Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
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ABSTRACT
Partial and limited opening of
authoritarian political systems in
Turkey and Egypt created new
E ven though there is no simple causal
relationship between the lack of de-
mocracy and political extremism, it has been
democratic opportunities for argued that institutional exclusion from the
Islamists to participate in public life. political process and indiscriminate repression
It also fostered democratic learning
make extremist groups inclined to adopt revo-
by permitting Islamists to compete
for power and popular legitimacy. In lutionary1 or even worse terrorist methods.
the process of democratic opening, Conversely, political participation (even in
Islamists have had to address semi-democratic autocracies) encourages rad-
and represent the interests of a
group much larger than their own
ical groups to pursue their objectives through
ideological constituency. They have peaceful means. Political pluralism, albeit in a
also had to endure repression and limited form, can induce radical and even an-
party closures in a semi-democratic ti-systemic parties to moderate their political
political framework. However,
the democratic learning process discourses.2
coupled with the establishment’s
constraints has paved the way for This paper analyses how and to what extent
the transformation of Islamists the processes of exclusion and/or inclusion
to Muslim democrats. While the policies of the regimes, general framework
process in Turkey is almost complete,
of political and legal structures, politico-legal
in Egypt there are still heated debates
on the transformation among the constraints and opportunities in Turkey and
Islamists. This study highlights Egypt have influenced the transformation and
the importance of the democratic moderation of Islamisms toward a pluralist
opportunities given to Turkish
Islamists and argues that if given
discourse in these two countries. Instead of fo-
similar opportunities, Egyptian
Islamism will also transform to a * Assist. Prof., Public Administration Department, Fatih Univer
post-Islamist phase. sity, ihsanyilmaz@yahoo.com
cusing only on the Islamist discourse, the interaction of discourse, context, struc-
ture and practice will be examined.3
Islamist parties in Turkey were successively banned from politics, but re-
emerged after reframing their discourse in response to their perceived oppor-
tunities and constraints. The current Justice and Development Party (AK Party)
has gone a step further than its Islamist predecessors, dramatically highlighting a
process of institutional change and ideological moderation. The increasing mod-
eration of the Islamist movement is the result of several institutional factors.4 The
Turkish Islamists have been given the political freedom in a liberalized autocracy5
to make strategic choices in a political system that rewards political participation
with credible opportunities for power, while at the same time, the state and civil
society have imposed public institutional constraints on the Islamists in addi-
tion to the interactions taking place between Islamists, their constituency and the
state.6 Similar developments have also been taking place in a different context,
Egypt. After analyzing the evolution of Turkish Islamists to Muslim democrats,
the paper will look at the same issue in the Egyptian context.
Kotku’s disciple Professor Necmettin Erbakan and his followers have succes-
sively established the National Order (Jan. 26, 1970 to Jan. 14, 1971), National
Salvation (Oct. 11, 1972 to Sept. 12, 1980), Welfare (July 19, 1983 to Jan. 16, 1998),
Virtue (Dec. 17, 1997 to June 22, 2001) and Felicity parties (July 20, 2001 to pres-
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Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst
The NSP won 11.8 percent of the vote in the national elections of 1973. It
participated in a series of three coalition governments in the 1970s. After the
military coup in 1980, the NSP was also closed down, together with all other po-
litical parties. When the army returned to its barracks in 1983, Erbakan founded
a new party under a new name -- the Welfare Party (RP). The RP ideology was
not different from that of the MSP. But, in the early 1990s, the RP realized “the
need for turning the party into a mass political movement, adopting an agenda
that put stress on social problems rather than on religious themes, using modern
propaganda methods. It particularly tried to mobilize the urban poor, who suf-
fered from the liberalization policies of the 1980s”.13
The RP had steadily increased its share of the vote, and after the 1994 general
local elections mayors of several major cities such as Ankara and Istanbul (cur-
rent Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the mayor of Istanbul at that
date) were RP members. In 1996, as the bigger partner of a coalition govern-
ment (Refah-Yol) with the True Path Party (DYP), Erbakan became Turkey’s
first Islamist prime minister. The Erbakan government’s “policies, in particularly
those designed to link Turkey more closely with Islamic countries and to widen
the scope of religious freedoms, upset the civil and military bureaucracy.”14 The
establishment also pressurized Islamist and Islamic groups, companies and in-
stitutions. Several “briefings, joined by judicial personnel, journalists and other
professionals were organized by the General Staff of the Armed Forces on the
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İHSAN YILMAZ
In January 1998, the Constitutional Court closed down the RP and banned Er-
bakan from politics for five years. Being aware of history’s repetition, this time Er-
bakan’s new party was already ready before the closure decision. The Virtue Party
(FP) continued operating under the leadership of Erbakan’s close friend, Recai
Kutan, until it too was shut down by the Constitutional Court in June 2001.
