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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000]


CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, JOSEFINA V. AMAGAN and DINA V.
AMAGAN, petitioners, vs. TEODORICO T. MARAYAG, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing
before the regional trial court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the property
as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended
even on appeal, on considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners'
house would result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC)
judgment.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the February 9, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 50472, which disposed as follows:
[1]

"It is plain to see that this Court, under its Decision, merely nullified the
Order of the Respondent, dated November 26, 1996 granting Private
Respondents Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and denying
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration [of] its said Order. This Court did
not enjoin the Respondent Court from resolving Petitioners appeal from
the Decision of the Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court, on its merits.
"Petitioners complaint for Quieting of Title and Reconveyance in Civil Case
No. 1632 filed [at] the Regional Trial Court does not abate the proceeding
in Civil Case No. 1671 (TG) before the Respondent Court (Asset
Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 627; Felicidad Javier, et
al., versus Hon. Regino T. Veridiano, II, et al., 237 SCRA 565.
"In sum, then, the [im]pugned Orders of the Respondent Court are in
accord with case law and issued in the exercise of its sound discretion.
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due
course and is hereby dismissed. No cost.
"SO ORDERED." [2]

Also challenged by petitioners is the April 22, 1999 CA Resolution denying their Motion
[3]

for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"x x x. On June 3, 1996, the private respondent filed a complaint against
the petitioners for 'unlawful detainer' with the Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court
in Silang, Cavite. On September 27, 1996, the trial court promulgated a
Decision in favor of the private respondent and against the petitioners, the
decretal portion of which reads as follows:
'IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds for the
plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter as
follows:
1.......To vacate the property of plaintiff located
at San Vicente, Silang, Cavite containing an
area of 420 square meters and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 13023 and remove their house
constructed thereon;
2.......To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
amount of P10,000.00 starting from June 1,
1996 until the subject premises are fully
vacated, as reasonable compensation for their
continued unlawful use and occupation of the
same and another amount of P50,000.00 as
and by way of attorney's fees and other
litigation expenses; and
3.......To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.'
"The petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cavite from said
Decision, which appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 1671. On
November 26, 1996, the private respondent filed a 'Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal' with the Respondent Court which, on November 26,
1996, issued an Order granting said motion, the decretal portion of which
reads as follows:
'As prayed for by the plaintiff(s), through (their) counsel, and
finding the grounds alleged in their 'Motion for Immediate
Exec(u)tion' to be impressed with merit, the same is hereby
GRANTED.
Accordingly, let a writ of execution pending appeal be issued
in this case.'
"The Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration' [of] said Order, was denied
by the Respondent Court per its Order dated February 21, 1997.
"In the interim, the petitioners filed, on December 10, 19[96], a complaint
against private respondent in the Regional Trial Court for 'Quieting of Title,
Reconveyance and Damages,' entitled 'Concepcion v. Amagan, et al.
versus Teodorico Marayag, Civil Case No. 1682 (TG).'
"The petitioners filed, a 'Petition for Certiorari,' in the Court of Appeals,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated April 28, 1997, against the
respondents for the nullification of the aforesaid Orders of the Respondent
Court, dated November 26, 1996 and February 21, 1997, in Civil Case
No. 1671, granting private respondent's 'Motion for
Reconsideration' respectively, which Petition was entitled 'Concepcion v.
Amagan, et al., versus Regional Trial Court, et al., CA-G.R. [SP No.
43611].' This Court issued a Resolution granting petitioners' plea for a
temporary restraining order which expired on June 25, 1997.
"On July 7, 1997, the private respondent filed, with the Respondent Court,
in Civil Case No. 1671 (TG), an 'Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion to Direct
Sheriff To Make a Report And/Or Implement Writ of Execution and
Declare the Case Submitted for Decision' with the parties submitting to the
Respondent Court their respective 'Memorandum on Appeal.' The next
day, July 18, 1997, this Court promulgated, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], a
Decision in favor of the petitioners and against the respondents therein the
decretal portion of which reads as follows:
'WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated February 21,
1997, allowing execution pending appeal is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.'
On July 11, 1997, the Respondent Court issued an Order granting private
respondent's Omnibus Motion,' supra. The private respondent likewise
filed a Petition for Review'with the Supreme Court, from the Decision of
this Court in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611] and its Resolution denying private
respondent's 'Motion for Reconsideration' but the Supreme Court, per its
Resolution dated November 12, 1997, issued a Resolution denying private
respondents['] 'Petition for Review.' The Resolution of the Supreme Court
became final and executory.
"On December 12, 1997, the private respondent filed with the Respondent
Court, in Civil Case No. TG-1671, a 'Manifestation and Ex-Parte
Motion' praying that the Respondent Court resolve the case and
promulgate its Decision on the merits. However, the petitioners filed an
Opposition to private respondent's motion, contending that the
proceedings before the Respondent Court, in Civil Case No. 1671
(TG), be suspended pending decision, on the merits, of the Regional Trial
Court, in Civil Case No. 1682 (Quieting of Title, Reconveyance with
Damages). On April 3, 1998, the Respondent Court issued its Order
granting private respondent's motion, declaring that the Court, under its
Decision, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], merely nullified its Order granting
execution pending appeal but did not enjoin the Respondent Court from
hearing and resolving Civil Case No. 16[7]1 on the merits. The petitioners
filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of the aforesaid Order of the
Respondent Court but the latter issued an Order dated December 14,
1998 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, in this language:
'Anent the Motion for Reconsideration, movants anchored
their arguments that this Court should restrain itself from
further proceeding with the appealed case because of the
decision, resolution of the Court of Appeals, and resolution of
the Supreme Court. It is worthy to note that [what] was
brought up with the higher Courts was the Order of the Court
allowing the execution pending appeal, the said Order was
reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals[;] however,
there was no permanent injunction that has been issued for
this Court to stop from further proceeding with the case. The
said motion is, therefore, DENIED for lack of merit.'"
The facts of this case may be simply summarized as follows. The MCTC rendered a
Decision granting the ejectment suit filed by respondent against herein petitioners.
While an appeal was pending before the RTC, respondent filed a Motion for immediate
execution of the MCTC judgment, which was granted. However, the Court of
Appeals later reversed the RTC Order granting the execution pending appeal, a
[4]

