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Roth v. United States 1956

Facts of the Case:

Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene
circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was
combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by
Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing
and publishing obscene advertisements for his products.

Question:

Did either the federal or California's obscenity restrictions, prohibiting the sale or transfer of
obscene materials through the mail, impinge upon the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the
First Amendment?

Conclusion:

In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was
not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials
that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine
obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that
such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due
Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973).

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against

Miller v. California 1971

Facts of the Case:

Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was
convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some
unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal
proceedings.

Question:

Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's
freedom of speech guarantee?

Conclusion:
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In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment
protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the
Memoirs decision.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Miller, 4 vote(s) against

New York v. Ferber 1981

Facts of the Case:

A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual
performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such
performances.

Question:

Did the law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion:

No. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it
found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling
"government objective of surpassing importance." The law was carefully drawn to protect
children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not
violating the First Amendment.

Decisions

Decision: 9 votes for New York, 0 vote(s) against

New York Times v. Sullivan 1963

Facts of the Case:

Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad in the New York
Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama
was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks
to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the
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newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the
allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under Alabama law,
Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming that the ad was
truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment.

Question:

Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement personally
harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors, unconstitutionally
infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections?

Conclusion:

The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false
ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice
(with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this
new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed.

Decisions

Decision: 9 votes for New York Times, 0 vote(s) against

Gertz v. Welch 1973

Facts of the Case:

Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In
a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist"
and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law
enforcement officer. Gertz lost his libel suit because a lower court found that the magazine had
not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York
Times v. Sullivan (1964).

Question:

Does the First Amendment allow a newspaper or broadcaster to assert defamatory falsehoods
about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure?

Conclusion:

The Court reversed the lower court decision and held that Gertz's rights had been violated. Justice
Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was
inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the
opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be
allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. However,
continued Powell, the actual malice standard did not lose all significance in cases involving
ordinary citizens as he advised states to use it in assessing claims for punitive damages by
citizens suing for libel.
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Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Gertz, 4 vote(s) against

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 1987

Facts of the Case:

A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody" of an
advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist
minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an
outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and
was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed.

Question:

Does the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection extend to the making of patently
offensive statements about public figures, resulting perhaps in their suffering emotional distress?

Conclusion:

Yes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not
recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending
publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court
added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's
interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could
not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject.

Decisions

Decision: 8 votes for Hustler Magazine, 0 vote(s) against

Reno v. ACLU 1996

Facts of the Case:

Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications
Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized
the intentional transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages as well as the transmission of
information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner
deemed "offensive" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from
enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent
protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the
Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions.

Question:
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Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth
Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their definitions of the types of internet
communications which they criminalized?

Conclusion:

Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted
to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent"
communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would
not impact on adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of
internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive"
material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment
distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the former,
the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent"
from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.

Decisions

Decision: 9 votes for ACLU, 0 vote(s) against

District of Columbia v. Heller 2007

Facts of the Case:

For the first time in seventy years, the Court heard a case regarding the central meaning of the
Second Amendment and its relation to gun control laws. After the District of Columbia passed
legislation barring the registration of handguns, requiring licenses for all pistols, and mandating
that all legal firearms must be kept unloaded and disassembled or trigger locked, a group of
private gun-owners brought suit claiming the laws violated their Second Amendment right to bear
arms. The federal trial court in Washington D.C. refused to grant the plaintiffs relief, holding that
the Second Amendment applies only to militias, such as the National Guard, and not to private
gun ownership.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed, voting two to one that
the Second Amendment does in fact protect private gun owners such as plaintiffs. Petitioners
agree with the trial court's decision that the Second Amendment applies only to militias, and
further argue that (a) the Second Amendment should not apply to D.C. because it is a federal
enclave rather than a state, and (b) that the D.C. legislation merely regulates, rather than
prohibits, gun ownership. Respondents, although disagreeing on the merits, have also urged the
Court to review the case in order to clearly define the relationship between federal gun control
laws and the Second Amendment.

Question:

Whether provisions of the D.C. Code generally barring the registration of handguns, prohibiting
carrying a pistol without a license, and requiring all lawful firearms to be kept unloaded and
either disassembled or trigger locked violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who
are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other
firearms for private use in their homes?
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Conclusion:

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that firearm for traditionally
lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. The Court based its holding on the text of
the Second Amendment, as well as applicable language in state constitutions adopted soon after
the Second Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices John
Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer filed dissenting opinions, each joined by the other as well as
Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Stevens argued that the Second
Amendment only protects the rights of individuals to bear arms as part of a well-regulated state
militia, not for other purposes even if they are lawful. Justice Breyer agreed with Stevens'
argument but also stated that even if possession were to be allowed for other reasons, any law
regulating the use of firearms would have to be "unreasonable or inappropriate" to violate the
Second Amendment. In Breyer's view, the D.C. laws at issue in this case were both reasonable
and appropriate.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Heller, 4 vote(s) against

Lochner v. New York 1905

Facts of the Case:

The state of New York enacted a statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or
10 hours a day.

Question:

Does the New York law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Conclusion:

The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority (through Peckham) maintained that the
statute interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to
liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court viewed the statute as a labor law; the state
had no reasonable ground for interfering with liberty by determining the hours of labor.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Lochner, 4 vote(s) against

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Meyer v. Nebraska 1923

Facts of the Case:

Nebraska, along with other states, prohibited the teaching of modern foreign languages to grade
school children. Meyer, who taught German in a Lutheran school, was convicted under this law.

Question:

Does the Nebraska statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause?