After the RP was ousted from power, many younger members of the Islamists
also began thinking that the only way they could succeed was to avoid confronta-
tion with the Kemalist establishment and to stay away from the instrumentalist use
of religious rhetoric in politics. This started an internal debate among the Islamists.
Thus, a cleavage emerged within the movement between two different groups. The
“traditionalists” (Gelenekçiler), centered on Erbakan and party leader Kutan, op-
posed any serious change in approach or policy, while the younger group of “re-
newalists” (Yenilikçiler), led by Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç, argued
that the party needed to revise and renew its approach to a number of fundamental
issues, especially democracy, human rights and relations with the West.
The influence of this internal debate was reflected in the platform of the FP.
The FP embraced Western political values, and anti-Westernism was not on its
agenda. Its slogans included “pluralist society,” “basic rights and liberties,” “more
democracy,” “privatization,” “decentralization” and “globalization.” 17
After the Constitutional Court closed down the FP, the old guard went on to
establish the Felicity Party (SP), but the renewalists did not join them and instead
formed the AKP, adhering to their renewalist discourse, frequently asserting uni-
versal values and value-based discourses such as human rights, democracy and
free market principles.18 They have learned to avoid confrontational rhetoric. The
emergence of the AK Party has shown that Muslim politics in Turkey is evolv-
ing from an instrumentalist usage of Islam to a new understanding of practic-
ing Muslims who deal with daily politics.19 While acknowledging the importance
of religion as personal belief, they accommodated themselves within the secular
constitutional framework.20
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Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst
In the Turkish domestic context, there are several major factors that contrib-
uted to the transformation of Islamists. As can be understood from our histori-
cal summary above, the first is the ever-present existence of de jure and de facto
constraints imposed upon the Islamist political parties by the Kemalist establish-
ment.21 Erbakan had been naively hoping in his every new attempt that the es-
tablishment would let him run the country. As opposed to Erbakan, the younger
generations realized that they had to avoid confrontation with the aggressively
laicist establishment as this would prevent their staying in power even if they
reached it, as the RP government’s experience showed. But realizing the Kemalist
constraints is only one of the causes of transformation. As experienced politi-
cians, the founders of the AKP knew that in order to come to power they needed
the public’s support, and especially its votes. Thus it is obvious that they had to
take into account what had been happening at the grassroots level.
They first had to gauge their voters and potential voters’ reaction to the RP
experience in power, its overthrow by the generals and, in particular, Erbakan’s
record. They did not have to wait too long. At the first election in which the FP
took part in 1999, its voters penalized the Islamists and their votes decreased to
15.1 percent from 21.38 of ante-power RP. Traditionally, Turkish voters act in
almost direct opposition to the wishes of the generals, but this time they indicated
that they were not happy with Erbakan’s record in power. They would penalize
the generals and penalize them harshly later in November 2002.
97
İHSAN YILMAZ
tual demands of ordinary people. Gül is also known to have frequented the of-
fices of this institution before establishing the AK Party. This scientific, as it were,
awareness of reality should have helped the younger generation of Islamists to de-
velop a down-to-earth and realistic political discourse and party program when
establishing the AK Party.
