1
G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957
SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE
CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.
Magno T. Bueser for appellant.
Alver Law Offices and Edon B. Brion and
Vencedor A. Alimario for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was
accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and
Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No.
15001). During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as
mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina,
reserved her right to bring a separate civil action
for damages against the accused. After trial,
Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime
charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals
affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only
(15) years old when he committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed
the present action against Delfin Capuno and his
son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the
aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of
her son Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the
defense that if any one should be held liable for
the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante
Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the
time of the accident, the former was not under
the control, supervision and custody, of the latter.
This defense was sustained by the lower court
and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante
Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the
complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to
us on the ground that the appeal only involves
questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of
the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the
Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio
in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949
he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in
said city upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. From the school Dante, with other
students, boarded a jeep and when the same
started to run, he took hold of the wheel and
drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They
have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle
and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and
Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It
further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of
Dante, was not with his son at the time of the
accident, nor did he know that his son was going
to attend a parade. He only came to know it
when his son told him after the accident that he
attended the parade upon instruction of his
teacher.
The only issue involved in this appeal is whether
defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly
liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for
damages resulting from the death of Isidoro
Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor
Dante Capuno.
The case comes under Article 1903 of the
Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which
provides:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the
next preceding articles is enforceable not
only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children
who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damages caused
by their pupils or apprentices while they
are under their custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is
liable for the damages in question jointly and
severally with his son Dante because at the time
the latter committed the negligent act which
resulted in the death of the victim, he was a
minor and was then living with his father, and
inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the
civil liability of the father is evident. And so,
plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in
relieving the father from liability.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under
the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they
are under their custody", but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and
not to any academic educational institution
(Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See
12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante capuno
was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary
School and as part of his extra-curricular activity,
he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal
upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
And it was in connection with that parade that
Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and
while driving it, the accident occurred. In the
circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of
that school, nor the city school's supervisor,
could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante
because he was not then a student of an institute
of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the
father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by
the minor children who live with them, is obvious.
This is necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them
and instructing them in proportion to their
means", while, on the other hand, gives them the
"right to correct and punish them in moderation"
(Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The
only way by which they can relieve themselves of
this liability is if they prove that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph,
Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to
prove.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
modified in the sense that defendants Delfin
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Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as
damages, and the costs of action.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador and Endencia,
JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-14342 May 30, 1960
CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL
QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL., respondents.
Abad Santos and Pablo for petitioner.
Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for
respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the Court
of Appeals, which condemned petitioner to pay
P2,000 as moral damages and P50 for medical
expenses, for a physical injury caused by the son
of petitioner, Augusto Mercado, on a classmate,
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., both pupils of the
Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City.
The case had originated in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan,
presiding, which dismissed the complaint filed by
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and his father against
petitioner, father of the above-mentioned
Mercado. The facts found by the Court of Appeals
are as follows:
Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana
Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while
Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-
appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado
were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic
School on Kanlaon, Quezon City. A
"pitogo", which figures prominently in this
case, may be described as an empty
nutshell used by children as a piggy bank.
On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado
and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled
over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto
wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek
with a piece of razor.
xxx xxx xxx
The facts of record clearly show that it
was Augusto Mercado who started the
aggression. Undeniably, the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent
it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn
Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi.
Renato was not aware that the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto, because right after
Benedicto gave it to him, Benedicto ran
away to get a basket ball with which they
could play. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was
likewise unaware that the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto. He thought it was
the "pitogo" of Benedicto P. Lim, so that
when Augusto attempted to get the
"pitogo" from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him
not to do so because Renato was better at
putting the chain into the holes of the
"pitogo". However, Augusto resented
Manuel, Jr.'s remark and he aggresively
pushed the latter. The fight started then.
After Augusto gave successive blows to
Manuel, Jr., and the latter was clutching
his stomach which bore the brunt of
Augusto's anger, Augusto seeing that
Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut
him on the right check with a piece of
razor.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the doctor who treated Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr., Antonio B. Past, testified
for plaintiffs-appellants, he did not declare
as to the amount of fees he collected from
plaintiff-appellants for the treatment of
Manuel, Jr. the child was not even
hospitalized for the wound. We believe
that the sum of P50.00 is a fair
approximation of the medical expenses
incurred by plaintiffs-appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
The damages specified in paragraphs C
and D of the aforequoted portion of
plaintiffs-appellant's complaint come
under the class of moral damages. The
evidence of record shows that the child
suffered moral damages by reason of the
wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado.
Though such kind of damages cannot be
fully appreciated in terms of money, we
believe that the sum of P2,000.00 would
fully compensate the child.
As second cause of action, plaintiffs-
appellants pray for P5,000.00 covering the
moral damages they allegedly suffered
due to their son's being wounded; and the
sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. The
facts of record do not warrant the granting
of moral damages to plaintiffs-appellants
Manuel Quisumbing and Ana Pineda. "In
law mental anguish is restricted, as a rule,
to such mental pain or suffering as arises
from an injury or wrong to the person
himself, as distinguished from that form of
mental suffering which is the
accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for
another's suffering of which arises from a
contemplation of wrong committed on the
person of another. Pursuant to the rule
stated, a husband or wife cannot recover
for mental suffering caused by his or her
sympathy for the other's suffering. Nor
can a parent recover for mental distress
and anxiety on account of physical injury
sustained by a child or for anxiety for the
safety of his child placed in peril by the
negligence of another." (15 Am. Jur. 597).
Plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to
attorney's fees, it not appearing that
defendant-appellee had wantonly
disregarded their claim for damages.
In the first, second and third assignments of
error, counsel for petitioner argues that since the
incident of the inflicting of the wound on
respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during
recess time), through no fault of the father,
petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the
school should be held responsible instead of the
latter. This precise question was brought before
this Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno,
101 Phil., 843, but we held, through Mr. Justice
Bautista:
We find merit in this claim. It is true that
under the law above-quoted, "teachers or
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directors of arts and trades are liable for
any damage caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their
custody", but this provision only applies to
an institution of arts and trades and not to
any academic educational institution
(Padilla, Civil Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p.
841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)
The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that
the school where his son was studying should be
made liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody," contemplates a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In these circumstances the control or
influence over the conduct and actions of the
pupil would pass from the father and mother to
the teacher; and so would the responsibility for
the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not
appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go
to school during school hours and go back to
their homes with their parents after school is
over. The situation contemplated in the last
paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor
does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes
father or mother responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children. The claim of
petitioner that responsibility should pass to the
school must, therefore, be held to be without
merit.
We next come to the claim of petitioner that the
moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive. We
note that the wound caused to respondent was
inflicted in the course of an ordinary or common
fight between boys in a grade school. The Court
of Appeals fixed the medical expenses incurred in
treating and curing the wound at P50. Said court
stated that the wound did not even require
hospitalization. Neither was Mercado found guilty
of any offense nor the scar in Quisumbing's face
pronounced to have caused a deformity, unlike
the case of Araneta, et al. vs. Arreglado, et al.,
104 Phil., 529; 55 Off. Gaz. (9) 1561. Petitioner's
counsel argues that if death call for P3,000 to
P6,000, certainly the incised wound could cause
mental pain and suffering to the tune of P2,000.
In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court
pronounces that the child Quisumbing suffered
moral damages "by reason of the wound inflicted
by Augusto Mercado." While moral damages
included physical suffering, which must have
been caused to the wounded boy Quisumbing
(Art. 2217, Civil Code), the decision of the court
below does not declare that any of the cases
specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
which moral damages may be recovered, has
attended or occasioned the physical injury. The
only possible circumstance in the case at bar in
which moral damages are recoverable would be if
a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been
committed.
It does not appear that a criminal action for
physical injuries was ever presented. The
offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years old
and it does not appear that he had acted with
discernment when he inflicted the physical
injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have
considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or
guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries,
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
2219. Even if we assume that said court
considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when
it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts
found by said court indicate that Augusto's
resentment, which motivated the assault, was
occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried
to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of
Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." This is,
according to the decision appealed from, the
reason why Mercado was incensed and pushed
Quisumbing who, in turn, also pushed Mercado. It
is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause
of the injury caused to Quisumbing was
Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having
interfered with Mercado while trying to get the
pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the
Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases
mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
which authorizes the grant of moral damages,
was shown to have existed. Consequently, the
grant of moral damages is not justified.
For the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and the
petitioner is declared exempt or free from the
payment of moral damages. The award of P50 for
medical expenses, however, is hereby affirmed.
Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Barrera, and
Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo and Concepcion, JJ., concur in the
result.
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P.
PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V.
VALENTON, owner and President,
respectively, of a school of arts and trades,
known under the name and style of "Manila
Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L.
DAFFON and SANTIAGO M.
QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .
Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .
Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee
Daffon. .
TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of
law from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila. .
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-
year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in
automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical
Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on
May 19, 1966, the action below for damages
arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of their
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son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant
Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the
said Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are:
"(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the
time when the incident which gave rise to his
action occurred was a member of the Board of
Directors of the institute;1 the defendant Teodosio
Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant
Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to
which the deceased belonged; and the defendant
Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the
deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical
Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately on
August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs'
son were thus narrated by the trial court: "(T)he
deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant
Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the
afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and
three o'clock, they, together with another
classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory
room located on the ground floor. At that time the
classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio
L. Daffon were working on a machine while
Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at
them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that
Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this
remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the
face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong
flat blow on the face, which was followed by
other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated
apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon
followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which
caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc
became pale and fainted. First aid was
administered to him but he was not revived, so
he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never
regained consciousness; finally he died. The
foregoing is the substance of the testimony of
Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident."
The trial court expressly gave credence to this
version of the incident, as testified to by the lone
eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the
protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness
who "has no motive or reason to testify one way
or another in favor of any party" and rejected the
self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon
denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on
the deceased. .
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo
Singian of the Manila Police Department who
performed the autopsy re "Cause of death: shock
due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th,
left, contusion of the pancreas and stomach with
intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight subarachnoid
hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that
these internal injuries of the deceased were
caused "probably by strong fist blows," the trial
court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.3 It
held that "(T)he act, therefore, of the accused
Daffon in giving the deceased strong fistblows in
the stomach which ruptured his internal organs
and caused his death falls within the purview of
this article of the Code."4
The trial court, however, absolved from liability
the three other defendants-officials of the Manila
Technical Institute, in this wise:
... Their liabilities are based on the
provisions of Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 2180. ... .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students and
apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
In the opinion of the Court, this article of the
Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since
this contemplates the situation where the
control or influence of the teachers and heads
of school establishments over the conduct and
actions by the pupil supersedes those of the
parents.
CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL
CODE CONSTRUED: — The clause "so long as
they remain in their custody" contained in
Article 2180 of the new civil code
contemplated a situation where the pupil lives
and boards with the teacher, such that the
control or influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents. In those circumstances
the control or influence over the conduct and
actions of the pupil as well as the
responsibilities for their sort would pass from
the father and mother to the teachers. (Ciriaco
L. Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals,
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents,
G.R. No. L-14862, May 30, 1960).5
There is no evidence that the accused Daffon
lived and boarded with his teacher or the
other defendant officials of the school. These
defendants cannot therefore be made
responsible for the tort of the defendant
Daffon.
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial
court as follows:
1. Sentencing the defendant
Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the
plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased
Dominador Palisoc (a) P6,000.00
for the death of Dominador Palisoc;
(b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c)
P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d)
P10,000.00 for loss of earning
power, considering that the
deceased was only between
sixteen and seventeen years, and
in good health when he died, and
(e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee,
plus the costs of this action. .
2. Absolving the other
defendants. .
3. Dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit.
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal
question that under the factual findings of the
trial court, which are now beyond review, the trial
court erred in absolving the defendants-school
officials instead of holding them jointly and
severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant
Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a
result of their son's death. The Court finds the
appeal, in the main, to be meritorious. .
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school
officials on the ground that the provisions of
Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold
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"teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades ... liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students and apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody," are not applicable
to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence
that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal
fistblows]6 lived and boarded with his teacher or
the other defendants-officials of the school.
These defendants cannot therefore be made
responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion
expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs.
Court of Appeals,7 that "(I)t would seem that the
clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives
and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from
the father and mother to the teacher; and so
would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
Such a situation does not appear in the case at
bar; the pupils appear to go to school during
school hours and go back to their homes with
their parents after school is over." This dictum
had been made in rejecting therein petitioner
father's contention that his minor son's school,
Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City
[which was not a party to the case] should be
held responsible, rather than him as father, for
the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged
against him for the physical injury inflicted by his
son on a classmate. [A cut on the right cheek
with a piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by
way of medical expenses to treat and cure, since
the wound left no scar.] The moral damages
award was after all set aside by the Court on the
ground that none of the specific cases provided
in Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding moral
damages had been established, petitioner's son
being only nine years old and not having been
shown to have "acted with discernment" in
inflicting the injuries on his classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on
another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs.
Capuno,8 where the only issue involved as
expressly stated in the decision, was whether the
therein defendant-father could be civilly liable for
damages resulting from a death caused in a
motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and
negligently by his minor son, (which issue was
resolved adversely against the father).
Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that
"It is true that under the law abovequoted,
teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable
for any damage caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody,
but this provision only applies to an institution of
arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution" was expressly cited and
quoted in Mercado. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against
the school officials and squarely raises the issue
of liability of teachers and heads of schools under
Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by
their pupils and students against fellow students
on the school premises. Here, the parents of the
student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not
involved, since Daffon was already of age at the
time of the tragic incident. There is no question,
either, that the school involved is a non-
academic school,9 the Manila Technical Institute
being admittedly a technical vocational and
industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal article,
defendants head and teacher of the Manila
Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and
Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and
severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for
the death of the latter's minor son at the hands
of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory
room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes
as a mere member of the school's board of
directors. The school itself cannot be held
similarly liable, since it has not been properly
impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs
sought to so implead it, by impleading improperly
defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor,
the lower court found that it had been
incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore
the school itself, as thus incorporated, should
have been brought in as party defendant.
Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that
Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to
plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly
manifested and made of record that "defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered
owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute"
which is now a corporation and is not owned by
any individual person."10
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads
and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils
and students, so long as they remain in their
custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as
to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and
are called upon to "exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child." 11 This
is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and
352 of the Civil Code.12 In the law of torts, the
governing principle is that the protective custody
of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it
becomes their obligation as well as that of the
school itself to provide proper supervision of the
students' activities during the whole time that
they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their
custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that
some student themselves may inflict willfully or
through negligence on their fellow students. .
4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the
basis of the presumption of negligence of Art.
1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that
the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority" 13 and
"where the parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and
not the parent, should be the one answerable for
the torts committed while under his custody, for
the very reason that the parent is not supposed
to interfere with the discipline of the school nor
with the authority and supervision of the teacher
while the child is under instruction." The school
itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or
negligence of its school head and teachers under
the same cited article.14
 6
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in
absolving defendants-school officials on the
ground that they could be held liable under
Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who
inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and
victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the
other defendants officials of the school." As
stated above, the phrase used in the cited article
— "so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time. There is nothing in
the law that requires that for such liability to
attach the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the
dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which
it relied, must now be deemed to have been set
aside by the present decision. .
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as
president and teacher-in-charge of the school
must therefore be held jointly and severally liable
for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon
in the latter's having caused the death of his
classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The
unfortunate death resulting from the fight
between the protagonists-students could have
been avoided, had said defendants but complied
with their duty of providing adequate supervision
over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm,
whether at the hands of fellow students or other
parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable
unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in
compliance with the last paragraph of Article
2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage." In the light of the
factual findings of the lower court's decision, said
defendants failed to prove such exemption from
liability. .
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award
of P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their
son should be increased to P12,000.00 as set by
the Court in People vs. Pantoja,15 and observed in
all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken.
The Court, in Pantoja, after noting the decline in
the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had
expressed its "considered opinion that the
amount of award of compensatory damages for
death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should
now be P12,000.00." The Court thereby adjusted
the minimum amount of "compensatory damages
for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as
per Article 2206, Civil Code, from the old stated
minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which
amount is to be awarded "even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances" pursuant to
the express provisions of said codal article. .
8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal
that the lower court should have awarded
exemplary damages and imposed legal interest
on the total damages awarded, besides
increasing the award of attorney's fees all
concern matters that are left by law to the
discretion of the trial court and the Court has not
been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of
such discretion on the part of the trial
court.16 Decisive here is the touchstone provision
of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross
negligence on the part of defendants was found
by the trial court to warrant the imposition of
exemplary damages, as well as of interest and
increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not
been shown in this appeal any compelling reason
to disturb such finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is
modified so as to provide as follows: .
1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L.
Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M.
Quibulue jointly and severallyto pay plaintiffs as
heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a)
P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc;
(b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory
expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d)
P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e)
P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this
action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA,
JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA
PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A.
AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE
A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A.
AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO
DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH
SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON,
ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru
his parents and natural guardians, MR. and
MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO
VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO
ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora
was looking forward to the commencement
exercises where he would ascend the stage and
in the presence of his relatives and friends
receive his high school diploma. These
ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As
it turned out, though, fate would intervene and
deny him that awaited experience. On April 13,
1972, while they were in the auditorium of their
school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that
mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations
and his life as well. The victim was only
seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos,
its rector the high school principal, the dean of
boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their
 7
respective parents. The complaint against the
students was later dropped. After trial, the Court
of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining
defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P294,984.00, representing death compensation,
loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation,
funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees .3 On appeal to the
respondent court, however, the decision was
reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved .4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, the respondent court found that Article
2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and
trades but an academic institution of learning. It
also held that the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident
as the semester had already ended, that there
was no clear identification of the fatal gun and
that in any event the defendant, had exercised
the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo
Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April
13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to
death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the
implications and consequences of these facts,
the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the
school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private
respondents. The private respondents submit
that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only
for the purpose of submitting his physics report
and that he was no longer in their custody
because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the
gun used which the petitioners consider
important because of an earlier incident which
they claim underscores the negligence of the
school and at least one of the private
respondents. It is not denied by the respondents
that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the
dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an
unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him
without making a report to the principal or taking
any further action .6 As Gumban was one of the
companions of Daffon when the latter fired the
gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend
that this was the same pistol that had been
confiscated from Gumban and that their son
would not have been killed if it had not been
returned by Damaso. The respondents say,
however, that there is no proof that the gun was
the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend
on the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it
happens, is invoked by both parties in support of
their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of
this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the
Court in connection with the above-quoted
provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v.
Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v.
9
Brillantes. These will be briefly reviewed in this
opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of
the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy
Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After
the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its
wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned
turtle, resulting in the death of two of its
passengers. Dante was found guilty of double
homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action flied against them, his father
was held solidarily liable with him in damages
under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil
Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old
boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice
Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the
school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party
to the case) on the ground that it was riot a
school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes
concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the
school authorities who should be held liable
Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on
(1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools
of arts and trades in particular. The modifying
clause "of establishments of arts and trades"
should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and
with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate
with a razor blade during recess time at the
Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the
parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for
damages. Through Justice Labrador, the Court
declared in another obiter (as the school itself
had also not been sued that the school was not
liable because it was not an establishment of arts
and trades. Moreover, the custody requirement
had not been proved as this "contemplates a
situation where the student lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influences on the pupil supersede those of the
parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but
the other members of the court concurred in this
decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4,
1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a
classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the
Manila Technical Institute. Although the
wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not
boarding in the school, the head thereof and the
teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with
him. The Court declared through Justice
Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as
(the students) remain in their custody" — means
the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over
the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.
There is nothing in the law that requires that for
such liability to attach, the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in
the school, as erroneously held by the lower
court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in
Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed
to have been set aside by the present decision.
 8
This decision was concurred in by five other
members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion,
that even students already of age were covered
by the provision since they were equally in the
custody of the school and subject to its discipline.
Dissenting with three others,11 Justice Makalintal
was for retaining the custody interpretation in
Mercado and submitted that the rule should
apply only to torts committed by students not yet
of age as the school would be acting only in loco
parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed
with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case
but added that "since the school involved at bar
is a non-academic school, the question as to the
applicability of the cited codal provision to
academic institutions will have to await another
case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded
and is sought to be held liable under Article
2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of
arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning. The parties herein have also directly
raised the question of whether or not Article 2180
covers even establishments which are technically
not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when
the offending student is supposed to be "in its
custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem,
the Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general rule.
In the case of establishments of arts and trades,
it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be
held liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable
for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is
the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis"teachers" should apply to the words
"pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting
opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art.
1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts
and trades and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there between them
insofar as concerns the proper supervision and
vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously
contended that an academic teacher is
exempt from the duty of watching that his
pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of
third Persons, so long as they are in a position
to exercise authority and Supervision over the
pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades"
used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the
words "arts and trades" does not qualify
"teachers" but only "heads of establishments."
The phrase is only an updated version of the
equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos"
used in the Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis
of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903
in some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred
in the exercise of their authority, it would
seem clear that where the parent places the
child under the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts committed
while under his custody, for the very
reason/that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor
with the authority and supervision of the
teacher while the child is under instruction.
And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between
the academic and the non-academic schools
insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from
the teacher over the students under his control
and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching. The suggestion in
the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the
provision would make the teacher or even the
head of the school of arts and trades liable for an
injury caused by any student in its custody but if
that same tort were committed in an academic
school, no liability would attach to the teacher or
the school head. All other circumstances being
the same, the teacher or the head of the
academic school would be absolved whereas the
teacher and the head of the non-academic school
would be held liable, and simply because the
latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of
vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their
respective schools. There does not seem to be
any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance
simply because the school is academic in nature
and for increasing such vigilance where the
school is non-academic. Notably, the injury
subject of liability is caused by the student and
not by the school itself nor is it a result of the
operations of the school or its equipment. The
injury contemplated may be caused by any
student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be
able to excuse himself by simply showing that he
is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the
school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the
teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it the head of the school only
who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades? And in the case of the
academic or non- technical school, why not apply
the rule also to the head thereof instead of
imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the
fact that historically the head of the school of
arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over
his pupils than the head of the academic school.
 9
The old schools of arts and trades were engaged
in the training of artisans apprenticed to their
master who personally and directly instructed
them on the technique and secrets of their craft.
The head of the school of arts and trades was
such a master and so was personally involved in
the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By
contrast, the head of the academic school was
not as involved with his students and exercised
only administrative duties over the teachers who
were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had
then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with
the students. Consequently, while he could not
be directly faulted for the acts of the students,
the head of the school of arts and trades,
because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer
obtains at present in view of the expansion of the
schools of arts and trades, the consequent
increase in their enrollment, and the
corresponding diminution of the direct and
personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains
unchanged. In its present state, the provision
must be interpreted by the Court according to its
clear and original mandate until the legislature,
taking into account the charges in the situation
subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the
necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of
the responsibility of the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades over the students. Is
such responsibility co-extensive with the period
when the student is actually undergoing studies
during the school term, as contended by the
respondents and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under
examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does
not mean that the student must be boarding with
the school authorities, it does signify that the
student should be within the control and under
the influence of the school authorities at the time
of the occurrence of the injury. This does not
necessarily mean that such, custody be co-
terminous with the semester, beginning with the
start of classes and ending upon the close
thereof, and excluding the time before or after
such period, such as the period of registration,
and in the case of graduating students, the
period before the commencement exercises. In
the view of the Court, the student is in the
custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has
not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes
under the discipline of the school only upon the
start of classes notwithstanding that before that
day he has already registered and thus placed
himself under its rules. Neither should such
discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of
classes notwithstanding that there may still be
certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of
the course, such as submission of reports, term
papers, clearances and the like. During such
periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot
consider himself released altogether from
observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in
the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in
the campus in the company of his classmates
and friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the
teacher-in-charge who must answer for his
students' torts, in practically the same way that
the parents are responsible for the child when he
is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the
one designated by the dean, principal, or other
administrative superior to exercise supervision
over the pupils in the specific classes or sections
to which they are assigned. It is not necessary
that at the time of the injury, the teacher be
physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in
him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the
injuries caused by the student, the teacher and
not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort
was committed within the premises of the school
at any time when its authority could be validly
exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability
imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly
on the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades and not on the school itself. If at all,
the school, whatever its nature, may be held to
answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the
head thereof under the general principle
of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate
itself from liability by proof that it had exercised
the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the
defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the
liability imposed by Article 2180, which also
states that:
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the
Persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to
prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the
teacher will be held liable not only when he is
acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority
age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if
 10
his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student
under him regardless of the student's age. Thus,
in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the
teacher and the head of the technical school
although the wrongdoer was already of age. In
this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions
expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting
opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly
exposed to liability under this article in view of
the increasing activism among the students that
is likely to cause violence and resulting injuries in
the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be
sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that,
under the present ruling, it is not the school that
will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense
of due diligence is available to it in case it is
sought to be held answerable as principal for the
acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its
employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper
measures in selecting the head or its teachers
and the appropriate supervision over them in the
custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to
its rules and regulations for the maintenance of
discipline among them. In almost all cases now,
in fact, these measures are effected through the
assistance of an adequate security force to help
the teacher physically enforce those rules upon
the students. Ms should bolster the claim of the
school that it has taken adequate steps to
prevent any injury that may be committed by its
students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this
defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold
him directly answerable for the damage caused
by his students as long as they are in the school
premises and presumably under his influence. In
this respect, the Court is disposed not to expect
from the teacher the same measure of
responsibility imposed on the parent for their
influence over the child is not equal in degree.
Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience
from the child because the latter's dependence
on him is greater than on the teacher. It need not
be stressed that such dependence includes the
child's support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teacher's influence, besides
being coterminous with the period of custody is
usually enforced only because of the students'
desire to pass the course. The parent can instill
more las discipline on the child than the teacher
and so should be held to a greater accountability
than the teacher for the tort committed by the
child.
And if it is also considered that under the article
in question, the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades is responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice even if he is
already of age — and therefore less tractable
than the minor — then there should all the more
be justification to require from the school
authorities less accountability as long as they can
prove reasonable diligence in preventing the
injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer
liable for the student's acts because he has
reached majority age and so is no longer under
the former's control, there is then all the more
reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's
responsibility for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court
has arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot,
he was still in the custody of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding
that the fourth year classes had formally ended.
It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or
merely to submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere
savoring of the company of his friends in the
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose
that would have also brought him in the custody
of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the
dean of boys cannot be held liable because none
of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising only a
general authority over the student body and not
the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or
sections and thus immediately involved in its
discipline. The evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the
offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not
necessarily make the physics teacher,
respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-
in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-
observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him
because he was not supposed or required to
report to school on that day. And while it is true
that the offending student was still in the custody
of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed,
it has not been established that it was caused by
his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the
student. On the contrary, the private respondents
have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school
regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is
probably the dean of boys who should be held
liable especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and
returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily
link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not
been shown that he confiscated and returned
pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable
under the article because only the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
 11
answer for the tort committed by any of the other
private respondents for none of them has been
found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such
custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as
disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by
Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted
in the latter's death at the auditorium of the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972.
While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners
over the loss of their son under the tragic
circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they
seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they
have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernan, Padilla and Teehankee, C.J., JJ, took no
part.
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.
PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO and LT. M.
SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA
ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial
Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and
ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
Balgos and Perez for petitioners.
Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private
respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which
caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
second-floor premises of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the
parents of the deceased to file suit in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47)
presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals
justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages
against the said PSBA and its corporate officers.
