Fire and Explosion Guidance

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UKOOA / HSE
Fire and explosion guidance

Part 2: Avoidance and mitigation of fires
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Document number 152-RP-48

Revision Date Reason for Issue
A 1 Mar 05 Initial build
B 21 Jun. 05 All received material to date
0 3 July 05 Issued for comment to sponsors, authors and peer review
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Foreword
This document has been prepared by fireandblast.com limited by compiling contributions from a
selection of industry experts in various aspects of fires on offshore installations.
This is an initial rough draft of the document produced at an early stage of its development in order
to seek consensus from the project sponsors, UKOOA and HSE, with input from the rest of the UK
industry, on the shape of the guidance that will be produced over the next few months.
fireandblast.com have made no significant technical changes to the text provided by the experts,
but have compiled and formatted it in to a more consistent style.
Comments are invited on this document, but these should be limited to the technical scope of the
contents, and particularly to any omissions identified, corrections required, or any views expressed
that cannot be regarded as representing any form of consensus.
It should be noted that extensive reformatting and rearrangement of text from the experts has been
undertaken, and that completion of certain formatting and particularly of the final compilation of the
document references will be undertaken before finalization of the document in UKOOA / HSE
format.
Items that will be completed at that time, and which do not need to be commented on in this issue
include:
• Moving references to end of each chapter and filling them out
• Consistent format and references for Figures, tables and equations
• Red text, highlighted text and boxed comments to be responded to by the "experts"
• Figures to be properly drawn
Page 2 of 240 152-RP-48 Rev 0, July 2005

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Contents
1. Introduction 5
1.1 History ................................................................................................................................. 5
1.2 Objectives ........................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Fire and explosion hazard management............................................................................. 7
1.4 Overview of the guidance.................................................................................................... 8
2. Fire hazard management philosophy 10
2.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................... 10
2.2 Understanding the fire hazard........................................................................................... 13
2.3 Hazard management principles ........................................................................................ 23
2.4 Hazard management systems .......................................................................................... 24
2.5 Legislation, standards and guidance................................................................................. 27
2.6 Inherently safer design...................................................................................................... 30
2.7 Risk screening................................................................................................................... 36
2.8 Risk reduction ................................................................................................................... 39
2.9 Human factors................................................................................................................... 41
3. Fires on offshore installations 42
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 42
3.2 Fire types and scenarios ................................................................................................... 42
3.3 Fire prevention methods ................................................................................................... 46
3.4 Fire detection and control methods................................................................................... 48
3.5 Methods for mitigating the effects of fires ......................................................................... 56
3.6 Performance standards..................................................................................................... 60
3.7 Methods of analysis .......................................................................................................... 63
3.8 Particular considerations for floating structures, storage and offloading systems ............ 71
3.9 Particular considerations for mobile offshore units ........................................................... 74
3.10 Particular considerations for existing installations............................................................. 82
3.11 Particular considerations for accommodation and other areas for personnel ................... 86
4. Interaction with explosion hazard management 88
4.1 General ............................................................................................................................. 88
4.2 Fire and explosion prevention methods ............................................................................ 88
4.3 Fire and explosion detection and control methods............................................................ 89
4.4 Fire and explosion mitigation methods.............................................................................. 93
4.5 Combined fire and explosion analysis............................................................................... 97
4.6 A comment on risk analysis ............................................................................................ 101
5. Derivation of fire loadings 102
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 102
5.2 Fire characteristics and combustion effects .................................................................... 102
5.3 Fire and smoke loading................................................................................................... 112
5.4 Estimating fire and smoke loadings for a QRA ............................................................... 116
5.5 Heat transfer ................................................................................................................... 125
5.6 A methodology for an initial fire QRA .............................................................................. 142
152-RP-48 Rev 0, July 2005 Page 3 of 240

6. Response to fires 143
6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 143
6.2 Review of effects of fire and nature of failures ................................................................ 144
6.3 Acceptance criteria.......................................................................................................... 153
6.4 Definition of failure this should come right up front! – and there should be more of it. ... 155
6.5 Methods of assessment .................................................................................................. 156
6.6 Attachments and coat-back – we need to link this with possible measures.................... 165
6.7 Process responses.......................................................................................................... 166
6.8 Personnel ........................................................................................................................ 174
7. Detailed design guidance for fire resistance 188
7.1 General ........................................................................................................................... 188
7.2 The design sequence – minimising fire hazards throughout the design ......................... 189
7.3 Best practice for fire protection systems ......................................................................... 199
7.4 Human factors – man / machine interface ...................................................................... 211
7.5 Industry & regulatory authority initiatives ........................................................................ 213
8. References 216
Annex A Acronyms, abbreviations etc. 221
Annex B Details on legislation, standards and guidance 222
Annex C Review of models 228
Annex D Checklists 237

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1. Introduction
1.1 History
Following the Piper Alpha disaster a large Joint Industry Project called ‘Blast and Fire Engineering
for Topsides Structures (Phase 1)’ was carried out between May 1990 and July 1991. The main
deliverable from this project was the Interim Guidance Notes (IGNs) [11] and 26 background
reports [X to XX] written by the participants and published by the Steel Construction Institute (SCI)
in November 1991. These background reports are available as free downloads from the HSE web
site [12].
The development of the Interim Guidance Notes was a major step forward which consolidated the
then existing knowledge of fire and explosion hazards. At about this time the Fire and Blast
Information Group (FABIG) was set up and has subsequently issued a number of Technical notes
on specific aspects of fire and explosion engineering [13 to 19], of the 8 published Technical Notes
5 deal with fire hazard issues.
The hazards, characteristics and physical properties of hydrocarbon jet fires were appraised in the
Phase 1 reports of the Joint Industry Project on ‘Blast and Fire Engineering of Topside Structures’
(OTI 92 596/597/598) [X]. The main source of detailed information on the characteristics of jet fires
covered in the reports on the programme of jet-fire research was co-funded by the European
Community. This programme studied single fuel natural gas and propane jet fires (Bennett et al,
1990) [X].
Phase I of the JIP (OTI 92 596/597/598) [X] also included a review of open hydrocarbon pool fire
models. Three types of model (current at the time) were evaluated, semi-empirical proprietary
models (e.g. WHAZAN), field models (e.g. CFD models) and integral models (falling between semi-
empirical and field models). Compartment fire modelling looked at two types of code, zone models
and field models. At that time, the zone models (typically used for modelling fires within buildings)
encountered severe limitations in the modelling of large offshore compartment fires.
Three further phases of the Blast and Fire Engineering Project JIP were conducted from 1994 to
2001, Phase 2 [20], Phase 3a and Phase 3b [21] consisted mainly of experiments to define and
determine explosion overpressure load characteristics under a range of conditions and to provide a
basis against which load simulation software may be validated. However, Phase 2 did produce
notable gains in knowledge in the area of unconfined crude oil jet fires and confined jet fires
(compartment fires). These areas were studied in Phase 2 (Selby and Burgan, 1998) [X] along with
another JIP on releases of ‘live’ crude oil containing dissolved gas and water.
The Phase 2 JIP also focussed on horizontal free jet fires of stabilised light crude oil and mixtures
of stabilised light crude oil with natural gas and the main findings are listed below.
• The free flame releases, of crude oil only, were not able to sustain a stable flame and one
of the mixed fuel releases was also unstable.
• All the flames were particularly luminous compared with purely gaseous jet flames and
generated large quantities of thick black smoke, mainly towards the tail of the flame.
• All the flames were highly radiative, with maximum time averaged surface emissive powers
(SEP’s) ranging between 200 kWm-2 to 400 kWm-2.
• The incident total heat fluxes (radiative and convective) measured on the pipe target were
significantly higher for the mixed fuel tests than for the crude oil only tests, by a factor two
in many cases. Typical values were in the range 50 kWm-2 to 400 kWm-2.

Phase 2 of the JIP included a fire model evaluation exercise. This considered three jet-fire
scenarios, but no pool-fire scenarios. However it did generate high quality data that were
considered suitable for future pool fire model evaluation.
Check 3a didn’t produce anything to summarise.
The most recent Joint Industry Project, known as Phase 3b, was undertaken to study the explosion
hazard from realistic gas releases inside the test rig. These experiments were conducted under
different wind conditions with different gas release rates and different confinement and obstacle
geometries.
Other valuable work, mostly executed in Norway and following the probabilistic approach, has
resulted in the NORSOK guidance documents [22, 23]. Both references were among the source
documents for Part 1 of this Guidance, it can be seen that the guidelines for risk and emergency
preparedness will support emergency response for fire hazards as well.
1.2 Objectives
The primary objective of this document is to offer guidance on practices and methodologies which
can lead to a reduction in risk to life, the environment and the integrity of offshore facilities exposed
to fire hazards.
Risk is defined as the product of the probability of an event and its consequences.
Preventative measures are the most effective means of minimising the probability of an event and
its associated risk. The concepts of Inherently Safer Design or ‘Inherent Safety’ are central to the
approach described in this document both for modifications of existing structures and new designs.
This document consolidates the R&D effort from 1988 to the present day, integrates fire type and
scenario definition, fire loading and response development and provides a rational design
approach to be used as a basis for design of new facilities and the assessment of existing
installations.
This Guidance is intended to assist designers and duty holders during the design of, and in making
operational modifications to, offshore installations in order to optimise and prioritise expenditure
where it has most safety benefit.
An additional intent of this Guidance is to move the decision-making processes within the fire and
explosion design field as much as possible towards a ‘Type A’ process from ‘Type B or C’ as
defined in UKOOA’s document on decision-making, the key figure of which is illustrated in
Figure 1.1 below [25]. Due to the nature in which fire and explosion hazards are closely linked,
reference should be made to Part 1 of this guidance when developing concepts and solutions to a
“Type A” decision.

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Figure 1.1 The UKOOA decision making framework
The framework in Figure 1.1 defines the weight given to various factors within the decision making
process, ranging from those decisions that are dominated by purely engineering matters to those
where company and societal values predominate.
A substantial number of installations will lie in Areas A or B of the chart resulting in an approach
which involves codes and guidance based on experience and ‘best practice’ (as described in this
document) and supplemented by risk based arguments where required.
This Guidance will look to build past experience of the development of fire scenarios and the
prediction of design fire load cases and their timelines as part of the “Type A” approach.
1.3 Fire and explosion hazard management

A thorough understanding of all hazards and hazardous events, including fires and explosions, is
at the heart of the Safety Management System (SMS) and it should be proactive to reduce risks. A
commonly adopted overall process is outlined in the OGP “Guidelines for the Development and
Application of Health Safety and Environment Management Systems”. This Guidance adds more
detail to this process and applies it to fires and explosions. For these hazardous events the
management process is given below:
• identification of the hazardous events (coarse assessment);
• analysis and assessment of the hazardous events (type, areas affected, magnitude of the
consequences, duration, likelihood, etc.);
• reduction of the risks from fires and explosions through inherently safer design;
• design to reduce the likelihood, scale, intensity, duration and effects of each hazardous
event;
• identification and specification of the particular prevention, detection, control and mitigation
measures needed for each hazardous event;
• confirmation of the suitability and effectiveness of each of the measures selected;

• specification of the measures adopted;
• communication and implementation;
• verification;
• documentation.
The hazard management process should be employed in a timely manner and in accordance with
the type, severity and likelihood of each hazardous event, that is, it should be a risk-based
process. It is essential that all parties who can contribute to the reduction of hazards particularly
design engineering disciplines and those who will have to operate and maintain the plant,
understand the hazards and are involved during the appropriate stages of the lifecycle.
The lifecycle approach shows how to prepare and implement a strategy for the management of fire
and explosion on an offshore installation throughout its life, i.e. from design through commissioning
and operations to decommissioning. This is developed firstly by inherently safer design (elimination
of hazards), followed by prevention of identified fire and explosion hazardous events and then by
the selection of detection, control and mitigation measures. The fire and explosion assessment
process is used in the lifecycle to provide information on which to base decisions and the design of
systems. Thereafter, it is used to assess these arrangements to make sure that the high level
performance standards have been achieved.
The FEHM process can be applied to new or existing installations.

• For new installations it should start during feasibility studies and be fully developed during
detail design. The results should then be communicated to personnel operating the
installation to ensure that they know the purpose and capability of all the systems, can
operate them properly and that adequate maintenance schemes are in place;
• For an existing installation the process should be applied to current arrangements and
modifications. These should be assessed to determine if the high level performance
standards are achieved and that risks are as low as is reasonably practicable.
The management of hazards to reduce the risks involves many interests which may often appear
to conflict with each other. The process is a multi-disciplinary activity, involving all levels of
personnel from senior management to junior staff from a number of different organisations. It is
important that the input and activities of these personnel are fully coordinated and managed. The
SMS of each organisation should identify the relevant roles and responsibilities.
A more comprehensive and homogeneous view of the role of fire and explosion hazard
management within the overall Hazard Management System (HMS) can be found in Part 0 of this
Guidance, “Part 0 Fire and explosion hazard management”.
More information on specifically fire hazard management can also be found in Section 2 of this
Part 2 of the Guidance.
1.4 Overview of the guidance

Generally, the Guidance has been developed to consolidate current best practice in the industry
and research community and sets out to present this information in a coherent manner of use to
industry practitioners. The collation of existing information and the endeavour to relate the
information into the form of “Type A” decisions (see Sub-section 1.2), is intended to assist
practitioners by providing a set of “Rules of Thumb” by which to carry out work effectively and
quickly.
Section 2, ‘Fire hazard management philosophy’, describes the steps to be taken and the base
information to be considered in understanding fire hazards and outlining some of the key
considerations in managing them. This section sets out the principles, the process and the

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implementation steps required to decide what has to be done in any particular context and the
factors that have to be taken into account. The principles of ‘Inherent Safety’ are presented.
Section 3, ‘Fire scenarios and protective measures' discusses the various scenarios that can occur
in hydrocarbon installations and also the prevention, control and mitigation measures available to
combat them. The appropriate methods of analysis dependent on the expected risk level are
introduced. The tasks identified are linked with the relevant phase of a design project or the stage
in the life of the installation. This section also gives .particular considerations for particular
installations and parts of installations
Section 4, ‘Interactions with explosion hazard management’, identifies situations where fires may
precede or follow an explosion and deals with common areas of fire and explosion management,
potential conflict between the management of these hazardous events and potential areas of
combined analyses.
Section 5, ‘Derivation of fire loadings’ describes how appropriate design thermal and smoke loads
are derived. The section discusses eight fire types and the impacts of the associated heat transfer
and considers the manner in which loadings are estimated for the purposes of use within a QRA.
Section 6, ‘Response to fires’ discusses the effects of fire and the manner in which structures fail
and links these concepts to definitions of acceptance criteria from national and international
standards. The section also reviews potential failure definitions and failure modes of process
equipment and impact effects on personnel.
Section 7, ‘Detailed design guidance for fire resistance’, brings together the approaches identified
in the other sections and incorporates additional design and operations experience to provide
guidance on methods of detailed design. The guidance is presented in the context of best practice
and identifies other industry initiatives which have generated detailed design and operating
practice guidance. This subject area will be re-visited in Part 3 of the Guidance.
The annexes provide summary and supplementary material for quick reference.

2. Fire hazard management philosophy
2.1 Overview
2.1.1 General
In general terms a release of hydrocarbon with immediate ignition will result in a fire; release of an
inflammable vapour or gaseous mixture followed by later ignition (i.e. when the cloud of vapour or
gas is adequately large) may result in an explosion. Consequently some of the probabilities,
causes, methods of prevention and control of releases are identical for both the fire and explosion
hazard. Indeed, many of the hazard management principles and practices apply to both hazards.
This aspect is explored more in Section 4.
2.1.2 Hazard philosophy
In this, the second part of the Guidance, goals which should be achieved in designing for and
managing the fire hazard are identified. The legislative basis is reviewed and some high level
performance standards are given. (Terms in italics are defined in Annex A).
The features of an effective Safety Management System (SMS) are identified and the choice and
management of detection, control and mitigation systems is discussed. The main characteristics of
the fire hazard are also identified. The techniques of inherently safer design described in Sub-
section 2.6 are fundamental to the most effective approach to eliminate, prevent and mitigate the
fire hazard particularly for new designs.
The advantage of an inherently safer design or the ‘Inherent Safety’ design approach is that it
attempts to remove the potential for hazards to arise. It does not rely on control measures, systems
or human intervention to protect personnel.
In order to focus effort where it is most needed, a risk screening method is described in Sub-
section 2.8, which classifies installations and compartments according to their fire risk level. The
measures for frequency and consequence severity are based on process complexity and the
exposure potential for people on board. These measures are combined in a risk matrix to give low,
medium and high risk categories. The risk level is an indication of the level of sophistication to be
used in the fire assessment process.
Nominal loads for jet and pool fires have been available since the publication of the Interim
Guidance Notes (IGN) [1] in the form of heat fluxes for engulfed objects in open conditions. A
number of alternative values have since been published including nominal fire loads for confined
and ventilation controlled fires [2,3]. Approaches to the derivation of fire loads are given in
Section 5 with recommendations on their valid application.
2.1.3 Prescriptive vs. Performance based design
Prescriptive design against the fire hazard can be a valid alternative, especially for low risk
installations. This method is based on standardized guidance or requirements, without recognition
of site-specific factors. The size of the facility, hazards posed or specific water demand is not
considered. Prescriptive approaches to fire design generally are a result of compliance with
regulations, insurance requirements, industry practices, or company procedures. These are
generalized approaches largely based on past incidents.
Performance or scenario based design adopts an objective based approach to provide a desired
level of fire and explosion performance. The performance based approach presents a more
specific prediction of potential fire hazards for a given system or process. This approach provides
solutions based on performance measured against established goals or performance standards

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rather than on prescriptive requirements with implied goals. Solutions are supported by a Fire
Hazard Analysis (FHA) or, in some cases, a fire risk assessment.
2.1.4 Hazard management
A fire risk assessment takes account of more than just the consequences, and includes the
likelihood or frequency of the fire and explosion scenarios occurring. A performance based
approach looks at determining the need for fire and explosion design on a holistic basis.
Performance objectives and measures allow the designer of fire systems more flexibility in meeting
requirements and can result in significant cost-savings as compared with the prescriptive
approach. Conversely, for small projects, the cost of performance based design may not be cost-
effective.
In a scenario or performance based approach release scenarios are postulated and their
consequences and probabilities of occurrence determined. For existing installations, reliable
estimates of fire loads, extents and durations may be available from previous assessments.
The most severe fires from the point of view of initial rate of release may be less frequent and less
durable than fires of lesser severity and hence may present a smaller risk. Although the initial
extent of the engulfed region may be greater, the lower duration may result in lower quantities of
heat being delivered to those equipment items and structural members within the affected region.
The scenarios considered, should be sufficiently varied to cover the following:-

• Severe, but unlikely cases which give short duration fires with the potential for the
maximum number of immediate fatalities
• Small long duration scenarios which still have sufficient size to cause local escalation.
• Intermediate scenarios which have the greatest potential for escalation or platform impact
whilst lasting long enough to realise this potential.
Design or Dimensioning fire scenarios are selected on the basis of the risk they present and should
be accommodated by the safety critical elements (SCEs) of the installation which will include parts
of the structure, piping and equipment.
It will be necessary to consider the effect of non-availability of mitigation measures such as shut
down, blow down, venting, deluge or barriers in the construction of design scenarios. Some
scenarios may also assume a prior explosion has occurred with fire being an escalation event.
It is suggested in this guidance, that the number of SCEs which need to be considered in detail is
reduced by classification into criticality categories with respect to the fire hazard.
The direct consequences of fires are the blockage of access ways by radiation or the development
of a hot gas layer, smoke and fume generation, structural weakening and possible collapse.
Further escalation through subsequent release of inventory may occur.
The consequence measures of relevance to fires are:-

• Intensity – heat flux and temperature
• Extent – the area or volume occupied by flame, affected by radiation or by combustion
products.
• Duration
• Frequency – probability of occurrence depending on the probability of immediate or delayed
ignition
• Mitigation effectiveness will depend on detection, inventory isolation and deluge activation
together with the probabilities that these measures will be initiated
• Radiation thresholds for personnel safety and escape, the integrity of equipment and
supporting structure.
Reducing risks to ALARP must be demonstrated in all cases, both through the justification of the
choice of design scenarios and from a determination of the impairment frequency of the SCEs
under the fire loads.
An acceptable level of risk can be identified within the ALARP framework, which identifies the
acceptable frequency of exceedance of the severity of the design or dimensioning scenarios.
Typically this frequency of exceedance will be of the order of 10-4 to 10-5 per year depending on the
risk to people on board, the impact on the SCEs and the overall individual risk including that from
other hazards.
Following NORSOK [4], ISO [5] uses a threshold probability of exceedance level (10-4 per year)
below which the actions from each category may be eliminated from further consideration. Events
above this level are considered to be ‘dimensioning’, requiring to be analysed further to determine
the size and extent of the resulting loading and its effects.
The UKOOA Part 1 document [6] takes a slightly different approach. An (explosion) event will be
considered depending on whether the event impinges directly on the Temporary Refuge with
probability of exceedance > 10-5 per year. Events directly affecting other regions where a barrier
may be present to prevent impingement on the TR are considered if the probability of exceedance
is greater than 10-4 per year.
2.1.5 Fire loading and response
Guidance is given on the information required by the Structural, Process and Safety disciplines
from the fire loading specialists. A common terminology has been developed to facilitate the
transfer of complete and unambiguous information between these disciplines.
The determination of the acceptability of the results of an assessment is also discussed. The
aspects include comparison with high and low level or element specific performance standards and
risk acceptability criteria. The guiding principle here is that risks should be reduced to ALARP.
Guidance on detailed design is included in Section 7, which brings together the approaches
identified in the other sections and incorporates additional design and operational experience.
Other industry initiatives which have generated detailed design and operating practice guidelines
are presented and discussed.
This section provides the engineer with the means of managing the various factors which
contribute towards the fire hazard:
• the probability of a release and early ignition.
• the severity of the consequences of an ignited release.
• the control and mitigation of consequences of a fire.
In general terms there are two classes of fires, ventilation limited fires and open fires. The energy
release rate for a ventilation limited fire is determined by the amount of air available for
combustion, the energy release rate for an open fire is determined by the fuel supply rate.
Ventilation limited fires can occur in confined conditions and flame extents and locations are
uncertain with flames migrating towards the supply of air and the openings in a compartment.
Unconfined Jet fires are usually represented as conical in shape with the apex at the release point.
If a jet fire impinges on adjacent equipment or obstructions then the shape of the flame will be
distorted. If sufficient ventilation is available to burn the fuel as it is released, then the flame volume
will be determined by the release rate. The flame volume and extent of engulfment may then be

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calculated from the flame volume expressions given in Sub-section 5.2 whatever the assumed
shape.
Other types of fires such as BLEVE’s (Boiling Liquid and Evaporating Vapour Explosion), flash
fires, liquid jets, spray fires and running pool fires should also be considered if these scenarios are
credible.
Ventilation limited and obstructed fires are generally less predictable than fires in open or
unobstructed regions. Layout should minimise these effects consistent with the need to isolate
possible sources of release from people and ignition sources.
This section deals with two main topics. Sub-section 2.4 focuses on the project management
system and how getting that right forms the basis of managing the explosion hazard. These
sections contain a description of the elements of a safety management system (SMS) that should
be in place to ensure that a framework exists within which a successful design can be produced.
Much of the discussion concerning the SMS is applicable to all aspects of design not specifically
the fire hazard.
The remaining sections focus on management of the explosion hazard itself and how an
installation may be designed to reduce risk from fires to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
2.2 Understanding the fire hazard

2.2.1 General
Understanding the risks from fire hazards is the key to their minimisation. This applies at all levels
of an organisation from the directors to those designing and operating the facilities. This knowledge
should be used to inform people making critical decisions both in design and operation. It should
not be acquired after these decisions have been made in order to retrospectively justify them. In
other words, the knowledge should be used proactively to reduce risk. The type of understanding
differs according to the level of people in the organisation and the responsibilities that they hold.
• Senior Management: They need to know the overall level of risk for the facilities to decide if
the design is viable or if existing operations may continue.
• Project or Facilities Management: They need to know the pattern of risk by facility and the
proportion of that risk which comes from different hazards such as fire. This will allow them
to decide how the facilities are to be designed and operated. It will also allow them to
provide sufficient resources.
• Discipline Engineering and the Supervision of Operations: They need an overall
understanding of all the hazards for which they have responsibility. The understanding of
the causes, severity and consequences will allow them to decide how each of the hazards
will be managed and the measures needed to do so.
• Designers, Operators and Technicians: They need to understand the hazard characteristics
so that they may design, operate and maintain critical elements to suit the needs of the
hazards.
It is essential that the information gained from hazard and risk studies is distilled, documented and
communicated so that every level and person is kept informed. It must also be kept up to date. It is
a living picture which becomes progressively more detailed and accurate as the design
progresses. It also changes throughout the life of the facilities as different activities take place and
the fields mature.
2.2.2 Classification of fire hazards
It may be helpful to classify fire hazards according to their potential for harm. This may be done by
assessing what is in place either in a design or an existing facility and determining the
classification. It is preferable to actively manage the fire hazards such that steps are taken to
actively lower their classification by reducing the severity of the effects. This may be done by
following the principles for inherently safer design (see Section 2.6) or by applying or optimising
hazard management measures to minimise the size of releases, their location, effects on the
facility, the rate of release and the duration. One method of classification is as follows:
• Catastrophic: As the name suggests, these events would overwhelm an installation and it
would be impractical to counteract the effects such that the lives of those on board could be
saved. This type of event should be designed out or very high integrity preventative
measures provided such that the likelihood is minimised.
• Evacuation/Extreme: This type of event would have a major impact upon a large part of the
installation such that the effects upon people, both physical and psychological, would be
such that evacuation would be necessary. It would also apply to those events where the
potential for escalation is widespread including structural, process, safety systems or the
impairment of muster and escape routes. Typically these events are those which would
give prolonged effects beyond the source module, in particular external flaming and dense
smoke effects. In some cases it may be possible to suppress the widespread effects of
these fires reducing the categorisation to the lower, controllable, level. If not, the effects
must be fully understood and premature catastrophic escalation delayed, and personnel
protected from smoke and heat until evacuation has been completed. By their nature these
are inherently low frequency events, requiring a significant sized release from a major
inventory and/or its combination with safety system failures such as ESD.
• Controllable: These events have the potential for local fatalities and may also be capable of
escalation to a scale requiring evacuation. However, the moderate scale of the effects
should allow these events to be controlled such that further escalation is prevented and
evacuation is not essential to preserve life. Typically, the prolonged effects of these events
will be limited to one module or process area and will be of finite duration. They would be
associated with smaller releases from moderate inventories. In these cases effective
control of the source inventory and the prevention of escalation will be critical. It may be
practical to extinguish some of these events but in other cases, this may not be possible or
may be dangerous in which case, they should burn out under controlled conditions
• Minor: These events are of a very small scale. They may cause local injuries but would not
have either the scale or duration to cause critical escalation. They may lead to damage to
plant causing financial loss but not major loss of life. These events can be managed by
limiting the size of the event and allowing it to burn out. Protection would only be needed for
asset protection.
2.2.3 Causes and likelihood of hydrocarbon releases
The causes of hydrocarbon releases are numerous and it is essential that a full causation is carried
out so that effective preventative measures can be put in place. These causes can generally be
broken down into three categories;
• Human or procedural error
• Plant or equipment failure
• Systemic failure; i.e. inherent weaknesses in the business processes and infrastructure
supporting design and operation.
The likelihood of an event is a function of the propensity of the causes; e.g. the corrosivity of the
fluids, the number of times containment is deliberately breached or the number of weak points
such as flanges or tappings. It is also a function of the understanding of those causes and the
effectiveness of measures which are put in place to manage them. Statistical data is a good start
point from which to list causes and to determine likelihood. This should then be augmented with
the knowledge of engineers, technicians and operators to give a more accurate picture for each
facility. HAZOP procedures will give a rigorous identification of process causes but the overall
examination should be sufficiently broad to address external and human effects. This examination
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should be fully documented so that there can be assurances that preventative measures are
suitable and sufficient.
For statistical data, the most frequent sources of the hazard as given by the history of releases
experienced to date are documented as follows.
The HSE document OTO 2001 055 Ref [X] states that for the UK sector of the North Sea:
61 % of all releases are from pipework systems
11 % of all releases are from small bore piping
15 % of all releases are from flanges
14 % of all releases are from seals and packing
Of the causes;
11 % are due to incorrect installation
26 % from degradation of materials (excluding corrosion and erosion)
11 % of all releases are due to vibration/fatigue
19 % of all releases are due to corrosion and erosion
It is considered that 40 % of equipment related releases are attributable to poor design and 38 %
to inadequate inspection and condition monitoring.
Avoidance of potential leak sources in design therefore needs to consider these above issues in
particular. The importance of operational aspects is also shown in proportion of leaks attributable
to poor inspection and monitoring.
Sources of release data include WOAD Ref [X], OREDA Ref [X] release statistics published
annually by the HSE Refs [X] and the HSE/UKOOA publication on the subject Ref [X]. The
Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the US also publishes data on incidents on the Gulf of
Mexico [X].
2.2.4 Ignition causes and probability
The probability of ignition will depend upon the following factors:

• The rate and duration of the release and the size of the consequent gas cloud
• The location of the release
• The type of fuel and the proportion of gas or volatile vapours which is generated in the short
term
• The nature of the release; whether high or lower pressure. The turbulence caused by high
pressure gas releases will cause effective mixing with the air to give a well defined
flammable cloud. High pressure liquid releases will encourage fine droplet formation and
increase the vaporisation of any light ends.
• The flammability characteristics of the gases and vapours. Each different gas or vapour has
a specific flammability range, from a lower flammability limit, through stoichiometric and
rising to a higher limit above which ignition should not occur. Very large releases may have
a non flammable rich core but will be surrounded by a flammable region which may engulf
ignition sources as it spreads away from the point of release. Each gas or vapour will also

have a specific auto ignition temperature ranging from 200 – 550 °C. such that contact with
hot surfaces such as an exhaust turbocharger would cause ignition
• The dispersion characteristics; whether there are heavy vapours which will descend or
lighter gases which should rise.
• The confinement of the escaping vapours and gases by floors, ceilings or walls. These may
also cause flammable gases to be directed towards areas without flameproof equipment
• The ventilation characteristics in the areas, whether forced or natural and the variation of
those characteristics with wind strength and direction
• The characteristics of the fluid and its release, where this might build up static
• The presence of sulphurous impurities in the fluids which might lead to the formation of
pyrophoric scale
• The number of fixed ignition sources and the standard of their maintenance, if designed for
use in flammable atmospheres.
• The proximity of the release to areas which are classified as “safe” and therefore are not
fitted with flameproof equipment.
• The gas detection philosophy and the local and wider shutdown of ignition sources upon
detection
• The detection of gas ingress at the air intakes to enclosures such as accommodation or
equipment rooms and the closure of dampers.
• The hot work philosophy on the facility, the number of these activities and the effectiveness
of their control.
• The possibility of ignition being caused by the action of personnel carrying out emergency
response actions such as plant shutdown causing sparks at electrical breakers.
Ignition probabilities have been widely studied and this work is summarised in recent work for
UKOOA studying ignition probabilities [X].
The probability of ignition should be determined using that guidance together with an assessment
of the characteristics listed above. As with the likelihood of release, it is possible to influence the
probability of ignition by design, good maintenance and operational controls.
2.2.5 Fire hazards: Understanding the source
2.2.5.1 General
It is essential that the source of the hydrocarbons is examined and fully understood in order to
examine the fire hazard effects resulting from a release.
Key parameters would include the range of release rates and characteristics which can originate
from any part of the plant. Each parameter would be associated with a failure causing a specific
hole size. The release rate would then vary with time depending upon the source conditions of
fluid, pressure, inventory, location within the hydrocarbon system and the functional characteristics
(or the failure) of control systems such as ESD, depressurisation, and drainage. A detailed picture
of the source terms from each inventory will allow the identification of the cases requiring analysis
of the fire characteristics. If hazards are being classified as described above, it will give an initial
indication which hazards fall into each category. It would show for example the process events
which simply do not have sufficient inventory to realistically cause escalation, those which should
be controllable and the events which require evacuation. For individual hazardous inventories, it
would show the approximate conditions of hole size and control system operation which would
determine whether it was controllable or require evacuation.

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2.2.5.2 Reservoir hazards
Direct releases from the reservoir may occur due to well intervention such as drilling or workover.
In these cases the releases are likely to occur within the drilling facilities; typically at the bell nipple.
These are likely to be of indefinite duration if the primary well control and blowout prevention
systems have failed. Such releases may also contain drilling fluids, cuttings and other debris. In the
case of blowouts from an oil reservoir with delayed ignition, the oil may build up over much of the
top deck leading to a particularly hazardous and unpredictable situation when it ignites. Reservoir
and drilling engineers should be consulted to identify the fluid composition and calculate the
realistic flow rates. In most cases, the releases should be near the top of the platform with the
flames rising above it. This will lead to rapid collapse of the derrick and severe radiation onto the
top deck. It the release is below the drilling rig structure, this may collapse onto the wells leading to
progressive escalation. A shallow gas blowout is another case in which a pocket of shallow gas is
controlled by venting through a diverter. Diverters can fail due to erosion giving a large gas release
of prolonged but finite duration within or below the drilling facilities with possible escalation as
described above. Again drilling and reservoir engineers should be consulted to determine the
possible flowrates and their likelihood.
Large continuous releases from the Christmas Trees are much less likely due to the multiple valve
isolation. They may occur during wirelining but only if there are multiple failures of the barriers. A
more realistic scenario is a release from the lubricator which is sustained by leakage through the
valves and wireline BOP. In the gas-lifted wells, it is possible that the gas within the annulus could
backflow into the wellbay with inventories of up to 10 tonnes and pressures up to 130 bar. The
potential for escalation to other wells should be examined but is unlikely if they are fitted with
effective downhole isolation or have a heavy-duty integrated Christmas Tree valve assembly.
Flowline releases are considered to be part of the process hazards as they are downstream of the
well isolation valves.
Completion failures may result in leakage from the reservoir into the well annuli or around the
cement such that oil or gas may surface round the outside of the well at the seabed. This may
arise during the initial completion of the well. It may also arise in later life due to seismic action or
the deterioration of the well bore, for example by corrosion. Well completion engineers should be
consulted about the possibility of this occurrence, the potential flow rates and the locations at
which hydrocarbons may be released. The effects of fires on the sea are discussed in
Sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.6
2.2.5.3 Process hazards
The process plant can have up to 40 sections which are segregated by ESD valves. Each of these
is a source with individual characteristics of the fluids, pressures and volumes. Typically, the
processing will include;
• Production fluids manifolding and mixing: The manifolds collect the reservoir fluids from the
wells via the flowlines, mix the fluids and direct them to the appropriate separators. They
contain well fluids (see below) which may be a mixture of oil, condensate, gas, water and
other materials such as sand. The inventory will be based on the combined volumes of
these pipes. It will range from less than 500 kg in a mature, low pressure gas field up to 5
tonnes of oil for a new field. In oil facilities running at low pressures or using gas lift, the
fluid can be three phase with a relatively low density. It may also have a high water cut
giving small inventories which may not have the potential for escalation if rapidly isolated.
The process conditions, aggressive nature of the fluids and the complexity of the piping
give a high probability of a release, particularly large bore flowline failures which may be
caused by corrosion or erosion.
• Water, gas and oil/condensate separation: This takes place in large vessels, generally over
2 – 3 stages. The liquids have a 3 – 10 minute residence time. Typically, these vessels
have total volumes up to 100 m3 and operate at pressures from 70 down to 3 bar. The
flammable liquid inventories can be up to 30 tonnes but this may be divided in half by weirs

which can reduce the amount which can realistically be released by half. There are
relatively few release points providing that there is effective isolation at the outlet. Typically
these are tappings for instruments and the possibility of corrosion in the body or welds of
the separator vessel. These liquid inventories have the potential to overwhelm a moderate
sized platform with a large fire lasting long enough to cause major escalation, particularly if
the separators are located lower down in the topsides. They may have less of an impact if
located on an open deck such as an FPSO as the smoke and flames can freely rise above
the rest of the facility. The potential for harm is governed by the release pressure; see
below under liquid fires. If these vessels are depressurised, the fires become much more
controllable and the time to depressurise is critical (see 2.2.6). If they can brought below
this pressure before escalation can occur or evacuation is required, this may reduce the
classification of these hazards to the controllable level, at least for moderate sized holes.
The free gas inventory will range from 200 kg for a very low pressure vessel to 5000 kg for a very
high pressure vessel with high molecular weight gas. Typically it will be in the 1000 – 2000 kg
range. However this may be doubled by additional gas released from the liquids as the vessel
depressurises. This inventory has the potential to cause local escalation but is unlikely to
overwhelm a medium sized facility. Its potential for harm may be minimised by depressurisation.
• Stabilisation and final dewatering: Some oil production platforms have a final stage of
stabilisation or dewatering. These require large vessels which are filled with virtually stable
oil plus a small quantity of water in the bottom. They operate at 2 – 6 bar and can contain
up to 200 tonnes of oil. These lower pressures would result in a pool fire which would only
be a threat to the platform if there were no arrangements to bund the release, minimising
the size of the fire and further arrangements dispose of the oil and firewater.
• Oil/condensate pressurisation for export: Export pump arrangements may use one or two
pumps in series. These pumps are usually duplicated with manifold arrangements. These
complex piping arrangements can give an isolated inventory of up to 15 tonnes for a field
with large throughput. The most likely releases are at the pumps themselves but the study
of available inventory should carefully examine how much could realistically be released,
taking into account the operating philosophy standby arrangements for off line pumps and
the provision of valves and check valves. The pump pressures will range from 40 – 120 bar
depending upon the pressures within the pipeline infrastructures. Transfer pumps to export
tankers will run at much lower pressures. These pressures will drop to the vapour pressure
of the oil on shutdown, giving a continuous rate of release until the available inventory is
exhausted. The pump seals and the complex jointed piping leak to a high likelihood of a
release. The inherent design of the plant requires the pumps to be located close to the
lowest level of the platform, often beneath the separators. This will lead to a low level
source with the potential for low level external flaming, smoke affecting most of the topsides
and escalation to the inventories above. Shutdown of the pumps and careful management
of the inventory which can be released will help to reduce the impact but it may still require
evacuation in some cases.
• Gas compression including gas liquids condensing and knockout. Gas from the various
stages of separation is progressively compressed and cooled allowing liquids such as
ethane, propane, butane and water to be condensed and returned to the liquids system.
Typically several compressors will be required with the final discharge pressures of 50 – 60
bar. It is likely that the compressor sections and their associated condensers and knockout
pots will be sectionalised with ESD valves. This reduces the gas inventories to 1000 – 2000
kg. As with separation, this has limited potential for local escalation and this can be
minimised with depressurisation. The major risk is that to personnel in the immediate area
from flash fires or from explosions if the area is congested. There is a moderately high
possibility of a gas leak arising from the compressors and associated vibration.
The liquids which are condensed and collected in the gas knockout pots may be either liquefied
gases or water. The gas-liquid inventories should be less than 2 tonnes and in many cases, just a
few hundred kg. Only the larger inventories will have the potential for escalation. However, there is
a major exposure to flash fires or explosions as these liquids are very reactive, will have a high

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release rate and the vapours may not disperse easily. The likelihood of release should be low as
there are few release points in the liquid sections of these process plants.
• Gas drying: This will use either glycol units or molecular sieves and can operate at up to 60
bar. The largest inventory is likely to be a contactor with up to 3 tonnes of gas. Again, this
has a limited potential for local escalation and can be minimised using depressurisation.
• High pressure export, gas lift and reinjection compression: A typical pressure for these
systems is150 bar. However it can be as high as 400 bar for some reinjection requirements.
Again, the inventories will be moderate; typically 1 – 3 tonnes with the potential for local
escalation. However, the high pressures can give high release rates from moderate hole
sizes, increasing the risks from flash fires and explosions.
• Oil and gas metering: Metering is generally carried out using inline flowmeters. From a
hazard’s point of view, they are equivalent to piping with additional potential release sites at
the instruments. The hazards are similar to the export pumping and compression
respectively and may be part of the same inventory.
I think these notes above are good candidates for quick reference checklists, by process type etc.
An inventorisation of each process section should be carried out to determine the conditions and
inventory during operation and immediately after shutdown. The behaviour of each section should
be modelled using simple calculations to determine the gas and liquid release characteristics from
a range of hole sizes. The intent is to build up a picture of the types of events that can occur in
each part of the platform. These scenarios and associated hole sizes should reflect the failures
which have been identified during the causation analysis. They should be sufficiently varied to
cover the following; those large but unlikely cases which give short duration fires with the potential
for the maximum number of immediate fatalities; those small long duration cases which still have
sufficient size to cause local escalation; and those intermediate cases which have the greatest
potential for escalation or platform impact whilst still lasting long enough to realise these effects –
typically a 10 minute duration.
2.2.5.4 Import and export risers
Risers may contain any of the fluids mentioned above, from well fluids to stabilised oil or dry clean
gas. They may be connected to a major pipeline infrastructure or be small infield flow lines from
satellite wells or for gas lift. The risers may be rigid steel or flexible. The releases may range from
pinholes due to corrosion up to a full shear. The location of a release may be as follows:
• immediately under the platform
• closer to sea level where they may be exposed to ship damage or chafing and corrosion
• sub sea or at the sea bed where it may be subject to internal corrosion
The location will affect the release characteristics and the ignition probability. Release rates from
these pipelines may initially be modelled using simple calculations such as those in Ref [X], the
Sintef and Scandpower fire calculations for the process industry or using more sophisticated
methods. They should be based upon the hole sizes which could realistically occur as identified in
the causation analysis. The modelling should cover cases with and without the operation of subsea
isolation valves or check where these are fitted or considered. They should take into account time
delays in the operation of ESD valves and their operability with a high differential pressure
following a major riser failure. ESD valves would not respond quickly enough to prevent the
immediate fatalities rising from a major gas riser failure unless there was delayed ignition. The
characteristics of pipeline releases from two phase fluids or liquids with dissolved gases should
take into account the variation in release characteristics caused by; gas and liquids separation,
slug flow, the elevation of the release point relative to the main inventory on the sea bed, and
effervescence as gas separates carrying with it liquids in aerosol form. In some cases such as
subsea releases, the fires may burn on the sea surface – see Sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.6.

2.2.6 Types of fire hazard: - Liquids
Liquid fires generally have a greater potential for harm than gas fires for the following reasons:
• They have greater isolated process inventories arising from the higher densities of
between 600 and 850 kg/m3. Typically these can be up to 20-30 tonnes in separators.
• The release rates will be much greater than gases for the same hole sizes and
pressures.
• The heat fluxes from pool fires will be lower than gas jets but pressurised oil or gas
liquids, particularly with dissolved gas can give the same or greater radiative heat flux.
• A moderate sized oil leak of 20mm at 20 bar would have a flame volume of 4500 m3
and this has the potential to completely engulf a medium sized process module and
cause some external flaming. A 20 tonne inventory would sustain this fire for 30
minutes assuming a constant release rate.
• This confinement with a roof and/or walls will also cause high radiative heat fluxes,
even with pool fires.
• Liquid fires can also be the source of overwhelming quantities of smoke.
• Liquids tend to be located at the lower levels of a platform which causes the fire source
to have a greater impact on the facility, engulfing the levels above and to the sides in
flames and smoke and also leading to the exposure of structures, people and plant
above it.
• Liquid releases can be difficult to detect if there is only a small gas content and this can
lead to a build-up of oil on the floor, possibly spreading to lower levels prior to ignition.
This can exacerbate the effects by increasing the total fuel quantity, the initial fire size
and its spread into more vulnerable locations.
These potential effects can give liquids the potential to overwhelm a platform giving many cases
which could be classified as evacuation/extreme, even with moderate pressures and hole sizes on
a poorly laid out facility.
The fire characteristics will vary according to the release pressures and the fuel type. Most oil is
only partially stabilised; i.e. it will have some dissolved and liquefied gas within it. It will also be
pressurised; by the inherent state of the fluid (its own vapour pressure); by the pressurised gases
above the liquid as in separators; or through pumping. The pressure will determine the release rate
and the management of that pressure after the fire is detected is a key component of managing
these hazards. This may be achieved by isolating the pumps or by depressurisation. The release
rate is proportional to the square root of the pressure and will reduce as these actions come into
effect. Equations for calculating release rates are given in Reference [X] Handbook for Fire
Calculations and risk assessment in the process industry – Sintef and Scandpower. The pressure
will also determine how the liquid will burn, for example, as a spray or a pool. The heat fluxes will
drop with the pressures and this allows deluge systems to become more effective both in
protecting exposed plant and in suppressing the fire itself. This is discussed in Section 7. Lighter
liquids such as condensate will have lower transition pressure. Gas liquids; ethane, propane and
butane will be pressurised and it is unlikely that their operating temperatures will ever be low
enough to allow them to burn as a pool. They are only likely to be found in moderate quantities of
1 – 2 tonnes within the gas compression and drying facilities.
2.2.7 Types of fire hazard: Gases
Gases will give an intense jet with high localised convective and radiative heat fluxes. Most jets are
relatively unaffected either by obstructions such as piping or by convective effects. The radiative
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content will increase both with the molecular weight and as the jet encounters obstructions. They
are generally not large enough or sustained by a sufficiently large inventory to be significantly
affected by confinement within a roofed module except where they directly impact the ceilings or
walls. This makes their potential for escalation highly directional and this is likely only to affect a
small number of critical items such as a single structural member, part of a vessel or some piping.
Only very large inventories would have the potential for more widespread simultaneous failure.
These large inventories require both high pressures and large volumes within the process plant or
an isolation failure to a primary source such as a riser or well. Gas jets have moderate release
rates unless there are very large hole sizes and/or high pressures. A 20mm hole at 20 bar would
give a methane jet of approximately 10 – 12m and a flame volume of 100 m3. With a source of
40 m3 in volume, typical of the gas content in a separator, this would reduce to a jet of 7-8m and a
flame volume of 25 m3 within 10 minutes of the ESD operating. If the separator was depressurised,
this would decay even faster but this may be offset by the evolution of any dissolved gas in the oil.
It is worth comparing these characteristics with the equivalent oil release from the same vessel
discussed in Sub-section 2.2.5.
2.2.8 Types of fire hazard: Confinement and ventilation control.
The presence of walls, ceilings, floors and obstructions will significantly affect the way in which air
can mix with the fuel. They will also affect the flame shape. These two factors will change the heat
fluxes, the efficiency of combustion and the density of smoke.
The air requirements for stoichiometric burning of hydrocarbon fires are between 15 and 17 times
the mass burn rate of the fuel. In most cases, this is the release rate unless there is containment of
a pool fire to reduce the burn rate. Most modules have good ventilation and venting to minimise
gas buildup and explosion overpressures respectively. The air input rate through a single opening
in a wall is calculated using the formula Ma = ½A √H where Ma is the air input rate in kg/sec, A is
the area of the opening in m2 and H is the height of the opening in m. With openings in the floors
and ceilings or multiple openings in the walls of different heights, this becomes a complex
calculation. Typically the fuel burn rate than can be sustained by a module with one open wall of
30m by 8m is 21kg/sec. It is unlikely that severe ventilation limitation will occur unless there is a
very high release rate and this is sustained for several minutes. If it does occur it is likely to involve
a major liquid inventory rather than gas fires. If the ventilation is severely limited, then the
combustion characteristics within the modules will be affected with reduction in heat fluxes,
reduced liquid vaporisation rates, combustion instability, very dense smoke with high
concentrations of carbon monoxide. Unburnt vapours may also burn as they leave the module
giving the external flaming described below. It can take a few minutes before the fire becomes
ventilation controlled as the air inside is used up.
It is more likely that a large fire will not be ventilation controlled but that its size will simply exceed
that of the module. Once the flame volume reaches 1/3 of the free volume in a module (i.e. that
volume up to the top of the highest opening and excluding the volume in between the ceiling
beams), then the flames will spread across the ceiling and begin to extend beyond the module. In
the initial stages of these fires, the flames build up across the ceilings with a hot flame layer slowly
descending across the whole module. This is the neutral plane at which air entering the module
mixes with the vapours. This can descend to 2/3 of the way down the openings in the walls with
significant flame velocities as they travel towards the openings. These areas will have high
radiative and moderately high convective heat fluxes. These will be highest near to or above the
source of the fire but will provide a relatively uniform heating of all structures, piping and upper
parts of vessels above the neutral plane. This is likely to lead to multiple failure of this equipment.
These high fluxes will occur both with pool and spray fires but gas jets are less likely to develop
this module engulfment for the reasons described above. The area between the ceiling beams
becomes stagnant with high radiative but lower convective heat fluxes.
It either the fire is ventilation controlled or the fire size reaches that described above, then external
flaming will occur. With large external flame volumes the width of the base of the flame can be
much wider than the opening. If it originates from the lower modules, it can engulf the whole side of

the platform with wind causing it to tilt, possibly towards the accommodation or TR. This effect is
graphically illustrated in Ref Piper Alpha Inquiry Report part 2 plates14b through to 18a [X]. This
will have a major impact upon the whole installation and it is likely to require evacuation if it is
sustained for more than a few minutes. There is only limited understanding of this external flaming
and there are few if any predictive tools to quantify it accurately. Its characteristics may be similar
to a large pool fire, with the flames subject to tilt in high winds as described in Ref Sintef and
Scandpower fire calculations for the process industries [X].
Deluge testing both large oil fires has shown that the presence of a roof and ceiling beams has a
significant effect upon the effectiveness. It appears to increase the vaporisation from the water
droplets as they pass through this zone. There is considerable steam generation and it is possible
that this may reduce or even suppress external combustion. However, this effect has not been
quantified yet.
2.2.9 Fires on the sea
Fires on the sea will be affected by a number of factors; the fuel, release characteristics, release
rate, the sea and weather conditions. It requires a fairly large release and benign sea and weather
conditions before the fire has a major impact on the facility. This could lead to structural or riser
failure, smoke engulfment of the topsides or the impairment of evacuation. All of the contributing
factors must be examined to determine the risk of failures and benign conditions occurring
simultaneously. This may be very low in the North Sea but not in other parts of the world.
2.2.10 Consequences
Fires may result in any of the following consequences:

• Direct injury or loss of life to personnel exposed to the immediate effects of fire, particularly
flash fire effects
• The impairment of the ability of people to make rational decisions and to preserve their own
lives, either through the effects of smoke or the psychological effects of the incident
• Impairment of escape routes and entrapment of personnel so that they cannot return to a
refuge
• Impairment of the accommodation or temporary refuge
• Impairment of critical control and communication centres
• Impairment of evacuation routes and means of evacuation or escape from the platform
• Further escalation through the failure of process plant, well containment or risers
• Catastrophic rupture of pressure vessels or containers, both containing flammable and non
flammable fluids
• The release of toxic materials and the generation of toxic fumes through their combustion
• The loss of critical safety and communication systems
• Weakening of the primary structure leading to progressive structural collapse
• Weakening of secondary structures leading to any of the hardware failures listed above
The probability and timing of these failures is dependent upon the following:
• The intensity of the exposure. Greater heat fluxes or more dense smoke concentrations will
lead to more rapid failures.
• The degree of exposure: Localised exposure rather than complete engulfment will reduce
the probability and increase the time to failure. The time dependent size of fires such as
decaying gas jets should be taken into account when making this assessment.
• The duration of the exposure
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• The inherent mass, strength and stresses on exposed plant

• The presence of any protection or insulation which could realistically reduce the rate of heat
transfer
2.2.11 Developing a set of representative scenarios
There is an almost infinite range of events which can occur on an offshore facility. A representative
selection of scenarios should be selected from each of the hazards which are considered to have
the potential for a major accident. An initial hazard identification and expert judgement will identify
those hydrocarbon sources with the greatest potential for harm and those with a high probability.
These should be subject to more intense scrutiny than lesser risks. The events chosen for analysis
should encompass the following cases
• Those with the greatest potential for escalation; i.e. the largest events with sufficient
duration to cause failure
• Those events which could realistically occur; i.e. those with clearly identified causes giving
failures of an identified maximum size; e.g. the largest tapping size or the dimensions of
typical corrosion failures
• Those events of a critical duration such as the time to cause evacuation
• The characteristics of the events whenever critical control systems such as ESD fail to
operate
The examination of these hazards should be used to build up a completer picture of all of the
hazards; their causes and probability, the range of sizes, location and duration, the possible rates
and timings to escalation and the effects when such escalation does occur. This should be
documented as described in the introduction to Sub-section 2.2 so that everyone with a part to play
in their management can see the whole picture. Once it is in place, the effectiveness of systems to
counteract the effects can be assessed and the future management of these hazards can be
planned as described in Sub-section 2.4. The analysis is a living process and should be capable of
future use to examine different cases or the optimisation of control systems such as
depressurisation both during design and operation.
2.3 Hazard management principles

• All fire hazards shall be identified analyses and understood by everyone with a part to play
in their management.
• Every opportunity to minimise fire risks at source shall be identified, considered and where
practicable, implemented. This shall cover minimising the likelihood, severity and the
exposure of people and plant.
• A practical strategy to manage each of the hazards shall be identified, documented and
implemented.
• An appropriate combination of prevention, detection, control and mitigation measures shall
be put in place to implement the chosen strategies.
• All of these measures, including people, processes and plant shall be documented, have
clear ownership and shall have minimum performance standards
• All causes shall be identified, understood and sufficient effective prevention measures shall
be implemented. Where the effects of failure could require evacuation of overwhelm the
installation, these measures shall be specifically identified and shall be of high integrity.
• The operating limits for the whole facility shall be identified and clear instructions as to the
continued operation of the facility or use of additional controls whenever they are exceeded.
• The systems provided to detect fires shall be suitable for the hazard types and the
environmental conditions. They shall provide sufficient information to warn personnel and to
allow an assessment of the hazards to be undertaken without hazardous personnel
exposure.
• There shall be effective isolation of all major external sources of hydrocarbons including
pipelines and the reservoir. This isolation shall be designed to survive all reasonably
foreseeable fire hazards on the facility.
• The characteristics of those hazards which may require evacuation shall be carefully
studied so that the severity and potential for escalation may be reduced, thereby minimising
the need to evacuate.
• Personnel shall be located so that their exposure to fire hazards is minimised
• The systems provided to protect personnel, plant, structures and safety system shall be
suitable for the fire hazard effects.
• Areas required to shelter personnel from fire effects and their supports shall remain viable
until either the incidents have been brought under control or full controlled evacuation has
taken place.
• A minimum provision of routes, systems and arrangements to allow evacuation shall remain
viable under the effects of every incident which may require them
• All reasonably practical steps to reduce the risks from fires shall be taken, concentrating
first on prevention and thereafter in descending order on control, the prevention of
escalation and evacuation.
2.4 Hazard management systems

2.4.1 General
A structured approach to the management of fire hazards shall be put in place by all organisations
responsible for the design or operation of offshore facilities. This shall ensure that the principles
outlined in Sub-section 2.3. are implemented throughout the lifecycle. It shall fit within the overall
safety management system for that company and shall show the company safety policy is to be
implemented.
The management of fire hazards is a complex process: It requires contributions from a very wide
range of people, plant and processes. These may be required to prevent, detect control, protect or
evacuate. It is not acceptable simply to manage each one in isolation to default standards and to
presume that this will give an effective hazard management system. It in necessary to have a fully
integrated process that ensures that all hazards have the necessary components in place and that
they all work together effectively.
This may be based upon the generic frameworks outlined in HSG 65 [X], API RP 75 [X]or
ISO 14001 [X]. These all use the 5 step process as follows in the next section.
All of these elements need to be underpinned by a commitment to safety from the organization’s
management at the highest level, with effective leadership to ensure that the above elements are
diligently carried out. The management needs to be aware of the safety policy and aims and
provide the necessary resources to ensure that these aims are fulfilled.
2.4.2 Policy
Each company should have a coordinated set of policies which cover the principles listed above
and the means by which they are implemented and assured. Policies may be considered at four
levels of increasing detail and specific application:
• Corporate policies: These should set the overall ethos of the company, its overall stance
with respect to HSE and its public expression of commitment to the protection of its
personnel and those with whom it interacts. It should set an overall standard of risk
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tolerability. This may be an expression of individual risk covering all types of exposure
including occupational and major hazards risk. The organisation may also choose to set
tolerable risk criteria for major hazards which may result in multiple fatalities. Most
organisations should also demonstrate a commitment to continuous improvement.
Corporate goals may also be set stating how the business should be organised and run in
pursuance of their risk criteria. It may also set minimum standards relating to design and
operations such as the requirements for the use of codes and standards. The company’s
attitude to regulatory compliance should be clearly defined. This may be regarded as a
discrete demonstration process which is separate from the hazard management process or
its may be integral with the whole hazard management process. The UK legislation mirrors
the suggested processes outlined in this guidance and it is helpful to integrate compliance
and hazard management.
• Regional or business policies: These should apply the overall corporate criteria to that
business or region and set minimum standards. This will relate to the development of risk
assessment processes and the criteria for acceptance in a wide range of activities from
discipline engineering applications such as structural assessments and instrument
criticalities to operational criteria such as SIMOPs or task risk assessments. They should
also set the framework for management systems, and set the minimum technical and
operational standards which apply across that whole region of business.
• Facility: Specific policies and standards may be required for an individual facility. This
would result from the assessment of the facility and would apply controls or set minimum
technical requirements so that the risks are kept within the criteria. This may apply to
operational or technical limits
• Specific requirements: These would be the minimum standards for specific items of plant,
competence, or any systems needed to manage hazards effectively.
2.4.3 Planning
Planning covers five specific items and these apply both in design and in operation;
• Identification of the hazards and the analysis to give the understanding outlined in Sub-
section 2.3.
• The development of strategies to manage each of the hazards, identification of the people,
plant and procedures needed to manage them and the setting or confirmation of the
minimum standards for those elements
• The assessment of the risks from the hazards based on the chosen strategies and the
performance of the elements chosen to implement them
• The assessment of the business infrastructure and resources needed to implement the
strategies both initially and thereafter to maintain them
• The documentation and communication of the hazard knowledge, the strategies and the
measures needed to implement them
The planning process itself needs to be organised so that the requisite information is available to
promote proactive hazard management; i.e. the understanding of hazards needs to be in place
before key decisions are made rather than using it to retrospectively justify them. In design, this
requires the early development and resourcing of the risk assessment and management process
through the use of an HSE plan. It also needs commitment from the project managers to ensure
that this proactive culture flourishes and that everyone uses this information to optimise the design.
This includes the discipline engineers, particularly process and layout who have the greatest
opportunities to maximise the inherent safety. The specialist risk and safety engineers should act in
support of these disciplines in furtherance of a safer design rather than as a discrete and
independent group providing data for regulatory compliance. Operations should be well
represented both to provide their knowledge of the causes and risks and to agree the hazard
strategies

Typically the HSE plan will include each of the following activities for each of the project stages:
Concept development and selection:

• Identification of the primary generic risk drivers; i.e. those that will apply whichever concept
is chosen
• Identification of different viable concepts
• Hazard identification and qualitative risk ranking
• Comparison and selection of the concept
Front end engineering design; (FEED)

• Update and more thorough hazard identification
• Initial characterisation of the hazards; cause severity, consequence and escalation
• Use of the hazard knowledge to optimise the inherent safety during the early process and
layout design
• Selection of the strategy and primary systems to manage each hazard
• Selection of scenarios and detailed hazard characterisation (HAZOP, fire analysis,
escalation analysis, vulnerability studies, evacuation and emergency response analysis)
• Setting of the performance standards for each system
• Risk assessment (This may be quantitative where required but is not essential)
Detail design:
• Design of the systems to meet the performance standards
• Preparation of the operational procedures
2.4.4 Implementation
This is the process of putting the hazard decisions into practice and maintaining the minimum
standards throughout the lifecycle. It requires the provision of a business infrastructure both within
direct operations control and to support these operations. This may include but not be limited to
design engineering, integrity management, procurement, HSE, training, emergency response.
Each part of the organisation will make specific contributions to the management of each hazard.
The requirements arising from the planning process should be embedded into each of these
business processes. This should include the identification or cross referencing of critical elements
to the hazards and the assurance that the required performance is correctly documented.
The operational procedures and controls should be fully developed in conjunction with the
operators. This should cover both procedures to prevent accidents and those to manage the
incidents if they should occur. The emergency response plans should be written in the full
knowledge of the hazards and the timeline of their development.
2.4.5 Measurement
Measurement covers a range of activities. At the higher level, it is the verification that the hazard
identification, analysis and management process is thorough, complete and is of adequate quality.
Thereafter, there should be confirmation that it is working; i.e. that there is a widespread
understanding of risks and hazards, that the linkages between hazards and critical elements are in
place and that the resourcing and infrastructure is sufficient. At a more detailed level it is the
confirmation that the design of the plant is adequate and that the minimum standards of
performance for people, processes and plant are being met.

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2.4.6 Review and improvement
Periodic review should examine trends from the measurement processes. It should be carried out
at the levels described, from considering how the overall risks are changing down to the specific
performance history of plant or changes in personnel and their competence. It should then give
structured proposals for investment in future risk reduction.
2.5 Legislation, standards and guidance

2.5.1 General framework
This section details the major legislation covering risks arising due to fire related hazards. It is not
exhaustive as any legislation covering general safety or requiring a safety risk assessment to be
performed, will be relevant where the potential for a fire exists. Legislation may be added or
amended during the lifetime of this Guidance.
The primary legislation governing safety in the workplace is the ‘Health and Safety at Work Etc. Act
1974’ (HSAWA) [X] This imposes a responsibility on the employer to ensure the safety at work for
all employees. Employers have to take reasonable steps to ensure the health, safety and welfare
of their employees.
Various regulations are enacted under the HSAWA. These include the ‘Management of Health and
Safety at Work Regulations 1999’ [X], which places an obligation on the employer to actively carry
out a risk assessment of the workplace and act accordingly. Risks assessed will include those from
fire and explosion. It should be noted that the Management of Health and Safety at Work
Regulations were amended at the start of 2005 to address issues of employee consultation and
are now referred to as SI 2005 000 Management of Health and Safety at Work and Health and
Safety (Consultation with Employees) (Amendment) Regulations 2005 [X]. All technical issues
relating to hazard management are unchanged within the regulations.
2.5.2 Offshore regulations
More specifically related to fire and explosion risk are the Prevention of Fire and Explosion and
Emergency Response on offshore installations (PFEER) [13] regulations which place on the Duty
Holder the requirement to take appropriate measures to protect persons from major hazards
including fires and explosions. These measures include identification of fire and explosion hazards
and the evaluation of their consequences and likelihood (reg. 5). Regulations 9 to 12 specify the
types of measures which are required for prevention, detection, communication and control of
emergencies. The regulations also require mitigating measures to be specified and put in place
and for performance standards to be set for safety critical measures to prevent, control and
mitigate explosion hazards.
The Duty Holder must ensure that effective evacuation, escape recovery and rescue will occur in
the case of an explosion event (Regulations 14 to 17).
The Safety Case Regulations SCR [14] require all installations in UK waters to have an acceptable
Safety Case. Information regarding the following issues is required to be addressed in the Safety
Case:-
• Identification of major hazards;
• Evaluation of risks associated with the identified hazards;
• Details of appropriate measures taken to reduce these risks to as low a level as is
reasonably practicable;
• Details of the Duty Holder’s (Safety) Management Systems.

The Design and Construction Regulations DCR [15] amended the SCR by placing a responsibility
on duty holders to prepare a suitable verification scheme for their installations to ensure
independent and competent evaluation of those elements of the installation which are critical to
safety (known as safety-critical elements, SCEs). Performance standards are used to define the
functionality and integrity of these safety critical elements. They will define how these SCEs are
expected to function during and after explosion events.
2.5.3 APOSC
The ‘Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases’ document (APOSC) [28] provides open
guidance for Duty Holders on the basis by which HSE inspectors would assess safety casers. The
APOSC provides clarifications on issues which may not have been clear from the regulations and
associated ACOP where available. The APOSC document advises that the following should be
demonstrated for Major Accident Hazard assessments to an HSE inspector’s satisfaction:
Acceptable safety cases will demonstrate that a structured approach has been taken which:
• Identifies all major accident hazards (paragraphs 38-48);
• Evaluates the risks from the identified major accident hazards (paragraphs 49-74);
• Describes how any quantified risk assessment (QRA) has been used and how uncertainties
have been taken into account (paragraphs 75-82);
• Identifies and describes the implementation of the risk reduction measures (paragraphs 83
89);
• Describes how major accident risks are managed (paragraphs 90-112);
• Describes the evacuation, escape and rescue arrangements (paragraphs 113-144).
The structured approach listed above is generic, so that there are no specific requirements for how
an assessment of fire hazards should be carried out.
2.5.4 Fire and explosion strategy
The HSE have recently compiled and published issue 1 of a Fire and Explosion Strategy to
illustrate their approach. The overall objective of the document is to identify the areas which OSD
has identified as requiring possible future work to address significant areas of uncertainty in fire
and explosion issues on offshore installations. The document covers a number of areas of
relevance to this guidance, the topics covered briefly in the strategy document are:
• Fluid characteristics (referred to as Source Terms by HSE [X])
• Ignition
• Fire and gas detection
• Dispersion and ventilation
• Fire and explosion hazard assessment
• Fire and explosion consequence assessment
• Prevention, control and mitigation of fires and explosion
The more detailed scope covered by the strategy document is as follows:

• Provide an introduction to each topic area, e.g. describing the scope of the review, the
nature of the hazard etc (as appropriate to the topic area);
• Describe the significance of the topic with regard to the risk of major accidents on offshore
installations;

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• Summarise current knowledge of the topic (i.e. reference to completed and on-going
research, standards, codes of practice, design guidance etc);
• Summarise existing modelling capabilities (as appropriate to the topic area);
• Based on the results of the knowledge summary and the model capabilities above, identify
areas of uncertainty;
• Summarise current industry practice (i.e. reference to approaches taken in Safety Cases,
extent of implementation of existing codes, guidance etc, awareness of issues);
• Summarise areas identified to potentially be carried forward as part of OSD 3’s strategy
development.
The strategy document emphasises that individual topics are subject to continuous change and
their priority is not addressed in the strategy document.
2.5.5 Codes, standards and guidance
Guidance documents are available from the Health and Safety Executive for the legislation
mentioned above. However there is little guidance, apart from ISO 13702 [16] and PFEER, relating
specifically to the design of installations against fire hazard events. The most relevant are the
Interim Guidance Notes (IGN) [45] for which this Guidance represents an updated publication.
Various codes, standards and guidance are available covering elements related to the fire hazards,
(it should be noted that explosion incidents will often be followed by fire, hence the guidance below
incorporates some references to fire hazards as well). Some of the widely used standards are
listed below.
For ignition prevention and Hazardous Area Classification;

• Institute of Petroleum, ‘Area Classification Code for installations handling flammable fluids’,
August 2002, (IP15) [20].
• The ATEX (Atmospheric Explosion) Directives 94/9/EC and 1999/92/EC [X]cover electrical
and mechanical equipment and protective systems, which may be used in potentially
explosive atmospheres.
• BS EN 60079-10. ‘Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres Part 10.
Classification of hazardous areas’, [21].
• For equipment in hazardous areas ‘BS EN 1127-1: 1998 Explosive atmospheres [X].
Explosion prevention and protection’ [19] is available.