Conclusion:

Yes, the Nebraska law is unconstitutional. Nebraska violated the liberty protected by due process
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Liberty means more than freedom from bodily restraint. State
regulation of liberty must be reasonably related to a proper state objective. The legislature's view
of reasonableness was subject to supervision by the courts. The legislative purpose of the law was
to promote assimilation and civic development. But these purposes were not adequate to justify
interfering with Meyer's liberty to teach or the liberty of parents to employ him during a "time of
peace and domestic tranquillity."

Griswold v. Connecticut 1964

Facts of the Case:

Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she
and the Medical Director for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice
to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a
Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counselling, and other medical treatment, to
married persons for purposes of preventing conception.

Question:

Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's
ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?

Conclusion:

Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various
guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy.
Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new constitutional right, the
right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this
right and is therefore null and void.

Decisions

Decision: 7 votes for Griswold, 2 vote(s) against

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Roe v. Wade 1971

Facts of the Case:

Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited
abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. After granting certiorari, the Court heard
arguments twice. The first time, Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the
constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd --
misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round.
Her new opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under strong questioning from Justices Potter
Stewart and Thurgood Marshall.

Question:

Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion?

Conclusion:

The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in
Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman
total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state
interest for the second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the
Court's ruling.

Decisions

Decision: 7 votes for Roe, 2 vote(s) against

Planned Parenthood v. Casey 1991

Facts of the Case:

The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new
provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the
procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a
judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified
her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several
abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the
husband notification requirement.

Question:

Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, and,
if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe
v. Wade?

Conclusion:
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In a bitter, 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the
Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the
validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation
has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this
standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification
requirement. The opinion for the Court was unique: It was crafted and authored by three justices.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Planned Parenthood, 4 vote(s) against

Bowers v. Hardwick 1985

Facts of the Case:

Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of
consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being
charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the
statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to
state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J.
Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.

Question:

Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual
sodomy, thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal?

Conclusion:

No. The divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy, and
that states could outlaw those practices. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to
protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937) or when they are "deeply rooted in the
Nation's history and tradition" (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). The Court held that the right to
commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. White feared that guaranteeing a right to
sodomy would be the product of "judge-made constitutional law" and send the Court down the
road of illegitimacy.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Bowers, 4 vote(s) against

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Lawrence v. Texas 2002

Facts of the Case:

Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered

John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a
private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate
sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the
statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.

Question:

Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual
Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical
behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the
home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?

Conclusion:

No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that
the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and
overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and
Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under
the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy.
"The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court
overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for Lawrence and Garner, 3 vote(s) against

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 1989

Facts of the Case:

In 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident which left her in a
"persistent vegetative state." She was sustained for several weeks by artificial feedings through an
implanted gastronomy tube. When Cruzan's parents attempted to terminate the life-support
system, state hospital officials refused to do so without court approval. The Missouri Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the state's policy over Cruzan's right to refuse treatment.
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Question:

Did the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit Cruzan's parents to refuse life-
sustaining treatment on their daughter's behalf?

Conclusion:

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that while individuals enjoyed the right to refuse medical
treatment under the Due Process Clause, incompetent persons were not able to exercise such
rights. Absent "clear and convincing" evidence that Cruzan desired treatment to be withdrawn,
the Court found the State of Missouri's actions designed to preserve human life to be
constitutional. Because there was no guarantee family members would always act in the best
interests of incompetent patients, and because erroneous decisions to withdraw treatment were
irreversible, the Court upheld the state's heightened evidentiary requirements.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 4 vote(s) against

Chimel v. CA 1968 searches incident to an arrest

Facts of the Case:

Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary.
Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of
Chimel's residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict
Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction.

Question:

Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth
Amendment as "incident to that arrest?"

Conclusion:

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are
limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably
search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from
rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the
importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse.

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for Chimel, 2 vote(s) against

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Rochin v. California 1951 loss of evidence searches

Facts of the Case:

Rochin swallowed drug capsules to dispose of evidence. The police pummeled him and jumped
on his stomach in a vain effort to make him throw up. They took him to a hospital where a doctor
was instructed by the police officers to administer an emetic by forceably passing a tube into
Rochin's stomach. He vomited the capules and was convicted on the basis of the evidence
produced from his vomit.

Question:

Did the police procedure forcing Rochin to vomit violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment?

Conclusion:

The Court reversed the conviction. The police violated Rochin's right to due process of law. Due
process was an admittedly vague concept, but it prohibited "conduct that shocks the conscience."
This nebulous approach was mocked in a concurring opinion by Justice Black.

Schmerber v. CA 1965 loss of evidence searches

Facts of the Case:

Schmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital.
During his treatment, a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that
Schmerber had been drunk while driving. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court and
Schmerber was convicted.

Question:

Did the blood test violate the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination?

Conclusion:

No. Justice Brennan argued for a unanimous Court that the protection against self-incrimination
applied specifically to compelled communications or testimony. Since the results of the blood test
were neither "testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the
petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds."

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for California, 4 vote(s) against

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Arizona v. Hicks 1986 plain view doctrine

Facts of the Case:

A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment
below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three
weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an
officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer
moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning
from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct.

Question:

Was the search of the stereo equipment (a search beyond the exigencies of the original entry)
reasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion:

No. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971),
Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some
circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. However, critical to this
doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special
operational necessities" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo
equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the
equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution.

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for Hicks, 3 vote(s) against

Katz v. US 1967

Facts of the Case:

Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients
in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone
booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted
under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los
Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challanged his conviction arguing that the
recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point,
noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted
certiorari.

Question:

Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the
police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone?
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Conclusion:

Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his
conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the
Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter
Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a
'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.

