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Chapter Thirteen
INTER-MADHHAB SURFING, NEO-IJTIHAD,
AND FAITH-BASED MOVEMENT LEADERS

Ihsan Yilmaz

Introduction

The very nature of Islam, which orders an individual’s life in ethical and
legal normative ways, paves the way for Muslim legal pluralism.1 Muslim
legal pluralism is inevitable even in non-Muslim spheres, regardless of non-
recognition by officials. Many Muslims in Muslim and non-Muslim poli-
ties relate more to the Shari'a than to the lex loci as Islam demands full
allegiance from them once they have freely chosen to embrace it.
Currently, many Muslims live in secular and modern milieus. Normally,
in times of necessity ('aßr al-∂arùra)2 an identity crisis could be anticipated in
environments where clashes with the Islamic way of life occur. Yet Muslims
find ways to cope with the conflicting situations arising from their being
subject to legal pluralism. They successfully respond to the changing social
and cultural contexts and skillfully navigate and surf across these conflicting
lifestyles, rules, norms, and laws.
Today there are many types of navigation between official and unofficial
laws. At times the state itself navigates across its own official law and exis-
tent but non-recognized or unincorporated, unofficial madhhabs or other
Muslim laws. This is exemplified in the cases of the Ottoman Family Rights
Law (OFRL) of 1917, and more recently in the Pakistani Family Law.
Navigation is also typified by individual Muslims navigating, for any num-
ber of reasons, across the official law of a particular country of which they
are a citizen and unofficial Muslim law to meet the demands of both.
“Skillful legal navigators” of England and Turkey are examples of this
phenomenon.3
A second category of navigation is totally within the unofficial realm and
has nothing to do with the official law. In this category Muslims navigate
across unofficial madhhab laws. Put differently, they surf on the “inter-
madhhab-net.”4 Here, Muslims navigate in order to fit their beliefs to
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secular and modern environments. Legal pluralism of conflicting and some-

times opposing rules among madhhabs facilitate this phenomenon. This
second category of navigation is also subdivided into two practices. The
first is institutional navigation as exemplified in the case of the Islamic
Shari'a Council (ISC) of Britain and the second is individual navigation
by those who may be referred to as “micro-mujtahids.”5 This study focuses
on these two dimensions of unofficial navigation, which is a manifestation
of the dissolution of madhhab boundaries in the unofficial realm.
After giving an analytical picture of the current unofficial Muslim socio-
legal sphere vis-à-vis the dissolution of madhhab boundaries, I will deal
with the new challenges to traditional fiqh and Shari'a since this new
Muslim legality carries the danger of post-modern fragmentation and anar-
chy as a result of the inadequacy of new ijtihads (individual reasoning),
problems surrounding the issues of legitimacy and doctrinal authority.
Subsequent to presenting these problems and challenges, my study suggests
civil neo-ijtihad and new implementation techniques as possible alternative
avenues in order to cope with the socio-legal dangers. In this regard, it is
argued that faith-based movement leaders of Muslims have a role to play
to face the challenges posed by Muslim legal pluralism in this age.

Ijtihad and tajdìd in times of necessity

The Shari'a is an essential and central part of a Muslim’s religion; it is

the core of the faith. Law in Muslim understanding is a system of mean-
ings and a cultural code for interpreting the world.6 Islam “represents an
order which governs all spheres of life, in which . . . even the rules of pro-
tocol and etiquette are of a legal nature.”7 Thus Muslim law must be con-
ceived as a culture.8 Consequently, issues with regards to Muslim socio-cultural
change, transformation or renewal would inevitably intermingle with the
discussions surrounding ijtihad. Any new discourse or practice vis-à-vis these
issues is directly or indirectly a result of a new ijtihad, and this does not
have to be in the field of “law” only, as strictly defined and understood
by the legal modernity.
As non-recognition does not make Muslim law and legal pluralism dis-
appear, the tools of ijtihad and tajdìd (renewal) maintain their relevance
wherever Muslims live. That is why especially after the decline of Muslim
power and triumph of the Western hegemony, Muslim advocates of renewal,
reform,9 and revival have argued for a return to the right to exercise ijti-
had to facilitate reinterpretation and to renew the Islamic heritage.
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Most of the responses in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies to the impact of the West on Muslim societies resulted in substan-
tial attempts to reinterpret Islam to meet the changing circumstances of
Muslim life.10 The purpose of ijtihad is a return to a purified Islam by
weeding out un-Islamic beliefs and practices that have infiltrated the law
and life of Muslims.11 For those modernists, revivalists, and activists, ijti-
had was a prerequisite for the survival of Islam in a modern world.12 They
argued for internal renewal through ijtihad and selective adaptation (Islam-
ization) of Western ideas and technology.13
The atmosphere of renewal and the emphasis on the need for new ijti-
had in 'aßr al-∂arùra paved the way for the revival and wide usage of takhayyur
(selection) in different contexts by individuals and institutions both in official
and unofficial realms. Under the concept of necessity (∂arùra), an individual
may employ takhayyur, i.e., he can choose minority interpretations or another
madhhab’s view to resolve a particular problem. In other words, he can
navigate across different madhhab laws, surf on the inter-madhhab-net.