reversal that was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, petitioners
also filed before the RTC a new action for quieting of title involving the same property.
Petitioners thence claimed that the proceedings in the ejectment appeal should be
suspended pending final judgment in the quieting of title case. The RTC ruled in the
negative.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In sustaining the RTC, the CA held in two short paragraphs that its earlier Decision in
CA-GR SP No. 43611 enjoined only the execution of the judgment pending appeal.
Without discussing petitioners' plea for an exception, it curtly applied the jurisprudential
principle that an action for quieting of title would not abate an ejectment suit.
Hence, this Petition. [5]

The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners submitted for the consideration of the Court the
following issues:
"I.......Whether or not the 8 July 1997 Decision and 23 September 1997
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43611 (Annex I), as
affirmed in toto by the Supreme Court, called off and restrained the
proceedings in this case;
II. Whether or not the dispositive portion of the Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43611 should be referred to its body and text.
III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals Decision having been based
on Vda. de Legaspi vs. Avendano x x x, is now final and executory as it
was upheld by the Supreme Court in toto.
IV. Whether or not Lao vs. Court of Appeals [x x x] is applicable to the
present case, and
V. Whether or not the Court of Appeals failed to consider and pass
judgment on the exceptional nature of the present case." [6]

In the main, the issue is whether the peculiar circumstances of this case justify the
suspension of the ejectment proceedings on appeal before the RTC, pending the
resolution of the action for quieting of title.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue: Suspension of the Ejectment Suit
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are designed to summarily
restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally
or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing
claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. It has been held that these
actions "are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the
law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession." In these
[7]

cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on
questions of ownership are provisional in nature.
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same
property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying
reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not
involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in
the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment
proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved." [8]

