DSWD, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO M.

BELEN, respondent
A.M. No.RTJ-96-1362
July 18, 1997

Facts:

The spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are
naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their
niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea, which was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 5830 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and assigned to
Branch 38 thereof. In due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a
decision dated June 25, 1992, after finding that petitioner spouses were highly
qualified to adopt the child as their own. However, when the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in
order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the department uncovered
what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It
turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the
adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to
conduct a Home and Child Study Report in the case. Furthermore, there was no
directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court
to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minors
adoption.

As the adoption never passed through the DSWD, it filed the present
administrative complaint against respondent judge charging him with violating
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 which requires, inter alia, that
petitions for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and
submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive
parents.

Issue: Won the respondent judge is guilty with violating Article 33 of

Presidential Decree No. 603 otherwise known as The Child and Youth Welfare Code,
and the corresponding Supreme Court circular.

Held

Yes. By respondents’ failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly

placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under
consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which
a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea
in this case. the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to
notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No.
5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted
by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that
possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that
it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD
regarding the adoption.
 Cang vs CA
G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's
extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought
a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of
the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor
children. Herbert contested the adoption, but the petition was already granted
by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC
require the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted,
but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It
held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated
the case to the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written
consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.

RULING:

Yes. Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption; the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite
for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to
the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who
is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent
for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child
or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means
"neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe their children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to,
constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent,
he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support
for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he
maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and
telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims.
 Republic v. CA and Wong
G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992
Regalado, J.

Facts:

Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and
Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known as
Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they
were, with the consent of their natural parents and by order of the court in
Special Case No. 593 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong
and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was
an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher. They
decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years of
marriage. The couples showered their adopted children with parental love and
reared them as their own children.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married
and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a
petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of
the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as
the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim
Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a
Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his
adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.

Issue:

Whether or not the reasons given by Wong in his petition for change of his name
are valid, sufficient and proper.

Ruling:

Yes. The change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather
than the object of adoption proceedings. A change of name does not define or
effect a change in one’s existing family relations or in the rights and duties
flowing therefrom. Neither does it alter one’s legal capacity, civil status or
citizenship.- The change of name is justifiable because of the embarrassment and
ridicule his family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and
friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another
justifiable cause is his desire to improve his social and business life.- In
granting and denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all best evidence
available.- Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; b. when the change results as legal consequence, as in legitimation
;c. when change will avoid confusion; d. having continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of alien parentage; e. sincere desire
to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; f. when the surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that change of name would prejudice public interest.- Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court has its primordial purpose which is to give a person an opportunity to
improve his personality and provide his best interest.- Concordantly, the Court
held that a change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing
family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter
one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship; what is altered is only the
name.