Decisions

Decision: 7 votes for Katz, 1 vote(s) against

Illinois v. Gates 1982

Facts of the Case:

The Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an anonymous tip that Lance and Susan
Gates were selling drugs out of their home. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation
in action, police obtained a warrant and upon searching the suspects' car and home uncovered
large quantities of marijuana, other contraband, and weapons.

Question:

Did the search of the Gates's home violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion:

The Court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the test
for probable cause which the Court had announced in Spinelli v. United States (1969). Justice
Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are important in
determining probable cause, but that those issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly
applied. He argued that the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause was the
correct one to glean from Spinelli, and that the law enforcement officials who obtained a warrant
abided by it in this case.

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for Illinois, 3 vote(s) against

Arizona v. Gant 2003

Facts of the Case:

Arizona police went to the home of Rodney Gant in search of drugs and to arrest him for failing
to appear in court. When they arrived at the house, Gant was not there (though two other people
were in his home, one of whom was in possession of a crack pipe) but while the police were still
at the house Gant pulled into the driveway. While Gant was still in his car, an officer shined a
 15

flashlight into the vehicle, but the police made no other contact with him until he stepped out of
the car. After he was out of the car, the police searched it and found drugs and a handgun. Gant
was arrested and charged with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia.

Before trial, Gant asked the judge to rule the evidence found in the car unconstitutional because
the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that
the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement under New York v. Belton (1981). Gant was convicted
and sentenced to three years in prison.

Gant appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling the search
unconstitutional. The court found that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. The court ruled that
these justifications did not apply in Gant's case because he had left the vehicle voluntarily without
being stopped by police or asked to get out of the car. The search of the vehicle was therefore not
directly connected to the arrest and, without that justification, clearly violated the Fourth
Amendment.

Question:

When police arrest the recent occupant of a vehicle who got out voluntarily, can they search the
vehicle without a warrant?

Conclusion:

On October 20, 2003, without issuing a decision in the case, the Court sent it back to Arizona
state court for further consideration in light of the Arizona case State v. Dean. The issue raised in
this case, however, was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court later in the same term. On May 24,
2004, the Court issued a decision in the case of Thornton v. U.S., finding that police could
constitutionally search a vehicle even after its occupant has left it voluntarily.

Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding 2008

Facts of the Case:

Savana Redding, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, was strip-searched by school
officials on the basis of a tip by another student that Ms. Redding might have ibuprofen on her
person in violation of school policy. Ms. Redding subsequently filed suit against the school
district and the school officials responsible for the search in the District Court for the District of
Arizona. She alleged her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure
was violated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. However, on rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms.
Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It
reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related
to the circumstances.

Question:
 16

1) Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit school officials from strip searching students suspected
of possessing drugs in violation of school policy?

2) Are school officials individually liable for damages in a lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C Section
1983?

Conclusion:

Sometimes, fact dependent. No. The Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription
painkillers. With David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G.
Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel
A. Alito, and in part by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reiterated
that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out
contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Here, school
officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her
underwear. The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally
liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment." It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted
doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right.

Justice Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and was joined by
Justice Ginsburg. He agreed that the strip search was unconstitutional, but disagreed that the
school administrators retained immunity. He stated that "[i]t does not require a constitutional
scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year old child is an invasion of constitutional rights
of some magnitude." Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate concurring opinion, largely agreeing
with Justice Stevens point of dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment in part
and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the school administrators were qualifiedly
immune to prosecution. However, he argued that the judiciary should not meddle with decisions
school administrators make that are in the interest of keeping their schools safe.

Terry v. Ohio 1967

Facts of the Case:

Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed
to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons
on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years
in jail.

Question:

Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion:

In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence
 17

against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found
that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have
been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety
while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches
undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the
investigation.

Decisions

Decision: 8 votes for Ohio, 1 vote(s) against

Mapp v. Ohio 1960

Facts of the Case:

Dolree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police
search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of
expression.

Question:

Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May evidence obtained
through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal
proceeding?)

Conclusion:

The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment],
inadmissible in a state court." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained
evidence. This was an historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of
excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The decision
launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary
rule.

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for Mapp, 3 vote(s) against

US v. Leon 1983

Facts of the Case:

The exclusionary rule requires that evidence illegally seized must be excluded from criminal
trials. Leon was the target of police surveillance based on an anonymous informant's tip. The
police applied to a judge for a search warrant of Leon's home based on the evidence from their
surveillance. A judge issued the warrant and the police recovered large quantities of illegal drugs.
Leon was indicted for violating federal drug laws. A judge concluded that the affadavit for the
 18

search warrant was insufficient; it did not establish the probable cause necessary to issue the
warrant. Thus, the evidence obtained under the warrant could not be introduced at Leon's trial.

Question:

Is there a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule?

Conclusion:

Yes, there is such an exception. The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a
mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial. The exclusionary rule, argued the
majority, is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. In Leon,
the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. The exclusionary rule is costly to
society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law. The benefits of the
exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like Leon, where they act in
good faith on a warrant issued by a judge.

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against

Hudson v. Michigan 2005

Facts of the Case:

Booker T. Hudson was convicted of drug and firearm possession in state court after police found
cocaine and a gun in his home. The police had a search warrant, but failed to follow the Fourth
Amendment "knock and announce" rule which requires police officers to wait 20-30 seconds
after knocking and announcing their presence before they enter the home. The trial judge ruled
that the evidence found in the home could therefore not be used, but the Michigan Court of
Appeals reversed based on two Michigan Supreme Court cases that created an exception to the
suppression of evidence when the evidence in question would have inevitably been found.

Question:

Does the general rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment apply to
the "knock-and-announce" rule?