• BS 5958: 1991 ‘Code of practice for control of undesirable static electricity’, [22].
These documents only cover operational leaks rather than accidental releases. They do not define
the extent of hazardous areas from the point of view of explosion and fire risk.
Alongside UK legislation, EN ISO 13702 [16] also addresses the need to develop a fire and
explosion strategy (FES) which describes the role, essential elements and performance standards
for each of the systems required to manage possible hazardous events on the installation.
Guidance on the demonstration of ALARP is available throughout this Guidance and from the
following sources;
• Policy and Guidance on reducing risks to ALARP in Design [25],
http://www.hse.gov.uk/dst/alarp1.htm
• Principles and Guidelines to Assist HSE in its Judgement that Duty Holders Have Reduced
Risk as Low as Reasonably Practicable [26]. http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/spc/perm12.htm

HSE Books have published a guide which sets out an overall framework for decision taking by the
HSE (“Reducing Risks, Protecting People”), which is available in hard copy form [27] and as a free
download from http://www.hsr.gov.uk/dst/r2p2.pdf
HSE guidance relating to Gas Turbine enclosures is relevant as the principles mentioned are
applicable to explosions in general.
• ‘Control of Risks at Gas Turbines Used for Power Generation’, Guidance Note PM84 HSE,
[24].
Further details on legislation, standards and guidance can be found in Annex B.
2.6 Inherently safer design

2.6.1 Introduction
Having determined the installation concept it is necessary to manage fire and explosion risk within
the constraints imposed by the subsequent offshore layout.
The advantage of an inherently safer design or the ‘Inherent Safety’ design approach is that it
attempts to remove the potential for hazards to arise. It does not rely on control measures, systems
or human intervention to protect personnel [7].
All control systems have the potential for failure to operate as intended – generally expressed as
the probability of failure on demand. Critical loops are designed according to their criticality in
mitigating personal, environmental or commercial risk by setting a Safety Integrity Level (SIL). In
setting a SIL it is acknowledged that there is failure potential although this is designed to be
inversely proportional to the importance of the loop in risk mitigation.
There is always the potential for the systems to be damaged in a hazardous event. Inherent safety
avoids this potential by aiming for prevention rather than protection and the preference for passive
protection over active systems.
It is particularly important to follow Inherently Safer Design principles where the consequences of
process release or system failure are high. Where it is possible to reduce the reliance on
engineered (active or passive) safety systems or operational procedures this should be done.
The Inherently safer design approach is contrasted with the process design spiral in Figure 2.1.
The result of the application of the Inherently Safer Design approach is reduced complexity and a
reduced requirement for human intervention, resulting in a simpler more robust system.

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Enhanced
Monitoring Requirement
More Complexity
More Maintenance
more leak sources
Intervention
Duplication to increase
redundancy More Instrumentation
Automation
More Safety
Systems
Process Design Spiral
Reduced Monitoring
Requirement
Less instrumentation
Less Automation
Reduced Complexity
fewer leak sources
Reduction
reduced inventories
Less Maintenance
Less Intervention
Attenuation
Substitution
Increased
Robustness
Inherently safer
Design Cycle
Figure 2.1 - Comparison between the process design spiral and the inherently safer design
cycle
2.6.2 Goals of inherently safer design
The goals of inherently safer design [8] are to avoid the hazard and maintain safe conditions
through inherent and, where appropriate, passive design features; and to minimise the sensitivity
of the plant to potential faults as far as can be reasonably achieved.

This implies that the plant response to the fault should satisfy the following criteria in order:
• The response produces no operational response or results in a move to a safer condition.
• Passive or engineered safeguards should be continuously available and should make the
plant safe.
• Active engineered safeguards activated in response to the fault should make the plant safe.
2.6.3 Approaches to achieve the goals of inherently safer design
In Inherently Safer Design the following processes are commonly employed [9]:
• reduction – reducing the hazardous inventories or the frequency or duration of exposure,
• substitution – substituting hazardous materials with less hazardous ones,
• attenuation – using the hazardous materials or processes in a way that limits their hazard
potential, e.g. storage at lower temperature or pressure,
• simplification – making the plant and process simpler to design, build and operate hence
less prone to equipment, control failure and human error.
The application of the above principles should result in:

• fewer and smaller hazards,
• fewer causes,
• reduced severity,
• fewer consequences,
• more effective management of residual risk.
In order to implement the principles, contributions will be required from all levels of the project
team. Managers should show leadership in the focus on safety, discipline engineers will be
involved in concept choice, plant layout, and engineering detail and safety specialists must make
the options visible and available to designers and document the process.
Table 2.1 summarizes the major ‘inherent safety’ and control features necessary to achieve the
goals stated above:
Table 2.1 Inherent Safety Features to Achieve Goals
Goal to minimise fire risk Inherent Safety features to achieve goal

Benefits of good layout (including – place equipment, utilities and personnel areas along a clear hazard
partitioning effects or not) gradient
– where possible use as much segregation as possible to limit
escalation
– avoid congestion in process areas
– place safety critical equipment in uncongested areas where
possible (limits vulnerability to high explosion loads)
– use height between floors to provide ventilation space (cheap
volume)
– identify measures required by fire and explosions and balance
benefits from measures for each hazard category

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Minimisation of Potential Leak – minimise number of pipe joints
Sources/Release potential – maximise welded pipe joints
– minimise invasive instrumentation
– eliminate/minimise small bore pipework
– minimise offshore processing and process complexity
– minimise vibration
– minimise corrosion/erosion
– ensure effective inspection
Minimisation of Ignition Potential – ensure there are no naked flames in live plant
– audit and review safety management system with respect to hot
work procedures
– insulate hot surfaces (where inspection is not critical)
– ensure effective earth bonding
– implement hazardous area zoning (area classification)
– ensure an effective maintenance regime
Minimisation of POB Exposure to – separate quarters and non-operational personnel from process
Fire Effects areas
– minimise maintenance requirements
– remote operation of processes
– simplify the offshore process
– introduce separate accommodation platforms
– use fully rated fire barriers and protect non-redundant primary
structure
– provide multiple escape routes from each hazardous area
– introduce structural redundancy
Minimisation of Hazardous – simplification/minimisation of offshore processing
Inventory – use of small isolatable inventories
– effect isolation from large inventories upon gas/leak detection
– ensure effective blowdown of inventories
Minimisation of potential release – minimise inventory pressure and potential leak rate
mass and severity of – minimise hazardous inventory
consequences
– minimise module size, segregation of release sites from ignition
sources and personnel – compartmentalisation
– Minimise congestion and the possibility of obstructed fires
– Improve natural ventilation (to reduce ignition probability, avoid re-
circulation and external flaming)
– Consider the use of subsea completions
Monitoring and maintenance of – implement an effective inspection programme
SCE integrity/functionality – introduce effective maintenance procedures
– minimise the exposure of the TR and SCEs to smoke and heat
– improve SCEs resistance to thermal effects
– protect SCEs from severe vibration effects
– protect SCEs from structural displacement effects
– separate process areas from critical non-hazardous areas

Maintain Effective Management of – safety leadership and focus
residual risk – implement an effective safety management system
– pursue prevention rather than protection
– use passive systems of control and mitigation in preference to
active systems
The above table details inherent safety and control features that minimise the potential for fires to
occur, or if a fire should occur, that minimise the consequences and risk to personnel. These
features should ideally be built into the early design of the installation, rather than being included
as mitigation measures at a later date.
Inherent safety practices must be maintained throughout the life of the installation continuing
through the operational phase by adherence to effective inspection and maintenance regimes and
by ensuring that management systems and related procedures are followed.
The benefits of the inherently safer design approach are that hazards and risks are tackled at
source. There is an opportunity for cost effective risk reduction (at an early project phase). The
approach will normally result in easier and more reliable plant and often results in reduced through
life costs.
2.6.4 Effective management of residual risk
The risk which cannot be eliminated or prevented by the application of inherent safety methods is
referred to as residual risk. Inherent safety methods can also be applied to the management of the
residual risk by consideration of the general principles indicated below:
CONTROL is better than
MITIGATION is better than
EMERGENCY RESPONSE.
As regards systems to reduce risk
PASSIVE systems are more reliable than
ACTIVE systems are more reliable than
OPERATIONAL systems are more dependable than
EXTERNAL systems
This indicates:-
The use of passive rather than active control and mitigation systems.
No reliance on personnel to prevent, control or mitigate hazards.
This process is illustrated in Figure 2.2 below [10].

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Cause &
Understand Hazards Likelihood Severity Escalation Exposure
Minimize Each at Source
Strategy Prevent
? Control
Mitigate
Evacuate
System
Choice Passive
? Active
Operational
External
System
Performance Role, Functionality, Criticality, Survivability
?
Risk
02 -002
No Is it good
enough
?
Yes
Proceed with
Detailed Design
Figure 2.2 Risk Reduction Flowchart
2.6.5 Constraints and limitations of inherent safety
Ideally the inherently safer design approach should be applied throughout the project duration and
continue throughout the life of the installation.
At the concept choice stage the selection of a safer concept should be paramount. At the
preliminary engineering phase layout should be designed with the intention of reducing the severity
and consequences of major hazards. At the detailed engineering stage systems should be
designed to reduce the likelihood and severity of the hazard.
If the method is not applied from the start then it may not be possible, cost effective or effective in
risk reduction terms to modify the plant to conform to the ideals of inherently safer design.
Intervention may give rise to an additional hazard which must be assessed and should not
compromise the gains to be achieved by the modifications.
It may not be reasonably practicable to apply retrospectively to existing plant, what may be
demanded by reducing risks to ALARP for a new plant and what may have become good practice
for every new plant.
The overall individual risk and the TR impairment frequency (TRIF) from all hazards must still be
less than 10-3 per year. If risks are in this intolerable region then risk reduction measures must be
implemented, irrespective of cost.
There may be some conflict between the various approaches employed to improve inherent safety.
For example, increased compartmentalisation will generally reduce the size of a potential ignitable
gas cloud and the number of potential ignition sources, however this may decrease the potential

for natural ventilation, increase confinement and give rise to obstructed or ventilation limited fires.
The balance between such features needs to be considered.
Corrosion under insulation is a major cause of line failure and high operational cost, hence
insulation may be inappropriate as an ignition source reduction measure and as a process
protection measure. Insulation may actually increase the temperature of enclosed inventory or the
surfaces being protected.
There will also be a balance to be struck between reduced complexity and redundancy/duplication
of systems. Economic requirements may make such duplication necessary and may actually
reduce the required intervention.
Whilst it is generally beneficial to reduce in-line instrumentation, instrumentation associated with

autonomous systems such as deluge and leak detection systems should not contribute to the
likelihood of a release and hence this instrumentation is bound to be beneficial, unless the
maintenance requirements and instrumentation failure consequences increase the risk. A strict
adherence to the principles of inherently safer design may, in some circumstances, increase the
overall risk.
2.7 Risk screening

2.7.1 General
The higher the life safety risk (or risk to life) on an installation or within a compartment/module the
greater should be the rigor that is employed to understand and reduce that risk.
Where the risk associated with an outcome is low, any inaccuracies in determining that risk will
also be low in absolute terms. The effort expended should be proportional to the risk. It is important
therefore to have a means of early estimation of the risk level of an installation to determine the
appropriate approach to be used in installation fire assessment.
The approach to fire assessment needs to be decided early in the design process when absolute
values for release frequency and detailed consequence analysis are not available.
Risk is the product of consequence and frequency of occurrence. This risk can be calculated as a
numerical value expressed as individual risk (IR) or in terms of a value for the installation such as
Potential Loss of Life (PLL). Where quantitative values are not available a qualitative measure of
risk can be estimated to a degree of accuracy sufficient to make a decision on the assessment
approach to be adopted.
Likelihood is a more appropriate term in this context where a qualitative assessment is being
performed, The terms probability and frequency imply that numerical values are available.
At a later stage in a design project a 5 x 5 risk matrix may be appropriate for risk acceptance.
However at an early project phase the increased number of boundaries between consequence and
likelihood classes may be difficult to identify and assign.
A simple approach which is frequently adopted for qualitative risk assessment uses a 3 x 3 matrix
of potential consequence versus likelihood of a fire event is described in this section.
2.7.2 Consequence severity
The consequence side of the matrix comprises an assessment of the effects of credible fire
scenarios including escalation.
A major risk lies in effects such as oxygen depletion and radiation from flames and the emission of
hot gases. It is more likely that the major consequences will involve escalation, such as:

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• fires resulting from loss of inventory from damaged equipment, supports, pipework and
vessels;
• structural failure;
• inaccessibility of means of escape and/or evacuation.
For a long duration fire there is a risk to those who attempt to tackle the fire.
For the installation under consideration the direct and indirect effects of fires should be identified.
This should be achieved by assessing parameters such as;
• the vulnerability of Safety Critical Elements to thermal loads
• occupancy of the area immediately affected
• vulnerability of people in adjacent areas
• the relative location of the TR
• the suitability of the layout
• hazardous inventories, both isolatable and non-isolatable
• The operating and control philosophy influences the extent of operator intervention and the
potential for human error and inventory loss.
Low consequence outcomes would be predicted where the radiation levels are predicted to be
relatively low and immediate and delayed consequences are also low. The fire extent and duration
may also be predicted to be small. The equipment count would probably be low, being limited to
wellheads and manifold with no vessels (i.e. no associated process pipework) resulting in low
inventory and congestion. Segregation should separate release sites, people and ignition sources
with low confinement and good access. Manning would be consistent with a normally unattended
installation with a low attendance frequency, for example, less frequent than 6-weekly. A 6-weekly
visit by a maintenance/intervention crew results in an occupancy rate of about 1%.
A medium consequence installation would be typically a platform or compartment which is well

segregated with a low manning level consistent with a normally unattended installation.
Congestion, typified by the amount of equipment installed, will be greater than for the low
consequence case. Manning would be consistent with a normally unattended installation with a
moderate attendance frequency, more frequent than 6-weekly. Alternatively, a medium
consequence installation may be a processing platform necessitating permanent manning but with
low escalation potential to quarters, utilities and control areas which are located on a separate
structure.
A high consequence installation would encompass remaining installations and compartments

where there is significant processing on board leading to significant congestion (high equipment
count) and potential confinement with populated areas within the consequence range of escalation
scenarios. This may typically be characterised by a PDUQ/PUQ installation (jacket, semi-sub, jack-
up or FPSO) with quarters on the same structure as the process.
Where there is doubt regarding the category into which an installation should fall, it is
recommended that the category with next higher consequence is used.
2.7.3 Likelihood
The likelihood of a significant fire will depend upon the likelihood of occurrence of a large release
and ignition. The following parameters will influence the potential likelihood of a fire:
• hazardous inventory complexity, i.e. the number of flanges, valves, compressors and other
potential leak sources;
• the type of flanges, valves or pipework. Some generic types of flange tend to have lower leak
frequencies associated with them, e.g. hub type flanges;
• the number of ignition sources within the flammable region of a potential spray release, gas or
vapour cloud;
• the ventilation regime;
• the equipment reliability and the maintenance philosophy.
The likelihood considerations tend to align closely with the consequence factors in that the low
consequence installations will tend to be small and therefore less complex. Large installations will
have more potential leak and ignition sources and therefore a greater requirement for intervention
and maintenance.
Low event likelihood installations and compartments will have a low equipment count. The
frequency intervention period of 6 weeks or more is also recommended as a criterion as this will be
a surrogate for equipment count and reliability as well as a measure of maintenance risk with
respect to an ignited release.
Medium event likelihood is suggested by an NUI with equipment count greater than for the ‘low’
case. Similarly, where the planned frequency of maintenance/intervention is greater than a 6-
weekly basis then this suggests a higher or less reliable class of equipment with medium level of
potential for an ignited release.
Where the complexity of the process in a compartment requires a permanently manned installation
this suggests a high equipment level, high congestion and therefore potentially a high likelihood
of a fire event, a large number of potential leak sources and high ignition potential.
Where there is doubt regarding the category into which an installation should fall, it is
recommended the category with next higher likelihood is used.
2.7.4 The risk matrix
The risk category for the installation is assigned using the risk matrix below:
Consequence
Low Medium High

Frequency/
High Medium risk High risk High risk

Likelihood
Medium Low risk Medium risk High risk
Low Low risk Low risk Medium risk
Figure 2.X Risk matrix – determination of risk category
The risk category determines the level of sophistication required for the assessment (low, medium
or high). Levels of analysis are discussed in Sub-section 3.7 and checklists for each level are given
in Appendix E.
The level of risk screening discussed above is scenario independent. The risk level for each
scenario may be made using the risk matrix if representative ranges of frequency and severity can
be attached to the likelihood and consequence categories.

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2.8 Risk reduction

Risk management and reduction is an integral part of the Health, Safety and Environmental
Management System (HSEMS) of any organisation or project. The HSEMS provides the overall
framework within which all risks (not just fire related) should be managed.
To assess and manage the risks arising from a specific operation especially with respect to a
specific hazard category it is necessary to recognise the requirements of the HSEMS on the risk
management process (e.g. in determining acceptable levels of risk) and to implement the
processes that contribute to the risk management.
As part of the processes contributing to risk management, an assessment and implementation

programme for dealing with risk reduction measures should be in place. The risk reduction
measures include preventative measures (i.e. likelihood reducing) and mitigation measures (i.e.
consequence reducing). The detailed definition and specification of these measures form
significant components of design codes and standards. Where appropriate, risks can also be
significantly reduced by the adoption of inherently safe designs as discussed in Sub-section 2.6.2.
In identifying candidate risk reduction measures, consideration should be given to the full range of
measures involving inherently safer design, prevention, detection, control and mitigation that have
been discussed through Sub-section 2.6 and 2.8.
The risk reduction measures considered may range from items of equipment and physical systems
through to operational procedures, managerial structures and planning.
It is worth emphasising that the UK regulator will expect to see the following demonstrations for
risks lying below the maximum tolerable, but above the broadly acceptable level.
• That the nature and level of the risks are properly assessed and the results used to
determine control measures
• That residual risks are not unduly high and have been kept ALARP
• That the risks are periodically reviewed to ensure that they still meet the ALARP criteria
Duty holders should not assume that if risks are below the maximum tolerable level, they are also
ALARP. This should be demonstrated through the application of relevant good practice and sound
engineering judgement; and the consideration of further measures that can be adopted to reduce
risks to ALARP. The degree of rigour of the ALARP demonstration should also be proportionate to
the level of risk associated with that hazard category on that installation.
A number of example risk reduction measures that have been used in submitted safety cases (up
to 2001) has been tabulated in the HSE publication, “Fire, Explosion and Risk Assessment Topic
Guidance”, Issue 1, February 2003. This table is reproduced overleaf.
For full document see http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/hid/manuals/pmtech12.pdf

Table 2.2 Examples of Risk Reduction Measures Implemented on Existing Installations
(2001)
Type of measure Description

Prevention (i.e. reduction of Leak prevention
likelihood) – Removal or strengthening of small bore pipework connections
– Isolation of disused wells at production header as well as Xmas tree and venting of
flow lines back to tree
– Decommissioning of redundant equipment
– Improvements to systems of work
– Implementation of competence management and assurance system
– Improvements to PTW system
– Improvements in integrity assurance
Ventilation
– Removal of wind walls
– Enhancement of HVAC in process modules
Ignition control
– Monitoring of gas turbine exhaust system temperature
Detection (i.e. transmission Gas detection
of information to control – Installation of ultrasonic leak detectors
point)
– Installation of additional IR beam detectors
Fire detection
– Installation of additional fire detectors
Control (i.e. limitation of Emergency shutdown (ESD) systems
scale, intensity and – Installation of high integrity check valve on gas re-injection header
duration)
Blowdown and flare systems
– Installation of additional blowdown valves
Explosion control
– Initiation of water deluge on detection of gas
– Removal of redundant equipment
Mitigation (i.e. protection Active fire protection
from effects) – Replacement of deluge system piping
Passive fire protection
– Uprating of fire walls
Blast protection
– Uprating of blast walls
Temporary Refuge
– Re-location of Main Control Room to TR
– Re-definition of TR
– Enhancement of mustering facilities
– Protection of external staircase
– Provision of airlock doors
– Provision of dedicated HVAC system for TR
Evacuation and escape
– Installation of additional emergency lighting on escape route
– Provision and maintenance of proper training in the use of evacuation and escape
facilities
– Provision of alternative escape routes
Fire-fighting equipment
– Installation of new foam monitors

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Type of measure Description

Manning
– Reduction of POB
2.9 Human factors

The influence of Human Factors in the control of and response to fire hazards and fire hazard
management systems is significant and must be considered in the assessment of hazards and the
design of control and mitigation systems.
The Human Factors issues covered within this guidance document summarise 2 areas of
application; reference should be made to Section 6.8 for “Response to Fires (Personnel)” and
Section 7.4 for “Human Factors/Man Machine Interface”.
The response of personnel to fires covers the effects of heat, radiation, smoke and other toxic or
debilitating products of combustion. These issues are discussed in detail in Section 6.8 where (in
addition) some examples of the types of fires generating these hazards are given along with a
summary of the timeline of the harm criteria that develop along with the escalating hazard.
The ability of the workforce to safely and effectively manage and maintain the detection and
mitigation systems for fire hazards is described in more detail in Section 7.4. The considered
design of the man machine interface for these safety critical systems is a major contributor to their
successful function to meet a hazard demand. The issues of ergonomics, working environment and
clarity of supplied information are discussed in detail in Section 7.4 along with some indications of
appropriate analysis techniques to assist the designers and operators.

3. Fires on offshore installations
3.1 Introduction
In order to successfully implement the appropriate protective mechanisms for fire hazards, it is
essential (and obvious) to understand what element or area is being protected and what event the
designer is protecting against. Therefore, the protective measures can only ever be effective when
an assessment is carried out of the potential fire hazards. This step is required by the fire and
explosion risk analyses (FERA.).
Some preliminary guidance on describing the unfolding scenarios is given in the following sections.
3.2 Fire types and scenarios

3.2.1 General
This section identifies fire scenarios which need to be addressed in the component of the QRA for
an offshore installation dealing with fire hazards. The fire hazard scenarios may or may not form
part of an escalation event and may or may not follow an explosion. The assessment should start
with a review of possible initial events that could lead to a fire (Section 2.1). It should then consider
how the fire and the thermal loading from the fire may develop and be affected by ESD, Blow-
down, confinement, deluge, PFP (Section 2.2) and ultimately derive a range of fire scenarios from
the range of possible release events that can lead to fire (Section 4). The assessment must then
continue with the consideration of how events may change with time which may lead to a transition
between fire scenarios (Section 5).
3.2.2 Fire types
On offshore installations, there is a range of potential conditions for fuel sources and types, context
of release and ignition, all of which lead to a range of fire types. The fire types are discussed
further in Sub-section 5.4 but the summary table below provides basic information for considering
protective options.
Table 3.1 Summary of release and fire type examples from existing Installations [X] (2001)
(this table transposed from Annex D)
Hydrocarbon Release Release Local Ignition Properties

Type Pressure/ site obstruction
Temperature
Gas High Smooth none Immediate Directional jet fire,
hole or delayed erosive with high
momentum.
Could self-extinguish to
give un-ignited cloud
and fire hazard.
Gas High Flange, Medium Immediate Diffuse fire plume of
irregular (adjacent irregular shape, fire ball.
hole plant)
Non-buoyant Medium Any Low to high Immediate Flash fire with burning
gas or delayed of cloud between
flammability limits
Buoyant gas High to medium Any Low to Delayed Rising fire ball
medium

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Hydrocarbon Release Release Local Ignition Properties

Type Pressure/ site obstruction
Temperature
Liquid High Any Medium Immediate Spray fire with a well
or delayed defined jet, particularly
for volatile liquids or
liquids with significant
flash fraction
Liquid High Irregular Medium to Immediate Wide spray fire
high
Liquid Low Any Low to Delayed Pool fire
medium
Liquid High Any Low to Delayed Pool fire
medium
Liquid High Any Low to high Delayed Flash fire for volatile
liquids
Superheated High Vessel Any Immediate BLEVE (boiling liquid
liquid rupture expanding vapour
explosion)
Usually an escalation
consequence of a fire
on a vessel
Liquid High Any Low to Immediate Running pool fire if
medium or delayed bunding and drainage is
inadequate for the
release rate.
3.2.3 Release events
To establish which fire scenarios should be considered as part of a QRA of an installation, it is first
necessary to consider the range of incidents that may lead to an uncontrolled release of flammable
material which, if ignited, would give rise to a fire. In this context, relevant questions concerning
potential release scenarios are:
• WHY did the release occur?
• WHAT is released?
• WHERE did it occur?
The answers to these questions combine to determine the type of fire that may result, the likely
size of the fire and its potential impact on people and the installation. Considering each in turn:
WHY: The answer to this question will establish the size of the leak and influence the likelihood of
ignition. For example, has the leak occurred due to a leaking flange joint or as a result of a
preceding explosion event? A range of sizes should be considered from small leaks at flanges and
fittings up to major failures of vessels and risers which result in very high release rates. The leak
rate may also change with time and may have a limited duration. Failure frequencies for different
sizes of event should be taken into account; generally small leaks will be the most common. The
reason why a failure is being considered may also influence the likelihood of ignition, for example,
if a vessel failure is being considered as a result of a preceding explosion or fire attack then ignition
is almost certain, whereas a small leak of high pressure gas generated as a result of a leaking
flange may not interact with a potential ignition source. Ignition probabilities also depend on fuel
type, for example, a spillage of diesel onto a cold surface is not readily ignited.

WHAT: The nature of substance being released will also influence the type of fire that results. A
non-volatile liquid spillage may result in a pool fire whereas a high pressure gas release may
produce a jet fire. Apart from process fluids, other flammable substances are likely to be stored
and used on an installation for use in service roles. Potential fluids to be considered are:
• Natural Gas – dry or containing condensate and/or water
• Condensate – unstable or stabilized
• Live crude –possible including a significant amount of water
• Transport fuels - Aviation fuel, Diesel
• Process fluids – Methanol, Ethylene Glycol
• Lubricants and hydraulic fluids
In addition, some of the gas and oil streams may include hydrogen sulphide, which may require
special consideration because of its potential to produce toxic products or be toxic if unignited.
WHERE: Where the leak occurs will also influence the type of fire that results. In particular, is the
fire likely to be in an open area or confined area and what is the potential for the fire to impact onto
pipework or vessels that may also contain flammable material? The latter question is important
with regard to the potential for incident escalation. Some fires may occur at a location away form
the source of the leak, for example, liquid spills which may spread to other areas or even spill onto
the sea. The location of the fire will also influence its likely consequences; hence fire scenarios at a
range of key locations should be addressed in the QRA. In particular, fires that are close to where
people work, which could affect escape routes, Safety Critical Equipment, the Temporary Refuge
or key structural components.
Having selected and defined a release event giving rise to a fire, this fire and its effects may well
change and develop with time depending on the prevailing circumstances. The following factors
may affect fire behaviour and/or the consequences:
• ESD: Assuming the ESD operates the volume of the isolatable volumes will affect the
duration of the larger leak scenarios and result in a transient fire size, reducing with time.
• Blow-down: Similar to ESD operation, this could result in a transient release rate.
Additionally, blow-down may reduce the consequences of the fire scenario by
depressurising a vessel or pipework onto which a fire is impacting, thereby preventing
escalation.
• Confinement: Fires in confined areas with limited ventilation may change over time, for
example, become progressively more severe as ‘external flaming’ occurs, when the fire
moves through the ventilation openings.
• PFP: The use of passive fire protection may not affect the nature of the fire but will affect
the response of objects subjected to fire attack and delay or prevent incident escalation.
• Deluge: Depending on the fire type, active water deluge systems (area and dedicated) may
affect both the nature of fire and the thermal loading to engulfed objects and in most cases
will be beneficial to escaping personnel.
3.2.4 Ignition
The likelihood of ignition is clearly an important factor to consider for any QRA and will also be
dependent on the answers to the WHY, WHAT, WHERE questions above. Some fuels are more
easily ignited than others and the manner of spillage may affect its flammability (for example oil
spills onto the sea are often not readily ignitable and additionally are likely to be distant from
common ignition sources on an offshore installation.

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Ignition sources such as electrical fault, electrical arcs (for example across switch contacts),
sparks, high temperature surfaces, flames and electrostatic discharge should be considered and
the proximity of such sources will vary at different locations on an installation.
3.2.5 Fire scenarios
Given that ignition has occurred, the answers to the WHY, WHAT, WHERE questions in
Section 3.2.2 above also determine the nature of the initial fire and how the fire may subsequently
develop. Typical answers to these questions include:
WHY WHAT WHERE

– Leaking flange, small – High pressure gas – In open module in
fitting or valve open area or
congested region
– Pipework failure from – Pressurised volatile – In confined area
impact or corrosion or liquid
preceding event
– Equipment failure – Pressurised gas/liquid – Spillage onto sea
mixture
– Vessel rupture or – Non pressurised non – From subsea source
collapse following volatile liquid
explosion, structural
collapse or fire event
By considering combinations of these answers the fire type can be determined. Three examples
are as follows:
WHY WHAT WHERE FIRE TYPE

Leaking flange joint High pressure natural In an open sided module Jet fire with potential
gas impact onto pipework
and vessels
Fire attack on Gas and volatile liquids On the installation BLEVE - fireball
pressurised vessel
leading to failure
Storage vessel failure Non-volatile liquid On the installation but Potential pool fire on the
liquid spills onto sea sea
Considering a range of generic cases, such as those above, the following 6 fire types are
proposed:
• Gas Jet Fire – originating from a pressurised gas release on the installation.
• Two-Phase Jet Fire – originating from a pressurised release of a flashing liquid or a
gas/liquid mixture on the installation.
• Pool Fire on the Installation – originating from a liquid spillage. May be static or running
depending on the drainage paths or bunding around the source.
• Pool Fires on the Sea – originating from a spillage on the installation falling onto the sea,
or failure of a sub-sea liquid pipeline.
• Gas Fires on the Sea – originating from failure of a sub-sea gas pipeline.
• BLEVE – originating as a result of catastrophic failure of a pressurised vessel containing a
volatile liquid.

It should be noted that the behaviour of these fires may change with time as noted in
Sub-section 3.2.2.2, for example, due to the effect of ESD, confinement or deluge. The nature of
these fires and their behaviour when interacting with confinement and/or deluge is considered in
Sub-section 5.2. The heat and smoke loadings produced by these fire types and the heat transfer
to engulfed obstacles are considered in Sub-sections 5.4 and 5.4.
3.2.6 Transition between fire scenarios
As indicated in Sub-sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.4 some fire scenarios may change with time, for
example, where a fire occurs in a confined space the lack of available air may lead to increasing
fire severity with time and the movement of the flame through the vent producing external flaming.
Similarly, some fire scenarios may lead to incident escalation and result in a different fire event
occurring as a direct consequence, for example, a jet fire impacting onto a pressurised vessel may
lead to vessel failure and a BLEVE fireball event. A liquid spillage may start as a pool fire on the
installation but drainage of the spill may ultimately lead to a pool fire on the sea. Therefore, it is
important that a QRA considers the potential sequence of fire events and that a fully representative
set of events is analysed.
3.3 Fire prevention methods

3.3.1 General
The principals of Fire Hazard Management promote a four-part strategy for dealing with the fire
hazard. The strategy, in order of priority is to seek to:
1. Prevent or minimise fires at source
2. Detect fires early
3. Control Fires
4. Mitigate against effect of fires
Sub-sections 3.3 to 3.6 give an outline of the methods available in each of these four categories. In
reality almost every offshore installation employs a mixture of all four methods. The fire scenarios
for every installation vary. Good design seeks out the best mix of prevention, detection, control and
mitigation methodologies for the specific fire scenarios associated with an installation.
There are opportunities throughout the design of any installation to minimise the fire hazard using
the four strategies above. Every engineering discipline involved in the design process should be
aware of the interaction between their specific discipline input and the fire hazard management for
the installation. It is the responsibility of the safety engineer in conjunction with the project manager
to engage all the engineers in discussion of fire hazards from an early stage so that no cost-
effective opportunities for improvement are missed.
This section outlines the options available for preventing or minimising the fire event at source.
Sub-sections 3.4 and 3.5 cover the various options for detection, control and mitigation of fire
events once they have already occurred.
3.3.2 Methods of fire prevention or minimisation at source
Given that the principal role of oil and gas installations is to produce large quantities of
hydrocarbons, removal of the fuel source altogether is not really an option. However there are
opportunities for process and other engineers to design so as to minimise the potential for huge
releases of fuel:-

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3.3.3 Minimise inventories
The biggest inventories are in the reservoir, the pipelines attached to the installations and the
process vessels. Engineers need to be briefed to consider minimisation of release potential in
addition to consideration of production maximisation and cost. They should aim to :
• Minimise inventories between the wellhead and downhole valves
• Provide suitably located topsides and subsea isolation valves on all import and export
pipelines. It should not be assumed that subsea isolation is unjustified. Justifications must
consider all lifecycle phases (especially for NUIs).
• Size pipelines, vessels and other process equipment to minimise inventory loss in a leak
situation as well as meet process requirements
• Provide adequate automatic isolation throughout the process system, backed up where
necessary with accessible manual isolation valves.
• Minimise on-platform storage wherever feasible
3.3.4 Optimise layout
Good layout is essential to the overall safety of the installation. Where separation of people from
hazardous areas is not possible, provide protection by segregation behind firewalls and attention to
escape/egress routes. Key points are:
• Keep living quarters and evacuation facilities away from the process
• Provide diverse egress routes from modules and access platforms/decks back to the TR or
provide a suitable protected muster point (PMP)
• Provide grated deck in process areas to reduce pool fire risks
• Consider drain arrangements for all fire scenarios
• Locate risers as far as possible from the TR & evacuation point
• Locate risers and riser valves where other fires or fire escalation cannot affect them.
• Small Southern gas platforms cannot provide separation by distance therefore immediate
safe egress/escape provision plus sheltered evacuation points are crucial for safety of
personnel.
3.3.5 Minimise the potential for loss of containment events

• Minimise the number of potential leak points in the design, particularly flanges and
instrumentation connections. However enough valves need to be left to provide for safe
isolation for intrusive maintenance. Use of newer design of equipment such as high integrity
flanges, valves with integral block and bleed and inherently safer wellheads should be
considered
• Design for future sand erosion and corrosion by providing for ease of detection, monitoring
and replacement.
• Where facilities and access for routine test and maintenance are not provided on the
understanding that such work will only be done during shutdowns, this should be
highlighted on drawings and in manuals.
• where emergency manual isolation is provided, make sure it is documented in emergency
response plans, unambiguously labelled in the field and accessible in the relevant fire
scenarios.

3.3.6 Minimise the time to ESD and blowdown
• ESD should be designed to occur immediately on detection of a release event. ESD should
move the plant to a safer state. Designers need to check whether the ESDV locations
minimise ignited release consequences rather than just reducing leak size.
• Rapid blowdown or draining of topsides process inventories in order to prevent escalation
of a fire situation should be provided - unless there are specific good reasons for not doing
so (e.g. very small topsides process).
• The code-based design approach of providing blowdown to 7 barg or half design pressure
in 15 minutes should no longer be automatically assumed adequate. Blowdown should be
designed in the light of the specific escalation times for each fire scenario and generally be
as fast as feasible once activated (see also Section 7.2)
• Where only a manual blowdown capability is justified – the designer must record the design
and operating philosophy for the intended user. All the details must be in the emergency
response instructions for the installation.
• Blowdown must be to a safe location with respect to personnel, bearing in mind the
likelihood of spurious blowdown events as well as real emergency events, and increases in
flare or ignited vent radiation.
3.3.7 Minimise ignition sources

• All electrical equipment in hazardous areas shall be certified. This is to cater for ‘fugitive’
leaks in accordance with hazardous area design codes.
• The dispersion distances for such leaks, from which the hazardous zones are calculated,
do not cater for major accident releases
• A gas cloud from a medium or large leak can, and will, drift outside hazardous area limits.
Therefore caution must be exercised in locating unclassified equipment such as generator
sets, temporary pump skids, heating equipment etc in ‘safe’ open locations around the
installation.
• The ignition-prevention philosophy for the platform should explain how the ignition risk is
minimised
• Plant should be suitably earthed and all operators trained in awareness of offshore static
spark risks (a recurring cause of fires)
• Equipment which provides an ignition source and is unacceptably close to release sources
should either be located inside an enclosure with ventilation ducts that close off
automatically on detection of gas, or be provided with some alternative form of protection.
Certified electro-mechanical equipment (e.g. diesel generators) requires careful maintenance in

order to retain its certification and is a significant operating expense.
3.4 Fire detection and control methods

3.4.1 Detection of loss of containment events
Early detection of loss of containment events is crucial. Detection should always trigger limitation of
the leak by rapid automatic isolation it should simultaneously alert personnel to the danger. Since it
is difficult to automatically detect liquid oil leaks (although oil mist detectors can detect higher
pressure liquid leaks), historically reliance has been placed on detection of the associated gas.
Most installations have hundreds of sensitive detectors in place. In order to prevent spurious
shutdowns and un-necessary platform alerts, most installations have a two-tier alert system.
Typically, under this system, a single low-gas-level alarm alerts staff in the control room to a
potential problem, which is immediately investigated but no shutdown or general alarm is initiated.

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One single low level gas detection is more likely to be a false alarm than a real gas release. If a
second alarm in the same area then occurs or if a high-gas-level alarm goes off, then this is
indicative of a real release rather than a false alarm. The fire and gas system voting interprets 2 or
more low-level or 1 or more high-level alarms as ‘confirmed’ gas releases. This automatically
initiates platform alarms and shutdowns.
Confirmed gas detection should always initiate immediate, appropriate executive action in the form
of shutdowns and, where applicable, blowdown. Most platforms have between 2 and 5 levels of
shutdown, depending on the extend of the detected release. A system which requires operations
personnel to walk into a gas-release scenario in order to investigate before initiating shut down of
the process system is potentially dangerous and no longer acceptable. Personnel should never be
asked to enter a gas-cloud for the purposes of investigation or manual action – they may be
rendered unconscious by the un-ignited gas or be engulfed in flame if the cloud suddenly ignites.
Where one person is missing, more people are exposed through search and rescues attempts and
the evacuation process becomes delayed. The detection system should instead be designed to
give remote indication of the development and/or migration of the release thus allowing personnel
to stay well away from danger. Once the fire and gas panel shows the situation is sufficiently under
control then cautious, upwind approach from a position of safety can be attempted.
There are many different types of gas detector available. All have their strengths and weaknesses
which are explored in the table below. All installations, modern and old, use a combination of
different methods in order to cover the range of duties necessary.
The approach to the detection of flammable gas has moved away from trying to detect all leaks
and now concentrates mostly on the following distinct criteria:-
1. The detection of gas clouds of a specific size and LEL (i.e. 5 metres, 50% LEL cloud)
2. The detection of gas leaks also of a specific size (i.e. 0.1kg/s to 2.5 kg/s)
3. The detection of gas at the HVAC intakes to areas containing potential sources of
ignition (TR, turbine enclosures, etc)
The basis for the specific cloud size and gas leak size are established by specialist
analysis/modelling of the areas. The systems are generally not concerned with the detection of
fugitive gas leaks, except in some special cases.
Performance standards are used to set the initial design conditions to be met by the various
detectors (see Section 3.6).

Method of Gas Strengths Weaknesses
Detection
Single point Pellistors Well-understood item. Good designs should Susceptible to ‘poisoning’ of the
These detect the allow gas clouds to be tracked, as they drift catalyst by oil-spray and
presence of gas when it through areas of plant, from the safety of the contact with other chemicals.
reaches a detector control room. Very large numbers are required Always check proposed site
head. They are good at to adequately cover a typical fire zone and contamination issues with
detecting accumulations manufacturer. They generally
of gas. require a high level of
maintenance due to drift, and
recalibration due to poisoning,
as these detectors do not
automatically provide indication
of a faulty pellistor.
Not preferred on new or
upgraded installations.
Used for detection of gas in air supply ducts to Location in an air intake duct is
enclosed areas containing unclassified an arduous duty for this type of
electrical equipment or other potential sources detector Executive action
of ignition. occurs on 2oo3 voting. Access
for frequent maintenance and
testing is essential. I/R point
detector with duct probe or I/R
open path detector are now
available, and better, for this
service.
Not very effective for small
leaks in open areas. In this
situation use in conjunction with
acoustic detectors.
Susceptible to drifting if not
regularly checked and
maintained, leading to
unnecessary shut-downs.
Unless the gas comes into
direct contact with the detector
head it will not operate so
numerous detectors, suitably
located are required. Vapours
heavier than air require
detector location at floor level.
For natural gas releases,
detectors need a high level
location.
Must be calibrated and located
appropriately for the vapours
they are designed to detect.
Calibration settings for LNG
(methane), LPG (propane),
condensate and hydrogen are
all different. Heavier or lighter
than air gases require
increased numbers of detectors
and present difficulties
positioning to avoid damage at
low level and maintenance
access at high level.

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Detection
Note: On older installations where there is heavy reliance on pelllister type detectors, consideration should
be given to setting the devices to give initial (low level) alarm at a levels just above the anticipated drift range
of the device and high level alarm slightly above that. Operators have found that alarm at 10 to 20% LEL and
executive action at 25 to 40% is feasible for a well maintained system. This gives an added margin of safety
while avoiding nuisance alarms. Different set points will be necessary for different applications. The
suitability of the set point each application should be documented, and not automatically assumed to be 20%
LEL for low level and 60% for high level alarm.
IR point detectors Very good at detecting flammable gases at Not good as the prime detector
potentially known locations. Very little type for open process areas as
maintenance or calibration required during the large numbers of detectors
life of the detector (in excess of 5 years). These would be required.
detectors are least sensitive to methane, so
when calibrated for methane will also detect
other gases i.e. propane, butane etc more
readily. This type of detector is good for
confined areas, ducts etc (with a duct probe
unit).
IR Beam (open path) Very good at detecting gas clouds in open Some early versions could be
detectors. process areas, effectively taking the place of activated by adverse weather,
These detect the numerous point detectors. Very little especially rain and fog and
presence of a cloud of maintenance necessary, but this can be vibration
hydrocarbon gas achieved by one man with an interrogator tool.
between a detector Not susceptible to poisoning.
head and its reflector Detectors can be sited at the boundaries of
modules of fire zones to provide economic
coverage of large areas, providing good
information on gas migration.
Leak detectors Will detect any significant leak in vicinity without Area mapping of background
(acoustic) contact with gas therefore large numbers of noise is necessary to enable
These detect the noise detectors not necessary. Usually only two or the correct alarm setting to be
made by any significant three detectors are required in a typical process established. These detectors
leakage from a high area. require to be located with easy
pressure gas (whether access for routine testing.
flammable, toxic or These detectors will detect a
inert) system. high pressure leak of any gas,
whether hydrocarbon, air, N2,
CO2 etc. Hence caution is
necessary when arranging the
shutdown logic.
Note: There has been a Early concerns about spurious activations by
reluctance by the background noise such as operation of nearby
industry to embrace relief valves are averted due to the introduction
acoustic detection. It is of a pre-set time delay, prior to initiating an
still regarded with alarm. However proper initial design and
suspicion as ‘new calibration of the detectors for their location is
technology’ despite essential.
nearly ten years of
successful use in the
Southern North Sea.
Manual Personnel should always be vigilant and report
small leaks for Investigation/repair/monitoring.
Most small leaks are still detected manually
especially on open design platforms

Detection
CCTV (see under Not applicable for gas detection Visibility of large gas releases
CCTV in table below) depends on numerous process,
release and atmospheric
variables. Small gas releases
would not generally be picked
up.
3.4.2 Detection of fire events
Early detection of fire is crucial. The earlier a fire can be detected the early personnel can be
warned and steps taken, both automatic and manual for containment and control. There are many
types of fire detection device available on the market. No one device covers every fire situation.
The uses, locations, strengths and weaknesses of the most common types are outlined below
Methods of Fire Strengths Weaknesses

Detection
Smoke Detection:
Ionisation Smoke Widespread use in enclosed areas such Not effective in open modules, as the
detectors detect the as accommodation ceiling voids, smoke is usually dispersed before
visible and invisible electrical equipment and control rooms. reaching detector.
products of combustion The detectors can be wired in series with Not advised for use in areas where
as they come into up to 20 detectors on one loop. These some smoke is expected in normal
contact with the detectors have a high resistance to operation e.g. above cookers.
detector. contamination and corrosion. They are
Care is needed with disposal since
available in a wide range of versions to
they contain a minute radioactive
suit different needs.
source
Optical Smoke detectors Widespread use in enclosed areas such Not advised for use in areas where
detect only visible as accommodation modules. The some smoke is expected in normal
smoke and rely on the detectors can be wired in series with up operation e.g. above cookers.
‘light scatter’ principle to 20 detectors on one loop. These
detectors have a high resistance to
contamination and corrosion and are
available in a wide range of versions to
suit different needs.
VESDA or HSSD
These pull air samples Alert personnel to the incipient These are being widely used to
from areas susceptible development of a fire situation e.g. replace Halon systems removed from
to electrical fires to a behind instrument panels, especially in control rooms, MCC or switchrooms.
small analyser and unmanned control rooms or in cable They can be alarm only, or wired to
check them for smoke routes. These detectors are particularly the F&G control panel for executive
or pre-combustion suitable in areas with high air flow actions and/or shutdowns. These
vapours, depending on ventilation. systems are relatively high unit cost
the alarm. The very early warning allows personnel and there are additional maintenance
to enter the room to investigate and/or requirements for checking and
isolate power supplies without undue keeping air-sampling tubes clear.
exposure to risk.

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Detection
Flame Detection
IR flame detection Widely used and well understood. Used Detect ‘yellow’ flames, but weak on
to detect the infra-red wavelengths of a bluer flames (e.g. methanol fires).
hydrocarbon flames. Typically 4 to 16 Vision of units can be obscured by
detectors would be needed to cover a smoke or equipment (especially
module depending on module congestion forgotten ‘temporary’ items). Often
and dimension. used in combination with UV
detectors where several types of fire
can occur in one module. Generally
specialist mapping techniques are
used to optimise detection and
ensure adequate coverage is
achieved. To avoid spurious alarms
higher numbers of detectors are
required to provide voted logic.
Spurious alarms may occur from
other, non-fire IR sources, so not
suitable in areas where ‘black body
radiation’ occurs.
UV flame detection Widely used and well understood. Used Detect the bluer flame types. As for
to detect the Ultra-violet wavelength of a the infra red detectors, solid objects
flame spectrum. Typically installed under or smoke will obscure the cone of
turbine/compressor hoods. vision, reducing the effectiveness of
the detector. The lens of each
detection unit needs regular checking
for dirt build-up which prevents
effective operations of the device.
Video flame detector Very good at detecting flaming fires. Unit cost may be high but fewer
Sophisticated versions can be set up to number of units required to cover a
mask out known flame sources e.g. typical process area.
platform flare. These can provide
conventional alarm signals plus a video
image if required. Possibly the way
forward for ‘greenfield’ projects.
Fusible bulbs These bulbs break at a pre-defined
temperature and raise an alarm/ESD.
They also usually either release water
directly or release air to activate deluge
systems. This system does not rely on
electrical power for satisfactory operation
and deluge release.
Fusible links These melt at pre-defined temperatures
to raise an alarm/ESD by breaking a
circuit. Some directly initiate release of
hydraulic fluids to close safety valves on
wells or risers.
Fusible plugs These melt in fire situations to send an
alarm signal and release hydraulic fluids
thus closing well and riser safety valves.
Rate of heat rise Detects rapid temperature change.
Useful in areas with temperature
fluctuations. Highly reliable as a single
detector, confirmed fire signal.

Detection
Rate of heat rise Detects temperature change, but not as
- Rate Compensated fast as the rate-of-rise detectors. Highly
reliable as a single detector, confirmed
fire signal
Fixed Detects a pre-set high temperature.
Based on thermocouple design. Highly
reliable as a single detector, confirmed
fire signal.
Gaining in popularity and reducing in Systems with good coverage can be
price with time. expensive to install and maintain.
Particularly good for checking alarms in
CCTV used in remote areas such as column bases on
conjunction with semi-subs.
traditional fire and gas
detection devices Allows escape routes from TR to
evacuation points to be checked and
state of fire development in process
areas without exposing emergency
response personnel to danger.
Can we put a lot of this stuff into checklists? It would very useful for designers.
The reliability of the fire and gas detection system needs to be designed in at the outset of design
and then maintained at a high level of reliability and availability throughout the platform’s
operational phase. Best practice for new designs relies on;
• Good redundancy in the electronic system architecture (usually dual or triple redundancy),
• Electrical fault monitoring to detect any electrical discontinuity faults which have occurred in
the system. Fault alarms should not be cleared until the fault is investigated and removed,
• Significant redundancy in field devices,
• Fire and explosion survivability for detectors and cabling,
• Uninterruptible power supply.
The required target reliability of the Fire and Gas detection system must be specified by the Project
team to the manufacturer at the outset of the system design (if not already specified in the
invitations to tender). It will be difficult (and extremely expensive) for anyone but the manufacturer
to produce the reliability figures once the system is already built.
3.4.3 Control methods
Where fires cannot be prevented, they can be controlled (once detected) to reduce the size,
duration, and escalation potential of the fire.
The following control methods are commonly in use offshore. All platforms are different, but many
of these control methods will relevant to most installations. Note that extinguishants and manual
firefighting are considered below as control methods. Deluge systems and passive fire protection
methods are classed as mitigation methods because they generally protect against the impact of
an existing fire rather than working to control the fire itself. The mitigation methods are addressed
in Sub-section 3.5.
Some typical fire related operational and design considerations are provided for each control
method in the table below.

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Control Method Control Mechanism Fire Related Design Considerations

Process ESDVs Automatic - Reduces inventory Ease of testing and maintenance. Regular test
available to leak or fire by isolating of process ESDVs often neglected.
process into separate, smaller, Specify and justify test interval and acceptable
segments. leak rate as part of design. Record in
performance standard documentation
In fire situations several ESDVs plus adjacent
pipework may be engulfed at one time, releasing
several inventories to prolong fire.
Riser ESDVs – Automatic - Isolates platform from Topsides valves to fail close
(Topsides and pipeline inventories Locate away from process fire areas wherever
subsea) possible.
Protect valve and exposed riser sections against
foreseeable fire scenarios
Always consider benefits of subsea pipeline
isolation, even a simple NRV may provide
significant risk reduction. Justify and record
basis of decision.
Well head and Automatic - Isolates platform from Surface and downhole valves to fail close on
downhole isolation reservoir inventories confirmed fire or gas release event.
valves
GPA Automatic - Removes people to Any prolonged fire necessitates evacuation as a
place of relative safety precaution
OIM and deputies must understand escalation
mechanisms and timeframes for all emergency
scenarios in order to be able to make competent
decisions.
Blowdown and Automatic or manual - Removes BDVs to be fail-close, unless this endangers
blowdowm vlaves gases to flare or cold vent helicopter operations and pre-warning not
(BDVs) feasible.
Automatic facility recommended. Any manual
arrangements need clear and detailed
instructions for operation to offshore staff.
Appropriate blowdown time to be developed
from escalation scenarios
Process drain Automatic or Manual - Removes Usually manual facility
facility main liquid inventories from vicinity Consider vulnerability of dump line route
of fire to a safer location (e.g. cellar
Consider time required for draining
deck surge tanks)
Manual Manual fire intervention with Appropriate for very small fires - Immediate
Firefighting hydrants, fire hoses, foam monitors, intervention on discovery of small fire can
extinguishers etc prevent fire taking hold. All personnel trained for
small fire intervention.
Fire fighting, equipment cooling and helideck fire
control only possible where trained fire teams
available. Effectiveness depends on
understanding of installation-specific fire and
escalation scenarios and plus realistic offshore
exercises.
Remote manual Initiation of fixed or oscillating fire Often used on helideck or open upper or
monitors, with or without foam. weather decks. May be affected by strong
winds.

Control Method Control Mechanism Fire Related Design Considerations
Inerting agents Prevents fire from starting/taking Useful in enclosed, remote spaces difficult to
holds by rendering the atmosphere access in fire situations (e.g. pump rooms in
inert – Inergen, CO2 etc. semisub or ship hulls)
Static discharge may ignite atmosphere, causing
explosion – check potential with vendor.
Inerted atmosphere may not be breathable so
warnings and pre-discharge alarms required.
Extinguishants Stops fire burning by preventing Useful in enclosed spaces such as machinery
oxygen reaching fuel, removing enclosures
heat, or otherwise interfering with Deluge and fuel/water wash-off needs weight-
combustion process – water-mists, control consideration, particularly on floating
foams, some types of deluge etc installation.
Dirivent systems Disperses very small leaks to Only effective for fugitive (very tiny) leak
prevent flammable cloud build-up. scenarios
System shuts down on in major release
scenarios as may spread leak and mix release
to flammable concentrations.
Bunds Control spread of liquid releases While bunds can contain a liquid release/fire,
they can also concentrate a fire around the
equipment in the bund therefore often used in
conjuction with foam. Design must ensure
deluge does not cause bund overflow.
Foam application Reduces evaporation of vapours. Suitable for contained liquid fires. Less effective
Creates film/foam to prevent oxygen on running pool fires
reaching liquid fuel thus reducing, or
extinguishing pool fire.
Drains Remove liquid and deluge releases Small releases are usually within drain system
to drain system. capacity. Large releases (or burning releases
along with deluge water) usually go through
overflow or deluge drains straight overboard.
Effects of burning liquids in drain system always
need checking.
Sea-fire possibilities and consequences need
checking
In emergency scenarios environmental issues
become secondary to preservation of life.
3.5 Methods for mitigating the effects of fires

3.5.1 Passive fire protection methods
Passive methods are preferred where specific protection of critical process or structural items is
needed in order to prevent escalation. Widespread application to process and structural items is
not generally feasible due to weight, inspection and maintenance/replacement issues. Modern
design philosophy is to identify specific areas or items of concern (usually structure or piping which
on failure, would escalate the initial event) and target these items for PFP application. PFP is
preferred over deluge in such situations since it is immediately available and has no moving parts
to fail and prevent operation.
If properly applied/installed it is highly reliable in service. However it has also been the cause of
problems in the past so current best practice concerning the design and application of such
systems, is discussed below.
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Passive fire protection (PFP) comes in many forms, but the object is always to provide some sort
of heat insulating barrier between the fire and the item to be protected. PFP can be designed for
use on vessels, pipework, structural members, boundary walls or individual items of safety critical
equipment. The objective is to prevent the protected item heating up and either losing strength,
losing function, distorting or producing noxious fumes.
Previously the design emphasis was on application of codes and rules. For example,
accommodation block were given A60 walls regardless of the fire risk to the accommodation. Now,
best design is to design all PFP systems to be appropriate to the specific fire scenario for which the
PFP is required.
The system is usually designed by the PFP supplier’s engineers to the scenario-based
specification of the relevant discipline engineer (process, structural, mechanical or instrument as
appropriate for the item being protected) and the safety engineer.
For any of the systems outlined below it is up to the designer to demonstrate initial suitability of the
PFP system to the IVB and HSE, and the duty holder to maintain the protection throughout the
lifecycle. For some of the common systems initial suitability is easy to demonstrate since the
manufacturer will have a standard fire test certificate (such as A60, B15, or H120) for the proposed
system. However for some of the newer products, or existing products in severe or novel
applications such classification is not easy to obtain and the demonstration of suitability will have to
be via specially devised fire tests or research. The considerations around standard fire tests are
discussed in Section 6.3 of this guidance.
The following types of PFP are in current use and their uses and drawbacks are discussed in the
paragraphs below and in 5.4.3.2.
3.5.1.1 Cementitious or vermiculite type
These are heavy mineral-based based coatings which can be applied to walls structure or
pipework in a wide variety of ways from spraying or trowelling to bolting on of pre-formed sections.
They have been used extensively offshore since the 1970s. There are many different types
available. The thickness of the coating principally determines the time it takes to transfer the heat
through the coating and the mechanical strength of the compound or sometimes an extra outer
shell, determines whether the coating will withstand the physical impact of the fire, for example
erosion from jet fire impingement or pressure waves from explosions.
Since the properties of cementitious or vermiculite coatings are well researched and many
applications have been extensively tested, classification of the protection is relatively easy to
obtain. Some systems have been tested and found capable of withstanding the impact of high
pressure jet fires.
In the 80s and early 90s the biggest problem with use of these coatings was that the offshore
installation process was carried out poorly. Many poorly applied coatings fell off after a few years.
Deluge water found its way beneath coatings and the fixing pins or protected items (particularly
where they were warm) corroded rapidly. Some coatings just disintegrated with time. Products
have improved significantly since the early 1990s and recent experience has demonstrated that
provided these systems are installed in full compliance with the manufacturers’ instructions, there
are few problems. However it is difficult to exercise control over application in the offshore
environment, especially in exposed areas and below main deck levels. Therefore, wherever
possible for new designs, coatings should be installed onshore under controlled conditions before
float out.
Removable PFP, in the form of enclosures or blanket wraps can be removed to allow corrosion
checks and inspection/maintenance of protected equipment. However, removable systems are not
practical in many places, being generally heavy, costly and requiring space.

3.5.1.2 Intumescent coatings:
Intumescent paints and coatings work by expanding to many times their original thickness on
exposure to high heat or flame to produce a fire resisting, thermally insulating coating or ‘char’.
Like the mineral-based coatings discussed above they are available in a variety of forms to suit a
wide variety of applications from protection of deck undersides to sealing of piping or cable transits.
The possibility of corrosion under PFP coatings is a major concern for designers. For new builds it
is possible to plan for future inspection through the coating, out as explained below. Retrofitted
systems remain problematic. Although intumescent coatings can now be applied in fairly thin
layers, use in underdeck or other exposed areas and particularly in the splash zone usually
requires a thin neoprene layer under the coating and another on top to prevent external corrosion
and protect the coating. Any such thick or composite coating makes subsequent NDT inspection
results extremely difficult to interpret. It would be possible to plan for such NDT inspection if the
designer specified at the outset that sample pieces of steel were taken and kept, coated and
uncoated, for calibration purposes. This would allow results to be interpreted with more confidence.
For retrofitted systems, without these calibration aids, effective NDT through PFP coating systems
is not practically achievable at present. Research continues but no viable methods exist at present.
Wet-applied intumescent coatings often shrink slightly as they dry out, and they usually give off
toxic gases when they intumesce. The effects on adherence to substrate plus the migration of toxic
gases to affect personnel need taking into account during design.
As for the cementatious PFP, proper preparation of surfaces to be coated with intumescent PFP is
essential for long-term performance. Intumescent systems can be specified to provide fire
protection for anything from minutes to hour, and many systems have been through fully
documented testing. Both cementitious and intumescent coating systems are continually changing
and developing so details are best obtained directly from the manufacturer.
Futher discussion of common types of PFP application, such as PFP in firewalls, enclosures,
flexible wrap systems etc is provided in Section 7.3.2 on Fire Protection Design.
3.5.1.3 Weathered and cracked PFP
Since much of the PFP in existence on offshore installations at the current time is suffering from
some degree of weathering or cracking (although still considered ‘fit for purpose’), a joint industry
research project is underway by MMI to try and understand how weathering and cracking of PFP
affects the performance of a variety of PFP systems in order that better guidance can be provided
to the industry. It is understood that the results of the research will be available around mid 2005.
3.5.2 Active fire protection methods
3.5.2.1 Mitigation by deluge water application
Deluge works mitigates the effects of fires principally by providing cooling both to the fire and to
equipment exposed to radiant heat from the fire. In addition it can wash away liquid fuel fires to
drain systems or overboard. Protection of all the equipment in a module by application of FPF is
rarely practical, so the alternative is to deluge a whole module or section of structure with large
quantities of water.