At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in
the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It
was established that his assailants were not
members of the school's academic community
but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the
following school authorities: Juan D. Lim
(President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President),
Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col.
Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M.
Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security).
Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private
respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for
the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during
and after the attack on the victim. During the
proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his
relationship with the other petitioners by
resigning from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to
have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they
are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of
action against them, as jurisprudence on the
subject is to the effect that academic institutions,
such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the
rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled
petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8
December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration was
similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January
1988. Petitioners then assailed the trial court's
disposition before the respondent appellate court
which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June
1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22
August 1988, the respondent appellate court
resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the
respondent appellate court primarily anchored its
decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate court's
now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903)
of the Civil Code is an adoption
from the old Spanish Civil Code.
The comments of Manresa and
learned authorities on its meaning
should give way to present day
changes. The law is not fixed and
flexible (sic); it must be dynamic.
In fact, the greatest value and
significance of law as a rule of
conduct in (sic) its flexibility to
adopt to changing social conditions
and its capacity to meet the new
challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern
day educational system, Article
2180 cannot be construed in its
narrow concept as held in the old
case of Exconde
vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado
vs. Court of Appeals; 3hence, the
ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it
should apply to all kinds of
educational institutions, academic
or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the
teachers and heads of the school
staff liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability
pursuant to the last paragraph of
Article 2180 by "proving that they
observed all the diligence to
prevent damage." This can only be
done at a trial on the merits of the
case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate
court that the motion to dismiss the complaint
was correctly denied and the complaint should be
tried on the merits, we do not however agree
with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.
 12
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the
afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza,
Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs.Court
of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been
stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly
provides that the damage should have been
caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he
educational institution sought to be held liable for
the acts of its pupils or students while in its
custody. However, this material situation does
not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not
students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school
could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to
consider such material facts mean the
exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It
does not necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students
for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the
implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or
assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and
other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there
looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus
premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation between the PSBA
and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do
not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176
shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts
or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not
prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a
contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil.
722), the private respondent was awarded
damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a
first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is
noted, however, that the Court referred to the
petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from
tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage.
In effect, Air France is authority for the view that
liability from tort may exist even if there is a
contract, for the act that breaks the contract may
be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs.
Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even
as early as 1918, this Court was already of a
similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38
Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual
obligation is much broader than
that of contractual obligation,
comprising, as it does, the whole
extent of juridical human relations.
These two fields, figuratively
speaking, concentric; that is to say,
the mere fact that a person is
bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-
contractual liability to such person.
When such a contractual relation
exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions
that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the
contract would have constituted
the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter
of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly
Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals,
good custom or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the
damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the
airline which emboldened the petitioner's
employee to forcibly oust the private respondent
to cater to the comfort of a white man who
allegedly "had a better right to the seat."
In Austro-American, supra, the public
embarrassment caused to the passenger was the
justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals,
(Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that
should the act which breaches a contract be done
in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then
there is a cause to view the act as constituting a
quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had
been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could
give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra,
the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista.
In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability.
The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant
difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like
a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
 13
students against all risks. This is specially true in
the populous student communities of the so-
called "university belt" in Manila where there
have been reported several incidents ranging
from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It
would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to
carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises
and environs. Should this be the case, the school
may still avoid liability by proving that the breach
of its contractual obligation to the students was
not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined
to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponding to the circumstances of
persons, time and place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence
on the substance of the private respondents'
complaint, the record is bereft of all the material
facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court
can make such a determination from the
evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered,
the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC,
Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue
proceedings consistent with this ruling of the
Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Regalado and Nocon, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992
MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by
his judicial guardian VIRGINIA C.
SOLIMAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding
Judge of Branch LXI, Regional Trial Court of
Region III, Angeles City, and the REPUBLIC
CENTRAL COLLEGES, represented by its
President, respondents.
Mariano Y. Navarro for Republic Central Colleges.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a
civil complaint for damages against private
respondent Republic Central Colleges
("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and
one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as
defendants. The complaint alleged that:
. . . on 13 August 1982, in the morning
thereof, while the plaintiff was in the
campus ground and premises of the
defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES,
as he was and is still a regular enrolled
student of said school taking his morning
classes, the defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON,
who was on said date and hour in the
premises of said school performing his
duties and obligations as a duly appointed
security guard under the employment,
supervision and control of his employer-
defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC.,
headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without
any provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner,
with intent to kill, attack, assault, strike and
shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .
38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon,
which ordinarily such wound sustained
would have caused plaintiff's death were it
not for the timely medical assistance given
to him. The plaintiff was treated and
confined at Angeles Medical Center,
Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion,
the plaintiff may not be able to attend to his
regular classes and will be incapacitated in
the performance of his usual work for a
duration of from three to four months
before his wounds would be completely
healed. 1
Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to
dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no
cause of action against it. Private respondent
argued that it is free from any liability for the
injuries sustained by petitioner student for the
reason that private respondent school was not
the employer of the security guard charged,
Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible
for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private
respondent school further argued that Article
2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not
apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and
heads of establishment of arts and trades liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy
Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of
the school.
In an order dated 29 November 1983, respondent
Judge granted private respondent school's motion
to dismiss, holding that security guard Jimmy
Solomon was not an employee of the school
which accordingly could not be held liable for his
acts or omissions. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, without success.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is
contended that respondent trial judge committed
a grave abuse of discretion when he refused to
apply the provisions of Article 2180, as well as
those of Articles 349, 350 and 352, of the Civil
Code and granted the school's motion to dismiss.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one
against another by fault or negligence exists not
only for one's own act or omission, but also for
acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by
law responsible. Among the persons held
vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of
another person are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their
employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils, their students or
apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
xxx xxx xxx
 14
The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis
for holding the Colleges liable for the alleged
wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy B. Solomon
inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private
respondent school was not the employer of
Jimmy Solomon. The employer of Jimmy Solomon
was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the
school was the client or customer of the R.L.
Security Agency Inc. It is settled that where the
security agency, as here, recruits, hires and
assigns the work of its watchmen or security
guards, the agency is the employer of such
guards or watchmen. 2Liability for illegal or
harmful acts committed by the security guards
attaches to the employer agency, and not to the
clients or customers of such agency. 3 As a
general rule, a client or customer of a security
agency has no hand in selecting who among the
pool of security guards or watchmen employed
by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection of the guards cannot, in the
ordinary course of events, be demanded from the
client whose premises or property are protected
by the security guards. The fact that a client
company may give instructions or directions to
the security guards assigned to it, does not, by
itself, render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and
liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those
instructions or directions are ordinarily no more
than requests commonly envisaged in the
contract for services entered into with the
security agency. There being no employer-
employee relationship between the Colleges and
Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot
impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for
the acts of security guard Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon
was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the
Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L.
Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
similarly not available for imposing liability upon
the Republic Central Colleges for the acts or
omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
The relevant portions of the other Articles of the
Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349. The following persons
shall exercise substitute parental
authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Directors of trade
establishments with regard to
apprentices;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 350. The persons named in the
preceding article shall exercise
reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 352. The relations between
teacher and pupil, professor and
student are fixed by government
regulations and those of each
school or institution. In no case
shall corporal punishment be
countenanced. The teacher or
professor shall cultivate the best
potentialities of the heart and mind
of the pupil or student.
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, 4 invoked by petitioner,
the Court held the owner and president of a
school of arts and trades known as the "Manila
Technical Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila,
responsible in damages for the death of
Dominador Palisoc, a student of Institute, which
resulted from fist blows delivered by Virgilio L.
Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be
seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought
it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article
2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely
different from the facts existing in the instant
case.
Persons exercising substitute parental authority
are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a
third person by the child or person subject to
such substitute parental authority. In the instant
case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who
committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in
injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or
apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the
school had no substitute parental authority over
Solomon.
Clearly, within the confines of its limited
logic, i.e., treating the petitioner's claim as one
based wholly and exclusively on Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial
judge was correct. Does it follow, however, that
respondent Colleges could not be held liable
upon any other basis in law, for or in respect of
the injury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle
respondent school to dismissal of petitioner's
complaint in respect of itself?
The very recent case of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) v. Court of
Appeals, 5 requires us to give a negative answer
to that question.
In PSBA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the
Civil Code was not applicable where a student
had been injured by one who was an outsider or
by one over whom the school did not exercise
any custody or control or supervision. At the
same time, however, the Court stressed that an
implied contract may be held to be established
between a school which accepts students for
enrollment, on the one hand, and the students
who are enrolled, on the other hand, which
contract results in obligations for both parties:
When an academic institution accepts students
for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which parties are bound to comply
with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the
implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or
assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and
 15
other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there
looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus
premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof. 6
In that case, the Court was careful to point out
that:
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had
been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could
give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra,
the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista.
In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability.
The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Court is not unmindful of the attendant
difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like
a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
students against all risks. This is specially true in
the populous student communities of the so-
called "university belt" in Manila where there
have been reported several incidents ranging
from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It
would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to
carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises
and environs. Should this be the case, the school
may still avoid liability by proving that the breach
of its contractual obligation to the students was
not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined
to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of person,
time and place. 7
In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the
school's motion to dismiss the complaint against
it, and both the Court of Appeals and this Court
affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar,
the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss
filed by respondent Colleges, upon the
assumption that petitioner's cause of action was
based, and could have been based, only on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however,
states, acts which are tortious or allegedly
tortious in character may at the same time
constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal,
obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious
error when he supposed that petitioner could
have no cause of action other than one based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial
judge should not have granted the motion to
dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of
justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts
constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent
Colleges.
In line, therefore, with the most recent
jurisprudence of this Court, and in order to avoid
a possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and
putting aside technical considerations, we
consider that respondent trial judge committed
serious error correctible by this Court in the
instant case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT DUE
COURSE to the Petition, to TREAT the comment of
respondent Colleges as its answer, and to
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated 29
November 1983. This case is REMANDED to the
court a quo for further proceedings consistent
with this Resolution.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ.,
concur.
[G.R. No. 156109. November 18, 2004]
KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and
Represented by ARMANDO
REGINO, petitioner, vs. PANGASINAN
COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A.
GAMUROT and ELISSA
BALADAD, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Upon enrolment, students and their school
enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students
agree to abide by the standards of academic
performance and codes of conduct, issued
usually in the form of manuals that are
distributed to the enrollees at the start of the
school term. Further, the school informs them of
the itemized fees they are expected to pay.
Consequently, it cannot, after the enrolment of a
student, vary the terms of the contract. It cannot
require fees other than those it specified upon
enrolment.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
under Rule 45,[1] seeking to nullify the July 12,
2002[2] and the November 22, 2002[3] Orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U-7541.
The decretal portion of the first assailed Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court
GRANTS the instant motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of
action.[4]
The second challenged Order denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first
year computer science student at Respondent
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
(PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to
college mainly through the financial support of
her relatives. During the second semester of
school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and
statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A.
Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as
teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising
campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance
 16
Revolution, the proceeds of which were to go to
the construction of the schools tennis and
volleyball courts. Each student was required to
pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The
project was allegedly implemented by
recompensing students who purchased tickets
with additional points in their test scores; those
who refused to pay were denied the opportunity
to take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her
religion from attending dance parties and
celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the
tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the
scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic
and statistics, her teachers -- Respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad --
allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit
out her logic class while her classmates were
taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad,
after announcing to the entire class that she was
not permitting petitioner and another student to
take their statistics examinations for failing to
pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from
the classroom. Petitioners pleas ostensibly went
unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who
unrelentingly defended their positions as
compliance with PCSTs policy.
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a
pauper litigant, a Complaint[5] for damages
against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In her
Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal
damages; P500,000 as moral damages; at
least P1,000,000 as exemplary
damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the
costs of litigation and attorneys fees.
On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion
to Dismiss[6] on the ground of petitioners failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. According to
respondents, the question raised involved the
determination of the wisdom of an administrative
policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have
been initiated before the proper administrative
body, the Commission of Higher Education
(CHED).
In her Comment to respondents Motion,
petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies was unnecessary,
because her action was not administrative in
nature, but one purely for damages arising from
respondents breach of the laws on human
relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with the courts.
On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the
Complaint for lack of cause of action.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In granting respondents Motion to Dismiss,
the trial court noted that the instant controversy
involved a higher institution of learning, two of its
faculty members and one of its students. It
added that Section 54 of the Education Act of
1982 vested in the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) the supervision and regulation
of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled that the CHED,
not the courts, had jurisdiction over the
controversy.[7]
In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order
dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of
action without, however, explaining this ground.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present
Petition on pure questions of law.[8]
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the
following issues for our consideration:
Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies in a civil action
exclusively for damages based on violation of the
human relation provisions of the Civil Code, filed
by a student against her former school.
Whether or not there is a need for prior
declaration of invalidity of a certain school
administrative policy by the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) before a former student
can successfully maintain an action exclusively
for damages in regular courts.
Whether or not the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) has exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for damages based upon
violation of the Civil Code provisions on human
relations filed by a student against the school.[9]
All of the foregoing point to one issue --
whether the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is applicable. The Court,
however, sees a second issue which, though not
expressly raised by petitioner, was impliedly
contained in her Petition: whether the Complaint
stated sufficient cause(s) of action.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondents anchored their Motion to
Dismiss on petitioners alleged failure to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the
RTC. According to them, the determination of the
controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom
and the propriety of PCSTs academic policy. Thus,
the Complaint should have been lodged in the
CHED, the administrative body tasked under
Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state
policy to protect, foster and promote the right of
all citizens to affordable quality education at all
levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure
that education is accessible to all.[10]
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no
relevance to the present case since she is
praying for damages, a remedy beyond the
domain of the CHED and well within the
jurisdiction of the courts.[11]
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies has no
bearing on the present case. In Factoran Jr. v. CA,
[12]
the Court had occasion to elucidate on the
rationale behind this doctrine:
The doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is basic.