Conclusion:

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that evidence need not be excluded when police violate the
"knock-and-announce" rule. The opinion by Justice Scalia reaffirmed the validity of both the
knock-and-announce rule and the "exclusionary rule" for evidence obtained by police in most
cases of Fourth Amendment violation. However, the majority held that the exclusionary rule
could not be invoked for evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce violation, because the
interests violated by the abrupt entry of the police "have nothing to do with the seizure of the
evidence." Justice Scalia wrote that the knock-and-announce rule was meant to prevent violence,
property-damage, and impositions on privacy, not to prevent police from conducting a search for
 19

which they have a valid warrant. The Court also found that the social costs of the exclusionary
rule as applied to the knock-and-announce rule outweighed any possible "deterrence benefits,"
and that alternative measures such as civil suits and internal police discipline could adequately
deter violations. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, and was joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissent noted the Court's long history of upholding the
exclusionary rule and doubted that the majority's cited precedents supported its conclusion. The
dissent also expressed doubt that knock-and-announce violations could be deterred without
excluding the evidence obtained from the searches.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Michigan, 4 vote(s) against

Herring v. United States 2008

Facts of the Case:

The Coffee County, Alabama Sheriff's Department apprehended Bennie Herring in July of 2004.
Upon searching Herring's vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and
a gun under the seat of his truck. However, the situation was complicated by the fact that the
initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. The warrant, still active in the neighboring
Dale County Sheriff's Office, was supposed to have been recalled five months prior, however
someone had accidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. Herring filed a motion to
suppress the allegedly "illegally obtained" evidence, however the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama denied Herring's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that illegally
obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could “result in appreciable
deterrence” of future police misconduct. In his petition for certiorari, Herring pointed to an
Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way, noting that “as policing
becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems, the number of illegal arrests and searches
based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply." The Court granted certiorari on February
19, 2008.

Question:

Does a court violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant by introducing
evidence obtained through a police search based on an arrest warrant that should have been
recalled, but was negligently allowed to remain active, at the time of the search?

Conclusion:

No. In a 5-4 decision with Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by
Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr., the Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. It held that a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police
 20

mistakes that lead to unlawful searches are merely the result of isolated negligence and "not
systematic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements." Evidence obtained under
these circumstances is admissible and not subject to the exclusionary rule.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice
David H. Souter, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer. Justice Ginsburg argued that an intact
exclusionary rule provides a strong incentive for police compliance with respect to the Fourth
Amendment and its erosion in this case was not warranted. Justice Breyer also filed a separate
dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Souter. He argued that the Court should move away
from its reliance on analyzing the degree of police culpability when determining whether the
exclusionary rule applies, but rather draw a bright line between errors made by record keepers
and those made by police officers.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against

Escobedo v. Illinois 1963

Facts of the Case:

Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours,
the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo's lawyer sought
unsuccessfully to consult with his client. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder.

Question:

Was Escobedo denied the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment?

Conclusion:

Yes. Justice Goldberg, in his majority opinion, spoke for the first time of "an absolute right to
remain silent." Escobedo had not been adequately informed of his consitutitonal right to remain
silent rather than to be forced to incriminate himself. The case has lost authority as precedent as
the arguments in police interrogation and confession cases have shifted from the Sixth
Amendment to the Fifth Amendment, emphasizing whether the appropriate warnings have been
given and given correctly, and whether the right to remain silent has been waived.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Escobedo, 4 vote(s) against

 21

Miranda v. Arizona 1965

Facts of the Case:

The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of a number of instances, ruled on
jointly, in which defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of [their]
freedom in any significant way." In Vignera v. New York, the petitioner was questioned by
police, made oral admissions, and signed an inculpatory statement all without being notified of
his right to counsel. Similarly, in Westover v. United States, the petitioner was arrested by the
FBI, interrogated, and made to sign statements without being notified of his right to counsel.
Lastly, in California v. Stewart, local police held and interrogated the defendant for five days
without notification of his right to counsel. In all these cases, suspects were questioned by police
officers, detectives, or prosecuting attorneys in rooms that cut them off from the outside world. In
none of the cases were suspects given warnings of their rights at the outset of their interrogation.

Question:

Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifiying them of their right to
counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion:

The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation
of defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination." The Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody
interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood of the
accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." The Court specifically
outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects, including warnings of the right to
remain silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogations.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Miranda, 4 vote(s) against

Missouri v. Seibert 2003

Facts of the Case:

Patrice Seibert was convicted of second degree murder for the death of 17-year-old Donald
Rector, who died in a fire set in the mobile home where he lived with Seibert. Several days after
the fire, Seibert was interogated by a police officer. The officer initially withheld her Miranda
warnings, hoping to get a confession from her first. Once she had confessed, the officer took a
short break from questioning, then read her her Miranda rights and resumed questioning her after
she waived those rights. He prompted her to restate the confession that she had made earlier.
Based on this second, Mirandized confession, Seibert was convicted.

She appealed, charging that the officer's intentional use of an un-Mirandized interrogation to get
the initial confession made the later confession, though it occurred after she had waived her
Miranda rights, inadmissable. The prosecution cited Oregon v. Elstad to argue that an initial, un-
 22

Mirandized confession did not make a defendant incapable of voluntarily waiving her Miranda
rights and confessing later.

The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with Seibert, overturning the conviction.

Question:

Does the rule from Oregon v. Elstad that a defendant who has made an un-Mirandized confession
may later waive her Miranda rights to make a second confession (admissible in court) still apply
when the initial confession is the result of an intentional decision by a police officer to withhold
her Miranda warnings?