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The water acts to:

• cool the general area by evaporation of the smaller water droplets
• provide a running film of water onto equipment in the area in order to cool it
• provide a screen of water droplets as a barrier to radiant heat, thus reducing the heat load
on structures and equipment
• provide a screen of water droplets as a barrier to radiant heat exposure of people
• retard the movement of the flame front through a module and consequently reduce
explosion overpressures to some degree (see Part 1 of the Guidance).
For general area cooling the key factors are application rate and water droplet size. If the water
droplets are too small, they evaporate rapidly in a severe fire or can be blown away if the area is
exposed. If the droplets are too large there is less evaporation from fewer droplets and the cooling
is inefficient for the amount of water used. The droplets however are less affected by wind, will
reach the floor, cool and wash liquid spills away and can provide a running film of water over
equipment to keep it cool. Larger droplets however require bigger pumps, more power, and more
AFFF so the cost of the system has to be balanced against its efficiency. Research indicates that
larger droplets are preferred for reduction of explosion overpressures, and smaller droplets are
better for suppression of combustion. The best overall compromise for whole module deluge
appears to be water droplets of between 0.5 and 1mm diameter (TO BE CONFIRMED).The deluge
rate depends on both the fire scenario and the escalation potential, but the general rules are:
• General deluge only protects equipment exposed to flame or/and radiant heat from pool
fires or radiant heat from jet fires providing there is a sufficient deluge rate to provide a film
of running water over the equipment. Where a jet-flame actually engulfs equipment,
however, much of the film is likely to be displaced by the jet flame and the cooling effect
lost.
• Areas shielded from deluge but exposed to the fire will receive some limited protection from
the heat attenuation of the deluge droplets falling between the location of the fire and the
location of the equipment. At the present time there is no method for calculating the
protection provided by this mechanism.
• Suppression of combustion and cooling of the high heat layer in the roof of a burning
module (where the module is partially enclosed) is known to be achievable by spraying of
very fine droplets at roof beam height. At the present time there is no method for calculating
the protection provided by this mechanism,
• The deluge rate and droplet size must be suitable for the cooling mechanism appropriate to
the type of fire. Where there are several different scenarios, the deluge rate for the worst-
case scenario, should be used as this should cover all lesser cases. Therefore in the case
of enclosed modules with potential for serious, pressurised oil, gas or condensate fires
deluge rates of 20 to 24 l/min per m2 would be needed, with rapid activation and water
coverage especially at roof-level where the high heat will concentrate.
• People should usually be able to evacuate the module immediately, before ignition occurs
and before deluge water reaches the module provided they understand the dangers and
are trained to react this way for all but insignificant leaks.
Further details on appropriate flowrates and other design issue for deluge systems are provided in
Sub-section 7.3.2
Mitigation by Sprinkler Systems
These are usually potable water filled systems and provided in areas where the fire-risk is non-
process related and therefore less severe, for example inside accommodation modules. They are
activated by frangible bulbs, which release water directly from the sprinkler piping as soon as the

bulb is broken by the heat of the fire in the area. Design is straightforward by comparison with
deluge systems and is usually in accordance with the applicable NFPA standards.
3.5.3 Watermist systems
Watermist systems are now commonly being used in turbine, generator or pump enclosures to
replace Halon protection systems which are no longer permitted for use. The fine mist is injected
intermittently from pressurised water reservoirs/ cylinders, in roughly 15 second bursts. The mist
provides cooling and suppresses the combustion, which would be also be controlled by lack of air
into the enclosure (provided there is no explosion on ignition). Such fires tend to be non
installation-threatening (but always need due consideration within the fire and explosion review
process for the installation) The protection is usually automatic and provides immediate control,
however there are a limited number of mist-injection cycles available from the water reservoir and
instruction/training for follow-up action by the platform personnel e.g. fire team action and/or
evacuation needs to be covered in platform emergency response plans.
3.6 Performance standards

3.6.1 Application of performance standards
The fire and gas detection and protection systems on an installation are generally categorised as
safety critical systems, or ‘safety critical elements’ (SCEs) for the installation. In order to pass on
the understanding of the design and operation of the system to those who operate and maintain
the installation, the key features of the systems are recorded for all to see and understand in the
form of ‘Performance Standards’.
The Performance standards for SCEs should contain precise information relating to the
functionality, availability, reliability and survivability of the system in question
It is rare for platforms to have only one type of device within such systems. The ‘Fire and Gas
Detection’ the ‘Active Fire Protection’ SCEs for example will have many different aspects, parts or
subsystems. While the ‘goal’ of the overall system will be the same, the Performance Standards for
each part of the SCE will probably be different and needs to be specified separately within the
documentation.
3.6.2 Functionality issues
As can be seen from Sub-sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, there are many different types of equipment
available for the purposes of detecting fires and gas releases, and for protecting against fire. The
principals of operation of the various sub-system vary widely, as do the availability and reliability
requirements of the equipment involved. It is important that the Performance Standard captures all
the key information, not just part of it. In addition it should provide cross references to the various
codes, standards, analyses and guidance documents which have a bearing on the performance.
Some examples of different functionalities within the same SCE Performance Standard are shown
in the table below:
SCE Sub-item Functionality Typical

derivation/
supporting
documents
Gas detection 1. Gas detection at Detect low-level gas at 10% (alarm) and Fire and Gas
system inlets to enclosed high-level at 25% (ESD 1, close dampers, Detection
Goal: areas containing S/D fan). 3 IR Point detectors in each duct Philosophy
non-certified on 2oo3 voting
Detect loss of
electrical equipment

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SCE Sub-item Functionality Typical

derivation/
supporting
documents
containment 2. Gas detection in Detect 50% LEL gas cloud of radius 5m or 2.Fire and Gas
events. open hazardous more using paired IR beam detection in Cause and Effect
areas process modules. Confirmed beam-pair Drawings
detection initiates ESD 2.
3. Installation
Safety Case
Section 4.6 to 4.9
3.Accoustic leak Detect gas leaks of 0.1kg/s and above in 4. In-house Vendor
detection process modules. Executive action only on Design Code for
coincident gas detection (by beam detectors) Acoustic Detection
in same area.
Active Fire 1.Water deluge with 12 l/min per m2 general area coverage in LP 1. Firewater design
Protection AFFF in Process separator and oil metering modules with 1% philosophy
Modules XX mezz AFFF to cool equipment in vicinity of oil pool 2. Installation Fire
plus XX & YY deck fires and prevent consequent leakage from and Explosion
levels other inventories. Activated on confirmed Analysis and
Flame detection (2ooN) voting. Assessment
2. Water mist Water mist injection to generator rooms to 3. In-house vendor
application in provide suppression and cooling. Activated design code for
Generator Rooms A on confirmed smoke or heat detection in Water Mist
and B generator room. Systems
Passive Fire 1.H120 firewalls Firewall at gridline 2, process area 1. Safety Case
Protection boundary, providing protection to TR and Sections 2.4 to 2.9.
TEMPSC embarkation areas 2.Passive Fire
2. J15 passive fire Fire protection of gas space of First Stage Protection strategy
protection on First Separator to protect against jet fire Document.
Stage Separator impingement from gas export system and 3. Installation Fire
potential BLEVE. and Explosion
Analysis and
Assessment
4. Vendor design
Code for PFP
suitable for Jet Fire
impingement
3.6.3 Availability issues
These are often given limited consideration in Performance Standards. It is important to

understand the availability issues for any Performance Standard.
Just as there are different functionalities there are differing availabilities associated with different
methods or types of protection equipment. Availability is not the same as reliability. The availability
is the fraction of time the equipment is available to perform its intended function. A passive coating
for example is available 100% of the time (assuming it has not been damaged or degraded in
service). A passive fire protection enclosure or removable cladding on a vessel however may be
removed for several weeks in the year to allow inspection of a valve or NDT of a significant part of
a vessel. Similarly, automatic Fire and Gas detection systems might be keyed out, making them
only partially available during maintenance or project related activities.

It is important that the person responsible for devising the Performance Standard also documents
the assumptions made regarding availability, so that the design intent is correctly understood and
upheld throughout the life cycle of the installation by the operations and maintenance personnel.
Some example maintenance arrangements for safety critical equipment are given below.
• F&G detection system – During period of unavailability of fire and gas detection in an
area due to essential maintenance, local manual surveillance for fire/gas events will be
provided at all times.
• Evacuation Systems -- Due to jet fire exposure potential, a standby vessel will be on
close standby whenever the installation (normally unmanned) is manned. Manning will
only be allowed within documented weather operating limits (2m significant wave
height) for Skyscape© evacuation system.
3.6.4 Reliability issues
Reliability and availability are two technical terms that are often confused. Availability is explained
above. Reliability is the probability that the system or item of equipment will perform its intended
function when available to do so. The reliability details for each system or subsystem listed within a
performance standard should be clearly stared, with reference back to the reliability studies carried
out during the design of the equipment. Changing the frequency of inspection and maintenance will
have a direct bearing on its stated reliability. For this reason the maintenance or the inspection
period used as key input to the frequency figure quoted must also be quoted in order for the
reliability figure to be meaningful.
It is also important to understand that reliability figures theoretically derived from calculations
involving manufacturer’s data on ‘mean time to failure’ may be over optimistic. The manufacturer’s
data is usually gained under laboratory conditions and produces times-to-failure information that
may not be reproducible in the real offshore environment. For example, theoretical calculations for
a pellistor gas detection head, using the manufacturer’s data may imply that an adequate reliability
is achieved by a 6 monthly test and inspection frequency. In reality, if the detector is then placed in
an air inlet duct, exposed to salt, spray, temperature and pressure cycling and vibration, the time to
failure in actual service may be significantly shorter. Where un-revealed faults in safety equipment
could occur, test/ maintenance history must be monitored. If every time the gas detector is tested it
fails to operate there must be immediate feedback to the responsible engineer, that the high
reliability indicated in the Performance Standard is not being achieved. The test frequency should
then be adjusted (for example to a 3 monthly interval) until is can be demonstrated that an
appropriate level of reliability is restored.
Voting arrangements for heat, smoke, flame or gas detectors also have a direct bearing on the
proposed frequency of maintenance interventions. For example, a detection voting system that
requires 1 detection element to be activated out of a total 2 (known as 1 out of 2 and indicated as
1oo2), has only one other item by way of redundancy plus a spurious indication from either item
will cause unit or platform shutdown. It should be remembered that reliability requirements
encompass unnecessary activation as well as failure to activate. The “built-in” redundancy is
unavailable during maintenance of any one item. Industry good practice has converged on 2 out of
3 voting systems (2oo3) which offer a “good” compromise of high reliability of having 3 items
available and still leaving a working arrangement in the event of a single item failure plus the
demand rate for spurious indications is lower as a confirmed signal is always required. During
maintenance this arrangement becomes a 2oo2 system. The voting arrangements should always
be stated in the Performance Standards. Where reliance is placed on just one or two detectors to
take executive action a review of the failure modes and the consequences of failure should always
be undertaken.

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3.6.5 Survivability
The Performance Standard must state the survivability requirements for each SCE and each of its
component parts where there are different requirements to those for the overall system. This
makes it clear to all concerned exactly how long the item will need to continue to function in a
major emergency in order to fulfil its safety role. For example one or more of the communications
systems and the place of temporary refuge (TR) will be required to function as long as there are
any personnel left on the installation. This may be anything from 10 minutes on a small NUI to 2
hours on a large installation. Individual fire or gas detectors however may only need to survive for
long enough to detect the release or fire and initiate the necessary alarms, shut-downs and
blowdowns. This may be only a few seconds. Valve actuation systems may need around a minute.
Whatever the specified survivability, the information provided in the Performance Standard must be
clear and unambiguous to the reader. Experience from major disasters both on and offshore
indicates that failure to examine, understand and then communicate the survivability requirements
of the provided safety systems to the right personnel has been a major contributor to the disaster.
3.6.6 Written schemes of examination (WSEs) or verification
The detailed schemes of examination or verification required under the PFEER and DCR
regulations are intended to provide an independent check that:
• the initial design of the safety critical system/element is appropriate for the hazard
• the maintenance being carried out is compatible with the reliability and availability specified
in the Performance Standard
• the maintenance activity takes into account the likely failure modes (especially un-revealed
failures) of the components
The written schemes must be thorough. Since they are derived from the Performance Standard
documentation, any essential information omitted from these documents is in danger of being left
out of either the maintenance scheme or the written schemes of the independent Competent
Person, or both. This will lead to gaps in the platform safety management system. Such gaps may
only come to light in the aftermath of a major incident.
3.7 Methods of analysis

3.7.1 General
The risk level for the installation as defined by the risk matrix given in Sub-section 2.8.4 determines
the level of sophistication required for the fire assessment.
If the conservatism of simplified methods of analysis can be guaranteed, then these could be used
at an early project phase or as a first step in a sequence of analyses of increasing sophistication.
For High or Medium risk installations, a ‘Structural Assessment’ should be performed for a
representative range of fire scenarios. The process and Safety disciplines will generally define
these Scenarios.
A Structural Assessment may be performed at three levels of increasing complexity starting with a
‘Screening Analysis’. Should a structure fail the ‘Screening analysis’ then a ‘Strength level analysis’
will be required. If it fails the Strength level analysis then ‘Ductility level analysis’ must be
performed. If the Ductility level analysis indicates failure then mitigation measures are required.
These could involve measures for elimination or reduction of the frequency of exceedance of the
initiating event, reduction of the severity of the consequences of the event or structural
modification.

‘Failure’ in the context of fires means failure to satisfy the performance standards for the
installation. High-level performance standards for the installation and safety critical components
are defined in terms of allowable peak temperature, strain or time to collapse depending on the
method of analysis used.
Screening Analysis, Strength level or Ductility level performance characteristics from an

assessment of one installation may be used to infer the fitness for purpose of other similar
installations, provided the framing, foundation support, service history, structural condition, blast
and fire barriers and payload levels are not significantly different. In cases where one platform’s
detailed performance characteristics are used to infer those of another similar platform,
documentation should be developed to substantiate the use of such generic data.
The required initial level of analysis depends on the Risk level assigned to the installation or the
risk level associated with a representative set of fire scenarios.
The risk category of the installation does not preclude the use of more sophisticated methods of
assessment which may result in reductions in conservatism and hence cost, if they are considered
more appropriate.
Table 3.6 - Appropriate Method of Analysis – Fires
Risk Level Analysis method Load Calculation Response Calculation
Low Screening Allowable temperature (yield strength Design basis checks.

analysis reduction to 60% - see Tables 2.xx and 2.x)
Past experience. Past experience for
demonstrably similar
platforms.
Medium or Strength level Calculate peak temperature member by Strength level analysis,
High analysis member, from nominal fire loads and fire Redundancy analysis
extent.
Ductility level Calculate temperature - time history of Redundancy analysis,

analysis primary members from fire loads time Ductility level analysis
history and flame extent.
A structural ‘Redundancy Analysis’ of a topside structure will indicate which members can be
removed without collapse of the structure. In addition those members not supporting the TR,
muster areas, escape routes or safety critical equipment must survive during and after the fire
event for sufficient time to allow personnel on board to escape, allowing for the possible need to
assist injured colleagues. The results of a fire response analysis will then indicate which structural
members and SCEs must be protected to achieve the fire performance standards for the
installation.
Simple fire response analyses are usually performed based on the following assumptions [38].
• Unprotected structural members and panels have no variation of temperature through
thickness or along their length. In practice the critical sections of the member are
considered from the point of view of resistance.
• Fire protected structural members and panels have a constant steel temperature, the
thermal insulation has a linear variation of temperature through thickness.
• Each member may be considered to have reached a steady state, variations of temperature
are due entirely to changes in boundary conditions and incident heat fluxes.
• Conduction between members need not be considered (except when considering coat-back
requirements).

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• Thermal stresses due to restraint may generally be neglected as supports also soften
during fire loading.
The methods of analysis identified above are discussed in the following sections.
3.7.2 Screening analysis
Screening analysis for an existing installation consists of a condition assessment which may
involve a survey followed by design basis checks.
Design basis checks consist of checking the basis of the existing design for the installation and
determining if the methods used for the design are currently acceptable in the context of fire
events.
For a Screening Analysis, the Zone method may be used. The zone method assigns a maximum
allowable temperature that a steel member can sustain. This method does not take into account
the stresses present in the member before the fire. The maximum allowable temperature may be
read from Table 2.x below.
These temperature values correspond to a yield strength reduction to 0.6 of the ambient
temperature values. The fact that a fire is an accidental load will mean that the allowable stress is
the full yield stress value as opposed to about 60 % of the yield stress allowed for in the
conventional design load cases. The yield stress corresponding to 0.6 of the ambient yield stress
will then give an allowable stress the same as that for the structure before the fire.
Higher strain levels than 0.2 % may give a proportionately higher decrease in Young’s Modulus
giving an unmatched reduction in yield strength with the reduction in Young’s modulus exceeding
the reduction in yield strength. The Zone method may then not be applicable [11].
Fire barriers must perform according to their required rating.
A blanket critical temperature for all members may be postulated as in the Zone method. This
critical temperature is chosen typically to be 400 °C as this requires no modification to the normal
code checks if strains are limited to 0.2 % in an elastic Design Level analysis. This approach may
result in unnecessary protection and may be unconservative locally to areas of high strain.
It will not usually be necessary to protect every vulnerable member unless the scenario
performance standards demand that the installation is required to re-start after a few days. The
above method will indicate the protection of non-essential members from the point of view survival
of the installation.
The temperature calculation for each member is performed and measures are taken to restrict the
temperatures to values below the critical temperature usually by the application of PFP (Passive
Fire Protection).
It will also be necessary to check that radiation levels on escape ways remain at acceptable levels
(i.e. below 2.5 Kw/ m2), to allow for personnel on board to escape.
3.7.3 Strength level analysis
Strength level analyses are conventional linear elastic analyses as used in design against
environmental, operating and gravity loads. The loads used in such an analysis should be in a form
which could be interpreted as a load case as used in the design process.
In investigating the effect of a fire the ‘live’ loads such as contained liquids and storage may be
taken as 75 % of their maximum values as is the case for the consideration of Earthquakes.
Alternatively, live loads may be taken as the values used in the fatigue analysis performed for the
installation if these have been properly derived.
The transfer of conclusions and load characteristics from the analysis of a geometrically similar
platform with similar structural and process characteristics is acceptable for strength level
analyses.
In a strength level analysis a maximum allowable temperature in a steel member is assigned

based on the stress level of the member prior to the fire such that the utilization ratio remains less
that the corresponding value given in Table 2.xx below.
The maximum allowable temperature in a steel member as a function of utilization ratio is given in
Table 2.xx below.
Table 3.7 - Maximum allowable steel temperature as a function of Utilisation Ratio [11]
Member UR at 20 °C to give UR =
Maximum Member Yield Strength Reduction
1
Temperature Factor
at Max. Temperature
°C °F
400 752 0.60 1.00
450 842 0.53 0.88
500 932 0.47 0.78
550 1022 0.37 0.62
600 1112 0.27 0.45
If the primary structure on the installation have been designed for all credible fire scenarios to then
the primary structure will be acceptable from a fire resistance point of view.
Higher strain levels than 0.2% may give a proportionately higher decrease in Young’s Modulus
giving an unmatched reduction in yield strength and Young’s modulus. Strength level checks may
then give utilization ratios above unity. A Ductility level or ‘elastic-plastic’ method of analysis may
be required.
Table 2.x gives the maximum allowable steel temperature as a function of strain. The peak
temperature of each member needs to be determined for the fire event to check if the structural
response remains elastic.
Table 3.8 - Maximum allowable temperature of steel
Maximum Allowable Temperature of Steel

Strain %
°Celcius °Fahrenheit
0.2 400 752
0.5 508 946
1.5 554 1029
2.0 559 1038
Fire barriers must perform according to their required rating.
Scenario or performance based strength level analysis
In a performance or scenario based approach, the first task involves the definition of credible fire
scenarios from the failure probabilities of vessels and piping, the inventory pressures local to the
release point, the material released, the emergency shut down systems available and the
ventilation conditions. This information will normally be supplied by the Safety and Process
disciplines.
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A scenario based Strength level analysis is performed in the following general stages:
1. Definition of a fire scenario. See Sub-section 3.2
2. The time history of the rate of release is calculated.
3. If required, the probability of occurrence of the release can be estimated from published
failure statistics and the numbers of past failures which are available for most types of
vessels, flanges and process equipment generally [12,13,14,15,16,17,18].
4. Calculation of the burning rate for the fire geometry enables the extent and duration of
the fire to be determined.
5. The heat output from the fire in terms of radiation and convected hot air and gases may
then be determined.
6. The heat incident on structural members and panels may then be used to calculate the
temperature/time history of the member.
7. For load bearing members, the temperature determines the appropriate values for the
yield stress and Young’s modulus of the material of the member to be used in the
structural analysis performed.
8. For panels and firewalls, which are usually non load bearing, the important parameters
are the temperature of the cold face and the time to reach certain limiting temperatures
which determine the walls’ rating.
where immediate injury will not caused (i.e. below 2.5 kW/m2) (THERE IS AN API PHRASE USED
AT THIS FLUX LEVEL THAT WE COULD USEFULLY REPEAT API 521?).
A utilization ratio of up to 1.7 will be acceptable for members loaded in bending if a small amount of
plastic deformation is acceptable. A different utilization ratio will be appropriate for detection of
buckling. Shear stresses should be kept within the yield stress for the material at that temperature.
Alternatively the yield stress may be enhanced by a factor of 1.5 to take account of the fact that fire
is an accidental load.
Modified code checks may be made on the structural members and if load re-distribution is
neglected then the material effects and isolated plasticity may also be taken into account in the
analysis.
The occurrence of plastic hinging may be taken into account by factoring the acceptable utilization
ratio by the ratio of the plastic ‘Zx’ to elastic section modulus ‘Sx’. This factor is generally greater
than 1.12 and will be in the range 1.1 to 1.5. The member must be able to sustain the formation of
a plastic hinge before buckling, ie. be in tension or be a ‘plastic’ section.
Use of the critical temperature approach may give an efficient scheme for the application of PFP in
combination with a full non-linear elastic-plastic (progressive collapse) structural analysis. This type
of analysis is referred to as a ductility level analysis for fire or explosion response calculations.
3.7.4 Redundancy analysis
An elastic linear analysis is performed to determine the minimal structure which will fulfil the
requirement that escape ways will remain available for sufficient time to allow escape and that the
TR integrity is maintained during and after a fire event.

A structural redundancy analysis will determine which members are essential for the above.
Protection of these members with PFP will complete the assessment on the basis of a redundancy
analysis.
The determination of the critical structural members may be performed using an elastic structural
frame model as follows:
1. Eliminate all non-critical structural elements by inspection, with due regard to escalation
potential. For example the support of a piece of non-safety related, heavy equipment
may be critical.
2. Remove all members identified in 1
3. Modify the static loading to represent the probable load at the time of the fire 75% of the
loads associated with process contents and storage may be used as suggested for
Earthquake analysis in Reference 11.
4. Remove safety factors in the code check, enhance the yield stress by a 1.5 factor, or
allow a correspondingly higher utilization.
5. Identify those members with the highest utilization ratios - particularly relating to stability
using the frame model
6. Remove these members from the geometry
7. Repeat step 6 and assess the remaining structure at each stage.
3.7.5 Ductility level analysis
A ductility level analysis may be required for Medium or High Risk installations. This method of
analysis can take into account the load re-distribution which takes place when structural
components fail and the time to failure of the structure considered.
A number of options for the linearization of stress/strain relationships at elevated temperatures

exist. If the software used for the ductility level analysis allows temperature dependent stress/strain
curves to be input then the linearization will not be necessary.
The levels of heat radiation, and convection from the selected fire scenarios are calculated and the
time history of the increase of temperature of the structural components is derived. Conduction of
heat from neighbouring structural components will also occur but may generally be ignored in the
primary framing analysis. Methods of performing these calculations are discussed in detail in
Section 6.
Once the steel temperature at a given time is known, the reductions in yield stress and Young’s
modulus may be calculated.
Failure of a structural member is defined as collapse (where increasing displacement results in no

net increase of capacity) under the imposed static gravity and operating loads.
In investigating the effect of a fire the ‘live’ loads such as contained liquids and storage may be
taken as 75 % of their maximum values as is the case for the consideration of Earthquakes.
Alternatively, live loads may be taken as the values used in the fatigue analysis performed for the
installation if these have been properly derived.
Optimization of PFP (passive fire protection) thickness is rarely worthwhile as application of PFP to
a given thickness is not sufficiently controllable. The thickness of PFP is controllable at best to
within about 3mm.

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The scenario based strength level analysis method will not detect failures at intermediate or later
times caused by thermal restraint from cold members. This is, in any case, an unlikely event in the
context of offshore topside structures. Imperfections or deflections for example due to a previous
explosion will not be taken into account. It will be necessary to use a ductility level analysis to take
these effects into account.
In view of the fact that a single scenario is only one among many, the spatial variation of thermal
loading is not generally meaningful. It is unlikely that this level of analysis will be necessary unless
a single extreme event such as a riser failure, or blow-out which puts the whole installation at risk
is being considered.
(i.e. below 2.5 kW/m2).
3.7.6 Assessment of fire barriers
Fire barriers are given a ‘rating’ derived from the SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) [X] classification
system for use on ships. Originally they were developed for cellulosic fires as opposed to
hydrocarbon fires, which are more severe. The type of fire is represented in a furnace test where
the firewall is in contact with a furnace with a well-defined temperature/time relationship. The
hydrocarbon fire curve has a higher rate of temperature rise and attains a higher peak
temperature.
The three main ratings used offshore are:
B maintains stability and integrity for 30 minutes when exposed to a cellulosic fire. The
temperature rise of the cold face is limited to 140 degrees Celcius for the period in minutes
specified in the rating. i.e. A30 has a 30 minute time period during which temperature rise is
below 140 degrees.
A maintains stability and integrity for a period of 60 minutes when exposed to a cellulosic fire.
The temperature rise of the cold face is limited to 140 degrees Celcius for the period
specified in the rating.
H maintains stability and integrity for a period of 120 minutes when exposed to a hydrocarbon
fire. The temperature rise of the cold face is limited to 140 degrees for the period specified
in the rating.
Here retaining ‘stability and integrity’ means that the passage of smoke and flame is prevented and
that the load bearing components of the barrier do not reach a temperature in excess of 400
degrees Celcius.
3.7.7 Analysis methods by risk level
3.7.7.1 Low fire risk installations
Where the fire risk category for the installation is low, the low risk methodology may be used. This
applies not only to the definition of the fire hazard but also to methodologies in handling the
response of structures, piping, and other SCEs.
A suitable low sophistication means of defining the fire hazard is the use of valid nominal fire loads
available in published codes and Guidance [1,2,3] in the form of averaged and maximum heat
fluxes. Section 5 contains tables of these nominal fire loads.
Another acceptable means of fire severity determination for low risk installations is comparison with
a specific past cases. Such comparisons should be supported by evidence that a structured
assessment has been undertaken to identify areas of difference and that the original means of
calculation were sound. Extrapolation of data for the relevant parameters is not generally
recommended but may be valid if a sound basis exists. The comparison process would incorporate
consideration of the following factors:
• the validity of the model used in the initial assessment;
• the version of the fire modelling software used;
• the resolution and precision of the grids used in the calculation if a computational fluid
dynamics or CFD method is used;
• consideration of any substantial physical differences between this and previous cases.
The nomination of a typical installation to represent a fleet of platforms may be acceptable
3.7.7.2 Medium fire risk installations
Where past cases exist that are relevant, these values may be employed. However the premise is
that the variables listed would be more closely analysed than might be the case for a low fire risk
installations or compartments, and no extrapolation of data is allowed unless published data exists.
Where there are no suitable past cases for comparison, then the level of analysis appropriate for
high risk installations should be used for fire hazard assessment.
For medium risk installations, it is recommended that for medium risk installations the choice of
methodology for any particular task should be justified where it deviates from the high risk
installation methodology.
3.7.7.3 High fire risk installations
Where the potential risk level on an installation or within a compartment is high, this will warrant a
commensurately high sophistication level of analysis. The ability of the installation and the safety
critical systems on it to withstand the fire scenarios need to be accurately determined as any error
could have a significant risk impact. The time before failure may also be an important
consideration.
This level of analysis would normally involve;
• A complete set of fire scenario investigations
• A combination of CFD and phenomenological fire simulation with knowledge of the

frequencies of release and ignition.
• Determination and assessment of the structure and SCEs against the design fire loads
including consideration of escalation potential.
• Time dependent and possibly non-linear modelling of the installation and systems
response.
Escalation and interaction between fire and explosion scenarios shall be considered including the
collapse of tall structures.

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3.8 Particular considerations for floating structures, storage and offloading

systems
3.8.1 Introduction
Floating structures for production, storage and offtake have been used safely and reliably
throughout the oil industry for many years. Early installations were primarily floating storage and
offtake vessels, “FSO”, but today the modern floating production, storage and offtake vessel,
“FPSO”, includes processing equipment and a higher level of sophistication. Consequently, the
FPSO becomes an offshore producing installation, storage facility, and loading terminal all rolled
into one unit.
The early “ship-shaped” vessels, developed in the 1980s, took advantage of a severe downturn in
the tanker market and were converted from relatively new tankers. More recently, the tendency has
been to use new, purpose-built, ship-shaped hulls, particularly for FPSOs associated with long
lived projects. Conversions of tankers, both old and new, continue to take place. There are many
different types of design, weather-vaning with internal or external turrets or spread moored that
maintain a fixed orientation.
The FPSO and the FSO present many of the same hazards to personnel and the environment,
although the added complexity of production facilities on the FPSO increases associated risk.
The guidance in this section relies heavily on the published guidance of UKOOA, [1] and the draft
guidance being prepared by OGP [2]. This guidance document will adopt the OGP nomenclature
and when considering an issue applicable to both types of floating installation will use the term
F(P)SO.
A number of features impact fire related hazards on floating installations; for example, the
geometry of the layout, compartmentalisation, operations, fire scenarios, response characteristics
of marine construction to fires and the vulnerability of marine systems associated with the motion,
station keeping and stability. The effects of fire on these features are discussed further in the
following sections.
3.8.2 Marine life cycle considerations
F(P)SOs usually consist of a marine structure supporting process and utilities decks of a
conventional offshore construction. These differing methods of construction are governed by
differing regulatory regimes. For the UKCS, the application of SOLAS and MODU codes without
demonstration of validation by the additional risk assessments normally required by PFEER will be
insufficient for the treatment of fire events.
Some specific attributes to be considered on F(P)SOs are;

• Fire-fighting in the enclosed compartments containing marine systems (e.g. engine rooms,
DP control rooms, generators); fire fighting techniques will include inerting, with the
ramifications this entails for personnel access and the requisite alarms
• As the process and utilities modules are normally located above the vessels deck (and the
cargo storage), the process and utilities deck areas will be large, usually of one or two
levels. Segregation to avoid escalation of a fire can be achieved by separation of modules
occasionally further separated by fire barriers, (this may or may not help explosion
overpressures but will impair the dispersion of released hydrocarbons).
• The fire risk analysis undertaken on F(P)SOs will consider the nature of the hydrocarbon
fuel source as well. Due to the nature of the storage on F(P)SOs, the fields they are
generally use for tend to be crude that can be stabilised fairly readily. F(P)SOs may be
required to hold stored product in their cargo tanks for typically 3-7 days dependent upon
their geographic location. The F(P)SO solution is therefore less favoured for more volatile
reservoirs.
• The (potentially) long process and utilities decks and their orientation with respect to wind
conditions will be affected by the weather vaning of the F(P)SO. The top decks should be
designed to follow a hazard gradient from the most hazardous area with respect to fires
(and explosions) to the least hazardous. This will generally be from the turret outwards.
Due to the weather vaning effects (either due to wind or current and their effects on the
superstructure height and hull draft) the fires can escalate downwind and at the very least,
toxic products of combustion will be distributed downwind. The layout should consider
these additional hazards and the design should accommodate them to maintain levels of
safety. (Some designs have used DP to adjust the F(P)SO orientation in the event of a
release or a fire hazard although the DP then becomes a Safety Critical Element and
subject to the development of Performance Standards and integrity assessments required
in the UKCS.)
• On an F(P)SO, escape routes and piping runs may be very long and tortuous and
personnel may need to pass the origin of the incident to reach the Temporary Refuge.
Consideration in the design of escape over long distances during incidents and incident
escalation should be a key issue.
• Fire water mains will also be extensive and distant from the fire pumps in the process area.
Correct fire-pump sizing and firewater-main hydraulic analyses will be required to ensure
adequate pressure at deluge points, hoses and monitors.
• Buoyancy, stability and station-keeping must be maintained at all times, and the systems
associated with these duties must be protected from fire hazards.
F(P)SOs also require specific consideration of major fire hazard and release scenarios unique to
their design and operation.
• Oil storage tanks – May present hazards in the form of either large scale storage of
stabilised crude or with empty storage tanks containing potentially explosive mixtures (see
Sub-section 3.8.3.1 for further details)
• Non-process hydrocarbon inventories – The F(P)SO is a power-hungry installation and
requires substantial stores of diesel to maintain station, process and utilities power
demands plus other life-support systems. The vessels are often located in difficult or
remote places and will generally be designed to be “self-sufficient” for extended periods in
the event that supply vessels cannot reach them.
• Jet fires on main deck – The process decks on F(P)SOs are often lifted clear of the cargo
storage tank roof for several reasons, (see bullet points below) a 5metre gap is not
uncommon. The space provided also allows jet fires from the underside of the process to
reach other process or utility modules without any impingement to reduce the effect of the
flame. The gaps provide other risk reducing and operational benefits but steps can be taken
to reduce the likelihood of jet fires by careful layout and orientation of the higher pressure
equipment.
• A gap will allow “green water” to flow over the main deck without placing an excessive
load on the process modules supports by creating restrictions and eddy current effects.
• A gap allows a clear and uninterrupted space for long piping runs (both process piping
and storage tank vent and balancing lines)
• A gap allows personnel access across the vessel, both for normal operational and
maintenance access as well as facilitating emergency response.
• Swivel connections, a source of releases – The turret contains a large number of swivel
joints in order to function, these are often at the highest process pressure and pass the
reservoir fluids prior to any cleaning or conditioning and are therefore subject to the
F(P)SOs most onerous process duty.

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• Offloading and pool fires on the sea – Offloading to shuttle tankers is a regular event and
poses a significant risk both on the F(P)SO and the shuttle tanker. The risks comprise the
breakage or leakage of the transfer hoses and the potentially flammable mixing of
hydrocarbon and air in the storage holds of F(P)SO and shuttle tanker. During the
offloading operation, the shuttle tanker and F(P)SO are in relative proximity and the risks on
either vessel are compounded by increased potential for escalation to another vessel.
3.8.3 Application of fire hazard management to floating structures
3.8.3.1 Topsides considerations
The storage and transfer of hydrocarbons on F(P)SOs present particular hazards to personnel and
the environment and some of these have been listed above. This sections describes further
measures that can be applied to the management of fire hazards in the F(P)SO topsides.
There is a need to continuously vent hydrocarbon vapours during loading, it is important that the
venting system be designed to accommodate the maximum volume of volatile organic compounds
(VOCs) vented from storage. Allowance must be made the higher temperatures the vents will
experience when venting during maximum production rates and as well as providing design
allowances for possible process upsets. In some areas, local regulations or guidelines limit the
amount of VOCs that may be released to the atmosphere. It is always good practice to adopt
loading procedures that will minimise VOC emissions.
The atmosphere in the F(P)SO tanks is to be maintained in a ‘non explosive’ condition. The normal
method is to supply low oxygen content combustion products to the tanks from boiler uptakes or
from an independent oil or dual fuel generator.
Cargo tank purging must be carried out before introducing air to the tank to ensure that the
atmosphere will at no time enter the flammability region. The guidelines given in Chapter 10.0 of
ISGOTT [3], should be strictly adhered to during this operation.
F(P)SOs need special consideration due to the potential venting of hydrocarbons either near the
process plant or near the flare stack. Calculations will have to be made at the design stage to
ensure that carry over of hydrocarbons from the inert gas stack will not interfere with day to day
operations.
It is recommended that the inert gas system comply in all respects with the requirements of SOLAS
and the relevant IMO guidance notes. Prudent operators may also consider maintaining 100%
redundancy for this critical component.
After purging, the tank must be gas freed in order to remove the residual inert gas from the tank
and replace it with a normal atmosphere containing 21 % Oxygen.
The issue of VOC return lines and their use during offloading represents a key safety issue. The
operation of VOC reclamation represents a highly hazardous situation where flammable mixtures
of hydrocarbons are returned to the F(P)SO. An added complication is that the offloading and
reclamation systems may often be combined as a dual hose system and for F(P)SOs with stern
accommodation, the offloading and reclamation point may be located close to the accommodation
and TEMPSC.
Due to the longer term storage (compared with most other offshore installations), water and other
contaminants in the crude can accelerate corrosion of the F(P)SO storage structure and systems
resulting in premature failure and, potentially, escape of hydrocarbons. Design allowances should
not be based on ideal crude conditions but should consider a realistic appreciation of operational
practices.

3.8.3.2 Vessel and marine considerations
The layout of surface and sub-sea facilities must be carefully considered early in the design to
account for the following shipping related hazards (that may give rise to loss of integrity and fire).
• Passing ships and local community activities, such as fishing
• Supply and maintenance vessels in relation to anchoring or dropped objects,
• Anchor mooring patterns of drilling rigs during locating and moving
• Safe access by offtake tankers, avoiding interference with other moorings, flowlines and
risers as well as other field operations
The field layout must also consider the need for offtake tankers to approach the F(P)SO, moor,
load their cargo, unmoor and proceed to open waters, always in safety. The parameters for
achieving this, which will include manoeuvring areas and weather limits on operations for the
tankers, may be derived by means of a risk assessment study as described in OCIMF Offshore
Loading Safety Guidelines [4] – With Special Reference to Harsh Weather Zones.
Thrusters may also be useful in fire or platform abandonment scenarios where the vessel can be
rotated to clear fire or smoke from around production areas and living quarters and to provide a lee
side for survival craft launch. It should also be noted that thrusters may well be Safety Critical
Elements.
Due to the vessels being in very close proximity, the risk of a fire or explosion on one vessel
affecting the other is greatest during offloading.
It is important that the F(P)SO is equipped with emergency shutdown and release equipment that
will allow the vessels to part in the event of an emergency on one vessel.
3.9 Particular considerations for mobile offshore units

3.9.1 Introduction
Units that work in the North Sea will generally conform to three types of which two are more
common. Ship-shape units are not often used for drilling, as their motion characteristics are often
not suitable for drilling in harsh weather. A small number of construction and well intervention
vessels work in the calmer weather months.
Most MOUs in the North Sea are of two types, Semi-submersibles and Jack-ups. Semi-
submersibles have more in common with floating structures while jack-ups have more in common
with fixed structures. This specialist subset is termed Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, or MODUs.
Though they are fundamentally different from each other, they do have one thing in common. They
are vessels subject to the Conventions and Codes of the International Maritime Organisation, or
IMO, and thus emanate from a long-standing marine tradition.
3.9.2 MODU classification
The UK Safety Case Regulations do not stipulate design safety cases for MODUs. However,
MODUs are subject to Classification Society rules for design, construction, and operation.
Generally, certificates are subject to renewal every five years with intermediate surveys of a less
intrusive nature ranging from every year to every two and one-half years. General areas of interest
with respect to fire hazards include such items as:
• Structural fire protection layout plan for decks and bulkheads
• Fire extinguishing systems
• Recommended sequence of emergency shutdowns
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• Hazardous areas
ABS, the leading Classification Society for MODUs, devotes a whole chapter to Fire Safety
Features, including: -
• Fire control plans
• Fire Pumps
• Fire main
• Hydrants, hoses, and nozzles
• Fixed fire fighting systems
• Extinguishing systems (CO2, foam, water spray, portable extinguishers, etc.)
• Fire detection/alarms
• Gas detection/alarms
• General alarm
• Area or specific alarms
• Fireman’s outfits
• Other PPE
• Helifuel
• Paint lockers
Any reader will quickly note there is a distinct marine “feel” to the rules. This is appropriate as
hydrocarbons are seldom present on MODUs, thus the threat of types of fires that occur on ships is
given attention. In the main, Conventions and Codes of the IMO are meant to apply to vessels on
international voyages, not when the vessel is undertaking its industrial function. Though these rules
are prescriptive, the great number of ships in the world’s fleet lends of validity through experience.
Marine tradition refers to conventional ships on long distance voyages who must cope with
mishaps such as shipboard fires and explosions with faint prospects for immediate rescue. This
tradition has within it the experience of thousands of ships but scant experience of live
hydrocarbons. Perhaps it is best characterised as highly worthy knowledge in its own right but not
directly coincident with the newer oilfield traditions.
Obtaining and remaining in class is very important for a MODU. Otherwise, it would not be able to
obtain hull insurance. Minimising losses is important for underwriters so MODUs are able to benefit
from loss reduction strategies of the world’s fleet of ships, and the considerable reservoir of
experiences thus represented.
3.9.3 Conventions, codes and regulations
3.9.3.1 General
MODUs are also subject to flag-state rules for operation under the conventions (roughly equivalent
to regulations) and codes (roughly equivalent to guidance) of the IMO. The flag-states are
responsible for enforcing the conventions and codes of the IMO through their national legislation.
The most significant IMO instruments are the international conventions for:
• Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) [X]
• Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) [X]
• Load Lines (LL) [X]
• Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping (STCW) [X]
• Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) [X], and
• Tonnage Measurement (Tonnage 69) [X]
For the purpose of this guidance, SOLAS is the most relevant and receives expanded treatment.
Two versions of IMO MODU Code are also important, the 1979 and 1989 versions of the Code for
the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units [X, X], or MODU Code [X],
covered later in this section.
3.9.3.2 SOLAS
SOLAS Chapter II Construction – Subdivision and stability, machinery, and electrical installations
The parts of interest (within SOLAS) are:
Part D – Electrical Installations: Precautions against shock, fire, and other hazards of electrical
origin
Part E – Additional Requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces: Fire precautions,
alarm system, safety system, and special requirements for machinery, boiler, and electrical
installations
SOLAS Chapter II – Fire protection, fire detection, and fire extinction
The whole of Chapter II is relevant. Coverage includes fire pumps, fire mains/hydrants/hoses, fixed
gas fire-extinguishing systems, fire-extinguishing arrangements for machinery spaces, foam
systems, water systems, arrangements for fuel/lubricating oil/other flammable oils, ventilation, fire
control plans, and so on.
Details for passenger ships, cargo ships, and tankers are given and will be of interest for
informational purposes.
3.9.3.3 MODU code
There are two versions of the MODU Code. The 1989 Code [X]is meant to be applied to units
constructed after 1 May 1991. The 1979 Code [X] applies to earlier units. The 1989 Code
addresses fire/explosion safety in the following chapters: -
Chapter 4 – Machinery installations for all types of units
4.7 – Arrangements for oil fuel, lubricating oil, and other flammable oils
Chapter 5 – Electrical installations for all types of units
5.5 Precautions against shock, fire, and other hazards of electrical origin
Chapter 6 – Machinery and electrical installations in hazardous areas for all types of units
6.1 to 6.7 – Zoning of hazardous areas and the types of machinery in these areas
Chapter 8 – Periodically unattended machinery spaces for all types of unit
8.3 – Fire safety
Chapter 9 – Fire safety
1 to 13 – Structural fire protection, accommodation, means of escape, fire

pumps/mains/hydrants & hoses, systems in machinery spaces, portable extinguishers, fire

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detection & alarms, gas detection & alarms, firemen’s outfits, helicopter facilities, storage of gas
cylinders, and miscellaneous items.
3.9.4 Overview of MODU operations on the UKCS
MODUs operating in the North Sea area are generally prepared to drill a range of wells of different
types in order to meet the needs of the client oil companies. Though there are fire risks from
flammable materials on MODUs, the about half the risks with the greatest consequences are
presented by the hydrocarbon accumulation the MODU has been hired to exploit. The Formal Risk
Assessment required in a UK or North Sea safety case overlays all the provisions from fire and
explosion protection that Classification, the flag-State rules, and MODU Code. However, there are
two main differences.
1. The rules emanating from the IMO are prescriptive. The risk reduction model is the
marine industry acting on the experiences of the world’s shipping fleet.
2. The model of model of application is for ships on international voyages, not vessels
undertaking industrial processes.
3.9.5 The UK safety case
Generally, oil companies hire MODUs to pursue drilling campaigns. The campaigns can be as
short as one well of less than 30 days duration or as long as long 3 years, longer on rare
occasions. In the UK, it will be necessary to for the MODU to have an accepted safety case before
drilling can begin. The main hazards a MODU faces are as below
• Helicopter crash
• Fire
• Explosion
• Major mechanical failure
• Blowout
• Toxic release
• Dropped object
• Structural failure
• Mooring failure
• Ship collision
• Loss of stability
• Towing incident
The most serious of these incidents requires a PFEER Assessment [X] in order to be sure the
personnel can escape to a place of safety. The assessments MODUs generally undertake are as
below. It is worthwhile pointing out that the MODU Owner will generally engage the crew in a
compartment-by -compartment analysis for fire and explosion risk. This utilises the greatest asset –
the rig crew who are exposed to the risk. Following from this approach, the qualitative method is
preferred. Such QRA as takes place is generally done to meet statutory requirements for integrity
of the Temporary Refuge. The QRA calculations are most often done by consultants outside the
MODU Owner’s organisation. The crew are generally not in the habit of assimilating such
information.
Typical hazard list showing preliminary PFEER assessments

Item no. Type of event Fire & Comments and description
explosion
consequences
1 Shallow gas Yes MODU Owner depends on the client oil
blowout, subsea company site selection and shallow gas
detection by seismic plus experience in the
area (if available)
2 Shallow gas Yes Usually occurs when the riser is attached
blowout in the (semi) or drilling out the first (structural) string
cellar deck of pipe (jack-up). Same comments as shallow
gas blowout, subsea, above, apply.
3 Reservoir blowout Yes The client oil company’s drilling programme
at drill floor is required to analyse and predict reservoir
content (gas or oil), pressure, and
temperature, any other relevant
characteristics.
4 Toxic gas release No This scenario is meant to cover precautions
against the toxic effect of H2S on personnel.
MODU Owner depends on the client’s drilling
programme.
5 Gas Yes Caused by gas entrained in the drilling mud.
release/ignition in Consequences are more severe for oil-based
mud processing mud. MODU Owner “works as directed” by
areas the oil company and thus depends on oil
company’s drilling programme and
consultation with his site personnel to predict
the likelihood of and to control this event.
6 Well test area Yes Occurs during flow testing of wells only.
fire/explosion
7 Accommodation Yes Covered by class, flag-state rules, and
fire MODU Code
8 Machinery space Yes Covered by class, flag-state rules, and

fire/explosion MODU Code
9 Helicopter crash No Client’s standby vessel covers this scenario
into the sea
10 Helicopter crash Yes MODU helideck requirements are the same
on the installation as for fixed producing installations, per ICAO
rules for design, augmented by such
instruments as CAP 437 [X]in the UK.
11 Collision No MODUs have provisions for survival in
damaged conditions. They rely on the client
oil company to provide information such as
proximity so shipping lanes and on the client-
contracted standby vessel to warn errant
vessels away.
12 Structural failure No Covered by Class, flag-state rules, and
due to extreme MODU Code
weather
13 Mooring failure No Covered by Class, flag-state rules, and
MODU Code
14 Loss of stability No Covered by Class, flag-state rules, and
MODU Code

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Typical hazard list showing preliminary PFEER assessments

Item no. Type of event Fire & Comments and description
explosion
consequences
15 Loss of control in No i.e. loss of towline
transit
16 Man overboard No Client’s standby vessel covers this scenario.
Half of the events above that cause most serious concerns on a MODU involve fire and explosion.
This is a very significant proportion. Thus, the question occurs as to how the fire and explosion
expert(s) might apply themselves to reducing the risks MODUs face. The information given below
is meant to stimulate further consideration. Particular circumstances and personnel roles will have
large roles to play.
From the hazard events itemised above in table XX , it can be seen that of 16 event categories that
8 consider fire (and explosion) events. Event categories 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 are caused by well upsets
which are covered in more detail in Sub-section 3.8.8. Three of the remaining hazard categories
consider non-well events such as;
• Accommodation fire
• Machinery space fire/explosion
Are covered by classification, flag-State and MODU Code.
The last, helicopter crash on the installation, is common to all installations. It is thus well laid out in
CAP 437. The inspection of helidecks is covered by BHAB inspection of the installation.
3.9.6 Pre-hire surveys
Many oil companies use 3rd party inspectors to perform pre-hire checks on the rigs they intend to
contract. The Fire & Explosion expert might want to peruse the survey sections dealing with the
sections as below that the surveyors generally cover.
Typical items for pre-hire surveys.
• Well testing equipment
• Electrical safety
• Automatic fire detection system
• Fixed fire extinguishing systems (water & foam)
• Breathing apparatus
• Electric safety
• Blow out prevention equipment (BOPs)
• Well control equipment
• Fire control system
• CO2 system for fire control
• Portable extinguishers and fire fighting equipment

• Gas detection system
• Safety
3.9.7 Classification society surveys
Classification societies will carry out surveys of vessels to ensure that they continue to comply with
class requirements; these will be carried out against the rules issued by the class societies referred
to throughout this section. The survey reports generally stay on the unit and at the field office..
3.9.8 The well programme
The well programme lays out the plan for drilling the well, including predictions for formations to be
encountered, along with the types of fluid in the formations (oil, water, or gas). Part of the
programme will deal with site assessment, covering the prospects for encountering shallow gas.
The programme should offer information regarding whether H2S is likely to be encountered. The
type mud system to be used will be detailed for each hole section. If well testing is foreseen, the
details of the flow rates likely to ensue will be given along with the duration of the test and the
sampling foreseen. Well testing is given separate treatment below.
There is no equivalent of a design safety case for wells. However, the Safety Case Regulations
require operators to apply a process termed Well Examination. This regulation requires that
operators file their well programmes with the HSE a minimum of 21 days before operations are due
to begin. The details to be submitted are spelled out in some detail. If there is no objection from the
HSE, work can begin. However, if there are material changes in the well programme, an
independent, competent person known as a Well Examiner, must agree the change does not pose
an increase in risk.
For the MODU Owner, the effect of Well Examination is that the programme is fixed in good time
for them to interpret it and make ready for it. It also ensures there is a process for ensuring
changes are subject to analysis for risk.
All told, the well programme covers 5 of the 8 contingencies involving fire and explosion.
3.9.9 The MODU safety case safety management system
The UK Safety Case and supporting regulations entail a robust Safety Management System
(SMS). One component of the system is an active system of audit. Another is the Verification of
Safety-critical Elements – those elements or systems vital to the safety of the personnel on the
MODU. The SMS audits and verification scheme can be a source of information readily available to
the interested fire and explosion specialist.
3.9.10 A special word on well testing
Though the Well Programme covers the objectives of well testing, it may not provide copious detail
on the well testing equipment. On many rigs, well testing equipment is not permanently installed. It
is brought to the rig when well testing is foreseen. On rigs where the installation is permanent,
maintenance of such equipment is not generally with the core skill and experience of the drill crew.
Few drilling specialists have extensive experience testing wells. The safety case can only generally
cover the well testing equipment and cannot be very specific as there are many different
manufacturers, different layouts for this equipment, and different crews generally man the well test
equipment. Therefore the constructive overview of a fire and explosion specialist should be
welcome in these circumstances.

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3.9.11 Recommended approach
The following is written from the aspect of an oil company contracting for the services of a MODU.
Generally, the oil company will likely have staff or have access to 3rd party specialists specialising
in fire and explosion. MODU Owners generally do not. In this situation, it seems natural for the oil
company specialist to at least have an overview. It is probably sub-optimal to ask the MODU
Owner to do everything; on the other hand, it is probably sub-optimal to make numerous in-depth
enquiries of the MODU Owner when many aspects are covered by Classification or flag-State
rules. What is recommended is a cooperative, balanced, and constructive overview into all aspects
of fire and explosion aspects.
Any enquires should respect the culture and strength of the MODU Owner. Chief amongst these is
that the MODU Owner’s greatest asset is the crew. Some of their number will have participated in
or have knowledge of the rig’s treatment of fire and explosion. Rig crew use the “hands on”
approach. Thus, their expertise can best be accessed by qualitative data, as it is the type of data
they are most used to dealing with.
Finally, remember the marine approach should be seen as counting for something. Though the
rules are prescriptive, the nature of their derivation makes them statistically valid as most have
been derived from experiences of the world’s shipping fleet.
Given the diverse character of information for fire and explosion on MODUs, the approach given
below could function as a starting point(s).
Item Overview
MODU Be aware of the Classification Society. Look up and become familiar with their
Classification rules. The MODU Owner will have records of the ongoing surveys.
Flag-State Be aware of who the flag-State is. Look up and become familiar with their
rules. The MODU Owner will have records of the ongoing surveys.
MODU Code Be aware if the unit has a certificate and whether it is 1989 or 1979. Be
familiar with what it contains.
Safety Case Be aware of the analyses in the safety case for fire and explosion, especially
those with PFEER Assessments. They represent the risks with the most
severe consequences.
Pre-hire survey Have a look at the fire and explosion aspects of the pre-hire survey, provided,
of course, such a survey was performed.
Well Programme Have a look at the well programme from the point of view of the MODU
Owner. Judge whether you would be happy with the information in the
programme in terms of preventing fire and explosions? If not, it would be a
service to both oil company and MODU Owner to point out where better
information would be beneficial.
SMS Audits The MODU Owner’s own audits can provide information on the standard of
maintenance. It would be a good thing to be aware of the audit findings.
Further delving could be undertaken if an overview gave cause for concern.
Verification of The same comments apply here as above for SMS audits.
Safety-critical
Elements
Well testing Probably the area where the fire and explosion expert might make best input.
Well testing can be infrequent and thus less familiar. An overview of the
equipment, procedures, and risk analyses may well prove beneficial in terms
of risk reduction.

3.10 Particular considerations for existing installations
3.10.1 Application of fire hazard management to existing structures
3.10.1.1 General
Much of the preceding guidance has been written with design of new installations in mind. For
existing installations, the elements of the overall platform fire protection design will have already
been fixed. Unless the existing fire risk is found to be unacceptably high, major changes are
unlikely to be justified. The challenge for existing installations is in
• Continuing to ensure all the design arrangements for fire hazard management operate as
intended throughout the long life of the installation.
• Ensuring that if the design or the operation changes, the fire management is reviewed and
changed where necessary to suit the changed fire hazard.
There are slightly different considerations to be borne in mind at different stages of the field life.
Some typical examples of issues for the early, mid and the late stages of field life are provided
below to illustrate this point.
3.10.1.2 Early operating phase
Vigilance is required in the early stages of field life for deviations from the original process,
structural, mechanical or instrument design intent. Such changes need review for any implications
for fire hazard creation or management. Such a review needs to be scheduled and chaired by the
project safety engineer and attended by a mixture of design and operations personnel. It should
take place after a year or two of operation. Since key project design personnel are likely to have
moved to another project by that stage, an alternative would be for operations to log all variations
to original design, operating or maintenance assumptions/intent for formal follow-up by the
installation safety engineer in order that the implications for fire hazard management can be
explored and corrective action taken if found necessary..
Nowadays, plant modifications are closely scrutinised by a range of discipline engineers and
onshore support staff for any detrimental effect on safety. Minor operating and maintenance
changes however, can still go un-noticed unless vigilance is maintained and the offshore personnel
have been made aware during training of the original design premises.
Examples of the types of change that would not be obvious without a specific attempt to capture
them are:
• Environmental data (sea level or weather pattern changes)
• Instrumentation problems – e,g, leading to changed operator response to alarms
• New fire research findings
• Change in production composition or phases, leading to changed fire scenarios or release
frequencies
3.10.1.3 Midlife operating phase
Some typical considerations for fire hazard management of existing installations at the mid-life
stage are:
• Creeping change in original design assumptions – examples are development of sand,
vibration or corrosion problems, increasing the likelihood of releases in certain areas;

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changes in process conditions resulting in change to fire consequence modelling

assumptions
• Fire-related protective equipment proves unsatisfactory in operation – detection devices
give frequent alarms or are found to be failed at every inspection. Alarms that are too
frequent are eventually ignored.
• PFP left off vessels or other equipment for longer and longer periods to allow access for
NDT/inspection
• Areas of the platform always ‘keyed out’ of the automatic fire and gas system
• Very slow process changes which come to be regarded as normal by operations personnel
e.g. too frequent alarms, very low temperatures etc. and not queried with process engineer.
If minor deviations go un-noticed, over time it becomes custom and practice to operate outside the
original design scope, and/or without all protection functioning. Problems then become apparent
only during an emergency situation.
Many of these minor changes would be identified by the independent competent person during the
course of his examinations of safety critical equipment and systems, but some changes can still be
missed.
Most oil companies include operations personnel in their project teams. Often one or both intended
OIMs plus key offshore supervisors are part of the project team specifically to become fully
conversant with, and supply input to operations and design issues. Over a period of 10 years or so
however, personnel change and key information, whether held personally, in hard-copy or in
electronic format is likely to be lost if no active steps are taken to refresh the ‘corporate memory’ at
regular intervals. In addition, over time, new research improves the understanding of the fire threat
and the ability of the designed fire control measures to effectively counter the threat. The
implications of this knowledge need taking into account and where necessary the emergency
response procedures updated.
It is thus recommended that a formal review (taking into account new research knowledge) or audit
of the fire hazard management arrangements and records be carried out every 3 to 5 years.
3.10.1.4 Late operating phase
As platforms age the safety systems tend to require more repair and maintenance in order to keep
them in full working condition. The late operating phase is also a time when the platform production
tail off and there is a big drive to reduce OPEX costs. Fortunately, as platform age and production
rates drop, process pressures also drop, water cut increases and fire risks tend to reduce.
It is possible on some installations, where parts of the process have been simplified or
decommissioned or where drilling activity is finished, to review a platform’s fire hazard
management arrangements and remove fire protection equipment that is, by then, surplus to
requirement. Thus it is sometimes possible to reduce the maintenance burden. Any such
modifications have to be formally justified and recorded through the Operator’s Plant Modification
Request procedures, and documented in the Safety Case and associated PFEER/DCR
documentation.
Typical Problems for the Late Operating Phase are:

• Degradation of Passive Fire Protection
• Corrosion of firewater systems and leaks in air-trigger systems
• Wear and tear on firewater pumps and deluge valve sets
• Obsolescence of parts for Fire and Gas detection/protection systems

• Increased leak likelihood due to sand erosion, corrosion (especially under lagging) and
fatigue.
• Tightened commercial constraints and reductions in manning
Despite the associated cost of maintenance and inspection, the performance standards laid down
for of all the safety critical systems, subsystems and individual items must either:
• Continue to be met as per the original design,
or
• Revised (with appropriate justification) to reflect the changing fire risk. The associated
written schemes would be updated to reflect the changed performance standard in
discussion with the appropriate Independent Competent Person(s).
In either case the Performance Standards (either original or revised) for the safety critical item
must continue to be met as long as the installation continues to operate.
3.10.2 Life cycle considerations
During the operational phase, vigilance over the fire hazard management must be maintained as
covered in Section 3.10.1. Some of the changes that will need to be catered for in the various other
phases of the lifecycle are covered in the table below:
Life Cycle Phase Fire Hazard and Fire Protection Issues

Installation and commissioning Checklists, commissioning procedures and test schedules are
required to ensure that design is properly installed and performs
as intended.
Early Operational Phase Regular maintenance and testing to ensure performance
standards met for continued operation as design (see
Section 3.10.1 above)
Mid Operational Phase Continue to be vigilant for creeping change to platform process
conditions.
All design modifications
subject to appropriate ‘Plant
Modification Request’
procedures
Late Operational Phase Repair or replace parts of system subject to unacceptable wear
and tear, continue to ensure performance standards are met,
regardless of OPEX constraints, while production continues.
HOWEVER: Where fire hazard is proven to be reduced some
protection system removal may be justified and maintenance
burden reduced. Any changes to original design concept to be
formally justified and recorded in platform Safety Case and
PFEER/DCR documentation.
Asset life extension See Section 3.10.2.3 below
Decommissioning Fire risk profile for installation changes.
Production fire risk reduces as plant is isolated, hydrocarbon-
freed and removed.
Other fire risks introduced e.g. gases for flame-cutting or fuel for
temporary plant

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Life Cycle Phase Fire Hazard and Fire Protection Issues

Fire protection needs to be based on fire risk assessment of each
stage of decommissioning plan.
Proper isolation from pipelines and reservoir must be ensured
3.10.3 Aging installations and life extension
3.10.3.1 Overview
Many installations in the North Sea have reached the end of their originally stated life span but are
still producing sufficient quantities of oil to make continued operation worthwhile. Other
installations, although no longer producing oil from their own wells are being modified to act as
production hubs, taking oils from other subsea wells in the area and processing it, often with new
or modified topsides plant, for export to pipeline or tanker.
Asset life extension raises several issues in relation to fire hazard management:
3.10.3.2 Design Issues:

• New process plant needs to be provided with adequate fire and gas detection systems. The
existing systems may be adequate to cover the new equipment or may need extending, but
the same considerations as for a new design will still apply. The existing system may be
virtually obsolete and not feasible to extend so replacement of the whole system may be
required.
• The effect of the new plant on the ESD and blowdown systems must be evaluated in the
light of the additional fire scenarios. It should not be assumed that tie-in to the existing
platform blowdown system will be adequate, even though original demands on the system
may have reduced. If the installation is old the original blowdown system may have been
under-designed by current practice.
• All new fire scenarios must be reviewed for effect on existing deluge systems. A fire in the
new plant may set off several other systems, especially on an open installation. The project
may have supply new fire pumps to cover the new plant as the existing pumps are unlikely
to have spare capacity. The condition of existing pumps for extended future service must
be assured.
• More use of passive protection may be possible, but integrity assurance for aging
piping/structure/equipment must be provided for
• Existing deluge systems are often difficult to extend. The mechanical condition of the
system needs to be assured for extended service. There may now be a new fire scenario
with implications for important parts of the structure (e.g. the TR or TEMPSC areas or their
supports) which are currently unprotected. (see Sections 2.1.3 and 7.3.2 for discussion of
retrofitting PFP to structure in situ) . All escalation potential should be considered, and the
decisions relating to selection of protection recorded.
• New fire scenarios must be evaluated for impact on evacuation, escape and rescue.
• New support structure provided for the new plant may be vulnerable to fire impingement
from existing fire scenarios, and may require protection.
3.10.3.3 Operations Issues:
There is a tendency for this type of work to be carried out in isolation by small project teams within
narrow boundaries in order to keep costs down. The project teams try to keep documentation
updates to the bare minimum in standalone, project specific reports. It is essential that operations

personnel are involved in the project and offshore personnel are specifically trained on the
implications of the change for fire hazard management.
3.10.3.4 Emergency Response Issues:
As platforms age, emergency equipment and facilities degrade. Although some items can be easily
replaced once they fall below an acceptable standard, other items such as sea ladders, spider
deck walkways, gratings on rarely-used escape routes to sea can fall into disrepair and are
expensive to replace. Routes to sea are important in severe fire scenarios and must be kept up to
standard as long as the fire hazard remains. Where new business is introduced over an old
installation, new escape routes, as well as refurbishment of existing routes (where the original fire
hazard still exists) may be needed.
3.10.3.5 General Considerations

• Fire hazards would be identified in the HAZID and stage of the process modification design,
and subsequently assessed as for any new design project.
• The impact of the new facilities on the existing fire and gas detection and protection
systems needs to be documented and recommendations tracked to implementation.
• Incorporation of new safety critical items into existing Safety Case, SCE and PS related
documentation is a legal requirement.
3.11 Particular considerations for accommodation and other areas for

personnel
3.11.1 General
Much fire measurement data, definitions and internationally accepted standard tests have been
developed from building fires and the damage caused. Many of these have been adapted for use
on the appropriate sections of petrochemical plants and their shortcomings in wider applications
should be understood. The following sections deal with some standard aspects of conventional
onshore fires but practitioners should refer to standards produced for onshore and civil use for
these “non-hydrocarbon” areas.
Accommodation and other areas of the installation such as control rooms, some workshops (i.e.
those without specific storage requirements for hazardous materials), leisure areas and galleys are
all based on normal architectural practices. The internal materials are the same as onshore
facilities and the design practices tend to be with only minor variation. The key difference with
these areas is how they relate to process and other operating areas and extreme care should be
taken to make sure that even the most apparently benign systems do not interface with a
hydrocarbon system in an unforeseen manner. Key aspects where interfaces can occur are listed
below and these should be assessed when considering the process fire hazards.
• HVAC,
• Drainage,
• Storage areas/enclosures,
• Access (both for personnel using the facilities and working there and goods coming into
or out of the area).
3.11.1.1 Compartment fires - general
In a compartment or building fire, the source of ignition will normally be at a discrete location and
the initial fire growth will be slow. The temperature in compartment will increase and a hot layer of

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gas will build up below the ceiling. A point is reached when re-radiation from this gas layer causes
the unburnt furniture etc to ignite. Within a short space of time the entire contents of the
compartment will be burning in a process called flashover.
The severity and duration of a building fire depend on the amount of fuel and the ventilation
conditions. Fires may be fuel controlled or ventilation controlled. Generally, ventilation controlled
fires are more severe.
The main difference between a building fire and a pool or jet fire is the nature of the fuel. Although
buildings contain hydrocarbons in the form of plastics they also generally contain a large amount of
cellulosic material in the form of paper, and wooden furniture. It is common, although not strictly
correct, to refer to building fires as cellulosic.
When assessing elements of construction for buildings the Standard Fire resistance Test fire is
normally uses. For some “fire engineered” designs a natural fire is modelled. The simplest natural
fire model is the parametric fire although there are many, more complex, computer models for
building fires
3.11.2 Compartment fires – parametric
A parametric fire [sci 6] is an idealised form of a natural fire in a building compartment. They
provide a simple means to take into account the most important physical phenomena which may
influence the development of a fire. They take into account the fire load, the ventilation conditions
and the thermal properties of the compartment linings.
The parametric fire was developed to model mainly cellulosic building fires. It gives reasonably
correlations against tests for modern office fires. It may often be more severe than the Standard
cellulosic fire. Needs a better description of a parametric fire is? What’s a “natural” fire?.
3.11.3 ISO, cellulosic (Standard fire)
Building regulations throughout the world almost invariably require elements of construction to
have fire resistance based on the Standard fire(2). This is an idealised fire defined by a time-
temperature relationship and is the basis for fire resistance tests.
3.11.4 Temperatures
The Standard cellulosic fire has, when compared with most other “design” fires, a low initial rate of
temperature increase. However, the temperature rises logarithmically with no limit. It reaches
945ºC in 60 minutes and 1153ºC in 240 minutes. The temperature reached depends on the
conditions in the compartment and in a typical office fire, the gas temperature will reach about
1300ºC. The fire temperature will normally peak at about 45 to 60 minutes and decline steadily
afterwards. Compartment temperatures will reduce to 200ºC after 120 minutes.