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil
action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao, wherein the Court declared:
"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as
distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to
recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion
and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant
inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal
possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain,
should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any
order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final
judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or
ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter
of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set
at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other
party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises
involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru
force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts." [9]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the mere existence of a judicial proceeding putting at
issue the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is not enough reason to justify an
exception to the general rule. In Salinas v. Navarro, the Court explained that "the
[10]

exception to the rule in x x x Vda. de Legaspi is based on strong reasons of equity not
found in the present petition. The right of the petitioners is not so seriously placed in
issue in the annulment case as to warrant a deviation, on equitable grounds, from the
imperative nature of the rule. In the Vda. de Legaspi case, execution of the decision in
the ejectment case would also have meant demolition of the premises, a factor not
present in this petition."
After a close reading of the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, however, we
hold that equitable considerations impel an exception to the general rule. In its earlier
July 8, 1997 Decision in CA-GR No. 43611-SP which has long become final, the Court
of Appeals, through Justice Artemio G. Toquero, arrived upon the following factual
findings which are binding on herein parties:
"Admittedly, petitioners who appealed the judgment in the ejectment case
did not file a supersedeas bond. Neither have they been depositing the
compensation for their use and occupation of the property in question as
determined by the trial court. Ordinarily, these circumstances would justify
an execution pending appeal. However, there are circumstances attendant
to this case which would render immediate execution injudicious and
inequitable.
"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for
unlawful detainer on the theory that petitioners possession of the property
in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand
letter dated April 13, 1996 (Annex D), petitioners categorically denied
having any agreement with him, verbal or written, asserting that they are
owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J. P. Rizal Street, San
Vicente, Silang, Cavite. In other words, it is not merely physical
possession but ownership as well that is involved in this case.
"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question,
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages
against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is
squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will
be determinative of who is entitled to the possession of the premises in
question.
"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful
detainer case will include the removal of the petitioners house [from] the
lot in question.
"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay enequitable, to allow
demolition of petitioner's house prior to the determination of the question
of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands. [11]

Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition
of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of
equity require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de
Legaspi, the respondent's suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And
most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a
matter that is likely to create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and
expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go
[12]

through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the
premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming
ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the
courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the
outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and
probably irreparable.
We should stress that respondent's claim to physical possession is based not on an
expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any
way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the
present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.
The Suspension of Proceedings Even During Appeal
One final point. In Vda. de Legaspi, the Court held that "if circumstances should so
require, the proceedings in the ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it
may be found." This statement is unequivocally clear; it includes even the appellate
stage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed
Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite
is DIRECTED to suspend further action in Civil Case No. 1671 until Civil Case No. 1682
is concluded. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

[1]
Penned by J. Romeo J. Callejo Sr. with the concurrence of JJ. Fermin A. Martin Jr., Division chairman; and
Mariano M. Umali, member.
[2]
CA Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 36.
[3]
Rollo, p. 38; also penned by J. Callejo and concurred in by JJ Umali and Bernardo P. Abesamis (who took the
place of J. Martin)
[4]
The Decision was written by J. Artemio G. Tuquero with the concurrence of JJ. Artemon D. Luna (chairman) and
Hector L. Hofilena (member)
[5]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on November 26, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of respondent's
Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Joselito A. Oliveros. Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Florante
C. Roxas, had been filed earlier on November 24, 1999.
[6]
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 7; rollo, p. 422.
[7]
Vda [de Legaspi v. Avendao, 79 SCRA 135, September 27, 1977, per Barredo, J.
[8]
Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 108, April 10, 1992, per Narvasa, CJ. In this case, the
Court also held:
"1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other
courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 (1966)) do not abate the latter; and neither do proceedings
on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 (1956), citing Pue et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81, (1950)).
2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza,
106 SCRA 187 (1981)).
3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal issue before the Regional Trial Court
does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue involved is
the material possession or possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa Sr. v. CA et al.; etc., 168 SCRA
518 (1988)).
4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit involving the same property
(Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 (1972)).
5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g., to compel renewal of a lease
contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 (1966); Pardo de Tavera v. Encarnacion, 22 SCRA 632 (1968);
Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 (1987); Commander Realty, Inc. v. CA, 161 SCRA 264 (1988)).
6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) does
not suspend an ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 (1975)).
7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits regarding
the same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 (1963); Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la
Cruz v. CA, 133 SCRA 520 (1984); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 (1987); Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412
(1987); Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. CA, 174 SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 (1989);
Guzman v. CA (annulment of sale and reconveyance), 177 SCRA 604 (1989); Demamay v. CA, 186 SCRA 608
(1990); Leopoldo Sy v. CA et al., (annulment of sale and reconveyance), GR No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions
respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro (annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to
declare the same an equitable mortgage), 126 SCRA 167 (1983); Ang Ping v. RTC (annulment of sale and title), 154
SCRA 153 (1987); Caparros v. CA (annulment of title), 170 SCRA 758 (1989); Dante v. Sison (annulment of sale
with damages), 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (annulment of document), 177 SCRA 288
(1989)"
[9]
Supra, p. 145.
[10]
126 SCRA 167, November 29, 1983, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
[11]
CA Decision in CA-GR SP No. 43611, p. 3; rollo, p. 90. Emphasis supplied.
[12]
In fact, according to private respondent (Memorandum, p. 19; rollo, p. 477), the "RTC had already rendered its
decision dated 7 April 1999 affirming in toto, the earlier judgment rendered by the (MCTC)in herein respondent's
favor."