Takhayyur: Surfing on the inter-madhhab-net

Classical Muslim jurisprudence has provided room for choosing minority

interpretations or another madhhab’s view to resolve a particular problem
under the heading of takhayyur, takhyìr or tarjì˙: eclecticism, selection or pref-
erence from among the opinions of the different schools of law or the views
of individual scholars within the schools.14 Takhayyur refers to the right of
an individual Muslim to select and follow the teaching of a madhhab other
than his own.
Modern-day Muslim scholars are of the opinion that under ∂arùra inter-
madhhab surfing is permissible (˙alàl ).15 However, a majority of them
emphasizes that surfing is only ˙alàl if there is a condition of ∂arùra.16
Injunctions of Islam are related to a great extent to the consciousness and
psychology of individuals. In secular environments, where Islamic laws are
not enforced by a state, this is even more so. Thus psychology is not a
minor issue and must be thoroughly taken into account especially in
the context of inter-madhab surfing when psychological comfort may be
disturbed. The definition of ∂arùra is therefore a major issue in this regard.
Îarùra is a comprehensive concept that covers all fiqh rulings.17 This
concept developed within Islamic jurisprudence to facilitate and allow for
actions which are normally forbidden.18 Its existence can lift a prohibition
or a compulsory act. When there is ∂arùra, a mufti may issue a fatwa in
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accordance with the ruling of a given mujtahid most suitable for the cir-
cumstance at hand.
To decide if ∂arùra exists is not arbitrary. There are certain borderlines
and conditions to decide if it really exists.19 If a vital interest needs to be
protected, this condition is called ∂arùra. Vital interests as usually listed in
ußùl al-fiqh literature may be related to the following: religion (dìn), person
(nafs), offspring (naßl ), property (màl ), or reason ('aql ). In such contexts there
is a well-known legal maxim stating that “Necessity lifts prohibition” (al-
∂arùràt tubì˙ al-ma˙Ωùràt ). A strict definition of ∂arùra allows that a primary
necessity is one of an emergency nature, where one’s life or circumstance
is threatened. An exception made to protect a “vital interest” cannot exceed
the minimum necessary to obviate harm to that interest. If there is no per-
missible alternative, ∂arùra exists. The condition of ∂arùra must be existent
at the present time; a future possible ∂arùra condition has no legal weight.20
The dissolution of madhhab boundaries justified by a modified under-
standing of takhayyur can be observed in the legislative attempts of some
Muslim countries to modernize their societies by restructuring Muslim laws.
The takhayyur right of individual Muslims was adopted in Muslim countries
in draft legislation to justify the selection of one legal doctrine from among
divergent opinions of the four Sunni madhhabs, and it has been the most
notable basis for reforms, especially in the field of family law.21 This use
of takhayyur departs from the traditional understanding in which takhayyur
was the right of the individual Muslim in a specific case and not that of
a government in legislating changes for all Muslims.22
Preliminary observations and anecdotal evidence suggest that today both
the official realm and the unofficial realm employ takhayyur. A close scrutiny
of contemporary literature on Islamic jurisprudence and fiqh also shows