4. Interaction with explosion hazard management
4.1 General
The methods and systems for the management of explosion and fire hazards will have a degree of
commonality. Some of these will be complementary, whereas others will serve a single function
only. In addition, conflicts may exist between the successful management of explosion hazards
and the successful management of fire hazards. Thus, a holistic approach must be taken in the
management of both types of hazard.
Hazard management will always be a series of compromises between economics, engineering,

operability and loss prevention considerations.
Successful hazard management involves identifying the best compromise between all these
considerations, in compliance with any statutory obligations placed on the operator of the
installation.
4.2 Fire and explosion prevention methods

4.2.1 General
It has to be accepted that the complete prevention of fires and explosions can never be attained.
However, procedures and systems should be provided to reduce the frequency of such events to
as low as is reasonably practicable. Such procedures and systems are detailed below.
4.2.2 The minimisation of leakage frequency.
The loss of containment of a flammable material is a necessary precursor to the occurrence of an

explosion or fire. This can be avoided, as far as is reasonably practicable by:
• Fitness for purpose of all flammable material containment equipment and associated
pipework.
• The maintenance of the design fitness for purpose throughout the life of the installation.
This requires that an adequate inspection and maintenance regime be in place throughout
the life of the installation. In addition, care must be taken to ensure that the original design
intent is not debased by subsequent modification that may take place within the life of the
installation.
• Wherever possible, the number of potential leakage sources should be minimised. Typical
of these would be instrument tappings and pipework flange connections. However, care
must be taken in applying this philosophy as this may lead to an increased need for ‘hot
work’ if modifications, replacement or repair of equipment becomes necessary.
4.2.3 The minimisation of ignition probability.
Given that the leakage of flammable materials cannot be totally prevented throughout the life of the
installation, then an explosion or fire will only occur if the leak is ignited. The probability of such
ignition may be minimised by:
• Adequate control of ‘hot work’ on live installations by the use of air-purged habitats.
Alternatively, only carry out ‘hot work’ during an installation shutdown.
• The correct hazardous area zoning for electrical equipment and the correct selection and
maintenance of such equipment.
• The early detection of any leakage together with the necessary control actions to isolate all
non-essential items of equipment which could potentially be sources of ignition.
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Note that ignition probability per se, does not represent an adequate measure of risk. What are
most significant are the time-delay between a leak occurring and the ignition of the leak, and also
the time delay (if any) between the detection of the leak and the ignition of the leak. These are a
function of the rate of ignition rather than of the ignition probability. The minimisation of ignition
probability illustrates one of the many compromises that have to be arrived at in the management
of explosion and fire hazards, whilst accepting that ignition probability must be minimised, in doing
so it must also be recognised that the potential for a ‘long-delayed’ ignition increases. Under these
conditions a severe explosion event may result.
4.3 Fire and explosion detection and control methods

4.3.1 General
The positive pressure phase of an explosion is in the order of a few hundred milliseconds. Thus,
the effects of an explosion are realised immediately. Conversely, the time for the effects of a fire to
be realised, even upon personnel, is of at least an order greater than that for explosions. Thus the
early detection of a leak is of greater significance when explosion hazards are considered than
when fire hazards are considered.
It follows that leak-detection and associated alarms, are the only means of providing adequate
warning to personnel. Fire-detection is of no value in this context. However, fire-detection is still of
importance when fire hazards are considered.
It may be that very rapid response fire-detection systems, such as those that utilise flame-
detection, could detect an explosion before they are damaged by the explosion blast or drag
effects. As stated above, this would be of no significance when explosion hazards are considered.
However, it may be important for the management of fire-hazards to detect any fire that may follow
an explosion. This may provide an argument for the use of rapid-response fire-detection systems,
where the frequency of occurrence of explosions is deemed to be significant. It may also provide
an argument under the same circumstances for the automatic actuation of any active fire control
and mitigation systems upon the detection of a leak.
4.3.2 Automatic leak-detection systems and alarms.
Two generic types of leak detectors are available. These operate on:
1. The detection of an accumulation of flammable gas or
2. The direct detection of a leak based on the acoustic signature of the release.
Type a) detectors may be point detectors e.g. pellistors, or beam detectors. In each case of type a)
detectors there is a requirement to assess the minimum flammable cloud size that should be
detected. There is very little guidance available to assist in this. One approach may be to consider
both the thermal effects and the blast effects on a flammable cloud. The thermal effects may be
assessed by treating the combustion of the flammable cloud as a fireball. The minimum cloud size,
which is required to be detected, may then be based on an acceptable probability of persons in the
area surviving these thermal and blast effects. A figure for the probability of survival of 0.9 is
suggested as being acceptable.
Type b) detectors appear to have an advantage over type a) detectors in as much as they detect a
leak directly. However, it is important that the sensitivity of such detectors is adequate. A figure for
the leak-detection threshold of 0.1 kg/sec is considered acceptable. In addition, there is no clear
evidence as to whether or not such acoustic detector will operate adequately when two-phase
leaks occur. Thus it is suggested that the ideal leak detection system should employ both types of
detectors. The detection of a leak should be annunciated on an installation-wide basis. All
installation personnel, including visitors, should have received clear instruction as to the correct
action to be taken on the receipt of such an alarm.

4.3.3 Automatic fire-detection systems and alarms.
As has already been stated only leak detection can provide adequate warning to personnel of a
potential explosion hazard. Fire detection is of very limited value in the event of an explosion and
this will decrease as the explosion severity increases.
A multiplicity of fire detection device-types is available. These include:

• UV and IR flame-detectors
• Rate of temperature rise detectors
• Smoke detectors.
The flame-detectors will have the most rapid response of the above, although very early smoke
detector (VESDA) systems can approach this response time. However it is advisable that total
reliance is not placed on flame-detectors alone. Conditions could arise where the fire would be
obscured by smoke. Therefore, the fire-detection system should include a mix of each type of
detector.
The comments concerning alarms made for leak detection are equally pertinent for fire detection.
4.3.4 The reduction of the available inventory of fuel.
This is of equal importance to the management of both fire and explosion hazards. Obviously,
where explosion hazards are concerned, any beneficial effects will arise if the fuel inventory is
partially or completely depleted before an ignition takes place. This contrasts with the situation
where fire hazards are concerned, where the beneficial effects will continue to operate after an
ignition takes place. However, these beneficial effects on the fire-hazard will only ensue if the
automatic isolation and blow-down and flare systems are not damaged by any prior explosion, to
such an extent as to prevent their correct operation. Isolation and blow-down valves should,
wherever possible, be ‘fail closed.’ For large valves, which are likely to employ double-acting
actuators, this will not be possible. Such valve actuators should be protected against blast and
drag-effect damage as much as reasonably practicable, but it must be accepted that there will be
practical limitations on the extent to which this can be achieved.
This emphasises the importance of early detection of leaks and the automatic initiation of the ESD
and blow-down systems upon the detection of a leak.
Whereas, ESD and blow-down systems do provide benefit in the management of fire and
explosion hazards, it is important to realise that these systems alone cannot be relied upon to
prevent subsequent failures of equipment or structural elements due to the effects of a fire. Blow-
down systems are almost universally designed to API RP520 [X]. This requires that the internal
pressure be reduced by 50% or to 100 psig; whichever is the lower; within fifteen minutes.
However, even if this is achieved, a significant fire could still be ongoing which could cause
failures, especially in congested areas.
The jet flame length for a natural gas release can be approximated from the following correlation;
L = 0.37 d 0.82 P10.41 (1)
where
L is the flame length (m)
d is the leakage orifice diameter (mm)
P1 is the drive pressure (bar abs)

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Thus a 5 mm diameter hole at 100psig drive pressure would produce a jet flame of length 2.25m. It
is possible that this flame could impinge on other equipment or structural elements. IS THERE A
REFERENCE FOR THE EQUATION??
4.3.5 The significance of area ventilation on explosions
4.3.5.1 On explosions
The equilibrium size of a flammable cloud, produced by the accumulation of flammable gas from a
leak will be inter-alia, a function of the area-ventilation rate. The severity of an explosion following
the ignition of such a flammable cloud, will be, inter-alia, a function of the mass of flammable gas in
the cloud. Thus it follows that an increased rate of area ventilation will have a beneficial effect upon
the explosion hazard. The possible disbenefit of this is that it could make early detection of a leak
more difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, it is highly probable, in most cases that the balance of risk
will come down in favour of maximising the rate of area ventilation.
One possible exception to this general conclusion may be the mechanical ventilation of enclosed
areas. If following a leak, the concentration of flammable gas throughout the whole area, rises
above the upper-flammable limit of the gas, then ignition of the atmosphere becomes impossible.
This might provide an argument for the shutting down of the mechanical ventilation system to an
enclosed area following the detection of a leak. This could provide time for the removal or isolation
of potential ignition sources within the area before the ventilation is re-established. A further
consideration, in support of this course of action is the avoidance of the movement of the
flammable gas into adjacent areas via the ventilation system ductwork.
4.3.5.2 On fires
The influence of area ventilation rate on fires is less apparent than its influence on explosions. The
research report [ref CJG 1] indicates that the suppression of pool fires by water/foam deluge
systems is aided by increased wind-speed i.e. an increased ventilation rate. However, the possible
distortion of the water spray pattern by the wind could mitigate against this. This could be a
problem on small, open installation areas. It is unlikely to be a problem on large, congested open
areas as the internal wind-speeds achievable by natural ventilation are unlikely to be high enough
to significantly distort the water-spray pattern, but could be sufficient to produce the flame-tilt
necessary to assist the suppression of the pool fire by the water-spray system.
The above is relevant to naturally ventilated areas. Where mechanically ventilated, enclosed areas
are concerned; the internal wind-speeds are unlikely to be sufficient to produce either of these
effects. Note that for enclosed areas, the rate of mechanical ventilation will usually be of the order
of 10 air changes per hour. Research report [ref CJG 2] indicates that for naturally ventilated areas
ventilation rates in the order of a few hundred air changes per hour are achievable.
4.3.5.3 The maximisation of ventilation rates.
For existing installations, it must be accepted that little can be done to increase the existing
ventilation rates, without major modifications to the installation. For mechanically ventilated areas it
is difficult to envisage any practical steps that could be taken to increase the ventilation rate. For
naturally ventilated areas, it may be possible to increase the ventilation rate by the removal of any
louvered wind walls.
For ‘new builds’ the influence of the rate of ventilation on both fire and explosion hazards should be
addressed in the design. For naturally ventilated areas a conflict may arise between protecting the
temporary refuge against smoke ingress and the maximisation of area ventilation. It is conventional
wisdom that wherever possible, the temporary refuge should be up-wind of the prevailing wind
direction. There will normally exist bulkheads between the temporary refuge and drilling and
process areas. This means that the open sides of these areas will be at a right angle to the
prevailing wind direction and thus the maximisation of the ventilation of these areas will not be
possible.
4.3.5.4 Other factors influencing ventilation rate.
4.3.5.4.1 Equipment layout
The equipment layout within an area will have an influence on the area ventilation rate. The most
efficient layout to maximise the ventilation rate will be the same as that to minimise the explosion
hazard. Such layouts are describes in the FLACS explosion handbook.
For existing installations, it must be accepted that little can be done to change the existing layout of
equipment. For ‘new builds’ cognisance should be taken of the recommendations given in the
FLACS explosion handbook.
4.3.5.4.2 Influence of release rate
The release rate of gas can itself have a significant influence on the rate of natural ventilation.
The research report [ref CJG 7] provides some, albeit limited, data on this effect. Analysis of this
data indicates that:
• If the leak is counter-flowing to the ventilation flow direction, the ventilation rate will be
reduced.
• If the leak is co-flowing with the ventilation flow direction, the ventilation rate will be
increased.
• If the leak is crosswind to the ventilation flow direction, the ventilation rate is effectively
unchanged.
The following correlations are suggested as representing a conservative estimate of these effects.
For leak direction counter to ventilation flow direction,
V ′ = V (1 − 22.4 x ) (2)
where
V is the reduced ventilation rate (m3/s)
V' is the original ventilation rate (m3/s)
x is the gas release rate (m3/s)
For leak direction co-flowing with the ventilation flow direction,
V ′ = V (1 + 12.45 x ) (3)
where
V is the increased ventilation rate (m3/s)
V' is the original ventilation rate (m3/s)
x is the gas release rate (m3/s)
4.3.5.4.3 Influence of water deluge
The research report [ref CJG 3] indicates that the presence of water deluge reduces the ventilation
rate in naturally ventilated areas. The date on this is very limited and applies only to deluge rates in
the order of 24 litres/minutes/metre².
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It is suggested that a conservative estimate of this effect would be to reduce the area ventilation
rate by 30% when the area deluge system is operating.
4.4 Fire and explosion mitigation methods

4.4.1 Active fire-fighting systems
The first, and most obvious, consideration of the interaction with the explosion events is whether or
not the fixed fire-fighting systems would still be functional after an explosion. Water deluge systems
should be provided with as much protection against the explosion effects as is practicable. For
existing installations, it must be accepted that little can be done in this regard. For ‘new builds’, this
may be achieved by the judicious location of water deluge pipe-work. However, because of its very
nature, such a system will be distributed throughout the whole of the area, it is likely that only a
limited degree of protection could be provided.
It is now well established that in well-vented areas, the presence of an area water deluge can
reduce the severity of explosions. This would appear to be an argument for the initiation of water
deluge, wherever possible within the affected area, before the ignition of a flammable atmosphere
takes place. The could have the benefits of reducing the explosion severity to an extent that the
water deluge system in operation to control or mitigate the effects of any subsequent fire, and also
prevent damage to automatic isolation and blow-down systems. Research report (ref CJG 4)
provides correlations to estimate the reduction in explosion severity by area deluge.
The correlations also demonstrate the variation in explosion severity with the gas concentration in
the flammable atmosphere. The correlations are:
In the absence of water-spray,
PE 2 = PE 1 e
( −17.693((E −1.0563) −(E −1.0563) ))
2
2
1
2
(4)
In the presence of water-spray,
PE 2 = PE 1 e
( −18.215((E −1.007) −(E −1.007) ))
2
2
1
2
(5)
where
PE1 is the overpressure at equivalence ratio E1
PE2 is the overpressure at equivalence ratio E2
C1
E1 =
CS
C2
E2 =
CS
and
C1 is gas concentration 1
C2 is gas concentration 2
CS is the gas stoichiometric concentration

It is not possible to provide a generic correlation for the absolute reduction in explosion severity, as
the domains in which the explosion takes place will vary from one another. However, it can be
stated that the ratio of the unmitigated explosion severity to the mitigated explosion severity
increases as the unmitigated explosion severity increases. Thus area deluge mitigation of
explosions is most effective where very severe explosions can occur. This means that such a
system will be most effective in large, congested well-vented areas.
It is probable that if the maximum explosion peak over-pressure predicted for a domain were less
that 0.5bar, area water deluge would provide virtually no benefit. The mitigation of explosions by
area water deluge will only occur when the explosion is accompanied by significant flame
acceleration. In practice, this means large, well-vented domains. Where this does not occur, such
as in enclosed domains area water deluge will not provide any benefit, and in some cases, could
increase the explosion severity.
As has been stated above, the presence of water-deluge will result in the reduction of the natural
ventilation rate. This will have the effect of increasing the equilibrium, size of the flammable cloud
and also increasing the time required to disperse this flammable cloud. Another counter-argument
is that the presence of water-deluge may increase the probability of ignition due to water ingress
into electrical equipment. It is an open question as to whether or not this is significant, but work
done by SINTEF and NEMKO (refs CJG 5and CJG 6) indicate that this is very difficult to achieve.
Thus, in any particular situation, the decision as to whether or not the activation of an area water-
deluge is appropriate can only be informed by an assessment of all the above factors.
Water-deluge systems, with or without foam, can be effective in suppressing and extinguishing
pool fires. The following correlations for the time to extinguish pool fires have been developed from
a research programme of fire trials (ref CJG 8). These trials used diesel as the fuel but the
correlations would give a reasonable approximation for the time to extinguish stabilised crude oil
fires.
29
T50 = 494 − 376 Y + (6)
Y
80
TE = 859 − 448 Y + (7)
Y
where
T50 is the time to reduce the fire size by 50 % (s)
TE is the time to extinguish the fire (s)
Y = C ×U
and
C is the waterspray area cover rate (litres/min/m2)
U is the internal wind speed (m/s)
These correlations are specific to water sprays with droplet Sauter mean diameters of 400 to 500
microns. The research report (ref CJG 7) indicates that the water droplet diameter can have a
significant effect upon the time to extinguish a pool fire. In summary, large droplets are more
effective than small droplets, inasmuch as they are less easily displaced by ventilation crosswinds
and can penetrate the fire plume more effectively.

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The addition of a foaming agent to the water spray system can reduce significantly the time
extinguish a pool fire compared to those predicted from equations 6 and 7.
Ref CJG 8 provides a summary of foam system performance. One additional factor in foam
compound selection is the viscosity of the finished foam. For two dimensional pool fires a low
viscosity of the finished foam is appropriate. However, for three-dimensional running fires, such as
may be encountered on a helideck, a high viscosity (or sticky) finished foam is appropriate.
Where water miscible fuels may be encountered, then alcohol resistant foam is necessary.
In locations where the ambient temperature can be below 0°C for a significant time the foam
compound should be ‘freeze-protected.’
Water spray systems with or without foam will have no effect upon jet fires. Where diffusion flames,
such as from a pool fire, are encountered, local cooling water spray systems designed to NFPA15
[X], will be effective in protecting the equipment being sprayed. However, such systems, (and also
area deluge systems) will not protect the equipment against jet fire impact.
However, area water deluge can provide significant protection against incident thermal radiation
from both jet and pool fires.
The research report (ref CJG 7) suggests the following correlation for the reduction in incident
thermal radiation.
R = 100 tanh (1.55 x ) (8)
where
R is the percentage reduction in incident thermal radiation
x = f ×L
and
f is the water volume fraction in the atmosphere
L is the distance through the water spray or curtain (m)
This indicates that the presence of area deluge could provide significant protection for personnel
escaping from the location of a fire. The same applies to the use of water curtains if these are of
adequate thickness.
Area deluge systems or water curtains cannot be relied upon to protect personnel from the thermal
effects of an explosion. These thermal effects are of too short a duration to prevent any serious risk
of failure of equipment or structural elements. Such risks would be associated with the blast and
drag effects of an explosion. Obviously, water spray systems can provide no protection against
such effects. Dual agent (foam and dry powder) can be effective in the suppression and
extinguishment of pool fires. Their effectiveness is probably limited to enclosed areas due to the
problem of delivering the dry powder to the base of the fire in open, well-ventilated areas. Where
effective, dual agents can reduce the fire duration to less than that where water deluge and foam is
used.
Any area deluge or local cooling system should be fully operational as soon as possible after the
receipt of an initiating signal. The recommendation for the maximum value of this time delay, given
in NFPA, should be adhered to. This is because waterspray heads constructed of brass or
gunmetal will, when exposed to flame impingement, suffer major damage if water flow has not
been established. This level of damage is likely to occur within 60 seconds and seriously degrade
the effectiveness of the waterspray system. This could be avoided by the use of waterspray heads
constructed of a high melting point material, such as super-duplex stainless steel. However this
option would be accompanied by a severe cost penalty.
Where high voltage electrical equipment, or equipment susceptible to damage by exposure to

water are present then conventional water deluge or foam systems will not be appropriate fire
fighting systems. Historically, such equipment has been protected against fire by the installation of
Halon flooding systems. Since the adoption of Montreal protocol, this option is no longer available.
A number of drop-in Halon replacement systems have come on to the market but these are not yet
in general use and thus little data are available on their effectiveness in ‘real’ fire situations.
Water mist systems do appear to be very effective against electrical fires in enclosed areas.
However, there is no general agreement as to whether or not unacceptable levels of damage to
such equipment would ensue. More evidence is required to determine whether this objection to the
use of water mist systems is or is not valid.
4.4.2 Fire-proofing systems
Two types of fireproofing materials are in general use on offshore installations. These are:
• Inert materials
• Intumescent materials.
The inert materials provide excellent protection against fire exposure and a resistant to the erosive
effects of jet flame impact. They do suffer from the disadvantage of increased load on the
structure. It is for this reason that the intumescent materials are generally preferred. The
inumescent materials can also provide excellent fire protection. However, there is a concern that
the erosive effect of jet flame impact could dislodge the ‘char’ formed and thus reduce the
effectiveness of the fireproofing. Where these materials are to be used, the material manufacturer
should provide jet fire test data to demonstrate that this is not a problem.
The design standard performance specifications for fireproofing materials are generally based on
diffusion flame engulfment rather than jet flame impact. Thus the need for the test data referred to
above is reinforced.
In this context it is of course necessary to know whether diffusion flames or jet flames will be
encountered. The research report (ref CJG 9) does provide some evidence on the likely rainout of
liquid from an ignited two-phase release. If the rainout is significant then a pool fire will result. If
not, then a spray fire (equivalent to a jet fire) will result. It is suggested that for ignited two-phase
releases;
• If the GOR is low, then at drive pressures above 10 bar absolute a spray fire will result.
• If the GOR is high, than at drive pressures above 5 bar absolute a spray fire will result.
The effectiveness of both types of fireproofing materials can degrade over time. This can be due to
mechanical damage of the coating, especially the sealing topcoat. This in turn can lead to water
ingress and deterioration of the fireproofing material, together with possible unrevealed corrosion
of the substrate. This can be avoided by regular inspection of the fireproofing coatings and repair
as necessary. Ideally, the fire-proof coating of any item should be capable of withstanding an
explosion blast loading, up to the failure loading of the equipment item or structural element
concerned, without suffering any significant degradation of the fire-proof rating. This would retain
the protection provided by the fire-proofing against any fire subsequent to the explosion. There are
very little data available on the blast resistance of commercially available fire-proofing materials.
The design of fire-proofing systems is universally carried out on the basis of the fire loading only.
4.4.3 The temporary refuge
Ideally, the temporary refuge should provide for the protection of personnel against the effects of
both fires and explosions. Whilst it is feasible that the temporary refuge could provide such
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protection against the thermal and smoke effects of fires and against the thermal effects of
explosions, there must exist a practical limitation on the protection that could be provided against
the blast effects of explosions. Thus the objective should be to reduce the explosion blast effects
on the temporary refuge to as low as is reasonably practicable. This is probably best achieved by
maximising the separation distance between the temporary refuge the likely locations of explosions
as much as it is reasonably practicable to do.
4.5 Combined fire and explosion analysis

4.5.1 Introduction
Parts 1 and 2 of the Guidance have considered the subjects of explosion and fire in isolation. In
practice, not only is it impossible to fully isolate the two phenomena, but also to do so risks missing
potential high-risk events. This applies particularly where a fire analysis ignores potential damage
caused by a preceding explosion or where an explosion occurs during a fire.
The nature of the interaction between explosion and fire will depend upon whether an explosion
precedes a fire (the usual base case) or whether it occurs during a fire. The effects of interaction
are discussed in the following sections.
For the purposes of this section, explosion shall be assumed to include the effects of projectiles.
4.5.2 Fire response of explosion damaged structures
4.5.2.1 General
There are four categories of explosion damage to structures, three of which may affect subsequent
fire endurance.
1. A structure, which has responded to explosion while remaining in the elastic deflection
range everywhere and without connection failures. A Category 1 structure can be
considered to have been unaffected by explosion when considering its response to fire.
This is the case for structures subject to explosion within the SLB range.
2. A structure, which has responded to an explosion with plastic deformation but without
connection failures. A Category 2 structure will be unaffected in its response to fire
except in respect of:
• Possible damage to PFP (e.g. due to substrate strains)
• Loss of straightness of members subject to buckling loads
• Deformation of supported equipment and pipes.
• Loss of pipe/equipment support.
3. A structure that has responded to explosion loading with or without connection failures
(local or global). Category 3 structures will be weakened and behave differently in fire
scenarios, compared to undamaged structures, with much reduced fire endurance.
4. A structure, severely damaged by explosion with loss of entire segments of the

structure.
Category 2, 3 and 4 damage relate to structures designed to resist explosion in DLB range.
4.5.2.2 Analytical treatment of explosion damaged structure
For category 1 damage in an explosion (SLB) there is no weakening of structure for fire endurance
hence fire and explosion can be considered independently by different techniques, if required.

In practice it is very difficult to perform fire response analysis of explosion-damaged structure,
where the explosion damage may have reduced the reserve structural capacity for dead loads.
The two practical difficulties are:

• Calculating the reserve structural capacity for distorted and/or weakened structures
• Covering a suitable range of explosion damage scenarios
It is therefore recommended to design the main parts of the structure to survive design (10-4
return) events with category 1 or modest category 2 damage. In practice this will involve optimising
the overall layout of the topsides facilities to minimise explosion pressures.
For category 2, 3 or 4 damage it would be necessary to apply a structure model that has been fully
modified to take account of the explosion damage that has occurred prior to fire.
This is a particularly advanced type of analysis but could be practical where the non-linear software
can determine both fire and explosion response. It is probably necessary to account both for
geometry changes and the straining that has occurred in strained members, and this will affect the
material model for those members. For this reason it may not be suitable to use different software
for the fire and explosion response and merely use the output geometry from the non-linear
explosion software as input to the fire-response software.
4.5.3 Explosion response of structures at elevated temperatures
4.5.3.1 General
As temperature increases, the yield stress and Young’s modulus of metals decrease. This can
result in comparatively small temperature rises resulting in a considerable increase in explosion
related deflection. This applies particularly where a component is designed to resist explosion
through plastic deformation.
Explosions during fire can sometimes result from:

• Equipment or vessel BLEVEs due to heating in fire,
• Delayed effect of explosions in one area on an adjacent area, already in flames. This is part
of a complex domino situation where a first area is in flames and the explosion in that first
area has caused leaks in a second (adjacent) area, and it takes some time before the leaks
in the second area ignite and cause the second explosion, causing explosion
overpressures in the first area.
Other damage can occur due to projectiles caused by vessel BLEVEs and to a lesser extent from
pipe failures. Another source of damage may be equipment and structure falling from areas above
that has become weakened by fires. The higher the module stack, the more the dropped object
energy there will be. Where appropriate, this aspect needs to be linked to dropped-object hazard
evaluation. On FPSOs and converted jack-up type substructures the damage consequence due to
impact with the deck might be large and the protection requirements difficult to meet without heavy
protection such as thick steel plates or Bi-steel.
4.5.3.2 Analytical treatment of fire-damaged structure
Rigorous numerical analysis for explosion effects on fire-damaged structure is currently not
practical in most cases, though the advanced non-linear techniques mentioned in 4.5.2.1 might be
applicable here.
Coping with the explosion after fire scenarios is principally achieved with a suitable barrier
philosophy and distancing (sensitive equipment and structure from hazard). For vessel BLEVEs
distancing will not usually be sufficient due to long projectile trajectories. Barriers, which may be

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walls or other equipment installed between the BLEVE incident and vulnerable targets, can reduce
projectile trajectories and thereby render distancing philosophy effective.
From the practical standpoint, where an explosion during a fire is a significant risk, the temperature
of structural steelwork may need to be kept significantly lower than for fire-only loaded steelwork.
This is to improve resistance to resist the secondary explosions. This can be accommodated by
more extensive application of PFP and this factor should be borne in mind when contemplating
reducing the extent of PFP coverage to meet only specific fire scenarios.
An additional consideration is that where there is a significant risk of an explosion during a fire it is
necessary to ensure adequate strength and bonding or fixing of passive fire protection materials at
high temperatures.
4.5.4 Safety conflicts
The main safety conflict in fire and explosion resistant design is between the desire on the one
hand to ventilate and on the other to protect. Opening up the facilities is primarily designed to
prevent or reduce the probability of the formation of large clouds of explosive gas mixtures and to
ensure effective venting to reduce the explosion pressures that occur in the event of ignition.
Enclosing facilities (use of walls and solid decks) confines explosion increasing their severity but
reduces the spread of fire and projectile effects to nearby areas. Enclosing is however often
necessary to protect people and equipment from the weather, an especially important factor in
colder climates.
In practice topsides design is a process of optimising and balance between these conflicting
requirements.
It is necessary to try and protect fire-fighting equipment, such as deluge pumps and piping from the
effect of explosions. In a design which includes dividing the topsides facilities into separate fire /
explosion areas (eg by walls and solid decks) it is often possible to route critical equipment serving
one fire explosion area in a different fire / explosion area. Where explosion is a risk, and this might
be the consequence of secondary explosion, it is necessary to design fire-fighting equipment for
explosion effects. For this reason it is recommended to design piping and equipment for fire
fighting for an appropriate explosion resistance even outside the areas the facilities are designated
to serve.
Comment: in the old IGN’s the safety conflicts issue was broader than “fire and explosion
interaction” (it was part of a section called “Integrated design strategy for explosion and fire”). It
seems that the recommendations in the IGN’s (which are quite good) would be located elsewhere
in the new UKOOA document. If this is not the case, i can expand this section. My problem is that I
cannot think of conflicts that are unique to fire and explosion interaction, other than the ones I have
mentioned here. – I like this idea!
4.5.5 Fire and explosion walls
There are two main types of fire and explosion resistant walls: Proprietary corrugated walls (in
carbon or stainless steel) and bulkhead walls.
Corrugated walls are the most popular, mostly because they are lighter, less expensive and can be
manufactured complete, off-site and installed after grit-blasting and painting of topsides structure
and installation of main equipment. They fit more easily into the construction programme.
Another issue for manned areas can be toxicity of smoke from intumescent PFP. This type of PFP
is rarely used on corrugated walls but is common on bulkhead structures.
Corrugated walls are designed not to participate in the loads bearing capacities of the structures
they are integrated into and only have to have residual strength in fire to support their own weight.
Bulkhead walls on the other hand do participate in the dead load carrying capacity of the structures
into which they are constructed and therefore require to be insulated to prevent strength loss in
fire. Most fire / Blast walls do not otherwise require to be insulated, and insulation of them is only
normally required where they are used as boundaries to enclosed occupied rooms.
Resistance to penetration by projectiles will be affected by temperature rise and this will depend
upon whether PFP is used or not. It also depends on whether or not the insulation is on the fire
attack side or the cold side of the wall.
In some cases relatively thin coatings of PFP have been applied to (carbon steel) corrugated walls
and this has the advantage of ensuring limited temperature rise during the important early blow-
down phase of platform equipment when BLEVE and projectile risk is highest (a compromise
solution).
Stainless steel corrugated walls have more residual strength at elevated temperatures and are
therefore more resistant to projectiles. On the other hand they tend to be thinner than equivalent
carbon steel walls and this diminishes the strength advantage in regard to projectile penetration,
but they are very ductile.
Support interface design is important as this must allow for thermal expansion of the wall in fire and
out-of-plane bending, due to preceding explosion or differential temperature through the depth of
the wall or both. The out of plane deflection due to fire is lower with corrugated walls because the
geometry of the wall profile ensures that the inner flange and outer flange are heated equally,
whereas large differential temperatures occur in bulkhead walls and stressed skin construction
(with the plate on the fire side) because the cold side flange of the stiffeners is not heated directly:
the temperature gradient is greatest with uninsulated walls.
Provided the supports are configured to deform without strength-loss the residual strength of the
wall will not be affected by the distortion but care needs to be taken with the PFP in these areas,
particularly where such PFP is within the coat-back distance for the structure that supports the
wall. If in doubt, shaped stainless steel flashings can be used in such locations with fibrous
insulation behind.
4.5.6 Decks
Decks normally comprise a series of girders and a stiffened deck plate. Usually the PFP will be
applied to limit the temperature rise of main girders and those secondary beams that support the
higher categories of Safety Critical Equipment. Coat-back requirements are often relaxed to 50mm
or so hence the overall percentage of cover to deck steel work will be relatively small.
Of course it is not normal to coat the top surface of decks. In pool fires decks would not be
expected to be heated if the fire is from above but this may not be the case with jet fire. The top
flanges of girders can be weakened in such circumstances, particularly as the insulation to the
girder below the deck plate will inhibit heat loss and allow higher top flange temperatures to occur.
These are potential considerations.
As a general rule it is preferable to specify the secondary deck beams and plating to have a higher
strength than the primary structure so that it’s loss in explosion and / or fire does not lead to the
primary structures being dragged down or losing their secondary stabilising support members, for
example for lateral torsion buckling. The welding of secondary steel and girder connections needs
particular attention and it is recommended to make welded connections capable of transmitting the
forces imposed during gross deformation of the secondary members they connect without fracture
(as in earthquake-resistant design).
Potential deficiencies in fire resistance of decks which support SCE’s or which act as fire-
boundaries can sometimes be overcome by the addition of deck to deck hangers. Where the
critical fire is below the deck these hangers would not be weakened as they would be located in a
different fire area. This is a solution that can be applied for retrofit situations.

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4.5.7 Feedback from explosion testing (Spadeadam and Sintef) and real incidents
There has been no significant large-scale testing of explosion and fire interaction in the large scale
Spadeadam and Sintef tests, largely because Spadeadam was not set up to do large scale fire test
and Sintef set up to do explosion tests.
Work on tests of PFP materials and the substrates to which they are attached have proven some
PFP materials to be suitable for situations with explosions and high substrate strains but it is not
known to which extent the dynamic effects (imposed accelerations) typical of full scale explosions
is adequately represented in the test rigs used: this may affect the validity of adhesion tests.
If further large or medium scale testing is done it would be useful to included some panels coated
with intumescent PFP.
Further feedback from real incidents required
4.6 A comment on risk analysis

To achieve the objective of reducing risks to as low as reasonably practicable it is necessary to
identify those hazards that need to be protected against (as opposed to those hazards which do
not). This implies that some form of risk analysis, whether quantified or not, must take place to
achieve this.
The factors influencing both the frequency and consequences of an explosion or a fire, on an
offshore installation, are numerous. Also there can be a multiplicity of interactions between these
factors. Hence it is unlikely that any analytical assessment of these risks would produce a
defensible assessment of such risks.
To do so would require the assignment of a unique set of values to parameters that, by their
nature, are continuous distributions. Examples of these include leakage hole size distributions,
ventilation rate distributions and ignition delay time distributions. The use of unique values for such
as these would introduce an unmanageable level of uncertainty into the measures of risk levels
produced.
The use of simulation techniques may provide a way of reducing this uncertainty. Such techniques
could allow for the assessment of millions of scenarios thus allowing such parameters to be treated
directly as continuous distributions in the analysis.
It is probable that the performance of such analyses, for existing installations, would be of little
benefit as the options for design changes would be limited.
The use of risk analysis is of much greater benefit when carried out during the design stage of an
installation, when the options for design changes are less limited. One objection which has been
raised to this approach is that insufficient detailed information on the installation is available to
enable meaningful risk analyses to be carried out. However the use of simulation techniques may
go some way towards meeting this objection.

5. Derivation of fire loadings
5.1 Introduction
In Sub-section 3.2.4 six generic fire types were identified representing the types of fire that might
occur on or near an offshore installation. In this section, these fire types are considered further in
terms of their characteristic flame and how their behaviour might be affected by confinement and/or
deluge (Sub-section 5.2).
Based on large scale experimental work (including unpublished studies by Advantica to which
access had been granted) and on the predictions of validated models developed and used by Shell
and Advantica [references for the models], typical fire loading data are summarised in Sub-
section 5.4 for the six fire types. These typical values can be used to assess the potential hazard
to personnel and the likely affect to fire impacted obstacles using a simple calculation method as
outlined in Sub-section 5.4.
The effect of deluge on fire behaviour, the potential heat loads from fires and the effect on the
temperature rise of an engulfed object are also considered in Sub-sections 5.4 and 5.4. PFP may
limit the rate of temperature rise of an engulfed object and blow-down may reduce the heat load
and hence the likelihood of failure. These aspects are also considered in Sub-section 5.4.
Using these typical fire loadings and calculations of heat transfer to objects, an initial scoping or
indicative QRA of the fire hazards can be undertaken as outlined in Sub-section 4.6.
Firstly however, the parameters used to define the fire and the hazards presented by the fire in
terms of thermal and smoke loading are defined in Sub-section 5.3.
5.2 Fire characteristics and combustion effects
Missing: 1. Add flash fires
2. Add impacts from other fuels, e.g. methanol, kerosene, diesel, MEG but not sure
about LNG?
3. Discuss issues around flammability/auto-ignition/domestic fires (e.g. cellulosic) in

context of accommodation and control units
5.2.1 General
In Sub-section 3.2.4, potential fires on an offshore installations were categorised into six fire types.
In this section, each of these fire types is described in detail in terms of the likely nature of the
flame and the thermal loading it may present to the surroundings. Where appropriate, the effect of
active water deluge on the fire is discussed as is the effect of confinement.
5.2.2 Gas jet fire
5.2.2.1 Nature of the gas jet fire
An ignited pressurised release of a gaseous material (most typically natural gas) will give rise to a
jet fire. A jet fire is a turbulent diffusion flame produced by the combustion of a continuous release
of fuel. Except in the case of extreme confinement which might give rise to extinguishment, the
combustion rate will be directly related to the mass release rate of the fuel.
In the offshore context, the high pressures mean that the flow of an accidental release into the
atmosphere will be choked having a velocity on release equal to the local speed of sound in the
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fluid. Following an expansion region downstream of the exit the flame itself commences in a region
of sub-sonic velocities as a blue relatively non-luminous flame. Further air entrainment and
expansion of the jet then occurs producing the main body of the jet fire as turbulent and yellow. In
the absence of impact onto an object, these fires are characteristically long and thin and highly
directional. The high velocities within the released gas mean that they are relatively unaffected by
the prevailing wind conditions except towards the tail of the fire. The fire size is predominantly
related to the mass release rate which in turn is related to the size of the leak (hole diameter) and
the pressure (which may vary with time as a result of blowdown).
In the case of high pressure releases of natural gas, the mixing and combustion is relatively
efficient resulting in little soot (carbon) formation except for extremely large release rates. Hence
little or no smoke is produced by natural gas jet fires (typically <0.01 g m-3), and the fires tend to
be less luminous than jet fires involving higher hydrocarbons. CO concentrations in the region of 5
to 7 % v/v have been measured within a jet fire itself but this is expected to drop to less than 0.1 %
v/v by the end of the flame.
A factor which is often overlooked is the noise produced by sonic gaseous releases. This is usually
high pitched and so loud that it may prevent effective radio communication between personnel. As
a result emergency actions could be hampered.
A further point to note is that some combinations of leak size and pressure will not give rise to an
inherently stable flame. For hole sizes under 30 mm diameter, there is a lower bound pressure
which high pressure releases must exceed to produce stable flames. Simplistically, this extends
approximately linearly from a gauge pressure of 2 bar at 30 mm diameter to about 75 bar at 8 mm
diameter. In practice this means that most small leaks (see Sub-section 5.4.1) will be inherently
unstable and will not support a flame without some form of flame stabilisation, such as the
presence of another fire in the vicinity to provide a permanent pilot or stabilisation as a result of
impact onto an object such as pipework, vessels or the surrounding structure. In the highly
congested environment offshore, impact within a short distance is very likely, and hence small
leaks are most likely to stabilise on the nearest point of impact.
Apart from providing flame stabilisation, impact onto an obstacle may also significantly modify the
shape of a jet fire. Objects which are smaller than the flame half-width at the point of impact are
unlikely to modify the shape or length of the flame significantly. However, impact onto a large
vessel may significantly shorten the jet fire, and impact onto a wall or roof could transform the jet
into a radial wall jet where the location and direction of the fire is determined by the surface onto
which it impacts.
As noted above, the combustion process within a natural gas jet fire is relatively efficient and
produces little soot (carbon). Consequently these flames are not as luminous as higher
hydrocarbon flames. Radiation emissions from natural gas flames arise mostly from water vapour
and carbon dioxide, except for very large releases where soot production starts to enhance the
process. The long thin shape may also result in a flame path which is not optically thick. The net
result is that the radiative heat transfer to the surroundings is lower than for higher hydrocarbon
flames and this is reflected in the fraction of heat radiated, F, for such fires (see Sub-section 5.4.2).
Similarly, the radiative heat transfer to objects engulfed by the flame is generally lower than for
higher hydrocarbon flames, but the high velocities within gas jet fires can result in high convective
heat transfer to objects. Clearly the total heat flux which is imparted to an engulfed object will vary
over the surface of the object. In addition, the relative proportions of convective and radiative heat
flux will vary over the surface, with the highest convective component likely to be experienced
close to the point of impact of a flame where the highest velocities occur, whereas the highest
radiative heat load will be experienced where the more radiative part of the flame (usually nearer
the end of the flame) is viewed by the object. As the more radiative part of the flame is closer to
the tail, this can result in the highest overall heat fluxes being experienced on the rear surface of
an engulfed object which may seem counter-intuitive. Neglecting such spatial variations, broadly
speaking, for a given location of an object within a flame (as a proportion of flame length), the
convective component is more or less constant with increasing size of release, whereas the
radiative component increases with release rate as the flame becomes optically thick and more
smoky. Hence the relative proportion of convective to radiative flux varies with fire size. (see Sub-
section 5.4.2).
5.2.2.2 Effect of deluge on gas jet fires
The activation of general area deluge can adversely affect the stability of high pressure gas jet
fires, particularly if the fire is not impacting onto an obstacle. However, in most practical cases, this
undesirable effect is very unlikely to occur due to impact onto obstacles providing adequate flame
stabilisation. Indeed, deluge has little effect on the size, shape and thermal characteristics of a high
pressure gas jet fire. Therefore, the heat loading to engulfed obstacles is not diminished. The same
is true for dedicated vessel deluge systems; the water being unable to form a film over the vessel
in the presence of the high velocity jet, and so dry patches form where the temperature rise is
undiminished by the action of deluge.
There is some evidence that the deluge increases combustion efficiency resulting in lower CO and
increased CO2 levels within the flame.
The major benefit of area deluge with jet fires arises from the suppression of incident thermal
radiation to the surroundings, which protect adjacent plant and in particular, aid escape by
personnel. For an MV57 type nozzle operating at 12 litres m-2min-1, incident radiation levels can
be reduced by about 20 % for a single row of nozzles, 50 % for a 2 rows and 50-60 % for more
than 2 rows (general area deluge). Increased deluge rates can further reduce incident radiation
levels: 60-70 % at 18 litres m-2min-1; 80-90% at 24 litres m-2min-1 for general area deluge.
Nozzles producing smaller droplet sizes can have an enhanced mitigation effect, but there is an
increased risk that the droplets will be blown away by the wind.
5.2.2.3 Effect of confinement on gas jet fires
The behaviour of a jet fire within a confined or partially confined area will depend upon the degree
of confinement and the direction of the jet relative to the ventilation opening. If ventilation is
plentiful or the jet is directed through a vent then there may be little difference in jet fire
characteristics compared to an unconfined fire. However, if the release rate of gas is large relative
to the size of the confinement or the ventilation openings are small then the fire may not be able to
entrain enough air for complete combustion inside the compartment. This is likely to result in
increased levels of incomplete combustion products such as CO, increased levels of smoke (soot)
and increased flame temperatures, particularly in regions close to the ceiling of a compartment
where hot combustion products may be trapped and recirculate. This leads to increased heat
fluxes to objects and surfaces compared to an unconfined fire.
The location where combustion occurs and the hottest parts of the flame may also shift due to the
confinement. In tests involving horizontal jet fires in a compartment incorporating a single wall vent,
where the jet was directed away from the vent, increased temperatures were seen at the interface
between the smoke layer leaving the compartment and the air layer entering the compartment,
most particularly in the area furthest from the vent.
Unlike unconfined fires, the behaviour of under-ventilated confined fires changes with time as the
air initially available within the compartment is consumed, and this may lead to ‘external flaming’
after a period of time when the body of flame moves through the vent in order to find the oxygen
required for combustion. CO levels of up to 5 % v/v at the vent may occur but after the onset of
external combustion the CO levels drop to typically less than 0.5 % v/v by the end of the flame.
Soot production is related to the equivalence ratio and hence the degree of ventilation and may
range from about 0.1 g m-3 at = 1.3 to up to 2.5 g m-3 at = 2.
Certain ventilation patterns could lead to flame instability and extinguishment. The worst case
condition is likely to occur if the jet fire is slightly under-ventilated as this leads to high heat release
rates and enhanced soot production.

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5.2.2.4 Confinement and deluge of gas jet fires
Deluge of a confined jet fire may lead to flame extinguishment and hence a serious explosion
hazard from the continuing release. The likelihood of flame extinguishment is significantly
increased if the surroundings are already hot at the time the deluge is activated as the main
mechanism which results in extinguishment of the jet fire is ‘inerting’, that is evaporation of the
water droplets leading to a mixture of gas/air/steam within the compartment which is outside the
flammable limits. The water vapour may also contribute to flame instability by reducing the burning
velocity. However, if the deluge is activated at an early stage, prior to the compartment walls
becoming hot, then the fire may not be extinguished and some benefit in terms of reduced flame
temperatures and wall temperatures may accrue.
5.2.3 Two-phase jet fire
5.2.3.1 Nature of the two-phase jet fire
An ignited release of a pressurised liquid/gas mixture (such as ‘live crude’ or gas dissolved in a
liquid) will give rise to a two-phase jet fire. The gas stream atomises the liquid into droplets which
are then evaporated by radiation from the flame. However, a pressurised release of a liquid can
also give rise to a jet fire in which two-phase behaviour is observed if the liquid is able to vaporise
quickly. This is most likely to occur when a liquid is released from containment at a temperature
above its boiling point at ambient conditions whereupon flash evaporation occurs, (for example
propane, butane).
Pressurised releases of non-volatile liquids (for example, kerosene, diesel, or stabilised crude) are
unlikely to be able to sustain a two-phase jet fire, unless permanently piloted by an adjacent fire;
even so, some liquid drop-out is likely and hence the formation of a pool. At high pressures, a
spray of liquid droplets may be formed which can drift in ambient winds and become dispersed
over a wide area.
As for the gas jet fire described above, the two-phase jet fire is a turbulent diffusion flame produced
by the continuous combustion of a fuel at a rate directly related to the mass release rate, producing
a fire which is long and thin (although generally wider than a gas only jet fire) and highly
directional. The exception is when liquid drop-out occurs, leading to a potentially increasing
accumulation of fuel as a pool. Two-phase jet fires (particularly those generated by flashing liquid
releases) are significantly less noisy than gas jet fires. As for gas jet fires, impact onto an obstacle
larger than the flame half- width at the point of impact may shorten or modify the shape of a fire
significantly.
The liquid content results in relatively higher release rates for a given aperture and pressure
compared to gaseous releases and, when the release is two-phase (such as may arise from a
relatively long pipe connected to a liquid storage vessel), estimating the release rate is non-trivial.
The generally lower exit velocities from flashing liquid releases lead to shorter flame lift-offs and
proportionately shorter and more buoyant flames overall. These lower velocities also make the
fires more wind affected whilst the higher hydrocarbon content of these fuels increases the flame
luminosity. However, two-phase releases involving gas dissolved in, or mixed with, a liquid can
result in a jet fire which combines the worst aspects of both the gas jet fire and the flashing liquid
jet fire, that is, high velocities and high flame luminosity.
The higher hydrocarbon content also results in more soot being formed than in a natural gas jet
fire, although there is no available experimental data quantifying the difference. Measurements in
the smoke downstream of a ‘live crude’ jet fire determined an optical obscuration factor of typically
10 % over a 200 mm path length. This corresponds to a visibility distance of about 20 m.
The soot produced then contributes significantly to the radiant emissions from the flame, resulting
in a proportionately higher contribution of radiative flux to engulfed objects. However, the generally
lower velocities arising from flashing liquid releases (such as propane or butane) results in a lower
convective flux to engulfed objects. Impaction to an obstacle close to the leak can also result in a
local cold spot and hence high temperature gradients to the surrounding hot areas, inducing
thermal stress.
In the case of a pressurised gas-liquid mixture (such as ‘live’ crude), the high velocities may still
occur and result in a high convective contribution, whilst the higher hydrocarbon content maintains
a high radiative contribution; making these type of jet fires a ‘worst case’ in terms of total heat flux
to engulfed obstacles. Experimental work suggests that the maximum combined fluxes occur for
gas-liquid mixtures which are about 70 % by mass liquid.
A special case of interest at some installations is ‘live’ crude which includes a significant quantity of
water. Experiments have shown that mixtures with a ‘water cut’ (defined as ) of up to 125 % remain
flammable, although not necessarily capable of supporting a stable flame in the absence of some
other supporting mechanism. The inclusion of water also slightly increases flame length and flame
buoyancy, and the amount of smoke produced reduces significantly. For water cuts under 50 % no
significant reduction in heat fluxes to engulfed objects can be expected (<10 %). However, over 50
% the flames are significantly less radiative, and the overall heat flux to an obstacle can be
reduced by 40 % or more.
5.2.3.2 Effect of deluge on two-phase jet fires
Compared to the situation with a gas jet fire, the use of dedicated vessel deluge to protect a vessel
against a flashing liquid two-phase jet fire (eg propane, butane) can be more effective. The water
interacts with the flame to some extent; reducing the flame luminosity and the amount of smoke
produced. Nevertheless, at typical application rates (10 to 15 litres m-2min-1) it cannot be relied
upon to maintain a water film over the vessel and hence to prevent vessel temperature rise in
areas where dry patches form, although the rate of rise may be expected to reduce to 20-70 % of
the rate without deluge for a propane jet fire. Similar behaviour has been noted for ‘live’ crude jet
fires with dedicated deluge although, in this case, no reduction in the rate of temperature rise was
observed in the area where the fire impacted the obstacle. In tests with an increased water
application of 30 litres m-2min-1, a 2 tonne LPG tank was effectively protected when subjected to a
2 kg s-1 flashing propane jet fire.
For ‘live crude’ jet fires, using area deluge at the ‘standard’ rate of 12 litres m-2 min-1 is unlikely to
modify the flame behaviour although there is some evidence that a higher deluge rate (24 litres m
2 min-1) can result in water interaction with the flame, resulting in a shorter flame and some
reduction in heat fluxes to certain areas of an engulfed object, notably the front (where flame
impact occurs) and top areas. Since dedicated vessel deluge is more effective at reducing the
radiative heat fluxes in the region to the rear of the vessel, the combination of area deluge and
dedicated vessel deluge can be effective in reducing overall heat fluxes to a vessel such that the
temperature rise is halted or at least the rate of temperature rise is reduced. This may prevent
vessel failure, especially if combined with a blowdown strategy.
As for gas jet fires, a major benefit of area deluge of two-phase jet fires arises from the attenuation
of incident thermal radiation to the surroundings, which protect adjacent plant and in particular, aid
escape by personnel (see Sub-section 5.2.1.2). Even dedicated vessel deluge alone can result in
some reduction (~15-20 %) in the incident thermal radiation to the surroundings as a result of
modifying the flame characteristics.
Measurements in the combustion products downstream of ‘live crude’ jet fires determined an
obscuration factor due to smoke of typically 10 % over a 200 mm path length without deluge (see
Sub-section 5.2.2.1) and no significant change was noted in the presence of area deluge at 12
litres m 2 min-1. At 24 litres m 2 min-1 the smoke changed from black to grey due to the increased
water vapour and this had the effect of increasing the obscuration factor to about 20 %,
corresponding to a visibility distance of about 10 m.

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5.2.3.3 Effect of confinement on two-phase jet fires
Confined two-phase jet fires are expected to behave in a similar manner to confined gas jet fires
(see Sub-section 5.2.1.3).
5.2.3.4 Confinement and deluge of two-phase jet fires
The effect of area deluge on two-phase jet fires in compartments is expected to be similar to that
noted in Sub-section 5.2.1.4 for gas jet fires. Extinguishment could give rise to a mist-air explosion
hazard and/or the formation of a liquid pool. In tests involving only partial confinement around the
upper area of a module, during which ‘dead spaces’ occurred close to ceiling, area deluge was
found to be beneficial in reducing heat fluxes to the ceiling surface, reducing the flame extent and
the amount of smoke produced.
5.2.4 Pool fires on an installation
5.2.4.1 Nature of hydrocarbon pool fires
A pressurised release of a hydrocarbon liquid which is not sufficiently atomised or volatile to

vaporise and form a jet fire will form a pool. Similarly a spillage from non-pressurised liquid storage
will result in a liquid pool being formed. Ignition of the vapours evolving from the liquid can lead to a
pool fire which is a turbulent diffusion flame. For hydrocarbons such as condensate the vapours
will evolve readily from a spillage and be easily ignited. For heavier hydrocarbons, such as diesel
or crude oil, little vapour evolution occurs unless the fuel is heated and hence initial ignition of a
spillage may be dependent on the presence of other fires in the vicinity providing sufficient energy
to initiate vapour evolution. However, once ignited, the fire itself radiates heat to the pool surface
causing more fuel to evaporate. The heat transfer from the flame to the pool controls the vapour
evolution rate (and hence mass burning rate) and within minutes the fire will reach a steady state
condition of flame size and mass burning rate. Larger fires from larger pools will tend to result in
higher mass burning rates. However, an upper limit is reached when the radiation to the pool
surface is independent of the flame thickness above it (optically thick). This occurs for fires only a
few metres in diameter for heavy hydrocarbons due to the radiative emissions from soot. The mass
burning rate is also dependent on the fuel type and for liquid hydrocarbons decreases with
increasing carbon number (typically ranging from 0.1 kg m-2 s-1 for light hydrocarbons to 0.05 kg
m-2 s-1 for some crude oils).
Combustion of these relative high hydrocarbons inevitably leads to the production of large
quantities of soot, particularly in large pool fires where the size of the pool reduces the ability of air
to mix with the fuel evolving in the centre of the pool. The soot emissions result in the characteristic
yellow flame and large quantities of smoke can be produced; to the extent that the smoke can
result in reduced thermal radiation to the surroundings by screening of the radiant flame. (Hence,
the fraction of heat radiated, F, tends to decrease with increasing fire size, although the smoke
hazard may increase). In measurements in the smoke downstream of 16 m2 diesel pool fires, the
obscuration factor over a 200 mm path length, as a result of the soot, was found to be typically 30
% corresponding to a visibility distance of about 7 m. CO levels measured at the same location
were in the range 100-200 ppm v/v. However, a worst case level at the end of the flame of about
0.5 % v/v are recommended. Soot levels in the range 0.5 g m-3 to 2.5 g m-3 can be expected.
Except in very large fires where buoyancy driven turbulence may become significant, the low
velocities within the fire result in the flame being affected by the wind and this factor determines the
trajectory of the flame. These low velocities also result in low convective heat fluxes to objects
engulfed by the fire; the predominate mode of heat transfer being radiation.
5.2.4.2 Effect of deluge with hydrocarbon pool fires
General area deluge can be very effective in controlling hydrocarbon pool fires and mitigating their
consequences. If the water is capable of reaching the liquid pool, the cooling of the fuel reduces
vapour evolution and hence reduces the size of the flame. This, in turn, leads to reduced radiative
heat transfer from the flame to the fuel surface which also contributes to reducing the vapour
evolution. Consequently, with time, the fire size is reduced and complete extinguishment may
result or, if not, sufficient control achieved that manual fire fighting could be safely undertaken. The
ability of the water to enter the pool of fuel is higher on the upwind side of the fire where the
thickness of the flame is least. Consequently, as the deluge starts to take effect on the fire, the
flame retreats from the upwind side of the spillage. In tests involving condensate, the fire coverage
of the pool was reduced by over 90 % in 10 minutes. Hence, after 10 minutes, the flame size was
commensurate with a pool of less than 10 % of the original area. The introduction of a small
percentage (1 %) aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) into the deluge system can significantly
increase the rapidity of achieving fire control and extinguishment.
Due to the much reduced fire size when a pool fire is subject to water deluge, the amount of smoke
is also significantly reduced. Measurements of the obscuration factor over a 200 mm path length in
the combustion products from a diesel pool fire dropped from typically 20-30 % to negligible levels
when the fire was deluged and CO levels at the same location dropped from over 100 ppm v/v to
typically 10 ppm v/v. However, if the water does not directly interact with the fire itself and only
interacts with the stream of smoke evolving then there is no evidence that the water deluge
‘washes’ soot out of the smoke, nor that the toxicity (such as CO level) is reduced. A point of note
is that the cooling effect of deluge may reduce the smoke buoyancy and possibly result in smoke
being present at lower heights where it may hinder the visibility for personnel trying to escape.
The heat loading to objects engulfed in a pool fire may also be reduced by the activation of deluge,
most particularly on the surfaces where a water film can be maintained. The vulnerable areas will
be the underside where the water cannot provide coverage, and the downwind side where the
flame is likely to be thickest. Nevertheless, in these areas the rate of temperature rise is likely to be
reduced and additional benefit accrues from the action of the deluge in reducing the fire size. The
use of dedicated vessel deluge would be expected to protect an object engulfed in a pool fire,
especially in combination with general area deluge which will, simultaneously, reduce the degree of
fire attack.
As for jet fires, the water deluge will also provide benefit to objects not engulfed by the fire by
attenuating the thermal radiation (see Sub-section 5.2.1.2)
5.2.4.3 Confined hydrocarbon pool fires
The behaviour of confined pool fires will depend on the degree of ventilation and whether the
confining structure becomes hot and re-radiates heat to the fire. In the case of adequate ventilation
for combustion, the mass burning rate and fire behaviour will be similar to a pool fire in an
unconfined area, unless the walls become hot due to insulation in which case the flame
temperatures may rise significantly (by about 200-400 ºC) and hence the heat fluxes to objects
within and near the flame will rise. This is associated with soot combustion and can lead to less
smoke being evolved.
However if the ventilation is less than that required for combustion the fire becomes ventilation
controlled and the mass burning rate (and hence the vapour evolution rate) decreases to match
available air flow. Due to the reduced burning rate, the flame size and heat fluxes to objects from
ventilation controlled confined pool fires may be lower than from unconfined fires unless re
radiation from hot compartment walls increases flame temperatures. The restricted air flow may
result in an external fire at the vent openings and so areas not previously exposed to fire outside
the compartment may now be exposed to flame engulfment and thermal radiation.
In under-ventilated conditions both the CO and soot levels increase. CO up to 5 % v/v may be
measured at a vent prior to the onset of external flaming although at the end of an external flame
the levels are likely to fall to less than 0.5 % v/v. Soot levels up to 3 g m-3 might be expected.

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5.2.4.4 Confined hydrocarbon pool fires with deluge
When deluge is activated within a confined space, the residence time of the water droplets in the
flame and hot walls leads to water evaporation within the flame and a significant reduction in flame
temperatures. This then reduces the radiation back to the pool surface and results in a lower mass
burning rate. An initially ventilation controlled pool fire may then become fuel controlled at this
lower burning rate and any external flaming that had formed is likely to be reduced or to cease
entirely.
5.2.4.5 Methanol pool fires
Methanol differs significantly from the hydrocarbon fuels discussed above. It burns with a non-
luminous invisible flame. No soot is produced and the thermal emissions are dominated by the
molecular emissions associated with the production of CO2 and water vapour. The flame height is
about one third that expected from an equivalent sized hydrocarbon pool. The mass burning rate
increases with increasing pool size and a value of 0.03 kg m-2 s-1 has been measured for a 10m
diameter pool. It is not known if the flame has reached ‘optical thickness’ at this scale and hence
whether this would increase further for larger fires. The low radiative emissions of the flame results
in a low fraction of heat radiated, F, and low heat fluxes to engulfed objects. On an offshore
platform an important hazard may be to personnel entering the flame unwittingly due to its
invisibility.
5.2.5 Hydrocarbon pool fires on the sea
Once established, a hydrocarbon pool fire on the sea will behave in a similar manner to an
unconfined pool fire on an installation (See Sub-section 5.2.3.1). Consequently, depending on the
size of the fire, engulfment of the installation legs and the underside of the platform are
possibilities. Flame temperatures of typically 900 to 1200 ºC can be expected and heat fluxes to
engulfed objects up to 250 kWm-2.
Following initial ignition, the flame spread across the surface of a spill on the sea will depend upon
the volatility of the fuel, and the wind speed and direction. For oil spills, the rate of flame spread
downwind increases with increasing wind speed. The flames tend to spread from the ignition
source downwind across the spill without significant crosswind spread and flame spread upwind is
slow. The presence of sea currents or regular waves (swell) does not appear to influence flame
spread but it may be curtailed by choppy conditions or steep waves.
The significant difference between liquid spills on an installation and liquid spills on the sea is that
on the sea it is unlikely that ignition will occur at all. Overall, the likelihood of ignition is low
(especially for less volatile hydrocarbons such as crude oil) due to a number of factors which are
discussed below. The likelihood of ignition also decreases with time following a spill, sometimes
rapidly, so spills where immediate ignition could occur (or ignition has already occurred) are likely
to be the main focus of attention.
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the likelihood of an ignition source being present near the
sea surface would generally be low. Assuming an ignition source is present, there are three main
factors that influence the ignitability of liquid spills onto the sea, all of which are time dependent.
Their significance in inhibiting ignition increase with time resulting in lower ignition probabilities.
These are: pool thickness; fuel flashpoint; and emulsification.
Following an initial spillage, the pool will spread out quickly reaching an equilibrium thickness
within a few hours, even for a large spillage. This equilibrium thickness depends upon fuel type
with typical values of less than 0.1 mm for light crude oils and 0.05-0.5 mm for heavy crude oils.
However, there is a minimum pool thickness which is capable of supporting a stable flame; about
0.5 mm for condensate; 1 mm for light crude; and 1-3 mm for heavier oils. When the thickness falls
below these levels, the cooling effect of the sea prevents evaporation of the fuel from the pool
surface which is required for combustion. This is because the temperatures at the pool/water
interface are never above 100 ºC and are generally close to ambient temperatures. When the pool
is thick, a steep temperature gradient through the pool allows evaporation at the pool surface and
potential ignition, especially if a high energy ignition source is present such as another fire which
will enhance evaporation rates.
Therefore, the fuel flashpoint is also a factor in determining the likelihood of ignition. Fuels with a
flashpoint lower than the ambient temperature will ignite readily but those with a flashpoint over
100 ºC (such as stabilised crude oil) will require the presence of a major heat source to achieve
ignition, such as a pre-existing fire on the platform. Therefore, the likelihood of ignition of a liquid
spill reduces with time as the lighter fractions evaporate.
Emulsification of a hydrocarbon fuel with sea water will reduce significantly its flammability. For
crude oils, emulsions with over 25 % water are considered to be not ignitable. The cut-off point for
condensate is unknown, but is likely to be higher. Emulsification of the fuel and water arises
primarily as a result of the initial spill conditions and the subsequent weather/sea conditions.
Breaking waves and wind speeds over 15 m s-1 will promote emulsification and result in a low
probability of ignition. (The wave action will also cause fluctuations in the pool thickness and may
result in breaking up of the pool and thereby prevent sustained burning). Spills which plunge into
the sea from the platform, (which, if burning, may be extinguished in the process) are likely to
break up and begin to emulsify. The least emulsification is likely to result if spills run down an
installation leg or occur close to the sea surface.
In the case of sub-sea oil pipeline failures in shallow water (<200 m), the oil plume widens as it
rises through the water and breaks up into small droplets. Any significant gas component in the oil
provides additional initial upward momentum and the oil droplets are likely to break the surface in a
location above the original failure and then spread radially. However, the pool may then be carried
along by tidal currents and wind. This process provides significant opportunity for emulsification
and reduces the ignitability of any resulting pool. In case of stabilised crude, the lower initial
buoyancy will result in the rising plume being more affected by tidal currents and the oil may reach
the surface at a location displaced laterally from the original leak site.
In deep water, some or all of the gas component may form gas hydrate solids and this results in a
reduced initial upward velocity for the leak, leaving the oil droplets to rise purely as a result of their
buoyancy. In these circumstances the lateral movement of the rising plume may be significant and
the oil eventually reaches the surface some distance from the original leak location. Again,
significant emulsification will have occurred resulting in very low ignition probabilities.
In summary, a low velocity, ignited, large volume spillage of a volatile liquid hydrocarbon close to
the sea surface near to the installation in calm or moderate conditions represents the worst case
scenario in terms of a pool fire on the sea. Most other scenarios have a low likelihood of producing
a pool fire.
5.2.6 Gas fires from sub sea releases
In shallow water, failure of a sub-sea gas pipeline (or a pipeline containing a gas-oil or
gas-condensate mixture with a high GOR) could give rise to a flammable gas release at the sea
surface. However, the likelihood depends primarily on the depth of sea water. In shallow water the
plume of bubbles will increase in radius approximately linearly as it rises through the water
producing a conical plume. When close to the water surface, the streamlines diverge horizontally
and tidal currents interact with the plume and this may result in the area where the gas bubbles
break the surface being twice that expected by conical plume development only. Whether the
resulting gas breaking the surface is flammable will depend on the rate of gas released and the
area over which it breaks the surface which, as already noted, is related to the water depth.
However, unless the water is very shallow (<10 m), the resulting gas release at the sea surface is
likely to be a dispersed low velocity source and burn as a weakly turbulent diffusion flame, strongly
affected by the wind. It could be considered as a ‘pool fire’ with an effective mass burning rate
given by the release rate divided by the area over which the gas surfaces. A full bore rupture of a
sub-sea pipeline will result in a highly transient outflow, so the resulting fire hazard will also vary

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with time. The operation of a sub-sea ESDV valve may limit the duration of the release and also
give rise to a rapidly changing release rate with time.
In deep water (>300 m) some formation of gas hydrates is likely and over 500 m some researchers
report complete conversion to hydrates, although this also depends on gas composition and water
temperature. In such cases, the hydrates will rise solely as a result of buoyancy and are likely to
reach the sea surface some distance laterally from the original leak site. Some researchers
suggest that water turbulence may keep the hydrates in suspension and the gas may never reach
the surface.
5.2.7 BLEVE
Fire impingement on a vessel containing a pressure liquefied gas causes the pressure to rise
within the vessel and the vessel wall to weaken. Even within a short timeframe, this may lead to
catastrophic failure and the total loss of inventory. The liquefied gas which is released flashes
producing a vapour cloud which is usually ignited. These events are known as Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapour Cloud Explosions, BLEVEs. This highly transient event generates a pressure
wave and fragments of the vessel may produce a missile hazard leading to failure of other items in
the vicinity and hence the potential for escalation. In addition, there is a flame engulfment and
thermal radiation hazard produced by the fireball.
Onshore, BLEVEs are generally associated with the storage of pressure liquefied fuels such as
LPG. Experimental work has shown that a standard LPG storage vessel, incorporating the normal
pressure relief valve, can fail catastrophically within 5 minutes of being subjected to a medium
sized (<2 kg s-1 or ~100 MW) jet fire, despite operation of the relief valve. Following failure, a large
approximately spherical fireball is produced which is highly radiative with little smoke obscuration
due to the fuel atomisation and vaporisation leading to good mixing with the air. Consequently, the
fraction of heat radiated, F, is higher than for a large pool fire involving the same fuel. The initial
upward momentum and vorticity of the fireball causes it to rise into the air as it develops and
eventually it burns out when all the fuel is consumed. How much of the initially liquid fuel vaporises
and takes part in the fireball depends upon the degree of superheat of the fuel at the time of failure
and also whether liquid becomes entrained into the flashing vapour.
In the offshore context, a BLEVE hazard might be considered, for example, in relation to a
pressurised separator vessel containing unstabilised condensate and gas. However, a BLEVE is
unlikely to develop in the same way as described above for an onshore facility as the vessel will
probably be located within a module amongst other vessels and pipework. The potential for
escalation is thus much increased due to the proximity of other vessels and pipework which may
be struck by missiles. Additionally, the presence of this other equipment may lead to increased
overpressures being developed as the burning gas cloud expands through the congested region.
The presence of roof confinement will significantly modify the shape of the developing fireball and
lead to increased lateral development. Even a small inventory of fuel being involved in a BLEVE
event (<100 kg) would be expected to produce a fireball extending throughout the entire volume a
typical module. Consequently, apart from the risk of the BLEVE causing escalation, the event
presents a severe hazard to personnel.
Whilst pre-activation of deluge (area and dedicated vessel deluge) may prevent or delay the
occurrence of a BLEVE, the deluge is unlikely to provided any significant benefit in terms of
mitigation of the event, especially within the region of potential flame engulfment.
5.2.8 External flaming
Text to be added

5.3 Fire and smoke loading
Missing: 1. Discuss factors influencing smoke generation
2. Add effects of scale/debris/detritus on fire & smoke
3. Add more detail on smoke, generation and impacts (including movement)
4. Add notes on both fire and smoke issues with respect to their contribution
to escalation
5.3.1 Fire loading to the surroundings
An obvious hazard presented by a fire is the thermal radiation to the surroundings, in particular to
personnel during escape and evacuation. The incident thermal radiation, q, to a person or object
from a fire can be described as:
q=VEt (kWm-2) (5.3.1)
where:
V is the view factor of the flame by the receiver,
E is the average surface emissive power of the flame (kWm-2) (Note the surface
emissive power varies over the surface of the flame and hence an area-based
average is required to represent the whole surface)
τ is the atmospheric transmissivity
The view factor is a function of the flame shape. Consequently, most integral or empirical
mathematical models will assume some kind of simplified flame shape which is then used to
calculate the view factor. The flame average surface emissive power is also a function of the flame
shape. Therefore, average surface emissive powers used by the model will not necessarily be the
same as those measured during an actual fire.
In the far field, (typically more than 2 flame lengths away) the flame shape is not critical, so a
simplified approach can be taken using the ‘point source’ model, whereby the difficulties of defining
a flame shape and associated average surface emissive power can be avoided. In this approach,
the fraction of the heat of combustion of the fuel radiated to the surroundings is defined as:
EA
F= (5.3.2)
Q
where:
A is the surface area of the flame (m2)
Q is the net rate of energy release by combustion of the fuel (kW) and Q = m H
m is the rate of fuel combustion (kg s-1)
H is the calorific value (kJ kg-1)
The incident radiation received in the far field at a distance, d (m), from the fire is then expressed
as:

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τ F m H
qd = (5.3.3)
4 π d2
The atmospheric transmissivity will depend upon the prevailing atmospheric conditions (absolute
humidity) and the path length, but might typically be 0.8 on a dry day. However, fog would
significantly reduce this value.
The activation of water deluge on an offshore installation, producing water droplets in the air,
effectively reduces the transmissivity by absorbing radiation. However, for the purposes of this
document, a revised ‘effective’ fraction of heat radiated is defined as F ′ , accounting for the
reduced transmissivity in the area being deluged, (but not including the transmissivity of the
atmosphere between the fire and the receiver which is outside the deluged area). The incident
radiation at a distance, d(m), from the fire can be estimated using:
τ F ′ m H
qd = (5.3.4)
4 π d2
Note that the above equation does not necessarily take account of any effect of the deluge on the
flame behaviour itself – such as lowering the flame temperature or size. As will be noted later, jet
fires are little affected by deluge, but pool fires can reduce significantly in size. In the case of pool
fires, this reduction in size (area of the surface actually burning) would result in a reduced value of
m and hence would be reflected in calculations made using the above equation.
This ‘point source’ model can be useful for estimating the distance to a given radiation level. In the
case of personnel, it is important to consider both the level of radiation and the duration of
exposure and the consequences for personnel (in terms of burn injuries or fatality) are often related
quantitatively to the dosage level, S d , given by:
S d = ∫ qd
( 4 3) dt (5.3.5)
As a guide, a radiation level of about 5 kWm-2 can be tolerated for about one minute and
consequently represents a level from which it is reasonable to assume that escape, without
significant injury, would usually be possible for an average employee wearing typical protective
clothing.
However, the point source model is not suitable for estimating incident radiation to locations close
to (certainly within one flame length) of the flame, where it may be significantly in error and over
estimate radiation levels. In the near field, a mathematical model which defines a realistic flame
shape (and ideally a variation of surface emissive power over the flame to allow for smoke
obscuration) should be used (see Sub-section 5.4.3). Typical values of F and F ′ are provided in
Sub-section 5.4.2 for a range of fire types.
5.3.2 Thermal loading to engulfed objects
The thermal load per unit area to an object engulfed by fire will be a combination of radiation from
the flame (qrl) and convection from the hot combustion products (qcl) passing over the object
surface. Hence the thermal load can be written as:
q1 = qrl + qcl
(
q1 = ε f σ T f4 + τ f σ Ta4 + h T f − Ts ) (5.3.6)
where

τ f , ε f are the flame emissivity and transmissivity respectively,
σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant (5.6697 x 10-11 kWm-2K-4)
T f , Ts and Ta are the flame, object surface and ambient temperatures respectively (K)
h is the convective heat transfer coefficient (kWm-2K-1)
However, not all the thermal loading is necessarily absorbed by the surface, some may be
reflected back and the surface will also lose heat by radiation. Hence the total absorbed load per
unit area ( qt ) is given by:
(
qt = ε f α s σ T f4 − ε s α f σ Ts4 + α s τ f σ Ta4 − ε s τ f σ Ts4 + h T f − Ts ) (5.3.7)
where α s , α f are the absorptivities of the surface and flame respectively. Assuming that both the
flame and surface can be considered as diffuse grey bodies, then α s = ε s , α f = ε f and
τ f = 1 − ε f . Furthermore, the term involving Ta is small and can be neglected, giving:
qt = qr + qc
( ) (
qt = ε s σ ε f T f4 − Ts4 + h T f − Ts ) (5.3.8)
When considering an actual object engulfed by a fire, the flame temperature exposed to different
parts of the object surface may vary; similarly the flame velocities (and hence convective heat
transfer coefficient) may vary. Hence, to determine the total load absorbed by an object,
Equation 5.3.8 should be summed over the area of the object. For further details on the derivation
of the terms in Equation 5.3.8, see 5.4.1.
Also, as the object engulfed in the flame heats up, the absorbed load will reduce. This is
particularly the case with the convective load which reduces linearly with increasing object
temperature. Therefore, for an accurate transient calculation of the temperature rise of an object,
the parameters T f , ε f and h are required, together with the emissivity of the surface (which itself
may change as the surface heats up). Where possible, typical values of these parameters are
provided in Sub-section 5.4.2.
However, researchers often quote heat fluxes measured during experiments using calorimeters
(for total heat flux) and radiometers (for radiative flux). These instruments are designed to have a
surface emissivity close to 1 and are maintained at a low temperature throughout the experiments.
Hence the fluxes measured and reported for calorimeters are given by Equation 5.3.8 with ε s = 1
and Ts ≈ 333 K and can be regarded as a conservative estimate of the total heat flux absorbed by
an engulfed object. Radiometers are designed and calibrated to measure ε f σ T f4 . At an early
stage, whilst Ts is low, the flux measured by a radiometer is approximately ( qr ε s ) and so, if ε s is
taken as 1, it provides a conservative estimate of the radiative flux absorbed by an object.
Subtracting the measured radiative flux from the measured total heat flux enables the initial
convective flux absorbed by the object to be determined. Using an estimated or measured value
for T f enables h to be determined at the measurement location. In this way, experimentally
measured flux levels can be used to derive input data for transient heat-up calculations (see also
Sub-section 5.4.2).