Courts, for reasons of law, comity,
and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first
been resorted to and the proper
authorities have been given the
appropriate opportunity to act and
correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative
forum. x x x.[13]
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the
policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to
allow her to take her final examinations; she was
already enrolled in another educational
institution. A reversal of the acts complained of
 17
would not adequately redress her grievances; unjustly influence and compel
under the circumstances, the consequences of them into taking the tickets;
respondents acts could no longer be undone or 13. Despite the students refusal, they
rectified. were forced to take the tickets
Second, exhaustion of administrative because [of] defendant
remedies is applicable when there is competence Rachelle A. Gamurots coercion
on the part of the administrative body to act and act of intimidation, but still
upon the matter complained of.[14] Administrative many of them including the
agencies are not courts; they are neither part of plaintiff did not attend the
the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial dance party imposed upon
tribunals.[15] Specifically, the CHED does not have them by defendants PCST and
the power to award damages.[16] Hence, Rachelle A. Gamurot;
petitioner could not have commenced her case 14. Plaintiff was not able to pay the price
before the Commission. of her own two tickets because
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of aside form the fact that she
exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is could not afford to pay them it
purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the is also against her religious
trial court.[17]Petitioners action for damages practice as a member of a
inevitably calls for the application and the certain religious congregation
interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that to be attending dance parties
falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.[18] and celebrations;
Second Issue: 15. On March 14, 2002, before
Cause of Action defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot
Sufficient Causes of Action Stated gave her class its final
in the Allegations in the Complaint examination in the subject
As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently Logic she warned that
allege a cause of action; failure to do so warrants students who had not paid the
its dismissal.[19] A complaint is said to assert a tickets would not be allowed to
sufficient cause of action if, admitting what participate in the examination,
appears solely on its face to be correct, the for which threat and
plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. intimidation many students
Assuming the facts that are alleged to be true, were eventually forced to
the court should be able to render a valid make payments:
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the 16. Because plaintiff could not afford to
complaint.[20] pay, defendant Rachelle A.
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause Gamurot inhumanly made
of action hypothetically admits the truth of the plaintiff sit out the class but
alleged facts. In their Motion to Dismiss, the defendant did not allow
respondents did not dispute any of petitioners her to take her final
allegations, and they admitted that x x x the crux examination in Logic;
of plaintiffs cause of action is the determination 17. On March 15, 2002 just before the
of whether or not the assessment of P100 per giving of the final examination
ticket is excessive or oppressive.[21] They thereby in the subject Statistics,
premised their prayer for dismissal on the defendant Elissa Baladad, in
Complaints alleged failure to state a cause of connivance with defendants
action. Thus, a reexamination of the Complaint is Rachelle A. Gamurot and PCST,
in order. announced in the classroom
The Complaint contains the following factual that she was not allowing
allegations: plaintiff and another student to
10. In the second week of February take the examination for their
2002, defendant Rachelle A. failure and refusal to pay the
Gamurot, in connivance with price of the tickets, and
PCST, forced plaintiff and her thenceforth she ejected
classmates to buy or take two plaintiff and the other student
tickets each, x x x; from the classroom;
11. Plaintiff and many of her classmates 18. Plaintiff pleaded for a chance to take
objected to the forced the examination but all
distribution and selling of defendants could say was that
tickets to them but the said the prohibition to give the
defendant warned them that if examinations to non-paying
they refused [to] take or pay students was an administrative
the price of the two tickets decision;
they would not be allowed at 19. Plaintiff has already paid her tuition
all to take the final fees and other obligations in
examinations; the school;
12. As if to add insult to injury, 20. That the above-cited incident was
defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot not a first since PCST also did
bribed students with additional another forced distribution of
fifty points or so in their test tickets to its students in the
score in her subject just to
 18
first semester of school year
2001-2002; x x x [22]
The foregoing allegations show two causes of
action; first, breach of contract; and second,
liability for tort.
Reciprocity of the
School-Student Contract
In Alcuaz v. PSBA,[23] the Court characterized
the relationship between the school and the
student as a contract, in which a student, once
admitted by the school is considered enrolled for
one semester.[24] Two years later, in Non v. Dames
II,[25] the Court modified the termination of
contract theory in Alcuaz by holding that the
contractual relationship between the school and
the student is not only semestral in duration,
but for the entire period the latter are
expected to complete it.[26] Except for the
variance in the period during which the
contractual relationship is considered to subsist,
both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in
characterizing the school-student relationship as
contractual in nature.
The school-student relationship is also
reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences
appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of
such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal
rights and obligations. The school undertakes to
provide students with education sufficient to
enable them to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the students
agree to abide by the academic requirements of
the school and to observe its rules and
regulations.[27]
The terms of the school-student contract are
defined at the moment of its inception -- upon
enrolment of the student. Standards of academic
performance and the code of behavior and
discipline are usually set forth in manuals
distributed to new students at the start of every
school year. Further, schools inform prospective
enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of
payment.
In practice, students are normally required to
make a down payment upon enrollment, with the
balance to be paid before every preliminary,
midterm and final examination. Their failure to
pay their financial obligation is regarded as a
valid ground for the school to deny them the
opportunity to take these examinations.
The foregoing practice does not merely
ensure compliance with financial obligations; it
also underlines the importance of major
examinations. Failure to take a major
examination is usually fatal to the students
promotion to the next grade or to graduation.
Examination results form a significant basis for
their final grades. These tests are usually a
primary and an indispensable requisite to their
elevation to the next educational level and,
ultimately, to their completion of a course.
Education is not a measurable commodity. It
is not possible to determine who is better
educated than another. Nevertheless, a students
grades are an accepted approximation of what
would otherwise be an intangible product of
countless hours of study. The importance of
grades cannot be discounted in a setting where
education is generally the gate pass to
employment opportunities and better life; such
grades are often the means by which a
prospective employer measures whether a job
applicant has acquired the necessary tools or
skills for a particular profession or trade.
Thus, students expect that upon their
payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set
academic standards, completion of academic
requirements and observance of school rules and
regulations, the school would reward them by
recognizing their completion of the course
enrolled in.
The obligation on the part of the school has
been established in Magtibay v. Garcia,[28] Licup
v. University of San Carlos[29] and Ateneo de
Manila University v. Garcia,[30] in which the Court
held that, barring any violation of the rules on the
part of the students, an institution of higher
learning has a contractual obligation to
afford its students a fair opportunity to
complete the course they seek to pursue.
We recognize the need of a school to fund its
facilities and to meet astronomical operating
costs; this is a reality in running it. Crystal v.
Cebu International School[31] upheld the
imposition by respondent school of a land
purchase deposit in the amount of P50,000 per
student to be used for the purchase of a piece of
land and for the construction of new buildings
and other facilities x x x which the school would
transfer [to] and occupy after the expiration of its
lease contract over its present site.
The amount was refundable after the student
graduated or left the school. After noting that the
imposition of the fee was made only after prior
consultation and approval by the parents of the
students, the Court held that the school
committed no actionable wrong in refusing to
admit the children of the petitioners therein for
their failure to pay the land purchase deposit and
the 2.5 percent monthly surcharge thereon.
In the present case, PCST imposed the
assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in
the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance
party fee as a condition for the students taking
the final examinations, and ultimately for its
recognition of their ability to finish a course. The
fee, however, was not part of the school-student
contract entered into at the start of the school
year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed
to the prejudice of the enrollees.
Such contract is by no means an ordinary
one. In Non, we stressed that the school-student
contract is imbued with public interest,
considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the
State of supervisory and regulatory powers over
all educational institutions.[32] Sections 5 (1) and
(3) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution
provide:
The State shall protect and
promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels and
shall take appropriate steps to
make such declaration accessible
to all.
Every student has a right
to select a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and
academic requirements.

The same state policy resonates in Section
9(2) of BP 232, otherwise known as the Education
Act of 1982:
Section 9. Rights of
Students in School. In addition to
other rights, and subject to the
limitations prescribed by law and
regulations, students and pupils
in all schools shall enjoy the
following rights:
xxxxxxxxx
(2) The right to freely choose their
field of study subject to existing
curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation,
except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of
disciplinary regulations.
Liability for Tort
In her Complaint, petitioner also charged
that private respondents inhumanly punish
students x x x by reason only of their poverty,
religious practice or lowly station in life, which
inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt,
disgrace and unworthiness;[33] as a result of such
punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish
any of her subjects for the second semester of
that school year and had to lag behind in her
studies by a full year. The acts of respondents
supposedly caused her extreme humiliation,
mental agony and demoralization
unimaginable proportions in violation of Articles
19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These provisions
of the law state thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of
anothers residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing
the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another
to be alienated from his
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating
another on account of his
beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical
defect, or other personal
condition.
Generally, liability for tort arises only
between parties not otherwise bound by a
contract. An academic institution, however, may
be held liable for tort even if it has an existing
contract with its students, since the act that
violated the contract may also be a tort. We ruled
thus in PSBA vs. CA,[34] from which we quote:
19
x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil
Code] shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by
contract, whether express or implied.
However, this impression has not
prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there
obtains a contract. In Air France v.
Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private
respondent was awarded damages for his
unwarranted expulsion from a first-class
seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is
noted, however, that the Court referred to
the petitioner-airlines liability as one
arising from tort, not one arising form a
contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is
authority for the view that liability from
tort may exist even if there is a contract,
for the act that breaks the contract may
be also a tort. x x x This view was not all
that revolutionary, for even as early as
1918, this Court was already of a similar
mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38
Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated
thus: x x x. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the
same act which constitutes a breach of
of the contract would have constituted the
source of an extra-contractual obligation
had no contract existed between the
parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the
chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, particularly Article 21 x x x.[35]
Academic Freedom
In their Memorandum, respondents harp on
their right to academic freedom. We are not
impressed. According to present jurisprudence,
academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to
determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what
may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4)
who may be admitted to study. [36] In Garcia v. the
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology,[37] the Court upheld the respondent
therein when it denied a female students
admission to theological studies in a seminary for
prospective priests. The Court defined the
freedom of an academic institution thus: to
decide for itself aims and objectives and how
best to attain them x x x free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
[38]
In Tangonan v. Pao,[39] the Court upheld, in
the name of academic freedom, the right of the
school to refuse readmission of a nursing student
who had been enrolled on probation, and who
had failed her nursing subjects. These instances
notwithstanding, the Court has emphasized that
once a school has, in the name of academic
freedom, set its standards, these should be
meticulously observed and should not be used to
discriminate against certain students.[40] After
accepting them upon enrollment, the school
cannot renege on its contractual obligation on
grounds other than those made known to, and
 20
accepted by, students at the start of the school On August 20, 1997, respondents Mutya
year. Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano, Sorianos wife and
In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint daughter, respectively, filed a complaint for
alleges sufficient causes of action against damages against Macasasa and
respondents, and that it should not have been petitioner Flordeliza Mendoza, the registered owner
summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court of the vehicle. The complaint was docketed as Civil
is not holding respondents liable for the acts Case No. C-18038 in
complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
due course by the court a quo. 121. Respondents prayed that Macasasa and
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby petitioner be ordered to pay them: P200,000 moral
GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED. damages; P500,000 for lost income; P22,250 for
The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the funeral services; P45,000 for burial lot; P15,150 for
Complaint and, with all deliberate speed, to interment and lapida; P8,066 for hospitalization,
continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. U- other medical and transportation
7541. No costs. expenses; P28,540 for food and drinks during the
SO ORDERED. wake; P50,000 exemplary damages; P60,000
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio- indemnity for Sorianos death; and P25,000 for
Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur. attorneys fees plus P500 per court appearance.[4]
Corona, J., on leave. In her answer, petitioner Mendoza
maintained that she was not liable since as
owner of the vehicle, she had exercised the
FLORDELIZA MENDOZA, G.R. No.
diligence
164012 of a good father of a family over her
Petitioner, employee, Macasasa.
Present: Upon respondents motion, the complaint
for damages against Macasasa was dismissed.
QUISUMBING After trial, the trial court also dismissed
- versus - CARPIO the complaint against petitioner.[5] It found
CARPIO Soriano
MORALES negligent for crossing Commonwealth
TINGAAvenue by using a small gap in the islands
VELASCO,
fencing
JR., rather than the pedestrian overpass. The
MUTYA SORIANO and Minor JULIE lower court also ruled that petitioner was not
ANN SORIANO duly represented by negligent in the selection and supervision of
her natural mother Promulgated:
Macasasa since complainants presented no
and guardian ad litem MUTYA evidence to support their allegation of petitioners
SORIANO, June 8,negligence.
2007 [6]

Respondents. Respondents appealed. The Court of

Appeals reversed the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the appellate
courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment
appealed from is REVERSED, and
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - another one is hereby rendered
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x ordering [petitioner] Flordeliza
DECISION Mendoza to pay [respondents] Mutya
QUISUMBING, J.: Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano the
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of following amounts:
the Rules of Court, petitioner asks this Court to 1. Hospital and Burial
reverse and set aside the Expenses P80,926.25
[1]
Decision dated November 17, 2003 and the 2. Loss of earning
[2]
Resolution dated May 24, 2004 of the Court of capacity P77,000.00
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69037. The appellate 3. Moral
court found petitioner, as employer Damages P20,000.00
of Lomer Macasasa, liable for damages. 4. Indemnity for the
The facts are as follows: death of Sonny
At around 1:00 a.m., July 14, 1997, Soriano P50,000.00
Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Actual payment of the
Avenue near Luzon Avenue in Quezon City, was aforementioned amounts should,
hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer however, be reduced by twenty
Macasasa. Soriano was thrown five meters away, (20%) per cent due to the presence
while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters of contributory negligence by the
from the point of impact. Gerard Villaspin, one victim as provided for in Article
of Sorianos companions, asked Macasasa to bring 2179 of the Civil Code.