many examples of takhayyur, of fatwas based on takhayyur, and suggestions
for its usage.23
The inter-madhhab-net is composed of and maintained by the following:
(i) Intra-madhhab texts. These are traditional books of particular madh-
habs, citing different views within the particular madhhab. For each
issue, authors cite views of different scholars of the same madhhab one
by one, from the strongest to the weakest. For instance, for the Hanafi
madhab, the view of Abù Óanìfa is cited first, then Abù Yùsuf, then
Mu˙ammad al-Shaybànì, then Zufar, and then others. The reader is
advised to follow the strongest view, yet it is lawful to navigate across
the intra-madhhab net by following the view of another. Any view can
be selected. It is possible that in the very near future these texts will
be available on the Internet and on CD- or DVD-ROMs.
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(ii) Inter-madhhab texts. These texts are formatted in the same way as
those discussed above; however, here the views of the four major madh-
habs on a given topic are cited for contrast and comparison. In some
cases, they offer a fifth madhhab.24 As with the intra-madhhab exam-
ple, readers may navigate across the different views by adopting one
approach from one madhhab and another from another madhhab.
Again, in the near future these texts will likely be available in elec-
tronic form.25
(iii) New inter-madhhab fatwa books.26 Contemporary Muslim thinkers are
continuing the traditional attitude of considering legal diversity as a
source of richness rather than a difficulty.27 They reaffirm the tradi-
tional idea that dissension (ikhtilàf ) is in fact a benefit to the Muslim
community, demonstrating flexibility in the Shari'a. It is often reiter-
ated that the diversity of madhhabs is a bliss.28 Thus many scholars
today, in their books on contemporary issues, give fatwas based on
views of different madhhabs. Although they do mainly follow one par-
ticular madhhab, they employ takhayyur when necessary and thereby
reach a conclusion on a given subject. In sum, these authors use the
aforementioned texts but they navigate on behalf of the reader and
come up with an answer. In some cases, they produce more than one
answer and leave it to the individual to navigate across these re-
produced fatwas.
(iv) Newspaper inter-madhhab fatwa columns. This is almost identical to
the inter-madhhab fatwa books but here the medium is a newspaper.
For instance, a close look at some Turkish dailies, such as Zaman,
Yeni Safak, Vakit, Milli Gazete, Turkiye and so on, shows that the
attitude taken by the fiqh-fatwa columnists to takhayyur is positive and
that they cite different views and opinions of madhhabs and scholars
when dealing with a particular issue.
(v) Radio-TV programs. In addition to newspapers and journals, with the
advancement and spread of telecommunication, radio stations and
television channels have their own muftis and question-answer pro-
grams. In Turkey a number of private TV channels broadcast such
programs.29
(vi) Inter-madhhab fatwas in cyberspace. This is no different from inter-
madhhab fatwa books or newspaper columns, yet in this case cyber-
space is the medium.30 As Mandeville observes, “through various popular
newsgroups and e-mail discussion lists, Muslims can solicit information
about what ‘Islam’ says about any particular problem.”31
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Post-modern fragmentation