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40437 September 27, 1977
LOURDES GUARDACASA VDA. DE LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO A. AVENDAÑO, as Presiding Judge of Biñan Br. I of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, HON. WENCESLAO E. HERCE, as Municipal Judge of San Pedro, Laguna,
ROGELIO S. MOLINA, as Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Laguna and JOSE O.
LEGASPI, respondents .
Castro, Makalintal, Mendoza, Gonzales & Associates for petitioner.
Jose M. Luison for private respondent.

BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the nullification and setting aside of the order of
dismissal and denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction dated
January 30, 1974 of respondent Judge Herminio A. Avendaño of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna in Civil Case No. 929 as well as all his subsequent orders confirmatory of or enforcing the
same, particularly, that of January 28, 1975 declaring his order of November 11, 1974 final and
executory, and the writ of execution and order of demolition issued by respondent Judge Wenceslao
E. Herce of the Municipal Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. 953 of said court, an action
for ejectment, and to enjoin enforcement of said orders by respondent sheriff, upon the main ground
that the issue of ownership between petitioner and private respondent over the property involved is
precisely being litigated in said Civil Case No. 929, an action for quieting of title.
On June 21, 1971, private respondent Jose O. Legaspi and Pilar O. Legaspi filed with the Municipal
Court of San Pedro, Laguna presided by respondent Judge Herce an action for forcible entry with
preliminary injunction against petitioner to recover a residential lot (Lot 17, Block 56, Poblacion "A",
Tunasan Homesite at A. Mabini Street of said municipality) on which the defendant had a building
with a dancing hall and bowling alleys therein, the plaintiffs being brother and sister and the
defendant claiming to be the widow of a brother of said plaintiffs. After said defendant had
unsuccessfully moved for the dismissal of said case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, since the
issue of ownership of the premises involved was being raised by her, she was declared in default for
having failed to file answer. Judgment was subsequently rendered against her, which became final,
and so a writ of execution and later an order of demolition were issued, whereupon, said defendant,
herein petitioner, instituted Civil Case No. 927, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February
12, 1972, a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the said proceedings. Petitioner succeeded
in securing a writ of preliminary injunction, which was however questioned by private respondent in
an appropriate special civil action in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01551.
In the meanwhile, on March 8, 1972, petitioner filed in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna
another action, Civil Case No. 929, for quieting of the title over the lot in issue, and as a preliminary
remedy therein, prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction likewise to suspend the
demolition ordered by the municipal court. The record is not clear as to whether petition in the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
01551 did actually involve both Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929. All that appears is that the prayer of
the petition read thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most prespecfully prayed of this
Honorable Court of Appeals:
(a) That upon the filing of this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with this
Honorable Court, and the posting by petitioner of a bond of P500.00 or in the amount
which this Court may fix, duly approved by this Court, A Writ of Preliminary Injunction
be forthwith issued against the respondent in this case, restraining them from
proceeding with the trial of the Petition of certiorari in Civil Case No. B-927 and of the
Complaint in Civil Case No. B-929, now pending before the respondent Court of First
Instance of Laguna, Branch I, on December 21 and 28, 1972 at 8:30 a.m. or at any
time or date thereafter until further orders from this Honorable Court;
(b) That after due hearing, judgment be rendered in the above-entitled case as
follows:
(1) Annulling and setting aside the orders of the respondent Judge in
Civil Case No. B-927 dated April 5, 1972 (Annex "GG") and August
21, 1972 (Annex "LL"), and dissolving the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued by the respondent Judge under the said order;
(2) Prohibiting the respondent Judge from entertaining, hearing and
deciding Civil Case No. B-927 for certiorari;
(3) Dismissing the petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. B-927 of the
respondent Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I;
(4) Making the Writ of Preliminary Injunction theretofore issued by this
Honorable Court final, permanent and perpetual;
(5) Ordering the private respondent to pay to the petitioner the costs
of this suit; and
(6) ( 6) Granting to the petitioner herein such other and further reliefs