Soriano to the hospital, but after checking out the SO ORDERED.[7]
scene of the incident, Macasasa returned to the While the appellate court agreed that
FX, only to flee. A school bus brought Soriano Soriano was negligent, it also found Macasasa
to East Avenue Medical Center where he later negligent for speeding, such that he was unable to
died. Subsequently, the Quezon City Prosecutor avoid hitting the victim. It observed
recommended the filing of a criminal case for that Sorianos own negligence did not preclude
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide recovery of damages
against Macasasa.[3] from Macasasas negligence. It further held that
 21
since petitioner failed to present evidence to the
contrary, and conformably with Article 2180[8] of
the Civil Code, the presumption of negligence of
the employer in the selection and supervision of
employees stood.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied by the appellate court in a to cases where the damages are
Resolution[9] dated May 24, 2004.
Hence, this appeal where petitioner
alleges that:
I.
THE TOTAL AMOUNT PRAYED FOR
IN THE COMPLAINT IS NOT WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
II.
[COROLLARILY], THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE
RESPONDENTS [HAS] NO BASIS IN
LAW.[10]
The issues are simple: (1) Did the Regional
Trial Court have jurisdiction to try the case? and (2)
Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?
Petitioner argues that the amount claimed
by respondents is within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. She posits that to
determine the jurisdictional amount, what should
only be considered are the following: P22,250 for
funeral services; P45,000 for burial lot; P15,150
for interment and lapida; P8,066 for
hospitalization and transportation; P28,540 for
food and drinks during the wake; and P60,000
indemnity for Sorianos death. She maintains that
the sum of these amounts, P179,006, is below
the jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial
Court. She states that under Section 19(8) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the
following claims of respondents must be
excluded: P200,000 moral damages, P500,000
for lost income; P50,000 exemplary
damages; P25,000 attorneys fees plus P500 per
court appearance. Petitioner thus prays that the
decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and
the dismissal of the case by the trial court be
affirmed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
[11]
as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states
the pertinent law.
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil
cases.Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in
which the demand, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such
other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00).
But relatedly, Administrative Circular No. 09-
94[12] expressly states:
xxxx
2. The exclusion of the term
damages of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19(8) and
Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129, as
amended by RA No. 7691, applies
merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the
court. (Underscoring supplied.)
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts,
as in this case, are primarily and effectively actions
for the recovery of a sum of money for the
damages for tortious acts.[13] In this case,
respondents claim of P929,006 in damages
and P25,000 attorneys fees plus P500 per court
appearance represents the monetary equivalent for
compensation of the alleged injury. These money
claims are the principal reliefs sought by
respondents in their complaint for damages.
[14]
Consequently then, we hold that
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City possessed
and properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.[15]
Petitioner further argues that since
respondents caused the dismissal of the complaint
against Macasasa, there is no longer any basis to
find her liable. She claims that no iota of evidence
was presented in this case to
prove Macasasas negligence, and besides,
respondents can recover damages in the criminal
case against him.
Respondents counter that
as Macasasas employer, petitioner was presumed
negligent in selecting and supervising Macasasa
after he was found negligent by the Court of
Appeals.
The records show that Macasasa violated two
traffic rules under the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe
speed to avoid endangering lives.[16] Both the
trial and the appellate courts found
Macasasa overspeeding.[17] The records show
also that Soriano was thrown five meters away
after he was hit.[18] Moreover, the vehicle stopped
only some 25 meters from the point of impact. [19]
Both circumstances support the conclusion that
the FX vehicle driven
by Macasasa was overspeeding. Second, Macasas
a, the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the
accident victim, in violation of Section 55,
[20]
Article V of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to bring
Soriano to the hospital, he fled the scene in a
hurry. Contrary to petitioners claim, there is no
showing of any factual basis that Macasasa fled
for fear of the peoples wrath. What remains
undisputed is that he did not report the accident
to a police officer, nor did he summon a
doctor. Under Article 2185[21] of the Civil Code, a
person driving a motor vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating traffic regulations.
While respondents could recover damages
from Macasasa in a criminal case and petitioner
 22
could become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner,
as owner and employer, is directly and separately
civilly liable for her failure to exercise due
diligence in supervising Macasasa.[22] We must
emphasize that this damage suit is for the quasi-
delict of petitioner, as owner and employer, and
not for the delict of Macasasa, as driver and
employee.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers
are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks.The liability arises due to the
presumed negligence of the employers in
supervising their employees unless they prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
In this case, we hold petitioner primarily
and solidarily liable for the damages caused
by Macasasa.[23] Respondents could recover
directly from petitioner[24] since petitioner failed to
prove that she exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in supervising Macasasa.
[25]
Indeed, it is unfortunate that petitioner
harbored the notion that the Regional Trial Court
did not have jurisdiction over the case and opted
not to present her evidence on this point.
Lastly, we agree that the Court of Appeals
did not err in ruling that Soriano was guilty of
contributory negligence for not using the
pedestrian overpass while
crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even note
that the respondents now admit this point, and
concede that the appellate court had properly
reduced by 20% the amount of damages it
awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction[26] of the
amount earlier awarded, based on Article 2179 of
the Civil Code which reads:
When the plaintiff's own
negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for
lack of merit and hereby AFFIRM the Decision
dated November 17, 2003 and the Resolution
dated May 24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 69037.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE
AGANA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 126467 January 31, 2007
NATIVIDAD (Substituted by her children
MARCELINO AGANA III, ENRIQUE AGANA,
JR., EMMA AGANA ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA,
and RAYMUND AGANA) and ENRIQUE
AGANA, Petitioners,
vs.
JUAN FUENTES, Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - x
G.R. No. 127590 January 31, 2007
MIGUEL AMPIL, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE
AGANA, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Hospitals, having undertaken one of mankind’s
most important and delicate endeavors, must
assume the grave responsibility of pursuing it
with appropriate care. The care and service
dispensed through this high trust, however
technical, complex and esoteric its character may
be, must meet standards of responsibility
commensurate with the undertaking to preserve
and protect the health, and indeed, the very lives
of those placed in the hospital’s keeping.1
Assailed in these three consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals’
Decision2 dated September 6, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 affirming
with modification the Decision3dated March 17,
1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-43322 and
nullifying its Order dated September 21, 1993.
The facts, as culled from the records, are:
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to
the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City
Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. After a
series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil,
petitioner in G.R. No. 127590, diagnosed her to
be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the
medical staff4 of the Medical City Hospital,
performed an anterior resection surgery on
Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her
sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary,
necessitating the removal of certain portions of
it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of
Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit
Dr. Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467,
to perform hysterectomy on her.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the
hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the
operation and closed the incision.
However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In
the corresponding Record of Operation dated
April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered
these remarks:
"sponge count lacking 2
"announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but
to no avail continue for closure."
On April 24, 1984, Natividad was released from
the hospital. Her hospital and medical bills,
including the doctors’ fees, amounted to
P60,000.00.
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of
excruciating pain in her anal region. She
consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it.
They told her that the pain was the natural
consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then
recommended that she consult an oncologist to
examine the cancerous nodes which were not
removed during the operation.
On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her
husband, went to the United States to seek
 23
further treatment. After four months of
consultations and laboratory examinations,
Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence,
she was advised to return to the Philippines.
On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the
Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks
thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze
protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed
about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where
he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured
her that the pains would soon vanish.
Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead,
the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to
seek treatment at the Polymedic General
Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon
Gutierrez detected the presence of another
foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling
gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly
infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula
had formed in her reproductive organs which
forced stool to excrete through the vagina.
Another surgical operation was needed to
remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984,
Natividad underwent another surgery.
On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her
husband filed with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon
City a complaint for damages against the
Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the
Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43322. They alleged
that the latter are liable for negligence for
leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s
body and malpractice for concealing their acts of
negligence.
Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative complaint for gross negligence
and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes, docketed as Administrative Case No.
1690. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case
only with respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed
to acquire jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was
then in the United States.
On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of
the above cases, Natividad died and was duly
substituted by her above-named children (the
Aganas).
On March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision
in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and
Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice,
the decretal part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for
the plaintiffs ordering the defendants
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., DR. MIGUEL
AMPIL and DR. JUAN FUENTES to pay to the
plaintiffs, jointly and severally, except in respect
of the award for exemplary damages and the
interest thereon which are the liabilities of
defendants Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes only, as
follows:
1. As actual damages, the following
amounts:
a. The equivalent in Philippine
Currency of the total of
US$19,900.00 at the rate of
P21.60-US$1.00, as reimbursement
of actual expenses incurred in the
United States of America;
b. The sum of P4,800.00 as travel
taxes of plaintiffs and their
physician daughter;
c. The total sum of P45,802.50,
representing the cost of
hospitalization at Polymedic
Hospital, medical fees, and cost of
the saline solution;
2. As moral damages, the sum of
P2,000,000.00;
3. As exemplary damages, the sum of
P300,000.00;
4. As attorney’s fees, the sum of
P250,000.00;
5. Legal interest on items 1 (a), (b), and
(c); 2; and 3 hereinabove, from date of
filing of the complaint until full payment;
and
6. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 42062.
Incidentally, on April 3, 1993, the Aganas filed
with the RTC a motion for a partial execution of
its Decision, which was granted in an Order dated
May 11, 1993. Thereafter, the sheriff levied upon
certain properties of Dr. Ampil and sold them for
P451,275.00 and delivered the amount to the
Aganas.
Following their receipt of the money, the Aganas
entered into an agreement with PSI and Dr.
Fuentes to indefinitely suspend any further
execution of the RTC Decision. However, not long
thereafter, the Aganas again filed a motion for an
alias writ of execution against the properties of
PSI and Dr. Fuentes. On September 21, 1993, the
RTC granted the motion and issued the
corresponding writ, prompting Dr. Fuentes to file
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary
injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32198.
During its pendency, the Court of Appeals issued
a Resolution5 dated October 29, 1993 granting
Dr. Fuentes’ prayer for injunctive relief.
On January 24, 1994, CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 was
consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 42062.
Meanwhile, on January 23, 1995, the PRC Board
of Medicine rendered its Decision6 in
Administrative Case No. 1690 dismissing the case
against Dr. Fuentes. The Board held that the
prosecution failed to show that Dr. Fuentes was
the one who left the two pieces of gauze inside
Natividad’s body; and that he concealed such
fact from Natividad.
On September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision jointly disposing of CA-G.R.
CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198, thus:
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the
case against defendant-appellant Dr. Juan
Fuentes is hereby DISMISSED, and with the
pronouncement that defendant-appellant Dr.
Miguel Ampil is liable to reimburse defendant-
appellant Professional Services, Inc., whatever
amount the latter will pay or had paid to the
plaintiffs-appellees, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal
DISMISSED.
Concomitant with the above, the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by herein
 24
defendant-appellant Dr. Juan Fuentes in CA-G.R.
SP No. 32198 is hereby GRANTED and the
challenged order of the respondent judge dated
September 21, 1993, as well as the alias writ of
execution issued pursuant thereto are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The bond posted by
the petitioner in connection with the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by this Court on
November 29, 1993 is hereby cancelled.
Costs against defendants-appellants Dr. Miguel
Ampil and Professional Services, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Only Dr. Ampil filed a motion for reconsideration,
but it was denied in a Resolution 7 dated
December 19, 1996.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
In G.R. No. 126297, PSI alleged in its petition that
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: (1) it is
estopped from raising the defense that Dr. Ampil
is not its employee; (2) it is solidarily liable with
Dr. Ampil; and (3) it is not entitled to its
counterclaim against the Aganas. PSI contends
that Dr. Ampil is not its employee, but a mere
consultant or independent contractor. As such, he
alone should answer for his negligence.
In G.R. No. 126467, the Aganas maintain that the
Court of Appeals erred in finding that Dr. Fuentes
is not guilty of negligence or medical
malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. They contend that the pieces of gauze
are prima facie proofs that the operating
surgeons have been negligent.
Finally, in G.R. No. 127590, Dr. Ampil asserts that
the Court of Appeals erred in finding him liable
for negligence and malpractice sans evidence
that he left the two pieces of gauze in Natividad’s
vagina. He pointed to other probable causes,
such as: (1) it was Dr. Fuentes who used gauzes
in performing the hysterectomy; (2) the
attending nurses’ failure to properly count the
gauzes used during surgery; and (3) the medical
intervention of the American doctors who
examined Natividad in the United States of
America.
For our resolution are these three vital issues:
first, whether the Court of Appeals erred in
holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and
malpractice; second, whether the Court of
Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any
liability; and third, whether PSI may be held
solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.
I - G.R. No. 127590
Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Holding Dr.
Ampil
Liable for Negligence and Malpractice.
Dr. Ampil, in an attempt to absolve himself, gears
the Court’s attention to other possible causes of
Natividad’s detriment. He argues that the Court
should not discount either of the following
possibilities: first, Dr. Fuentes left the gauzes in
Natividad’s body after performing hysterectomy;
second, the attending nurses erred in counting
the gauzes; and third, the American doctors were
the ones who placed the gauzes in Natividad’s
body.
Dr. Ampil’s arguments are purely conjectural and
without basis. Records show that he did not
present any evidence to prove that the American
doctors were the ones who put or left the gauzes
in Natividad’s body. Neither did he submit
evidence to rebut the correctness of the record of
operation, particularly the number of gauzes
used. As to the alleged negligence of Dr. Fuentes,
we are mindful that Dr. Ampil examined his (Dr.
Fuentes’) work and found it in order.
The glaring truth is that all the major
circumstances, taken together, as specified by
the Court of Appeals, directly point to Dr. Ampil
as the negligent party, thus:
First, it is not disputed that the surgeons
used gauzes as sponges to control the
bleeding of the patient during the surgical
operation.
Second, immediately after the operation,
the nurses who assisted in the surgery
noted in their report that the ‘sponge
count (was) lacking 2’; that such anomaly
was ‘announced to surgeon’ and that a
‘search was done but to no avail’
prompting Dr. Ampil to ‘continue for
closure’ x x x.