Conclusion:

No. In a decision with no majority, a four-justice plurality found that the post-Miranda confession
is only admissible - even if the two-stage interview was unintentional, as it was in Elstad - if the
Miranda warning and accompanying break are sufficient to give the suspect the reasonable belief
that she has the right not to speak with the police. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a concurring
opinion that provided the fifth vote, found that evaluating the warning and accompanying break
was only necessary if the police used the two-stage interrogation intentionally. Justice Kennedy
wrote, "The admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to be governed by Elstad's
principles unless the deliberate two-step strategy is employed. Then, the postwarning statements
must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before they were made."

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Seibert, 4 vote(s) against

Powell v. Alabama 1932

Facts of the Case:

Nine black youths -- young, ignorant, and illiterate -- were accused of raping two white women.
Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and
all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital
cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to
represent them at the trial. This cases was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and
Weems v. Alabama.

Question:

Did the trials violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion:

Yes. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given
reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. Though Justice George
Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth
 23

Amendment, he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. This case was an early example of national
constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice.

Gideon v. Wainwright 1962

Facts of the Case:

Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with a felony for breaking and entering. He lacked
funds and was unable to hire a lawyer to prepare his defense. When he requested the court to
appoint an attorney for him, the court refused, stating that it was only obligated to appoint
counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases. Gideon defended himself in the trial; he was
convicted by a jury and the court sentenced him to five years in a state prison.

Question:

Did the state court's failure to appoint counsel for Gideon violate his right to a fair trial and due
process of law as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion:

In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that Gideon had a right to be represented by a court-
appointed attorney and, in doing so, overruled its 1942 decision of Betts v. Brady. In this case the
Court found that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel was a fundamental right, essential
to a fair trial, which should be made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black called it an "obvious truth" that a fair trial for a poor
defendant could not be guaranteed without the assistance of counsel. Those familiar with the
American system of justice, commented Black, recognized that "lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries."

Decisions

Decision: 9 votes for Gideon, 0 vote(s) against

Batson v. Kentucky 1985

Facts of the Case:

Batson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four
black persons on the venire, resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Batson was convicted on
both of the charges against him.

Question:

Did the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude the four blacks from the jury violate
Batson's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair jury trial and his Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws?
 24

Conclusion:

The Court found that the prosecutor's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the Constitution. Relying heavily on precedents set in Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and
Swain v. Alabama (1965), Justice Powell held that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors
not only deprives the accused of important rights during a trial, but also is devastating to the
community at large because it "undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice." Without identifying a "neutral" reason why the four blacks should have been excluded
from the jury, the prosecutor's actions were in violation of the Constitution.

Decisions

Decision: 7 votes for Batson, 2 vote(s) against

Sheppard v. Maxwell 1965

Facts of the Case:

After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his
pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial.
Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect
him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On
appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. When Sheppard appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question:

What threshold must be crossed before a trial is said to be so prejudicial, due to context and
publicity, as to interfere with a defendant's Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial?

Conclusion:

In an 8-to-1 decision the Court found that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. Noting that
although freedom of expression should be given great latitude, the Court held that it must not be
so broad as to divert the trial away from its primary purpose: adjudicating both criminal and civil
matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting. The Cleveland television media's
repeated broadcasts of Sheppard confessing in detail to crimes he was later charged with, the
blatant and hostile trial coverage by Cleveland's radio and print media, and the physical
arrangement of the courtroom itself - which facilitated collaboration between the prosecution and
present media - all combined to so inflame the jurors' minds against Sheppard as to deny him a
fair trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings
or transferred them to a different venue.

Decisions

Decision: 8 votes for Sheppard, 1 vote(s) against

 25

Richmond Papers v. VA 1979

Facts of the Case:

After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to
the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not
object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action.

Question:

Did the closure of the trial to the press and public violate the First Amendment or the Sixth
Amendment?

Conclusion:

In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was "implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment." The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not
only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas. The
Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such
as courthouses. The Court emphasized that "certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in
enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly
defined."

Decisions

Decision: 7 votes for Richmond Newspapers Inc., 1 vote(s) against

Gregg v. Georgia 1975

Facts of the Case:

A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal,
the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery
conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital
sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Jurek v. Texas, Roberts v.
Louisiana, Proffitt v. Florida, and Woodson v. North Carolina.

Question:

Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
as "cruel and unusual" punishment?

Conclusion:
 26

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a
defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the
death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures
the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the
trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime
and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with
other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's
finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an
appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.

Decisions

Decision: 7 votes for Georgia, 2 vote(s) against

Atkins v. VA 2001

Facts of the Case:

Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the
penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who
testified that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded. The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the
Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a
misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this
time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In
affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention
that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded.

Question:

Is the execution of mentally retarded persons "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment?

Conclusion:

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that executions of
mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. Since it last confronted the issue, the Court reasoned that a significant number of
States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.
Moreover, the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification
underpinning the death penalty - retribution and deterrence of capital crimes - applies to mentally
retarded offenders, due to their lessened culpability. "Construing and applying the Eighth
Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such
punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's
power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender," wrote Justice Stevens. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Justice Clarence
Thomas joined both. "This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others
in turning the process of capital trial into a game," argued Justice Scalia.

Decisions
 27

Decision: 6 votes for Atkins, 3 vote(s) against

Plessy v. Ferguson 1985

Facts of the Case:

The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In
1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only"
car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested.

Question:

Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on

both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Conclusion:

No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an opinion authored by
Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their
decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied
the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate but equal" was not
part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment intended to establish
absolute equality for the races before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either."
In short, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination.

Decisions

Decision: 7 votes for Ferguson, 1 vote(s) against

Sweatt v. Painter 1949

Facts of the Case:

In 1946, Herman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas
Law School. State law restricted access to the university to whites, and Sweatt's application was
automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his
admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students.

