l+®rralily, 39,606-617.
Kuhi,J., & f'uhrm:mn, A. ( 1998}. Decomposing sdf-n:gulation and sclf..:ontrol: The
th~'On:tical :md c.mpiric.'ll basis of the Volitional Components Checklist. ln.J. H eckhausen
& C. Dweck (Eds.), Motivati1111 tl1lli :y!fugulation anou thL lift-JfXJn (pp. 15-49). 1'\ew York:
Cambrid!,'C Uni\T.nity Prc.ss.
Lepper, ~1. R. & Cn:cnc, D. ( 1975). Turning play into work: EffectS of adult sur-
vcillance and cxtrimic I'C\\'3rcls on children's intrinsic moti•'3tion. .ftuma/ 'If Pffl()na/i!J twl
Social Psyrhology, 31, 4 7!J- 486.
Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. ( 1973). Undermining dllldrcn's intrinsic
interest with extrinsic rewards: A test or the "rwerjustitication" h~pothcsis. Journal ~
Pmonnli!J! nnd Sl)(ia/ Ps;·cho/og)•,l8, 129-137.
Locvingcr,J., & IJia~, A. (1991 ). Ocvclopmcnt of the self as subject. lnJ. Strauss &
G. R. Goethals (Ed<.), 'nu u!f lniLrdi.sriplinory n/IIJroacht.s (pp. 150- 167). New York:
Spring~:r- Verlag.
Markus, H. R .. &. Nurius, 1\ S. (1966). Sdl:undcr~tanding and self: regulation in mid-
d le chilr.lhocx.l. In W. /\. Collins (Ed.), /)n•dopmme tlurittg tttitftllt dtildlwod. Washington, DC :
National Acadcrnr 1>n:$s.
Maslow, A. H. (1955). Deficiency rnotivmiorr and growth moti,·ation.ln M. R, Jones
(Eel.), Ntbraska !)-,nposiuttt on muliuatir.,, (Vol. $, pp. 1-30). Lincoln: University rof NclmLSka
Press.
Meissner, W. W. (1961). lniLrnnli<Ption in /tS)'dt(}(ma!uis. New York: lntematirmal
Universities Pres>.
~lillor, J. G. (1997). Cultural t•oncclltkms of duty: Implications for moti,'3tion and
rnoralit)< In D. ~iunro.J. F. Sdruma~~r, & t\. C. C'.arr (Eds.}, ,\/oti:'fJtion anti rullurr, (pp. 178-
192). :-lew York: Routledge.
:Mischel, \V., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A co~:nitin·-affttti\'1: sptcm tlu:ory of personality:
Reconc~plu:tlizing situations, dispositions. d)'tl:unics, ;md im...t.riance in personality stnac..
ture. PSJ<lwl~al Rmtw, 102, 246-268.
~liscrandino, l\1. (1996). Childn:n who do well in >Cl1ool: l ndi•oidual differences in
pera:k<-.:1 competence and :urtonom) in abo\'e :n-cragc duldren. ]01nnal ~ EJuralional
Ps.Jdrolr>g,, 88,203-214.
:O.·I~holder, K. \ V. (1980). Effrc:ts of cxtcrnall)• mediated goal setting on intrinsic
motivation: r\ laboratory c.x~rimcnt.Journa/ ~ Applirtl PIJ<Irolou, 65. 202-210.
Nunberg, H. (1931). The synthetic function of the ego. lniLrnalianal]wrnrzl ~ PIJ<M-
Ana[ysis, 12, 123- HO.
Piaget ,j. (1971). /Jiology anti knowldfi'. Chic;ogo: University of Chicago Press.
Plam, R ., & Ryan, R. M. (19135). lntrirt$iC motivation and the effects of sclf-cou-
sciousncss. :«:-Jf..:Hvan·nt"SS, anri tgo.. involvcrnenl: An im'Cstigation of intcm all;: e:onf:nJIIing
styles. ] oumal ~Pmonoli!Ji, 5.1, 43~-4·19.

