1
Republic of the Philippines the payment of those amounts, the Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the
Treasurer of the Philippine Islands,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by
the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake
which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on
October 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of
Spain, to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation
and consideration, the relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its
resolution, dated September 22, 1866, and, by order of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of those entitled
thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila dated April 7, 1870. There was later
distributed, inaccordance with the above-mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65,
leaving a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body
of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated
the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of
$80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received on
the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the
possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and heirs
of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for
Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government
of the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those
persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette
instituted on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by
the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for
the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal
interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant appealed and
makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), give to
the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so given as a donation subject to one
condition, to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish Government of these
Islands, within eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme
Government of Spain should not approve the action taken by the former government.
2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said
eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) being at present the exclusive property of the appellant
the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.
3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has
subrogated the Spanish Government in its rights, as regards an important sum of money
resulting from a national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of June 3, 1863,
in these Island.
4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the
Philippine Legislature on January 30, 1912, is unconstitutional.
5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the
prescription of this suit brought by the Insular Government against the Monte de Piedad y
Caja de Ahorros for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) given to
it by the late Spanish Government of these Islands.
6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to
reimburse the Philippine Government in the sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000)
gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation,
with legal interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.
2
In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was
directed to inform the home Government in what manner the indemnity might be paid to
which, by virtue of the resolutions of the relief board, the persons who suffered damage by
the earthquake might be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the
Government of Spain had assumed toward the donors.
The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February 1, 1883,
addressed to the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, which reads:
Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia.
Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of
Manila informs your Excellency, First: That the funds which it has up to the present been
able to dispose of have been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only remains the sum
of one thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended between to-day and day after
tomorrow. Second: That, to maintain the credit of the establishment, which would be greatly
injured were its operations suspended, it is necessary to procure money. Third: That your
Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's Government to apply to the funds of the Monte de
Piedad a part of the funds held in the treasury derived form the national subscription for the
relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863. Fourth: That in the public treasury
there is held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief board over $1090,000 which was
deposited in the said treasury by order of your general Government, it having been
transferred thereto from the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been held. fifth: That in the
straightened circumstances of the moment, your Excellency can, to avert impending disaster
to the Monte de Piedad, order that, out of that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in
the Treasury at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to the Monte de
Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be held under the same conditions as at present in the
Treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not be
approved for any reason, either because of the failure of His Majesty's Government to
approve the proposal made by your Excellency relative to the application to the needs of
the Monte de Piedad of a pat of the subscription intended to believe the distress caused by
the earthquake of 1863, or for any other reason, the board of directors of the Monte de
Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may have received on account of the
eighty thousand pesos, or the whole thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a
loan from whichever bank or banks may lend it the money at the cheapest rate upon the
security of pawned jewelry. — This is an urgent measure to save the Monte de Piedad in the
present crisis and the board of directors trusts to secure your Excellency's entire cooperation
and that of the other officials who have take part in the transaction.
The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:
GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
MANILA, February 1, 1883.
In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of
the Monte de Piedad of this city, in which it is stated that the funds which the said
institution counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and that the small
account remaining will scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days, for
which reason it entreats the general Government that, in pursuance of its telegraphic
advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that there be turned over to said Monte de
Piedad $80,000 out of the funds in the public treasury obtained from the national
subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, said board
obligating itself to return this sum should H. M. Government, for any reason, not approve
the said proposal, and for this purpose it will procure funds by means of loans raised on
pawned jewelry; it stated further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be
compelled to suspend operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so beneficient
an institution; and in view of the report upon the matter made by the Intendencia General
de Hacienda; and considering the fact that the public treasury has on hand a much greater
sum from the source mentioned than that solicited; and considering that this general
Government has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance
which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may
remain as a surplus should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as
a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing the
wishes of the donors would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were no
other than to relieve distress, an act of charity which is exercised in the highest degree by
the Monte de Piedad, for it liberates needy person from the pernicious effects of usury;
and
Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of the pious
institution referred to would be frustrated, and that the great and laudable work of its
establishment, and that the great and laudable and valuable if the aid it urgently seeks is
not granted, since the suspension of its operations would seriously and regrettably damage
the ever-growing credit of the Monte de Piedad; and
Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the public
mind, it might be said that at the present juncture it would assume the nature of a
disturbance of public order because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes resulting
3
from the late calamities, and because it is the only institution which can mitigate the effects
of such poverty; and
Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein
contained, for the funds in question are sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H> M.
Government does not approve the recommendation mentioned, this general Government, in
the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in conformity with the report
of the Intendencia de Hacienda, resolves as follows:
First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum held
in the public treasury of these Islands obtained from the national subscription opened by
reason of the earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum $80,000, as its needs may require,
in installments of $20,000.
Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return,
within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government
does not approve this resolution.
Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in preference to all
other work, proceed to prepare the necessary papers so that with the least possible delay the
payment referred to may be made and the danger that menaces the Monte de Piedad of
having to suspend its operations may be averted.
H. M. Government shall be advised hereof.lawphi1.net
(Signed) P. DE RIVERA.
By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands was ordered to "inform this ministerio what is the total sum available at the present
time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the
decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the rights of the
claimants, whose names were published in the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870,
and their heirs had been established, as therein provided, as such persons "have an
unquestionable right to be paid the donations assigned to them therein, your general
Government shall convoke them all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to
such as shall identify themselves, without regard to their financial status," and finally "that
when all the proceedings and operations herein mentioned have been concluded and the
Government can consider itself free from all kinds of claims on the part of those interested
in the distribution of the funds deposited in the vaults of the Treasury, such action may be
taken as the circumstances shall require, after first consulting the relief board and your
general Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte
de Piedad and those that were expended in 1888 to relieve public calamities," and "in
order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a result of the
earthquake be clearly understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore
mentioned comply with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal order
of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this Finance order by the Governor-General, the
Department of Finance was called upon for a report in reference to the $80,000 turned
over to the defendant, and that Department's report to the Governor-General dated June 28,
1893, reads:
Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of the Philippines)
— Excellency. — By Royal Order No. 1044 of December 3, last, it is provided that the
persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capital in the year
1863 shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this
purpose, with observance of the rules specified in the said royal order, one of them being
that before making the payment to the interested parties the assets shall be reduced to
money. These assets, during the long period of time that has elapsed since they were
turned over to the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, were used to cover the general needs
of the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of charitable institutions
and another part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public calamities. On January 30,
last, your Excellency was please to order the fulfillment of that sovereign mandate and
referred the same to this Intendencia for its information and the purposes desired (that is,
for compliance with its directions and, as aforesaid, one of these being the liquidation,
recovery, and deposit with the Treasury of the sums paid out of that fund and which were
expended in a different way from that intended by the donors) and this Intendencia
believed the moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of the Monte de
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos which, by decree of your general
Government of the date of February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said funds, the
(Monte de Piedad) obligating itself to return the same within the period of eight days if H.
M. Government did not approve the delivery. On this Intendencia's demanding from
the Monte de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with the provisions of the
Royal Order, it was to be supposed that no objection to its return would be made by
the Monte de Piedad for, when it received the loan, it formally engaged itself to return it;
and, besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so had arrived, inasmuch as H. M.