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Consequently, typical values of the total, radiative and convective fluxes (as defined in equation
5.3.8 above with ε s = 1 and Ts ≈ 333 K ) are also provided in Sub-section 5.4.2 for the range of fire
types.
5.3.3 Smoke loading
The combustion of hydrocarbons produces large volumes of initially high temperature combustion
products which disperse and cool down. If combustion is efficient and complete then the products
from burning a hydrocarbon mixture comprise carbon dioxide and water vapour. These are not
toxic or harmful, providing the ambient oxygen levels are not significantly affected. (The foregoing
excludes fuels containing sulphur or sulphur compounds which can present a toxic hazard).
However, the combustion process of non-premixed hydrocarbon fuels is rarely so efficient
(especially for higher hydrocarbons) and intermediate combustion products such as carbon
monoxide (CO) and soot (carbon particles) are usually formed within the flame and may persist
beyond the flame envelope within the stream of combustion products. Incomplete combustion may
also lead to unburnt fuel being carried over in the products as well. CO is toxic and soot particles
are an irritant to the lungs. The soot also reduces visibility and may affect the ability to escape.
The amount and nature of the combustion products produced by a fire is determined by the fuel
combustion rate and the amount of air involved in the combustion reaction or entrained within it. A
rough estimate of the mass flow rate of combustion products evolving from a fire can be made by
multiplying the fuel mass burning rate by the ratio of air needed for complete combustion. For
methane this figure is about 17.2 and for higher hydrocarbons is about 15.
The equivalence ratio, φ , defined as:
m
φ=r (5.3.9)
a
where
m is the mass burning rate of fuel
a is the mass rate of air entrained
r is the mass ratio of air to fuel required for stoichiometric burning (that is ~15)
Hence, for stoichiometric burning, φ = 1 and the rate of formation of products will be (r + 1) times
the mass burning rate of fuel. For well ventilated fires where plentiful air mixes with the fuel, φ < 1
and more products may be produced compared to the case of stoichiometric combustion.
However, the excess air in the products dilutes the smoke, reducing both the concentration of toxic
products and soot and also lowering the temperature. For fires where the ventilation is restricted to
an extent that insufficient air is available for complete combustion, φ > 1 and the concentrations of
intermediate combustion products (for example CO and soot) will increase and are more likely to
persist beyond the flame envelope.
The amount of CO within the combustion products is usually quantified in terms of its volume
concentration as a volume percentage (or ppm). For soot, the mass concentration of particles in
the combustion products is difficult to measure and an alternative approach is to determine the
optical density by measuring the attenuation of a beam of light passing through the smoke. The
optical density, D10 , is given by:
⎛ I ⎞
D10 = −10 log10 ⎜ ⎟ = κ C L (5.3.10)
⎝ I0 ⎠

where
I is light intensity through the smoke
I0 is the intensity without smoke
κ is the extinction coefficient
C is the mass concentration of soot (g m-3)
L is the path length of the optical beam through the smoke
The optical density, expressed in terms of unit path length (D10 / L in db m-1) correlates reasonably
well with visibility with 1 db m-1 corresponding to a visibility of about 10 m and 10 db m-1
corresponding to about 1 m. The visibility of exit signs can be significantly improved if they are
back-illuminated and may be seen at 2.5 times the distance of a surface illuminated sign.
5.4 Estimating fire and smoke loadings for a QRA

5.4.1 Inventories and release rates
The inventories of isolatable sections between ESDVs may vary considerably but typically would
be less than 10 tonnes for gas and 25 tonnes for liquids, excluding those associated with the well
and risers and utility fuels such as diesel and methanol. The inventory of an isolatable section and
the size of a leak will determine the maximum duration of resulting fire. For gas inventories, this
duration may be further reduced by a successful blowdown of the isolated section. Hence, the
duration of large gas leaks may be relatively short. For liquid spills, an effective drainage system
may limit the inventory involved in a fire. Historical data also shows that the likelihood of a release
is also related to its size, with the smallest leaks being more common.
The resulting fire size following an accidental release will be strongly dependent on the mass
release rate of the fuel, which will be determined by the hole size and pressure. For a QRA a range
of sizes should be considered. A leak classification often used is:
• Small leaks – typically 0.1kg s-1
• Medium leaks – typically 1kg s-1
• Large leaks – typically 10 kg s-1
• Major failures – typically >30 kg s-1
In the following section, these leak sizes are considered for the gas jet fires and two-phase jet fires.
For leak sizes 10 kg s-1 and above, the fire is large compared with the average module and it may
be necessary to consider the fire to be ‘confined’ with the consequent effects on fire characteristics
as discussed in Sub-section 5.2.1.3.
For pool fires, two sizes are considered:

• Small pool (typically less than 5 m diameter)
• Large pool (typically >5 m in diameter)
A small pool fire might typically result for a leak rate in the region of 1 to 2 kg s-1 and, within a
typical open module, would be expected to burn in the fuel controlled regime, that is, sufficient air
for combustion should be available and the fire behaviour would not be affected by confinement or
restricted ventilation. A large pool fire would be expected to produce a flame reaching to the roof of
a module and be affected by the confinement. It may also suffer from restricted ventilation.
Consequently, the effects of confinement on fire characteristics as discussed in Sub-
section 5.2.3.3 need to be considered. A similar effect might arise for a small pool fire within a
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compartment within a module and these fires should be considered as behaving like a large pool
fire.
For pool fires on the sea, only large spills are considered, as small spills are unlikely to affect the
installation. Similarly, only a gas fed fire at the sea surface due to major failure of a 24” diameter
sub-sea pipeline is considered.
For BLEVEs, as discussed in Sub-section 5.2.6 even a small inventory would be expected to give
rise to a fireball extending throughout a module resulting in serious consequences for personnel
within the immediate area.
5.4.2 Typical values
5.4.2.1 General
Ideally, the fire size and thermal loading from fires should be assessed using mathematical models
which have been extensively validated against large scale data. A range of such models are
available on a licence or consultancy basis. (see Sub-section 5.4.3 and Annex D).
However, a simplified approach was proposed in the Interim Guidance Notes, whereby correlations
for flame dimensions were suggested for jet and pool fires together with guidance on typical heat
loadings to engulfed objects. In this section a similar approach to the Interim Guidance Notes is
taken and updated to reflect recent knowledge and experimental work. For the six fire types
identified and discussed in Sub-section 5.2, tabulated values are provided giving guidance on
typical fire sizes and heat loadings for the fire sizes identified in Sub-section 5.4.1. The values
presented were derived from information in the literature; the results of an extensive body of large
scale experimental data (some of which is unpublished but to which Advantica has kindly provided
access); and predictions made by Shell and Advantica. Information on smoke loading is also based
on experimental data gathered by Advantica and Shell, much of which is unpublished.
5.4.2.2 High pressure jet fires – gas and two-phase
Wherever possible, the following information is provided for the four release rates of Sub-
section 5.4.1:
1. The expected flame extent, so that items or personnel within that range can be
identified and the consequences of flame engulfment considered.
2. The Fraction of Heat Radiated, F, so that estimates of the far field incident radiation
hazard can be made using equation 5.3.3 in Sub-section 5.3.
3. The CO level and soot concentration in the smoke produced.
4. The total heat flux to an engulfed object together with the radiative and convective
components, so that calculations of the object heat-up can be performed (see Sub-
section 5.4). Note that these fluxes represent the initial values when the engulfed object
is cold. Values of typical flame temperature, emissivity and convective heat transfer
coefficients are also provided.
5. The effect of deluge (where appropriate) in terms of the reduction in the heat flux to
engulfed objects and the enhanced attenuation of incident radiation to the surroundings
using the Effective Fraction of Heat Radiated, F’ (see equation 5.3.4).
6. The effect of confinement on fire characteristics and the combined effect of confinement
and deluge.
This information is presented in Table 5.4.1 for gas jet fires and Table 5.4.2 for two-phase jet fires.
As discussed in Sub-section 5.2.2.1, for two-phase jet fires, the maximum heat fluxes to engulfed
objects have been found to occur when the mixture is about 30 % gas and 70 % liquid by mass.
Consequently, the values shown in Table 5.4.2 correspond to this worst case condition.
Table 5.4.1: High Pressure Gas Jet Fires
Size (kg s-1) 0.1 1.0 10 >30 Effect of confinement

Flame length (m) 5 15 40 65 Affected by enclosure shape and
openings
Fraction of heat 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.13
radiated, F
CO level (% v/v) CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 Increased CO up to about 5% v/v at
and smoke a vent prior to external flaming, but
Soot Soot Soot Soot after external flaming <0.5 % v/v at
concentration ~0.01 ~0.01 ~0.01 ~0.01
(g m-3) the end of the flame. Soot levels
depend on equivalence ratio from
about 0.1 g m-3 at =1.3 to 2.5 g m-3
at =2.
Total heat flux 180 250 300 350 Increased heat loadings up to
(kWm-2) 400 kWm-2. (280 kWm-2 radiative,
120 kWm-2 convective, Tf =1600K,
=0.75, h= 0.09)
Radiative flux 80 130 180 230
(kWm-2)
Convective flux 100 120 120 120
(kWm-2)
Flame 1560 1560 1560 1560
temperature, Tf
(K)
Flame emissivity, 0.25 0.4 0.55 0.7
Convective heat 0.08 0.095 0.095 0.095

transfer
coefficient, h
(kWm-2K-1)
Effect of deluge No effect on heat loadings to engulfed Risk of extinguishment and
objects. explosion hazard if deluge activated
In far field, take F’=0.8F for 1 row of water when enclosure is already hot and
sprays, F’=0.5F for 2 rows and F’=0.4F for >2 fire is well established.
rows at 12 litresm-2min-1, for use in equation
5.3.4 (see Sub-section 5.2.1.2 for other rates).
May improve combustion efficiency and
reduce CO levels within flame.

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Table 5.4.2: High Pressure Two-Phase Jet Fires
Size (kg s-1) 0.1 1.0 10 30 Effect of Confinement

Flame length (m) 5 13 35 60 Affected by enclosure shape and
openings
Fraction of heat See equation below table
radiated, F
CO level (% v/v) CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 Increased CO up to about 5 % v/v
and smoke Soot Soot Soot Soot at a vent prior to external flaming,
concentration (g ~0.01 ~0.01 ~0.01 ~0.01 but after external flaming < 0.5 %
m-3) v/v at the end of the flame. Soot
levels depend on equivalence
ratio from about 0.1 g m-3 at =1.3
to 2.5 g m-3 at =2.
Total heat flux 200 300 350 400 Increased heat fluxes, take values
(kWm-2) as per 30 kg s-1 two-phase jet
fire.
Radiative flux 100 180 230 280
(kWm-2)
Convective flux 100 120 120 120
(kWm-2)
Flame 1560 1560 1560 1560
temperature (K)
Flame 0.3 0.55 0.7 0.85
emissivity,
Convective heat 0.08 0.095 0.095 0.095
transfer
coefficient, h
(kWm-2K-1)
Effect of deluge Some benefit to engulfed objects but Risk of extinguishment and
temperature may still rise although at a slower potential formation of pool, see
rate. Combined area and dedicated deluge may Sub-section 5.2.2.4.
prevent temperature rise if effectively applied.
See Sub-section 5.2.2.2. In far field take F’ as
per Table 5.1.
Fraction of Heat Radiated, Fm , of mixture involving x% liquid by mass: Use

⎛ x ⎞
Fm = ⎜ ⎟ ⋅ ( FL − FG ) + FG where FG is the fraction of heat radiated for natural gas as given in
⎝ 100 ⎠
Table 5.4.1 and FL is the fraction of heat radiated for the liquid fuel involved. Take FL = 0.24 for
C3; 0.32 for C4, 0.45 for C6-C25 (including condensate and diesel); and 0.5 for crude oil.
IMPORTANT NOTE: The heat flux data in the above table relates to a 30 % gas, 70 % liquid by
mass mixture. For flashing liquid fires (such as propane or butane) a lower flame temperature of
about 1300 °K is likely with an emissivity of 1, giving a radiative flux of about 160 kWm-2. A
convective heat transfer coefficient of about 0.07 kWm-2K-1 is suggested giving a convective flux of
about 70 kWm-2 and a total flux of about 230 kWm-2.
5.4.2.3 Pool fires on the installation
The following information is provided for pool fires on an installation:
1. The expected flame extent, so that items or personnel within that range can be
identified and the consequences of flame engulfment considered.

2. The mass burning, so that the duration of a fire following a spillage might be assessed
and to provide input to calculations of the incident radiation field.
3. The Fraction of Heat Radiated, F, so that estimates of the far field incident radiation
hazard can be made using equation 5.3.3 in Sub-section 5.3, where the rate of fuel
combustion, , is taken as the mass burning rate times the area of the pool.
section 5.4). Note that these fluxes represent the initial values when the engulfed object
is cold. Values of typical flame temperature, emissivity and convective heat transfer
coefficients are also provided.
6. The effect of deluge in terms of the reduction in the heat flux to engulfed objects and
the enhanced attenuation of incident radiation to the surroundings using the Effective
Fraction of Heat Radiated, F’ (see equation 5.3.4).
7. The effect of confinement on fire characteristics and the combined effect of confinement
and deluge.
This information is presented in Table 5.4.3.

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Table 5.4.3: Pool Fires on the Installation
Pool fire Methanol Small Large Effect of

parameter pool hydrocarbon pool hydrocarbon pool confinement
Typical Pool 5 <5 >5 Any
Diameter (m)
Flame Length Equal to pool Twice pool diameter Up to twice pool See Sub-
(m) diameter diameter section 5.2.3.3. Take
values as per large
Mass Burning 0.03 Crude – 0.045-0.06 Crude – 0.045-0.06 hydrocarbon pool fire
Rate Diesel – 0.055 Diesel – 0.055 for worst case. If
(kg m-2 s-1) Kerosene – 0.06 Kerosene – 0.06 confinement is severe
Condensate - 0.09 Condensate - 0.1 then mass burning rate
will decrease to match
C3/C4s – 0.09 C3/C4s – 0.12 available air flow and
Fraction of 0.15 0.25 0.15 large external fire at
Heat Radiated, vent expected.
F
CO level (% Negligible CO < 0.5 CO < 0.5 Increased CO up to
v/v) and Soot 0.5 – 2.5 Soot 0.5 – 2.5 about 5 % v/v at a vent
Smoke prior to external
Concentration flaming, but after
(g m-3) external flaming about
0.5 % v/v at the end of
the flame. Soot levels
up to 3 g m-3 .
Total Heat Flux 35 125 250 See Sub-
(kWm-2) section 5.2.3.3. Take
values as per large
Radiative Flux 35 125 230 hydrocarbon pool fire.
(kWm-2)
Convective 0 0 20
Flux (kWm-2)
Flame 1250 1250 1460
Temperature
(K)
Flame 0.25 0.9 0.9
Emissivity,
Convective - - 0.02
Heat Transfer,
h Coefficient
(kWm-2K-1)
Effect of Extinguishable See Sub-section 5.2.3.2. Considerable fire See Sub-
Deluge using AFFF. control and potential extinguishment can be section 5.2.3.4. Expect
Water soluble achieved. Expect a reduction in flame reduced flame
but effect of coverage (and hence flame size) of up to temperatures and
water deluge 90% within 10minutes. Rapid extinguishment reduced or no external
unknown. with AFFF. flaming. Mass burning
Up to 50 % reduction in radiative heat flux to rate reduces to match
engulfed objects. available air flow.
In far field take F’ = 0.8F for 1 row of water
sprays, F’=0.5F for 2 rows and F’=0.4F for >2
rows at 12 litres min 1 m-2 (See Sub-
section 5.2.1.2 for other rates).

5.4.2.4 Fires on the sea
The following information is provided in Table 5.4.4 for hydrocarbon pool fires on the sea:
1. The expected flame extent, so that items within that range can be identified and the
consequences of flame engulfment considered.
2. The mass burning, so that the duration of a fire following a spillage might be assessed
and to provide input to calculations of the incident radiation field.
3. The Fraction of Heat Radiated, F, so that calculations of the far field incident radiation
hazard can be made using equation 5.3.3 in Sub-section 5.3, where the rate of fuel
combustion, , is taken as the mass burning rate times the area of the pool.
section 5.4). Values of typical flame temperature, emissivity and convective heat
transfer coefficients are also provided.
The gas outflow from a sub-sea pipeline will depend on the pressure and the pipeline size. The
release will also vary with time; this variation depending upon the length of pipeline which is
depressurising. Similarly, the area at the sea surface over which the gas emerges will depend on
the depth and the gas release rate. Furthermore, depending on the gas outflow and the depth, the
gas plume at the sea surface may not be within flammable limits. For these reasons, simplified
guidance cannot be readily provided and the use of a model is recommended. This topic is an area
of some uncertainty and model predictions vary considerably. For illustrative purposes, predictions
of the fire hazard following the rupture of a long 24” diameter natural gas pipeline operating at 100
bar at a depth of 50 m suggest that the fire diameter might be of the order of 100 m with a flame
length of 150-200 m. On the basis that the fire is a low velocity laminar flame, it can be regarded as
a large pool fire and the values presented in Table 5.4.4 for fraction of heat radiated and heat
fluxes are recommended.

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Table 5.4.4: Hydrocarbon Pool Fire on the Sea
Pool fire on sea parameters Value

Typical Pool Diameter (m) >10
Flame Length (m) Up to twice diameter
Mass Burning Rate (kg m 2 s 1) Crude – 0.045-0.06
Diesel – 0.055
Kerosene – 0.06
Condensate – 0.1
C3/C4s – 0.2
Fraction of Heat Radiated, F 0.12
CO level (% v/v) and Smoke Concentration (g m-3) CO < 0.5
Soot 0.5 – 2.5
Total Heat Flux (kWm-2) 250
Radiative Flux (kWm-2) 230
Convective Flux (kWm-2) 20

Flame Temperature (K) 1460
Flame Emissivity, 0.9
Convective Heat Transfer Coefficient, h (kWm-2K-1) 0.02
5.4.2.5 BLEVEs
BLEVEs are highly transient events in which a fixed inventory is instantaneously released. The
subsequent combustion gives rise to a fireball which grows in size to a maximum before burning
out as all the fuel is consumed. Consequently, the key parameters of interest in terms of a
consequence assessment are the extent of the flame and the incident radiation hazard to
personnel outside the flame. These parameters are also highly transient. In relation to incident
radiation levels outside the fireball, both the maximum level experienced and the ‘dosage’ over the
duration of the event are of interest in order to determine the effect on people.
Consequently, Table 5.4.5 presents the following data in relation to BLEVEs:
1. Typical maximum fireball diameter (assuming unconfined) based on the mass of fuel
involved in the BLEVE, and the maximum flame volume calculated assuming a
spherical geometry. Hence the area of a module which would be expected to be
engulfed in flame can be assessed by dividing the volume of the fireball by the height of
the module.
2. The expected duration as a function of the mass of fuel involved in the BLEVE.
3. The Fraction of Heat Radiated, F, which can be used to calculate the dosage received
at a given location, d, remote from the fireball (more than one fireball diameter distant
from edge of fireball) using the equation:
τ FM H
Sd = kWm-2s (5.4.1)
4 π d2
where:
τ is the atmospheric transmissivity

M is the mass of fuel involved in the BLEVE (kg)
H is the calorific value (kJ kg-1)
d is the distance from the centre of the fireball where the dosage is
experienced (m)
4. The Modified Fraction of Heat Radiated F*, which can be used to calculate the
maximum incident radiation received at a location d, remote from the fireball (more than
one fireball diameter distant from edge of fireball) using the equation:
τ F*M H
qd ,max = kWm-2 (5.4.2)
4 π d2 t
where: t is the duration of the BLEVE event (s).
Various correlations have been developed relating the maximum diameter (D), maximum height (h)
and duration (t) of the fireball following an unconfined BLEVE to the mass of fuel released, for
example CCPS Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis suggest that
D = 6.48 x M0.325 ; h = 0.75 x D; t = 0.825 x M0.26. These equations have been used to derive the
values presented in Table 5.4 for maximum diameter and duration. Comparisons with large scale
data showed reasonable agreement. The values of Fraction of Heat Radiated F and the Modified
value F* were derived from large scale experimental data.
Table 5.4.5: BLEVEs
Parameter Characteristic expressed as function of

BLEVE fuel mass (M kg of fuel)
Maximum Diameter (m) D = 6.48 x M0.325
Maximum Flame Volume (m3) V = 142.47 x M0.975
Duration (s) t = 0.825 x M0.26
Fraction of Heat Radiated, F 0.2

(ONLY for use in equation 5.4.1 to derive dosage
at locations remote from the fireball)
Modified Fraction of Heat Radiated, F* 0.35

(ONLY for use in equation 5.4.2 to derive
maximum incident radiation at a locations remote
from the fireball)
5.4.3 Predictive models for fire loading
There are basically three types of predictive models which can be used to predict fire
characteristics and the thermal loading from fires, these being:
• Empirical models
• Integral (or phenomenological) models
• Numerical (CFD) models

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Empirical models contain, to varying degrees, a physical basis combined with correlations which
have been derived from experimental data. They are generally easy to use, but their applicability is
limited to the range of experimental data used to derive them.
Integral models use equations relating the fire characteristics to the physical processes involved,
such as mixing, combustion and thermal emissions. However, the relationships are simplified and
are generally one-dimensional. Such models will also often contain some parameters which have
been empirically derived from experimental data. Nevertheless, integral models provide an
effective method for predicting fire characteristics and are generally easy to use. Strictly speaking,
they should only be applied to the range of circumstances for which they have been validated by
experimental data. However, because of the physical basis of the equations, the models can be
applied, within reason, to situations outside this range.
Numerical models (CFD) attempt to model in 3-dimensions the time varying processes within a fire
such as the fluid flow and combustion processes. In principle, this physical basis enables these
models to study complex geometries and conditions far removed from experimental data used to
validate them. However, the resulting predictions are often sensitive to small changes in input
parameters that may be difficult to determine or that are derived empirically. Also, these models
generally require ‘expert’ users. For these reasons, CFD codes are not routinely used for general
risk assessments. However, they can be useful to study in detail a particular fire scenario of
interest due to its severity. The impact of potential design changes (such as increased ventilation)
can then compared and provide at least qualitative guidance on how to reduce the hazard.
Appendix D discusses the above model types in more detail and provides an in-depth review of
different fire modes currently available.
5.5 Heat transfer

5.5.1 Mechanisms for heat transfer
5.5.1.1 General
Basic heat transfer by radiation, convection and conduction is well covered in the standard text
books (e.g. Incropera and De Witt, 2002). This section concentrates on determination of heat
transfer using the values identified in Sub-section 5.4 (Change this reference to specific table
references) for key parameters measured in intermediate and large scale trials as; previously,
these have not been readily available. This follows on from the approach recommended by the
Energy Institute (formerly the Institute of Petroleum) in assessing the effect of severe fires on
pressure vessels (Energy Institute, 2003).
5.5.1.2 Radiation
Radiation from the hot gases and incandescent soot particles is the main mechanism for
transferring heat. For flames with relatively little momentum, e.g. pool fires, radiative transfer to an
impinged object represents at least 80% of the heat transferred. Even with impinging high velocity
jet fires, radiative heat transfer still represents 50 % to 60 % of the heat load.
The radiative heat emission process is modelled by assuming that the radiation comes from the
flame surface. The surface emissive power (SEP) of a flame is the heat radiated outwards per unit
surface area of the flame. Generally, a uniform SEP is taken over the whole flame shape but this a
gross simplification of what may happen in practice. For example, in a large pool fire, the base of
the flame may have the relatively high SEP of 180 kWm-2 whereas the smoke obscured flames,
which may comprise two thirds of the flame shape, may have the relatively low SEP of 60 kWm-2.
Sub-section 5.4.2 gives average SEPs for the various types of fire.
If an object is definitely not directly impinged by flame, the radiative heat transfer is given by
equation 5.4.1.

qrad = VF Eτ (5.4-1)
where VF is the geometric view factor, E (kWm-2) is the surface emissive power of the flames and
τ is the atmospheric transmissivity.
The view factor is purely a geometrical parameter determining the proportion of radiation leaving
one surface which reaches a second surface. As radiation travels in straight lines, only those parts
of the respective surfaces that can see one another contribute to the value of the view factor.
Analytical expressions for the view factor are available (e.g. McGuire J H, 1953 and SFPE, 2002)
for standard geometries. For example, pool fires may be represented by tilted cylinders, jet fires by
a conical frustum and fireballs by circular discs through the centre of the fireball. Numerical
integration may be used for more complex geometries where the flame surface is divided into a
series of regular shapes (e.g. triangles or squares) and the view factors for each of these summed.
Atmospheric attenuation is primarily caused by absorption of radiation by carbon dioxide and by

water vapour and scattering by dust particles. The atmospheric transmissivity over a specified path
length, due to the presence of water vapour and carbon dioxide, can be calculated from the
temperature and relative humidity of the atmosphere provided that the emission spectrum is
known. Usually it is assumed that there is emission at every wave length (black or grey body). For
path lengths of 10 m or less it is usual to take the atmospheric transmissivity as 1. Expressions of
differing complexity are available ranging from those that just take distance into account to those
that also consider water and carbon dioxide concentration. Wayne (1991) gives the following
empirical expression, which takes both water vapour and carbon dioxide concentrations into
account:
t = 1.006 − 0.01171 ⎡⎣log10 X ( H 2O ) ⎤⎦ − 0.02368 ⎡⎣log10 X ( H 2O ) ⎤⎦

2
−0.03188 ⎡⎣log10 X ( CO2 ) ⎤⎦ + 0.001164 ⎡⎣log10 X ( CO2 ) ⎤⎦

2
(5.4-2)
Where
288.651
X ( H 2O ) = Rh d Smm (5.4-3)
T
RH is the fractional relative humidity, d is the path length (m), Smm is the saturated vapour
pressure of water (mmHg) at atmospheric temperature T (K). This expression assumes that the
flame is 1500 K, which was chosen as an average between that of a propane fire and a LNG fire.
The transmissivity given by this expression at 15 °C is illustrated by figure 5.4.1.

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Figure 5.4-1 Variation of atmospheric transmissivity with distance at 15 deg C
The 0.8 transmissivity suggested in Section 5.4 corresponds to that at a distance of 25 m at a

relative humidity of 60%.
As indicated in Section 5.3.1, the radiation to the surroundings may be represented by a point
source model. For a point source model, the radiation received (qd, kWm-2) at a distance d (m) is
given by:
τ F m H
qd = (5.4-5)
4π d2
Generally, the heat of combustion (H, kJkg-1) will be known from the literature (e.g. Weast, 1981)
and typical values for the fraction (F) of the heat of combustion radiated for six main fire scenarios
considered are given in Section 5.4.2. The mass burning rates ( m ) for hydrocarbon pool fires are
given in table 5.2. Slightly higher values are given for C3/C4 and condensate pool fires if the pool
diameter is greater than 5 m. For jet fires, the mass burning rate is based on the leakage rate and,
for QRA, these are generally assumed to be 0.1, 1, 10 or > 30 kgs-1. In the case of fireballs, the
mass burning rate is based on the total amount of fuel released divided by a fireball duration
calculated using an expression (0.825 . mass0.26) based on the mass released.
Application of the two techniques is illustrated using data from the BLEVE of a 2 tonne LPG tank
(Roberts et al., 2000). The relevant data is summarised in table 5.4.1 below.
Table 5.4.1 Example LPG BLEVE fireball data
Parameter Value
Heat of combustion 46000 kJkg-1
Amount of fuel released 1708 kg
Duration 7s
Mass burning rate 244 kgs-1
Fraction of heat of combustion radiated 0.38
Surface emissive power 312 kWm-2
Fireball diameter 71 m

The full data set indicated that the maximum output from the fireball was at the lift off point. This
situation can be modelled by treating the fireball as a disc through the centre of the fireball just
touching the surface and the target as a vertical receiver (normally it is necessary to determine
both the vertical and the horizontal component of the view factor) on the surface (see figure 5.4.2).
Figure 5.4.2 View factor for circular disc with receiver off axis but parallel
McGuire (1953) gives the view factor as:
⎛ ⎞
⎜ y2 + z 2 − R2 ⎟
VF = 0.5 ⎜ 1 − ⎟ (5.4-6)
R4 + 2 ( y2 − z 2 ) R2 + ( y2 − z 2 )
2
⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
Hence, if z = R and y = n.R
⎛ n ⎞
VF = 0.5 ⎜1 − ⎟ (5.4-7)
⎝ 4 + n2 ⎠
Table 5.4-1 provides the data for applying both a solid flame and point source model. Assuming an
atmospheric transmissivity of 1, the results from application of each model are plotted in Figure
5.4.3.

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Figure 5.4-3 Comparison of solid flame and point source model for a fireball
Figure 5.4-3 suggests that a solid flame model should be used if the object of interest is closer than
two flame widths/lengths from the flame as, at these distances, the receiver cannot “see” all of the
flame.
The above models are only applicable if there is no direct flame impingement. If the flames are
impinging on an object then the radiation received may be approximated (ignoring reflection and
re-radiation - see Section 5.3.2 for the derivation) by equation 5.4.8.
qrad = ε s σ ( ε f Tf4 − Ts4 ) (5.4-8)
where εf, εs are the flame and surface emissivities, σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant
(5.6697 x 10-8 Wm-2K-4), and Tf, Ts are the flame and object surface temperatures (K). Sub-
section 5.4.2 gives typical values for these coefficients for a range of fire types and sizes.
5.5.1.3 Convection
Heat transfer by convection occurs when there are hot gases flowing over the surface of the object.
Convective heat transfer will always occur to some extent if there is direct flame impingement and,
in these circumstances, at least as much radiative heat transfer will accompany it. Convective heat
transfer can occur without significant radiative heat transfer if a plume of hot gases is channelled to
an object not in direct (or reflected) line of site with the flames. Heat transfer by convection from
impinging flames is represented by equation 5.4-9.
qconv = h (T f − Ts ) (5.4.7)
where Tf and Ts are the flame and object surface temperatures respectively (K) and h is the
convective heat transfer coefficient (Wm-2K-1). The convective heat transfer coefficient varies with
geometry, boundary layer conditions, gas velocity and temperature. Typical values for the heat
transfer coefficient for a range of types and sizes of fire are given in Section 5.4.2. In cases where
there is convective heat transfer from a hot plume, the plume temperature can be used in
Equation 5.12 instead of the flame temperature if it can be reasonably estimated.
5.5.1.4 Conduction
Heat transfer by conduction is very small compared to the other methods of heat transfer but
needs to be taken into account in some circumstances. One-dimensional heat conduction under
steady state conditions is represented by equation 5.4-10.
qcond = k
(Ts − Tl ) (5.4-10)
L
where Ts is the temperature (K) of the surface exposed to flame, Tl is the temperature (K) at a
thickness L (m) and k is the thermal conductivity (Wm-1K-1). The thermal conductivity of carbon
steel is about 45 Wm-1K-1 and hence, even with a fairly large temperature differential, the heat
transmitted is low. Hence, in most circumstances, the heat transmitted by conduction can be
ignored. However, Section 6 indicates that there can be problems through differential heating at
the joints between thick and thin thick-walled structures. The other condition where conduction is
normally taken into account is where heat is transferred through the walls of a vessel or pipe to a
fluid inside.
5.5.2 Flame position relative to the receiver
Generally, flames are not static. They will move around in the wind and will vary with the fuel
release rate, amount of back radiation etc. For a pool fire, the wind may tilt the flame towards,
away from or sideways to the receiver. With jet fires, a co-flowing wind will elongate the flames and
a variable crosswind will move the flames from side to side. A fireball will present a smaller flame
area up and down wind compared to the crosswind area. An understanding of the geometry of the
flame is essential in order to apply the heat transfer mechanisms identified in the previous section.
Modern, validated empirical and phenomenological models are now available for most of the
standard situations but the user needs to be aware of the limitations and simplifications made in
the model used if the results are to be relied upon. Summaries and comparisons of these models
are available in the standard reference books e.g. “Yellow book” (1997) [X], SFPE Handbook
(2002) [X], Lees (2005) [X]. Some of these models have been incorporated in commercially
available suites of programmes e.g. FRED, PHAST. The following are given as examples:
• Carsley (1995) [X] has developed a model for predicting the probability of impingement of
jet fires;
• Cracknell et al. (1995) [X] have developed one for the heat flux on a cylindrical target due to
the impingement of a large-scale natural gas jet fire.
• Chamberlain (1995) [X] considered the hazards from confined pool fires in offshore
modules.
A feature of most of these models is that the surface emissive power used for a particular situation
will depend on how the flame geometry is modelled for that situation. Hence a model using a high
surface emissive power and relatively low flame area may/should give the same answer as a
model using a relatively low surface emissive power but larger flame area. Because of this, the
values tabulated in Section 5.4 will, in general, be conservative as they tend to give the higher of a
range of measured surface emissive powers with the higher of a range of measured flame lengths.
Combustion models used in computational fluid dynamics (CFD) have advanced enabling more
realistic modelling (this is discussed further in Annex D) in situations where the fire scenario can be
fully described. However, in preparing a safety case, only general assumptions are normally made
and, in practice, CFD would only be used to look at particular case in detail when the safety issues
/ expense justify it.
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In assessing the heat transferred, the key decision is on whether or not the object is impinged by
flame. For the general case, it may be sufficient to apply a safety margin, e.g. 50 %, to the flame
length given by a model or the relevant table in Section 5.4. If a key structural item is of particular
concern, e.g. a platform support leg, one approach used by industry is to estimate (using a solid
flame model) the distance for 50 kWm-2 received radiation and assume that everything within this
distance is impinged by flame and that everything outside this distance only receives radiation.
In practice, the heat transferred to a receiver will depend on whether it is fully, partially or not
enveloped in flame and, in partially or totally enclosed modules, how much re-radiation there is
from walls, ceilings and process plant. Even when there is full engulfment, the situation is still
complicated as the:
• Relative proportions of radiative and convective load from a flame will vary depending on
the fuel type and location of the object within the flame.
• Total heat loads will vary depending on the fuel type, the size and shape of the object and
the location of the object within the fire;
• Particularly with jet fires, the flames can be channelled along and around an object;
• Heat loads will vary over the surface of the object; and
• Heat absorbed by the object will vary with time.
Whilst detailed analysis may now be made using CFD and finite element analysis, calculations for
an initial analysis can be readily performed if some of the above factors are simplified. As indicated
in Section 5.3, the main simplifying assumptions are that:
• There are no heat losses;
• The flame and receiver surface are considered grey bodies,
• The ambient temperature can be neglected; and
• In most circumstances, heat conduction can be ignored.
In these circumstances, the heat transferred to the object surface from an impinging flame may be
represented by equation 5.3.7.
qtotal = qrad + qconv = ε s σ ( ε f T f4 − Ts4 ) + h (T f − Ts ) (5.4-11)
If the object is not impinged by flame (e.g. beyond the 50 kWm-2 distance) then, ignoring the hot
plume case, the heat transfer is by radiation and the solid flame model (equation 5.1) should be
applied.
qrad = V f E τ (5.4-12)
If the object is more than two flame widths/lengths away then the point source (equation 5.2) or a
multipoint source model (where the source is split into a number of zones, each representing a
fraction of the total radiation emitted and each zone represented by a point source emitting this
fraction of the radiation) may be used as an alternative to the solid flame model. It may be used at
closer distances but the results will be very conservative. This may be acceptable in some
situations.
τ F m H
qrad = (5.4-13)
4π d2

5.5.3 Temperature rise
All the equations given above provide the heat flux to the surface of the receiver. The key
requirement is to determine the temperature rise in the item being considered and the time taken to
reach the critical temperature for that particular component. The main situations considered are:
• Unprotected steel
• Fire protected steel
• Pressure vessels (unprotected and protected)
• People
As the heat absorbed is a time dependent process. Mathematical models, particularly finite
difference methods, are available which can undertake these calculations from first principles or
with the input parameters es, ef, Tf and h as determined by the particular model used or as
provided in Sub-section 5.4.2. Such models may also simultaneously calculate the heat up of a
structure, a vessel or pipe work contents. However, conservative calculations of heat up can be
undertaken on the basis that, at any particular time, steady state conditions exist.
5.5.3.1 Unprotected steel
The equations given in FABIG Technical Note 1 [X] are still valid. However, those equations used a
section factor (Hp/A, m-1) defined as the heated perimeter (Hp, m) divided by the steel cross-
sectional area (A, m2). ASFP (2002) [X] comment that in new European fire testing and design
standards (e.g. ENV 13381-4 2002 [X], BSEN 1993-1-2 2005 [X] and BSEN 1994-1-2 [X],) the
section factor (the unit remains the same, i.e. m-1) is defined as Asteel/Vsteel (note: the steel
subscripts are provided here to avoid confusion with other parameters) where Asteel is the surface
area of steel exposed to fire per unit length and Vsteel is the volume of the section per unit length.
Using the Asteel and Vsteel notation, for a fully engulfed steel member, e.g. an I-beam, the heat up of
the steel member is described by equation 5.4-14.
dT
ε s σ (σ f T f4 − Ts4 ) + h (T f − Ts ) =
Vsteel
Csteel ρ steel (5.4-14)
Asteel dt
where Csteel is the steel heat capacity (Jkg-1K-1) and ρsteel is the steel density (kgm-3). A steel section
with a large surface area will receive more heat than one with a smaller surface area and the
greater the volume the greater the heat sink. Hence the lower the section factor the slower an
I-beam will heat up. For an I-beam, the heated perimeter (ASFP still use this in their examples and
data sheets) is calculated as:

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Figure 5.4-4
where B and D are the overall breadth and depth of the section and W is the web thickness. A
comprehensive list of heated perimeter equations for different types of beams, columns etc are
given by ASFP in the “Yellow” book (ASFP, 2002) [X].
For a steel section that is not engulfed in flame, the heat up of the steel member is described by
equation 5.4-15.
Vsteel dT
qrad = V f E τ = Csteel ρ steel (5.4-15)
Asteel dt
In this case, the heated perimeter is the projected area of the member that sees the radiation.
Equations 5.4.9 and 5.4.10 can be solved numerically (e.g. by using a spreadsheet with fixed cell
addresses for the constants) by using incremental time steps. An example is given in the section
5.4.3.2 on pressure vessels.
5.5.3.2 Fire protected steel
The Interim Guidance Notes [X] advocate a heated perimeter approach when the steel is insulated.
Two equations are given, one where the fire protection material has negligible heat capacity
(Equation 5.4-19) and the other (not included as it does not appear right) where it does has
significant heat capacity. It is assumed that the insulation surface temperature (Ts) rapidly reaches
the flame temperature.
Asteel K PFP
dT = (Ts − T ) dt (5.4-16)
Vsteel Csteel ρ steel L
where KPFP is the thermal conductivity of the protection material and L the thickness of the
insulation material.
It should be noted that the thermal conductivity and heat capacity of both the steel and the
insulation material will vary with temperature and, for accurate calculations; these would have to be
expressed as parametric equations. API (2005) [X] give approximate thermal conductivity values
for typical insulations, e.g. light weight cementitious 0.51 Wm-1K-1, but the values given are
approximate and should be treated with caution. The problem is that it is very difficult to obtain a
realistic value for both the thermal conductivity and heat capacity as most forms of passive fire
protection react in a complex way.
Generally, steel may be protected from fire by passive fire protection, which may take the form of a
cladding or a coating (cemetitious, vermiculite or intumescent). Summaries of their properties are
reiterated below and should be read in conjunction with further detail in 3.4.1.
• Inert cladding e.g. ceramic boards, a thin steel panel backed by mineral wool, a removal
jacket or a composite panel. The insulation backed steel panels act as passive insulator
until the insulating materials melts leaving voids. Insulation materials such as rock wool
contain resins that will melt and migrate. Composite panels may comprise a series of
panels of different materials with either air gaps between them or some or all of the gaps
filled with insulating material. In most of these cases, the thermal conductivity needs to take
account of different materials and of internal voids giving rise to internal convection effects
and heat capacity will vary with each material used.
• Cementitious coatings. These will act as passive insulator with a thermal conductivity
dependent on the amount of water present until the temperature reaches about 100 oC.
The temperature will be kept at this until all the chemically and physically bound water has
been driven off. The temperature will then rise with the material again acting as passive
insulator but with a different thermal conductivity. Hence, an overall thermal conductivity

value must account for movement and evaporation of water in a situation where the total
amount of physically bound water is not likely to be known.
• An intumescent coating. These react to flames by melting and then swelling to form a hard
char five to ten times thicker than the unreacted material thickness. The char is gradually
eroded away exposing unreacted material, which then reacts to form more char. Hence the
unreacted material is gradually being used up and, once it has been used up, bare steel will
be exposed. In this case, the thermal conductivity needs to take account of the unreacted
material and the char and the fact that there are continual boundary and phase changes.
Not withstanding all the problems identified, the manufacturers will have data from furnace tests
with cellulosic and hydrocarbon heat up curves and will have resistance to jet fire test data. In
general, the manufacturers will use the ASFP (2002) [X] method to derive the thickness of material
required to protect against a particular fire scenario or combination of fire scenarios e.g. jet fire
preceding a pool fire. The manufacturers will have performed a series of furnace tests conducted
on structural elements with varying section factors, usually between 50 and 350, to various fire
durations and limiting temperatures. The thickness of material (L) required to provide specific
standards of fire resistance e.g. at least 1 hour for a mean temperature rise of 140 °C, is derived
by means of the empirical relationship:
Vsteel
tresist = a0 + a1 L + a2 L (5.4-17)
Asteel
where tresist is the fire resistance time (minutes). The furnace tests are chosen to cover the range of
section factors, thicknesses and duration required. The constants, a0, a1 and a2, applicable to each
material are determined by multiple linear regressions. Once a satisfactory correlation has been
obtained, the protection thicknesses for a given section factor and required fire resistance time can
be derived using the rearranged equation:
tresist − a0
L= (5.4-18)
V
a1 steel + a2
Asteel
Generally, interpolation of fire test data is allowed but extrapolation is not. ASFP (2002) [X] give
illustrations of how this works with product data sheets based on cellulosic fire curve furnace tests.
A method of combining the results from furnace and jet fire tests is to compare results from tests
on substrates with similar section factors (usually about 100 m-1) and use this to derive an “erosion”
factor which is added to the value obtained from the expression derived from the furnace tests.
This data can also allow approximate thermal conductivities and heat capacities to be determined
but they will be product specific and the manufacturers of the products being considered should be
consulted.
5.5.3.3 Pressure vessels
There are many different processes occurring when a flame interacts with a pressure vessel due to
the complex behaviour of the flame, the vessel and the vessel contents. API has considered the
requirements for pressure relief valves (API 520, 1997) [X] and emergency depressurisation
systems (API 521, 2005) [X] and these are considered in Section 6.7 discussing
process.responses. However, API only considers relatively small hydrocarbon pool fires and, if it is
a realistic fire scenario, a pressure vessel is much more likely to fail in a jet fire. This was reviewed
by Roberts et al. (2000) [X] and the Institute of Petroleum (2003) [X] have published guidance on
the effects of severe fires on pressure vessels and Scandpower (2004) [X] have considered this in
regard to emergency depressurisation.
The key processes occurring during jet-fire impingement on pressure vessels include:

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• heat transfer between the fire and outer surface of the vessel, in the vapour and liquid
'zones', by radiation and convection;
• heat transfer through the vessel walls by conduction. The wall may comprise of an outer
passive fire protection (PFP) coating plus the underlying steel wall;
• heat transfer into the vessel fluids by predominantly radiation in the vapour space, and by
natural convection or nucleate boiling in the liquid phase;
• mass transfer from the bulk liquid or vapour to the outside environment through any holes
in the vessel;
• mass transfer out of the vessel through any open or partially open pressure safety valves
(PSVs);
• mass transfer within the liquid phase by flow of heated fluid into a stratified 'hot' layer lying
above the bulk liquid. The hot layer may or may not be stable;
• mass transfer between the liquid and vapour phases by evaporation;
• pressure, enthalpy and composition changes (e.g. relative fractions of mixed hydrocarbons
in a separator) in the fluids during each of the above processes;
• catastrophic vessel failure resulting in a possible BLEVE.
The heat transfer processes described above are shown schematically in Fig. 5.4-5.
Figure 5.4-5 Heat and mass transfer
Various models have been proposed that take these factors into account although few have been
fully validated. Persaud et al. (2001) [X] has applied the Shell HEATUP [X] model to the heat up
and failure of LPG tanks. They give equations for all the physics describing heat and mass transfer
processes and predict vessel failure by comparing the hoop stress with the ultimate tensile
strength of steel. In practice, when a fire impinges on a vessel containing liquid, the wall in contact
with vapour will heat up very quickly and the wall in contact with liquid will stay at a relatively low
temperature unless film boiling occurs. In flashing liquid propane jet fire trials on unprotected
2 tonne LPG tanks (Roberts et al., 2000) [X] the vapour wall reached up to 870 °C on failure whilst
the wall in contact with liquid did not exceed 230 °C.

5.5.3.3.1 Vessel walls
LPG trials indicate that the prime cause of failure, at least for relatively thin walled vessels, was
heating the wall in contact with vapour to a temperature where the steel weakened rather than due
to over pressurisation although over pressurisation will be an important factor if a vessel becomes
hydraulically full. Gayton and Murphy (1995) [X] also suggest that time to metal plate rupture is
used in depressurisation system design. On this basis, a conservative estimate can be made of the
time to failure by ignoring the heat transfer to the contents. As indicated above, the iterative
process for solving the time dependent heat transfer equations is illustrated for the vessel vapour
wall case.
In a time step ∆t, the object will heat up by ∆T given by:
∆t q0
∆T = (5.4-19)
Csteel ρ steel L
where the initial heat absorbed by the wall (ignoring heat losses to the contents) is given by:
q0 = ε sσ ( ε f Tf4 − T04 ) + h (Tf − T0 ) (5.4-20)
At time t1 = t0 + ∆t, the surface temperature will be T1 = T0 + ∆T, where T0 is the initial surface
temperature.
Using the new T1 and substituting into equation 5.4-20, then the heat absorbed at time t1 is,
q1 = ε sσ ( ε f Tf4 − T14 ) + h (Tf − T1 ) (5.4-21)
So, in general, at time ti, the thermal flux absorbed by the object is given by:
qi = ε sσ ( ε f Tf4 − Ti 4 ) + h (Tf − Ti ) (5.4-22)
and the temperature of the object will increase to Ti+1 = Ti + Ti where
∆t qi
∆Ti = (5.4-23)
Csteel ρsteel L
In order to illustrate the conservatism of the data in Sub-section 5.4.2, both trials data and data
derived from table 5.1 is given below in table 5.4.2.

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Table 5.4.2 Data for calculation of LPG tank failure
Parameter Table 5.3 Trials data

Size 1 kgs-1
Total incident flux (kWm-2) 270 170
Radiative flux (kWm-2) 170 110
-2
Convective flux (kWm ) 100 60
Emissivity of flame εf 0.8 0.8
Emissivity of steel εs 0.5 0.8
Temperature of flame, Tf (K) 1560 1320
Heat transfer coefficient, h (Wm-2K-1) 90 60
Stefan-Boltzman constant, σ (Wm-2K-4) 5.67 x 10-8 5.67 x 10-8
Wall thickness, L (m) 0.0071 0.0071
Density of steel, ρ (kgm-3) 7850 7850
-1 -1
Heat capacity of steel, C (Jkg K ) 520 520
The predicted rise in wall temperature, for an initial temperature of 20 °C, is illustrated in
Figure 5.4-6. The measured times to failure and maximum wall temperatures (all at positions in
contact with vapour) for each degree of fill are summarised in table 5.4.3 and the failure points
shown in Figure 5.4-7.
Table 5.4.3 LPG tank failure data
Degree of fill Time to Maximum wall Pressure at

of 2 tonne tank failure (s) temperature at failure failure (barg)
(%) (Celsius)
20 250 870 16.5
41 286 704 21.3
60 217 821 18.6
85 254 848 24.4

Figure 5.4-5 - Comparison of heat up time with LPG failure times and temperatures
A comparison can also be made with API (2005) [X] data for an unwetted 25.4 mm plate. API 521
[X] gives 12 minutes to reach 593 °C. Use of the small hydrocarbon pool fire data (the API data are
based on calculations from a gasoline trial with a 0.125” plate) in table 5.2, gives about 11 minutes
as the time.
5.5.3.3.2 Vessel contents
The overall response of pressure vessels is considered further in Section 6.8. As indicated above,
the actual heat transfer processes are very complex. Traditionally, the API (2005) [X] approach has
been used to calculate the heat transfer to a vessel contents. For vessels containing only gas,
vapour or super-critical fluid the vessel wall is considered to be unwetted and the heat transfer to
the contents is not directly calculated. For vessels containing liquid, the approach is based on the
heat transfer to the wetted surface of vessels up to a height of 7.6 m; as only relatively small
hydrocarbon pool fires are considered. Two expressions are given; one (equation 5.4-24) where
adequate drainage and fire fighting equipment exists and one (equation 5.4-25) where it does not.
Qabsorb = 43200 F A0.82 (5.4-24)
Qabsorb = 70900 F A0.82 (5.4-25)
where Qabsorb is the total heat absorbed (W), F is an environment factor and A is the total wetted
surface area (m2). The expression A0.82 is an area exposure factor which recognises that large
vessels are less likely than small ones to be completely exposed to the flame of an open fire. In the
likely confinement offshore, it would be more appropriate to use A rather than A0.82. The
environment factors are given in Table 5.4.4.

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Table 5.4-4 API 521 environment factors
Type of equipment Environment factor (F)

Bare vessel 1.0
Water deluge protected vessel 1.0
Depressurising and emptying facilities 1.0
Insulated (conductance 22.71 kWm-2K-1) vessel 0.3
Note that credit is only given for insulated vessels. API now makes it clear that the insulation must
be passive fire protection but the requirement is that the insulation material should function
effectively up to 904 °C. As is recognised by API, their approach is not suitable if the fire scenario
identified is more severe than a about 110 kWm-2 hydrocarbon pool fire e.g. a jet fire or a confined
hydrocarbon pool fire.
Hekkelstrand and Skulstad (2004) [X] consider slightly higher heat fluxes than API. They consider
small to medium size fires on the basis that the aim is to prevent escalation to a large fire. Two
figures are given for the incident heat fluxes from fuel-controlled fires. The local peak heat load is
used to calculate the rise in steel temperature and global average heat load is used to calculate the
pressure profile. Their incident heat fluxes for jet and pool fires are summarised in table 5.4.5.
Table 5.4.5 Global and local peak loads
Heat load Jet fire Pool fire

-1 -1
Leak rate > 2 kgs Leak rate* > 0.1 kgs
-2
Local peak (kWm ) 350 250 150
Global average (kWm-2) 100 0 100
* This calculation is for an object close to the fire.
Various rules are given for the application of these values and the original publication should be
consulted before use of the values given.
5.5.3.4 Effect of fire protection on heat transfer to vessels
5.5.3.4.1 Directed water deluge
No credit is given for directed deluge systems in API 521 [X] as the reliability of water application is
uncertain because of freezing weather, high winds, clogged systems, unreliable water supply and
vessel surface conditions that can prevent uniform water coverage. However, it is suggested that
systems designed to NFPA 15 [X] can be effective. NFPA specifies an application rate of
12 dm3m-2min-1. This is derived from small-scale pool fire trials where the application rate is taken
as the amount of water leaving the nozzles divided by the vessel surface area. The NFPA [X]
requirements for nozzle spacing and spray angle are very general. In practice, it is the amount of
water flowing over the surface of the vessel, which has the greatest influence on fire resistance. As
only between 35 % and 45 % of the water exiting the nozzles actually forms a film on the vessel

surface, a poorly designed system delivering the minimum requirement of 12 dm3m-2min-1 may not
even fully protect against a pool fire. Although the application requirement of 10 dm3m-2min-1 in the
FOC tentative rules (1979) [X]is lower than the NFPA [X] requirement, systems designed to these
will, in general, apply more water to the surface of the vessel as there is a more detailed
specification of the nozzle spacing (longitudinal and stand-off from the surface), numbers of rows
of nozzles and spray angle relative to the size of vessel.
There has been considerable interest in the use of directed deluge in protecting against jet fires.
White and Shirvill (1992) [X] have shown that deluge systems with the usual medium velocity
nozzles are not effective in protecting against natural gas jet fires. Lev (1995) [X] has suggested
that it may be possible with systems using high velocity nozzles and White and Shirvill (1992) [X]
suggest it may be possible with high velocity water monitors. Shirvill (2003) [X] has shown that a
system delivering about 17 dm3m-2min-1 is not effective is fully protecting (keeping the wall
temperature to 100 oC or less) vessels against 2 to 10 kgs-1 flashing liquid propane and butane jet
fires. Roberts et al. have shown that about 30 dm3m-2min-1 will protect 2 tonne vessels against
2 kgs-1 flashing liquid propane jet fires. Hankinson and Lowesmith (2003) [X] have looked at the
effectiveness of area and directed deluge in protecting against “live” jet fires. Davies and Nolan[X]
have empirically modelled the parameters for predicting the surface water coverage and have
developed a practical method for characterising the water coverage. All these recent results are
summarised in a special edition of the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process industries (March,
2003) [X]. Even though a directed deluge system may not be fully effective (primarily in protecting
the unwetted wall) in protecting against flashing liquid propane and butane jet fires, Shirvill [X]
suggests that the overall rate of heat transfer is reduced by 50 %. This is consistent with results
(Roberts, 2003) [X] from 20 % filled LPG tanks.
5.5.3.4.2 Passive fire protection
Roberts and Moodie (1989) [X] have shown that a range of fire protection materials are suitable for
protecting LPG tanks against hydrocarbon pool fires. As indicated previously, API (2005) [X] takes
reduced heat input into account by the use of environment factors. These environment factors are
calculated using equation 5.4-26.
kPFP ( 904 − Trelief )

F= (5.4-26)
66570 L
where kPFP is the thermal conductivity (Wm-1K-1) of the PFP, Trelief the temperature (°C) of the vessel
contents at relieving conditions and L is the thickness (m) of the insulation. API [X] provides
thermal conductivities for a range of materials but these may only be strictly applicable to
hydrocarbon pool fires.
In general, PFP materials that have successfully, i.e. meeting the required time to critical
temperature, passed a resistance to jet fire test (Jet Fire Working Group, 1995) [X] will be suitable
for protecting pressure vessels against jet fires. Roberts et al. (1995) [X] have shown that this is at
least true for LPG vessels. At present, there appear to be no standardised criteria for the protection
of pressure vessels. LPGA (2001) suggests that 90 minutes to reach 300 °C (the temperature at
which carbon steel starts to lose its strength) is suitable for LPG vessels. Higher temperature
criteria may be suitable for thicker walled (> 12 mm) vessels or for vessels made from steel alloys,
which maintain their strength to higher temperatures.
5.5.3.5 People
The response of people to fires is considered in Section 6.8. Hymes et al. (1996) [X] have
considered the physiological and pathological effects of thermal radiation and relate these to a
thermal load (note: dosage is usually taken as irradiation x time). The thermal load (s(Wm-2)4/310-4)
is given by:

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4
TL = t ( qrad ) 3 10−4 (5.4.22)
where t is the exposure time (s), qrad the radiation (Wm-2) received and 10-4 a convenient scaling
factor. The radiation received should be calculated from either the solid flame model if close to the
fire or the point source model if more than two flame widths/lengths away from the source.
From a major hazard perspective, there are two issues:

• How long can a worker continue to operate in an emergency system whilst exposed to a
given level of radiation?
• What fraction of the population will die or sustain injury given exposure to a certain dose of
radiation?
In regard to the former, API (2005) [X] provides permissible design thermal radiation levels for
personnel. These are given in Table 5.4-6 (Note: API 521 [X] should be consulted to consider
these in the context - disposal by flaring - in which they are given).
Table 5.4.6 API 521 permissible radiation design levels
Permissible
design level Conditions
(kWm-2)
Maximum radiant heat intensity at any location where urgent emergency action by
personnel is required. When personnel enter or work in an area with the potential for
9.46
radiant heat intensity greater than 6.31 kWm-2, then radiation shielding and/or special
protective apparel (e.g. a fire approach suit) should be considered a
Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting up to 30 s
6.31
may be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing b
Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting 2 to 3 minutes
4.73
may be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing b
Maximum radiant heat intensity at any location where personnel with appropriate
1.58
clothing b may be continuously exposed.
a
It is important to recognise that personnel with appropriate clothingb cannot tolerate thermal
radiation at 6.31 kWm-2 for more than a few seconds.
b
Appropriate clothing consists of hard hat, long-sleeved shirts with cuffs buttoned, work gloves,
long-legged pants and work shoes. Appropriate clothing minimises direct skin exposure to thermal
radiation.
The lethality to the population is usually addressed by probit or logit analysis. The two commonly
used probit relations for fatality are:
Eisenberg (based on nuclear bomb data) Y = −14.9 + 2.56 ln ( X ) (5.4.28)
where X = t qrad
43
Lees (valid up to 70% mortality) Y = −10.7 + 1.99 ln ( Z X ) (5.4.29)
where ZX is a function of X depending on whether clothing ignites.
Hymes et al. [X] gives doses for probability of 1 % and 50 % lethality as 1050 s(Wm-2)4/310-4 and
2300 s(Wm-2)4/310-4 respectively. These correspond to a radiation dose of 8.6 kWm-2 for 1 minute
or 2.6 kWm-2 for 5 minutes for 1 % lethality and 15.4 kWm-2 for 5 minutes for 50 % lethality.