Examples of fragmentation within responses to modern-day ∂arùra con-

ditions and challenges can be seen in two contrasting examples: a state-
sponsored official ijtihad committee in Turkey and a civil unofficial council
in England. While neither state recognizes Islamic law, they do allow civil
Shari'a institutions to operate as long as they do not contravene the lex
loci.
Also discussed below is the phenomenon of Muslim individuals who surf
on the inter-madhhab-net as mujtahids of their own in daily life.

Survival of Muslim law in Turkey and an official ijtihad committee: The Higher
Committee of Religious Affairs (HCRA)

With the transplantation of a new secular Turkish civil code from Switzer-
land in 1926, aimed at secularizing the Turkish society in order to bring
it closer to Western models,32 Islam was officially removed from public life.
Nevertheless, Islam is still deeply rooted in the minds and hearts of the
Turkish people,33 and it continues to be an important dynamic within
Turkish public life.
In the area of family law, recent research has showed that the Turks
have not abandoned their religious law but reconstructed it.34 The state
expected that through education, legal literacy campaigns, and urbaniza-
tion, the populace would give up its local customs and religious laws and
would follow only the official law. However, it is becoming clear that
Muslim legal pluralism is a metropolitan reality, too.35
In addition to family law, other areas such as business, finance, and
insurance see Muslim law referred to and obeyed by many, despite the
non-recognition of this law by the state. An indication of this phenome-
non is the fact of fatwa books now being bestsellers in Turkey. Moreover,
many newspapers have fatwa columns, and recently, the number of Turkish
fatwa sites in cyberspace has increased.36 Scholars have been asked about
such contemporary topics as working in Europe, madhhabs, using amplifiers
when reading the call to prayer, Friday prayer and work, dàr al-Islàm, fast-
ing and traveling by train, the stock exchange, tax, ˙alàl meat, marrying
non-Muslim women, †alàq, court divorce, polygamy, nationalism, unem-
ployment benefits, inflation, interest, customs tax, bribery, depositing money
at a bank in non-Muslim countries, selling alcohol in a non-Muslim coun-
try, gambling in dàr al-˙arb, sterilization, plastic surgery, using perfumes,
abortion, ijtihad, military service, organ transplantation, prayers ( ßalàt ) on
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the bus, VAT, mortgage, the European Union, alcohol in medication, eau
de cologne, life insurance, feminism, fertility clinics, etc.37 In this regard,
it is also worth mentioning that a recent survey has found that 14.1% of
the Turkish people have accounts with interest-free Islamic finance insti-
tutions despite the fact that such finance institutions carry no state guar-
antee for any losses, as opposed to mainstream banks.38
Albeit secular, the state has set up an ijtihad committee, Diyanet ({leri
Ba{kanlı<ı Din I{leri Yüksek Kurulu (The Directorate of Religious Affairs Higher
Committee of Religious Affairs). The pervasiveness of Islam and Muslim
law in Turkish society is so evident that the state has needed to respond
to this socio-legal reality by establishing this committee.39 In Turkey, reli-
gious institutions are linked to the state bureaucracy, without any auton-
omy. Soon after the establishment of the Republic, the Directorate of
Religious Affairs was established, and all Islamic activities were placed under
the auspices of the state. The state has also tried for a long time to cre-
ate its own version of Islam.40 The HCRA is a result of this scheme.
This organ of the state has a somewhat awkward status. While the state
does not recognize Muslim law, and arguing for its application is a crim-
inal offence, the HCRA bases its arguments on officially non-recognized
Islamic legal and jurisprudential sources. This committee endeavors to pro-
duce fatwas to the questions put to it.41 The HCRA responds to the socio-
legal reality by exercising ijtihad and also by employing takhayyur.
There is a problem of doctrinal authority and legitimacy in this Turkish
case, similar to the Pakistani one.42 Some people do not see the rulings
and ijtihads of the HCRA as legitimate for it is an organ of a modern
secular state and scholars of the HCRA are officials of the state. These
scholars must act within the limits of the secular law and try to adapt the
Muslim law to the state law; scholars at the HCRA are not free to oper-
ate within the realm of Shari'a. If there is a clash between fiqh and sec-
ular state law then the lex loci must prevail. Indeed, on controversial issues
such as head-scarves, these scholars have had either to keep silent or to
advocate the state’s position.

A civil ijtihad committee: The Islamic Shari'a Council UK (ISC)43

The British state’s non-recognition of Muslim identity in terms of law

increased the number of problems the community has encountered.44 These
problems paved the way for the emergence of the Islamic Shari'a Council.45
The phenomenon of limping marriages, whereby some Muslim marriages
were not recognized, had a catalytic function in the establishment of the
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ISC.46 Muslim leaders tried to deal with this problem “in a manner that
would resolve the dispute without breaking either Shari'a or the law.”47
The ISC has an eclectic approach to Muslim law.48 It is not tied to any
particular madhhab and it is prepared to offer the parties the benefits of
any madhhab that suits their particular need.49 When needed, minority
views are chosen to resolve a conflict. The ISC’s verdicts are “based upon
rulings derived from the main four schools of thought together with other
sources within the Sunni Tradition, as well as the Literalist School.”50 These
decisions exemplify modern takhayyur. The ISC is concerned to apply the
underlying spirit and general principles of Muslim law, and takhayyur and
ijtihad are given free rein.51
In the British case, too, we see the problem of legitimacy and doctrinal
authority. People do not feel comfortable that the rulings of the Council
can easily be followed as communal pressure often dictates otherwise. The
ISC lacks the popular support of Muslim communities in Britain. Moreover,
even though civil ijtihad on most matters was the case in the classical
period, for centuries Muslims have obeyed their state’s Muslim law, and
in their perception legitimacy is mixed with state approval or reinforce-
ment. Thus, the ISC’s neo-ijtihads do not easily gain ground and earn
legitimacy in the wider community.