Question:

Did the Texas admissions scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Conclusion:
 28

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be
admitted to the university. The Court found that the "law school for Negroes," which was to have
opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The
Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty,
course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also
found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to
compete in the legal arena.

Brown v. Board of Education I 1952

Facts of the Case:

Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws
requiring or permitting segregation according to the races. The white and black schools
approached equality in terms of buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries. This case
was decided together with Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County.

Question:

Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the minority
children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?

Conclusion:

Yes. Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors, intangible issues foster and
maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on minority
children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate
facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Separate but equal is inherently
unequal in the context of public education. The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for
all forms of state-maintained racial separation.

Decisions

Decision: 9 votes for Brown, 0 vote(s) against

Brown v. Board of Education II 1954

Facts of the Case:

After its decision in Brown I which declared racial discrimination in public education
unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its
newly announced Constitutional principle. Given the embedded nature of racial discrimination in
public schools and the diverse circumstances under which it had been practiced, the Court
requested further argument on the issue of relief.

Question:
 29

What means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I?

Conclusion:

The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief
Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which
originally heard school segregation cases. They were to implement the principles which the
Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new
principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed."

Decisions

Decision: 9 votes for Brown, 0 vote(s) against

Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Ed. 1970

Facts of the Case:

After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had
been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North
Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either
totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of
possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court.

Question:

Were federal courts constitutionally authorized to oversee and produce remedies for state-
imposed segregation?

Conclusion:

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at
desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs were broad and flexible. The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their
effectiveness, and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate "starting points" for
solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts; 3)
non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective measures, were within the courts'
remedial powers; and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to
particular schools.

Decisions

Decision: 9 votes for Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 0 vote(s) against

 30

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District no. 1 2006

Facts of the Case:

The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. Since
certain schools often became oversubscribed when too many students chose them as their first
choice, the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted to
the popular schools. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to
maintain racial diversity. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by
more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student
population (approximately 40% white and 60% non-white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect.
At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on
which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal.

A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing
that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. A federal District Court dismissed
the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. On appeal, a three-judge panel the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Under the Supreme Court's precedents on racial classification in higher education, Grutter v.
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, race-based classifications must be directed toward a
"compelling government interest" and must be "narrowly tailored" to that interest. Applying these
precedents to K-12 education, the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not
narrowly tailored. The District then petitioned for an "en banc" ruling by a panel of 11 Ninth
Circuit judges. The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. The
majority ruled that the District had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. Applying
a test from Grutter, the Circuit Court also ruled that the tiebreaker plan was narrowly tailored,
because 1) the District did not employ quotas, 2) the District had considered race-neutral
alternatives, 3) the plan caused no undue harm to races, and 4) the plan had an ending point.

Question:

1) Do the decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger apply to public high school
students?

2) Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for
admission to public high schools?

3) Does a school district that normally permits a student to attend the high school of her choice
violate the Equal Protection Clause by denying the student admission to her chosen school
because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial balance?

Conclusion:

No, no, and yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found the
District's racial tiebreaker plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." The
Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling
 31

government interest in university admissions, but it ruled that "[t]he present cases are not
governed by Grutter." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education, the District's plan involved
no individualized consideration of students, and it employed a very limited notion of diversity
("white" and "non-white"). The District's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the
Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: "Racial balancing is not
transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it
'racial diversity.'" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious
programs. The Court held that the District's tiebreaker plan was actually targeted toward
demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity.
The District also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-race-
conscious means. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy agreed that
the District's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may sometimes
consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Parents Involved in Community Schools, 4 vote(s) against

Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education 2006

Facts of the Case:

Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) were integrated by court order until 2000. After its
release from the order, JCPS implemented an enrollment plan to maintain substantial racial
integration. Students were given a choice of schools, but not all schools could accommodate all
applicants. In those cases, student enrollment was decided on the basis of several factors,
including place of residence, school capacity, and random chance, as well as race. However, no
school was allowed to have an enrollment of black students less than 15% or greater than 50% of
its student population.

Meredith and other parents sued the school district, arguing that the plan's racial classifications
violated the students' Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. Under the
Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, race-based
classifications must be directed toward a "compelling government interest" and must be
"narrowly tailored" to that interest.

The District Court ruled that the plan was constitutional because the school had a compelling
interest in maintaining racial diversity. The court held that though the plan paid "some attention
to numbers," it did not constitute a rigid quota system. According to the Supreme Court's
precedents, rigid racial quotas are never narrowly tailored. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the District Court without issuing an opinion of its own, and Meredith appealed to the
Supreme Court. (See also Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District #1,
No. 05-908)

Question:

1) Do Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger allow a school district to use race as the sole
factor to assign high school students to public schools?
 32

2) Can a student enrollment plan that requires each school's student population to be between
15% and 50% African-American meet the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that racial
classifications be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest?

Conclusion:

No and no. By a 5-4 vote, the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found Jefferson
County's enrollment plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." The Court
acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling government
interest in university admissions, but it ruled that "[t]he present cases are not governed by
Grutter." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education, Jefferson County's plan involved no
individualized consideration of students, and it employed a very limited notion of diversity
("black" and "other"). Jefferson County's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the
Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: "Racial balancing is not
transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it
'racial diversity.'" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious
programs. The Court held that Jefferson County's enrollment plan was actually targeted toward
demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity.
Jefferson County also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-race-
conscious means. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy agreed that
Jefferson County's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may
sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Meredith, 4 vote(s) against

Loving v. Virginia 1966

Facts of the Case:

In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white
man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly
thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute,
which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in
jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not
return for 25 years).