More details on using these and other methods are given by Lees et al. (1996) [X]. The response
of personnel is considered further in Section 6.8.
5.6 A methodology for an initial fire QRA

An initial conservative QRA associated with the fire hazards on an installation can be undertaken
using the typical thermal loading values presented in Sub-section 5.4 and the response
methodology of Sub-section 5.4. Such an assessment should consider:
• A range of fire scenarios and sizes – particularly from high pressure areas.
• The impact of operation or non-operation of ESD valves.
• The impact of operation or failure of the water deluge system.
• High risk areas - where escalation might result in a short time, near escape routes, where
impact on Safety Critical Systems may occur, where structural integrity might be affected.
• Transition to other events – escalation to a larger fire or potential for an explosion.
The focus is primarily on the risk within the first 15 minutes whilst personnel are likely to be present
and trying to escape. However, if required, this can be extended to later times when the impact on
the asset may be considered.
If this assessment suggests that the risks are well understood and broadly acceptable, then it is
likely that the installation is falling into the Type A category of UKOOA Framework for Risk Related
Decision Support.
Otherwise, a more detailed analysis is warranted. This may mean using mathematical models,
(which should be validated against a wide range of large scale experimental data), to predict
spatial and time varying fire behaviour and thermal loading. More sophisticated calculation
techniques could also be used to predict the response of vessels and structures impacted by these
fires. Additional preventative and mitigation measures may need to be considered and a detailed
QRA undertaken.

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6. Response to fires
6.1 Introduction
The most effective way of achieving structural safety and reducing loss of life is not by using large
amounts of passive fire protection and specifying long fire resistance periods. It is by proper
management and training and by installing active systems such as detection, deluge and water
mist. The skill in defining the design scenarios is also very important. Reliance on applied fire
protection is the last line of defence.
There is evidence from fires in buildings in North America and Europe that fire protection to
structural steel is capable of rendering the structure reusable after a fire. Following a fire in a
building with applied fire protection, the building would reasonably be expected to be repairable
The fire tests in the UK at Cardington showed that a comparatively simple structure, with many
unprotected beams, could withstand large deformations without any collapse. Large deformation of
the floors occurred but applied loads were resisted with membrane action.
There are some similarities and many differences between the Cardington structure and offshore
structures. The building was designed as a simple structure with simply supported beams
supporting a composite floor (lightly reinforced concrete on a profiled steel deck). The columns
were continuous. Horizontal loads were resisted by a bracing system. The composite floors were,
structurally, not too dissimilar to those that one might find offshore and similar performance in fire
might be expected. Thus a beam and plated floor system used offshore will be able to support
appreciable distributed load in fire by membrane action.
The main difference between buildings and offshore structures is in the amount of welded
construction and amount of continuity. Offshore structures have a high degree of redundancy. This
may or may not be beneficial in fire. If the effects of restrained thermal expansion are not critical
then redundancy will probably be beneficial. But the potential forces generated by restrained
expansion are very large.
Any offshore structure should be able to withstand a small intense fire at any location without
collapse. As the fire considered gets larger, the point will be reached where the time to collapse is
the only relevant question. In a hydrocarbon fire, no unprotected steel will be able to carry any
appreciable load after about 5 minutes. Fire protection systems are normally not rated beyond 120
minutes and there is no guarantee that in a real fire they will perform as well. There are forms of
construction which can withstand hydrocarbon fires without applied fire protection. A simple (but
costly) approach is to put a tube within a tube and fill the gap with grout. For simple legs this may
be practical but for a complex truss it could be problematic.
In assessing the inherent safety, the effect of cooling should not be forgotten. As discussed earlier,
members can exert large forces on their supports, on cooling. To reduce this effect, it is important
to build sufficient ductility effect into the structure. The design of critical connections requires
careful consideration.
The reliability of any design will depend on the skill in identifying the correct design scenarios and
in selecting the most reliable method of analysis. Simple design methods are not inherently safer
than advanced FE models. The reliability of simple methods is unknown and their use should be
restricted to situations with simple boundary conditions.
As part of the design scenario, the selection of the applied load cases is important. It is always
possible to err on the conservative side and chose high values. This will lead to a safer structure
but loss of economy. Sensitivity analyses will assist in achieving a balance.

6.2 Review of effects of fire and nature of failures
6.2.1 Types of fire
We intend to put a distillation this text into 3.2
Missing: 1. Discuss mechanisms of failure
2. By reference to tests and actual incident data show how fires and failure used in
assessments are realistic (if possible!)
3. Put special emphasis on the failure of some key items like risers, jacket legs and
other primary structure
6.2.1.1 General
There are two main types of hydrocarbon fires – pool and jet and there are many subdivisions of
these. For example a pool fire may be an open fire on the sea or it might be contained within the
structure. Flames from an open fire would also be deflected by the wind. The thermal response of
the structure would depend on whether it was outside the fire or engulfed and on the severity of the
fire.
Although pool and jet fires have the greatest potential to cause structural damage there are other
types of fire which may occur offshore. These are very short duration fires which should not cause
major structural damage.
CLOUD FIRE: A transient fire resulting from the ignition of a cloud of gas or vapour and not subject
to significant flame acceleration via the effects of confinement or turbulence. It can therefore only
occur after a relatively slow release of hydrocarbon and in an open, free space.
FIREBALL: The rapid turbulent combustion of fuel as an expanding, usually rising ball of flame. It is
more intense than a cloud fire and can be close to an explosion.
BLEVE: A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion which results from the sudden failure of a
vessel containing a pressurised liquid at a temperature well above its normal (atmospheric) boiling
point.
In addition there are the Standard Fire resistance test fires for hydrocarbon fires which include
tests for jet fires.
Additional information on types of fire and selection of fire scenarios may be found in Fabig
Technical Note No.1 [sci 1] [X]
Table 6.1 Potential Durations of Different Fire Types
Type of fire Potential duration

Cloud fire Seconds
Fireball/BLEVE Seconds
Pool fire Hours
Running fire Hours
Jet or spray fire Hours
Cellulosic fire hours

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6.2.1.2 Pool fire
A pool fire can be defined as a turbulent diffusion fire burning above a horizontal pool of vaporising
hydrocarbon fuel under conditions where the fuel has zero or very low initial momentum.
A key feature of these fires is that there is a degree of feedback between the fire and fuel in that, to
a greater or lesser extent, heat transfer back from the fire to the pool influences or even controls
the rate of evaporation and hence the fire size and other characteristics.
The fuel pool is not necessarily static. It may be spreading or contracting. Additional fuel could be
coming from a leak. Depletion of the local fuel supply can occur via drainage or overflow to other
areas, perhaps giving rise to running liquid fires. The fire has inertia in that it takes time to develop
and cannot be quickly eliminated by isolating the fuel supply.
Running liquid fires are broadly similar to pool fires in that they rely on thermal feedback from the
flame for their fuel vapour supply, but the liquid fuel can be on surfaces of any orientation and in
motion.
There a number of numerical models for pool fires. These include the effects of flame geometry
and radiation characteristics.
6.2.1.3 Jet fire
A jet fire is a turbulent diffusion flame resulting from the combustion of a fuel continuously released
with some significant momentum in a particular direction.
Source momentum, and hence directionality distinguishes a jet fire from a pool fire.
A second distinction is the absence in jet fires of any direct feedback from the fire to the source.
The latter means that the evolution of their behaviour in compartments may be different from that
of pool fires. It also means that jet fire hazards can be treated more deterministically because at
least the mass flow rate and its behaviour with time is determined to a first order by the leak
characteristics, the inventory and the blowdown characteristics.
Unlike pool fires, jet fires have zero inertia and they reach full intensity almost instantaneously. In
principle they can also be turned off very quickly, and this has important consequences for control
and isolation strategies.
Size, location, directionality, duration, temporal variation, smoke generation and thermal output are
all significant characteristics to consider. A fire may also change characteristics, for example, a
running liquid fire could burn back to the fuel source thus becoming a jet fire. A jet fire could also
change into a pool fire as inventory pressure decays.
6.2.1.4 Temperatures – this doesn’t need to be a section on its own but could be part of the
introduction
In any hydrocarbon fire flame temperatures can be in excess of 1500ºC and temperatures of close
to 1800ºC have been recorded. The max temperature will depend on the size of the fire and the
degree of ventilation.
6.2.1.5 Standard hydrocarbon fire test I feel this should come near the end as a validation
and measure of fire effects
In a hydrocarbon fire resistance test[sci 2, 3, 4], the gas temperature is increased to 1100ºC in
about 20 minutes and then held constant.
The temperature time curve of the ISO and BS hydrocarbon test fires are compared with the
standard cellulosic fire in Figure 6.1.

Fire resistance tests are generally only useful for comparing the performance of different products
under constant conditions. Regulations and specifications will often refer to a performance
standard measured in a fire resistance test. Extrapolation to real fire behaviour can sometimes be
misleading. This should be part of a section covering resistance to or comparison of effects
The results of a hydrocarbon fire test are often expressed as H60 or H90 etc.
1200
Hydrocarbon
1000
800
Temperature (°C)
Cellulosic
600
400
200
0
0 30 60 90 120
Time (mins)
Figure 6.1 Time temperature curves for hydrocarbon and cellulosic fires in fire
resistance tests
6.2.1.6 Jet fire test
A new British Standard is being developed. It is intended to take the place of a full scale test (add
figure) which is prohibitively expensive. In the small scale test, the conditions are designed to
mimic the severe conditions of a much larger fire. The standard is similar to a new draft ISO
standard, ISO/CD 22899-1[sci 5].
The method provides an indication of how passive fire protection materials perform in a jet fire that
may occur. Jet fires give rise to high convective and radiative heat fluxes as well as high erosive
forces. In the test, a sonic release of a gas (0.3 kg s-1) is aimed into a shallow chamber, producing
a fireball with an extended tail. Propane is used as the fuel. High erosive forces are generated by
release of the sonic velocity at about 1000 mm from specimen surface.
The results from the small scale test have been compared with full scale jet fire test results from
four testing establishment laboratories.
The test standard gives guidance on the use of the test result and its application to the assessment
of passive fire protection material.
6.2.1.7 Thermal response of structural elements
The net heat flux received by a piece of steel at 300 °C engulfed in a fire for various fire
temperatures is given in Table 6.2.

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Table 6.2 Heat flux and temperature
Flame temperature Heat flux

Comment
(ºC) (kW/m2)
900 90 Less than 5 minutes in a standard hydrocarbon fire test

1000 130
1100 180 Standard hydrocarbon fire test
1200 230
1500 500
1700 770
For a pool fire, typical values of heat flux to an engulfed object on the open deck are 100 to
160 kW/m2. For a very large (~40 metre diameter) fire the flux could be up to 300 kW/m2.
In a hydrocarbon fire, unprotected steel will heat very quickly and will reach temperatures
associated with structural collapse in 5 minutes or so.
6.2.2 Type of failure –this stays and add definitions of failure
Missing: Discuss vulnerability of structure, process plant etc. (forward refer to where personnel
are discussed)
6.2.2.1 General
Structural failure in fire can take many forms and is often a subjective concept – this needs more
explanation of why this is so!. On the other hand structural damage – this if fine but needs to be
introduced as a clear concept (which is what this section is supposed to be about) is more common
but may not involve actual failure. When viewed in limit state terms, failure is any unwanted
occurrence and may take the form of anything from excessive deformation to total collapse.
In a fire, a structure has to carry the applied loads at the time but it also is subject to thermally
induced loading which may, for some elements be more severe. The thermally induced loads are
caused by restrained thermal expansion. This should be explained more fully and then the
following sections can be introduced. The failure types covered in 6.2.2.1.1 should be summarised
here and then dealt with.
Needs a section up front to discuss failure modes, yield, deformation limits to deformation, residual
strength, impairment to design life etc. Then go on to discuss acceptance criteria, this takes it back
to the tests and their relevance again then it could look at specific failure modes arising from fire
hazard events.
6.2.2.2 Thermally induced deformation
6.2.2.2.1 Linear expansion
Expansion is difficult to resist and a heated member can exert extremely large forces at its
supports. Fully restrained steel will yield at a temperature below 200ºC, the exact temperature
depends on the grade of steel. A beam, designed to resist bending, has a relatively large axial
resistance and, if restrained, may have an affect structure at some distance from any source of
heat. In building fires, damage to bracing members has been observed 40 metres away from the
fire.
6.2.2.2.2 Buckling
Restrained members may buckle to relieve induced compression. For simply supported members
this may not cause a problem but, for continuous members, bending resistance at supports may be
lost. Buckled steel can cause problems on cooling as the buckling may not be reversed and the
steel becomes shorter than its initial length. Connections may be pulled apart. Potentially the
tensile force generated is equal to the yield resistance of the member. Failures have been
observed in both bolted and welded connections and also in the section itself.
Buckling can also occur in any member in compression, when the buckling resistance falls to the
level of the applied or design load. The onset of this type of buckling may be exacerbated by axial
restraint. However, often, if supporting structure is capable of exerting compressive restraint, then
it is also capable of taking up load when a member starts to buckle. This is a complex mechanism
which depends on the extent of a fire as well as the structural form.
6.2.2.2.3 Thermal bowing
Any section which is non-uniformly heated will tend to bow. For most sections the free bowing is a
simple function of the temperature difference across the section. A 500mm deep section, 12
metres long, with a temperature difference of 300ºC will bow by about 125 mm. A linear gradient
will cause no stress in a steel member. A non-linear gradient will cause longitudinal shear stresses
to be induced. In some types of partially protected steel beam, compression flanges can, in the
early stages of a fire, go into tension.
In a continuous member, thermal bowing will lead to very large induced restraining moments which
are added to any existing moments (Figure 6.2). This can lead to failure of connections and
buckling of compression flanges and webs.
Deformation caused by thermal bowing can cause disruption of services and effect equipment
performance.
Increase due to
thermal bowing
Figure 6.2. The effect of thermal bowing on the bending moment in a continuous beam.
6.2.2.3 Load induced phenomena
6.2.2.3.1 Bending
Beams will generally withstand large deformations before they are unable to support their design
load. In fire tests and actual fires deformations in excess of span/20 are common.
Continuous beams may be more vulnerable because of the addition of thermally induced moments
at their ends. This may make laterally torsional buckling of some cross sections more likely.
In many forms of construction, as deformations increase, tensile membrane action may become
increasingly dominant. In plated construction, this will supplement the bending resistance and can
sometimes carry all imposed loads.

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Often, if a beam supports a plated floor, the beam and plate can act together in fire, although not
designed to do so. This can enhance strength and stiffness.
Large deformations due to loss of bending stiffness will affect connections, as described above.
6.2.2.3.2 Tension
Tension members will lose strength in direct proportion to the loss of yield strength. Isolated
tension members are rare in any structure so, as a tension member loses strength and lengthens
under load, loads redistribution tend to occur. Elongation can be significant. At 550ºC, a tension
member carrying 50% of its normal resistance will elongate by about 1.25%. This Assumes a
stress induced component of 0.5% and a thermal expansion component of about 0.75%. For a 6
metre length this is 75mm.
6.2.2.3.3 Compression
A member in compression will fail at a lower temperature (about 80ºC lower than a bending
member at the same load level). This is because the stiffness of carbon steel reduces at a faster
rate than the strength.
For most compression members, the applied stress in fire may be increased due to restrained
thermal expansion, see above.
No torsion equivalent?
6.2.2.4 Brittle and ductile failure – this comes back to the earlier comment about defining
failure and damage and the differences between them, the proceeding to catalogue
failure and damage types
Generally, in highly redundant structures, any mode of failure will be ductile as there will be
redistribution of load. However, failures such as those caused by induced thermal stresses on
welds and bolts will be brittle but may be followed by an immediate redistribution of load to other
parts. The consequences of the failure of large elements in redundant structures needs careful
consideration.
As damage and local failures accumulate, the final failure may be sudden as redistribution of load
becomes impossible.
In a steel structure with a high degree of redundancy, the likelihood of progressive collapse is low.
Progressive collapse, as witnessed at The World Trade Centre, occurs when the momentum of a
collapsing part of the structure causes the remaining structure to collapse. It can occur in badly
designed buildings but is unlikely to be a problem on most offshore structures.

6.2.2.5 Examples of structures following fire
Figure 6.3 Tensile membrane action in the web of a beam
(photo by permission of Corus plc, see also ref [sci 7] and [sci 8])
Shear capacity maintained

by unsplit side of plate
Tensile force induced

on cooling
Fractured
end plate
Typical split in connection
occurring on cooling
Figure 6.4 Failure of a welded connection on cooling
(photo by permission of BRE, see also ref [sci 7])

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Any available pictures please?
Offshore example 1 Fig 5.5
Any available pictures please?
Offshore example 1 Fig 6.5
6.2.3 Escalation issues
The discussion of failure in Sub-section 6.2.2, leads onto a major issue for the robust design of
installations against major accident hazards. The failure of a component or part of a system may
give rise to a cascading series of events leading to catastrophic failure or loss of life.
A systematic, structured approach to escalation analysis should be adopted to determine if, how
and when an event can escalate to endanger personnel.
The escalation analysis should comprise:

• The assessment of potential escalation paths from an initiating event towards a major
accident hazard as defined in the Safety Case or towards a “safe” shutdown
• Identification of the mechanisms by which that initial event could escalate to impinge on key
safety systems or facilities (such that the available safety systems can no longer function to
slow or stop the escalation)
• Evaluation of the probability of each escalation path and the time duration from the initial
event.
Appropriate consideration should also be given to the actions of key personnel in responding to an
incident, taking into account the effects of the hazard under review. In the case of fire, these effects
would comprise heat, smoke other products of combustion, the impacts to be considered would be
injury, burns, obscuration of vision and impaired breathing and judgement. The growing scale of
the incident should be understood and the dynamic of the incident growth such that there were not
unrealistic expectations of personnel performance, e.g. speed of running, ability to carry or assist
injured colleagues etc.
This assessment should include how operators have contributed to the detection of the fires
(especially in the case of a Normally Unattended Installation) as well as how they respond. The
speed and accuracy of detection will impact the potential escalation paths of the initiating incident
and if additional detection information from operating personnel contributes to an accurate
diagnosis of the event underway, this should be included in the emergency response assessment.
In the UKCS, the requirement for defining Safety Critical Elements is included in Statutory
Instrument 1996 No. 913 “The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc.)
Regulations 1996,” [X] where Safety Critical Elements means “such parts of an installation and
such of its plant (including computer programmes), or any part thereof -
• the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to; or
• a purpose of which is to prevent, or limit the effect of,
a major accident.
It can be seen that equipment or devices that prevent, slow or stop the escalation are by definition
safety critical elements. The discussions of acceptance criteria (Section 6.3) and failure (see
Section 6.4) should be linked to the review of methods of prevention (Section 3.3), detection and
control (Section 3.4) and mitigation (Sub-section 3.5). The consolidation if these issues will
contribute to the definition of the Performance Standards (see Sub-section 3.6) in the context of
fire hazards and their management mechanisms.

A summary table of more obvious elements (the failure of) which may give rise to escalation and to
which the above issues should be applied may be found below.
Tabulation of safety critical element failure or loss of function with respect to fire hazards
System or Safety critical element failure or Performance Standard Requirement

equipment loss of function (with respect to fire escalation
category normally part of survivability
characteristics - see other parts of
Sections 6 & 7 of this Guidance)
Primary Failure is direct cause of major – Resistance to defined fire loads for a given
structure (catastrophic) structural collapse duration
– Residual strength requirement defined
Secondary Failure allows shifting of load paths and – Resistance to defined fire loads for a given
structure generation of contributory increased duration
loads (ultimately) to primary structure – Residual strength requirement defined
Supporting Failure allows – Resistance to defined fire loads for a given
steelwork for distortion/movement/collapse of duration
vessels/piping hydrocarbon containing vessels and – Limits to movement are defined
piping with subsequent loss of
containment integrity
Supporting Failure allows distortion/movement/ – Resistance to defined fire loads for a given
steelwork for collapse of rotating equipment/ lifting duration
equipment equipment/ utilities leading to potential – Limits to movement are defined
loss of containment integrity/ equipment
failure/generation of dropped objects/
missiles/ potential loss of power for
some safety systems (control, ESD,
detection, active protection etc.)
steelwork for distortion/movement/collapse of areas duration
accommodation/ of key hazard control and places of – Limits to movement are defined
control/ muster safety/embarkation for POB
– Limits to loss of airtight integrity defined
areas/TR
– Residual strength requirement defined
steelwork for distortion/movement/collapse of access duration
flooring/ access for POB to places of hazard – Limits to movement are defined
ways control/safety/embarkation
Vessels/ main Failure leads directly to loss of – Resistance to defined fire loads for a given
piping containment integrity in hydrocarbon duration
containing vessels and piping – Resistance to impact and explosion loads
also defined
Vessel Failure leads to small leaks (loss of – Resistance to defined fire loads for a given
appurtenances/ containment integrity in hydrocarbon duration
small bore piping containing vessels and piping) with – Resistance to impact and explosion loads
potential for further fires and explosions also defined
Gas detection Fire from small event may disable – Event size and time delay before triggering
systems to detect further escalating defined
events – Generally resistance to fire and other
hazard loads impractical, continuing
function achieved by redundancy

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System or Safety critical element failure or Performance Standard Requirement

equipment loss of function (with respect to fire escalation
category normally part of survivability
characteristics - see other parts of
Sections 6 & 7 of this Guidance)
Fire detection As above – Event size and time delay before triggering
defined
– Generally resistance to direct impingement
of fire and other hazard loads impractical,
continuing function achieved by
redundancy
Blast walls Blast walls usually have protective – Resistance to impact and explosion loads
requirement with respect to fires as well defined
as explosions, loss of fire resistance – Resistance to defined fire loads for a given
integrity following an initial blast will duration following initial events also
potentially allow spread of fire hazard to defined
other areas
Active fire Failure leads to loss of control and – Resistance to impact and explosion loads
protection hence allows unimpeded escalation of defined (where possible)
systems the initial event – Generally resistance to direct impingement
of fire and other hazard loads impractical,
continuing function achieved by
redundancy
Passive fire Failure leads to loss of mitigation and – Resistance to impact and explosion loads
protection fire resistance on adjacent defined (where possible)
systems systems/steelwork and hence – Resistance to direct impingement of fire
eliminates or impairs any slowing of the and other hazard loads may be impractical,
escalation from an initial event continuing function achieved by diversity
within suite of safety systems
HVAC Failure of closure or redirect aspects of – Resistance to impact and explosion loads
HVAC leads to loss of a control system defined (where possible)
for unignited gas and products of – Resistance to direct impingement of fire
combustion, allowing unimpeded and other hazard loads may be impractical,
escalation of the initial event continuing function achieved by diversity
within suite of safety systems
If a major fire occurs then safety of the occupants is the major priority. It is important to give
occupants sufficient time, either to escape or to sit it out in a safe refuge until the danger has
passed. Depending on the location of a fire, any escape route must be adequately insulated to be
tenable.
Structurally, deformation leading to disruption of another system, or leading to an escape route or

refuge becoming untenable must be considered to be failure. Deformation is controlled by design
(computer simulation etc) and by the application of passive protection.
For further details on impacts to human beings and therefore understanding the limits to
escalation, see Section 6.8.
6.3 Acceptance criteria

6.3.1 General
Structures are designed for several limit states and what is acceptable for one limit state may not
be acceptable for another. When considering collapse, deformation may not be considered, but

when considering effects on safety critical elements and disruption to production, deformation is
clearly important.
In fire, acceptance criteria are set for any components tested in a standard fire resistance test. Not
sure this is true, this should cross-refer the issues discussed in escalation (6.2.3) In addition, in
critical areas more stringent requirements may be set by the safety authorities or specified by the
client.
The most straightforward criteria are the failure criteria specified in fire resistance test standards.
I thought the standard tests were not acceptance criteria but were benchmarks for assigning
acceptable performance standards.
6.3.2 Criteria used in standard fire tests
Fire resistance test standards such as BS476, ISO834 [X] or EN1363 [X] use three failure criteria
for structural elements They provide a means of quantifying the ability of an element to withstand
exposure to high temperatures, by setting criteria by which the loadbearing capacity, the fire
containment (integrity) and thermal transmittance (insulation) functions can be evaluated.
Linear structural elements such as beam only have to satisfy the load bearing criterion as they are
do not form a barrier to the spread of a fire. Separating elements, which directly prevent the spread
of fire, such as a bulkhead have to satisfy all three criteria.
For buildings, as a consequence of European Harmonization, fire resistance is increasingly being

expressed in terms of R,E,I (define). This terminology may be adopted for offshore structures in
due course.
• Resistance to collapse (R), i.e. the ability to maintain loadbearing capacity (which applies to
loadbearing elements only) or the ability not to collapse (non-loadbearing elements only)
The use of the term “resistance to collapse” can be applied to load bearing and non-
loadbearing elements and as such is preferred.
For loaded beams and floors, failure is deemed to occur when the deflection reaches
span/20 or, when the deflection is greater than span/20, the rate of deflection exceeds
span2/(9000D). D is the distance from the top of the element to the bottom of the design
tension zone. All dimensions are in millimetres. As well as experiencing large deformations
beams experience large strains. Tests and calculation have shown that strains in excess of
3% are common in the bottom of an “I” section beam in a fire test. (How do you normally
refer to an “I” section, with or without quotes?
For steel beams, the application of any of the deformation criteria will have a small effect as
the difference between the time to collapse and the time when any of the criteria might
apply is small.
• Fire containment or the resistance to fire penetration (E), i.e. an ability to maintain the
integrity of the element against the penetration of flames and hot gases (this applies to fire-
separating elements).
Integrity failures should be rare in fire resistance tests for essentially steel elements.
Problems are more likely to occur in actual fires at junctions between elements.
• Thermal transmittance refers to the resistance to the transfer of excessive heat (I), i.e. an
ability to provide insulation from high temperatures (this applies to fire separating elements)
An insulation failure is deemed to occur when the average temperature rise on the
unexposed face of a separating element exceeds 140ºC or the maximum temperature rise
exceeds 180ºC, whichever occurs first. These limits are to prevent combustion of any

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material which may be close to the unexposed face. Their origins are unknown and, in
many cases, the limits may be excessively conservative.
In a fire test an insulation failure will occur because the insulation is not adequate, or, it may
occur because the insulation becomes detached, often called a stickability failure. Often
tests on vertical separating elements are carried out on unloaded, unrestrained elements.
Results from such tests must be interpreted with care and the systems tested must be
carefully installed.
Table 6.3 Performance Requirements for Elements of Construction
Component Requirement
Loadbearing beams and columns R
loadbearing floors, walls and partitions R,E,I
non loadbearing separating floors, walls and partitions E,I
6.3.3 Relationship between criteria used in standard fire tests and actual
performance in real fires.
In the UK, fire tests are carried out on small elements. Beams generally have a span of 4.5 m and
columns, which in any case are rarely tested, are 3.2 m high. Wall panels are tested at 3 m x 3 m.
Elements in real structures are often many times the size tested or have no associated test
evidence. Structurally, there will often be little to learn from a Standard Fire Test and designers
must look elsewhere, at the limited evidence available from some large scale tests or rely on their
FE models. Even if the test is considered to be reasonable, any time measured in the test should
not be thought as actual time in any real fire.
In many cases, for a passive fire protection material, the results of fire resistance tests are all the
information that is available. Designers must decide whether the heating regime in the test
adequately represents the design scenario. If it is important to limit deformation then, interestingly,
the stickability of the material and its ability to deform is less important than it would be for a case
in which large deformations or strains are permitted.
Fire resistance test results on passive fire protection tests in the cellulosic fire should be used with
extreme care when considering performance in any hydrocarbon fire.
6.4 Definition of failure this should come right up front! – and there should
be more of it.
6.4.1 General
As stated earlier, when viewed in limit state terms, failure is any unwanted occurrence. When
carrying out any design, it is important that the failure criteria are understood by all parties. It is
also important that the consequences of minor failures on system are analysed with respect to their
effects on other systems. For example, a minor structural failure could lead to the fracture of a pipe
or breakdown in an electrical system.
Another consideration is repair. Has something failed if it does not have to be repaired? Minor
residual deformations following a fire may not impair the function of the component or any other
component and can probably not be described as failure.
Loss of support integrity is missing –

6.4.2 Loss of compartmentation
Fire spread by loss of compartmentation will increase the likelihood of most types of failure so, loss
of compartmentation is one of the most important types of failure. Regulations refer to loss of
insulation and loss of integrity. When considering a component in isolation, especially in a fire
resistance test, These criteria may be simple to achieve. In the test, a combination of good
detailing and a suitable thickness of insulation will normally suffice. However, when a component,
such as bulkhead is built into an offshore structure, the interaction between the bulkhead and its
boundaries must be considered. Restrained thermal expansion can lead to buckling which may
dislodge fire protection material. Boards and thick sprays will be effected the most. Intumescent
coatings will normally be sufficiently flexible.
Intumescent coatings will not protect against a loss of insulation. Their activation temperature is
generally greater than the limit on temperature rise (140 °C).
The biggest problem is in preventing gaps opening up through which the fire might spread.
Awareness and good detailing are probably the best ways to prevent this type of fire spread.
Designers should be aware of the likely magnitude of any gaps. In some circumstances the use of
intumescent mastic may be of use.
Frequently compartment boundaries will be penetrated by pipe work or some form of duct.
Maintenance of compartmentation will normally depend on the performance of a proprietary
penetration seal for which there should be suitable test evidence and careful installation and
regular inspection.
6.4.3 Asset protection
Both small and large fires can damage the structure making repair necessary. Damage can be
controlled by detection and suppression systems (Outside the scope of this guidance) or by the
application of passive protection. In a highly redundant structure, small fires can cause
disproportionate damage because of thermal expansion (discussed earlier).
Following a fire, passive protection that may have been heated may have to be replaced as it may
have suffered a “change of state”. Some board or sprayed materials may have lost water of
crystallisation and will no longer give the same level of protection. Intumescent coatings that have
not started to intumesce need careful assessment as the binders may have started to decompose.
Specialist advice should be sought.
Structural damage may occur during cooling (see above). A heat effected area can exert very high
tensile forces on its boundaries during cooling.
6.5 Methods of assessment

6.5.1 General
There are two possible approaches to carrying out structural analysis for the fire condition. Design
codes such as BS5950-8 [sci 9] and EC3-1-2 [sci 10] offer simple ways of checking elements.
However, the codes were written for building structures and may not always be suitable for highly
redundant offshore structures. Alternatively there are various types of finite element analysis
available which are capable of analysing large substructures or even the whole structure. It is also
possible to simply modify the existing “normal” or cold analysis by adopting elevated temperature
material properties.
In order to analyse any structure in fire a thermal model is required. For simple linear elements, all
that is required is the temperature distribution across the section at the mid point. This may be
computed using a 2D thermal analysis. For more complex elements and whole structures, ideally,

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the complete temperature history of all parts of the structure is required although some
simplification may be possible.
In carrying out a thermal analysis, the modelling of proprietary fire protection is not straightforward.
For fairly simple insulating materials, it should be possible to obtain a reasonable estimate of the
thermal properties. Intumescent materials behave in a very complex manner, as they react
differently in different situations. The local thickness of steel and the heating rate are important.
When carrying out any analysis, it is necessary to establish the applied loads on the structure.
BS5950-8 [X] and EC3-1-2 [X] allow loads to be reduced below the normal design values in fire as
it is considered that the probability of fire and full design load occurring at the same time is rare.
BS5950 is slightly more conservative than the Eurocodes. For an offshore structure, the partial
factors should be agreed between all parties.
It is also important to use appropriate mechanical material properties. BS5950-8 and EC3-1-2
effectively specify identical material properties for use in fire. However, BS5950 specifies different
strain limits for different types of element and mode of behaviour.
1. 2% for composite members in bending which are unprotected or protected with fire
protection materials which have demonstrated their ability to remain intact at this level
of strain
2. 1.5% for non-composite members in bending which are unprotected or protected with
fire protection materials which have demonstrated their ability to remain intact at this
level of strain
3. 0.5% for members not covered in a) or b)
The main use of the strain limits in is in calculating the plastic bending resistance of a beam. EC3
does not distinguish between these cases and effectively uses 2% strain in all cases. It is
recommended that the more conservative BS5950-8 approach is not followed.
It is conventional to assume that the section classification does not change in fire when carrying
the simple code checks. In some cases, the theoretical classification may change but it is generally
considered that the accuracy of the available material properties does not justify reclassification.
6.5.2 Selection of design cases – this should have a better introduction and come
earlier in the chapter
6.5.2.1 General
Compared with the normal design conditions fire is comparatively rare. It is not therefore
reasonable to consider the combination of fire with the most onerous of the other design cases.
The combination of cases should be agreed by all parties.
6.5.2.2 Partial factors for fire
In determining the structural resistance required, the applied loads on the structure at the time of
fire must be calculated. Both BS 5950-8 [X] and the Eurocodes allow reductions in some applied
loads in fire reflecting the accidental limit state. These reductions, which are for buildings, are
summarised in Table 6.4. For BS5950-8, the reductions are expressed as factors, for the
Eurocodes the reductions are expressed as Ψ1,1 factors. The use of Ψ1,1, rather than Ψ2,1, is
expected to be recommended in the UK National Annex to EC1-1-2 [X].
In fire, the applied force or moment is given by:
Gk + Ψ fi Qk ,1

where
Gk is the characteristic value of a permanent action
Qk,1 is the characteristic value of the leading variable action 1
ψ fi is the combination factor for fire situation, given either by (frequent value) or (quasi-
permanent value) according to paragraph 4.3.1(2) of EN 1991-1-2 [X]
It is expected that, in the UK, the more conservative frequent value, ψ1,1, will be used for ψfi
Table 6.4. Applied load reductions in fire
Type of load Location/type BS 5950-8 Eurocode

γf ψ1,1
Imposed Office 0.5 0.5
Escape stairs and lobbies 1.0 0.7
Other (including residential) 0.8 0.5
Storage 1.0 0.9
Snow Zero 0.2
Wind 0.33 0.2
Permanent All 1.0 1.0
The values in the above table have been derived for buildings and may not be applicable to
offshore structures. They are based on statistical evidence and are almost certainly conservative. It
should be possible to derive similar information for offshore structures and subsequently eliminate
possible costly over design.
As an illustration of what might happen consider wind loading. The design case for wind might be
for a once in 50 years gust. During a fire, a structure might be vulnerable for a few hours. For the
same level of reliability, the wind load might be only 20 % of the 50 year level.
6.5.3 Methods of analysis
6.5.3.1 Member analysis
In a member analysis, the applied loads are calculated using the appropriate partial load factors.
The end reactions are generally calculated making the same assumptions that were made for the
initial design. The effects of thermal restraint and any second order or P-delta effects are ignored.
Only load carrying ability is considered so deformations are ignored.
For compression members it is normal to consider the possibility that the degree of end fixity may
increase in fire leading to a reduction in effective length. Codes such as EC3-1-2, allow the
effective length in fire to be 50% of the system length, although, in the UK this may be
conservatively limited to 70%. The reduction is based on two factors. Firstly, in a building a column
will be constructed as a continuous member and secondly, it can reasonably be expected that the
temperature at the ends will not be as high as at the mid-height position.
The method is useful for beams or columns which are not heavily restrained and for simple ties.

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6.5.3.2 Finite element models
6.5.3.2.1 General
Finite element models can range from frame models with simple linear elements to complex
models utilising a number of element types.
6.5.3.2.2 Frame models
Trusses comprising slender members or portal-like structures can be analysed as simple frames,
however the analysis should be non-linear and capable of dealing with large displacements. Ideally
the models should be 3D as 2D will not pick up some buckling modes.
6.5.3.2.3 Complex models
Complex finite element models should give the best prediction of structural performance. However,
any model is only as good as its input data. There is little point carrying out an expensive FE
analyses unless the thermal history is known with a degree of confidence and the design scenarios
assumed are reasonable. For more information on FE modelling see Sub-section 6.5.8.
6.5.3.2.4 Modified “cold” model
It is sometimes reasonable to use the same structural model as was used for the normal, cold,
design in fire. Applied loads are appropriately factored and elevated temperature values for yield
stress and Young’s modulus are used. For a structure, or parts of the structure, which are not
highly restrained or which are not highly redundant the method may give reasonable answers but it
is impossible to say whether the results from such an analysis are conservative or unconservative.
6.5.4 Material properties
6.5.4.1 Mechanical
For simple beams or ties, the yield strength at elevated temperature is all that is required. For a
compression member the yield and the elevated temperature value for Young’s modulus is
required. For a complex FE analysis, the complete stress-strain curves at elevated temperature are
required. The most comprehensive source of material properties for the common structural carbon
steels is EC3-1-2. (S235, S275, S355, S420 and S460 of EN 10025, EN 10210-1 and EN 10219-
1). Many steel grades will be compatible with the European grades. BS5950-8 gives similar
information but tends to be less detailed.
For other grades of steel, one of the best sources of information is Fabig Technical Note 6 [sci 11].
This contains mechanical properties for:
Carbon Steels
BS EN 10113-3:1993, grades 355M, 420M (based on Helsinki University research), 460M
BS7191 grades 355EMZ, 450EMZ
Stainless Steels
BS EN 10088 grades 1.4301(304), 1.4404(316), 1.4462(2205), 1.4362(SAF2304)
The properties of the RQT and TMRC steels, tend to be lower than the normal carbon steels. At
400 ºC their relative strength is about 10% lower.
Stainless steels tend to maintain their strength and stiffness at elevated temperatures compared
with carbon steels.

For any carbon structural steel, the rate of loss of stiffness is greater than the rate of loss of
strength (Table 5.5). Consequently, for the same load level, buckling will occur at a lower
temperature than a failure depending on strength.
Table 5.5. Reduction factors for strength and stiffness (EC3-1-2)
Steel Reduction factor Reduction factor

temperature for effective yield for the slope of the
strength linear elastic range
20 ºC 1.000 1.000
100 ºC 1.000 1.000
200 ºC 1.000 0.900
300 ºC 1.000 0.800
400 ºC 1.000 0.700
500 ºC 0.780 0.600
600 ºC 0.470 0.310
700 ºC 0.230 0.130
800 ºC 0.110 0.090
900 ºC 0.060 0.0675
1000 ºC 0.040 0.0450
1100 ºC 0.020 0.0225
1200 ºC 0.000 0.0000
It can be seen in the table that the strength of steel falls very quickly. This makes an assessment of
the steel temperature very important. At about 500ºC a 10% difference in temperature can lead to
a 16% loss of strength.
For some heat treated and special steels it may be necessary to carry out tests to establish the
necessary properties. This is because the enhancement of properties caused by the heat
treatment may be lost if the steel is heated beyond the heat treatment temperature.
The mechanical properties given in EC3-1-2 are based on anisothermal tests. In these tests, the
steel is first loaded and then heated. The steel responds by expanding due to thermal expansion
and elongating due to the stress. As the steel loses strength and thickness the rate of elongation
increases until a run-away occurs. From a series of such tests at different stress levels, stress
strain curves can be derived for a range of temperatures.
The rate of heating is important. The EC3 data is based on steel being heated at about 10ºC per
minute. This corresponds to a 60 minute fire resistance in a building where failure will occur at
about 600ºC. For heating rates between 2ºC and 50ºC per minute the EC3 data is reasonable and
the effects of creep may be ignored. Because of the effects of creep, if the heating rate is faster the
data will be conservative and for slower heating rates it will be unconservative
Concrete loses strength at a broadly similar rate to structural steel but loses stiffness at a faster
rate. The best reference is EC4-1-2 [sci 12] (composite construction).
Both BS5950-8 and EC3-1-2 give the same information on the strength of bolts and welds at
elevated temperatures. As these are not well known, the information is shown here in Table 6.5.
The yield strength is also shown for comparison.

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Table 6.5 Strength retention factors for bolts and welds
Temperature Strength reduction factor Strength reduction Yield

for bolts (Tension and factor for welds strength
shear)
20 ºC 1 1 1
100 ºC 0.97 1 1
150 ºC 0.95 1 1
200 ºC 0.94 1 1
300 ºC 0.9 1 1
400 ºC 0.78 0.88 0.971
500 ºC 0.55 0.63 0.776
600 ºC 0.22 0.38 0.474
700 ºC 0.1 0.13 0.232
800 ºC 0.07 0.07 0.115
900 ºC 0.03 0.02 0.062
It can be seen that both bolts and welds lose strength at a faster rate than structural steel.
However, because of the partial factors used for normal and fire design this effect is not as
significant as it might appear (see Sub-section 6.5.7?)
6.5.4.2 Thermal
The thermal properties of the common structural steels are given in EC3-1-2. The thermal
properties of concrete are given in EC4-1-2.
6.5.5 Methods in structural design codes
Many countries have structural design codes for fire and shortly the Eurocodes will be finalised.
Almost without exception, these codes are for building structures and may only be of limited use for
offshore structures as building structures are generally much simpler than offshore structures with
less interaction between different elements.
An important consideration when assessing structures or structural elements in fire is that,

compared with cold, design, large deformations and strains are allowed. The strength of steel is
normally expressed as the stress corresponding to 2% strain, and deformation limits in fire
resistance tests are about 20 times greater than might be allowed in cold design.
The assessment methods can be used for beams and compression members. Little information is
given for plated structures. It is normal to assume that members are unrestrained. Problems
relating to expansion and restraint were discussed in Sub-section 6.2.2.2.
6.5.6 BS5950-8
BS5950-8 covers both non-composite construction and composite construction (steel acting with
concrete). For non-composite all the guidance relates to beams, columns and tension members. It
gives some guidance on unprotected steel but this is limited to 30 minutes fire resistance in the
standard cellulosic fire and would not normally be applicable offshore.
For beams it gives two methods of assessment. The load ratio – limiting temperature method is
largely based on fire resistance test results and is principally for I-section beams. The load ratio is
the ratio between the member resistance in fire and the normal, cold, member resistance. The

code assumes that the strength of a beam can be characterised by the temperature of the bottom
flange and that, in some circumstances, a colder top flange will be beneficial. However, a colder
top flange is assumed to be supporting a concrete floor. No guidance is given for beams
supporting steel plated floors.
The second method is based on moment resistance. From a knowledge of the temperature
distribution across the section and the material properties at elevated temperatures, the plastic
bending resistance may be computed. This method is useful for unusual sections but cannot be
used without the temperature distribution. Where a comparison can be directly made, this method
is slightly more conservative than the load ratio – limiting temperature method.
For members in compression, the only method given is the load ratio – limiting temperature
method and the information is, again, based on standard fire resistance test data. For compression
members with comparatively low slenderness, there is a built in assumption that the column will
have an effective length in fire of about 85% of the assumed cold effective length.
BS5950-8 gives simple interaction formulae to allow the load ratio to be calculated for both beams
and columns.
A method for checking concrete filled structural hollow sections is given. However, the method
given EC4-1-2 is more robust and is recommended.
In a useful annex, BS5950-8 gives guidance on re-use of steel following a fire and what one should
look for when inspecting a building.
6.5.7 EC3-1-2
EC3-1-2 is for non-composite construction only. EC4-1-2 deals with composite construction.
For use in the UK (for buildings) both codes will have a national annex. All Eurocodes contain
some nationally determined parameters. They also contain some informative annexes. For any
country, the National Annex will give values for the nationally determined parameters and guidance
on the use of informative annexes.
The structural Eurocodes are all written in the same format. The design methods start with tabular
data. This is followed by simple design methods and finally there is some guidance on advanced
methods.
EC3-1-2, however, has no tabular data as the only useful data would be on the protection of steels
using proprietary fire protection materials. The bulk of the design information is in the form of
simple calculation methods. It concludes with some guidance on advanced methods. The term
“simple” is sometimes a misnomer, as a small program or spreadsheet is required.
For beams in buildings, EC3 is generally less conservative than BS5950-8. However, for beams
not supporting concrete floors it is very similar to BS5950 8. EC3 starts from the assumption that
beams are uniformly heated. Their bending resistance is reduced by the reduction in yield strength.
It then allows an “adaptation” factor to be applied that may take into account of a temperature
gradient and, for a continuous beam, colder support conditions.
For compression members, EC3 gives a simple method in which a non-dimensional slenderness is
calculated which leads to a reduction in the squash resistances. The method is a modified form of
all other Eurocode strut formula.
EC3-1-2 gives some guidance on members made from sheet steel with class 4 cross sections.
These thin sections rapidly heat up and quickly lose strength. The guidance is for completeness
and academic interest.

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The strength of bolts and welds at elevated temperatures was given earlier in Table 6.5. EC3-1-2
gives some guidance on checking connections in fire. For example, for a bolt, EC3 states:
γM2
Fv ,t ,Rd = Fv,Rd kb,θ
γ M , fi
where
kb, θ is the reduction factor determined for the appropriate bolt temperature from
Table 6.5 (above)
Fv,Rd is the design shear resistance of the bolt per shear plane calculated assuming that
the shear plane passes through the threads of the bolt
γM2 is the partial safety factor at normal temperature
γM,fi is the partial safety factor for fire conditions
The important point to make is that although the reduction factor from Table 6.5 is lower than for
structural steel, the partial factor at normal temperature, γM2, is 1.25 and the factor for fire, γM,fi, is
1.0. Thus the effect of the reduction factors is somewhat ameliorated.
Guidance is also given on advanced calculation methods. In this context, this refers to finite
element modelling. It states that the model for mechanical response shall take account of:
• the combined effects of mechanical actions, geometrical imperfections and thermal actions;
• the temperature dependent mechanical properties of the material, see Section 4;
• geometrical non-linear effects;
• the effects of non-linear material properties, including the unfavourable effects of loading
and unloading on the structural stiffness.
EC3-1-2 and EC4-1-2 have their roots in the ECCS Model code on fire engineering[sci 13]. This
code also includes information on fires, covered by EC1-1-2. It also contains a commentary on
many of the clauses.
In due course, conflicting national standards will be withdrawn. At the time of writing, February
2005 the situation is:
• The loading code, EC1-1-2 was published at a full European standard in 2002. EC3-1-2
and EC4-1-2 are undergoing final editing and should be available during 2005. For all three
codes, the UK National Annexes are expected in 2007.
6.5.8 Finite element modelling
6.5.8.1 General
The use of FE modelling is now becoming the norm. Many packages exist which can carry out both
thermal and structural modelling. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), which will allow the growth
and spread of fire to be modelled. Integrated packages also exist which can carry out all three
analyses.
Any examples?
The FE package being used should have been validated against test data and the engineers using
the package should be experienced in the type of analysis being undertaken.

6.5.8.2 Structural modelling
Before any FE analysis is carried out the conceptual model of the structure should be carefully
checked and possibly agreed with any potential certification authority. Consideration should be
given to the need to include initial imperfections and whether a dynamic option should be included
in the analysis. It is important that any analysis includes all non-linear effects and that it can model
membrane action. The sensitivity of any analysis to the mesh density should be investigated
(although not necessarily for each job). Experience has shown that FE analyses of the same fire
and structural scenario using the same software, carried out by more than one group, can produce
widely different results. The differences are often due to differences in the conceptual model. The
assumptions regarding boundary conditions must be justified. If a substructure is being analysed,
the boundary condition assumptions regarding restraint thermal expansion can greatly affect
results. Also, at junction between two elements is there a load path and should adjacent nodes be
connected and in what way? Is the mesh sufficiently fine? Is the analysis being carried out by an
experienced engineer? These are all very important considerations which must be addressed if the
results are to be trusted.
In some areas it may be possible to carry out some preliminary “scoping” analyses to get some
idea what answers might be expected from the FE.
Following any analysis, the results should be carefully examined and anything that looks unusual
should be investigated. It may be correct or it may be due to an error in the conceptual model.
Compared with an elemental approach, any FE approach based on the same temperature
distribution should give more reliable results. However, many FE models will not properly predict
localised behaviour such as connection failure due to the need to refine the mesh density, unless
the analyst is aware of the possibility of such failure and has made an allowance for it in the model.
The main problems in any FE modelling start with the fire. In order to get a reliable estimate of
structural behaviour a reliable fire model is required. Often, designers will impose the Standard Fire
(hydrocarbon, cellulosic etc) on the structure. This may meet any regulatory requirements but it
can never model reality. In any real fire scenario, the heat flux impinging the structure will be
different from place to place and will vary in time. Imposing the Standard Fire will not allow effects
due to temperature differences to be modelled.
6.5.8.3 CFD
Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) can potentially predict the growth and movement of air,
smoke, and flame. CFD is probably more complex than structural mechanics and although,
researchers have been working on CFD for many years it is still in its infancy. In building design, it
is used to predict smoke movement but many think it is not particularly good at predicting pre-
flashover fires. This should be less of a concern for any form of hydrocarbon fire as the pre-
flashover phase will be less significant.
At present, the above cautionary advice for structural modelling, applies even more to CFD
modelling. Knowledge of fire and an understanding of what a particular package is doing are
paramount.
6.5.8.4 Eurocode requirements for advanced models
The structural Eurocodes all contain similar advice on using advanced models. The relevant parts
are summarised below:
The analysis should include:
• The effects of non-linear material properties, including the effects of unloading on the
structural stiffness and the effects of cooling,

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• Validation of advanced calculation models,
• The validity of any advanced calculation model shall be verified,
• A verification of the calculation results shall be made on basis of relevant test results,
• The critical parameters shall be checked, by means of a sensitivity analysis, to ensure

that the model complies with sound engineering principles.
Some of these requirements may appear to be very severe. It is recommended that they need not
be followed for every structure analysed but they do emphasise the need to use validated software.
6.5.9 Definition and assessment of secondary steelwork
In deciding which structural members need to have their performance checked in fire the required
performance for the structure for each particular limit state must be considered. All primary
elements of structure will need to be assessed and will probably require some form of fire
protection. A secondary member is one which, for the particular fire limit being considered, will not
cause failure of a primary member or loss of compartmentation by its removal. All secondary
members require assessment but may not require protection.
For example, a secondary beam, spanning between larger primary beams and supporting a plated
floor may be sacrificial in fire. For the fire scenario under consideration, deformation of the floor
may be unimportant. A steel plated floor system will often be able to act as a membrane and not
require additional support. The beam may not be critical for giving restraint to the primary beam.
However, in a severe fire heat may be conducted along an unprotected beam into the primary
beam and thus reduce the fire resistance of the primary beam. For practical reasons it might be
better to protect the entire secondary beam rather than simple coating the ends.
Secondary members, which when cold, restrain a primary member may require fire protection to
continue fulfilling this function when hot. However, experience has shown that at the reduced
applied loads in fire, the restraint may not be necessary. For example, loads may be resisted by
membrane action and the restraint may not be required. It is important to consider that it does not
follow that a member which carries load will always be required in fire. The function of all members
should be looked at. Only members which may fail or deform in fire leading to a performance
requirement not being met should be considered for protection.
Simple design methods are not able to provide information on whether secondary members require
special consideration. Only a full non-linear FE analysis will provide this information.
6.6 Attachments and coat-back – we need to link this with possible

measures
An unprotected secondary member attached to a protected primary member will allow heat to be
conducted into the primary member and may reduce its fire resistance. Most operators’
specifications require a length of any attachment to primary steelwork protected with passive fire
protection to be similarly protected.
The attachment acts as a heat conductor into the primary steelwork. Hence, it can introduce a
localised hot spot at its connection with the primary member. The extent of the hot spot depends
on the relative geometries of the primary member and the attachment. The purpose of the coat-
back is to reduce heat conducted through the attachment into the primary member and hence limit
the extent and severity of the local hot spot. In this way, the potential of premature failure can be
avoided. The coat-back length needs to be adequate to achieve this objective.
A joint industry study [sci 14] of the effects of coatback on the primary member temperature
demonstrated the following:
• The required coat back length should be determined based on the local average
temperature which can be tolerated in the primary member at the attachment location. As
the coat back temperature increases this temperature reduces. However, beyond 150mm,
any further reduction is small.
• The ratio of the cross sectional area of the attachment to that of the primary member was
found to have a significant influence on the temperature. The ratio of the section factors
(Hp/A) has secondary significance.
• The effect of the attachment on the temperature increased with increasing fire resistance
period. Thus, to maintain the same temperature in the primary, a longer coat back length
would be required for a 2 hour duration than for 1 hour.
• Within the limits of the study, it was found that the section shape (of both the primary
member and attachment) had negligible effect.
• The properties of fire protection material have a small effect on coat-back length.
The study developed simple rules for determining the required coatback length.
6.7 Process responses

6.7.1 General
A key requirement for any design is knowledge of the quantity, composition and properties of the
fluids to be processed and of the associated operating conditions (temperature, pressure, flow rate
etc.). The section is primarily concerned with the response of pressurised systems to fire. In a fire,
a pressurised system (e.g. vessel, pipeline or heat exchanger) will fail through weakening of the
containment material with temperature and time and/or over-pressurisation caused by heating up
the fluid contents. Generally, offshore systems are fitted with pressure relief systems to prevent
overpressurisation and blowdown systems to prevent loss of containment. Relief systems
automatically release the contained fluid if the fluid pressure within the system exceeds the
system’s lowest design pressure. These systems usually consist of relief valves or bursting discs
and they are designed to initiate at the set pressure without the intervention of the operator.
Blowdown systems are mechanisms for release of the vapour content from the system as a result
of operator action or as part of automatic control sequences. A system is normally blown down as
part of a planned shutdown or an emergency such as a fire that may weaken a plant component so
that it fails below the relief system set pressure. In both relief and blowdown systems, it is
necessary to dispose of the fluid safely, usually by burning it in a flare stack or venting to
atmosphere.
There are numerous references that discuss relief devices and relief sizing; examples are Parry
(1992) [X], DIERS (1992) [X], CCPS (1998) [X], HSE (1998) [X] and Energy Institute (2001) [X].
Roberts et al. (2000) [X] have reviewed the literature available (up to 2000) on the response of
pressurised process vessels and equipment to fire attack in regard to the new data available since
publication of the IGNs [X] and the remaining gaps in knowledge.
6.7.2 Relief
Traditionally, API 520 (2000) [X] has been used to size pressure relief valves for non-reactive
systems using heat inputs derived from the fourth edition of API 521 (1997) [X]. These heat inputs
have not been changed in the fifth edition of API 521 (2005) [X] although it is now recognised (e.g.
Energy Institute, 2003) [X] that more severe fires can occur than those assumed by API. It should
be recognised that pressure relief will not protect a vessel or pipeline from failure if there is a high
heat load to wall in contact with gas or vapour is this will rapidly heat up to a temperature where
the steel weakens. However, if the vessel/pipeline can be prevented from failure due to weakening,
e.g. by PFP (or deluge although it is not currently taken into account), then the pressure relief valve
can be effective under fire loading providing that the possibility of two-phase flow is adequately
considered. There are a considerable number of standards for relief valve sizing e.g. API 520[X],
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API 2000[X], NFPA 30 [X] and 58 [X] (for LPG) and ISO 4126 [X]. These are reviewed by the
Energy Institute (2001) [X] and recommendations are made, based on experimental data, for the
safe and optimum design of relief systems. Their publication also goes into detail on which is the
most appropriate relief device for the different situations. In particular, they consider the
advantages and disadvantages of using:
• Conventional spring-loaded relief valves;
• Balanced relief valves;
• Air assisted relief valves;
• Buckling pin valves;
• Bursting discs; and
• High integrity pressure protection systems.
They provide advice on relief system design, sizing of relief system systems and design of flare
and vent systems. In general, the recommendations complement those of API 520 and API 521
but, in the specific case of two-phase discharge, they suggest that the API method may not be
adequate, particularly in the case of high-pressure discharge. This conclusion is based on
experiments (described in an appendix) involving the two-phase discharge of mixtures of natural
gas, propane and condensate through orifices and relief valves.
6.7.3 Relief sizing
The method of relief sizing depends on the nature of the fluid being relieved. API 520 (Part 1) and
API 521 give equations to calculate the discharge areas for pressure relief devices on vessels
containing super-critical fluids, gases or vapours and for non-flashing liquids. The Energy Institute
(2001) have reviewed these equations and suggest that they give similar results to BS 6759 [X]
and ISO 4126 [X] and hence any of these standards may be used.
On the basis of comparisons with experimental data, the Energy Institute (2001) suggest that the
homogeneous equilibrium model gives the best predictions for two-phase relief flows and is
preferred to the API method. They suggest that the HEM method deals naturally with cases where
the flow upstream is gaseous and where condensate is formed. These cases may not be
calculated accurately with the API method. Since both the API method and the pure HEM method
involve flash calculations, they consider that there is little benefit from the simplification
represented by the API method. The Energy Institute gives details of application of the HEM
method. Whilst the HEM method for two-phase relief has been validated by tests, there is still no
recognised procedure for certifying the capacity of pressure relief valves in two-phase service.
6.7.4 Blowdown
The emergency depressurisation of process vessels is complex and the behaviour of the process
vessel during depressurisation varies depending on the vessel contents and the conditions of the
vessel. During depressurisation at ambient temperature, the temperature of the vessel may drop
dramatically as the contents are released, leading to the need to consider the minimum design
temperature requirements of the vessel. At the same time, however, if the vessel is exposed to an
engulfing fire, the behaviour of the vessel will be very different and the pressures and temperatures
experienced will significantly differ from those normally considered. The design of depressurisation
systems must therefore address both the depressurisation and also the characteristics of any
impinging flame, which may be the cause of the emergency depressurisation.
The Energy Institute (2003) performed a survey of methods used by industry for protection against
severe fires and, from the responses and information received, concluded that:
• There is little consistency in the design methodology used, even within a single company;

• Some said they had limited in-house expertise and engaged a specialist design contractor;
and
• Some applied API RP 521 (1997) and assumed that by designing to that code, the risk was
adequately addressed.
The new version of API RP 521(2005) recommends that a vapour depressurising system should
have adequate capacity to permit reduction of the vessel stress to a level at which stress rupture is
not of immediate concern. For sizing, this generally involves reducing the equipment pressure from
initial conditions to a level equivalent to 50% of the vessel design pressure within approximately 15
minutes. This criterion is based on the vessel wall temperature versus stress to rupture and applies
generally to carbon steel vessels with a wall thickness of ca. 25.4 mm or more. Vessels with
thinner walls generally require a somewhat greater depressurising rate. It should be noted the
blowdown systems are designed for vapour only flow. If the rate of depressurising is increased,
there is an increased likelihood of two-phase flow occurring with consequences to the method of
sizing calculation used and the need for the knockout pot in the flare header to be sized for this
two-phase flow. The required depressurising rate depends on the metallurgy of the vessel, the
thickness and initial temperature of the vessel wall, and the rate of heat input. For multi-component
fluids, these need to be calculated over a series of time intervals that adequately take into account
changes in the nature of the fluid, e.g. the latent heat of vaporisation. The recommendations in API
521 are typical for conditions in a refinery or chemical plant. However, they are not intended to
cover all fire scenarios, e.g. impinging jet fires or confined fires, foreseeable for offshore
installations.
Gayton and`Murphy (1995) [X] suggest that in more severe fires, rupture can occur well within the
15 minute criterion used by API. Roberts et al. (2000) [X] discuss application of the Shell
BLOWFIRE program to give vessel wall temperature-time relationships as input to the ANSYS
finite element program predicting thermal mechanical response of a second stage separator with a
wall thickness from 16 to 20 mm. The BLOWFIRE predictions were that after an initial pressure
drop on opening, the pressure could then increase and the ANSYS programme suggested that
failure could occur at 6 minutes. It was suggested that the worst case might be partial fire
engulfment where local heating of the shell causes local material expansion and the expanding
material pushes against colder, unheated sections, leading to premature buckling and an
increased probability of failure. The general implication is that process plant fitted with protective
systems designed to API RP 521 or a similar standard may be insufficient to prevent failure of the
pressure system before the inventory has been safely removed in a severe fire.
6.7.5 Blowdown system design
As indicated above, the API 521 approach to the design of blowdown systems covers most of the
key aspects but may underestimate the heat load in some credible offshore fire scenarios and may
not be accurate if there is two-phase flow. The Energy Institute (2001) [X] recommend that the
Gayton and Murphy [X] “fire risk analysis” approach is adopted to at least confirm the expected
thermal loads and that the HEM method is used if two-phase flow is anticipated. The Energy
Institute (2001) summarised the Gayton and Murphy approach as:
• For each item of equipment, define the type of fire (pool, jet, partial or total engulfment)
likely to affect it.
• Calculate the rate of heat input appropriate to that type of fire.
• Calculate the rate of temperature rise of the vessel wall neglecting heat transfer to the
contents. This simplification is appropriate for jet or other fires, which might affect only a
small area of the vessel. More complex methods can allow for heat transfer to the contents.
• Estimate the time to vessel rupture. From this temperature-time profile prepare a yield –
stress-time profile and a corresponding rupture pressure-time profile. Compare this to the
actual pressure vessel versus time for the required blowdown time.

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• If the time to rupture does not meet the established safety criteria (such as time to
evacuate), then design changes may be necessary to improve the vessel protection. These
may be a reduction in blowdown time, or application of fire protection insulation, or changes
to the plant layout to reduce the fire exposure.
The information given in this (UKOOA/HSE) guidance allows the simplified vessel wall approach to
heat transfer to be followed but, if heat transfer to the contents is taken into account, sophisticated
modelling is required. However, whilst there are validated models for blowdown under ambient
conditions (e.g. BLOWDOWN; Haque et al., 1992 [X]), there appears to be no experimental data
on blowdown under fire loading and hence there are no validated models. However, LPG tank pool
fire (Moodie et al., 1998 [X]) and jet fire data (Roberts and Beckett, 1996) [X] has been used to
partially validate models, e.g. BLOWFIRE, that are designed to cover a range of discharge devices
i.e. the models have been used to predict the pressure relief results. API (2005) and the Energy
Institute (2001) give the equations for calculating the blow down orifice.
In 2003, the Energy Institute published interim guidelines for the design and protection of pressure
systems to withstand severe fires. In this, the heat transfer to the vessel is split in terms of radiative
and convective fractions (See Sub-section 5.4) and the heat transfer to the vessel contents is
discussed in a similar way to Sub-section 5.4.3.3. They give an iterative procedure based on
calculating, for each process segment (isolatable section) and each time step:
• Pressure;
• Temperature in all fluid phases;
• Fluid composition in each phase;
• Flow rate through the orifice;
• Liquid levels;
• Temperature in the metal;
• Temperature downstream of the orifice;
• Heat transfer at all interfaces; and
• Stresses to which the pipes and equipment are exposed.
These are related to the:

• Acceptance criteria for failure;
• Given total capacity of the flare system;
• Method for initiating depressurisation (manual or automatic); and
• Time delay for initiation of depressurisation.
The Energy Institute approach is based on that of Hekkelstrand and Skulstad (2004) [X]. They
have refined their approach with the emphasis on using fast depressurisation making the maximum
use of the flare stack capacity and on minimising the use of passive fire protection.
6.7.6 Failure criteria
In order to know what measures to take, if any, in protecting an object against fire, it is necessary
to know the maximum acceptable temperature of the object and the minimum allowable time to
reach this temperature. Different references suggest different critical temperatures. Some of those
in most common use are summarised in Table 6.7-1.

Table 6.7-1 - Commonly used critical temperatures
Temperature Use Source Criterion

(Celsius)
550 - 620 Structural steel ASFP, 2002 (BS Temperature at which fully stressed carbon steel
onshore 5950) loses its design margin of safety
427 LPG tanks (France API 521 (1997) Based on the pressure relief valve setting
and Italy)
400 Structural steel ISO 13702, Temperature at which the yield stress is reduced
offshore 1999 to the minimum allowable strength under
operating loading conditions
300 LPG tanks (UK and LPGA CoP 1, Integrity of LPG vessel is not compromised at
Germany) 1998 temperatures up to 300 oC for 90 minutes.
200 Structural ISO 13702, Temperature at which the yield stress is reduced
aluminium offshore 1999 to the minimum allowable strength under
operating loading conditions
180 Unexposed face of ISO 834 BS 476 Maximum allowable temperature at only one
a division point of the unexposed face in a furnace test
140 Unexposed face of ISO 834 BS 476 Maximum allowable average temperature of the
a division unexposed face in a furnace test
45 Human skin Hymes et al., Pain threshold
1997
40 Surface of safety ISO 13702 Maximum temperature at which control system
related control will continue to function
panel
Failure of a steel component will occur at the time at which the superimposed stress exceeds the
material strength and/or deformation limit. Knowledge of the time to failure is critical in deciding on
the remedial methods to be applied to delay failure. The time to failure of a vessel or pipe work
depends on the severity of the fire, the extent and type of fire protection, and the pressure
response and can vary between a few minutes and a few hours. The Energy Institute (2003)
considered three calculation methods:
• Ultimate Tensile Stress (UTS) with a safety factor;
• Flow stress (combining UTS and elongation stress); or
• Creep rupture stress (where both temperature and time are taken into account).
In theory, the most appropriate failure criterion is the creep rupture strength, rather than the tensile
strength since, as the time to rupture goes to zero; the creep rupture strength becomes equal to
the tensile strength. However, in view of the complexity of creep rupture calculations (see, for
example, Benham et al., 1996 [X]), tensile failure criteria are often used. In severe fires, the rate of
temperature rise in the wall above the liquid level or in a gas/vapour only system is very high (of
the order of 100 to 200 K/minute depending on the steel thickness) and the material strength falls
rapidly once the temperature exceeds 500 °C. In these circumstances, where the time involved is
very short, the use of UTS may be acceptable if used with an appropriate safety factor. However,
BS 7910 (1999) [X] suggests that the proximity to plastic collapse should be assessed by
determining the ratio of the applied stress to the flow stress, where the flow stress is defined as the
average of the yield and tensile stresses. Use of a flow stress of the average of, say, the 0.2 %
elongation stress and the UTS would be a more conservative measure. However, if the rate of
temperature rise is much slower, e.g. with a system protected by PFP, it is more appropriate to use
the creep rupture stress. No consensus was reached within the Energy Institute working group on
which method of assessing stress is the most appropriate for response to severe fires. It was
stated that the ambiguity remains because of the lack of validation data. Offshore vessels tend to
be of a more complex design than storage vessels and will have stress raisers such as:
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• Different thicknesses of material;

• Inlet and outlet connections with constraining piping, manways etc;
• Different types of weld materials and configurations;
• Reaction forces during emergency depressurisation;
• Vapour-liquid interface.
The Energy Institute states that it is not clear which of these features are critical in assessing
failure or to what degree, if any, current failure criteria are conservative. Experiments are required
to assist in the validation of models intended to assess such features. Unless the failure criteria are
properly set, it is difficult to see how time to failure or realistic blowdown rates can be properly set.
In 2004, Salater and Overa [X] presented data from jet fire trials (170 – 190 kWm-2 incident heat
flux) on pipes pressurised with nitrogen to 85 to 90% of their design pressure. The experiments
were aimed at taking the pipes to failure and determining the failure criteria that most closely
represented the results. They used equation 5.3.7 to model the heat transfer to the pipe and found
good agreement with the measured values for small pipes but found that the model overestimated
the temperatures above 600 oC for 250 mm pipes. It was found that pipe failure was adequately
predicted by comparing the equivalent stress (von Mises) with the UTS. However, they emphasise
that the pipe corrosion allowance should not be used when making the calculations and that good
high temperature UTS data is needed. Hekkelstrand and Skulstad (2004) [X] have incorporated
these results in the latest edition of their guidelines. They imply that the method may be applicable
to pressure vessels containing vapour and liquid but the complexities identified above are not
explicitly considered. They also provide some data on the high temperature properties of steels.
Data is also available by Burgan (2001) [X]and Billingham et al. (2003) [X].
6.7.7 Performance standards
6.7.7.1 General
Use of performance standards came to prominence following issue of the Prevention of Fire and
Explosion and Emergency Response Regulations (PFEER, [7-1]) and UKOOA Fire and Explosion
Hazard Management Guidelines [7-2] in 1995. Performance standards are closely related to:
• Engineering Acceptance Criteria;
• Rule sets used in Quantitative Risks Assessments (QRA); and
• Design Accidental Loads (DALs).
The use and interrelationship of these are considered in this section.
According to the PFEER regulations [7-1], “a performance standard is a statement, which can be
expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, of the performance required of a system, item of
equipment, person or procedure, and which is used as the basis for managing the hazard, - e.g.
planning, measuring, control or audit – through the lifecycle of the installation”.
There are two levels of performance standards:
High level performance standards are applied to the installation as a whole or to the major systems
that comprise the installation. These are the goals for safety of the installation and relate to overall
risk to persons on the installation. These standards are verified from the results of assessments of
low level performance standards. High level performance standards are normally risk-based. For
example, HSE use [7-3, 7-4] the following:
• An unacceptable risk is one where the individual risk of a fatality is 10-3 per year or more
for a worker, or 10-4 per year or more for a member of the public.