Government, in ordering that the assets of the earthquake relief fund should he collected,
makes express mention of the 80,000 pesos loaned to the Monte de Piedad, without doubt
4
considering as sufficient the period of ten years during which it has been using this large
sum which lawfully belongs to their persons. This Intendencia also supposed that the Monte
de Piedad no longer needed the amount of that loan, inasmuch as, far from investing it in
beneficient transactions, it had turned the whole amount into the voluntary deposit funds
bearing 5 per cent interests, the result of this operation being that the debtor loaned to the
creditor on interest what the former had gratuitously received. But the Monte de Piedad,
instead of fulfilling the promise it made on receiving the sum, after repeated demands
refused to return the money on the ground that only your Excellency, and not
the Intendencia (Treasury), is entitled to order the reimbursement, taking no account of the
fact that this Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a sovereign command, the
fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to order; and on the further ground that
the sum of 80,000 pesos which it received from the fund intended for the earthquake victims
was not received as a loan, but as a donation, this in the opinion of this Intendencia,
erroneously interpreting both the last royal order which directed the apportionment of the
amount of the subscription raised in the year 1863 and the superior decree which granted the
loan, inasmuch as in this letter no donation is made to the Monte de Piedad of the 80,000
pesos, but simply a loan; besides, no donation whatever could be made of funds derived
from a private subscription raised for a specific purpose, which funds are already distributed
and the names of the beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta, there being lacking
only the mere material act of the delivery, which has been unduly delayed. In view of the
unexpected reply made by the Monte de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in
the matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in support thereof,
this Intendencia believes the intervention of your Excellency necessary in this matter, if the
royal Order No. 1044 of December 3, last, is to be complied with, and for this purpose I beg
your Excellency kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to reimburse within the period of eight
days the 80,000 which it owes, and that you give this Intendencia power to carry out the
provisions of the said royal order. I must call to the attention of your Excellency that the
said pious establishment, during the last few days and after demand was made upon it, has
endorsed to the Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it had on deposit
in the general deposit funds.
The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite action
taken by either the Philippine Government or the Spanish Government in regard to the
$80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad.
In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury:
February 15, 1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883, $20,000; April 14, 1883, $20,000; June 2,
1883, $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is as follows: "To the public
Treasury derived from the subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from
general Treasury as a returnable loan, and without interest." The account was carried in
this manner until January 1, 1899, when it was closed by transferring the amount to an
account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter account was a loan of $15,000 made to the
defendant by the Archbishop of Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada
Mitra" account at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The above-mentioned journal entry for
January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of these two account
which on this date are united in accordance with an order of the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of
the Council transmitted verbally to the Presidente Gerente of these institutions, $95,000."
On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant for
information concerning the status of the $80,000 and received the following reply:
MANILA, March 31, 1902.
To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands.
SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you request
information from this office as to when and for what purpose the Spanish Government
delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the subscription
opened in connection with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any other information that
might be useful for the report which your office is called upon to furnish, I must state to
your department that the books kept in these Pious Institutions, and which have been
consulted for the purpose, show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they received as a
reimbursable loan and without interest, twenty thousand pesos, which they deposited with
their own funds. On the same account and on each of the dates of March 12, April 14 and
June 2 of the said year, 1883, they also received and turned into their funds a like sum of
twenty thousand pesos, making a total of eighty thousand pesos. — (Signed) Emilio
Moreta.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the letter book No.
2 of those Pious Institutions.
Manila, November 19, 1913
(Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,
Secretary
5
(Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA,
Managing Director.
The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took
place between the Government of Spain and the Philippine Government on the one side and
the Monte de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000. The Monte de Piedad, after
setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute
necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the
Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there be
transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the
disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds
should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith.
It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. The Governor-General, after
reciting the substance of the petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for
the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the
proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus, should be
delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the
credit of the institution," and "considering that no reasonable objection can be made to
granting the request herein contained," directed the transfer of the $80,000 to be made with
the understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to
return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M.
Government does not approve this resolution." It will be noted that the first and only time
the word "donation" was used in connection with the $80,000 appears in this resolution of
the Governor-General. It may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid Government
did tacitly approve of the transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without
interest, but that Government certainly did not approve such transfer as a donation for the
reason that the Governor-General was directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to
inform the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the earthquake fund, "taking
into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued
by your general Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing else appearing,
might admit of the interpretation that the Madrid Government did not intend that the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands should include the $80,000 in the total available
sum, but when considered in connection with the report of the Department of Finance there
can be no doubt that it was so intended. That report refers expressly to the royal order of
December 3d, and sets forth in detail the action taken in order to secure the return of the
$80,000. The Department of Finance, acting under the orders of the Governor-General,
understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew that it
received this sum as a loan interest." The amount was thus carried in its books until January,
1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter
known as the "Sagrada Mitra and subscription account." Furthermore, the Monte de
Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000
"as a returnable loan, and without interest." Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt
the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not
as a donation. Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely without foundation.
Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in their
principal brief that:
The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the
distinction of being deputy ex officio of the Holy See and Apostolic Vicar-General of the
Indies, and as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and charitable institutions in
his kingdoms, especially those of the Indies; among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of
the Philippines, of which said King and his deputy the Governor-General of the
Philippines, as royal vice-patron, were, in a special and peculiar manner, the protectors;
the latter, as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly renounced this
high office and tacitly returned it to the Holy See, now represented by the Archbishop of
Manila; the national subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work, for
a charitable purpose in these Islands; and the entire subscription not being needed for its
original purpose, the royal vice-patron, with the consent of the King, gave the surplus
thereof to an analogous purpose; the fulfillment of all these things involved, in the
majority, if not in all cases, faithful compliance with the duty imposed upon him by the
Holy See, when it conferred upon him the royal patronage of the Indies, a thing that
touched him very closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary Government
though Christian, was not Roman Catholic and prided itself on its policy of
non-interference in religious matters, and inveterately maintained a complete separation
between the ecclesiastical and civil powers.
In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even without the express
provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did
not befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to subrogate to the American
Government in lieu of the Spanish Government anything respecting the disposition of the
funds delivered by the latter to the Monte de Piedad. The same reasons that induced the
Spanish Government to take over such things would result in great inconvenience to the
American Government in attempting to do so. The question was such a delicate one, for
the reason that it affected the conscience, deeply religious, of the King of Spain, that it
6
cannot be believed that it was ever his intention to confide the exercise thereof to a
Government like the American. (U. S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)
It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish
Government or rather, the King of Spain, in this regard; and as the condition annexed to the
donation was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was made, but
became impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spanish Government in these
Islands, compliance therewith is excused and the contract has been cleared thereof.
The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason, (1) because such
contention is based upon the erroneous theory that the sum in question was a donation to
the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because the charity founded by the donations
for the earthquake sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work.