Moreover, the younger generation Islamists knew that even though Erbakan
had employed a religious rhetoric, his parties had “never been able to gain the
support of dominant religious communities nor did it gain the support of some
prominent Sufi orders in Turkey. The dominant religious communities such as
Suleymancıs (the follower of Sufi leader Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan) and Nurcus
(the follower of Said Nursi, a commentator of Quran) and some brands of the Sufi
orders always gave support to the center-right parties. The political attitude of re-
ligious groups demonstrates that they are willing to take part in the system rather
than striving for its total conversion”.22 Several of the remaining Islamic groups
that had been supporting Erbakan had also joined other non-supportive Islamic
groups, questioning both the feasibility of Islam as a political project and the con-
formity of Islamism to Islam itself. Noticing that the social and economic net-
works of Islam had been damaged most when Islamism was at its peak in the late
1990s, these Islamic groups and businessmen started to withdraw their support
from Erbakan and the idea of a “social” rather than “political” Islam -- which has
been advocated by non-Islamist groups such as the Gülen movement for a long
time -- gained ground, opening up the way for the transformation of Islamism.23
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Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst
trash collection, not utopian endeavors to transform society. The chief executive
officer of Turkey’s largest city learned this lesson well.”25
The AKP increased its share of the vote to 47 percent in the July 22, 2007, elec-
tions, the main opposition party receiving only 21 percent.28 This election was
primarily shaped by evaluations of performance (economic or otherwise) rather
than by ideological cleavages.29 As a matter of fact, a survey by a polling firm,
which predicted the outcome of the 2007 election with precision, “has found that
the top two concerns leading people to cast a ballot for the AKP that year were
not religious sentiments, but rather the party’s economic-policy performance and
the attempts of the military and the judiciary to prevent the AKP from electing
its candidate for the presidency.”30 In the 2007 elections, even many Turkish-
Armenians reportedly voted for the AKP Party. This is a crucial fact showing how
successfully formerly intolerant and exclusivist Islamists transformed their vision
and political ideology, became Muslim democrats and were able to convince even
non-Muslim citizens of the country of the fact. The successful transformation of
the AKP has been noted in Middle East circles.
99
İHSAN YILMAZ
The liberalized autocracy in Egypt implies far more political freedoms than ex-
ist in Syria, the former Iraq, the oil-rich Gulf countries or even in Tunisia.33 Egypt
has a multi-party political system with several political parties, periodic elections,
opposition newspapers, popular criticism of the government and an independent
judiciary.34 But, the state has been employing pluralist policies not as catalysts for
pluralist political participation and demand making, but as valuable instruments
of social control.35
By allowing some public space to the Islamist opposition, the regime has also
been able to uphold fears of the “Islamist threat,” by which coercive measures can
be legitimized and thereby prolong the state of emergency and control elections.36
By arguing that democratization would enable Islamists to overturn the regime and
ultimately abolish democracy -- however limited it is -- itself, these movements
were used by the regime to justify the continuation of its repressive policies.37 The
persistence of Islamist groups also comes with some advantages for the regime: Is-
lamists are an important player in a juggling act by which opposition forces are pit-
ted against one another and struggles occur between secularist, leftist, rightist and
Islamist groups probably even more often than between regime and opposition.38
Islamism in Perspective
The Islamist revival in Egypt began in the 1920s but spread rapidly after the
early 1970s, reaching its peak in the early 1990s. It consists of several groups from
violent militants to non-violent and gradualist Islamic coalition, and from the
individualist Sufi orders to the state’s Al-Azhar, the Ministry of Awqaf and the
Supreme Islamic Council.40
100
Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst
Al-Banna was assassinated by the state in 1949 and was replaced by Hassan al-
Hudaybi as the spiritual guide. Despite its close connection with the state, the MB
faced harsh suppression after the 1952 revolution by secular nationalist Gamal
Abdel Nasser. MB figures such as Sayyed Qutb were sent to jail and executed, and
the state outlawed the organization.
After Nasser, a split divided the movement between revolutionary views like
those of Qutb and the gradualist views of al-Hudaybi. Both sides agreed that
Egyptian society and polity was one of Jahili, which was characterized by the wor-
ship of man by man, and the sovereignty of man over man. While both strived for
an alternative Islamic state and society, they differed on the ways to achieve such
order. Hudaybi called for preaching for the Islamic cause. Both wings shared an
opposition to Zionism, crusaders, communism, secularism and Nasserism.44 The
MB did not publicly denounce the state as an enemy to Islam and did not call for a
101
İHSAN YILMAZ
political revolt against it.45 Several pro-violence individuals and groups split from
the MB, as the MB remained loyal to its non-violent and bottom-up approach.