Third, after the operation, two (2) gauzes
were extracted from the same spot of the
body of Mrs. Agana where the surgery was
performed.
An operation requiring the placing of sponges in
the incision is not complete until the sponges are
properly removed, and it is settled that the
leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in
the wound after the incision has been closed is at
least prima facie negligence by the operating
surgeon.8 To put it simply, such act is considered
so inconsistent with due care as to raise an
inference of negligence. There are even legions
of authorities to the effect that such act is
negligence per se.9
Of course, the Court is not blind to the reality
that there are times when danger to a patient’s
life precludes a surgeon from further searching
missing sponges or foreign objects left in the
body. But this does not leave him free from any
obligation. Even if it has been shown that a
surgeon was required by the urgent necessities
of the case to leave a sponge in his patient’s
abdomen, because of the dangers attendant
upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to so inform
his patient within a reasonable time thereafter by
advising her of what he had been compelled to
do. This is in order that she might seek relief from
the effects of the foreign object left in her body
as her condition might permit. The ruling in Smith
v. Zeagler10 is explicit, thus:
The removal of all sponges used is part of a
surgical operation, and when a physician or
surgeon fails to remove a sponge he has placed
in his patient’s body that should be removed as
part of the operation, he thereby leaves his
operation uncompleted and creates a new
condition which imposes upon him the legal duty
of calling the new condition to his patient’s
attention, and endeavoring with the means he
has at hand to minimize and avoid untoward
results likely to ensue therefrom.
Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about
the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even
misled her that the pain she was experiencing
was the ordinary consequence of her operation.
Had he been more candid, Natividad could have
taken the immediate and appropriate medical
remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To
 25
our mind, what was initially an act of negligence
by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate
wrongful act of deceiving his patient.
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or
more appropriately, medical negligence. To
successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient
must only prove that a health care provider
either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or
that he did something that a reasonably prudent
provider would not have done; and that failure or
action caused injury to the patient. 11 Simply put,
the elements are duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead
surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign
objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body
before closure of the incision. When he failed to
do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about
it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach
caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her
further examination by American doctors and
another surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is
the proximate cause12 of Natividad’s injury could
be traced from his act of closing the incision
despite the information given by the attending
nurses that two pieces of gauze were still
missing. That they were later on extracted from
Natividad’s vagina established the causal link
between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury.
And what further aggravated such injury was his
deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes
from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.
II - G.R. No. 126467
Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving
Dr. Fuentes of any Liability
The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial
court of the case against Dr. Fuentes on the
ground that it is contrary to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. According to them, the fact that the
two pieces of gauze were left inside Natividad’s
body is a prima facie evidence of Dr. Fuentes’
negligence.
We are not convinced.
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing
speaks for itself." It is the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence,
or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and
present a question of fact for defendant to meet
with an explanation.13 Stated differently, where
the thing which caused the injury, without the
fault of the injured, is under the exclusive control
of the defendant and the injury is such that it
should not have occurred if he, having such
control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation that the
injury arose from the defendant’s want of care,
and the burden of proof is shifted to him to
establish that he has observed due care and
diligence.14
From the foregoing statements of the rule, the
requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an
injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was
under the control and management of the
defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in
the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or
management used proper care; and (4) the
absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the
foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the
"control and management of the thing which
caused the injury."15
We find the element of "control and management
of the thing which caused the injury" to be
wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
will not lie.
It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the
lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad.
He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only
to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil)
found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area
had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes
performed the surgery and thereafter reported
and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter
examined it and finding everything to be in order,
allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room.
Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad.
He was about to finish the procedure when the
attending nurses informed him that two pieces of
gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was
conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not
found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be
closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was
no longer in the operating room and had, in fact,
left the hospital.
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the
operating surgeon is the person in complete
charge of the surgery room and all personnel
connected with the operation. Their duty is to
obey his orders.16 As stated before, Dr. Ampil was
the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the
"Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such
role is evident from his following conduct: (1)
calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2)
examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and finding it
in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes’ permission to
leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision.
To our mind, it was this act of ordering the
closure of the incision notwithstanding that two
pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that
caused injury to Natividad’s body. Clearly, the
control and management of the thing which
caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil,
not Dr. Fuentes.
In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule
of substantive law, hence, does not per se create
or constitute an independent or separate ground
of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule.17 In
other words, mere invocation and application of
the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the
negligence was proven to have been committed
by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.
III - G.R. No. 126297
Whether PSI Is Liable for the Negligence of Dr.
Ampil
The third issue necessitates a glimpse at the
historical development of hospitals and the
resulting theories concerning their liability for the
negligence of physicians.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, hospitals were
generally charitable institutions, providing
medical services to the lowest classes of society,
without regard for a patient’s ability to
pay.18 Those who could afford medical treatment
were usually treated at home by their
doctors.19 However, the days of house calls and
philanthropic health care are over. The modern

health care industry continues to distance itself
from its charitable past and has experienced a
significant conversion from a not-for-profit health
care to for-profit hospital businesses.
Consequently, significant changes in health law
have accompanied the business-related changes
in the hospital industry. One important legal
change is an increase in hospital liability for
medical malpractice. Many courts now allow
claims for hospital vicarious liability under the
theories of respondeat superior, apparent
authority, ostensible authority, or agency by
estoppel. 20
In this jurisdiction, the statute governing liability
for negligent acts is Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
A derivative of this provision is Article 2180, the
rule governing vicarious liability under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, thus:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
x x
x x x
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks even
though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
x x
x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
A prominent civilist commented that
professionals engaged by an employer, such as
physicians, dentists, and pharmacists, are not
"employees" under this article because the
manner in which they perform their work is not
within the control of the latter (employer). In
other words, professionals are considered
personally liable for the fault or negligence they
commit in the discharge of their duties, and their
employer cannot be held liable for such fault or
negligence. In the context of the present case, "a
hospital cannot be held liable for the fault or
negligence of a physician or surgeon in the
treatment or operation of patients."21
The foregoing view is grounded on the traditional
notion that the professional status and the very
nature of the physician’s calling preclude him
from being classed as an agent or employee of a
hospital, whenever he acts in a professional
capacity.22 It has been said that medical practice
strictly involves highly developed and specialized
knowledge,23 such that physicians are generally
26
free to exercise their own skill and judgment in
rendering medical services sans
interference.24 Hence, when a doctor practices
medicine in a hospital setting, the hospital and its
employees are deemed to subserve him in his
ministrations to the patient and his actions are of
his own responsibility.25
The case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital26 was then considered an authority for
this view. The "Schloendorff doctrine" regards a
physician, even if employed by a hospital, as an
independent contractor because of the skill he
exercises and the lack of control exerted over his
work. Under this doctrine, hospitals are exempt
from the application of the respondeat superior
principle for fault or negligence committed by
physicians in the discharge of their profession.
However, the efficacy of the foregoing doctrine
has weakened with the significant developments
in medical care. Courts came to realize that
modern hospitals are increasingly taking active
role in supplying and regulating medical care to
patients. No longer were a hospital’s functions
limited to furnishing room, food, facilities for
treatment and operation, and attendants for its
patients. Thus, in Bing v. Thunig,27 the New York
Court of Appeals deviated from the Schloendorff
doctrine, noting that modern hospitals actually
do far more than provide facilities for treatment.
Rather, they regularly employ, on a salaried
x basis, a large staff of physicians, interns, nurses,
administrative and manual workers. They charge
patients for medical care and treatment, even
collecting for such services through legal action,
if necessary. The court then concluded that there
is no reason to exempt hospitals from the
universal rule of respondeat superior.
In our shores, the nature of the relationship
between the hospital and the physicians is
rendered inconsequential in view of our
categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of
Appeals28 that for purposes of apportioning
x responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians. This Court held:
"We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital
in this particular incident. The unique practice
(among private hospitals) of filling up specialist
staff with attending and visiting "consultants,"
who are allegedly not hospital employees,
presents problems in apportioning responsibility
for negligence in medical malpractice cases.
However, the difficulty is more apparent than
real.
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant
control in the hiring and firing of consultants and
in the conduct of their work within the hospital
premises. Doctors who apply for ‘consultant’
slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit
proof of completion of residency, their
educational qualifications, generally, evidence of
accreditation by the appropriate board
(diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most
cases, and references. These requirements are
carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital
administration or by a review committee set up
by the hospital who either accept or reject the
application. x x x.
 27
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting
or attending consultant, he is normally required
to attend clinico-pathological conferences,
conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and
residents, moderate grand rounds and patient
audits and perform other tasks and
responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to
maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the
privilege of admitting patients into the hospital.
In addition to these, the physician’s performance
as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer
review committee on the basis of mortality and
morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients,
nurses, interns and residents. A consultant remiss
in his duties, or a consultant who regularly falls
short of the minimum standards acceptable to
the hospital or its peer review committee, is
normally politely terminated.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and
exercise real control over their attending and
visiting ‘consultant’ staff. While ‘consultants’ are
not, technically employees, x x x, the control
exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate
consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of
an employer-employee relationship, with the
exception of the payment of wages. In assessing
whether such a relationship in fact exists, the
control test is determining. Accordingly, on the
basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals
and their attending and visiting physicians. "
But the Ramos pronouncement is not our only
basis in sustaining PSI’s liability. Its liability is also
anchored upon the agency principle of apparent
authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine
of corporate negligence which have gained
acceptance in the determination of a hospital’s
liability for negligent acts of health professionals.
The present case serves as a perfect platform to
test the applicability of these doctrines, thus,
enriching our jurisprudence.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes
referred to as the "holding
out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or
agency by estoppel,29 has its origin from the law
of agency. It imposes liability, not as the result of
the reality of a contractual relationship, but
rather because of the actions of a principal or an
employer in somehow misleading the public into
believing that the relationship or the authority
exists.30 The concept is essentially one of
estoppel and has been explained in this manner:
"The principal is bound by the acts of his agent
with the apparent authority which he knowingly
permits the agent to assume, or which he holds
the agent out to the public as possessing. The
question in every case is whether the principal
has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such
a situation that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with business usages and the nature
of the particular business, is justified in
presuming that such agent has authority to
perform the particular act in question.31
The applicability of apparent authority in the field
of hospital liability was upheld long time ago in
Irving v. Doctor Hospital of Lake Worth,
Inc.32 There, it was explicitly stated that "there
does not appear to be any rational basis for
excluding the concept of apparent authority from
the field of hospital liability." Thus, in cases where
it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions,
has held out a particular physician as its agent
and/or employee and that a patient has accepted
treatment from that physician in the reasonable
belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the
hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the
physician’s negligence.
Our jurisdiction recognizes the concept of an
agency by implication or estoppel. Article 1869 of
the Civil Code reads:
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied
from the acts of the principal, from his silence or
lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the
agency, knowing that another person is acting on
his behalf without authority.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of
the Medical City Hospital the names and
specializations of the physicians associated or
accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and
Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals’
conclusion that it "is now estopped from passing
all the blame to the physicians whose names it
proudly paraded in the public directory leading
the public to believe that it vouched for their skill
and competence." Indeed, PSI’s act is
tantamount to holding out to the public that
Medical City Hospital, through its accredited
physicians, offers quality health care services. By
accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital
created the impression that they were its agents,
authorized to perform medical or surgical
services for its patients. As expected, these
patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted
the services on the reasonable belief that such
were being rendered by the hospital or its
employees, agents, or servants. The trial court
correctly pointed out:
x x x regardless of the education and status in
life of the patient, he ought not be burdened with
the defense of absence of employer-employee
relationship between the hospital and the
independent physician whose name and
competence are certainly certified to the general
public by the hospital’s act of listing him and his
specialty in its lobby directory, as in the case
herein. The high costs of today’s medical and
health care should at least exact on the hospital
greater, if not broader, legal responsibility for the
conduct of treatment and surgery within its
facility by its accredited physician or surgeon,
regardless of whether he is independent or
employed."33
The wisdom of the foregoing ratiocination is easy
to discern. Corporate entities, like PSI, are
capable of acting only through other individuals,
such as physicians. If these accredited physicians
do their job well, the hospital succeeds in its
mission of offering quality medical services and
thus profits financially. Logically, where
negligence mars the quality of its services, the
hospital should not be allowed to escape liability
for the acts of its ostensible agents.
We now proceed to the doctrine of corporate
negligence or corporate responsibility.
One allegation in the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-43332 for negligence and malpractice is that
PSI as owner, operator and manager of Medical
 28
City Hospital, "did not perform the necessary
supervision nor exercise diligent efforts in the
supervision of Drs. Ampil and Fuentes and its
nursing staff, resident doctors, and medical
interns who assisted Drs. Ampil and Fuentes in
the performance of their duties as
surgeons."34 Premised on the doctrine of
corporate negligence, the trial court held that PSI
is directly liable for such breach of duty.
We agree with the trial court.
Recent years have seen the doctrine of corporate
negligence as the judicial answer to the problem
of allocating hospital’s liability for the negligent
acts of health practitioners, absent facts to
support the application of respondeat superior or
apparent authority. Its formulation proceeds from
the judiciary’s acknowledgment that in these
modern times, the duty of providing quality
medical service is no longer the sole prerogative
and responsibility of the physician. The modern
hospitals have changed structure. Hospitals now
tend to organize a highly professional medical
staff whose competence and performance need
to be monitored by the hospitals commensurate
with their inherent responsibility to provide
quality medical care.35
The doctrine has its genesis in Darling v.