• A broadly acceptable risk is one where the individual risk of a fatality is 10-6 per year or
less.
• A tolerable risk is deemed to exist in the range between 10-3 and 10-6 per year for a
worker. All tolerable risks must be demonstrated to be as low as is reasonably practicable
(ALARP).
Low level performance standards are used to describe the required performance of lesser
systems, which may contribute to the high level performance standards. Performance standards at
this level relate to the principal safety critical systems used to detect, control and mitigate the major
hazards. The selected systems should make a significant contribution to the overall acceptability of
the hazard management arrangements. The performance standards should be directly relevant to
the achievement of the system goal and the performance standards should be expressed in terms
that are verifiable.
An important principle in setting performance standards is that the number and level of detail
should be commensurate with the magnitude of the risk being managed.
Typically, the lower level performance standard for the resistance of pressurised systems to fire
attack would be that isolation, depressurising and fire protection systems are functional, fit for
purpose and available on demand.
Reference 7-5 contains requirements and guidelines for the control and mitigation of fires and
explosions on offshore production installations, and uses an approach that is similar to the UK
performance standards approach. This reference states that, in the process of fire and explosion
evaluation and risk management, any risk reduction measures should be recorded so that they are
available for those who operate the installation and for those involved in any subsequent change to
the installation. For this record, the reference uses the term “strategy”. Two strategies are
introduced, namely a Fire and Explosion Strategy and an Evacuation, Escape and Rescue
Strategy. The strategies should describe the role and any functional requirements for each of the
systems required to manage possible hazardous events on offshore installations. The functional
parameters (integrity, reliability, availability, survivability and dependency), and the associated
specifications, are equivalent to the performance standards approach in the UK safety legislation.
6.7.7.2 Engineering acceptance criteria
Typically, the engineering acceptance criteria for a pressurised system to resist fire attack would
be that stresses, deformations and/or temperatures remain below values that would compromise
the integrity of the system. The criterion given in the API Recommended Practice 521 (see Sub-
section 6.3) aims to achieve this by depressurising the system at a recommended rate. However,
this may be inappropriate and inadequate for offshore installations, for which it was not originally
intended.
6.7.7.3 Quantitative risk assessment
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) provides a structured approach to assessing the potential for
incidents and expressing this potential numerically. In a QRA, risk is defined as the combination of
the probability or frequency of occurrence of the outcome event and the potential consequences.
The frequency of occurrence (i.e. outcome frequency) is normally calculated using Event Trees.
The results from an event tree calculation may be an outcome frequency for loss of life. QRA uses
“rule sets” to predict the effects of accidental loads on facilities and personnel. In general, rule sets
are based on past experience, statistics and simplistic response models and require a great deal of
judgement. As such, they sometimes do not accurately enough predict the behaviour of systems
affected by accidental loads, which often leads to lack of conservatism or over-conservatism with
inaccuracies in risk predictions as a result.
Typically, the rule set for a pressurised system in a fire would be no escalation of the initial fire
event, dependant upon the performance standards and engineering acceptance criteria being met.

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With current knowledge, this rule set would either be, possibly incorrectly, that following industry
guidance (engineering acceptance criteria) provides sufficient protection, or alternatively, and
possibly unnecessarily, that the system will rupture and fire escalation will always occur.
The QRA provides the confirmation or otherwise that the high level performance standards are
achieved. Every QRA is facility specific, i.e., it includes the consideration of expected standards of
performance of systems that are critical in various accidental scenarios that may occur on the
facility.
6.7.7.4 Design accidental loads
Design Accidental Loads (DAL) are loads for those accidental events where the associated risks
exceed the risk tolerability criteria. Therefore, the designed facility should successfully resist the
DAL. This would require a lengthy iterative approach whereby a QRA is carried out first to identify
those events and loads that cause the exceedance of risk tolerability criteria. Therefore, an
approximate approach has been used which defines DAL as being associated with those events
that have the order of magnitude of initiating frequency greater or equal to the tolerable outcome
frequency. For example, when the tolerable outcome frequency is 5x10-4, the DAL are those loads
with the initiating event frequency of 10-4 and higher.
The requirements for successful resistance of a facility to DAL are expressed in the form of
performance standards. Typically, the performance standard would state that a pressure vessel
should survive and remain functional during a postulated fire scenario. Again, in the terms of
engineering acceptance criteria this means that applied stress in the vessel is not to exceed a
defined allowable stress throughout the duration of a fire and thereafter.
6.7.7.5 Link between engineering acceptance criteria and QRA
As implied by the above, the link between engineering acceptance criteria related to pressure
systems and QRA may be made (7.6) using the following approach:
• Rule sets in a QRA are set to reflect the standards to which safety critical systems are to
perform, e.g. no escalation of the initial fire event in an area.
• This rule set assumes that isolation and depressurising systems, and a dedicated deluge
cooling system are functional, available on demand and survive the initial fire (performance
standards).
• The systems are designed to meet the normal engineering acceptance criteria for stress,
deformation, temperature etc.
• DALs are determined for the systems whose risk, calculated by QRA, exceeds the risk
based performance standards.
• The pressure systems are redesigned to resist the DALs.
Before formal industry guidance could be given on such links, guidance is needed on the rule sets
to use in QRA, the determination of DALs and appropriate engineering acceptance criteria.
6.7.7.6 Overview
Performance standards related to the resistance of pressurised systems to fire attack depend on
having robust engineering acceptance criteria and a robust method to determine if these are met.
At present, these do not exist. Quantitative Risk Assessment is used to confirm that high level
performance standards are achieved, and the QRA rule sets also depend on having robust
engineering acceptance criteria. Design Accidental Loads are determined for the risks calculated
by the QRA that exceeded the risk based performance standards and the facility is designed to
resist these DALs. Guidance is needed on the rule sets for use in QRA, the determination of DALs
and appropriate engineering acceptance criteria and on how these linked together.

6.8 Personnel
6.8.1 General
Fires have the potential to cause severe harm and death to personnel offshore as a result of the
evolution of both heat and toxic combustion products. This potential is present both in the
immediate vicinity of the fire but also through transport of hot products at remote locations through
the action of buoyancy and wind. Inhalation of toxic and irritant smoke is the largest single cause of
fatalities in both onshore and offshore fires.
The objective of any system to mitigate the effects of fire on personnel must be to remove the fire
hazard either through fire extinguishment, reduction of the received insult or separation of
personnel and fire hazard.
This section outlines the main issues to be considered in defining and quantifying the fire hazard to
personnel offshore and what preventive measures may be available to a designer to minimize this
hazard.
6.8.2 Characteristics of fires relevant to human response
6.8.2.1 Hazards of fire to personnel
The fires which can occur offshore are many and varied. The major concern lies with the process
fluids themselves. These can give rise to fireballs, vapour cloud, jet, or pool fires as detailed in
Sub-section 3.2.4. However, other fuels are present on the plant such as plastics, hydraulic fluids,
cabling, seals, paints, etc. These may become involved in the later stages of a process fluid fire or
be the main fuel consumed. General fires, not specific to the chemical process industry or offshore,
involving the structure and contents in the accommodation, control rooms and other occupied
buildings on the installation must also be considered.
All these fires produce heat in the form of radiant and convective fluxes. In particular exposure to
high radiant heat fluxes can produce severe burns to the skin and even ignite clothing. Smoke is
also produced. Here smoke is taken to comprise the airborne solid and liquid particulates and
gases evolved when a material undergoes pyrolysis or combustion together with the quantity of air
entrained or otherwise mixed into the mass. Smoke contains a complex mixture of:
• Asphyxiant gases such as carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide which cause partial/full
incapacitation and death:
• Irritant products (gases and aerosol) which at low and medium exposures cause partial
incapacitation thus hindering evacuation, while at high exposures may lead to delayed
death. The main irritants are acid gases for example hydrogen chloride and low molecular
weight aldehydes such as acrolein and formaldehyde. These materials attack the eyes and
respiratory tract:
• Particulates sometimes referred to as soot. These particulates may be either non-irritant or
irritant. In the former case vision is obscured making way finding difficult, while the latter, as
well as impairing vision, can also again act as an irritant to the eyes and respiratory system.
Both make evacuation from the scene of the fire more difficult.
The combustion product plume will also be at elevated temperature. Movement beneath or within a
smoke layer may result in exposure both to radiant and convective heat fluxes. Such exposure
may give rise to hyperthermia and skin burns while inhalation of hot products may result in burns to
the respiratory system.
Finally the lack of oxygen in the fire plume may induce a condition known as hypoxia. This can
cause dizziness and ultimately loss of conciousness.

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Movement of a smoke plume around the installation under the combined influence of the wind and
inherent buoyancy must also be considered since its influence may extend beyond the immediate
vicinity of the fire. The potential for smoke movement must always be considered; particularly when
the identification and design of escape routes and muster points is undertaken. This is a difficult
area which can only be approached using models based on computational fluid dynamics or
physical modelling. Experience with the applications of both these techniques to smoke movement
remains however very sparse and the conclusions should be treated with caution.
6.8.2.2 Specification of fire hazards
The heat hazards from a fire are expressed in terms of heat flux and temperature. Thus the
dimensions, shape and surface emissive power of the flame can be used to compute a received
radiant heat fIux generally in kWm-2 to personnel in the vicinity. The temperature and emissivity of
the combustion gases allows specification the thermal environment to which personnel might be
exposed if they must enter the fire plume.
In general the production of toxic and irritant species in a fire is expressed as a yield - the amount
generated per unit mass of fuel burned. This product is then mixed with air entrained into the fire
plume and the hazard of asphyxiant and irritant gases and liquid irritants is expressed as a
concentration in air, either in volume or mass terms as ppm or mg/l respectively. (Is this L litres?
small “l”?)
There does not appear to be a standard form for specifying the smoke hazard. Several may be
encountered. It can again be quantified as a mass concentration of product in the fire plume or
alternatively in terms more closely related to the hazard presented by smoke - a loss of visual
capability. Some parameters used include visibility – the distance in metres at which unilluminated
objects can be seen through smoke, an obscuration (%) – the amount of attenuation of light over a
given path, or an optical density. The latter is alternatively defined in terms of either natural (De) or
common (D10) logarithms:
De = -loge(I/I0) = KCL (6.8.1)
D10 = -10log10(I/I0) = (10/2.303) KCL (6.8.2)
Where
I and I0 are the light intensities with and without smoke,
C is the mass concentration of particles,
K is the specific extinction coefficient, and
L is the path length through the smoke.
K is a property of the type of smoke and depends on its size distribution and optical properties.
There is limited data available though some measurements for flaming and non-flaming fires
involving plastics suggest figures of 7.6 and 4.4 m2/g (Mulholland,2002) [X]. The product of K and
C is known as the extinction coefficient and has dimensions of /m.
It has been shown that the optical density expressed as a unit path length (D10/L dB/m) correlates
reasonably well with general visibility through smoke with an optical density of 1 dB/m
corresponding to a visibility of ~10 m. Smoke production is often specified in terms of the volume in
m3/s of unit optical density smoke issuing from a fire.
A further smoke measure often quoted is the mass optical density, Dm. This is more easily
measured in experimental tests and is related to the optical density measured in a volume flow of
combustion products V, resulting from a mass loss of smoke producing material ∆M:
Dm = D10 V / 10 L ∆M (6.8.3)
Mullholland [X] has tabulated existing data on Dm from various materials.
6.8.2.3 Typical hazard levels offshore
Two distinct types of fire are likely to occur offshore. The majority will result from releases of
process fluids and involve flammable liquids and gases. These will be characterized by an absence
of growth and decay phases so that they will reach their full potential output soon after ignition but
most will occur in well-ventilated open conditions. Hence the general levels of toxic species and
smoke production will be low. Indeed some fires, for example methanol and natural gas will
produce little if any smoke. The major hazards from these fires will result from the high heat fluxes
generated.
The exceptions to such a rule are large pool fires involving the heavy hydrocarbons such as crude
oil, which may produce copious quantities of dense smoke and the situation of significant
confinement which restricts ventilation. In these circumstances – vitiated fires - the lack of oxygen
in the combustion zone results in an increase of incomplete products of combustion including
carbon monoxide and smoke. Tewerson (2002) [X] has summarized current knowledge on the
rates of species production from the combustion of a wide range of materials including some
simpler hydrocarbons and solid building materials. This provides a useful compendium of
information, particularly for well-ventilated fires. Tewerson also noted that the levels of species
production for under-ventilated confined fires can be parameterized in terms of the equivalence
ratio – defined as the fuel air ratio relative to stoichiometric conditions and has presented data
which suggest that for solid phase fires the rates of production of incomplete products may
increase by factors of ~5-10 over the well-ventilated situation. Thus Chamberlain [X] measured
concentrations of oxygen, carbon monoxide and smoke of 12 %, 2 % and 2.0 g/m3 respectively for
confined jet fires where for such fires without containment carbon monoxide concentrations <0.1 %
might be expected.
Both experimental and theoretical studies have focused on the heat hazards from such fires and
there is considerable data on such issues (see for example Section 5). There are little data on the
typical species output levels for fires involving offshore process fluids. Table 6.8.1 provides some
typical hazard levels for offshore process fluid fires for design purposes covering both heat and
toxic species. For toxic species and smoke it provides current best estimates for well-ventilated
fires obtained from a combination of experiment and calculation. Here carbon monoxide content
has been used as a marker for the toxic potency of the plume and calculations are carried out at
the flame tip.
Fires offshore may also involve solid phase fuels. These are present in a wide range of locations.
They may include cabling, seals, building materials and building contents including accommodation
modules and control buildings. Some of these materials have the potential to produce heavy yields
of smoke, toxic and irritant products, for example aromatic polymers such as polystyrene and
polyurethane foams. Such fires are likely to conform to the general character of compartment fires
observed onshore with distinct initiation and growth phases leading to flashover and a fully
developed fire. The typical course of the heat output from such a fire is shown in Figure 6.8.1.
From the toxic hazard viewpoint there are a number of specific fire types which may occur in
isolation or as stages during the course of a developing compartment fire which are of particular
concern and which specific toxic threats. These are:

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Table 6.8.1 Typical characteristics of offshore fire involving process fluids
Fire type Release Heat flux Carbon Smoke

monoxide
Surface Convective Volume Visibility
concentration,
emissive flux m3 at NTP m
power, ppm
kW
kWm-2
Pool Small
<5m
diameter
Large
>10m
diameter
Large on
sea surface
Gas jet Small
1 kg/s
Large
10 kg/s
Two phase 1 kg/s
jet
Flash fire
Figure 6.8.1 The course of a typical solid phase fuelled compartment fire.
• Non-flaming fires which occur during the initiation phase of a fire.
• Flaming fires which are characterized by rapid growth.
• Small flaming vitiated fires which may occur if a fire does not grow to flashover as a result
of lack of ventilation.
• Fully-developed or post flashover fires.
A classification of the toxic hazards represented by these fire types is summarized in Table 6.8.2.
These will vary with the fuel involved, particularly the mix of irritants and the level of smoke but can
be taken as a general guide.
Any data for the table?

Table 6.8.2 Summary of toxic hazards presented by solid phase fires of particular concern.
Fire Rate of CO2/CO ratio Toxic hazard Temperature

growth
Non-flaming/ smouldering Slow ~1 CO 0-1500 ppm 400 °C
O2 15-21%
Irritants
Little smoke
Small flaming Rapid 1000 down to CO 0 –1%
50 CO2 0-10%
O2 10-21%
Irritants, heat,
smoke
Small vitiated flaming Rapid then slow <10 CO 0.2-4%
CO2 1-10%
O2<12%
Irritants, heat,
smoke
Fully-developed/post Rapid <10 CO 0-3% 800 °C
flashover HCN 0-500 ppm
Irritants
High temperatures
Dense smoke
6.8.3 Harm criteria
6.8.3.1 The developing hazard from the fire
The influence of any developing fire on potential victims can be considered in three phases:
• The first comprises a period when the fire is growing but before the victim is affected by the
stimuli from the fire - heat and smoke. During this phase the victim has the full capacity and
opportunity to escape and the main factors determining survival are concerned with
detection and response to alarms.
• The next phase is the period of exposure to heat and smoke. The effects of increasing
exposure to heat and toxic products increasingly hinder a victim’s escape capability and
induce growing incapacitation. Escape will become increasingly problematic. At some stage
a stage of full incapacitation will be reached.
• The third phase will result from prolonged exposure to heat and combustion products and
will result in serious injury or death.
Hydrocarbon fires involving process fluids may not exhibit the first of these phases. From this
analysis four major stages can be identified. The times at which these stages are reached is critical
to an individual’s survival or otherwise.
• The time to and level of partial incapacitation. The onset of partial incapacitation hinders
escape – for example it reduces an individual’s evacuation speed, thus increases exposure
to the fire hazard and increases the chance of more serious consequences.
• The time at which the onset of full incapacitation occurs is important since it removes any
chance of self rescue. The individual is then dependent on outside assistance.
• The time for occurrence of serious injury.
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• The time at which death occurs.
6.8.3.2 The process by which occupants escape
The is dependent on factors such as detection, provision of alarms, response to alarms, length and
design of escape routes, age profile of the population, level of training, knowledge of the
environment and physiological response to exposure to heat and smoke. Again these factors can
be expressed in terms of characteristic times. Thus there is a time to detection of the fire, a pre-
movement time before escape action begins and a time to reach a place of safety determined by
the length of the evacuation route and the evacuation speed.
6.8.3.3 Outcome of an evacuation
The outcome of any evacuation depends on the two parallel processes outlined in Sub-sections
6.8.2.1 and 6.8.2.2. A successful evacuation requires
tu < te (6.8.4)
Here tu is the time from the start of the fire at which conditions become untenable. This may be the
time for full incapacitation should external rescue not be possible or the time to serious injury or
death if external intervention is available. te is made up of a sum of various component times. For
example:
te = td + tpm + ts (6.8.5)
where
td is a time to detect the fire,
tpm is a pre-movement time and
ts is a time required to attain a place of safety or removal of the fire hazard.
6.8.4 Background to human response to fire effects – can we move this forward?
6.8.4.1 Effects of heat
6.8.4.1.1 General
A number of reviews have been produced adequately summarizing the basis of radiative transfer
relevant to hazard analysis and the hydrocarbon processing industries, for example Lees (1996)
[X] and Beyler (2002) [X]. Others have concentrated on the effects of radiation on humans. Thus
Hymes et al (1996) [X] has produced a comprehensive study, Hockey and Rew (1996) [X] have
examined Human vulnerability to radiation for hazard analysis used in onshore situations and
O’Sullivan and Jagger (2004) [X] have looked specifically at the offshore situation to identify
suitable injury criteria. These provide suitable methodologies for computation of the radiation
received from flames and assessment of its effect on man.
Significant casualties resulted from exposure to radiation during the Los Alfraques Campsite and
Lowell Gas Company incidents
6.8.4.1.2 Radiative transfer
This depends on the source and the intensity of radiation falling on the target. The former can be
specified in terms of the flame shape and dimensions and the total radiated energy or its surface
emissive power. The latter can be computed using a suitable model (Beyler, 2002). The simplest of
these is the point source model which approximates the flame by a point source located at the
actual center of the real flame. The target is then regarded as located on a sphere with a radius
given its distance from the flame center. The received flux is then given by:
q = τ Qr cosθ / 4 π R2 (6.8.5)
where
Qr is the total radiative energy from the fire,
θ is the angle between the normal to the target and the line of sight from the target to
the point source location,
R is the distance from the point source to the target and
τ is the atmospheric transmissivity and accounts for attenuation of radiation by the

atmosphere.
Alternatively the widely used method of view factors can be used. In this model the received flux is
given by:
q=ϕEτ (6.8.6)
Here E is the flame surface emissive power and ϕ the view or configuration factor. This is a
geometrical factor depending on the target location and orientation relative to the flame and the
flame dimensions and shape. ϕ takes values between 0 and 1. Lees (1996) has parameterised
several view factors relevant to process safety in terms of the geometry of the situation. More
complex computationally-based models used within computational fluid dynamics suites are also
available for the computation of radiation fields.
Beyler has provided a methodology for calculation of the transmissivity τ. He has shown that it
depends principally on water vapour concentration in the atmosphere. In general at distances
< 100m, and relative humidities up to 50 %, τ > 0.7. For lower humidities and for targets closer to
the source, τ = 1 would be a reasonably conservative assumption.
6.8.4.1.3 Burn injuries
Burn injury correlates closely with skin temperature and the severity of burning increases with
failure of the blood supply to remove heat incident on the skin. The severity of burns has been
previously classified in terms of degree as indicated in Table 6.8.3.
Table 6.8.3 Burn severity classification
Burn type Characteristic

First degree Persistent redness
Second degree moderate Some blistering
Second degree deep Full blistering
Third degree Charring
The terms second and third degree have largely given way to characterization in terms of depth
For example moderate second degree burns affect only the surface layers whereas deep second
degree burns penetrate into the dermis. Third degree burns destroy both the surface and
underlying layers. Those with first degree burns are expected to escape quickly since movement
should not be impaired. With second degree burns any exposed skin will be uncomfortable and
simple escape tasks such as donning survival gear or turning handles may become difficult.
Escape becomes increasingly problematic as the depth of second degree burns increases.
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However unassisted escape is still possible. The response of third degree burn casualties is
difficult to predict. Fine control of injured extremities may be impossible and the act of escape will
probably incur further injury. Individuals with third degree burns should be considered casualties
who cannot escape unaided. Prolonged exposure to high radiant intensities and extensive third
degree burning results in death.
Injury due to exposure to short but strong pulses of thermal radiation may be correlated in several
ways, the most appropriate factor is the thermal dose – the product of radiation intensity and time.
However, it has been found that this underestimates the effects of high intensities and that a better
correlation is obtained if injury is with a dose, D, in the form:
D = I4/3 t (6.8.7)
Where t is the time in seconds, and I is the radiant intensity in kW/m2. this gives D in thermal dose
in units of (kWm2)4/3 s. Table 6.8.4 show the spread of selected experimental burn data for infra
red radiation correlated with the severity of injury. The degree of variability is high.
Table 6.8.4 A summary of burn data for level of injury with threshold dose
Harm caused Infra red Radiation Thermal Dose TDU,

(kWm2)4/3 s
Mean Range
Pain 92 86-103
Threshold first degree burn 105 80-130
Threshold second degree burn 290 240-350
Threshold third degree burn 1000 870-2600
Fatality criteria similarly based on the thermal dose can be derived for hazard analysis purposes.
An alternative approach to deriving the level of fatality is the use of probit functions. Unlike linear
harm functions they account better for extremes of injury and the variable response of a
population. They are based on the statistical normal distribution.. The probit function, Y, takes the
form:
Y = a + b loge V (6.8.8)
V is the thermal dose in (kWm2)4/3 and a and b are constants derived by a fit to data. A number of
probits have been developed as shown in Table 6.8.5. In Table 6.8.5 the thermal dose used in the
Lees probit included a multiplier to account for the variation of exposed skin area. Thus for a
normally clothed population a factor of 0.5 was included while the factor rose to 1.0 to account for
ignited clothing. This demonstrates the importance of protective clothing. The probit function can
be converted to a mortality rate using a table such as that presented in Lees (1996). The problem
with the probit approach is that there is never likely to be a sufficiently large sample of injuries from
a well-defined event to validate a particular probit or that the normal distribution is appropriate to
this situation.

Table 6.8.5 Probit equations for the fatality effects of thermal radiation.
Source Probit equation constants

a b
Eisenberg et al -14.9 2.56
Tsao and Perry -12.8 2.56
Lees -10.7 1.99
The extent of exposed skin has an important effect on survivability in high radiation environments.
Thus reducing the burned area as a result heavy duty, well designed and specified clothing can
provide significant mitigation. Even without a hat and gloves an individual wearing a one piece long
sleeved overall and shoes will have an exposed body area of <20%. With only the hands, face and
neck exposed this is further reduced to about 15%. Such exposures, even with full depth burns,
significantly reduce the level of fatality.
The issue is then to avoid ignition of clothing. This issue is not well understood and further work is
required. For example Hymes (1996) [X] has examined the ignition properties of various grades of
clothing and counter intuitively he has predicted that fire retardant cotton will ignite more easily
than other clothing types. All useful clothing, for example man made fibres may melt and as a
result may increase exposure by melting on to the skin.
6.8.4.1.4 Hyperthermia
Simple hyperthermia involves prolonged exposure (>15 minutes) to heated environments at

temperatures too low to cause burn injury. This means temperatures below 120 °C and 80 °C in
dry and saturated air respectively. The main effect is a gradual increase in core temperature. When
this is raised to 40°C consciousness becomes blurred. Temperatures above 42.5 °C cause death
in minutes. The time taken to reach such a state depends on a number of factors including the heat
flux exposure, level of activity, air movement, humidity and amount of clothing. The latter may
reduce tolerance since it restricts mitigating evaporative cooling. Figure 6.8.2 summarises
tolerance data for unclothed humans exposed to hot environments with minimal air movement.
This suggests that at temperatures above about 100°C exposures in excess of a few minutes
should give concern particularly in conditions of high humidity and if the subject is working hard as
might be expected if evacuating from a fire.
Figure 6.8.2 Thermal tolerance for humans at rest. The lettered points refer to actual data.
6.8.4.1.5 Convective heating
Above about 120 °C skin burns become increasingly likely. Clothing may provide some protection
but at temperatures around 200 °C pain levels become intolerable after a few minutes due to
burns. If temperature and humidity are sufficiently high to produce facial skin burns they will also
cause internal burns to the respiratory tract. Dry air at 300 °C will cause burns to the larynx in a few
minutes and breathing air at temperatures down to 120 °C will be painful and potentially cause
incapacitating burns. Humid air, steam or high heat capacity smoke may be dangerous at
temperatures around 100 C causing severe burns throughout the respiratory tract. Indeed there is
some data to suggest that the highest temperature of breathable 100% saturated air is as low as
60 °C. Clearly in a fire there will be significant water produced this is an important area for further
study.
In practice heat flux and temperature tenability limits intended to protect victims from incapacitation
from skin burns should be adequate to protect from burns to the respiratory tract.

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6.8.4.1.6 Conducted heat
The handling of hot objects can produce pain and severe burns. For metals for a few seconds
exposure at temperatures or 50 °C - 60 °C, 60 °C - 70 °C and ~80 °C can produce discomfort,
partial thickness and full thickness burns respectively.
6.8.4.2 Effects of smoke
Purser (2002) has summarized current knowledge on the varied human reaction to the various
constituents of smoke and should be consulted for a comprehensive treatment of the subject.
The human response to some smoke constituents (eg CO) can be described in terms of an
accumulated toxic dose given by the product of concentration and time. The effect thus builds over
time.
W = Ct (6.8.9)
Where W is a constant dose and t is an exposure time. The units of W are generally ppm min.
The effect of other constituents including most irritants is concentration dependent and the effects
are felt immediately. The response to other materials such as carbon dioxide and low oxygen
concentrations is a combination of dose and concentration.
The concept of a fractional effective dose (FED) has been introduced to allow the combined effects
of combustion product mixtures to be examined. For FED the Ct product for small periods of time
during exposure are divided by the Ct product dose causing the toxic effect. This can be done for a
number of components. The fractional doses are then summed until the fraction reaches unity
when the toxic effect is predicted to occur. Thus:
FED = Dose received at time t (Ct)/Ct dose to cause incapacitation or death
Similar calculations for a fractional incapacitating dose (FID) and fractional irritant concentration
(FIC) can be carried out. A FID or FIC =1 generally indicates a state of partial incapacitation. Full
incapacitation is predicted for a FID or FIC ~ 3-5.
The effects of many fire plume constituents is felt in the lung so the rate of breathing is important.
This is dependent on activity. Thus for an average man running or walking uphill as might be
expected in an escape situation the rate of breathing increases almost 6 fold. Similarly some plume
constituents, notably carbon dioxide produced in all fires, produces a three fold increase in
breathing rate at concentrations of about 5%.
The effects of some of the different plume constituents are known to be additive. Thus those of CO
and HCN are and CO2 increases up take of these products in proportion to its effect on the
breathing rate. Similarly the effects of oxygen hypoxia is considered directly additive to the
combined effects of CO and HCN. However, the asphxiant effect of CO2 acts independently of
other gases. The effects of irritants are considered additive.
The effects of some of the main smoke constituents are:
Carbon monoxide: CO causes suffocation by blocking oxygen transport in the blood

haemoglobin. The effects are dose dependent but take up is dependent on breathing rate. For a
normal adult at rest or partaking in light activity full incapacitation occurs after about 21 or 5
minutes respectively at 5000ppm. Death will occur at a concentration of 12-16000ppm for a 5
minute exposure.
Hydrogen cyanide: The effects of hydrogen cyanide depend partly on uptake and dose. The
effects increase from zero at about 80ppm to loss of consciousness and full incapacitation in a few
minutes at 180 ppm.

Low oxygen hypoxia Again the effects of lack of oxygen are both concentration and does related.
The main effects are felt at concentrations below about 14%.Thus:
>14% No significant effects
14.4-11.8 Slight effects on memory, reduced exercise tolerance
11.8-9.6 % Severe incapacitation, lethargy
<9.6 % Loss of consciousness, death
Carbon dioxide: The asphxiant effects of carbon dioxide are only felt at high concentrations above
about 5% and then follow a dose response relationship. Below this figure the main effect is of
hyperventilation which acts to increase the uptake of other gases. At concentrations of 6-7%
individuals suffer severe respiratory distress and dizziness. Loss of consciousness occurs at
concentrations between 7 and 10 %
Irritants: Irritants produce two levels of harm:

• Sensory irritation pain to the eyes, respiratory tract and lungs to some extent.
• An acute pulmonary response including edema and inflammation in the respiratory system.
This may lead to death 6-24 hours after exposure.
The former is concentration dependent while acute damage only occurs above a threshold
concentration and then is dose dependent.
The main irritants are acid gases including HCl, SO2 and NOx and simple aldehydes such as
acrolein and formaldehyde. There is little data on irritants for humans. Some data for HCl and
acrolein indicate disturbing irritation to the eyes and upper respiratory tract occurs at
concentrations of 75 –300 and < 5ppm respectively. Acute pulmonary response may be induced by
exposures in excess of 12000 and 500ppm for five minutes respectively.
Particulate smoke: Smoke can be either irritant or non-irritant. Smoke causes disorientation and
thus acts physically to reduce escape speed. They make way finding difficult and reduce the
visibility of escape signage. Studies have shown that walking speed is reduced from 1.2 to 0.3 ms-
1 for non irritating smoke. There is also a psychological effect in that some individuals will not try to
evacuate through smoke at a density in excess of 0.33/m. The effects of irritating smokes are even
more pronounced. Such smokes with densities of only ~0.2/m reduced walking speeds to 0.3ms-1.
6.8.5 Vulnerability/harm criteria
6.8.5.1 Effects of heat
6.8.5.1.1 Radiation
A recent study (O’Sullivan and Jagger, 2004) [X] has taken account of the special features of the
offshore environment including its isolation, the age profile and fitness of the population, state of
dress etc and recommended that the criteria given in Table 6.8.6 are the most appropriate.

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Table 6.8.6Thermal dose harm criteria from radiation
Harm caused Thermal dose, (kW/m2)4/3s

Escape impeded 290
1-5% fatality 1000
50% fatality (to front and back only) 1000
50% fatality 2000
100% fatality 3500
6.8.5.1.2 Convected heat
The toleration of a hot environment depends on the level of activity, extent of clothing and level of
humidity. Temperatures above 120 °C will produce both skin and internal burn injuries. For air with
a humidity <10%, the existing work suggests a relation for time to incapacitation in a hot
environment of
tI = 5.107 T-3.4 (6.8.10)
Thus temperatures of 100 and 60 °C would cause incapacitation in a matter of some 8 and 45
minutes respectively.
The time to incapacitation in air with higher water vapour contents is not well defined. It will be
significantly less that those obtained from Equation (6.8.10) but no data exist to allow its
determination with certainty. This is particularly important for fires offshore where there is likely to
be significant quantities of water both produced in the fire and used for fire fighting.
6.8.5.2 Effects of smoke•
6.8.5.2.1 Asphyxiant gases
Existing knowledge suggest that the tenability limits given in Table 6.8.7 for asphyxiant gases are
appropriate for design purposes.
Table 6.8.7 Tenability limits for incapacitation and death from exposure to common
asphyxiant gases
Gas 5 minute exposure 30 minute exposure

Incapacitation Death Incapacitation Death
CO 6-8000 ppm 12-16000 ppm 14-1700 ppm 2500-4000 ppm
HCN 150-200 ppm 250-400 ppm 90-120 ppm 170-230 ppm
Low oxygen 10-13% <5% <12% 6-7%
CO2 7-8% >10% 6-7% >9%
Some currently accepted 30 minute LC50 values for CO and HCN are 5700 and 165ppm
respectively.
6.8.5.2.2 Irritants
Two irritant gases have been taken as examples, acrolein and HCl. Existing knowledge suggests
that the tenability limits given in Table 6.8.8 for these gases are appropriate for design purposes.
Two levels of sensory irritancy are given;

• level a is for unpleasant and severely disturbing eye and upper respiratory tract
irritation,
• level b represents severe eye and upper respiratory tract irritation with severe pain.
For death the levels represent concentrations at which there is a danger of death occurring during
or immediately after exposure. Concentrations are in ppm.
Table 6.8.8 Tenability limits for sensory irritation or death from irritant substances.
Gas Sensory irritation Death, minutes

a b 5 10 30
Acrolein 1-5 5-95 500-1000 150-690 50-135
HCL 75-300 300-11000 12-16000 10000 2-4000
6.8.5.2.3 Smoke
The ability to evacuate through smoke is dependent on a number of factors including knowledge of
the environment, levels of illumination (particularly of signage) and irritancy of smoke. Suggested
tenability limits based on ability to evacuate can be set in terms of optical density and set at 0.2
and 0.08 /m for small and large spaces respectively.
6.8.6 Hazards from fire protection systems
Possible interactions of fire with active and passive protection systems must be considered.
For example water mist and deluge systems will produce copious amounts of steam which will add
to the obscuration provided by smoke and hinder way finding. Also humid air enhances the effects
of hyperthermia and when inhaled is can significantly increase the severity of internal burns to the
respiratory tract.
Passive systems may also present hazards. Intumescent materials rely on chemical reaction for
their action and generate fumes. These fumes or their decomposition products may present a
hazard. Similar considerations apply also to binders used in other passive systems.
Many materials when treated with fire retardants are capable of resisting small ignition sources but
when faced with a large igniting fire can burn readily. The treatments themselves then add
significantly to the rate at which smoke is produced and the composition can be particularly irritant
and toxic.
6.8.7 Evacuation and mitigation
If the hazard cannot be removed then some means of separating the hazard and personnel must
be provided. This will generally be through evacuation of occupants by means of safe, protected
evacuation routes to a safe haven or temporary safe refuge. Platform layout can make a major
contribution to this.
Careful consideration must be given to the design and siting of evacuation routes. Their length
must be kept to a minimum and they must be routed away from high hazard areas. Should they be
likely to be subject to fire attack they must be protected with fire walls suitable for offshore duty or
water protection systems? The evacuation routes should maintain their integrity for a time sufficient
to allow even injured personnel to reach a location of safety. If likely to suffer from smoke logging
consideration should be given to other methods of way finding. There are no particular guidelines
for evacuation routes off shore. However CIA guidance for onshore situations, suggests that

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evacuation routes should not suffer incident radiant heat fluxes in excess of 6.3 kWm-2. There are
also general requirements relating to evacuation routes in public buildings and industrial premises.
There is a need to provide temporary refuges to serve as muster points prior to evacuation of the
facility. There are no particular guidelines for the design of such structures offshore. However, they
are required to allow staff to muster, assess the emergency and allow execution of the emergency
plan. The requirement is that the chance of loss of a TR, within the stated endurance time, will not
exceed 1 in 1000 per year. Thus there is a need to design fire resistance into the structure. Those
walls likely to be exposed to fire must be protected in such a way, either by insulation or water
deluge, as to provide this resistance. The prevention of smoke ingress must be considered and
any ventilation system should include a means to close off relevant air intakes. Similarly a means
must be provided to seal doors and other openings such as cable routes and other services.
There is currently much activity in the development of evacuation models. Traditionally evacuation
has relied on simple hydraulic formulations of people movement to derive travel speeds. These
have been corrected for travel through smoke, the use of stairs etc, and the difficulty of route
finding and an evacuation time obtained from simple combination with the length of the route. More
complex models are now available which take account of the response to alarms, other pre-
movement aspects and the varied response of a population to the threat of fire. These models
have recently been reviewed Nelson and Mowrer (2002) [X] and Gobeau et al (2004) [X]. They
have been applied to a variety of situations and potentially they may be applied offshore
particularly to the design process to calculate a time for all personnel to reach a place of safety for
different plant layouts and fire scenarios.
Evacuation routes
The mitigating effects of PPE and other protective equipment.
6.8.8 Consolidation of different approaches
The various approaches will be consolidated here.
To be added some words on fire safety engineering with reference to API RP14G, ISO 13702:
1999, ISO 15138: 2000 and BS PD 7974:2003

7. Detailed design guidance for fire resistance
7.1 General
Despite the complexity of the fire phenomenon and the many areas of uncertainty still
acknowledged by the industry, experience shows that, with care, offshore fire risks can be kept to
acceptable levels. This is achieved by designing with fire-related issues in mind throughout every
stage of a design project.
This section on design guidance for fire resistance seeks to pull together in one place guidance on
existing best practice for a two-pronged approach to fire protection i.e.
1. Designing to minimise both the occurrence and the magnitude of fires.
2. Designing effective fire protection systems to detect, control and mitigate the effects of
the fire risk remaining after all reasonable efforts to minimise the fire potential by
process design and layout have been exhausted.
Sub-section 7.2 guides engineers towards designing out problems and reducing risks early in
design, where significant changes can be made relatively cheaply. This assumes that sufficient
time for creative thought and corrective action is allowed in the project schedule. Failure to provide
time and resource for this could result in the need for very expensive fire-protection systems or
failure to meet risk targets without extensive QRA input and/or remedial design.
There is a legal obligation to base decision-making for health and safety on risk assessment.
Project managers need to understand that risk assessment is not a one-off activity but a
continuous process, best done at regular intervals throughout the design process. Failure to do this
courts a risk of missing safety or financial targets and having difficulty demonstrating ALARP.
These risk assessments do not always have to be complicated, quantitative, or time consuming,
but should be appropriate to the problem being assessed. Targets for risk are set at the beginning
of a project, but the desired information for QRA (where justified) is generally not be available until
later in the design. Thus early decisions on concept and layout may be based on a ‘quick estimate’
assessment, as described in Sub-sections 3.7 or 5.4.
It is important that design decisions are taken in the light of an understanding and assessment of
the Cost vs. the Risk Reduction in order that the justification can be recorded for the ALARP
demonstration. If this process is followed, it is far less likely that problems requiring expensive
solutions will be identified at the eleventh hour when the final QRA results for the installation are
produced.
There will always be a trade-off between cost and safety. Senior Management is responsible for
approving new projects or major modifications and may ultimately be called to account for their
decision. Two key safety issues to be addressed are:
1. Can this installation be built and operated to make a reasonable profit with an
acceptable level of safety?
2. Does the project documentation fully record the basis on which the decision to sanction
the project was made?
The cost of continuing to operate the installation safely once the revenue from the installation has
dropped to a fraction of its peak rate must not be forgotten. Some issues for older platforms
nearing the end of their life cycle are discussed in Sub-section 3.10.
Senior managers will look to their project managers, who will in turn look to their discipline
engineers for the detailed back-up to support the sanction decision. One of the aims of this
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Section 7 is to highlight to both project and discipline engineers the extent to which they can
influence the type of fires and well as the effectiveness of the fire management measures as part
and parcel of their discipline design effort.
7.2 The design sequence – minimising fire hazards throughout the design
7.2.1 Introduction
The recommended Fire and Explosion Hazard Management processes are laid out in Part 0 of this
guidance. Part 0 is aimed at safety specialists. The objective of this Sub-section 7.2 is to provided
some additional, qualitative, pragmatic, guidance on designing to reduce fire risk at each step of
the design process. This section is written for discipline engineers and project managers.
Each of the following stages of the design process should schedule safety reviews appropriate to
that particular stage into the project schedule.
7.2.2 Project appraisal & concept selection
At the first stage of design, a number of different concepts will be put forward for consideration. A
simple evaluation of which concept offers the smallest fire risk should be made. At concept stage
there will be only very basic well information, production flowrates, vessel inventories, utility
requirements and layout data, so only basic comparisons can be made. In addition, it must be
recognised that there is always a balance to be struck between safety, cost and practicality. The
discipline of recording the basis for the concept selection decision forces project teams to ensure
the balance of cost vs. safety is appropriate and in line with Company Safety Policy. If the cost of
the safety facilities necessary to maintain the Safety of any proposed concept within acceptable
bounds makes the installation unprofitable, then that concept should be rejected.
Key items to consider at concept selection stage are:

• Where will the wells, risers and process equipment be located in relation to each other and
to the TR and evacuation facilities? Evacuation from a small, unmanned NUI is just as
important as evacuation from a manned installation.
• What is the relative complexity of the topsides processes? Greater complexity implies
higher leak frequency and higher overall fire risk.
• How large are the major inventories – and how long will they support the various fire
scenarios?
• Enclosed or partially enclosed modules containing process equipment present serious fire
risks and should be avoided. Open module design with full-width fire and blast walls for
escalation protection is preferable. Open module design requires much deluge water as
several areas will be initiated at once. Enclosed design requires very heavy water
application, very rapid activation systems and extensive protection to high level support
structure and blowdown facilities so the cost will be higher.
• How will the wells, risers, process and TR be physically segregated to prevent a small
incident in one area spreading and escalating to cause topsides structural failure and
damage to risers, wells or evacuation facilities?
• Gas cloud and smoke plumes from un-ignited releases and fires cause panic and affect
EER issues. Interaction of weather and plume/cloud behaviour and EER
• If there is risk of sea pool fires, what will the consequences be?
• How do the blowdown arrangements for the proposed concepts compare. Removal of
inventory as fast as possible to a safe distance is critical issue and a significant expense.
• Where will cranes, boats and drilling rigs operate in relation to pipelines and risers?

The outcome of the review should be presented in a discussion meeting so that engineer and
managers can understand how the options were compared. In this way, any potential for the good
aspects of one concept to be adopted to improve one of the other concepts can be exploited. This
can result in final choice of a better, hybrid concept. The less effort put into control of fire at source
at concept stage, the higher the likely cost of the fire protection systems found necessary at a later
stage in design.
As a general rule, large installations with complex process plant can expect higher leak
frequencies so understanding of all the fire escalation issues should be a focus point right from
concept selection. These installations also tend to have a higher POB.
It is now known that heat build up from fires in confined modules is both more severe and more
rapid than was appreciated in the 1990s. A key finding of recent research work is that fires from
even relatively small hydrocarbon releases (around 1 to 3kg/s) in enclosed or partially enclosed
modules can generate a layer of very hot gases (temperatures of around 1000 °C) in the top few
metres of the module within a few minutes of ignition. Structural failure, damage to high level
process and safety equipment and smoke and flames reaching well beyond the module boundaries
are all realistic consequences to be considered. To control the consequences of sustained
pressure-release fires requires higher deluge rates and more passive protection than have been
traditionally used in the North Sea in such modules. At concept stage however, many of the causes
and consequences can be designed-out thus reducing costs. This is done by:
• Not placing process equipment that can sustain severe fires into partially enclosed
modules.
• In open modules, analysing where the heat, smoke and flame will go, and designing in the
light of this knowledge.
• Ensuring that all structure potentially exposed to high heat loads is examined and either the
structural concept changed or the structure adequately protected by PFP
• Where enclosure of process plant is unavoidable, providing for rapid removal of inventory
and high levels of protection against the high heat loads. (see Sub-section 7.3)
On large installations personnel can rapidly distance themselves from a major fire incident. The TR
and evacuation points can be far enough away to allow safe evacuation, provided the decision to
evacuate is made very rapidly. Evacuation risks on small, open, gas installations can sometimes
be acceptable because of low production rates, very simple process or small inventories. Small,
single jacket installations with complex process plant however need extremely close attention.
Where wells, risers, process and blowdown facilities are all in close proximity to each other, as well
as the TR and the evacuation points, a very high safety spend is likely. Innovative, well-informed
design is needed to make them safe. In such cases a separate accommodation jacket or unit may
prove the only feasible option.
Some normally unmanned very small gas satellite platforms in the Southern North Sea have ended
up with relatively high risk levels and ‘minimum facilities’, based on the philosophy that the
installation would only be manned for an absolute minimum time. The high risk stems from the fact
that these are small open installations with minimum safety features, and ignited gas jet fires are
large in comparison to the installation footprint. There is no shelter for personnel before or during
evacuation. Such installations need to have lower risk targets to take account of satellite team
personnel who may spend their time visiting a succession of similar facilities. The platform-specific
risk becomes high, although not excessive if viewed in isolation. However the cumulative individual
risk for satellite team members becomes high.
Once the design concept is selected, and a basic layout proposed, a layout review should be
undertaken. Good layout with regard to fire potential can minimise the likelihood of release and
ignition, and the subsequent impact on exposed equipment, critical systems or personnel.
The layout fire review should be a multidiscipline activity, addressing at least the topics and
associated considerations listed in the table below. Given that no two installations are alike, there
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will be many variations on the list of issues to be covered. The table is intended to highlight key
considerations to be addressed. If such layout issues are not addressed until late in design,
improvements are far more costly to implement. The table below covers the review of the platforms
normal operational phase. The objective is to explore whether the locations of key items which
contribute to fire safety can be improved without incurring disproportional cost..
Separate, shorter layout reviews should be considered, with appropriate discipline attendance for
other stages of the installation lifecycle (e.g. installation, commissioning, major drilling / workover
programmes, decommissioning etc). This would ensure that key layout considerations for other
lifecycle phases are not missed.
Topsides issues - Concept

Item Fire considerations
Wells Location, and segregation for all anticipated types of well operation (including drilling
and workover) and maintenance during field life.
Location, accessibility and vulnerability of automatic and manual isolation valves in
fire situations
Location of artificial lift arrangements, inventories and isolation
Risers / pipelines Riser and riser isolation valve locations – vulnerability to fire attack
Risers and Pipelines as source of release and potential for escalation.
Riser vulnerability to passing and attendant vessel collision especially during cranes
operations
Process & piping Location of major inventories
Location of blowdown vent/flare tip
Number and rough location of process ESDVs and BDVs
Location of overboard discharge lines or atmospheric vents (in worst case process
upset condition) with respect to ignition points
Location of fuel-gas piping and potential for fires/explosions outside main process
locations (especially turbine enclosures)
Exposure of personnel and equipment (especially instrumentation) to closed Vs open
module design needs due consideration
Structures and supports Location of tall structures or structural supports vulnerable to fire attack with severe
consequences
Points of ignition Consider ignition potential for all release scenarios (see factors listed in Sub-section
2.2.3)
Especially consider the location of all non-certified equipment with respect to releases
and associated gas plumes (e.g. cranes and generator or motor enclosures.
Egress, escape and For potential fire scenarios:
evacuation routes
• Consider egress routes, checking for trap points or need for protected muster
point alternative to TR
• Consider location of escape routes to sea
• Consider time to escalation Vs time to muster, appraise and evacuate.
• Consider impairment of TEMPSC loading area and helideck access routes
TR and alternate Location of air supply ducts

protected muster points
Vulnerability to heat/smoke

Topsides issues - Concept
Item Fire considerations
Vulnerability of TR supports to fire scenarios
Communications Location and vulnerability of any critical communications hardware
Communication between
UPS Check for vulnerability to fire
Fire Protection Location of firewalls
Vulnerability of fire pumps and ring-main to damage in fire scenarios
Vulnerability of module deluge supplies. Location of back-up supply lines.
Discharge location for oil and firewater drained to sea in fire incident.
Specific subsea or marine issues (see also Sub-sections 3.8 and 3.9)
Subsea layout Understanding of leak durations and isolation provision
Position of pipeline routes to minimise damage potential
Position of subsea isolation to minimise inventory loss
Subsea Refer to Sub-section 3.10.3 or 7.2.8
tiebacks
Subsea Location of control interface and vulnerability to fire attack
control
FPSOs
Time for escalation of process events to vessel threatening events
Diversity of escape routes for all fire scenarios (especially process/storage scenarios)
Location of evacuation facilities for sea-fire scenarios
MODUs Drilling units – vulnerability to drilling fire scenarios, especially survivability of ballast control
arrangements
Floating Production Units (converted MODUs) – consider vulnerability of hull to internal and
external process fire scenarios
Vulnerability of emergency pull-off arrangements in fire scenarios (drilling and production units)
For Jack-ups, vulnerability of legs to fire scenarios in both standalone drilling operations and
drilling operations over production installations-
7.2.3 FEED stage
At this stage, fire management input can still have a major impact on the overall risk levels for the
personnel and the TR impairment. This is the stage where the process control, ESD and
blowdown/dump systems are developed. The fire and gas detection and protection system
philosophies will be set. These systems must not be designed in isolation. Whichever particular
philosophy is followed the aim should always be to:-
• Raise alarms, shut down and isolate plant rapidly on fire or gas detection
• Provide the facility to remove all significant hazardous inventories from the fire zone quickly
without local manual intervention.

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• Get all personnel back to safety ASAP

• Ensure full emergency evacuation can be achieved before the incident escalates to a
platform–threatening event – under all weather conditions and wind directions. Rapid
evacuation of some personnel may be delayed, particularly on large installations, due to the
need to carry out search and rescue operations for personnel not appearing at muster. This
impacts on TEMPSC numbers and locations.
At the start of FEED stage the basic process design parameters are set down and the key plant
items and protection systems identified and sized. The process and the safety specialists need to
work together to
• Develop a draft ESD and blowdown philosophy document
• Examine the design for potential escalation points
• Develop draft fire and gas detection and protection philosophy documents, identifying the
goals of the key SCE’s for fire control i.e. how is each release or fire scenario prevented,
detected, stopped or controlled, (see Sub-section 3.6)
• Clarify the fire areas and location of fire walls with respect to plant & TR
• Decide what types of passive and active fire protection best suit the fire scenarios
• Compare escalation times with evacuation, search and rescues times
• Design egress routes including stairways, ladders to sea
• Review the isolation and blowdown systems to minimise the fire impact and escalation
potential ( a number of reiterations of the design may be needed)
• Carry our course fire risk assessment (see Sub-sections 2.8, 3.7 and 5.4)
• Carry out FEED stage HAZID and HAZOP studies. These may identify new fire related
issues to be considered as well as other safety issues.
European Standard EN ISO 13702:1999 [X] entitled ‘Petroleum and natural gas industries –
Control and Mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore production installations – Requirements
and Guidelines’ provides more guidance on layout, control systems, protection and mitigation
systems, EER arrangements and inspection, testing and maintenance issues for the various
systems.
NORSOK Standard S001, Rev 3 2000 [X], entitled ‘Technical Safety’ and its annexes, also lays out
requirements for layout, structural and process design safety, fire and explosion protection
arrangements and communication systems.
7.2.4 Detailed design
The effectiveness of the detailed design stage is dependent on the success of the preceding
design stages. If a design concept with high fire risks or poor protection philosophies has been
selected, then detailed design is unlikely to be able to rectify the situation without major cost and
time penalties.
7.2.4.1 Introduction
This stage of design presents many conflicting issues to be resolved. Realistically, design
decisions affecting safety have to be made by balancing the risks, and this has to be done on a
project timescale. This is only possible where the risks are honestly and openly brought up for
discussion between the various disciplines affected and the project management. Some of the
common fire-related issues for each discipline area are outlined below.

7.2.4.2 Structural design
The fire scenarios for the installation will have been identified in the FEED study. They should
already have been minimised as far as possible at concept and FEED stages.
• Key structural supports (or vessel hulls in the case of floating installations) either need
protecting against the remaining fire effects or redundancy provided in the design. The
effects on the structure of external, as well as internal flaming in confined but ventilation
controlled modules must be assessed. The escalated fire effects can be serious enough to
lead to progressive collapse of the topsides. Identification
• Structural redundancy, while costly in the short term, has other longer term benefits e.g. for
collision protection, reducing inspection or protection against long-structural degradation.
• Locating process pipework inside structural supports (e.g. flare structures) should always
be avoided as overpressure from releases or explosions, or heating by fire could cause
rapid structural failure.
An open design of platform with appropriately designed fire and blast walls to segregate process
and drilling areas from safer areas with higher occupancy is preferred wherever possible.
Wherever fire scenarios within enclosed modules are identified, early failure of structural items in
the roof of the module is predicted unless passive protection and/or a very high rate of deluge
application is provided. The times to structural failure and the consequences in the event of
protection failure should be provided by the structural engineer to the safety specialists.
Grated floors greatly reduce the pool fire risks and reduce explosion overpressures. Environmental
legislation however forbids marine pollution by oil, so alternative measures to prevent operational
spillage must still be provided. Grated floors do not provided a barrier against jet fires or radiant
heat, and this needs consideration during scenario development.
The structural design must provide for rapid egress and escape of personnel from the process
areas to sea or to the TR. Space allowance for a diversity of escape routes is essential. Escape
routes should be based on stairways not ladders. The routes must take into account all the
different fire scenarios.
7.2.4.3 Process systems
Process engineers should seek to minimise inventories, operating pressures and temperatures and
simplify their designs as much as possible. However they are limited by reservoir and export
system characteristics, residence times needed for separation and the product specification
requirement.
Where large inventories still remain in sections of the process train following ESD, blowdown
and/or dump systems to remove hydrocarbon inventories to flare, cold vent, or surge/storage
vessels should be considered. These systems themselves are not risk free and the risks need to
be balanced for every design, since designs vary enormously. The options considered and the
basis for the provision (or lack of) of key safety facilities should be documented as proof that
ALARP principles were upheld.
Process items exposed to severe fires (defined as confined or fully enveloping pool fires or jet
fires) should be designed and provided with protection in accordance with the Energy Institute’s
“Guidelines for the design and protection of pressure systems to withstand severe fires” [X].
Research shows that fires fuelled by 2-phase releases are far harder to control than simple pool
fires. The designers of blowdown systems must recognise that the biggest hazards are the liquid
inventories which sustain high release pressures for more than 5 or 10 minutes. This has little to do
with existing codes which require pressure reduction to half design pressure or 7 barg within 15
minutes. Identifying the transition point at which spray releases change to liquid releases (resulting
in simple pool fires as opposed to pressurised oil-spray fires) and designing the blow-down system

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accordingly, is key to good blowdown system design. Typically, this transition point occurs at
around 7 bar for oil and 4 bar for condensate. There is some evidence that in the presence of
general area coverage (of at least 12 lpm/m2 with medium velocity nozzles) the transition point
pressure could be raised to around 15 bar for oil and 10 bar for condensate, but the research is
currently inadequate to develop proper design methodologies.
Wherever possible, systems should be designed to contain overpressure caused by process

excursions. Where this cannot be done, pressure relief to a vent system or combined vent and
blowdown system is preferable to reliance on a High Integrity Pressure Protection System
(HIPPS). In the mid 1990s, it was thought that HIPPS systems provided cheaper protection,
equivalent to that offered by traditional vent systems. Experience has shown that the overall costs
associated with HIPPS systems, which involve extensive analysis input at design stage and
ongoing maintenance attention, are often in the end comparable with provision of pressure relief
systems.
Sand production frequently occurs as installation age. Many large releases have been caused by
sand erosion. An ignited release through a 17mm hole in an oil system at 20 bar in a mainly
enclosed module (but with some openings) of 8000 m325
would produce a major fire with external flaming and smoke sufficient to overwhelm the
installation. Reservoir engineers as well as process engineers should consider how they have
prepared for eventual sand production in their designs.
Production chemicals can cause leaks and fires as well as adverse health effects during handling.
Chemical data sheets should always be reviewed for potential contribution to platform fire risk.
7.2.4.4 Process pipework
Piping engineers can reduce risks on an installation by:

• Siting key isolation, pressure relief and blowdown valves away from fire effects or else
adequately protecting them.
• Where valves are quick acting and fail-safe, protection may not be necessary, but the
designer need to examine the fail-safe mechanism (with input from the instrument
engineers) to ensure they are truly fail-safe under all fire scenarios. Duplication of
solenoids, or steel enclosures for control cabinets may be necessary to achieve the
required reliability within the heat-up timeframe. This information should be documented
within performance standards for the equipment.
• Protection options must be chosen based on a clear understanding of the fire effects
• Pipe / valve support arrangements at high level also need to be considered for fire
protection, in the light of the fire scenarios. The consequences of failure where rapid and
severe heating is a significant risk should dictate the protection needs
• A balance has always to be struck between minimising sources of release and allowing
safe isolation and access for intrusive maintenance. Any areas with a concentration of
potential release points in close proximity to high inventory process plant require close
scrutiny to see how the risks can be reduced through re-arrangement, use of high integrity
flanges, use of integral block and bleed valves, shielding, grating floors, etc. Areas
susceptible to vibration or sand erosion should be similarly considered.
7.2.4.5 Instrumentation and control

• Instrumentation is a common leak source and should be minimised where possible
• Design of safety critical control systems needs to be checked for common mode failure
problems which cause releases, ignite releases or could occur as a result of fires.

• The safety integrity level (SIL) requirement of safety critical instrument or systems must be
determined. As part of this process, the consequences of failure are considered and
maintenance/testing frequencies established. The SIL assessment should be a
multidiscipline activity, chaired by a practical engineer with experience of such
assessments. Good SIL assessments often help to reduce un-necessary instrumentation
and should be carried out in accordance with the BS EN 61508 [X] or 61511 [X] as
appropriate.
• The consequences of rapid heating causing simultaneous failure of all mid to high level
instrumentation in modules which could suffer from prolonged engulfment should be
considered (see also Sub-section 2.2.1). Where this will lead to catastrophic or extreme
events the design needs the closest scrutiny to ensure risks are truly acceptable. Further
risks reduction may be possible either more rapid, higher rate water application, relocation
or protection of vulnerable items, failsafe design, providing redundancy, or reducing the
heat build-up by opening up the module.
• Setting realistic performance standards for safety critical instruments or systems is usually
a re-iterative process, requiring input from process mechanical and safety as well as
instrument disciplines. Sufficient time for discussion must be included in project schedules.
• Instrument tappings are prone to fatigue failure in the presence of pipework vibration and
unsupported instrument loads. This fatigue damage and subsequent failure can occur very
rapidly
7.2.4.6 Fuel gas and lubrication lines
Power generation systems fuelled by conditioned process gas or diesel can be a source of both
fuel releases and ignition. Fuel gas lines should be designed to tolerate failures at the HP/LP
interfaces in the system. Design should minimise inventory in the system and minimise routes
through process areas or areas of high mechanical damage risk. Provision for rapid isolation
and/or disposal of fuel inventory is required.
Provided proper maintenance and condition monitoring takes place, serious mechanical failures of
rotating equipment, leading to projectiles and serious fires are rare. The system design should
make system shut down as soon as it deviates from its safe operating envelope. Early intervention
allows the situation to be brought back under control. Escalated fires inside any enclosures, given
some air ingress, can be severe. Lube-oil or diesel fire produce smoke which migrates to other
areas. The layout should take into account the possibility of sudden mechanical failure and smoke
generation and locate enclosures where such events are less likely to escalate to process fires.
7.2.4.7 Power generation and electrical systems
Existing standards of protection against the occurrence of electrical fires on offshore installations
have proved adequate over time. Early automatic electrical isolation on overload is usually
sufficient to prevent development of serious cable fires and subsequent escalation.
Electrical equipment can provide a source of ignition in the event of a process hydrocarbon
release. Detailed design should minimise the risk of hydrocarbon releases coming into contact with
uncertified electrical equipment. Open design of process modules allows migration of large gas
releases. Best practice is to locate uncertified electrical equipment inside enclosed areas which
contain no process plant and to which the air supply can be shut off if gas is detected at the inlets.
Location of non-certified electrical equipment in open deck areas should be either avoided or
adequately justified, for example by gas dispersion modelling.
During a fire event, main power generation usually switches over to emergency arrangements.
Often initial emergency power is from diesel and then ultimately by battery power, shedding non-
essential loads at each stage. In a major fire event, UPS batteries power the voice and essential
shutdown / process / F&G data and life support/evacuation (e.g. lighting) systems. These systems
must work under all wind and wave conditions. Batteries can only supply power for a limited time.

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Design must be compatible with the fire, emergency response and evacuation timescales. Power
for each firepump is usually independently supplied. The location and redundancy arrangements
need to be designed in full cognisance of the fire scenarios and how they are influenced by
interaction with the weather.
The effect of power loss on the operation of all safety critical items should be reviewed early in
detailed design.
7.2.4.8 Fire and gas detection
There use to be an EIC guide that we may be able to use for this general part (with suitable
ackowledgements)
• Setting system performance standards
• Detector selection and location (gas, fire, smoke, heat, VESDA)
• Reliability issues and failure mode considerations
• Vulnerability to fire events
7.2.4.9 Fire and gas protection (active and passive)
what about a project spec somewhere?
7.2.4.10 Drains
The drain system design should be carefully checked. There have been many fatalities and near
misses due to hydrocarbon ingress to safe areas via drains. Specifically:
• Never mix separated process water and drains in one caisson
• Water seals in drain systems are unreliable protection devices
• Never allow process hydrocarbons into open drain systems
• Use of process pressure by operators to ‘blow down’ liquids to the closed drains system
should be forbidden unless the system is specifically designed for this practice
• Accommodation and sewage drains should be independent from any other drains
• Deluge operation must be taken into account in drain system design
• HAZOP of drain systems is essential on large, integrated platforms
7.2.4.11 HVAC
HVAC has a key function in preventing gas clouds from coming into contact with ignition sources:
• Locate HVAC intakes optimally with respect to gas releases and fire scenarios.
• Migration of gas clouds via extraction systems from enclosed hazardous modules should
be carefully considered. Arrangements for safe removal of gas releases from enclosed
process modules are difficult to make fool-proof, thus open module design is a better
option.
• Continued operation of the HVAC system is usually only safety critical for small control
rooms inside process modules during a gas release, as positive pressurisation is then
necessary to prevent gas ingress. Closure of HVAC dampers to protect against gas ingress
to safe areas however, is always safety critical. Therefore HVAC damper operation should
be failsafe and very reliable.