The first proposition has already been decided adversely to the defendant's contention. As to
the second, the record shows clearly that the fund was given by the donors for a specific and
definite purpose — the relief of the earthquake sufferers — and for no other purpose. The
money was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that purpose. The
Spanish Government remitted the money to the Philippine Government to be distributed
among the suffers. All officials, including the King of Spain and the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands, who took part in the disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil,
official capacity, and the fact that they might have belonged to a certain church had nothing
to do with their acts in this matter. The church, as such, had nothing to do with the fund in
any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the Monte de Piedad (an
institution under the control of the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question had
been founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the Governor-General,
in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and as royal vice-patron, respectively, would
have disposed of the fund as such and not in their civil capacities, and such functions could
not have been transferred to the present Philippine Government, because the right to so act
would have arisen out of the special agreement between the Government of Spain and the
Holy See, based on the union of the church and state which was completely separated with
the change of sovereignty.
And in their supplemental brief counsel say:
By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription. The
donors were persons in Spain, the trustee was the Spanish Government, the donees,
the cestuis que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine Islands. The whole matter is
one of trusteeship. This is undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish
Government at no time was the owner of the fund. Not being the owner of the fund
it could not transfer the ownership. Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it
certainly never has expressly done so and the general terms of property transfer in the
Treaty of Paris are wholly insufficient for such a purpose even could Spain have
transferred its trusteeship without the consent of the donors and even could the United
States, as a Government, have accepted such a trust under any power granted to it by the
thirteen original States in the Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It follows further
that this Government is not a proper party to the action. The only persons who could
claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or
the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither.
If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish
Government could not, as counsel say, transfer the ownership of the fund to the Monte de
Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no argument to
show that the Spanish or Philippine Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for
this purpose had there been no change of sovereignty and if the right of action has not
prescribed. But those governments were something more than mere common law trustees
of the fund. In order to determine their exact status with reference to this fund, it is
necessary to examine the law in force at the time there transactions took place, which are
the law of June 20, 1894, the royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the instructions
promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine
Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34)
The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal
order of the Spanish Government and which were remitted to the Philippine Government
to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relief Board constituted,
under article 1 of the law of June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27,
1875, a special charity of a temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public
charitable institution. As the Spanish Government initiated the creation of the fund and as
the donors turned their contributions over to that Government, it became the duty of the
latter, under article 7 of the instructions, to exercise supervision and control over the
moneys thus collected to the end that the will of the donors should be carried out. The
relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge for other
purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers, because paragraph 3 of article 11 of
the instructions conferred the power upon the secretary of the interior of Spain, and no
other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them to some
other charitable purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds
in this manner so long as they were necessary for the specific purpose for which they
7
were contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above mentioned to appoint
and totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to
defend the rights of the charity in the courts. The authority of the board consisted only in
carrying out the will of the donors as directed by the Government whose duty it was to
watch over the acts of the board and to see that the funds were applied to the purposes for
which they were contributed .The secretary of the interior, as the representative of His
Majesty's Government, exercised these powers and duties through the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the Philippine Islands in
complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in their governmental
capacities in attempting to carry out the intention of the contributors. It will this be seen that
those governments were something more, as we have said, than mere trustees of the fund.
It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return
the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of
sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot maintain this
action for that reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid
law," as it cannot rest upon any title to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to
such change. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still
pending, war between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the
United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first
paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to the United States "all buildings,
wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which,
in conformity with law, belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown
of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it is said that the right to recover this
amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not
follow as a necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition
that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of the treaty,
but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the
United States. We will not inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849,
the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. In
Vilas vs.Manila (220 U. S., 345), the court said:
That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the
ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the
political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force,
is also plain. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is equally settled
in the same public law that the great body of municipal law which regulates private and
domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character,
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their
force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among
"that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they
continued in force and are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present
Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very nature and
character. They are laws which are not political in any sense of the word. They conferred
upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some
extent control charities and charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting
"provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable
institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in
securities are concerned, under the general supervision of the Insular Treasurer (paragraph
4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701).
Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown
of Spain devolved upon he United States. In Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted
with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United States (136 U. S.,1, 57), the court said:
The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and
the prerogative of the crown, and gave their Acts the same force and effect.
In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the
opinion of the court in a charity case, said:
When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved
upon the people of the States. And this power still remains with them except so fact as
they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made
known to us by legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.
Chancelor Kent says:
In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the
right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending
8
authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com.,
508, note.)
The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra,
after approving also the last quotations, said:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to
those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great
detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most
beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and
for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3
Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court held that it is deemed indispensible that there
should be a power in the legislature to authorize the same of the estates of in facts, idiots,
insane persons, and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves, said:
These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and person not known, or not in
being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their
rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae.
They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of
government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative
department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice
and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other
cases whatever.
In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the
real party in interest; that the Attorney-General had no power to institute the action; and that
there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the people as a whole, as
distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an action could be brought by the
Attorney-General in the name of the people. The court, in overruling these contentions, held
that it was not only the right but the duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the action,
which related to charities, and approved the following quotation from
Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Younge & C. C., 417):
Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who
hold it devoted to that trust, it is the privilege of the public that the crown should be
entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf on the public
generally, the public interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be
found effectually to assert, even if the interest were such as to allow it. (2 Knet's
Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.)
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be
damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis
que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper
party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a
great number of small contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the
record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the title to their respective
contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, could
have been ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the
original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to
institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The
only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume
control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined.
The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground
upon which the right of the Government to maintain the action rests. The true ground is
that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public property, only
applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but
within those limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of the public resources
for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. (Mormon
Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be
contrary to sound public policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar
acts of humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in the future.
As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the
constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for the reason that we have just held
that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a
manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to exercise the power or right
which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not, as contended by counsel, in conflict with the
fifth section of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take property
without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000, but
9
holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central relief board. Therefor, there can be
nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature.
In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it existed
before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its present
charter from the Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and
liable upon the obligations of the old city. This court held that the present municipality is a
totally different corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish
municipality. The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing this judgment and in
holding the city liable for the old debt, said:
The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the
present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the
property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of
its liabilities.
In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as
the Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by the
Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time
this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969
of the Civil Code. While on the other hand, the Attorney-General contends that the right of
action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription cannot be set up against the
Philippine Government, (b) because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds
does not prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the
Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the same was revived by Act No.
2109.
The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad received the
$80,000 in 1883 "to be held under the same conditions as at present in the treasury, to wit, at
the disposal of the relief board." In compliance with the provisions of the royal order of
December 3, 1892, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedadin June,
1893, to return the $80,000. The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground
that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance
had the right to order the reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books of the Monte
as a returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the
"Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902, the Monte, through its legal representative, stated in
writing that the amount in question was received as a reimbursable loan, without interest.
Act No. 2109 became effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted on May
3rd of that year.
Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one
between individuals or corporations wherein the plaintiff is seeking to recover an ordinary
loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when the statute of
limitations began to run, for the reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on
March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that
it still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if counsels' theory is
the correct one the action may have prescribed on May 3, 1912, because more than ten
full years had elapsed after March 31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil
Procedure.)
Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme
Court of the United States in U. S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co.
(118 U. S., 120, 125), said:
It is settled beyond doubt or controversy — upon the foundation of the great
principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the
public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose
care they are confided — that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign
government, is not bound by any statute of limitations, unless Congress has clearly
manifested its intention that it should be so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U.