Charleston Community Hospital.36 There, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that "the jury could
have found a hospital negligent, inter alia, in
failing to have a sufficient number of trained
nurses attending the patient; failing to require a
consultation with or examination by members of
the hospital staff; and failing to review the
treatment rendered to the patient." On the basis
of Darling, other jurisdictions held that a
hospital’s corporate negligence extends to
permitting a physician known to be incompetent
to practice at the hospital.37 With the passage of
time, more duties were expected from hospitals,
among them: (1) the use of reasonable care in
the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities
and equipment; (2) the selection and retention of
competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or
supervision of all persons who practice medicine
within its walls; and (4) the formulation, adoption
and enforcement of adequate rules and policies
that ensure quality care for its patients.38 Thus, in
Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevich,39 it was
held that a hospital, following the doctrine of
corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that
it meets the standards of responsibilities for the
care of patients. Such duty includes the proper
supervision of the members of its medical staff.
And in Bost v. Riley,40 the court concluded that a
patient who enters a hospital does so with the
reasonable expectation that it will attempt to
cure him. The hospital accordingly has the duty
to make a reasonable effort to monitor and
oversee the treatment prescribed and
administered by the physicians practicing in its
premises.
In the present case, it was duly established that
PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the
purpose and under the concept of providing
comprehensive medical services to the public.
Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect from harm all patients
admitted into its facility for medical treatment.
Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such duty.
The findings of the trial court are convincing,
thus:
x x x PSI’s liability is traceable to its failure to
conduct an investigation of the matter reported
in the nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure
established PSI’s part in the dark conspiracy of
silence and concealment about the gauzes.
Ethical considerations, if not also legal, dictated
the holding of an immediate inquiry into the
events, if not for the benefit of the patient to
whom the duty is primarily owed, then in the
interest of arriving at the truth. The Court cannot
accept that the medical and the healing
professions, through their members like
defendant surgeons, and their institutions like
PSI’s hospital facility, can callously turn their
backs on and disregard even a mere probability
of mistake or negligence by refusing or failing to
investigate a report of such seriousness as the
one in Natividad’s case.
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
operated on Natividad with the assistance of the
Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of
resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it
is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the
operator of the hospital, has actual or
constructive knowledge of the procedures carried
out, particularly the report of the attending
nurses that the two pieces of gauze were
missing. In Fridena v. Evans,41 it was held that a
corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired
by or notice given to its agents or officers within
the scope of their authority and in reference to a
matter to which their authority extends. This
means that the knowledge of any of the staff of
Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge of
PSI. Now, the failure of PSI, despite the attending
nurses’ report, to investigate and inform
Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts
to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its
duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to
take an active step in fixing the negligence
committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously
liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly
liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.
In Fridena, the Supreme Court of Arizona held:
x x x In recent years, however, the duty of care
owed to the patient by the hospital has
expanded. The emerging trend is to hold the
hospital responsible where the hospital has failed
to monitor and review medical services being
provided within its walls. See Kahn Hospital
Malpractice Prevention, 27 De Paul . Rev. 23
(1977).
Among the cases indicative of the ‘emerging
trend’ is Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App.
75,500 P. 2d 335 (1972). In Purcell, the hospital
argued that it could not be held liable for the
malpractice of a medical practitioner because he
was an independent contractor within the
hospital. The Court of Appeals pointed out that
the hospital had created a professional staff
whose competence and performance was to be
monitored and reviewed by the governing body
of the hospital, and the court held that a hospital
would be negligent where it had knowledge or
reason to believe that a doctor using the facilities
 29
was employing a method of treatment or care
which fell below the recognized standard of care.
Subsequent to the Purcell decision, the Arizona
Court of Appeals held that a hospital has certain
inherent responsibilities regarding the quality of
medical care furnished to patients within its walls
and it must meet the standards of responsibility
commensurate with this undertaking. Beeck v.
Tucson General Hospital, 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.
2d 1153 (1972). This court has confirmed the
rulings of the Court of Appeals that a hospital has
the duty of supervising the competence of the
doctors on its staff. x x x.
x x x x x arises. Thus, a frequent flyer booked in the
x Business Class has priority for upgrading to First
In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs did
plead that the operation was performed at the
hospital with its knowledge, aid, and assistance,
and that the negligence of the defendants was
the proximate cause of the patient’s injuries. We
find that such general allegations of negligence,
along with the evidence produced at the trial of
this case, are sufficient to support the hospital’s
liability based on the theory of negligent
supervision."
Anent the corollary issue of whether PSI is
solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil for damages, let it
be emphasized that PSI, apart from a general
denial of its responsibility, failed to adduce
evidence showing that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the accreditation
and supervision of the latter. In neglecting to
offer such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden
under the last paragraph of Article 2180 cited
earlier, and, therefore, must be adjudged
solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil. Moreover, as we
have discussed, PSI is also directly liable to the
Aganas.
One final word. Once a physician undertakes the
treatment and care of a patient, the law imposes
on him certain obligations. In order to escape
liability, he must possess that reasonable degree
of learning, skill and experience required by his
profession. At the same time, he must apply
reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of
his skill and the application of his knowledge, and
exert his best judgment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY all the petitions and
AFFIRM the challenged Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 32198.
Costs against petitioners PSI and Dr. Miguel
Ampil.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 150843. March 14, 2003]
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS,
LTD., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES DANIEL
VAZQUEZ and MARIA LUISA
MADRIGAL VAZQUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Is an involuntary upgrading of an airline
passengers accommodation from one class to a
more superior class at no extra cost a breach of
contract of carriage that would entitle the
passenger to an award of damages? This is a
novel question that has to be resolved in this
case.
The facts in this case, as found by the Court
of Appeals and adopted by petitioner Cathay
Pacific Airways, Ltd., (hereinafter Cathay) are as
follows:
Cathay is a common carrier engaged in the
business of transporting passengers and goods
by air. Among the many routes it services is the
Manila-Hongkong-Manila course. As part of its
marketing strategy, Cathay accords its frequent
flyers membership in its Marco Polo Club. The
members enjoy several privileges, such as
priority for upgrading of booking without any
extra charge whenever an opportunity
Class if the Business Class Section is fully
booked.
Respondents-spouses Dr. Daniel Earnshaw
Vazquez and Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez are
frequent flyers of Cathay and are Gold Card
members of its Marco Polo Club. On 24
September 1996, the Vazquezes, together with
their maid and two friends Pacita Cruz and
Josefina Vergel de Dios, went to Hongkong for
pleasure and business.
For their return flight to Manila on 28
September 1996, they were booked on Cathays
Flight CX-905, with departure time at 9:20
p.m. Two hours before their time of departure,
the Vazquezes and their companions checked in
their luggage at Cathays check-in counter at Kai
Tak Airport and were given their respective
boarding passes, to wit, Business Class boarding
passes for the Vazquezes and their two friends,
and Economy Class for their maid. They then
proceeded to the Business Class passenger
lounge.
When boarding time was announced, the
Vazquezes and their two friends went to
Departure Gate No. 28, which was designated for
Business Class passengers. Dr. Vazquez
presented his boarding pass to the ground
stewardess, who in turn inserted it into an
electronic machine reader or computer at the
gate. The ground stewardess was assisted by a
ground attendant by the name of Clara Lai Han
Chiu. When Ms. Chiu glanced at the computer
monitor, she saw a message that there was a
seat change from Business Class to First Class for
the Vazquezes.
Ms. Chiu approached Dr. Vazquez and told
him that the Vazquezes accommodations were
upgraded to First Class. Dr. Vazquez refused the
upgrade, reasoning that it would not look nice for
them as hosts to travel in First Class and their
guests, in the Business Class; and moreover, they
were going to discuss business matters during
the flight. He also told Ms. Chiu that she could
have other passengers instead transferred to the
First Class Section. Taken aback by the refusal for
upgrading, Ms. Chiu consulted her supervisor,
who told her to handle the situation and convince
the Vazquezes to accept the upgrading. Ms. Chiu
informed the latter that the Business Class was
fully booked, and that since they were Marco Polo
Club members they had the priority to be
upgraded to the First Class. Dr. Vazquez
continued to refuse, so Ms. Chiu told them that if
they would not avail themselves of the privilege,
they would not be allowed to take the
 30
flight. Eventually, after talking to his two friends,
Dr. Vazquez gave in. He and Mrs. Vazquez then
proceeded to the First Class Cabin.
Upon their return to Manila, the Vazquezes,
in a letter of 2 October 1996 addressed to
Cathays Country Manager, demanded that they
be indemnified in the amount of P1million for the
humiliation and embarrassment caused by its
employees. They also demanded a written
apology from the management of Cathay,
preferably a responsible person with a rank of no
less than the Country Manager, as well as the
apology from Ms. Chiu within fifteen days from
receipt of the letter.
In his reply of 14 October 1996, Mr. Larry
Yuen, the assistant to Cathays Country Manager
Argus Guy Robson, informed the Vazquezes that
Cathay would investigate the incident and get
back to them within a weeks time.
On 8 November 1996, after Cathays failure
to give them any feedback within its self-imposed
deadline, the Vazquezes instituted before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City an action for
damages against Cathay, praying for the
payment to each of them the amounts
of P250,000 as temperate damages; P500,000 as
moral damages; P500,000 as exemplary or
corrective damages; and P250,000 as attorneys
fees.
In their complaint, the Vazquezes alleged
that when they informed Ms. Chiu that they
preferred to stay in Business Class, Ms. Chiu
obstinately, uncompromisingly and in a loud,
discourteous and harsh voice threatened that
they could not board and leave with the flight
unless they go to First Class, since the Business
Class was overbooked. Ms. Chius loud and
stringent shouting annoyed, embarrassed, and
humiliated them because the incident was
witnessed by all the other passengers waiting for
boarding. They also claimed that they were
unjustifiably delayed to board the plane, and
when they were finally permitted to get into the
aircraft, the forward storage compartment was
already full. A flight stewardess instructed Dr.
Vazquez to put his roll-on luggage in the
overhead storage compartment. Because he was
not assisted by any of the crew in putting up his
luggage, his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was
aggravated, causing him extreme pain on his arm
and wrist. The Vazquezes also averred that they
belong to the uppermost and absolutely top elite
of both Philippine Society and the Philippine
financial community, [and that] they were among
the wealthiest persons in the Philippine[s].
In its answer, Cathay alleged that it is a
practice among commercial airlines to upgrade
passengers to the next better class of
accommodation, whenever an opportunity arises,
such as when a certain section is fully
booked. Priority in upgrading is given to its
frequent flyers, who are considered favored
passengers like the Vazquezes. Thus, when the
Business Class Section of Flight CX-905 was fully
booked, Cathays computer sorted out the names
of favored passengers for involuntary upgrading
to First Class. When Ms. Chiu informed the
Vazquezes that they were upgraded to First
Class, Dr. Vazquez refused. He then stood at the
entrance of the boarding apron, blocking the
queue of passengers from boarding the plane,
which inconvenienced other passengers. He
shouted that it was impossible for him and his
wife to be upgraded without his two friends who
were traveling with them. Because of Dr.
Vazquezs outburst, Ms. Chiu thought of
upgrading the traveling companions of the
Vazquezes. But when she checked the computer,
she learned that the Vazquezes companions did
not have priority for upgrading. She then tried to
book the Vazquezes again to their original seats.
However, since the Business Class Section was
already fully booked, she politely informed Dr.
Vazquez of such fact and explained that the
upgrading was in recognition of their status as
Cathays valued passengers. Finally, after talking
to their guests, the Vazquezes eventually decided
to take the First Class accommodation.
Cathay also asserted that its employees at
the Hong Kong airport acted in good faith in
dealing with the Vazquezes; none of them
shouted, humiliated, embarrassed, or committed
any act of disrespect against them (the
Vazquezes). Assuming that there was indeed a
breach of contractual obligation, Cathay acted in
good faith, which negates any basis for their
claim for temperate, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees. Hence, it prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint and for payment
of P100,000 for exemplary damages
and P300,000 as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
During the trial, Dr. Vazquez testified to
support the allegations in the complaint. His
testimony was corroborated by his two friends
who were with him at the time of the incident,
namely, Pacita G. Cruz and Josefina Vergel de
Dios.
For its part, Cathay presented documentary
evidence and the testimonies of Mr. Yuen; Ms.
Chiu; Norma Barrientos, Comptroller of its
retained counsel; and Mr. Robson. Yuen and
Robson testified on Cathays policy of upgrading
the seat accommodation of its Marco Polo Club
members when an opportunity arises.The
upgrading of the Vazquezes to First Class was
done in good faith; in fact, the First Class Section
is definitely much better than the Business Class
in terms of comfort, quality of food, and service
from the cabin crew. They also testified that
overbooking is a widely accepted practice in the
airline industry and is in accordance with the
International Air Transport Association (IATA)
regulations. Airlines overbook because a lot of
passengers do not show up for their flight.With
respect to Flight CX-905, there was no overall
overbooking to a degree that a passenger was
bumped off or downgraded. Yuen and Robson
also stated that the demand letter of the
Vazquezes was immediately acted upon. Reports
were gathered from their office in Hong Kong and
immediately forwarded to their counsel Atty.
Remollo for legal advice. However, Atty. Remollo
begged off because his services were likewise
retained by the Vazquezes; nonetheless, he
undertook to solve the problem in behalf of
Cathay. But nothing happened until Cathay
received a copy of the complaint in this case. For
her part, Ms. Chiu denied that she shouted or
used foul or impolite language against the
 31
Vazquezes. Ms. Barrientos testified on the
amount of attorneys fees and other litigation
expenses, such as those for the taking of the
depositions of Yuen and Chiu.