Micro-mujtahids

In these ∂arùra times, some young people have developed adaptive strate-
gies to cope with the challenges of modern life. These young Muslims nav-
igate at the madhhab level across unofficial Muslim law. The legal pluralism
inherent in Islamic jurisprudence helps them to find answers to their every-
day life dilemmas. They select, eclectically and also pragmatically, a con-
venient answer from one of the mainstream, that is, Sunni madhhabs. By
employing this kind of modern individual takhayyur, a Muslim “becomes
his/her own mufti,”52 or a micro-mujtahid, making sometimes swift decisions
in face of a minor but instant problem.
As a result, one can observe many Muslims surfing on the inter-madh-
hab-net. A Hanafi follows the Shafi'i madhhab and combines the noon
prayer with the afternoon one or the evening prayer with the night one.53
Normally Hanafi law does not permit this. Or, surfing in the area of ablu-
tion is also possible:54 according to al-Shàfi'ì, if a man touches a woman,
he is no longer clean, but if he bleeds, he still is. In the Hanafi madhhab,
these two instances are diametrically opposite. Also, in the Hanafi madh-
hab, when performing ablutions one has to wash one’s feet completely;
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then if the person wears a tight leather sock during the next 24 hours, it
is enough that he touches this leather sock with a wet hand symbolically
instead of washing his foot. In the Hanbali madhhab, one can do this with
a normal sock as well. It is thus not surprising to see some Hanafis tak-
ing advantage of this Hanbali view when they perform ablutions in non-
Muslim environments where it is not convenient to wash the feet. A golden
tooth or filling is not permitted under Hanafi law, so Muslims follow the
Shafi'i view.55 Regarding alcohol, although there is a consensus that drink-
ing is prohibited, the external usage is permitted by some Hanafi schol-
ars.56 Thus, surfers from other madhhabs usually benefit from this.57 Regarding
interest, Abù Óanìfa and Mu˙ammad al-Shaybànì are of the view that in
dàr al-˙arb, it is permissible between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. Others
oppose this opinion, so if an individual wants to accept interest, he follows
the former view.58 This is not an exhaustive list of examples. Moreover,
with regards to individual surfing on the inter-madhhab-net and micro-
mujtahids, at this stage evidence is only suggestive but not compelling, and
this area merits further research.
While some of these micro-mujtahids confine their rulings to the bound-
aries of the four madhhabs, many others claim that they can deduce their
own interpretations directly from the Quran and Sunna.59 It is even sug-
gested that “in the absence of sanctioned information from recognized insti-
tutions, Muslims are increasingly taking religion into their own hands.”60
Thus, one frequently hears young Muslims say that one can now find all
the necessary information on Quran and hadith on CD-ROMs that even
imams could not access.61
It is obvious that at the end of the day this approach will lead to mil-
lions of madhhabs62 and there will be a postmodern fragmentation.63 In
traditional Islamic jurisprudence, consensus (ijmà' ) served as a brake on the
vast array of individual interpretations of legal scholars and contributed to
the creation of a relatively fixed body of laws.64 In 'aßr al-∂arùra, there is a
danger of post-modern fragmentation as individuals claim to be and act
as mujtahids. In this context, a leading British Muslim scholar, Dr. Abdal-
Hakim Murad of the University of Cambridge, strongly asserts that “with
every Muslim now a proud Mujtahid, and with taqlid dismissed as a sin
rather than a humble and necessary virtue, the divergent views which
caused such pain in our early history will surely break surface again. Instead
of four madhhabs in harmony, we will have a billion madhhabs in bitter
and self-righteous conflict.”65 The leading fiqh expert in Turkey, Professor
Hayrettin Karaman, points out another danger in that if there are no clear
answers to contemporary questions, then Muslims might be confused and
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follow un-Islamic ways.66 To prevent this, a new activity is required that

will respect the tradition but will also satisfy the demands of Muslims in
the postmodern age.
The examples of the Islamic Shari'a Council of Britain, the Higher
Committee of Religious Affairs in Turkey, and the work of micro-mujtahids
show that the question is no longer whether the gate of ijtihad is open or
not but which ijtihads are necessary and which ones are to be followed.
Many people and institutions claim a right to exercise ijtihad and indeed
do practice ijtihad. Whether these are legitimate in the eyes of the people
or not is another question. The problems of doctrinal authority, legitimacy,
and postmodern fragmentation will still need to be dealt with.
To prevent postmodern fragmentation but at the same time implement
new changes and ijtihads without confronting problems of civil disobedi-
ence or lack of legitimacy, it seems that faith-based movement leaders with
effective organizations to implement their ideas have a role to play. Fethullah
Gülen has found a wide audience for his ideas, which are described as
reformative by some scholars.67