S. vs. Knight, 14 Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U.
S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272, 281.)
In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:
It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the
State. That no laches can be imputed to the King, and that no time can bar his rights, was
the maxim of the common laws, and was founded on the principle of public policy, that as
he was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the negligence
of his officer and servants. The principle is applicable to all governments, which must
necessarily act through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation of the interests
and property of the public. It is upon this principle that in this country the statutes of a
State prescribing periods within which rights must be prosecuted are not held to embrace
the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs to be remedied are of
such a nature that it must necessarily be included. As legislation of a State can only apply
10

to persons and thing over which the State has jurisdiction, the United States are also Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes. Moreland, J., did not sign.

In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows:

In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do Republic of the Philippines
not as a general rule run against the sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But SUPREME COURT
the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature that the state Manila
must necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or in competition
with her citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his private rights by suit in the name of SECOND DIVISION
the state or government, so that the latter is only a nominal party.

In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in
bringing and prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974
seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the
United States. The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw
MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
Indians under treaty with that tribe, certain bonds of the State of Tennessee, the right of
vs.
action of the Government on the coupons of such bonds could not be barred by the statute of
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
limitations of Tennessee, either while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became
the owner of such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., supra.) So where lands are
held in trust by the state and the beneficiaries have no right to sue, a statute does not run Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
against the State's right of action for trespass on the trust lands. (Greene Tp. vs. Campbell,
16 Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
Reg. vs. Williams, 39 U. C. Q. B., 397].)

These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public
policy" are, in the very nature of things, applicable to the Philippine Government. FERNANDO, J.:p

Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not
question the amount of the judgment nor do they question the correctness of the judgment in
so far as it allows interest, and directs its payment in gold coin or in the equivalent in
Philippine currency.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
the appellant. So ordered.
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are
the mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy
issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of them should be
entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code
provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in this case. Defendant uncle
appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did following the specific mandate of
the law. In addition, it must have taken into account the principle that in cases of this
nature the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It is not an unreasonable
assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care
on and pay greater attention to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is
11
with the mother. There are no circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to
the natural order of things, even if the language of the law were not as clear. It is not to be
lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State as parens
patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under the present Constitution, did
weigh in the balance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the welfare of
the child called for the mother to be entrusted with such responsibility. We have to affirm.
The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts. "1 The
insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff,
Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10,
1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured
himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her
minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the
mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond
required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount
in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.2
After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment
ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main
reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or
in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance."3 The latter
states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his
work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct
to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he
lives; ...4
Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed
decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor
under the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives
with plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property
by lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in
usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to
possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar
as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order,
however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an
additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to
raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."5
It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the
two cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed, the decision must stand. There is no
ambiguity in the language employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning is
unequivocal. Time and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or
statutory norms are cast in categorical language, the task before it is not one of
interpretation but of application.6 So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed
decision.
1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the
defendant-appellant7 to blunt the force of legal commands that speak so plainly and so
unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered.
What is paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in
consonance with such primordial end that Articles 320 and 321 have been worded. There
is recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event that there
is less than full measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the
bond required. With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the
uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the
test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and
natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a
mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on Article 159 of the Civil
Code of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus "El
derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es una consecuencia
natural y lógica de la patria potestad y de la presunción de que nadie cuidará de los bienes
de acquéllos con mas cariño y solicitude que los padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo
puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una manera indirecta aquelia doctrina, y asi se
desprende de la sentencia del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se
refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho
principio los Codigos extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos mis
adelante."8
2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is
buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State
acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one
who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here,
that family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance
12

not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. CORONA,
is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, CARPIO MORALES,
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, TINGA,
validity of her plea. In a recent case,9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, CHICO-NAZARIO,
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and VELASCO, JR.,
of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has ROLDAN A. GAVINO, NACHURA,
no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs Respondents. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, x-------------------------------------------x BRION,
there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall ELISEO F. SORIANO, PERALTA, and
strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely Petitioner, BERSAMIN, JJ.
dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that
even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional - versus - G.R. No. 165636
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW
WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO
defendant-appellant. G. ALEGRE, JACKIE
AQUINO-GAVINO,NOEL R. DEL PRADO,
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. EMMANUEL BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO
IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their
capacity as members of the Hearing and
Barredo, J., took no part.
Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB,
JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA
Republic of the Philippines CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L.
SUPREME COURT LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S.
Manila YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and
ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in their capacity as
complainants before
EN BANC the MTRCB,
Respondents.
ELISEO F. SORIANO, G.R. No. 164785
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - Promulgated:
PUNO, C.J.,
MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in QUISUMBING, April 29, 2009
her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Television Review and Classification Board, CARPIO,
13
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F.
Soriano seeks to nullify and set aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances he made
in his television show, Ang Dating Daan.
Facts of the Case
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang
babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang
itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa
putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.[1] x x x
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints
were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),[2] against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was
then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang
Daan.[3] Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004
in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang
Dating Daan.[4]
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of
August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20
days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the
MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of
Procedure.[5] The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension
order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the
adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case.[6] Two days after, however,
petitioner sought to withdraw[7] his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with
this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition,[8] docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to
nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered,
finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him
a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, Ang Dating Daan.
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37
and its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 165636.
In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 164785 with
G.R. No. 165636.
In G.R. No. 164785, petitioner raises the following issues:
THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY
RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE
TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x IS NULL AND
VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
(A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT
PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
ORDERS;
(B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT
BENCH;
14
(C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE
LAW;
(D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND
(E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION.[10]
In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following grounds:
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986,
PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION x x x CONSIDERING THAT:
I We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding the assailed order
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY
INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF
RELIGION, SPEECH, AND EXPRESSION AS IT PARTAKES OF THE
NATURE OF A SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT CURTAILING THE SAME;
CONSEQUENTLY, THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS,
RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB
PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND
ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY
INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH;
II
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY
INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW; CONSEQUENTLY,
THE [IRR], RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB
PURSUANT THERETO, I.E., DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND
ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY
INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH; AND
III
[PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT PROVIDE
FOR A SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY
RESULTING IN AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
REASON THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR], RULES
OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT
THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER
DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY
IS INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH[11]
IN
G.R. No. 164785
of preventive suspension, although its implementability had already been overtaken and
veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed September 27, 2004 decision.
It is petitioners threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him
and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not
expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.
Petitioners contention is untenable.
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may
be conferred by the Constitution or by statute.[12] They have in fine only such powers or
authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.[13] And in
determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law
itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally
construed.[14]
A perusal of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by
the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive
suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of,
its power of regulation and supervision.
Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:
Section 3. Powers and Functions.The BOARD shall have the following
functions, powers and duties:
15
xxxx
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit
the x x x production, x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding
paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary
to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence or of wrong or crime such as but not limited to:
xxxx
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any
person, whether living or dead;
xxxx
(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television
broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to
the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the
BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x
produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or
broadcast by television;
xxxx
k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to
the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. (Emphasis added.)