Copyr hlf'd m rr
32 HANDBOOK OF SELF-DETERMINA'J'IO!I;

Rawsthorne, l • .J., & Elliot, A•.J. {1999). Achievement goals and intrinoic motiv-dtion:
A mcta-anal~1ic n:view. Pmonalit.J and Social P>ydlolbgy Rn,uw, 3, 326-344.
Reeve, J., & Dcci, E. L ( 1996). Elements within the competitive situation that a!feet
intrinsic motivation. Pcrsonali!J• and Social Pv~hotogy Bulletin, 22, 2-l-33.
Rcis, H. '[, Sheldon, K. M., Gable, S. L., Roscoe, J., & Ryan, R. lvl. (2000). Daily
'•d l-bcing: ' Tltc role of autonom)l wmpctencc, and relatedness. PmMaiJt)' nntl Social
Psycliolcgy Bullttin, 26', +19-435.
Rogers, C. ( 1963). The actualizing tendency in relation to "motive.•" and to con-
sciousness. In M. R .j oncs (Ed.), .NibriiJka 'J'm/JDJ;um on motica1io11 (Vnl. II, pp. 1-24). Linmln,
NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Rouer, J. (1966). Generalized cxpcwmcies for internal versus ~'tcrnal contml of
reinfcJrcement. Psy<holoJ..;Col Monographs, 80 {I, Whole No. 609). Pp. 1-28.
Ryan, R. M. (1982}. Control and information in the intmpersonal sphere: An exten-
sion of cognitive c'"uuation theory. Journal'![ Pmonali!J' and .'Wdol Ps;'tiwlof!J, -13, 450-461.
Ryan, R. M. (.1993). Agency and organization: Intrinsic motivation, autonomy a.n d
the self in psychological development. In J. J acobs (Ed.), .NtbTO.Jka .rym~um on motizwitm:
Droelopmmtal fH'r.rpatitw on motivation (Vol. 10, pp. 1-56). Lincoln. !'iE: University of
Nebraska Press.
Ryan, R. M. ( 1995}. l''}ochological needs and the facilitation of integrati\-e processes.
]01Jrno/ of Pmonali!)•, 6'3, 397-427.
Ryan, R. M., Chirkov, \ ( 1., l..itilc, T D., Sheldon, K. M., Timoshina, E., & Occi, E.
L. ( 1999). The American dream in Russia: Extrin1ic aspirations and wcll-bei.n g in two
cultures. l'trsvr~r.zli!>' tuul Stu:ial PsydwiOJ;.Y llullt:tiu, 25, 1509-1524.
Ryan, R. M., & Conncli,J. P. (1989). Perceived locus of cau.~ity and imcrru~ization:
Examining r...a~ons for acting in two domains. ]ournnl of Pmrmali!J' orui Social Pvmolog)•, 57,
749-761.
R)•an, R. l'vl., & Dcri, E. L (2000a). Intrinsic and extrinsic mmh«tiott.: Clas$iC def-
initions and new directions. Conltni{IOrary Edurntional PJ)v:holo,g1, 25, 54-67.
Ryan, R. M., & Dcci, £. L. (2000b). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of
intrinsic motivation, social development, and wcU-bcing American Pv'll1ologist, 55, 68-78.
Ryan, R. M., & Dt't.'i, E. L. {2001 ). To be happy or to be self-fulfilled: A review of
rcsea.rch on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being l.n S. Fiske (Ed.), llntJital Rtvitw '!!
PS)Yhologyf'lol. 52; pp. Hl - 166}. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, lnc.
Ryan, R. l\1., Dcci. E. L , & Grolnick. W. S. (1995). Autonomy, relatedness, and the
sclf: Their relation to development and psychopatbol<>g)c In D. Ciccht:tti & D..). Cohen
(Eels.), Da•tlopm<nttzl psyrhopal11ology liJl /. (pp. 618-655). New York: Wiley.
Ryan, R. !VI., & Frederick, C. M. (1997). On energy, personality, and h~.ahh:
Subjccti\'c vitalit)' as a dynamic reflection of well-being; Journal of Ptrwtalil)•, 6'5, 529-565.
Ryan, R. M ., & Lynch, J. H. (1989). Emotional autonomy versus dctachnwm:
Revi$iting the vicissitudes of adolesccnc.e and young adulthood. Child Dtt~elopm<nt, 6'0, 340-
356.
R)•an, R. l\1. , Jvfirns, V , & Koesmcr, R. ( 1983). Relation of reward cuntingcnL')' and
i01crpcrsonal context to intrinsic motivation: A review and test using cognitiw evaluation
theory J ournal '!l Pmonalil)' and Soria/ Pf)Yhowgy, 45, 736-750.
Ryan, R. M., Rigby, S., & King, K. (I 993). Two types of religious imemalization and
their relations w religious orientations and menial health. Joumal '![ PmotUuitf at1d Social
PJ)'<llolo,!()·, 65, 586-596.