Ideas implemented in the public sphere: Gülen and his movement

Fethullah Gülen is an Islamic scholar, thinker, writer, and poet. He was

born in Erzurum, in the east of Turkey, in 1938. Although he did not
receive any formal education after finishing elementary school, he was
trained in the religious sciences informally by several Muslim scholars and
spiritual Sufi masters. In 1958 he was awarded a state preacher’s license
and in the following years expanded his audience base. In his sermons and
speeches he emphasized the pressing social issues of the times. He has
inspired many people in Turkey to establish educational institutions that
combine modern sciences with ethics and spirituality. His efforts have
resulted in the emergence of the Gülen movement, a faith-based collec-
tivity whose boundaries are extremely loose and difficult to specify. The
movement depends on its members’ recognition of Gülen’s ideal cognitive
schemas and the Nur (Light) doctrines.68
By exercising ijtihad without flagging it as ijtihad, Gülen reinterprets
Islamic understanding in tune with contemporary times and develops a
new Muslim discourse that is based on “the synthesis of Islam and science;
an acceptance of democracy as the best form of governance within the
rule of law; raising the level of Islamic consciousness by indicating the con-
nection between reason and revelation; and, achieving this-worldly and
other-worldly salvation within a free market and through quality educa-
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tion.”69 Stated summarily, Gülen’s interpretation of Islam seeks a compro-

mise with the modern living world. He claims that an understanding of
secularism existed among the Seljuqs and Ottomans: they employed ijti-
had in worldly matters, and enacted laws and decrees to respond to the
challenges of their times.70
Some of the elements, if not all, in Gülen’s discourse may not be unique
to him; there have been a number of Muslim intellectuals and mujtahids
who developed new ideas and understandings in the face of the challenges
of modernity, without making concessions from the Islam of the past. Yet
what makes Gülen unique is that as a leader he has successfully persuaded
and mobilized many people—numbering a few million at the present time—
to establish institutions and to put into practice his discourse in over 50
countries.
Given his strong influence in particular on his followers and in general
on Turkish society, Gülen’s ideas regarding legal pluralism, renewal, takhayyur,
and ijtihad are likely to find an appeal and to have a chance of being
implemented in the future. What follows is an outline of some of his ideas
on these issues.
Gülen sees diversity and pluralism as a natural fact.71 By making refer-
ence to the Turkish Islam of the Seljuqs and Ottomans and to their prac-
tice of religious pluralism, he underlines that a legally pluralist system existed
during these times as well.72 Gülen believes that there is a need for ijtihad
in our age. He says that he respects the scholars of the past but also
believes that ijtihad is a necessity: to freeze ijtihad means to freeze Islam,
and imprison it in a given time and space. He argues that Islam is a
dynamic and universal religion, which covers all time and space, and renews
itself in real life situations; it changes from one context to another, and
ijtihad is a major tool for this. But he strongly affirms that sometimes the
ideas about ijtihad are luxurious, as there are many more serious prob-
lems challenging Muslims, and that everybody could claim to be a mujtahid
in today’s circumstances. He puts a strong emphasis on raising and edu-
cating strong believers, and is of the opinion that it is important to raise
individuals who would meet the criteria of a mujtahid.73
Regarding takhayyur, Gülen believes that under ∂arùra an individual can
follow another madhhab by judging the situation with his conscience, ensur-
ing that he is truly under ∂arùra. While opposing talf ìq (the combining of
doctrines), Gülen argues that keeping madhhabs separate will always give
people a chance to navigate across these madhhabs if any problem arises.74
With regard to the definition of ∂arùra, Gülen underlines that an indi-
vidual can define whether a particular situation is one of ∂arùra or not.
Yet he goes on to say that if everything is left to the individual to define
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what ∂arùra is, then there is a danger of arbitrariness, and this could pos-
sibly be against the spirit of Shari'a, which states that believers should
sometimes endure difficulty as life is essentially a test. Gülen emphasizes
that in the name of public interest (maßla˙a) and ∂arùra, people are inclined
to follow the easiest option at all times;75 if everything is permitted in the
name of ∂arùra, then the essence of religion will not remain. He argues
that if the earlier generations had given permission to everything and relaxed
the requirements, then today we would not have anything remaining as
far as religion is concerned.76 Gülen suggests that a consultative body or
a group of scholars can define specific ∂arùra conditions in detail, which
individuals can use as guidelines.77
Gülen strongly advocates ijtihad committees.78 He is of the opinion that
it is no longer possible for individuals to be mujtahids on all matters (muj-
tahid-i mu†laq); ijtihad committees should perform this task instead. In Gülen’s
view, it is quite possible that in the future people from all sorts of disci-
plines will come together in research centers and constitute ijtihad com-
mittees. He argues that these committees should consist of scholars from
different subject areas who advise on particular issues. They should also
use the latest technological advances of the age, including computers, cyber-
space, CD- or DVD-ROMs, and so on.79
To Gülen, even today some scholars can come together and try to answer
some contemporary questions put to them. In the future, he says, if more
suitable mujtahids emerge, they can come up with their own better solu-
tions and ijtihads. For ijtihad committees, theology faculties could be suit-
able bases or the Directorate of Religious Affairs could set up such a
committee or could evolve its already existing fatwa committee into an ijti-
had committee. The state can espouse one of these ijtihads and can enact
it. Then Muslims could follow such enacted official law, since they are
ordered to obey their rulers (ulù l-amr), as long as the latter act within the
realm of Shari'a and are not against its spirit. In Gülen’s view, states should
establish these committees as a service to society, and he gives as an example
the Directorate of Religious Affairs Higher Committee of Religious Affairs
(HCRA). Yet if a state fails to do this, Muslims should employ civil ijtihad.80