The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCBs
authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d),
as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or
cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and
materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with
paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television.
Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCBs express
regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary
authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render
its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation.[15] And the power to discipline and
impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative
complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of
the complaint.[16]
To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers
conferred under PD 1986. The MTRCB did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to
impose preventive suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986. It is true that
the matter of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986.
Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR provides:
Sec. 3. PREVENTION SUSPENSION ORDER.Any time during the
pendency of the case, and in order to prevent or stop further violations or for the
interest and welfare of the public, the Chairman of the Board may issue a
Preventive Suspension Order mandating the preventive x x x suspension of the
permit/permits involved, and/or closure of the x x x television network, cable TV
station x x x provided that the temporary/preventive order thus issued shall have
a life of not more than twenty (20) days from the date of issuance.
But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without
more, would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive
suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and
supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others,
indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to
prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the
aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the
law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually done in
furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCBs duty of regulating or
supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has
actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR
merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
16
Sec. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case, sufficient to
authorize the MTRCBs assailed action. Petitioners restrictive reading of PD 1986, limiting
the MTRCB to functions within the literal confines of the law, would give the agency little
leeway to operate, stifling and rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly
intends to grant the MTRCB a wide room for flexibility in its operation. Sec. 3(k), we
reiterate, provides, To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental
to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. Indeed, the power to
impose preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of MTRCB. As distinguished
from express powers, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the
wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the enabling act.[17] As we held
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, when a general grant of power is conferred or a duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the
other is also conferred by necessary implication.[18] Clearly, the power to impose preventive
suspension pending investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB.
We cannot agree with petitioners assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on
preventive suspension is applicable only to motion pictures and publicity materials. The
scope of the MTRCBs authority extends beyond motion pictures. What the acronym
MTRCB stands for would suggest as much. And while the law makes specific reference to
the closure of a television network, the suspension of a television program is a far less
punitive measure that can be undertaken, with the purpose of stopping further violations of
PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject
to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
Just as untenable is petitioners argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension
order on the ground of lack of hearing. As it were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed
order after petitioner, in response to a written notice, appeared before that Board for a
hearing on private respondents complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the order
was issued after the adjournment of the hearing,[19] proving that he had already appeared
before the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive
suspension shall issue [a]ny time during the pendency of the case. In this particular case, it
was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD
1986[20] and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such
violation.[21]
At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a
hearing.[22]
Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal protection of
the law, arguing that, owing to the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer
the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
Petitioners position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that all
persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.[23] It guards against
undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination.[24] Surely,
petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC
ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For
another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language
similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary action. If
the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains
temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation
of the equal protection guarantee. The Court need not belabor the fact that the
circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC
ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case,
simply too different to even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of
oppressive inequality.
Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he
uttered was religious speech, adding that words like putang babae were said in exercise of
his religious freedom.
The argument has no merit.
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners utterances in question can come
within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The
section reads as follows:
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing any
particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact
that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not
17
automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults
directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even
petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the
need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity,
that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daanowed
to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We
cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as
they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival
religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of
name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and
disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
Petitioner, as a final point in G.R. No. 164785, would have the Court nullify the 20-day
preventive suspension order, being, as insisted, an unconstitutional abridgement of the
freedom of speech and expression and an impermissible prior restraint. The main issue
tendered respecting the adverted violation and the arguments holding such issue dovetails
with those challenging the three-month suspension imposed under the assailed September 27,
2004 MTRCB decision subject of review under G.R. No. 165636. Both overlapping issues
and arguments shall be jointly addressed.
G.R. No. 165636
Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang
Dating Daan for three months on the main ground that the decision violates, apart from his
religious freedom, his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of
the Constitution, which reads:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievance.
He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3(c) in particular,
unconstitutional for reasons articulated in this petition.
We are not persuaded as shall be explained shortly. But first, we restate certain general
concepts and principles underlying the freedom of speech and expression.
It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion
pictures come within the broad protection of the free speech and expression
clause.[25]Each method though, because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of people
and accessibility to children, tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech
protection, with broadcast media, of all forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree
of protection.[26] Just as settled is the rule that restrictions, be it in the form of prior
restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of
license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution
for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior
restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression
in advance of actual publication or dissemination.[27] The freedom of expression, as with
the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It may be
regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not
being protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached
when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.[28] In the
oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee obviously was not
intended to give immunity for every possible use of language.[29] From Lucas v.
Royo comes this line: [T]he freedom to express ones sentiments and belief does not grant
one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must
be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others.[30]
Indeed, as noted in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire,[31] there are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech that are harmful, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problems. In net
effect, some forms of speech are not protected by the Constitution, meaning that
restrictions on unprotected speech may be decreed without running afoul of the freedom
of speech clause.[32] A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances
involved are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.[33] Being of little or no value,
there is, in dealing with or regulating them, no imperative call for the application of the
clear and present danger rule or the balancing-of-interest test, they being essentially
modes of weighing competing values,[34] or, with like effect, determining which of the
clashing interests should be advanced.
Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.
18
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected
speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography,
false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e., those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security.
The Court finds that petitioners statement can be treated as obscene, at least with
respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v.
Court of Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in formulating a definition
of obscenity that would apply to all cases, but nonetheless stated the ensuing observations
on the matter:
There is no perfect definition of obscenity but the latest word is that of Miller v.
California which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average
person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to
conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is
patently offensive. x x x What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for
judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the
judges sound discretion.[35]
Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v. California,[36] a patently
offensive utterance would come within the pale of the term obscenity should it appeal to the
prurient interest of an average listener applying contemporary standards.
A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the
case reveal that to an average adult, the utterances Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa
putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay
Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! may not constitute obscene but merely indecent
utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the
context they were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The
problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is
rated G or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes
and ears of children.
While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken
literally, children could hardly be expected to have the same discernment. Without
parental guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television
broadcast could corrupt impressionable young minds. The term putang babae means a
female prostitute, a term wholly inappropriate for children, who could look it up in a
dictionary and just get the literal meaning, missing the context within which it was
used. Petitioner further used the terms, ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, making
reference to the female sexual organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then
stating that Sandoval was worse than that by using his mouth in a similar
manner. Children could be motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner
said, also without placing the phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to why
Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the reasons for the dissimilarity. And
upon learning the meanings of the words used, young minds, without the guidance of an
adult, may, from their end, view this kind of indecent speech as obscene, if they take these
words literally and use them in their own speech or form their own ideas on the matter. In
this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear petitioners words, when
speaking of the average person in the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the average
child, not the average adult. The average child may not have the adults grasp of figures of
speech, and may lack the understanding that language may be colorful, and words may
convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is very suggestive of
a female sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, we find petitioners utterances
obscene and not entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech.
Even if we concede that petitioners remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional
protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to
children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected
speech.