which may be deemed just and equitable in the premises. (Pp. 5 to 6,
Record.)
In due course, and after having previously issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the lower
court from further proceeding with Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929, the Court of Appeals rendered the
following judgment on July 9, 1973 in said CA-G.R. No. 01551:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered —
1. Annulling and setting aside the order of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. B-927,
Annexes GG and LL, dated April 5, 1972, respectively, and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction issued pursuant to said orders;
2. Enjoining respondent Judge from hearing and deciding Civil Case No. B-927
which is hereby ordered dismissed;
3. Making the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case permanent; and
4. Ordering the private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Page 6, Record.)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied, hence she came to this Court on
October 1, 1973 for a review of the Court of Appeals decision, and on October 4, 1973, We issued
the following resolution:
L-37554 (Hon. Herminio A. Avendaño, etc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.). —
Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced
in the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Court Resolved to DENY the petition, without prejudice to petitioners' seeking
injunction in Civil Case No. B-929 for quieting of title to real property, pending in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I, in Biñan. (Page 7; Record.)
This resolution eventually became final.
It turned out that as early as July 14, 1973, petitioner had already virtually pressed for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 929 by filing a motion to that effect, apparently in
reiteration of her original prayer in the petition in said case of March 8, 1972. The proceedings
relative to said motion were overtaken by Our above resolution of October 8, 1973. But evently
misconstruing both Our resolution as well as the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondent judge
not only refused to grant petitioner's motion for a writ of preliminary injunction but even to proceed
with the trial on the merit of Civil Case No. 929, dismissing the same.
Upon this premises, We do not hesitate in holding that respondent judge acted precipitately and the
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders complained of. Considering the basic nature of the
controversy between petitioner and private respondent which simply is who between them has the
better right to the lot in question, the same being up to the present a public land with a standing
award apparently in favor of petitioner, but impugned by said respondent, it is quite clear that the
finality of the decision in the forcible entry case in the Municipal Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Civil
Case No. 953, is of very little consequence in the resolution of this case. It is elementary that matters
involving dominical rights are beyond the jurisdiction of municipal courts, except chartered cities,
hence the San Pedro court decision just mentioned may not be deemed to have in any manner
foreclosed the right of petitioner to retain possession of the subject lot so long as the appropriate
judicial action to determine petitioner's right thereto has not been finally terminated and the
corresponding writ of preliminary injunction has been issued.
On the other hand, the vehement claim of respondent's counsel that the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01551 setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of
First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case No. 927 settled the issue on dominical right between the
parties is farfetched and obviously nothing but a subjective rationalization. Nowhere in the appellate
court's opinion rendered in said case is any reference whatsoever made to the issue of ownership
raised by herein petitioner, much less is any mention at all made therein of Civil Case No. 929.
Rightly or wrongly, despite its having issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining proceedings in
both Civil Cases Nos. 927 and 929, in its whole opinion, the Court of Appeals made no validly
binding pronouncement as regards the propriety of the filing by herein petitioner of the action for
quieting title in Civil Case No. 929. The appellate court limited itself exclusively to the issue of
whether or not it was in order for the Court of First Instance of Laguna to restrain in Civil Case No.
927, which involved no more than a petition for certiorari against the inferior court premised on the
sole proposition that said court had acted improvidently in its Civil Case No. 953, the writ of
execution and order of demolition issued by said inferior court. And in so far as that particular point is
concerned, the Court of Appeals acted correctly, hence when its decision was brought to this Court
for review, We dismissed the petition, as may be seen in Our aforequoted resolution of October 4,
1973 .
As matters have developed, however, it is the import of this resolution of October 4, 1973 that has