The pro-violent militants declare society to be jahiliyya (the state of ignorance be-
fore Islam) and consider the state as infidel. The moderates and conservatives like
MB followers and members avoid blanket condemnation, while being critical of
the state for not implementing Islamic laws.46 Moderate groups like the MB work
within institutional channels, such as running candidates within the professional
syndicates and in parliamentary elections.47 Conforming to its strategy of working
within the official institutions, the MB made use of the professional syndicates as
a ground to expand its ranks and develop a white-collar base.48 Moreover, private
charity and aid organizations, usually connected to mosques, were established
by both the MB and other Islamist groups.49 At the same time, the MB engaged
in political mobilization.50 As a result, the MB established a very powerful social
base, with important ramifications in the political sphere.
Since the MB did (could) not establish its own party, because of both state re-
pression and al-Banna’s advice, it entered into electoral alliances with secular par-
ties. The MB guaranteed support from its religious social base, presenting voting
as a religious obligation, and these secular opposition parties, in return, supplied
the MB a legal venue for participating in elections and running its own candi-
dates. The first of these alliances was between the MB and the liberal al-Wafd in
the 1984 elections. Despite al-Wafd’s strong secular roots, the MB insisted that it
declare its commitment to considering Shari‘a in legislative activities. The MB ne-
gotiated a similar deal with the socialist party al-‘Amal in the 1987 elections, but
instead of a temporary alliance, al-‘Amal agreed to an MB takeover. This alliance
attracted another party: the liberal al-Ahrar. This new alliance won 17 percent of
the vote and 60 seats and led opposition in the parliament.51 In the meantime,
the pro-violence groups directed their harshest criticism against the MB for its
participation in the democratic process as a means to advance their own political
agenda.52 Even its alliances with the secular parties shows that the MB could work
with secular groups and institutions.
Since the early 1990s, Egypt has experienced a substantial degree of political
deliberalization. Repressive amendments to the penal code and to legislation gov-
erning professional syndicates and trade unions, as well as unprecedented electoral
fraud are only some of the indicators.53 Since 1998, the Political Parties Commit-
tee (PPC) has closed seven of the 16 legal opposition parties. The government is
not only preventing group and party development, but also preventing prominent
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Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst
CİHAN
The emergence of the AK Party has shown that Muslim politics in Turkey is evolving from an instrumen
talist usage of Islam to a new understanding of practicing Muslims who deal with daily politics.
independent individuals from using already existing parties to run in the parlia-
mentary elections.54 The parliamentary elections of 1990 were marked by fraud,
intimidation and a previously unseen level of violence.55 In the 1995 elections, Is-
lamist candidates were detained so that they could not participate in the elections.
The Islamists’ main collaborator, Al-‘Amal, was suspended from operating.56 In
June 1995 the government started a series of detentions and military trials of lead-
ing MB members. The organization’s headquarters and over 5,000 offices were
shut down. From 1993 to 1995 more than 1,000 MB activists were detained.57 In
the 2000 elections, they ran as independents and won 17 seats -- more than the to-
tal number of seats won by all opposition parties combined -- again becoming the
largest opposition block in parliament.58 A more striking victory occurred in the
2005 elections, when the MB secured 88 seats, more seats than those won by any
opposition party since the 1952 revolution. But this success gave way to a regime
clampdown on Islamists. The MB’s countermove was to use its presence in parlia-
ment to draw public attention to the regime’s use of suppression and intimidation
in a bid to make a national cause out of the matter. Members of parliament from
the MB (they sit as nominal independents) raised questions about transparency,
corruption, the role of Shari‘a in public life, and democratic reform -- all issues
that were and are of great significance to the Islamists’ popular base.59
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İHSAN YILMAZ
It should be noted that despite this almost constant repression and the fact that
the MB had never been legally recognized, the democratic learning experience of
electoral alliances broadened the political basis of the movement, both by attract-
ing more urbanite white-collar professionals and by providing opportunities for
experimentation with new approaches toward social reform and democracy, as
a result of physically and discursively interacting with secular, leftist and liberal
parties.62 The younger generation MB members’ involvement in syndicates, along
with participation in municipal and national elections, has been influential in the
transformation and moderation of the MB. These younger generations represent
a secular-leaning and pluralist Islamic approach towards politics and have been
influential in changing the MB along these lines.63 Thus, for instance, in 1995
the MB stated that Islam endorses political pluralism.64 Even though the use of