No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. But while
a jurisprudential pattern involving certain offensive utterances conveyed in different
mediums has emerged, this case is veritably one of first impression, it being the first time
that indecent speech communicated via television and the applicable norm for its
regulation are, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation,[37] a 1978 American landmark case cited
inEastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr.[38] and Chavez v. Gonzales,[39] is a rich
source of persuasive lessons. Foremost of these relates to indecent speech without prurient
appeal component coming under the category of protected speech depending on the
19
context within which it was made, irresistibly suggesting that, within a particular context,
such indecent speech may validly be categorized as unprotected, ergo, susceptible to
restriction.
In FCC, seven of what were considered filthy words[40] earlier recorded in a monologue
by a satiric humorist later aired in the afternoon over a radio station owned by Pacifica
Foundation. Upon the complaint of a man who heard the pre-recorded monologue while
driving with his son, FCC declared the language used as patently
offensive and indecentunder a prohibiting law, though not necessarily obscene. FCC added,
however, that its declaratory order was issued in a special factual context, referring, in gist,
to an afternoon radio broadcast when children were undoubtedly in the audience. Acting on
the question of whether the FCC could regulate the subject utterance, the US Supreme Court
ruled in the affirmative, owing to two special features of the broadcast medium, to wit: (1)
radio is a pervasive medium and (2) broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. The US
Court, however, hastened to add that the monologue would be protected speech in other
contexts, albeit it did not expound and identify a compelling state interest in putting FCCs
content-based regulatory action under scrutiny.
The Court in Chavez[41] elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction
of protected speech that is content-based and that which is content-neutral. A content-based
restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a content-neutral
restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression under well-defined
standards tailored to serve a compelling state interest, without restraint on the message of
the expression. Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny.
With the view we take of the case, the suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises
was, in one perspective, permissible restriction. We make this disposition against the
backdrop of the following interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was made via
television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak,[42]easily
reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the
day when there was a reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third,
petitioner uttered his speech on a G or for general patronage rated program.Under Sec. 2(A)
of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is [s]uitable for all
ages, meaning that the material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not
contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult
guidance or supervision. The words petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not
suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as indecent, as in petitioners
utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech.
A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to
pornography,[43] false or misleading advertisement,[44] advocacy of imminent lawless
action, and expression endangering national security. But this list is not, as some members
of the Court would submit, exclusive or carved in stone. Without going into specifics, it
may be stated without fear of contradiction that US decisional law goes beyond the
aforesaid general exceptions. As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to
the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet another
exception, another instance of unprotected speech, created by the necessity of protecting
the welfare of our children. As unprotected speech, petitioners utterances can be subjected
to restraint or regulation.
Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978,
petitioner asserts that his utterances must present a clear and present danger of bringing
about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent and such danger must be
grave and imminent.[45]
Petitioners invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most
permissive of speech tests, would not avail him any relief, for the application of said test
is uncalled for under the premises. The doctrine, first formulated by Justice Holmes,
accords protection for utterances so that the printed or spoken words may not be subject to
prior restraint or subsequent punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present
danger of bringing about a substantial evil which the government has the power to
prohibit.[46] Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of press is susceptible of
restriction when and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the government may lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine evolved in
the context of prosecutions for rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of
government.[47] It was originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given
to speech that espouses anti-government action, or to have serious and substantial
deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the community.[48] The clear
and present danger rule has been applied to this jurisdiction.[49] As a standard of limitation
on free speech and press, however, the clear and present danger test is not a magic
incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis and judgment in the
testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court to release a
defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of imminent
catastrophic disaster.[50] As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, the clear
20
and present danger test does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.[51]
To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been
applied by the courts. Generally, said doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of
the government and even other evils which do not clearly undermine national security. Since
not all evils can be measured in terms of proximity and degree the Court, however, in
several casesAyer Productions v. Capulong[52] and Gonzales v. COMELEC,[53] applied the
balancing of interests test. Former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in Gonzales v.
COMELEC, elucidated in his Separate Opinion that where the legislation under
constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more
generalized way and where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability
of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic
calculation,[54] then the balancing of interests test can be applied.
The Court explained also in Gonzales v. COMELEC the balancing of interests test:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the
regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the
duty of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests
demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. x
x x We must, therefore, undertake the delicate and difficult task x x x to weigh
the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights x x x.
In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting
social values and individual interests competing for ascendancy in legislation
which restricts expression, the court in Douds laid the basis for what has been
called the balancing-of-interests test which has found application in more
recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the balancing test
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.
xxxx
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by
Congressional power restricting the individuals freedom, and the social
importance and value of the freedom so restricted, are to be judged in the
concrete, not on the basis of abstractions, a wide range of factors are
necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among
these are (a) the social value and importance of the specific aspect of the
particular freedom restricted by the legislation; (b) the specific thrust of the
restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the
persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance of the public interest
sought to be secured by the legislationthe reference here is to the nature and
gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent; (d) whether the specific
restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for
the protection of such public interest; and (e) whether the necessary
safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by some other
measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.[55]
This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper,[56] rests on the
theory that it is the courts function in a case before it when it finds public interests served
by legislation, on the one hand, and the free expression clause affected by it, on the other,
to balance one against the other and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be
placed. If, on balance, it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is
of such nature that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the court will find the
legislation valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that
constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and
expression clause, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and
important interests.[57] To the mind of the Court, the balancing of interest doctrine is the
more appropriate test to follow.
In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three
(3)-month suspension was slapped on him for breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the
assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged against the
duty of the government to protect and promote the development and welfare of the youth.
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by
petitioner in support of his claim to free speech, the Court rules that the governments
interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately
buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioners prayer to continue
as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a State
is the freedom of speech or expression, for without the enjoyment of such right, a free,
stable, effective, and progressive democratic state would be difficult to attain. Arrayed
21
against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social being which the State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. Moreover,
the State is also mandated to recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation
building as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the
State to provide protection to the youth against illegal or improper activities which may
prejudice their general well-being. The Article on youth, approved on second reading by the
Constitutional Commission, explained that the State shall extend social protection to minors
against all forms of neglect, cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and practices which may
foster racial, religious or other forms of discrimination.[58]
Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to
minors against all forms of neglect, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute
innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping parents, through regulatory
mechanisms, protect their childrens minds from exposure to undesirable materials and
corrupting experiences. The Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier
indicated, to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field of
nation-building.[59] In the same way, the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character.[60]
Petitioners offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without
doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the
States mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae,[61] constitute a substantial
and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners utterances in TV broadcast as
provided in PD 1986.
FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the
children who, because of age or interest capacity, are susceptible of being corrupted or
prejudiced by offensive language, thus:
[B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to
read. Although Cohens written message, [Fuck the Draft], might have been
incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacificas broadcast could have enlarged a childs
vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from
the young without restricting the expression at its source.Bookstores and motion
picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from making indecent material
available to children. We held in Ginsberg v. New York that the governments
interest in the well-being of its youth and in supporting parents claim to authority
in their own household justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material,
coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special
treatment of indecent broadcasting.