In its decision[1] of 19 October 1998, the trial
court found for the Vazquezes and decreed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence
to sustain the instant complaint, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Vazquez
spouses and against defendant Cathay Pacific
Airways, Ltd., ordering the latter to pay each
plaintiff the following:
a) Nominal damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 for each plaintiff;
b) Moral damages in the amount
of P2,000,000.00 for each plaintiff;
c) Exemplary damages in the amount
of P5,000,000.00 for each plaintiff;
d) Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 for each
plaintiff; and
e) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
According to the trial court, Cathay offers
various classes of seats from which passengers
are allowed to choose regardless of their reasons
or motives, whether it be due to budgetary
constraints or whim. The choice imposes a clear
obligation on Cathay to transport the passengers
in the class chosen by them.The carrier cannot,
without exposing itself to liability, force a
passenger to involuntarily change his choice. The
upgrading of the Vazquezes accommodation over
and above their vehement objections was due to
the overbooking of the Business Class. It was a
pretext to pack as many passengers as possible
into the plane to maximize Cathays
revenues. Cathays actuations in this case
displayed deceit, gross negligence, and bad faith,
which entitled the Vazquezes to awards for
damages.
On appeal by the petitioners, the Court of
Appeals, in its decision of 24 July 2001, [2] deleted
the award for exemplary damages; and it
reduced the awards for moral and nominal
damages for each of the Vazquezes to P250,000
and P50,000, respectively, and the attorneys fees
and litigation expenses to P50,000 for both
of them.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated that by
upgrading the Vazquezes to First Class, Cathay
novated the contract of carriage without the
formers consent. There was a breach of contract
not because Cathay overbooked the Business
Class Section of Flight CX-905 but because the
latter pushed through with the upgrading despite
the objections of the Vazquezes.
However, the Court of Appeals was not
convinced that Ms. Chiu shouted at, or meant to
be discourteous to, Dr. Vazquez, although it
might seemed that way to the latter, who was a
member of the elite in Philippine society and was
not therefore used to being harangued by
anybody. Ms. Chiu was a Hong Kong Chinese
whose fractured Chinese was difficult to
understand and whose manner of speaking might
sound harsh or shrill to Filipinos because of
cultural differences. But the Court of Appeals did
not find her to have acted with deliberate malice,
deceit, gross negligence, or bad faith. If at all,
she was negligent in not offering the First Class
accommodations to other passengers. Neither
can the flight stewardess in the First Class Cabin
be said to have been in bad faith when she failed
to assist Dr. Vazquez in lifting his baggage into
the overhead storage bin. There is no proof that
he asked for help and was refused even after
saying that he was suffering from bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome. Anent the delay of Yuen in
responding to the demand letter of the
Vazquezes, the Court of Appeals found it to have
been sufficiently explained.
The Vazquezes and Cathay separately filed
motions for a reconsideration of the decision,
both of which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
Cathay seasonably filed with us this petition
in this case. Cathay maintains that the award for
moral damages has no basis, since the Court of
Appeals found that there was no wanton,
fraudulent, reckless and oppressive display of
manners on the part of its personnel; and that
the breach of contract was not attended by fraud,
malice, or bad faith. If any damage had been
suffered by the Vazquezes, it was damnum
absque injuria, which is damage without injury,
damage or injury inflicted without injustice, loss
or damage without violation of a legal right, or a
wrong done to a man for which the law provides
no remedy. Cathay also invokes our decision
in United Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals [3] where
we recognized that, in accordance with the Civil
Aeronautics Boards Economic Regulation No. 7,
as amended, an overbooking that does not
exceed ten percent cannot be considered
deliberate and done in bad faith. We thus deleted
in that case the awards for moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorneys fees, for lack of
proof of overbooking exceeding ten percent or of
bad faith on the part of the airline carrier.
On the other hand, the Vazquezes assert that
the Court of Appeals was correct in granting
awards for moral and nominal damages and
attorneys fees in view of the breach of contract
committed by Cathay for transferring them from
the Business Class to First Class Section without
prior notice or consent and over their vigorous
objection. They likewise argue that the issuance
of passenger tickets more than the seating
capacity of each section of the plane is in itself
fraudulent, malicious and tainted with bad faith.
The key issues for our consideration are
whether (1) by upgrading the seat
accommodation of the Vazquezes from Business
Class to First Class Cathay breached its contract
of carriage with the Vazquezes; (2) the upgrading
was tainted with fraud or bad faith; and (3) the
Vazquezes are entitled to damages.
We resolve the first issue in the affirmative.
A contract is a meeting of minds between
two persons whereby one agrees to give
something or render some service to another for
a consideration. There is no contract unless the
following requisites concur: (1) consent of the
contracting parties; (2) an object certain which is
the subject of the contract; and (3) the cause of
the obligation which is established.
[4]
Undoubtedly, a contract of carriage existed
between Cathay and the Vazquezes. They
 32
voluntarily and freely gave their consent to an
agreement whose object was the transportation
of the Vazquezes from Manila to Hong Kong and
back to Manila, with seats in the Business Class
Section of the aircraft, and whose cause or
consideration was the fare paid by the Vazquezes
to Cathay.
The only problem is the legal effect of the
upgrading of the seat accommodation of the
Vazquezes. Did it constitute a breach of contract?
Breach of contract is defined as the failure
without legal reason to comply with the terms of
a contract.[5] It is also defined as the [f]ailure,
without legal excuse, to perform any promise
which forms the whole or part of the contract.[6]
In previous cases, the breach of contract of
carriage consisted in either the bumping off of a
passenger with confirmed reservation or the
downgrading of a passengers seat
accommodation from one class to a lower
class. In this case, what happened was the
reverse. The contract between the parties was for
Cathay to transport the Vazquezes to Manila on a
Business Class accommodation in Flight CX-
905. After checking-in their luggage at the Kai
Tak Airport in Hong Kong, the Vazquezes were
given boarding cards indicating their seat
assignments in the Business Class
Section. However, during the boarding time,
when the Vazquezes presented their boarding
passes, they were informed that they had a seat
change from Business Class to First Class. It
turned out that the Business Class was
overbooked in that there were more passengers
than the number of seats. Thus, the seat
assignments of the Vazquezes were given to
waitlisted passengers, and the Vazquezes, being
members of the Marco Polo Club, were upgraded
from Business Class to First Class.
We note that in all their pleadings, the
Vazquezes never denied that they were members
of Cathays Marco Polo Club. They knew that as
members of the Club, they had priority for
upgrading of their seat accommodation at no
extra cost when an opportunity arises. But, just
like other privileges, such priority could be
waived. The Vazquezes should have been
consulted first whether they wanted to avail
themselves of the privilege or would consent to a
change of seat accommodation before their seat
assignments were given to other
passengers. Normally, one would appreciate and
accept an upgrading, for it would mean a better
accommodation. But, whatever their reason was
and however odd it might be, the Vazquezes had
every right to decline the upgrade and insist on
the Business Class accommodation they had
booked for and which was designated in their
boarding passes. They clearly waived their
priority or preference when they asked that other
passengers be given the upgrade. It should not
have been imposed on them over their vehement
objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay
breached its contract of carriage with the
Vazquezes.
We are not, however, convinced that the
upgrading or the breach of contract was attended
by fraud or bad faith. Thus, we resolve the
second issue in the negative.
Bad faith and fraud are allegations of fact
that demand clear and convincing proof. They are
serious accusations that can be so conveniently
and casually invoked, and that is why they are
never presumed. They amount to mere slogans
or mudslinging unless convincingly substantiated
by whoever is alleging them.
Fraud has been defined to include an
inducement through insidious
machination. Insidious machination refers to a
deceitful scheme or plot with an evil or devious
purpose. Deceit exists where the party, with
intent to deceive, conceals or omits to state
material facts and, by reason of such omission or
concealment, the other party was induced to give
consent that would not otherwise have been
given.[7]
Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty
through some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud.[8]
We find no persuasive proof of fraud or bad
faith in this case. The Vazquezes were not
induced to agree to the upgrading through
insidious words or deceitful machination or
through willful concealment of material facts.
Upon boarding, Ms. Chiu told the Vazquezes that
their accommodations were upgraded to First
Class in view of their being Gold Card members
of Cathays Marco Polo Club. She was honest in
telling them that their seats were already given
to other passengers and the Business Class
Section was fully booked. Ms. Chiu might have
failed to consider the remedy of offering the First
Class seats to other passengers. But, we find no
bad faith in her failure to do so, even if that
amounted to an exercise of poor judgment.
Neither was the transfer of the Vazquezes
effected for some evil or devious purpose. As
testified to by Mr. Robson, the First Class Section
is better than the Business Class Section in terms
of comfort, quality of food, and service from the
cabin crew; thus, the difference in fare between
the First Class and Business Class at that time
was $250.[9] Needless to state, an upgrading is
for the better condition and, definitely, for the
benefit of the passenger.
We are not persuaded by the Vazquezes
argument that the overbooking of the Business
Class Section constituted bad faith on the part of
Cathay. Section 3 of the Economic Regulation No.
7 of the Civil Aeronautics Board, as amended,
provides:
Sec 3. Scope. This regulation shall apply to every
Philippine and foreign air carrier with respect to
its operation of flights or portions of flights
originating from or terminating at, or serving a
point within the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines insofar as it denies boarding to a
passenger on a flight, or portion of a flight inside
or outside the Philippines, for which he holds
confirmed reserved space. Furthermore, this
Regulation is designed to cover only honest
mistakes on the part of the carriers and excludes
deliberate and willful acts of non-
accommodation. Provided, however, that
overbooking not exceeding 10% of the seating
capacity of the aircraft shall not be considered as
 33
a deliberate and willful act of non-
accommodation.
It is clear from this section that an
overbooking that does not exceed ten percent is
not considered deliberate and therefore does not
amount to bad faith.[10]Here, while there was
admittedly an overbooking of the Business Class,
there was no evidence of overbooking of the
plane beyond ten percent, and no passenger was
ever bumped off or was refused to board the
aircraft.
Now we come to the third issue on damages.
The Court of Appeals awarded each of the
Vazquezes moral damages in the amount
of P250,000. Article 2220 of the Civil Code
provides:
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a
legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Although incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of the defendants
wrongful act or omission.[11] Thus, case law
establishes the following requisites for the award
of moral damages: (1) there must be an injury
clearly sustained by the claimant, whether
physical, mental or psychological; (2) there must
be a culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the
award for damages is predicated on any of the
cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[12]
Moral damages predicated upon a breach of
contract of carriage may only be recoverable in
instances where the carrier is guilty of fraud or
bad faith or where the mishap resulted in the
death of a passenger.[13] Where in breaching the
contract of carriage the airline is not shown to
have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability
for damages is limited to the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation which the parties had foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case
the liability does not include moral and
exemplary damages.[14]
In this case, we have ruled that the breach of
contract of carriage, which consisted in the
involuntary upgrading of the Vazquezes seat
accommodation, was not attended by fraud or
bad faith. The Court of Appeals award of moral
damages has, therefore, no leg to stand on.
The deletion of the award for exemplary
damages by the Court of Appeals is correct. It is a
requisite in the grant of exemplary damages that
the act of the offender must be accompanied by
bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or
malevolent manner.[15] Such requisite is absent in
this case. Moreover, to be entitled thereto the
claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, or compensatory damages.[16] Since
the Vazquezes are not entitled to any of these
damages, the award for exemplary damages has
no legal basis. And where the awards for moral
and exemplary damages are eliminated, so must
the award for attorneys fees.[17]
The most that can be adjudged in favor of
the Vazquezes for Cathays breach of contract is
an award for nominal damages under Article
2221 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
Article 2221 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated
in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may
be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.
Worth noting is the fact that in Cathays
Memorandum filed with this Court, it prayed only
for the deletion of the award for moral
damages. It deferred to the Court of Appeals
discretion in awarding nominal damages; thus:
As far as the award of nominal damages is
concerned, petitioner respectfully defers to the
Honorable Court of Appeals discretion. Aware as
it is that somehow, due to the resistance of
respondents-spouses to the normally-appreciated
gesture of petitioner to upgrade their
accommodations, petitioner may have disturbed
the respondents-spouses wish to be with their
companions (who traveled to Hong Kong with
them) at the Business Class on their flight to
Manila. Petitioner regrets that in its desire to
provide the respondents-spouses with additional
amenities for the one and one-half (1 1/2) hour
flight to Manila, unintended tension ensued. [18]
Nonetheless, considering that the breach was
intended to give more benefit and advantage to
the Vazquezes by upgrading their Business Class
accommodation to First Class because of their
valued status as Marco Polo members, we reduce
the award for nominal damages to P5,000.
Before writing finis to this decision, we find it
well-worth to quote the apt observation of the
Court of Appeals regarding the awards adjudged
by the trial court:
We are not amused but alarmed at the lower
courts unbelievable alacrity, bordering on the
scandalous, to award excessive amounts as
damages. In their complaint, appellees asked
for P1 million as moral damages but the lower
court awarded P4 million; they asked
for P500,000.00 as exemplary damages but the
lower court cavalierly awarded a whooping P10
million; they asked for P250,000.00 as attorneys
fees but were awarded P2 million; they did not
ask for nominal damages but were
awarded P200,000.00. It is as if the lower court
went on a rampage, and why it acted that way is
beyond all tests of reason. In fact the
excessiveness of the total award invites the
suspicion that it was the result of prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial court.
The presiding judge of the lower court is enjoined
to hearken to the Supreme Courts admonition
in Singson vs. CA (282 SCRA 149 [1997]), where
it said:
The well-entrenched principle is that the grant of
moral damages depends upon the discretion of
the court based on the circumstances of each
case. This discretion is limited by the principle
that the amount awarded should not be palpably
and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it
 34
was the result of prejudice or corruption on the
part of the trial court.
and in Alitalia Airways vs. CA (187 SCRA 763
[1990], where it was held:
Nonetheless, we agree with the injunction
expressed by the Court of Appeals that
passengers must not prey on international
airlines for damage awards, like trophies in a
safari. After all neither the social standing nor
prestige of the passenger should determine the
extent to which he would suffer because of a
wrong done, since the dignity affronted in the
individual is a quality inherent in him and not
conferred by these social indicators. [19]
We adopt as our own this observation of the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
partly GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals of 24 July 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 63339
is hereby MODIFIED, and as modified, the awards
for moral damages and attorneys fees are set
aside and deleted, and the award for nominal
damages is reduced to P5,000.