Copyr ghtcd materia

 Overview of Se/j-Dtlermination Theory 33

Ryan I R., M., 5hGidonll\. M., Klm~r. T,&Deci. E. L. (IgoGJ. All go:J, arc not crc-
a t'Cd "'luaJ: ,\J, org-.1nisrnic perspective on the nature of goals and their regubtion. bt P.
M. Gollwitzcr &J. A. llargh {Eds.), 77u pfyclwlogy qf action: linking cognition and motioalion to
bdullJior (pp. i-26). New York: Guilford.
Ryan, R. M., Stiller,J., & L}1tch, J. H. (199-lJ. Representations of relationships to
teachers, parents, and fricnd1 as predictors of academic motivation and self-esteem.
Journal qf Ear/y Adok.turu:t, 14, 226-2•!9.
Rytf, C. D., & Singer, B. (1998). The contours of positive human health. Pv'thologieaL
Inquiry, 9, 1-28.
Schafer, R. (1968). Asptcls qf inttmali;:atum. New York: International Universities Press.
Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Htlpl-.mm. San Francisco: Freeman.
Sheldon, K. M ., & K asser, 1: (1998). Pursuing personal goals: Skills enable progress
but not aU progress is beneficial. Pmo11ali!J and Social Pv~IUI/Qgy Bullttin, 24, 1319-133 J.
Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R. M., & Reis, H. 't: (1996). What makes for n good day?
Competence and autonomy in the day and in the person. Personali!J and Social l'J)•thology
Bu/Jttin, 22, 1270-1279.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Sc.imu and human htlravinr. N<:w York Macmillan.
Smith, W. E. (1975). 711eifftct qf anticipated vs. utUJ.nlicipaud soeial rtward 011 >1thseqrunt
intrinsic motivation. Unpublished dissertation, Cornell University.
Sw:mn, W n., & Pit1man, T S. (1977). Initialing play activity of children : T he mcxl-
erating influence of verbal cues on intrinsic motivation. Grild l:Rvdopmrnt, 48, 1128-1132.
Vallernnd, R .J., & Reid, C. (1984). On the causal effects of pcn:ci\'cd competence ou
intrinsic motivation: A test of cognitive evaluation theory.}ournal qf Sport Psyrhology, 6, 9-1-
102.
Werner, H . (191-8). (omparatice ps;~hology qf mm/4/ drotlopmmt. New York: htternationnl
Universities Press.
White, R. W. ( 1959). !vlotivarion reconsidered: The concept of competence.
l'')'CM!ogir.al &.-itw, 66, 297-333.
\Vnitc, R. W. (1963). Ego and uali!)l in P.JJ~hoanalytic tJuory. New York: International
Univcrsilics Press.
Williams, G. C., Cox, E. M ., H edberg, V., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Extrinsic life goals
and health risk behaviors in adok~ents. ]o~tmal qf Applitd Social Pv~olo.f!J, .10, 1756-1 771.
\\'i llianiS, G. C., & Occi, E. L. (1996). Internalization o[ biopsychosocial values by
me-dical students: t\ test of self-determination theory. Journal qf Pmonali!JI and Social
Psyclwlog)', 70, 767-779.
Willi;uns, C. C ., Grow, V. 1\•1., Freedman, Z. R., Ryan, R. M., & Occi, E. L. (19<)6).
Motivational predictors of weight loss and weight-loss rmlintcnancc. } oum11l qf hrsmutli!)>
a11d S<Jrial Pf)·tholiJg)', 70, I I 5· I26.
Williams, G. C., Rcxlin , G. C., Ryan, R. M., Grolnkk, W. S., & Ded, E. L. (1998).
Autonomous regulation and long-term medication adherence in adult osutpatiems. Hmlth
Psycholog)', 17, 269-276.
Ya mauchi, H., & Tanaka, K. (1998}. Relations of autonomy, self-referenced beliefs
and self-regulated learning amongjapancse children. Psychological RLporls, 82, 803-81 6.
Zuckerman, M., Porac,J., Lathin, D., Smith, R., & D eci, E. L. (19i8). On the impor-
tance of sett:determination for intrinsic.ally motivated behavior. Pmonali{)' 1111d Social
Psychology Bullttin, 4, -143-446.

Copyr gh!cd malcria

View publication stats