Moreover, Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to
attend to the welfare of the young:
x x x It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a
less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion
pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home
where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of
the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies
of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the
young.[62]
The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory action
MTRCB took in the narrow confines of the case. To reiterate, FCC justified the restraint
on the TV broadcast grounded on the following considerations: (1) the use of television
with its unique accessibility to children, as a medium of broadcast of a patently offensive
speech; (2) the time of broadcast; and (3) the G rating of the Ang Dating
Daan program. And in agreeing with MTRCB, the court takes stock of and cites with
approval the following excerpts from FCC:
It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding.
This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver
and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided
that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction. x x x The
[FFCs] decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all
important. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time of
day was emphasized by the [FFC]. The content of the program in which the
22
language is used will affect the composition of the audience x x x. As Mr. Justice
Sutherland wrote a nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.We simply hold that when the [FCC] finds
that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not
depend on proof that the pig is obscene. (Citation omitted.)
There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time
television are blatantly indecent if not outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986
proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary powers. It is the
kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and prevent
should such action served and further compelling state interests. One who utters indecent,
insulting, or offensive words on television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is,
in the graphic language of FCC, a pig in the parlor. Public interest would be served if the
pig is reasonably restrained or even removed from the parlor.
Ergo, petitioners offensive and indecent language can be subjected to prior restraint.
Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or
subsequent punishment that, however, includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.
After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is
an administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for his offensive and obscene language
in Ang Dating Daan.
To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and
presumed unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior
restraint are movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to
numerous people, including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of
unprotected speech. PD 1986 was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures
and Television (now MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or license before showing a
motion picture or broadcasting a TV program. The Board can classify movies and television
programs and can cancel permits for exhibition of films or television broadcast.
The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and
television shows, even religious programs, was upheld in Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of
Appeals. Speaking through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, the Court wrote:
We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious program is per
se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the
rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it
will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the
State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding
interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. x x x
xxxx
While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that
[PD 1986] is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body
quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its
decision subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this
setup in Sotto vs. Ruiz, viz:
The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege
which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons possess no
absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its
character.[63]
Bernas adds:
Under the decree a movie classification board is made the arbiter of what
movies and television programs or parts of either are fit for public
consumption. It decides what movies are immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of
the Philippines or its people, and what tend to incite subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or sedition, or tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people
in their government and/or duly constituted authorities, etc. Moreover, its
decisions are executory unless stopped by a court.[64]
Moreover, in MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,[65] it was held that the
power of review and prior approval of MTRCB extends to all television programs and is
valid despite the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, all broadcast
networks are regulated by the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit before they
23
air their television programs. Consequently, their right to enjoy their freedom of speech is
subject to that requirement. As lucidly explained by Justice Dante O. Tinga, government
regulations through the MTRCB became a necessary evil with the government taking the
role of assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters. The stations explicitly agreed to this
regulatory scheme; otherwise, chaos would result in the television broadcast industry as
competing broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each others signals. In this scheme, station
owners and broadcasters in effect waived their right to the full enjoyment of their right to
freedom of speech in radio and television programs and impliedly agreed that said right may
be subject to prior restraintdenial of permit or subsequent punishment, like suspension or
cancellation of permit, among others.
The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of
petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued
to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in the form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he
uttered on the evening of August 10, 2004 in his television program, Ang Dating Daan. It is
a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of
the free speech clause. And the imposition is separate and distinct from the criminal action
the Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of PD 1986 and the remedies that may be availed
of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel or tort, if
applicable. As FCC teaches, the imposition of sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in
profane or indecent broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it be
overlooked, the sanction imposed is not per se for petitioners exercise of his freedom of
speech via television, but for the indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV
program.
More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of
his freedom of speech to regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners,
program producers, and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the
broadcast industry.
Neither can petitioners virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of
suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper
perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an
unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible
cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension meted was
simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law
which it is tasked to implement. Viewed in its proper context, the suspension sought to
penalize past speech made on prime-time G rated TV program; it does not bar future speech
of petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent administrative
sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not on all fours,
the Court, in MTRCB,[66] sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast
company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV episode without Board authorization in
violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986.
Any simplistic suggestion, however, that the MTRCB would be crossing the limits of
its authority were it to regulate and even restrain the prime-time television broadcast of
indecent or obscene speech in a G rated program is not acceptable. As made clear
in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. The
MTRCB, as a regulatory agency, must have the wherewithal to enforce its mandate,
which would not be effective if its punitive actions would be limited to mere
fines. Television broadcasts should be subject to some form of regulation, considering the
ease with which they can be accessed, and violations of the regulations must be met with
appropriate and proportional disciplinary action. The suspension of a violating television
program would be a sufficient punishment and serve as a deterrent for those
responsible. The prevention of the broadcast of petitioners television program is justified,
and does not constitute prohibited prior restraint. It behooves the Court to respond to the
needs of the changing times, and craft jurisprudence to reflect these times.
Petitioner, in questioning the three-month suspension, also tags as unconstitutional
the very law creating the MTRCB, arguing that PD 1986, as applied to him, infringes also
upon his freedom of religion. The Court has earlier adequately explained why petitioners
undue reliance on the religious freedom cannot lend justification, let alone an exempting
dimension to his licentious utterances in his program. The Court sees no need to address
anew the repetitive arguments on religious freedom. As earlier discussed in the
disposition of the petition in G.R. No. 164785, what was uttered was in no way a religious
speech. Parenthetically, petitioners attempt to characterize his speech as a legitimate
defense of his religion fails miserably. He tries to place his words in perspective, arguing
evidently as an afterthought that this was his method of refuting the alleged distortion of
his statements by the INC hosts of Ang Tamang Daan. But on the night he uttered them in
his television program, the word simply came out as profane language, without any
warning or guidance for undiscerning ears.
As to petitioners other argument about having been denied due process and equal
protection of the law, suffice it to state that we have at length debunked similar arguments
in G.R. No. 164785. There is no need to further delve into the fact that petitioner was
24
afforded due process when he attended the hearing of the MTRCB, and that he was unable
to demonstrate that he was unjustly discriminated against in the MTRCB proceedings.
Finally, petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative power, as
PD 1986 does not provide for the range of imposable penalties that may be applied with
respect to violations of the provisions of the law.
The argument is without merit.
In Edu v. Ericta, the Court discussed the matter of undue delegation of legislative
power in the following wise:
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers
that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of
the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local
affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under
the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of
the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of
legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes
what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a
complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process
can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of
power to make laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as
to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection can be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the
legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive
or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.[67]
Based on the foregoing pronouncements and analyzing the law in question,
petitioners protestation about undue delegation of legislative power for the sole reason
that PD 1986 does not provide for a range of penalties for violation of the law is
untenable. His thesis is that MTRCB, in promulgating the IRR of PD 1986, prescribing a
schedule of penalties for violation of the provisions of the decree, went beyond the terms
of the law.