Question:

Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Conclusion:
 33

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were
generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal
Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose "independent of
invidious racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was
legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial
classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Decisions

Decision: 9 votes for Loving, 0 vote(s) against

Shelley v. Kraemer 1947

Facts of the Case:

The Kraemers were a white couple who owned a residence in a Missouri neighborhood governed
by a restrictive covenant. This was a private agreement that prevented blacks from owning
property in the Kraemers' subdivision. The Shelleys were a black couple who moved into the
Kraemers neighborhood. The Kraemers went to court to enforce the restrictive covenant against
the Shelleys.

Question:

Does the enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment?

Conclusion:

State courts could not constitutionally prevent the sale of real property to blacks even if that
property is covered by a racially restrictive covenant. Standing alone, racially restrictive
covenants violate no rights. However, their enforcement by state court injunctions constitute state
action in violation of the 14th Amendment.

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for Shelley, 0 vote(s) against

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 1960

Facts of the Case:

In August 1958 William H. Burton, an African-American, entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a
restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority,
 34

and was denied service solely because of his race. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt, private
corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating
the city's parking facilities, and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions
from the city. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and
maintained the premises at its own expense.

Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially
discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the
Delaware Supreme Court.

Question:

Did the Eagle Coffee Shoppe's refusal to serve Burton constitute a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion:

Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court concluded that the restaurant,
as a recipient of assistance by the Parking Authority, clearly benefited from the city's aid and
"constituted a physically and financially integral and, indeed, indispensable part of the State's…
plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit." As such, the Court found that the state, via the
Parking Authority, had "made itself a party to the refusal of service."

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for Burton, 3 vote(s) against

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis 1971

Facts of the Case:

K. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107,
was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. The bylaws of the Lodge
limited membership to white male Caucasians. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him,
arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the
club's discrimination "state action."

Question:

Did the discriminatory practices violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Conclusion:

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Moose Lodge's refusal to serve food and
beverages to Irvis because he was black did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
noted that the state action doctrine did not necessarily apply to all private entities that received
 35

benefits or services from the government; otherwise, the Court reasoned, all private associations
that received electricity, water, and fire protection would be subject to state regulation. The Court
found that the Moose Lodge "a private social club in a private building," and thus not subject to
the Equal Protection Clause.

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for Moose Lodge No. 107, 3 vote(s) against

Reed v. Reed 1971

Facts of the Case:

The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing
administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought
to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the
Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court.

Question:

Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion:

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women
was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of
either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the
merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be
mandated solely on the basis of sex."

Decisions

Decision: 7 votes for Reed, 0 vote(s) against

Craig v. Boren 1976

Facts of the Case:

An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the
age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18
and 21, and a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory.

Question:

Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by
establishing different drinking ages for men and women?
 36

Conclusion:

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications.
The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a
substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about
the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the Twenty-first
Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case.

Decisions

Decision: 7 votes for Craig, 2 vote(s) against

US v. Virginia 1995

Facts of the Case:

The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only
exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit
against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was
unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On
appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's
admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal,
proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program
for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer
"substantively comparable" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Question:

Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only

academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion:

No. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was
unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's
gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational
diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or
maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not
offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide women with
the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni
reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's
"substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the
Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more
exacting standard, requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with
"heightened scrutiny." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny," Virginia's plan to create
the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so
 37

it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause. [NOTE: Justice Ginsberg's
announcement of the Court's opinion (below) may be considered an address to the American
public. It is a plain-spoken and forceful summary of the majority position.]

Decisions

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against

Romer v. Evans 1995

Facts of the Case:

Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial,
legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their
"homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Following a
legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a
permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed on appeal.

Question:

Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution, forbidding the extension of official

protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation, violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion:

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution
violated the equal protection clause. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and bisexual persons,
imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal
protection from discrimination. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that
oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause, even if it seems to
disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to "advance a legitimate government
interest." Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their
sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the
constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest."

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for Evans, 3 vote(s) against

 38

San Antonia Independent School District v. Rodriguez 1972

Facts of the Case:

In addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum

educational threshold in every school, Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on
local property taxes for supplemental revenue. The San Antonio Independent School District
(SAISD), acting on behalf of students whose families reside in poor districts, challenged this
funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the
vast property tax base that other districts utilized. The reliance on assessable property, SAISD
claimed, caused severe inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures.

Question:

Did Texas' public education finance system violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause by failing to distribute funding equally among its school districts?

Conclusion:

No. The Court refused to examine the system with strict scrutiny since there is no fundamental
right to education in the Constitution and since the system did not systematically discriminate
against all poor people in Texas. Given the similarities between Texas' system and those in other
states, it was clear to the Court that the funding scheme was not "so irrational as to be invidiously
discriminatory." Justice Powell argued that on the question of wealth and education, "the Equal
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for San Antonio Independent School Dis., 4 vote(s) against

Plyler v. Doe 1981

Facts of the Case:

A revision to the Texas education laws in 1975 allowed the state to withhold from local school
districts state funds for educating children of illegal aliens. This case was decided together with
Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Alien Child.

Question:

Did the law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion:

Yes. The Court reasoned that illegal aliens and their children, though not citizens of the United
States or Texas, are people "in any ordinary sense of the term" and, therefore, are afforded
Fourteenth Amendment protections. Since the state law severely disadvantaged the children of
 39

illegal aliens, by denying them the right to an education, and because Texas could not prove that
the regulation was needed to serve a "compelling state interest," the Court struck down the law.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Doe, 4 vote(s) against

Regents of University of CA v. Bakke 1977

Facts of the Case:

Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University
of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen
places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's
affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from
the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of
any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke
contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from
admission solely on the basis of race.