religious ideology in the discourse of the younger generations is still central to
mobilizing grassroots, it plays only a minimal role in their discourse, in contrast
to the elders of the MB. It seems that the younger generations of the MB, while
fighting for legality and trying to demonstrate their commitment to secular poli-
tics, are likely to go further.65
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Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst
105
İHSAN YILMAZ
With the passing of the old generation of leaders, the policies of the MB would
seem to be moving ever closer to the al-Wasat platform. It is significant that the
new general guide of the MB from January 2004, Muhammad Mahdi Akif, al-
though now in his 70s, has always been close to the younger generation, and re-
portedly played a prominent role in encouraging the al-Wasat initiative of 1996
against the opposition of the top MB leadership of the time. A reform initiative
announced by Akif in the spring of 2004 places the MB very close to the principles
propounded by al-Wasat.75
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Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst
Conclusion
The Egyptian case suggests that democratic learning in nondemocratic settings
is also possible as a result of factors such as regime accommodation and repres-
sion. This case has several similarities to
the Turkish case. In both, the partial and The emergence of the
limited opening of these countries’ au-
thoritarian political systems created new
Egyptian Muslim democrats
democratic opportunities for Islamists to both in al-Wasat and MB
participate in public life and politics, fos- circles shows that even
tering democratic learning by permitting limited political participation
Islamists to compete for power and mass opportunities in a liberalized
support. In the process as elected or pro-
spective officials and ruling politicians,
autocratic system can induce
they have had to address and represent radical opposition to moderate
the interests of a group much larger than its discourse and goals
107
İHSAN YILMAZ
Endnotes
1. In Pahlavi Iran, for example, all possible channels for political expression and participation
and Islamism represented the only opening left for protest, and it was used by different groups and
powers seeking probably completely different goals, Nazih N. M. Ayubi, “The Political Revival of
Islam: The Case of Egypt”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, (Winter,
1980), p. 487.
108
Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst
2. Carrie Wickham “The Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s
Wasat Party”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring 2004), p. 223. See also Sheri Berman,
“Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19 (January, 2008),
pp. 5-18.
3. Asef Bayat, ‘Islamism and Social Movement Theory’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 6
(2005), p. 906.
4. R. Quinn Mecham, “From the Ashes of Virtue, A Promise of Light: The Transformation of
Political Islam in Turkey”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, (2004), p. 339.
5. There are both de jure and de facto constraints in the name of Kemalism limiting a fully
functioning democracy in Turkey. The 1982 constitution, which was prepared after the Sept. 12,
1980 military coup, severely limits the democratic power of parliament and elected government
compared to Western democracies. Until very recently, through the National Security Council the
military had direct influence on the government. A parallel military court structure with even a
Supreme Court of Appeals which has no equivalent in the West makes even a black-letter civilian
control of the military impossible. In addition to these de jure factors, it is well known that the
military has always influenced daily politics either with almost periodical coups d’état or with a
threat of new coup’s occurrence. In the name of Kemalist principles, national security or protection
of secularism the generals interfere with many issues which in the West would normally be consid-
ered civilian concerns. But the opposite has not been possible. Civilians who question the army’s
motives, its dealings or budget have been accused of being people with bad intentions, to say the
least. Even today, very few dare to question the military. It is also a fact that there have always been
civilian supporters of such a Kemalist autocracy among elite circles such as the media, politics, busi-
ness and even judiciary. The reason I call this an autocracy is to highlight that the Turkish military
justifies its actions by constantly referring to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and sees itself as the embodi-
ment of his perceived ideals and vision. It is usual to hear statements from the generals and other
elite like, “What would Ataturk do in this situation?”, “Ataturk would be upset with this”, “Ataturk
would beat (or chase after) them with a stick” and so on. Thus, in a sense, Turkey is still a Kemalist
autocracy, as if he were still alive, thanks to his grand embodiment, the Turkish military.
6. Mecham, “From the Ashes of Virtue, A Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political
Islam in Turkey”, p. 339.
7. Serif Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture
and Reconstruction in Operational Codes”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2005), p. 152.
8. Thomas W. Smith, “Between Allah and Ataturk: Liberal Islam in Turkey”, The International
Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2005), p. 316.