Implementation of the new discourse and ijtihad in the public sphere

Gülen’s discourse is not only meant on a rhetorical level; he encourages

all his followers and sympathizers to realize his ideals and to put into prac-
tice his discourse. He is now “one of the latest and most popular modern
Muslims which Republican Turkey has produced.”81 His biography, pub-
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lished in 1995, has entered into its fiftieth edition. Roughly every year in
the print media, about 1,000 news items are reported on Gülen.82 The
actual size of Gülen’s millions of followers and sympathizers is not known,
but it is agreed that it is the largest civil movement in the country.83 He
is now described as an opinion leader in Turkey.84 In newspapers he is at
times referred to as the unofficial civil religious leader of Turkey.85
His movement is deemed to be moderate; it “can be considered ‘mod-
ern’ in the sense that it espouses a world view centered around the self-
reflexive and politically participant individual’s ability to realize personal
goals while adhering to a collective identity, and it seeks to shape local
networks and institutions in relation to global discourses of democracy,
human rights, and the market economy.”86 The movement has a television
network (Samanyolu TV) and two radio channels (Burch FM, Dunya FM),
broadcasting in Europe, the Near East, Central Asia, and the Indian sub-
continent; a daily newspaper, Zaman, with a circulation of 300,000 in
Turkey, and is also published in 16 countries including Europe and the
USA; a number of periodicals specialized in various fields; and a news
agency (Cihan News Agency).
Gülen has also been successful in transforming and even revolutionizing
the Muslim educational discourse by taking it from its traditional form as
practised in the madrasa and Quranic literacy courses to the modern high
school and university format. He has encouraged people to establish mod-
ern schools rather than traditional ones. Businessmen who follow Gülen’s
message are very active in education and have “built up a vast educational
empire in over 50 countries.”87 People inspired by Gülen have established
more than 500 elementary and secondary schools, of which almost 250
outside Turkey: in Europe, the USA, the Central Asian republics,88 Tanzania,
Senegal, Nigeria, Russia, Japan, South Africa, Australia, and Cambodia; a
number of language and computer courses; hospitals and health clinics;
tutoring chains, six universities in Turkey and Central Asia; and almost
600 student hostels. The movement has also an Islamic bank (Asya Finans),
and an insurance company. Some companies of the movement are in the
music industry.
Modern sciences are taught in the schools operated by Gülen’s follow-
ers. Another progressive aspect of the Gülen movement in the field of edu-
cation pertains to the raising of the educational standards of women. In
the words of Yavuz, “A decade ago, this religious community was not even
willing to allow their daughters to go to secondary or high schools. They
preferred to send female students to the Quranic courses or the strictly
female Imam Hatip schools. For years, Gülen publicly and privately encour-
aged the community to educate all their children regardless of gender.
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Today, there are many all-female schools and many of their graduates go
on to universities.”89
Gülen has changed the traditional tutoring practice of teaching by mak-
ing available printed texts and audio-visual material.90 Recently, the cyber-
space has also come into play.91 Moreover, millions of copies of these
materials have been sold and distributed. The daily Zaman alone has dis-
tributed many of Gülen’s books and audiocassettes, free of charge, to all
its readers in several promotional campaigns. The movement’s radio chan-
nels and TV station have been broadcasting Gülen’s speeches and sermons
as well. Gülen’s media and publishing houses have been propagating and
disseminating Gülen’s discourse on several issues, such as science, moder-
nity, democracy, secularism, dialogue, modern education, etc., as well as
his “ijtihads.”
Zaman also distributed an inter-madhhab text, Zuhayli’s Encyclopedia of
Islamic Fiqh.92 300,000 copies of this book were distributed to Zaman’s sub-
scribers free of charge. In this work, the author cites views of the four
Sunni madhhabs. In some cases even, he cites the fifth madhhab.
Interfaith dialogue all over the world is on the movement’s agenda. In
the countries where it operates, it either establishes interfaith organizations,
associations, and societies or is in close contact with men of faith. In the
schools Gülen encouraged to establish, Muslims, Christians, Jews, Buddhists,
Shamans, and others study together.93 Zaman employs Jewish and Christian
columnists, who contribute regularly.
The movement brings together scholars and intellectuals regardless of
their ethnic, ideological, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The Journalists’
and Writers’ Foundation functions as a think tank on related issues. The
Abant Platform is a result of the attempt to find solutions to Turkey’s prob-
lems regarding sensitive issues such as laicism, secularism, and religion. A
new theology, as it were, has been created in the Abant Platform.
Gülen has also encouraged his sympathizers to work on contemporary
issues such as genetic engineering, organ transplantation, music, art, mod-
ern theology, Quranic exegesis, Muslim-Christian dialogue, and secularism,
and possible Islamic responses to these issues.94 The movement’s publish-
ing houses—Nil, Kaynak, Tov, Truestar—have supported and published
these works. Many of Gülen’s followers publish papers and books and write
Ph.D. theses on these very topics. New fatwa books are published by these
publishing companies, too. The theology journal Yeni ümit has been dis-
seminating these ideas for the last decade. A new intelligentsia in the lines
of Gülen’s discourse has also been evolving.
In short, “Gülen is the engine behind the construction of a ‘new’ Islam
in Turkey.”95 Even though there has not been any discussion of ijtihad,
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neo-ijtihad or tajdìd within the movement, it is obvious that all these devel-
opments and activities are results of Gülen’s ijtihads, even though he would
neither claim nor admit that they were so. Put differently, what he does
can be labeled “ijtihad (and tajdìd ) by conduct.” People in his movement,
believing that he is capable of reinterpreting Islam to respond to the neces-
sities of the time, follow in his footsteps, put into practice his discourse,
and realize his ideals.