Question:

Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the
repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school?

Conclusion:

No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial
quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke.
However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the
school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four
justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was
constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race
was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white
opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial
minorities through affirmative action.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Bakke, 4 vote(s) against

 40

Adarand Constructors v. Pena 1994

Facts of the Case:

Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a
subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation.
Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional
compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native
Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a
subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales
Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand
was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the
additional payment for hiring Gonzales.

Question:

Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored
treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion:

Yes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial classifications,
whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other
words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to
further that interest." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on
disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards.
However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award
of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny
standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present
or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation
Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Adarand Constructors, 4 vote(s) against

Grutter v. Bollinger 2002

Facts of the Case:

In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of
Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161.
She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making
admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its
student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving
diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the
 41

admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding
precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict
scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also
rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional
equivalent of a quota.

Question:

Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964?

Conclusion:

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly
individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a
variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity
are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its
individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's
race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants."

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Bollinger, 4 vote(s) against

Bush v. Gore 2000

Facts of the Case:

Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,
and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential
election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in
Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered
that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes"
(ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots
to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate,
Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency
petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted
review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later.

Question:
 42

Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by
making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Constitution?

Conclusion:

Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be
devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the
Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount
was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were
applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and
other procedural difficulties, the court held that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in
the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of
the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5). Loathe to make broad precedents, the per curiam
opinion limited its holding to the present case.

Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme
was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law,
which only the state legislature may do.

Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's
recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the
remedy, believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is insubstantial when
constitutional rights are at stake.

Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the Florida
Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Moreover, the Florida decision was
fundamentally right; the Constitution requires that every vote be counted.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Bush, 4 vote(s) against

SC v. Katzenbach 1965
Facts of the Case:

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a "test or device" (such as literacy
tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. Federal examiners, under the Attorney General's
jurisdiction, were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities.

Question:

Did the Act violate the states' rights to implement and control elections?

Conclusion:
 43

The Court upheld the law. Noting that the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment gave
Congress "full remedial powers" to prevent racial discrimination in voting, the Act was a
"legitimate response" to the "insidious and pervasive evil" which had denied blacks the right to
vote since the Fifteenth Amendment's adoption in 1870.

Decisions

Decision: 8 votes for Katzenbach, 1 vote(s) against

Crawford v. Marion County Election Board 2007

Facts of the Case:

In 2005, the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to
present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. Plaintiffs including the
local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that
the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. At trial, the plaintiffs did not produce
any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law’s requirements. The district
court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. However, the three-judge appellate panel was
deeply divided. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law was a thinly-veiled attempt
to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates.

Question:

Does a law that requires voters to present either a state or federal photo identification unduly
burden citizens’ right to vote?

Conclusion:

By a vote of 6 to 3, the Court upheld the law, concluding that the photo I.D. requirement was
closely related to Indiana's legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud. The slight burden
the law imposed on voters' rights did not outweigh these interests, which the Court characterized
as "neutral and nondiscriminatory." Although there was no majority opinion, the Court's decision
included concurring opinions written by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia. Justices
David Souter and Stephen Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
joined Justice Souter's dissent.

Decisions

Decision: 6 votes for Marion County Election Board, 3 vote(s) against

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 2003

Facts of the Case:

In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform
the way that money is raised for--and spent during--political campaigns culminated in the passage
 44

of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill). Its
key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political
parties (often by corporations, unions, or well-healed individuals) and on the solicitation of those
donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-
profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on
political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue
ads" or "coordinated expenditures").

The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal
trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal
judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign
Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on
the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court
could hear and decide the resulting appeals.

Question:

1. Does the "soft money" ban of the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 exceed Congress's
authority to regulate elections under Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution and/or
violate the First Amendment's protection of the freedom to speak?

2. Do regulations of the source, content, or timing of political advertising in the Campaign

Finance Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment's free speech clause?

Conclusion:

With a few exceptions, the Court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. Because the regulations dealt mostly with
soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not
with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and
therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was
minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in
preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the
appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions.

In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had
not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions),
the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the
law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money, like water, will always find an outlet" and
that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get
around the contribution limits.

The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate
elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only
affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent
states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for McConnell, 4 vote(s) against

 45

Reynolds v. Sims 1963

Facts of the Case:

In 1961, M.O. Sims, David J. Vann (Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett),
and other voters from Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state
legislature. The Alabama Constitution prescribed that each county was entitled to at least one
representative and that there were to be as many senatorial districts as there were senators.
Population variance ratios of as great as 41-to-1 existed in the Senate.

Question:

Did Alabama's apportionment scheme violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause by mandating at least one representative per county and creating as many senatorial
districts as there were senators, regardless of population variances?

Conclusion:

In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system, holding that Equal
Protection Clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for
all citizens...." Noting that the right to direct representation was "a bedrock of our political
system," the Court held that both houses of bicameral state legislatures had to be apportioned on a
population basis. States were required to "honest and good faith" efforts to construct districts as
nearly of equal population as practicable.

Decisions

Decision: 8 votes for Sims, 1 vote(s) against

Miller v. Johnson 1994

Facts of the Case:

Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black.
According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an
additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the
state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the
Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional
majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was
called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the
Atlantic Ocean. In short, "the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells
a tale of disparity, not community."

Question:

Is racial gerrymandering of the congressional redistricting process a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause?
 46

Conclusion:

Yes. In some instances, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape
that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based
on race. Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the
"overriding, predominant force" in the redistricting process.

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Johnson, 4 vote(s) against