become the bone of contention in the case at bar. Obviously induced and persuaded by the
arguments of counsel for herein private respondent, respondent judge has taken the position that the
said resolution may not be deemed as modifying that part of the dispositive portion of the decision of
the Court of Appeals "making the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case permanent." It is
claimed that since the preliminary injunction was in regard to the proceedings in both Civil Cases
Nos. 927 and 929 and the same was made permanent and that decision is already final, respondent
judge had no more authority relative to Civil Case No. 929 except to dismiss the same. Such is the
sense of His Honor's order of January 30, 1974. And in the subsequent order of November 11, 1974,
His Honor made the following observation:
The plaintiff's further claim that when the Supreme Court issued its resolution dated
October 4, 1973 wherein it denied the petition of the plaintiffs' "without prejudice to
petitioner" seeking injunction in Civil Case No. B-929 for quieting of title to real
property pending in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I, in Biñan' it had
intended to modify the decision of the Court of Appeals. There is no legal basis for
making such a conclusion considering that if the Honorable Supreme Court wanted
to allow this Court to continue hearing and deciding this case, it could have easily
lifted and/or dissolved the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals. (Page 137-A
Printed Petition.)
It is thus evident that respondent judge made no real effort to imbibe the thrust of Our resolution in
proper light. Indeed, were We not convinced that His Honor may have acted in good faith, We could
consider his action on said resolution a deliberate misreading thereof warranting administrative
sanction against him from this Court. In effect, to say that We could have worded Our resolution
differently had We intended to modify the decision of the Court of Appeals is to suggest that this
Court was not aware of the peculiar circumstances on which its resolution is premised. The fact is
that We well understood them. As already pointed out above, We did take note of the fact that the
appellate court decision did not pass on any issue related to Civil Case No. 929 and could not,
therefore, have validly meant to make permanent its preliminary injunction referring thereto. That
petitioner had specifically invited in its motion for reconsideration attention to such an omission about
that case but the court denied said motion in a minute resolution did not impart to the court's
decision the legal significance respondents allege they see in it. Much less did it produce the
substantial effect of a resolution on the merits of petitioner's cause in Civil Case No. 929.
As a matter of fact, the reason why We inserted in Our resolution the reservation about Civil case no.
929 was precisely Our view that it is appropriate remedy open to petitioner to counteract the result of
the forcible entry case. Contrary to the observation of respondent judge, We did not have to spell out
this point in black and white. It should have been obvious to all concerned, assuming requisite
objectivity and the adequate knowledge of the law on their part, particularly His Honor. Respondent
judge should have known that in situation similar to those obtaining in the instant case, and
whenever the special circumstances obtaining permit it, for the sake of expediency and to save time
in indicating what should be done, the Supreme Court may dismiss petitions filed to correct errors of
lower court's, but without prejudice to such directives and instructions to the private and/or public
respondents delineating the proper course that should be pursued in the premises, almost as if the
petition has been found meritorious, and all courts and parties are expected to act accordingly. to
give due course to petitioners, particularly those involving procedural matter, and thereby be
required for further pleadings from the parties and hearing the case, from the indubitable facts
already before it, the matter in issue is already clear and can be readily resolved, is a procedure not
really consistent with the speedy administration of justice and may even be detrimental to it.
Accordingly, the Court has for sometime now resorted to the practice of merely indicating what
should be done, without having to give due course to petitions for review or in special civil actions,
thereby lessening its burden and at the same time disposing of procedural matters with utmost
deliberate dispatch.
Now, coming to the basic procedural issue before Us in the instant case, which is, whether or not the
final judgment in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 953 of the San Pedro court, should be fully
executed before the final termination of the action for quieting of title, Civil Case No. 929 in the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, it is Our considered opinion that it is at least a matter of equity that
petitioner's physical possession of the premises in controversy should not be disturbed in the
meanwhile. Actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are intended to avoid dirsuption of public