Petitioners posture is flawed by the erroneous assumptions holding it together, the
first assumption being that PD 1986 does not prescribe the imposition of, or authorize the
MTRCB to impose, penalties for violators of PD 1986. As earlier indicated, however, the
MTRCB, by express and direct conferment of power and functions, is charged with
supervising and regulating, granting, denying, or canceling permits for the exhibition
and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs, and publicity
materials to the end that no such objectionable pictures, programs, and materials shall be
exhibited and/or broadcast by television. Complementing this provision is Sec. 3(k) of the
decree authorizing the MTRCB to exercise such powers and functions as may be
necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purpose and objectives of [the law]. As
earlier explained, the investiture of supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would
surely be a meaningless grant if it did not carry with it the power to penalize the
supervised or the regulated as may be proportionate to the offense committed, charged,
and proved. As the Court said in Chavez v. National Housing Authority:
x x x [W]hen a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other is also conferred. x x x [W]hen the statute does not specify the particular
method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the
power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable
method to carry out its function.[68]
Given the foregoing perspective, it stands to reason that the power of the MTRCB to
regulate and supervise the exhibition of TV programs carries with it or necessarily implies
the authority to take effective punitive action for violation of the law sought to be
enforced. And would it not be logical too to say that the power to deny or cancel a permit
25
for the exhibition of a TV program or broadcast necessarily includes the lesser power to
suspend?
The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in accordance with Sec. 3(a) which, for
reference, provides that agency with the power [to] promulgate such rules and regulations as
are necessary or proper for the implementation of this Act, and the accomplishment of its
purposes and objectives x x x. And Chapter XIII, Sec. 1 of the IRR providing:
Section 1. VIOLATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS.Without
prejudice to the immediate filing of the appropriate criminal action and the
immediate seizure of the pertinent articles pursuant to Section 13, any violation of
PD 1986 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations governing motion
pictures, television programs, and related promotional materials shall be
penalized with suspension or cancellation of permits and/or licenses issued by
the Board and/or with the imposition of fines and other administrative
penalty/penalties.The Board recognizes the existing Table of Administrative
Penalties attached without prejudice to the power of the Board to amend it when the
need arises. In the meantime the existing revised Table of Administrative Penalties
shall be enforced. (Emphasis added.)
This is, in the final analysis, no more than a measure to specifically implement the
aforequoted provisions of Sec. 3(d) and (k). Contrary to what petitioner implies, the IRR
does not expand the mandate of the MTRCB under the law or partake of the nature of an
unauthorized administrative legislation. The MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to
regulate the public airwaves and employ such means as it can as a guardian of the public.
In Sec. 3(c), one can already find the permissible actions of the MTRCB, along with the
standards to be applied to determine whether there have been statutory breaches.The
MTRCB may evaluate motion pictures, television programs, and publicity materials
applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, and, from there, determine
whether these audio and video materials are objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, [etc.] x x x and apply the sanctions it deems
proper.The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of
a particular statute.[69] The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a
relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation
of legislative powers.[70] Administrative regulations or subordinate legislation calculated to
promote the public interest are necessary because of the growing complexity of modern life,
the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law.[71] Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-room in its
operations and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample
latitude in fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due
regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to effectively and
efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.
But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for
violations of PD 1986, its decision to suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere in
that issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in the MTRCB Schedule of
Administrative Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the
program host or even to prevent certain people from appearing in television programs.
The MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel
permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend television personalities, for such would be
beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation beyond what
the law provides. Only persons, offenses, and penalties clearly falling clearly within the
letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within the decrees penal or
disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor
of the person charged with violating the statute and for whom the penalty is sought. Thus,
the MTRCBs decision in Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and
the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The suspension
should cover only the television program on which petitioner appeared and uttered the
offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining
call for.
In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in
which absolute permissiveness is the norm. Petitioners flawed belief that he may simply
utter gutter profanity on television without adverse consequences, under the guise of free
speech, does not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat: freedoms of
speech and expression are not absolute freedoms. To say any act that restrains speech
should be greeted with furrowed brows is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates
speech or expression is per se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of
speech and expression, and indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may
restrain or regulate speech.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the MTRCB in Adm. Case No. 01-04 dated
September 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of limiting the
suspension to the program Ang Dating Daan. As thus modified, the fallo of the MTRCB
shall read as follows:
26

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered,
imposing a penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on the television
program, Ang Dating Daan, subject of the instant petition.
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz, and UNTV Channel 37 and
its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.
Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.[1] After almost two months, or on November
2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein
co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital,
Antipolo City.

Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino,
Costs against petitioner. with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she
SO ORDERED. submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father[3] (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
SECOND DIVISION Acknowledgmentexecuted by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino.[4] Both
affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA G.R. No. 177728 questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY which
CRUZ and minor Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of
CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ AQUINO, Present: which read:
represented by
JENIE SANJUAN DELA CRUZ, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO, AUTOBIOGRAPHY
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
versus PERALTA,* JJ. IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF
AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT
PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED
capacity as City Civil Registrar of Promulgated: JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS
Antipolo City, July 31, 2009 DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME IS RAQUEL STO.
Respondent. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
x------------------------------------------------x xxxx

DECISION AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie)
and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of
EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE
BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH
OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE
NOW. THATS ALL.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
27
By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald
Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name in
this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255 [An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article 176
of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the Family Code of the
Philippines]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live
Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten
instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is
supported by the following documents:
a. AUSF[8]
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the
document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between
the father and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was
born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no
more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of
Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity
or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint[9] for injunction/registration of name
against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA
Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged
that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to
use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,[10] which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname
of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an
admission of paternity in a private handwritten instrument within the contemplation of the
above-quoted provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons,
respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of
her common-law relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF
that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his yet unborn child.[11] She offered
Dominiques handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit A) as her documentary
evidence-in-chief.[12] Dominiques lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified,
corroborating Jenies declarations.[13]
By Decision[14] of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
cause of action as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2
(Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules
28
and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines private
handwritten document through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as
follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an instrument executed in the handwriting
of the father and duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the
child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten
Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this
purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF
THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A PRIVATE
HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF
ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH
ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHERS
SURNAME.[15] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not
expressly require that the private handwritten instrument containing the putative fathers
admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add that the deceaseds handwritten
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the
above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must
be duly signed by the father is void as it unduly expanded the earlier-quoted provision of
Article 176 of the Family Code.[16]
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding
that Dominiques handwritten Autobiography contains a clear and unmistakable recognition
of the childs paternity.[17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondents
position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the
dismissal of the petition. It further submits that Dominiques Autobiography merely
acknowledged Jenies pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her
womb.[18]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate
child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as
his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through
an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in
any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs
paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.[19]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that
the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by
the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related
provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his
signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument
must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family
Code.Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such
requirement; it did not unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the
law.
29
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant
matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the
facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.[20] Third, Jenies testimony
is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino
and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected
by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating
Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that
JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER
and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.
In Herrera v. Alba,[21] the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on
establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections
of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation
or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as
evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we
stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition
by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation
must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the
writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose
filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable
evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and
pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together
with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent
record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the
30

putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.[24]Too,
filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) (t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.[25]

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant
facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as
common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; is to petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now
and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto.
rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of
private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.
illegitimate child is made:
SO ORDERED.
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration in
resolving questions affecting him.[22] Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private

social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.[23] (Underscoring supplied)