Conclusion

Muslim legal pluralism is an everyday reality in both Muslim and non-

Muslim environments. By surfing on the inter-madhhab-net, Muslims have
successfully responded to the changing social and cultural contexts and
have found solutions within Islam without abandoning their Muslim iden-
tity and law. Even though such surfers are not always psychologically com-
fortable with what they do, at least it helps them to feel that they are still
operating within the boundaries of the Shari'a.
Muslim legal pluralism, skillful legal navigators, surfers on the inter-mad-
hhab-net, and postmodern micro-mujtahids paving the way for possible socio-
legal fragmentation will be part of our lives for years to come, and the
challenge of the future will be to accommodate this reality within tradi-
tional Islamic jurisprudence. It is crystal clear that at this point a new
understanding and application of ijtihad, responding to and reflecting the
Zeitgeist, will take place.96
To prevent postmodern fragmentation but at the same time implement
new changes and ijtihads without inciting civil disobedience, it seems, as
the Gülen case exemplifies, that civil faith-based movements have a role
to play. Having almost replaced the ulema’s doctrinal authority, faith-based
movement leaders exercise or advocate ijtihad and, most importantly, have
the means to implement their ideas in the civil realm, even though in most
cases they do not label or flag this as ijtihad or tajdìd. Individuals are not
coerced into following a faith-based leader and tend to judge the leader
with different criteria: the level of piety, appearance, honesty, knowledge,
sincerity, and so on. Whether these criteria are relevant, scientific, or cor-
rect is beside the point; they are enough to legitimize a faith-based leader
and his discourse and practice.97
The function of a faith-based movement leader in relation to tajdìd could
present itself in three ways. First, the leader is a mujtahid himself and makes
ijtihad. Second, he follows ijtihads of certain other individuals or institu-
tions, and by following such ijtihads of others he, in a way, legitimizes
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them. Third, the leader sets up an ijtihad committee, the ijtihads of which
will (may) be followed first by the leader and then by his followers. In this
way fragmentation of the Muslim socio-legal sphere as a result of activi-
ties of postmodern Muslim surfers and micro-mujtahids can be avoided while
Muslim legal plurality and diversity are maintained.