order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right
possession. In other words, the special civil action under Rule 70 has been designe to summarily
restore possession of land or building to one who has been forcibly deprived thereof, without
prejudice to the settlement of the opposing claims of the parties to legal possession in the
corresponding appropriate. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished
from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in
issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion
and disturbance physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the
Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownerhsip or not, is brought to
restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision
in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case
involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a
matter of public policy the right to physical possession or ownerhisp. It is only where there has been
forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately
set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately
be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to
recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the court.
In the instant case, the record before Us seems to indicate that notwithstanding that private
respondent denominated his complaint in Civil Case No. 953 as one of forcible entry, the actual
situation at the time the said complaint was filed was that petitioner had been in possession thereof
for sometime already, even more than one year. In other words, petitioner is actually the prior
possession as between her and private respondent. Accordingly, the true nature of the action from
which the whole controversy in this case originated is, to view it in the light most favorable to
respondents, that of possible unlawful detainer. It results, therefore, that pursuant to the above
pronouncement, petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 929 was in order. And
in this connection, it may be added that it was not really Our intention in the resolution of October 4,
1973 to direct respondent judge therein to issue the writ outright. By said resolution, all that We
meant was for petitioner to file the corresponding motion for preliminary injunction with the trial court
and for that court to grant or deny the same, after hearing both parties, as the facts shown to it by
them might warrant, with the understanding naturally that in determining the propriety of its action,
the court should not be bound by what the inferior court in the ejectment case might have already
done or is doing. Indeed, We contemplated in said resolution, that if circumstances should so
require, the proceedings in the ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found, in which event, the rentals due or whatever income might be derived from the premises owing
to whoever may ultimately be declared rightfully entitled to possession, should be ordered deposited
with the inferior court until the main case before it is finally terminated. To this end, all that is needed
is for the party concerned to include the prayer to that effect in the petition for preliminary injunction
which may be acted upon by the Court of Firs Instance without requiring joinder of the inferior court,
albeit notice of the petition and the subsequent developments should be given to it.
Incidentally, it may be stated that the same procedure as that just discussed should be observed
whenever two different parties are contesting between themselves the right to receive rentals or the
income from the occupants of the same premises, who are not claiming any right adverse thereto,
are already litigating in court in an appropriate proceeding their respective claims, even if a proper
special civil action of interpleader under Rule 63 has not been filed, considering, that in such an
eventually, the pending action between the adverse claimants would already serve the purposes of
such interpleading. Of course, no such interpleader may be filed in an inferior court, because of its
limited jurisdiction, hence the inferior court in which any unlawful detainer suit is filed by any of the
adverse claimants against the occupants of the premises concerned must have to await and make
all its actuations subordinate to the developments in and the disposition of the main case in the
Court of First Instance.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, all the impugned orders of respondent Judge Avendaño are
hereby nullified and set aside, with the consequence that Civil Case No. 929 of the Court of Firs
Instance of Laguna may now take its regular course for its decision on the merits, and respondent
Judge Herce and the sheriff, Rogelio S. Medina, or whoever is acting in his stead, are ordered to
suspend the enforcement and implementation of the writ of execution and order of demolition issued
in Civil Case No. 953 until after the final termination of Civil Case No. 929, when proper action may
be taken consonant with the result of said case. Costs against private respondent.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

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