9. Mardin “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Re-
construction in Operational Codes”, p. 158.
10. Rusen Çakır, Ne Seriat Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak (Neither the Shari’a Nor
Democracy: To Understand the Welfare Party), (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1994), cited in Mardin,
“Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in
Operational Codes”, p. 157.
11. Ergun Yildirim et al, “A Sociological Representation of the Justice and Development Party:
Is It a Political Design or a Political Becoming?”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2007), p. 6.
12. Omer Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Is-
lam”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2003), pp. 103-104.
13. Ihsan Dagi, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West
and Westernization”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005), p. 25.
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İHSAN YILMAZ
14. Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Islam”, p.
104.
15. Dagi, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and
Westernization”, p. 27.
16. Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Islam”, p.
104.
17. Ihsan Yilmaz, “State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey”, The Muslim
World, Vol. 95, No. 3 (2005), p. 402.
18. Yildirim et al, “A Sociological Representation of the Justice and Development Party: Is It a
Political Design or a Political Becoming?”, p. 17.
19. Ihsan Yilmaz, “Ijtihad and Tadjid by Conduct: The Gülen Movement”, in M. Hakan Yavuz
and John Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, (Syracuse, New York:
Syracuse University Press, 2003), p. 227.
20. Mecham, “From the Ashes of Virtue, A Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political
Islam in Turkey”, p. 350.
21. Gamze Cavdar, “Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning?”, Politi
cal Science Quarterly, Vol. 121, No. 3 (2006), p. 480.
22. Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Islam”, p.
112.
23. Ihsan Dagi, “Turkey’s AKP in Power”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008), p. 27.
24. Yasin Aktay, “Diaspora and Stability: Constitutive Elements in a Body of Knowledge”, in M.
Hakan Yavuz and John Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, (Syra-
cuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), p. 139.
25. Dagi, “Turkey’s AKP in Power”, p. 28.
26. See in detail, Ali Carkoglu, “Turkey’s November Elections: A New Beginning?”, Middle East
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2002), pp. 30-41; Soli Özel “Turkey at the Polls: After
the Tsunami”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2003), pp. 80-94; Ziya Onis and E. Fuat Keyman
“Turkey at the Polls: A New Path Emerges”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No.2 (2003), pp. 95-108.
27. Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Islam”, p.
102.
28. See in detail, Ali Carkoglu, “A New Electoral Victory for the ‘Pro-Islamists’ or the ‘New
Centre-Right’? The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary
Elections in Turkey”, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2007), pp. 501-519.
29. Carkoglu, “A New Electoral Victory for the ‘Pro-Islamists’ or the ‘New Centre-Right’? The
Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey”,
p. 518.
30. Dagi, “Turkey’s AKP in Power”, pp. 29-30.
31. Holger Albrecht, “How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt”,
Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2005), p. 393.
32. Daniel Brumberg, “Islam is Not the Solution (or the Problem)”, The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 29, No. 1 (2005), p. 106.
33. Albrecht, “How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt”, p. 389.
34. Asef Bayat, “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing
Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 40, No. 1
(1998), p. 168.
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Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst
35. R. Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 23.
36. Albrecht, “How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt”, p. 390.
37. Albrecht, “How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt”, p. 383.
38. Holger Albrecht and Eva Wegner, “Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment
in Egypt and Morocco”, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 11 No. 2 (2006), p. 136.
39. Brumberg, “Islam is Not the Solution (or the Problem)”, p. 107.
40. Bayat, “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic
Activism in Iran and Egypt”, p. 155.
41. Bayat, “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic
Activism in Iran and Egypt”, p. 158.
42. Husain Haqqani and Hillel Fradkin, “Islamist Parties and Democracy: Going back to the
Origins”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July, 2008), pp. 14-15.
43. See Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, “The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood: Foray Into Political Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions?”, CSID 9th Annual Con
ference, Political Islam and Democracy - What do Islamists and Islamic Movements want?, Washing-
ton, D.C., 2008, (CSID: Conference Proceedings, 2008), pp. 40-59.
44. Bayat, “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic
Activism in Iran and Egypt”, p. 160.
45. Hazem Kandil, “Islamization of the Egyptian Intelligentsia: Discourse and Structure in So-
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112