7.2.5 Explosion & fire hazards review –this will move to a checklist
This review should be carried out in the first half of the detailed design stage. At this stage, there is
enough information available to understand the fire and explosion hazards in the context of the
structural, process and safety system design. Small but important adjustments may still be possible
without major cost implications.
Perhaps give a few more steps on method here, i.e. define area, by geography, identify relevant
equipment and inventories, then note fire types (in categories only), including and going on to the
steps below, also identify that this is a first step in the FERA required by law (PFEER) in the UK.
The review provides a health check for the design to ensure it is on track to meet, or improve on,
the project risk targets. Courser reviews should already have been carried out at concept and/or
layout stage. The objective here is to check that the right key design decisions have been and are
still being made to minimise the risks.
The review process should be multidiscipline and consist of :

• Clarifying the potential fuel sources for fires, the quantities and their locations
• Confirming their release likelihood and characteristics
• Consider ignition sources and immediate effects, especially on personnel
• Identifying the escalation scenarios in the light of the layout and protection systems
provided
• Discussion of how effectively the fire prevention, detection, control and mitigation measures
will work together to reduce risk.
• Discussion of the failure modes for the safety systems
• Include consideration of peripheral systems such as drain systems, HVAC inlets, process
outlets etc which interface with the fire scenarios
• For large integrated installations especially consider all interfaces between the process
system and service systems
Discussion must differentiate between the higher risk (design case) scenarios (often smaller
incidents escalating to cause major events) and the improbable (residual risk) scenarios, with
special emphasis on potential for multiple fatality events. The methodology can vary but must the
review must be systematic to ensure no issues are missed. The objective is not to duplicate the
developing risk assessment for the new installation, but to serve as a cross-check for it, in case
any important factors have been missed.
Any concerns that arise need to be addressed during the remainder of the detailed design stage
and outcomes resolved through the project risk-tracking system. Failure mode issues for safety
items needs to be picked up and fed into the developing performance standards and written
schemes of examination.
7.2.6 Construction/commissioning phases
During construction many minor alterations take place. Some may have potential for negating
designed-in safety features. It is thus important during commissioning to:
• Monitor construction for on-site changes to design
• Ensure that personnel installing safety systems (PFP application, valve installation etc) are
competent and properly supervised,
• Ensure installation personnel have easy access to the design engineers so they can check
out any reservations/problems they have during installation/commission

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• Checklists, punchlists etc are used to ensure all items are finished, tested and properly
handed over to operations
7.2.7 Operational phase
Despite all the money that is spent during the design and construction of offshore facilities, the
transfer of key fire-safety information from the design team to frontline offshore staff (OIM,
supervisors, emergency response personnel) is often inadequately addressed. This should be
separately and adequately budgeted for at the outset of the project.
• Operational and maintenance staff and contractors based offshore will take over the
operation and maintenance of the safety systems. Supervisors need to be given an
overview of the fire scenarios and told about the design intent of the safety systems they
inherit. Offshore supervisors are under considerable time pressures offshore. It is not a
reasonable to expect them to absorb this information from the risk assessment documents
and the Safety Case is unlikely to provide the level of detail required.
• Without the above knowledge there is potential for work permit approvals or on-site risk
assessments to miss important issues.
• Maintenance and testing of SCEs must be adequate to prevent degradation of the installed
systems. The impact of degradation may not be obvious without the above training.
• The fire and explosion scenarios and the escalation timeframes must be captured and
incorporated into the platform specific emergency response plans. Scenario-based,
platform specific emergency response exercises should be carried out periodically
throughout field life. The quality will depend directly on the quality of the engineering input
to these exercises.
• All engineering changes must be properly monitored and controlled
• Changes of OIMs and supervisors are frequent. The new personnel need to be given the
same level of training as the original personnel.
7.2.8 Plant modifications
Short section about Control of plant modifications (including management and personnel changes)
7.3 Best practice for fire protection systems

7.3.1 Introduction
Although every effort may be made to minimise topsides inventories and likelihood of leaks, there
is always some level of hydrocarbon fire risk left. Thus fire protection systems need to be provided
for the benefit of personnel, plus protection of the asset and the reputation of the company.
Modern design philosophy for fire protection systems has changed over the last decade and a half
from being code-based to scenario-based.
Design of a fire protection system for any area of the installation must now be shown to be
appropriate for the potential fire loads within that area. This is a very different approach from the
code-driven approach of the ‘80s and early ‘90s where water deluge requirements were set for
different parts of the installation, in isolation from process and operating conditions. This ‘one size
fits all’ code-based approach is no longer acceptable. Design must start with understanding the
type of fire, the period for which it may persist, the time frames for all the potential fire escalation
events, times to structural failure and effects on escape and evacuation of personnel. Sections 4
and 5 of this Guidance discuss these issues in some depth.
Once the fire, and its interaction with the safety of personnel and preservation of the asset is
understood, the most appropriate combination of active and passive fire systems to achieve the
necessary degree of protection can be considered. Wherever feasible, use of passive protection is
preferred over active protection, because of its inherent reliability. On a typical platform there may
be several different active protection systems, plus up to a dozen different types of passive
protection. In addition there may be manual firefighting facilities. These are discussed in
Sub-section 7.3.2.
Examples of the types of protection system in common use are given in the table below.
Type of fire Type of Protection Aim of Protection

Jet fire impinging on PFP cladding on vessel Protect vessel against BLEVE until blowdown
process vessel complete
Pressurised liquid PFP cladding on roof support Delay structural failure of roof beams until platform
spray fire in partially beams plus high rate deluge evacuated. Suppress fire and cool process and
enclosed module (24 lpm/m2) application to safety equipment.
module.
Pool fire in open Low rate deluge Control/extinguish fire by cooling oil pool and putting
process module with (10 lpm/m2) with AFFF layer of AFFF on pool surface. Cool process
solid floor equipment to prevent further leaks. Reduce smoke
plus wash spill to deluge drains
Spray fire across Firewall (or escape tunnel on Protect people escaping to TR from spray-fire and
escape route FPSO) radiant heat effects
Gas jet fire in vicinity Mesh screens on stairwell Reduce radiant heat on stairs
of stairwell
High pressure jet fire PFP on export ESDV plus all Delay escalation to riser fire until after platform
in export module sections of downstream evacuation completed
export pipework in module
The table demonstrates how the protection has to be specific to the requirements of a number of
differing fire scenarios. Recent research on deluge systems has emphasised the importance of this
approach. Potentially there are 3 main roles for deluge:
• Cooling of exposed process and safety equipment
• Cooling and control of pool fires through suppression of fuel vaporisation
• Cooling of the high hot zone through interaction with the combustion process
These require totally different design philosophies and one ‘Catch-all’ design for deluge cannot
achieve them all.
7.3.2 Fire protection design
7.3.2.1 General
This section discusses some design issues associated with particular applications of passive and
active fire protection.
7.3.2.2 Passive systems
7.3.2.2.1 Firewalls
Design of firewalls is well understood. They should be designed to a specific fire rating compatible
with the fire scenario for which they offer protection. Wherever a firewall is placed, due
consideration needs also to be made for any deflection of flame by the firewall, plus the movement
of the smoke and hot gases that accompany the flame. Products of combustion do not disappear
when they encounter a firewall but build up or migrate. All firewall ratings and the extent of the

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firewall whether jet fire rated or only A0 rated, should be indicated on the appropriate drawings The
design basis must be clearly recorded for future reference– other wise justification of worthwhile
future changes becomes difficult. Penetrations and doors must be designed to the same rating as
the firewall itself.
Firewalls are often provided for area segregation. On many installations combined fire and blast
rated walls divide the process areas from the wellbay and the wellbay from the utilities and
accommodation areas giving multi-barrier protection across the platform from the high hazard
process end to the low hazard accommodation end. This strategy is simple and effective when
designed in at concept stage. Blast walls with superimposed PFP must be assessed for the
integrity of the PFP following deflections of the wall during an explosion.
TR/ accommodation and control room wall are usually fire-rated. The rating must be defined by the
potential fire exposure. On gas platforms where TRs are often very small, the TR may be located
behind a firewall segregating the open process areas from the enclosed units such as the
control/electrical room and TR/day room. It needs to be large enough to provide real protection.
Smoke and radiant heat effects around the edges of the wall and the effect on people leaving the
TR to evacuate the installation must be considered in the design.
Firewalls are usually composite items consisting of a structural part and an insulating part, both
parts need to retain their integrity for the life of the installation. Discussion about PFP attachment
and degradation issues is provided in Sub-section 3.5.
7.3.2.2.2 Mesh screens
These reduce heat radiation on escape routes by approximately 50 %, provided the flame is not
actually impinging on the route. They are frequently used to protect open stairways. They are
cheaper than firewalls and offer less protection, but have their place for gas jet scenarios provided
good diversity of escape routes is available.
7.3.2.2.3 PFP on structures and structural supports
Before design starts it is important to understand the temperatures at which structural failure will
start and the consequences as the fire continues and heat increases.
Whatever the design basis, the redundancy in the structure and the consequences of failure during
a fire should be explored in discussions between the structural or marine engineers, the safety
engineer and the designer of the passive fire protection system. Derivation of fire loadings and
response of steelwork to fire attack is covered in Sections 4 and 5 respectively.
Attachment systems for the PFP must be given detailed consideration in view of the cycles of
expansion, contraction and flexure experienced by steelwork in marine applications. Disintegration
and separation of heavy PFP cladding materials from walls or other structural supports is still
causing problems on existing older installations. Likewise retrofitting of PFP offshore e.g. externally
to the underside of TRs on small gas platforms has proved both costly and temporary. Modern
methods of attachment are much improved however. Best practice requires close attention to
detail, especially in fully meeting the requirements of the manufacturers specification for installing
the PFP. Wherever possible PFP should be installed onshore, under controlled conditions. Modern
trends for smaller topsides that can be fabricated onshore and installed in one heavy lift make this
a much more viable option than hitherto.
High pressure gas jet fire impingement on PFP, particularly of the early intumescent epoxy type
has been found to cause rapid degradation of the material. PFP systems are now available which
are resistant to jet fire attack. Where jet fire impingement is likely, and could be sustained for more
than a one or two minutes, type-testing of the selected PFP system should always be specified. A
Jet fire test standard has been developed in the last few years based on industry research and is
now publicly available (reference to standard required - (OTO 95624 describes research &
development but is the standard published yet?)
Floating structures have a different structural design basis (widespread use of integrated, stressed
skin designs) to that for a fixed steel jacket with modular topsides construction. Where fire or
explosion in these areas is catastrophic the possibility of occurrence should be designed out,
rather than reliance placed on protection systems. For this reason pipework containing process
hydrocarbons, under either normal or abnormal operating conditions should be avoided inside
support columns, pontoons, or inside the hull of ship-type vessels.
Any PFP application must take the need for periodic inspection of key parts of the underlying
structure. This can be catered for by leaving inspection hatches but their integrity must be sufficient
to prevent the ingress of water and subsequent corrosion.
7.3.2.2.4 PFP on process vessels
PFP is the preferred method of protecting vessels from heating up and failing when exposed to fire.
Water cooling is possible but not as reliable and requires large amounts of water (see
Section 7.3.2.3). Leaks from vessel caused by heat distortion are often capable of adding large
inventories to existing fires and if the fire exposure is severe, unprotected vessels could BLEVE
with devastating consequences.
The main concern with PFP on vessels is that it makes NDT of the vessel difficult. Given that
ongoing corrosion monitoring is an essential feature of most asset integrity programmes this has
been seen as a major drawback. Removable PFP is sometimes used, but this is susceptible to
water ingress under the cladding and can lead to external corrosion. Also it can become custom
and practice to leave large parts of the vessel bare of cladding for long periods for ease of
inspection (especially where the vessel is already known to suffer corrosion problems), thus
reducing the availability of the protection. Where the primary concern is BLEVE protection, and
given that it is the gas space of the vessel that needs protection rather than the liquid space, recent
ideas are that cladding may not need to be provided to the base of the vessel, to obtain the BLEVE
protection. This is because the liquid inside the vessel provides protection against rapid heat-up of
the vessel walls. This is subject to careful analysis and understanding of liquid levels under all
process conditions.
Research in the last few years has shown that for vessels subject to severe fire impingement, the
existing API codes 520 [X] and 521 [X] are inadequate for specification of the pressure relief
arrangements to prevent BLEVE. Vessels protected in accordance with these codes have burst
resulting in a BLEVE within 5 minutes following attack by jet flame or engulfment by confined pool
fire. New guidance has been produced setting out the design considerations for process vessels
and their pressure relief systems for BLEVE protection. For design against BLEVE events
engineers should design in accordance with the Energy Institute Guidance Document “Guidelines
for the design and protection of pressure systems to withstand severe fires” [X] which was
published in March 2003.
7.3.2.2.5 PFP coating of risers
Consideration for the application of PFP to risers is discussed in Sub-section 3.5 of this document.
Consideration of protection for riser and other emergency isolation valves is covered below in the
sections on PFP Enclosures and PFP Wrappings.
7.3.2.2.6 PFP enclosures for safety critical items
An alternative method of protection for safety critical items such as ESD valves and their actuators
is installation of a PFP enclosure around the item. Design considerations for enclosures are:
• Because they usually have to be have to be custom designed to suit the duty, the size and
the location, costs can be high
• They have to be designed to resist explosion overpressures for the particular area (and on
some platforms potential for wave-slam has also to be considered)

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• In-situ installation may be complicated by access problems – although for new build
projects this can be done early, before access problems are created.
• They have to be removable or otherwise designed to allow entry for essential repair and
maintenance. The design also has to take into account that after repair/maintenance the
unit will have to be restored to its original design specification. The costs of proper re-
instatement offshore throughout field life need to be considered from the outset of design.
Most importantly, it is no use protecting a specific item of safety-related equipment if escalation will
then take place through failure of the pipework on either side of the fire protection. In designing any
PFP system, an holistic view of the whole module, must be taken. Design of protection for just
‘safety critical’ items in isolation can lead to very inefficient safety spends.
7.3.2.2.7 PFP wrapping / blankets
In recent years soft wrapping jackets for protection of valves or critical piping sections has become
popular because by comparison with box-type enclosures they are relatively cheap, easy to design
and install, and can be removed to allow inspection. While there is potential for such systems to
promote external corrosion of the protected item, at least the extent of the corrosion can be visually
monitored each time the wrapping is removed for maintenance etc. The paint or coating system
under the lagging should be to a high specification.
Such systems tend to be rated for only short-term protection e.g. 5 or 10 minutes. This can give
useful protection where inventories are small, or rapidly blown-down. As for enclosures, they have
to be re-instated after every disturbance for maintenance/repair/inspection by personnel who have
been suitably trained for the task. (Has anyone had good or bad experiences with these systems?)
7.3.2.3 Bunding and draining for liquid fires
Bunding and draining is also considered a form of passive fire protection. Bunding is used to
contain oil pool fires which would otherwise spread to other areas and/or prevent any AFFF in the
deluge system from working effectively. Designers must also ensure that bunds provided primarily
for environmental purposes do not potentially concentrate a pool fire around an area of plant,
exposing it to a higher level of risk.
Drain design must take into account the interaction and disposal of both the fuel and the deluge
release. Where drains are critical for fire hazard management, they must be designed for easy
inspection, maintenance and testing so that their performance standard is always met. Offshore
drains are susceptible to blockage and the design should aim to minimise this.
7.3.2.4 Active systems
7.3.2.4.1 Firewater system design
In the 80’s and early 90’s firewater system design was code-based and the now-repealed SI 611
[X] laid out water application rates for different area of an installation. Best practice is now to
design for the specific fire scenarios in the area to be protected. Firewater test carried out at
Spadeadam in Cumbria in the late-1990s identified that deluge rates required for fire control
depend on the type of fire, not just the area designation.
The deluge application rates recommended in view of the findings of both the above research and
earlier Norwegian research into the characteristics of confined hydrocarbon fires, are summarised
in the table below.

Hydrocarbon Fire Deluge application rate Additional Comments
Type
Oil Pool Fires 10 l/min per m2 Suitable provided the cause of the pool fire is
not a two-phase (spray) release. Addition of
AFFF beneficial
Hydrocarbon jet or General area deluge not suitable Key items (e.g. riser sections , riser ESDVs,
spray fires for protection of specific items vessels with BLEVE potential) should be
(impingement) against impinging jet fires protected by other means (PFP or targeted, very
high rate deluge)
Jet or spray fires 20 l/min per m2 AFFF can help control residual hydrocarbon
(radiant heat general area cooling for plant pool fires, but does not contribute to cooling of
exposure) exposed to radiant heat from jet heat-exposed plant
fire in vicinity
Well head fires 400 l/min per wellhead The objective is to prevent fires on one
wellhead, affecting adjacent wellheads
Gas-only jet fires Where gas jet is large in This is often the case for small, open gas
comparison with size of module platforms especially normally unmanned
or installation, deluge may be of installations. Money may be better spent on
limited benefit. rapid detection, isolation and blowdown
systems.
7.3.2.4.2 Summary of research conclusions
The main lessons were that for fires giving free flame volumes in the order of 25% to 35% of
module volume, there will be a widespread and simultaneous heat input to the top half of the
module. This has implications for all the safety systems, structural supports and process
equipment (especially the tops of process vessel which could suffer a BLEVE) located at high
levels in most process modules.
Hydrocarbon fires, from releases of a relatively small size (with a burn rate from around 1 to 3 kg/s)
in enclosed modules, whether partially or fully ventilated generate a very hot layer, of partially burnt
gases a few metres deep at ceiling level. This occurs for any hydrocarbon fire whether all gas or all
liquid, however non-pressurised liquid releases burning as pool fires, are much easier to control by
deluge than fires fuelled by 2-phase pressurised releases.
The layer of hot gases can reach 1000 C within a few minutes if the fire is sustained for that period.
In one of the tests, the dry deluge system was virtually destroyed by the heat before it operated.
These research findings have major implications. Design guidance now suggests:-
• Designing to avoid roofed, enclosed or partially-enclosed modules (where heat build-up can
occur in the top part of the module) wherever possible
• Where enclosed modules are unavoidable, design for isolation and blowdown to prevent or
minimise ongoing severe fires. Ensure such control item/systems will not be vulnerable to
damage from heat build-up effects while they are in operation. Also take into account risk of
structural failure at ceiling levels.
• Designing deluge systems that recognise and mitigate the consequences of these
scenarios i.e. systems that provide the necessary deluge rates as fast as possible;
mechanical support systems that will not fail before the deluge brings the fire under control;
consider installing fine spray deluge specifically to cool the top few metres of ceiling space.
Once the flame volume in the module exceeds around 25% of the module volume, it is very likely
that flame and smoke will occur beyond the confines of the module, at the locations of any
openings in the module walls. When the flame volume reaches 100% most of the combustion will

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be taking place beyond the confines of the module as the partially combusted hot gases reach a
source of oxygen. This effect exposes further areas to the fire risk. It can also set off deluge
systems for other areas, thus reducing the fire protection to the source module. Design of the
deluge system and the structural protection needs to recognise these escalation scenarios.
In addition the sight of the fire and smoke by platform personnel may set off major panic. The
psychological impact of the sight and smell of a major fire on the personnel and is an important
factor for consideration. Personnel response to fire is discussed further in Sub-section 6.8.
In general, with the exception of risers inventories, it is the liquid inventories that are capable of
producing and sustaining these high flame volumes after ESD and blowdown. Temperatures close
to the flame can be around 1350 °C, with heat fluxes over 350 kW/m2. The overall platform design
should be scanned to remove as much of the potential for large, sustained, pressurised
hydrocarbon fires as possible. The deluge and PFP systems to mitigate against the remaining
ones, that can be minimised no further, will be expensive in view of the need to control the
consequences of such fires.
Other important findings from this research work are briefly discussed in the paragraphs below.
In the tests it was found that a deluge rate of 12 lpm/m2 for a pressurised jet fire had little impact on
hydrocarbon gas jet or spray fires, but did reduce the heat fluxes at ceiling levels from around
300kW/m2 to 200kW/m2. Increasing the deluge rate to 24 lpm/m2 reduced peak ceiling fluxes from
350 to 60 kW/m2, suppressed the flaming considerably and changed the smoke from dense black
to a grey mixture of steam and entrained carbon particles. It is not clear whether these benefits
arose because the water droplets at the higher deluge rate were smaller, or because the water rate
doubled.
The heat imparted to process vessels/pipework by an impinging sonic gas jet flame was found to
be little reduced by general area coverage of 24 lpm/m2. This rate did however, reduce the rate of
heat input from an impinging simulated live crude pressurised spray release. It was not possible to
confirm whether this reduction was sufficient to prevent eventual failure. Specific deluge at
10 lpm/m2 to the vessel using a conventional array of nozzles, in conjunction with 24 lpm/m2
general area coverage did appear to halt the rate of rise of the vessel surface.
For pool fires, it was found that general area deluge of 12 lpm/m2 effectively controlled the burning
of pool fires. The mechanism appeared to be through cooling of the fuel and minimisation of the
vaporisation rate, so this effect was most pronounced with heavier, higher flashpoint fuel. The tests
did not use any AFFF. For vessels exposed to pool fires, specific deluge coverage as per
NFPA 15 [X] (10 lpm/m2) provided effective heat exposure protection.
Fuller details are presented in Sub-sections 3.2 and 4. and in the following research reports:
• ‘A Programme of Large Scale Experiments to Study the Effectiveness of Water Deluge in
Mitigating Potential Offshore Jet and Pool Fires; BG Technology Internal Report GRTC
R1873; April 2000.’
• Combined Jet and Pool Fire Test Programme – Carried out by SINTEF Energy –
Norwegian Fire Research Laboratory near Trondheim, Norway. Available from Steel
Construction Institute or at www.fireandblast.com (is this still true?)
7.3.2.5 Component – specific design issues
Brief discussion of design issues associated with key components of typical North Sea deluge
systems is presented in the paragraphs below:
7.3.2.5.1 Fire pumps
Modern designs are based on an absolute minimum of 2x100% fire-pumps, each capable of
supplying the entire system needs. This enables the platform to continue operating when one
pump is out for maintenance. A variety of alternative fire pump configurations (e.g. 4x50% pumps),
are possible, based on analysis of vulnerability to fire scenarios, cost, operating characteristics,
maintainability, flexibility and system start-up reliability. ‘Cross-over’ valves allowing service water
to be diverted for fire-fighting use can be useful, with appropriate safeguards against reverse flow
and overpressure. Fire pumps and their power units should be located diversely, in safe
locations, in order to reduce the possibility of a major accident event rendering the entire system
inoperable. Materials of construction must be suitable for the marine operating environment and
the life of the installation. Parts that may fail early should be identified in advance and spares held
or ensured readily available.
The pumps need to be independently powered, not relying on the platform main power generation
system which tends to be designed to shut down in serious fire and gas release situations. Modern
pumps are usually electric submersible pumps, located in firewater caissons and powered by
topsides diesel-generator sets. Older pumps tend to be traditional diesel fire-pumps, taking suction
from pipes run inside firewater caissons, terminating below wave action depth. Start-up reliability is
crucial and can be a deciding factor in determining the number of pumps in the systems. Although
design is always for automatic start-up, back-up manual starting arrangements are generally
required and should be tested regularly.
Experience shows that fire pumps slowly deteriorate (i.e. they exhibit a gradual drop-off in peak
delivery capability) over the years, regardless of the fact they spend only a fraction of their life in
actual operation. They are started-up and discharged to hydrants or overboard dump lines at
regular intervals to prove their continued readiness for service.
7.3.2.5.2 Firewater ring mains
On most platforms the fire pumps all discharge (at different places) into a firewater ring main,
which runs around the perimeter of the installation at a low level. In this position advantage can be
taken of the protection from fire and blast damage offered by main structural support beams.
Pipework then rises off the top of the ringmain to distribute water to the deluge sets (which supply
specific modules), hydrants, hosereels and sprinkler or water curtain systems. Several isolation
valves are provided on the ringmain. The advantage of this fairly standard ring main type of design
is that if one area becomes damaged, the affected section of the ring main can be quickly isolated
and supply continued through the undamaged sections. Ring main isolation valves may be locally
or remotely operated, but they must be clearly identified. easily maintained and accessible for
operation in an emergency. Some operators also provide secondary ring main riser pipework either
to critical areas or where the primary riser supply to an area is vulnerable to fire/explosion damage.
One of the most important considerations for an offshore firewater system is speed of initiation. To
keep this to a minimum, ring mains are filled with seawater and held at pressure ready for
immediate use. Any significant drop in pressure, caused by a demand on the firewater system (e.g.
fire detection activates a deluge valve, thereby pouring water into the deluge pipework) initiates
automatic start-up of the fire-pumps. To prevent pressure fluctuations in the system frequently
starting and stopping the main firewater pumps, the pressure is held at around 8 to 12 barg., by a
small pump supplied from the service water system.
Because firewater ring mains are usually large-bore and contain salt water they are not lagged or
heat traced. However in extreme winter conditions freezing is not unknown. As an added
precaution, many systems provide for a continuous slight circulation within the system by dumping
a small flow back to sea. The smaller pipework rising off the ringmain is usually lagged and heat
traced.
Ring-main and riser pipework corrosion is a major issue, thus Cunifer is the usual material of
choice for the wet parts of the system. Older platforms with steel ringmains run the two-fold risk of
wall thickness loss and build-up of corrosion products throughout the system. Designers choosing
steel over Cunifer in the past for cost saving have passed the cost of replacing or maintaining such
systems onto operational staff working on a diminishing budget ten or so years later. Linings for
steel ring-main pipework have been used with mixed success. Corrosion inhibition can be used,
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but consideration must be given to treating the dead-legs in the systems, such as the wet riser pipe
sections between the ring main and the deluge valves.
Composite non-ferrous materials such as GRP (glass reinforced plastic) have also been used,
possessing significant price, corrosion and weight advantages. Key concerns for such alternative
materials remain:
• Can they be properly installed, maintained and repaired in-situ (some need specialist
installation)
• Will they melt in the event of serious fire attack, either before of after deluge water reaches
the distribution pipework and nozzles
As an alternative to traditional ring-main design, some operators arrange their fire-pumps to

directly supply different parts of the installation directly. Choice of system has to be justified with
respect to effectiveness for the specific fire-scenarios, the vulnerabilities to fire damage, and the
reliability requirements for the system.
7.3.2.5.3 Deluge valves and dry pipework
The deluge valve separates the wet part of the system from the dry pipe network that supplies the
firewater nozzles. These valves are usually air-activated either by loss of air when fusible links or
bulbs are breached by fire, or when solenoids are activated by the fire and gas detection system to
dump air. The valve opens to feed water into the dry pipework that leads to the firewater nozzles.
Design needs to focus on maintaining the air pressure for very long periods (i.e. the whole of field
life). Any leaks or pressure accumulator failures in later life, will trigger off the deluge system in the
affected section. Repair downtime on safety critical systems is likely to be expensive.
Deluge valves need careful design and maintenance since their operation is complicated especially
for valves which have AFFF proportioning as part of their function. Deluge valves may be at the
junction of the Cunifer and steel parts of the system, so dissimilar metal corrosion protection must
be designed in. Valve sets should not be located outside the area they are designed to protect. A
manual operation lever, very clearly labelled in large writing, should be provided. This allows for
override of the deluge valve should it fail to operate, or if water is needed as a priority elsewhere
on the installation.
Hydraulic shock within the system can result either when main firewater pumps kick in, or when
deluge valves suddenly open. The shock can cause damage to the small-bore end-piping in the
system and its supports. It is important to consider and quantify this problem as part of the design.
Pneumatic dampers may need to be used. Slowing down the opening of the valves is not a good
idea as it means a delay in getting water through to the dry pipework. Minimising the delay time is
critical for 2 reasons:
• The faster a fire is cooled the easier it is to bring under control and the chance of rapid heat
(and smoke) build-up is reduced.
• The dry pipework and its pipe supports are mostly located high in the module and are
vulnerable to high temperatures. Small-bore dry Cunifer or GRP pipe (depending on the
specification) may melt rapidly, thus steel is usually preferred. Once water flow is
established the pipework is provided with internal cooling.
Vulnerability of firewater pipe supports requires careful design attention.
Time delays between 30 and 90 seconds are experienced in many existing systems. New designs
should aim to minimise delays to well below 60 seconds as severe heat build-up may occur within
1or 2 minutes of ignition.
Because of the vulnerability of Cunifer to high temperatures, steel tends to be used in the dry,
small bore water piping. However this is susceptible to corrosion, especially where regularly tested
or accidentally discharged. Procedures calling for potable water flush and air-drying of the systems
after test or spurious operation are manhour intensive and often ignored, especially if systems to
make this painless were never provided. Salts, scales, dusts (in some drilling areas) and corrosion
products build up inside the pipework as it drys out and eventually gets pushed through the
systems to block up the small piping and nozzles. Modern designs thus tend to use larger ‘self-
cleaning’ nozzles. These also produce larger water droplets, which have benefits in terms of
cooling rates but require larger pumps and bigger supplies of expensive AFFF.
The grid of firewater nozzles covering a module or an area is designed to produce a specific range
of water droplet sizes The nozzles generally used for deluge are high or medium velocity nozzles.
The smaller the droplet the more likely it is to be evaporated or blown away between emerging
from the nozzle and reaching the fire. This is of concern for droplets under 0.5mm diameter. and
an important factor in more modern, open platform designs. The larger the droplet the less affected
by wind and the more water provided to the fire for cooling, but the bigger the pump required. High
velocity nozzles produce droplets over 1mm diameter. A large module may require a few hundred
such nozzles for adequate coverage. The pipe sizes may range from around 10” at pump
discharge to 1” and 2” at the nozzles. A full hydraulic analysis of the system is necessary to ensure
the necessary water distribution throughout the module will be achieved. Periodic testing of active
fire protection systems, both to ensure initial suitability (new systems) and continued compliance
with the stated performance standards (existing systems) is mandatory under the UK North Sea
legislation (PFEER).
7.3.2.5.4 Reference areas
Design of firewater systems in the 80s and early 90s was based on reference areas, which were
hazardous areas of the platform bounded by firewalls – and typically most reference areas were
enclosed modules. Fire pumps were designed to supply only two reference areas plus the helideck
in a fire situation. With the move to more open platform design this approach is not longer
appropriate. Platforms are now divided into ‘fire zones’, each defined both by area and fire
characteristic and not necessarily bounded by walls. The fire protection (or combination of
protection systems) in each zone must be suitable for the fire characteristics. A key decision to be
made early in design is how many different fire zones will be triggered by the design fire events.
Where these cannot be supplied simultaneously, the water supply will need to be adjusted for
targeting where it is most needed. Remote manual operation of isolation valves requires accurate
feedback on the fire development for decision making plus the availability of a suitably trained
emergency response and/or fire team. On some platforms, neither may be available. Reliance on
local manual intervention to supplement the automatic fire system response has to be realistically
evaluated and only used where it does not expose the person(s) operating the valve to danger
from the fire/smoke.ve. With proper attention to a) process isolation and blowdown, b) layout of
plant and escape routes, and c) passive protection of potential escalation points, huge firewater
demands can be more easily avoided.
7.3.2.5.5 AFFF design considerations
Addition of AFFF to firewater systems can bring great benefits where used for liquid pool fires. It is
less effective for running pool fires. AFFF, and other types of foam, work by creating a layer on the
surface of the burning hydrocarbon pool, cutting off contact with the air. This reduces the fire and
smoke generation significantly, and may extinguish the fire altogether in some situations (e.g.
bunded fires). Foams, sometimes in combination with dry power application are important for
fighting aviation fuel fires. Design of foam systems should take into account affect of high winds
during application. Application must be possible from at least opposite quadrants.
Foams are expensive, especially in the quantities needed offshore. Good design of storage
facilities will avoid costly early degradation. Stored foam should be sampled and tested.
Foam are injected either just downstream of firepumps, at deluge valve locations or into the fire
hoses directly at the hydrant. Proportioning equipment of various designs, for injecting foam at the
right concentrations into the firewater supply, have proved unreliable in the past. The vendors of
such equipment should be asked to provide evidence of reliability and maintainability for their
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systems and show they have a good track record in operation. The deluge system full scale trails
at Spadeadam did not incorporate AFFF. The view taken for the trails was that since delivery of
AFFF is not guaranteed, and the product and dosing rate varies from platform to platform, AFFF
would not be used in the tests at all. The researchers wished to avoid specification of deluge rates
for fire control becoming dependent on specific conditions of AFFF input quality and quantity as
well.
7.3.2.6 Area cooling and extinguishing systems
7.3.2.6.1 Water curtains
Water curtains have been used as a solution to reducing heat exposure of people on escape
routes, or critical plant items. Their advantage is that they do not exacerbate explosion
overpressure problems. But they have several disadvantages:
• The delay in activation means they are of limited use for immediate ignition situations – but
could be useful in delayed escape situations
• In open locations they are affected by wind
• There is limited research, but water application rates for effective operation were found in
tests to be high – in the region of 25 to 40 l/min per m2. A continuous screen of water is
required, achieved by flat plates or a combination of flat plates and nozzles. We believe that
tests were carried out but the results have never been published NEEDS CHECKING with
other authors
The attenuation of heat radiation by general area deluge is noted from research work to be
considerable. However at the current time there are no design methods for calculating the
personnel protection effect.
7.3.2.6.2 Ceiling cooling
Where there remains a possibility of heat build-up at the roof level within an enclosed or partially
enclosed module, which could still be the case on some existing installations, new systems are
becoming available specifically to reduce heat at high levels within the module.
These systems are based on heat-resistant rubber-type tubing that can be easily site- laid and
fixed to the structural beams. Being flexible they will withstand considerable deflection without loss
of function during an explosion event, and they do not suffer from the same corrosion problems as
steel-based systems. They generate fine water sprays which provide cooling through evaporation
of the water droplets. The steam generated also retards the combustion process.
7.3.2.6.3 Watermist design
These systems are now widely used as the replacement for Halon protection of power generation
or fire pump enclosure. A variety of watermist systems have been developed over the 3 to 5 years
and are available on the market. They work by injecting bursts of very fine water mist into the
enclosure once fire has been detected. The mist evaporates, reducing heat and rate of burning.
They work in enclosed, limited inventory conditions. They do not offer protection against fuel gas
explosions in gas turbine enclosures, which relies on a combination of ventilation and rapid
detection of gas build-up and isolation of gas supply.
7.3.2.6.4 Inerting and extinguishing systems
Halon is no longer used for offshore inerting / extinguishing systems. A few installations have
provided CO2 flood systems for extinguishing electrical fires, with appropriate safeguards against
asphyxiation, as a replacement. Many operators have removed the Halon previously provided in
switch-rooms and control rooms and replaced it with a VESDA (very early smoke detection and

alarm ) system instead for better protection of personnel against electrical fires. (see
Sub-section 3.4). This is in addition to the more traditional smoke detection systems in such areas.
7.3.2.6.5 Manual fire fighting equipment – hydrants and monitors
Previous legislation required hose stations to be provided in modules for use by fire teams. Teams
were trained to run hoses from nearby hydrants to supplement the fixed automatic systems if
necessary. More recent practice is to keep personnel in a safe place away from the fire and leave
the automatic protection systems to provide the all the necessary protection. Such systems are
therefore only provided on new installations where a specific need has been identified and there is
a team of trained and competent fire or emergency response personnel available to man the
equipment. The prime example of this is provision of helideck fire-fighting equipment and
personnel. Hydrants and hoses or fixed monitors (often fitted with an automatic oscillating
mechanism as well as manual control) are still provided where overhead deluge systems are not
practical e.g. on drilling rigs to target water onto escape routes and well fires from a safe distance,
or for protection of equipment on exposed upped decks where strong winds could prevent proper
deluge coverage. Manual hose facilities can also be useful in securing large un-ignited spills with
an application of aspirated foam
7.3.2.6.6 Manual fire fighting equipment – hosereels, trolleys and hand extinguishers
Manual firefighting equipment such as fire extinguishers, fire hose-reels and fire trolleys are still
provided offshore for use by personnel in the event that someone discovers a small fire which can
be safely bought under control by manual means. The main change in provision of such equipment
in recent years is that;
• Platforms are now occupied by much smaller workforces,
• Platforms no long support large fire teams,
• Few installations run 24 hour operations,
• Small fires are less likely to be found and dealt with by a passing member of the workforce,
especially at night,
• Hot-work and intrusive maintenance work on some platforms is very infrequent,
• Oversupply of extinguishers etc places a significant burden on small offshore crews.
Account needs to be taken of all the above in deciding the appropriate level of manual equipment
to be provided.
7.3.3 ‘Soft’ fire management issues
This section briefly highlights some important ‘soft issues’ issues around fire design. For the fire
design to be successful, both in terms of initial design and continued operation throughout
installation lifecycle, key personnel at different levels of the organisation must understand and be
able to fulfil their respective contributions to the fire safety of the installation. Although many people
will have many roles in design and operation, the following key personnel have some essential
requirement with respect to fire hazard management:
Project managers need to understand:

• The re-iterative nature of the fire-safety design process,
• The need to build contingency into time and cost estimates for re-iteration,
• The importance of documenting the decision process for ALARP demonstration,
Safety engineers need to understand:

• Their key role is to keep the discipline engineers fully involved in the fire hazard
management process’
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• The importance of passing their knowledge of the key safety issues to the offshore
personnel.
All discipline engineers;

• Basic fire / smoke & explosion science,
• Prevent / detect / control / mitigate cascade.
OIMs need to understand;

• The fire scenarios, escalation mechanisms, escalation times and how the protective
systems work (or may fail to work),
• That Emergency response drills/exercises should be based on the platform specific fire
scenarios,
• Human behaviour when confronted by fire.
Senior management need to know;

• Their legal obligations and how to discharge these duties,
• The wisdom of early consideration of, and investment in, fire issues,
• They must budget for platform specific fire response training of OIMs and supervisors
transferring from one platform to another. Very few platforms are alike. This is especially
important for older installations, which have a lower level of fire-safety provision than new
ones.
7.4 Human factors – man / machine interface

7.4.1 Introduction
This section describes the ways in which operators and maintenance personnel are able to
implement and maintain the systems and practices put in place to manage fire hazards. The
following areas will be reviewed;
• Ergonomics,
• Working conditions,
• Working environment,
• Information presentation,
• Information availability,
• Organizational factors,
• Organizational culture.
The designers of fire hazard management systems should optimise the allocation of system tasks
and functions between humans and technology. However, taking tasks away from personnel is not
always the best solution as a number of considerations are involved, for example;
• The potential consequences of human failure,
• The flexibility that the human can bring to the situation,
• The long-term well-being of the human, the feeling of “being of value and needed”,
• Interest levels and boredom thresholds (leading to enthusiastic engagement to the task or
potentially dangerous disengagement),
• Design to minimise fatigue,

• Clarity and consistency of instrumentation,
• Layout of man/machine interface, and
• Clarity of emergency procedures.
In all areas but especially where the performance of safety critical elements (managing a major
hazard such as fire) is at stake, it is essential to set operational tasks within the limits of human
operators. Physical stress levels must be set at acceptable levels, for example for turning, lifting,
reaching etc. The presentation of information and the issuing of instructions or advice must be
obviously prioritised and unambiguous.
The response of personnel to emergency conditions (following Emergency Preparedness and

Emergency Response procedures) must be planned for in the context of the hazard. The
application of Human Factors techniques applied to planning for fire conditions will have a direct
potential to save lives and reduce the probability of injury.
7.4.2 Assessment techniques
7.4.2.1 Overview
Several different types of analyses may be used in order to identify and analyse scenarios leading
to or arising from fires. The first two describe means of identifying tasks, allocating them logically
and then defining potential errors that may result from erroneous actions. The latter two
assessment techniques are from normal risk analysis approaches and may be expanded to include
human error and response.
Commonly applied techniques include;
1. Task analysis,
2. Human error analysis,
3. Fault tree analysis,
4. Event tree analysis.
The two specific Human Factors analysis techniques (items 1. and 2.) are discussed in more detail
below.
7.4.2.2 Task analyses
Task analyses support the identification of error modes, criticality and potential improvements by;
• Adding details to the scenario description,
• Specifying the context in which important actions (task steps) take place,
• Identifying aspects in relation to information, control and co-ordination which contribute to
performance shortfalls,
Task analyses would be the premier technique to use to confirm that operational and maintenance
tasks on fire hazard management tools and systems were achievable. The application of task
analysis would confirm that the implementation of the emergency response plans could happen
within the time frame of an escalating incident and it would identify preferred steps to be taken to
intervene to assist the control of any escalation.
Hierarchical Task Analysis and Tabular Task Analysis are the two variants of task analysis
techniques that may be applied.

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Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) describes the relevant task or operation from its overall objective
down to individual operations.
Tabular Task Analysis (TTA) identifies the context in which important task steps take place and the
aspects which may be improved. The TTA format concentrates on;
• Cues; which indicate to the operator that a task step can/should be initiated,
• Feedback; which indicates the effects of carrying out a task step,
• Traces; which indicate to the operator that the task step has actually been performed and
finalized successfully.
7.4.2.3 Human error analyses
Human Error Analysis provides a framework for understanding human errors, their causes and
consequences. Human error analysis is often referred to as the slips, lapses, mistakes and
violations model.
The Action Error Mode Analysis technique resembles the Human HAZOP and identifies human
errors for each task to be analysed. For each task step, possible erroneous actions are identified
using guide words such as ‘omitted’, ‘too early’, ‘too late’, etc. Possible abnormal system states are
identified, in order to consider the consequences of carrying out the task step (correctly or
incorrectly) during abnormal system states (e.g. specific hardware failures). The consequences of
erroneous actions, combinations of erroneous actions, abnormal system states and possibilities for
recovery are identified and described in order to support criticality ratings.
The application of the human error models would provide an understanding of the pressures on the
maintenance team to “get the job done” and would assist the operating and emergency response
teams to understand their role during a fire hazard emergency.
7.5 Industry & regulatory authority initiatives

7.5.1 Fire and explosion guidance
The knowledge gained from the fire and explosion studies sponsored by the industry and HSE in
the aftermath of the Piper Alpha disaster was pulled together in the FABIG document “Interim
Guidance Notes for the Design and Protection of Topsides Structures against Explosion and Fire”
[X] issued in 1993.
The objective of the four-part Fire and Explosion Guidance (of which this document is part 2) is to
update the 1993 Guidance notes in the light of the research work carried out since 1993. This
4-part Guidance is sponsored by UKOOA and HSE.
A number of other types of initiative relating to fire issues have been undertaken and brief details of
these, and where to go for further information are presented below.
7.5.2 HSE internal guidance on fire and explosion
HSE has published a number of documents offering explanation or guidance in fire and explosion
areas for their own inspectors. These documents lay out the principles and methodologies which
HSE expect to be followed by Duty Holders in their design process in compliance legislation and
demonstrated in the Safety Case. These documents also assist offshore oil and gas industry
engineers, who can use these documents to ensure that their designs meet the expectations of the
regulatory authority.
1. Fire and Explosion Strategy – This document presents an overview of the current state
of knowledge with respect to fires and explosions. As would be expected, it is focussed
around the hazard rather giving any specific guidance on designing against it. It

highlights that there is still much uncertainty in certain topic areas and suggests further
work in a number of areas. This document can be accessed at
www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/information
2. Fire, Explosion and Risk Assessment Topic guidance - The aim of the guidance is to
promote greater consistency and effectiveness in the assessment of safety cases and
greater transparency for duty holders. It gives guidance to HSE specialist inspectors
assessing those sections of the safety case addressing fire and explosion issues. It
serves as a useful checklist for all persons involved in analysis, design or assessment
of fires or explosions and associated protection methods, to ensure fire and explosion
issues are covered in line with HSE’s expectations. This document can be accessed at
www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/information.
3. Guidance for the Topic Assessment of the Major Accident Hazard Aspect of Safety
Cases (GASCET) – This document is intended primarily to assist topic assessors in
undertaking Safety Case assessment activities. It addresses the fire and explosion
hazard as well as other hazard topics and contains useful references to codes and
standard that HSE expect to see Operators using in their design processes. The
document is still at internal consultation stage, however the section on the Fire and
Explosion topic is expected to be largely a reproduction of that given under the
preceding bullet point.
4. Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases (APOSC) – Paragraphs 26 to 34 of
this document set out the various aspects of the identification, analysis and protection
for fire and explosions hazards that the HSE expect to see demonstrated within the
Safety Case. The document is available from HSE bookshops as booklet HSG181.
7.5.3 Guidance on design and protection of pressure systems to withstand

severe fires
Following research work on the development of BLEVEs the industry, in conjunction with the HSE
have produced guidance on design and protection of pressure systems to withstand severe fires.
The research showed that for certain fire scenarios the guidance provided by API RP 520 and API
RP 521 is insufficient to protect against BLEVE, or other severe fire events. The guidance is
published through the Energy Institute and is entitled “Guidelines for the design and protection of
pressure systems to withstand severe fires.” Further details are available at
www.energyinst.org.uk/publicationsdatabase
7.5.4 Guidance on preventing hydrocarbon releases
Following analysis of the statistics collected by the HSE on offshore hydrocarbon releases since
1994, three guidance documents were produced through the Institute of Petroleum. In an
additional effort to disseminate the learning throughout the industry, the document entitled
“Hydrocarbon Release Reduction Toolkit” [X] was produced by UKOOA’s Hydrocarbon Release
Reduction Workgroup and through the Step Change website.
The IP Guidance addresses the most common causes of loss of containment in process related
systems. These are;
• corrosion, erosion and fatigue in steel pipework,
• vibration or mechanical failure in instrumentation,
• improper make-up of flanges or other types of joints,
• use of flexible hoses.
As a result of investigating and understanding the most common failure modes in these areas the
following IP guidelines were issued to assist in avoiding releases:

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• Management of Integrity of Bolted Pipe Joints

• Flexible Hose Management Guidelines
• Guidelines for the Management, Design , Installation and Maintenance of Small Bore
Tubing Systems
A fourth guidance document was produced by the Marine Technology Directorate:

• Guidelines for the Avoidance of Vibration Induced Fatigue in Process Pipework
In the similar vein of working to reduce the frequency of occurrence of leaks, HSE have worked
with BP and a leading wellhead manufacturer on development of an inherently safer wellhead
design. This work was presented at the Offshore Europe Conference in Aberdeen in 2003, in a
paper entitled ‘Improving the Fundamental Safety of Xmas Trees and Wellheads for Platforms’ by
M. Copland, J. McKenzie and P. Webb [X]. The paper can be accessed via the SPE
(Paper no. 83997)
7.5.5 Improved ignition modelling
An updated ignition probability model is in the final stages of development, sponsored by

OKOOA/OSD. It is based on input from OIR12 data.
7.5.6 Research on effects of PFP degradation
Work is being carried out to better understand the impact of degradation of PFP on its
performance.
7.5.7 Collation of existing technical guidance relating to offshore major accident

hazards
The industry has recognised that while there is a wide range of informative technical guidance,
codes and standards available to the industry, a concise catalogue of this key information has
hitherto not been available to the industry and the HSE.
A catalogue is now in the process of being compiled through the Energy Institute, and the first
version is expected to be available from the end of February 2005. Further information on this
development is available at www.energyinst.org.uk/offshorecatelogue

8. References
CJG 1 -Experimental research to study the effectiveness of fresh and seawater deluge in
mitigating the effects of fires, British Gas, GRC/2200/121/04
CJG 2 -Explosions in offshore modules following realistic releases- final report, Advantica,
19/02/02
CJG 3 -Gas build up from high-pressure natural gas releases in naturally ventilated offshore
modules-Technical report, BG Technology, 1/5/99
CJG 4 -An experimental study of the combined influence of fuel concentration and water sprays on
gas cloud explosions, British Gas GRC R0048, 1/9/93
CJG 5 -Testing and examination of EEXe equipment under extreme environmental conditions,
NEMKO
CJG 6 - EEXe equipment as ignition source at gas explosions, EFI SINTEF O:dok/el/tov/9202,
1/10/92
CJG 7 -The effectiveness of water area deluge in mitigating the effects of fires- Overview of results
from tests, British Gas GRC/2200/121/R1386
CJG 8 - A programme of large scale experiments to study the effectiveness of water deluge on
mitigating potential offshore jet and pool fires-A literature study of the use of foam to mitigate fires,
BG Technology GRTC R1873(foam) 1/2/99
CJG 9 -Large scale experiments to study jet fires of crude/gas/water mixtures, BG

Technology/Shell Global Solutions GRTC R2961, 1/3/00
1. SW 1 ‘Interim Guidance Notes for the Design and Protection of Topside Structures Against
Explosion and Fire’, Various Authors, Joint Industry Project on Blast and Fire Engineering for
Topside Structures, November 1992.
2. SW 2 Selby C A, Burgan B A, ‘Blast and Fire Engineering for Topside Structures – Phase
2, Final Summary Report’, Steel Construction Institute, ISBN 1 85942 078 8, 1998
3. SW 3 FABIG, Technical note 3, ‘Use of ultimate strength techniques for fire resistant design
of offshore structures’, 1995.
4. SW 4 NORSOK, ‘Guideline for Risk and Emergency preparedness Analysis, Z-013, 2001
5. SW 5 ISO 19901-3 Petroleum and natural gas industries – Specific requirements for
offshore structures – Part 3: Topsides Structure
6. SW 6 ‘Part 1 – Guidance on design and operational considerations for the avoidance and
mitigation of explosions’, UKOOA/HSE, December 2002. (www.fireandblast.com)
7. SW 7 Graham Dalzell – FABIG Technical meeting – ‘Inherently Safer design’, January

1997.
8. SW 8 ‘Reducing risks protecting people, HSE’s decision making process’ (R2P2), ISBN 0
7176 2151 0, HMSO 2001. http://www.hse.gov.uk/dst/r2p2.pdf .
9. SW 9 ‘Petroleum and natural gas industry – Offshore production installations – Guidelines

on tools and techniques for identification and assessment of hazardous events’, ISO, 2004

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10. SW 10 Alderman J.A., Carter D., ‘White paper – working group 1 – Philosophy and
management strategy’, International workshop ‘Fire and blast considerations in the future design of
offshore facilities’, June 2002, Houston Texas. http://www.fireandblast2002.com
11. SW11 ‘Recommended Practice for the planning, Designing and Construction Fixed
Offshore Platforms – Working Stress Design’, API RP 2A-WSD, 21st Edition. API (American
Petroleum Institute).
12. SW 12 Bob Bruce, ‘The online offshore hydrocarbon releases (HCR) system’, Paper 11,
ERA Conference, ‘Major hazards offshore’, London December 2003.
13. SW 13 ‘Hydrocarbon release reduction campaign’, HSE books, HSE OSD report OTO 2001
055, HMSO 2001.
14. SW 14 ‘Worldwide offshore accident database’, (WOAD), DnV Publications,
15. SW 15 ‘Offshore Accident and Incident Statistics Report 1998’, OTO 98: 952, HSE, HMSO,
1998.
16. SW 16 ‘OREDA – Offshore reliability data’, Penwell Books.
17. SW 17 ‘Accident statistics for fixed offshore units on the UK continental shelf 1991–1999’,
DnV for the HSE, OTO 2002 012, HMSO 2002.
18. SW 18 ‘UKOOA Hydrocarbon release statistics review’, UKOOA, January 1998.
19. SW 19 ‘Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency Response)
Regulations’ (PFEER), HMSO, 1995
20. SW 20 ‘Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations’ (SCR), HMSO 1992.
21. SW 21 ‘Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc.) Regulations’
(DCR), HMSO 1996.
22. SW 22 ‘Assessment principles for offshore safety cases’ (APOSC), HSE Books, HSG181,
ISBN 0 7176 1238 4, HMSO 1998.
23. SW 23 ‘The offshore installations and pipeline works (Management and Administration)
Regulations, HMSO, (SI 1995/738), (MAR)
24. SW 24 ‘Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations’, Institute of Petroleum. March
1990. (IP 15)
25. SW 25 ‘Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres Part 10. Classification of
hazardous areas’, BS EN 60079-10.
26. SW 26 ‘Explosive atmospheres. Explosion prevention and protection’ BS EN 1127-1: 1998.
27. SW 27 ‘Code of practice for control of undesirable static electricity’, BS 5958: 1991.
28. SW 28 ‘Petroleum and natural gas industries – Control and mitigation of fires and
explosions on offshore production installations – Requirements and guidelines’, 1st Edn. 1999, ISO
13702.
29. SW 29 Policy and Guidance on reducing risks to ALARP in Design, HSE web site

30. SW 30 Principles and Guidelines to Assist HSE in its Judgement that Duty Holders Have
Reduced Risk as Low as Reasonably Practicable. http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/spc/perm12.htm
31. SW 31 API 'Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities against Fire and
Blast Loading', API RPFB, 2005
32. SW 32 FABIG Technical note 1, ‘Fire resistant design of offshore structures’ 1993.
33. SW 33 FABIG Technical note 2, ‘Technical note on Explosion mitigation systems’, 1994.
34. SW 34 FABIG Technical note 4, ‘Explosion resistant design of offshore structures’ 1996.
35. SW 35 FABIG Technical note 5, ‘Design guide for stainless steel blast walls’ 1999.
36. SW 36 FABIG Technical note 6, ‘Design Guide for Steel at Elevated Temperatures and
High Strain Rates’ 2001.
37. SW 37 Jan Pappas, ‘The NORSOK Procedure on Probabilistic Explosion Simulation’,Paper

5.5.1, ERA Conference, ‘Major Hazards Offshore’, London 27-28 November 2001, ERA Report
2001-0575.
38. SW 38 Walker S and Tahan N., FABIG (Fire and Blast Information Group) Article R139 - 'A
Rational Approach to Fire Consequence Assessment', Issue 9, June 1994.
39. SW 39 ‘Industry Guidelines on a framework for risk related decision support’, UKOOA,
Issue 3, February 1999.
sci 1 Fire and Blast Information Group (FABIG) Technical note number 1 Fire resistant design of
offshore topside structures Steel Construction Institute, 1993
sci 2 BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION
BS 476: Fire tests on building materials and structures
BS 476 20:1987: Method for determination of the fire resistance of load bearing elements of
construction (general principles)
BS 476 21:1987: Methods for determination of the fire resistance of loadbearing elements
of construction.
(This includes the hydrocarbon curve)
BS EN 1363-1:1999 Fire resistance tests. General requirements
BS EN 1363-2:1999 Fire resistance tests. Alternative and additional procedures
BS EN 1364-1:1999 Fire resistance tests for non-loadbearing elements. Walls
BS EN 1364-2:1999 Fire resistance tests for non-loadbearing elements. Ceilings
BS EN 1365-1:1999 Fire resistance tests for loadbearing elements. Walls
BS EN 1365-2:2000 Fire resistance tests for loadbearing elements. Floors and roofs
BS EN 1365-3:2000 Fire resistance tests for loadbearing elements. Beams
BS EN 1365-4:1999 Fire resistance tests for loadbearing elements. Columns

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sci 4 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ORGANISATION
ISO 834-1:1999 Fire-resistance tests -- Elements of building construction -- Part 1: General

requirements
ISO 834-4:2000 Fire-resistance tests -- Elements of building construction -- Part 4: Specific

requirements for loadbearing vertical separating elements

requirements for loadbearing horizontal separating elements

requirements for beams

requirements for columns

requirements for non-loadbearing vertical separating elements
sci 5 ISO/CD 22899-1, Determination of the resistance to jet fires of passive fire protection
materials – Part 1: General requirements Draft, August 2003
sci 6 BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION BS EN 1991: Eurocode 1: Basis of design and

actions on structures Part 1: Basis of design, and Part 1.2: Actions on structures exposed
to fire BSI, 2000
sci 7 NEWMAN, G.M.,ROBINSON, J.T. and BAILEY, C. G. Fire safe design: A new approach to
multi-storey steel framed buildings (SCI-P-288) Steel Construction Institute, 2000
sci 8 BRITISH STEEL PLC (CORUS) The behaviour of multi-storey steel framed buildings in fire
Report of a joint European joint research programme Corus, Swinden Technology Centre,
1999
BS 5950: The structural use of steelwork in buildings
BS 5950-8:2002: Code of practice for fire resistant design
sci 10 BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION DD ENV 1993: Eurocode 3: Design of steel

structures Part 1.2 Structural fire design (including UK NAD) BSI, 1998
sci 11 Fire and Blast Information Group (FABIG) Technical note number 6 Design guide for steel
at elevated temperatures and high strain rates Steel Construction Institute, 2001
sci 12 BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION DD ENV 1994: Eurocode 4: Design of composite

steel and concrete structures Part 1.2 Structural fire design (including UK NAD) BSI, 1998
sci 13 ECCS Model code on fire engineering ECCS Publication 111, 2001
sci 14 Steel Construction Institute Joint industry project, Rules for the determination of coat-back
requirements SCT report RT543, March 1996
FPSO

1. UKOOA FPSO Design Guidance Notes for UKCS Service, March 2002
2. OGP F(P)SO Design Guidance for Marine Hazards, (under review prior to issue)
3. International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT), 4th Edition, Oil
Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)/International Chamber of Shipping
(ICS)/International association of Ports & Harbors (IAPH), 1996
4. Offshore Loading Safety Guidelines: with special relevance to harsh weather zones,
OCIMF, December 1999

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Annex A Acronyms, abbreviations etc.

Annex B Details on legislation, standards and guidance
B.1 UK legislation
This section details major legislation covering explosion risk. It is not exhaustive as any legislation
covering general safety or requiring a safety risk assessment to be performed, will be relevant
where the potential for a fire event exists. Legislation may be added during the lifetime of this
guidance.
The primary legislation governing safety in the workplace is the ‘Health and Safety at Work Etc. Act
1974 (HASWA)’.[X] This imposes a responsibility on the employer to ensure the safety at work for
all employees. Employers have to take reasonable steps to ensure the health, safety and welfare
of their employees.
Various regulations are enacted under the HASWA. These include the ‘Management of Health and
Safety at Work Regulations 1999’, MHSW [X] which place an obligation on the employer to actively
carry out a risk assessment of the workplace and act accordingly. Risks assessed will include
those from fire and explosion.
More specifically related to fire and explosion risk are the Prevention of Fire and Explosion and
Emergency Response on offshore installations (PFEER) [19] Regulations which place on the Duty
Holder the requirement to take appropriate measures to protect persons from major hazards
including fires and explosions. Regulations 9 to 12 of PFEER specify the types of measures which
are required for prevention, detection, communication and control of emergencies. The regulations
also require mitigating measures to be specified and put in place and for performance standards to
be set for safety critical measures to prevent, control and mitigate explosion hazards.
The Duty Holder must ensure that effective evacuation, escape recovery and rescue will occur in
the case of an explosion event (see Regulations 14 to 17 of PFEER).
The Safety Case Regulations SCR [20] require that all installations in UK waters have an
acceptable Safety Case. Information regarding the following issues is required to be addressed in
the Safety Case:-
Identification of major hazards;

• evaluation of risks associated with the identified hazards;
• details of appropriate measures taken to reduce these risks to as low a level as is
reasonably practicable;
• details of the Duty Holder’s (Safety) Management Systems.
The Design and Construction Regulations DCR [15] amend the SCR by placing a responsibility on
duty holders to prepare a suitable verification scheme for their installations to ensure independent
and competent evaluation of those elements of the installation which are critical to safety (known
as safety-critical elements - SCEs). Performance standards are used to define the functionality and
integrity of these safety critical elements. They define how these SCEs are expected to function
during and after explosion events.

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B.2 Assessment principles for offshore safety cases

The ‘Assessment principles for offshore safety cases’ document (APOSC) [22] provides guidance
for duty holders on how the regulator intends to enforce the SCR and its supporting regulations,
PFEER, SI 1995/743, Management and Administration Regulations MAR-1995 [23] and the DCR
1996. The APOSC document requires the following be demonstrated for Major Accident Hazard
assessments:
Acceptable safety cases will demonstrate that a structured approach has been taken which:
• identifies all major accident hazards (APOSC paragraphs 38-48);
• evaluates the risks from the identified major accident hazards (APOSC paragraphs 49-74);
• describes how any quantified risk assessment (QRA) has been used and how uncertainties
have been taken into account (APOSC paragraphs 75-82);
• identifies and describes the implementation of the risk reduction measures (APSOC
paragraphs 83-89);
• describes how major accident risks are managed (APOSC paragraphs 90-112);
• describes the evacuation, escape and rescue arrangements (APOSC paragraphs 113-144).
The structured approach listed above is generic, so that there are no specific requirements for how
an assessment of fire hazards should be carried out.
B.3 Codes, standards and guidance
B.3.1 Introduction
Guidance documents are available from the Health and Safety Executive for the legislation
mentioned above. However there is little guidance, apart from ISO 13702 [28] and PFEER, relating
specifically to the design of installations against fire and explosion events. The most relevant North
Sea oriented guidance published by the industry are the Interim Guidance Notes (IGN’s) [1].
There are additional codes, standards and guidance are available covering elements related to the
hazard, namely:
For general fire and explosion hazard management;
• UKOO FEHMG (now re-issued as Part 0 of this Guidance)
• ISO 13702 ……..etc.
For ignition prevention and Hazardous Area Classification;

• Institute of Petroleum, ‘Area Classification Code for installations handling flammable fluids’,
August 2002, (IP15) [24].
• The ATEX (Atmospheric Explosion) Directives 94/9/EC [X] and 1999/92/EC [X] cover
electrical and mechanical equipment and protective systems, which may be used in
potentially explosive (and ignitable) atmospheres.
• BS EN 60079-10. ‘Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres Part 10.
Classification of hazardous areas’, [25].
• For equipment in hazardous areas ‘BS EN 1127-1 : 1998 Explosive atmospheres.
Explosion prevention and protection’ [26] is available.
• BS 5958 : 1991 ‘Code of practice for control of undesirable static electricity’, [27]

These documents only cover operational leaks rather than accidental releases. They do not define
the extent of hazardous areas from the point of view of explosion and fire risk.
Alongside UK legislation, EN ISO 13702 [28] also addresses the need to develop a fire and
explosion strategy (FES) which describes the role, essential elements and performance standards
for each of the systems required to manage possible hazardous events on the installation.
Guidance on the demonstration of ALARP is available throughout this Guidance and from the
following sources, but it should be noted that they are not specifically oriented towards the offshore
sector;
Policy and Guidance on reducing risks to ALARP in Design [29].

Principles and Guidelines to Assist HSE in its Judgement that Duty Holders Have Reduced Risk as
Low as Reasonably Practicable [30]. http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/spc/perm12.htm
HSE Books have published a guide which sets out an overall framework for decision taking by the
HSE (R2P2) [8].
B.3.2 Recent developments (to 2005)

In this section, three documents which are currently under development are discussed, compared
and contrasted. These are:-
1. The three-phase project sponsored by UKOOA and the HSE to develop updated
guidance for the treatment of fire and explosion hazards of which this document is
Part 2.
2. ISO development of a standard dealing with accidental actions as part of ISO

CD/19901-3 [5].
3. API Recommended Practice (API RPFB) [31] for the Design of Offshore Facilities
against Fire and Blast Loading.
Whilst the status, scope and applicability of these documents varies, it is still possible to compare
the technical content and approaches in a meaningful way. It has been an aim that all three
documents should adopt compatible approaches as they reflect the same underlying hazards and
confront common issues.
There is now widespread recognition that a multidisciplinary approach to design and assessment is
required, involving structural, mechanical, process, control and instrumentation and other
engineering disciplines.
In the case of fire hazard analysis, probabilistic methods appear to be of lesser importance than for
explosions, as the extreme events are not so disproportionately severe and can largely be
prevented or designed against.
In Fire assessment, nominal fire loads and modified code check methods have been in widespread
use for some years. Recent developments have given rise to the consideration of similar
techniques for application in the explosion case.
B.3.2.1 The new API RPFB

In 2001 it was agreed that the existing guidance on fire and blast engineering which formed part of
the 21st edition of API Recommended Practice (RP-2A-WSD) [X] should be augmented by a new
separate RP on fire and explosion engineering.

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This document is limited largely to a discussion of consequence assessment, with philosophy and
hazard management, including mitigation, dealt with by reference to API and other reference
documents.
The required scope of assessment for both conceptual and detailed design may be limited for
installations that can be considered less safety-critical. Simplified assessment methods are
described.
B.3.2.2 The ISO 19900 update

The new suite of ISO codes for offshore structures is currently being prepared by a large number
of national and international experts. Resistance to fire and explosion is covered particularly in ISO
19901-3 for Topside Structures [5].
The section on Accidental Actions includes requirements and useful guidance on fire and explosion
hazard management as well as vessel collision, dropped objects and helicopter crash scenarios.
(Natural hazards such as extreme weather and earthquake are dealt with in other codes.).
Although the code will have a very wide audience, ISO 19901-3 is written with practising project
engineers in mind. It makes full use of (and reference to) recently validated research so as to set
out the minimum requirements and to indicate current good practice for design. Part of the code is
Normative (mandatory), whilst the remainder is Informative to provide additional information about
other considerations and to indicate sources of guidance.
Like the API code, which is proceeding in parallel, the ISO code recognises that the significance to
life from fire and explosion events depends to a large extent on mitigation by the structural barriers
that are fitted to protect the people and safety critical equipment on board an installation.
There is agreement that the ISO codes for offshore structures should apply across the European
Union and other countries in place of any specific European (CEN) standards.
Table B1 illustrates the coverage of the subject areas in each document.
Table B1 Scope and range for the new Guidance documents
Subject area UKOOA Guidance API RP ISO

Explosion and Fire Parts 1 and 2 API 75 ISO 13702 and
Philosophy 19900
Explosion and Fire Parts 1 and 2 Refers to the ISO 13702, 19900
Hazard Management API 14 Series and 19903
Interaction of Explosion Parts 1 and 2 Refers to the ISO 19901-3
and Fire Hazard API 14 Series Informative and
Management 13702
Explosion and Fire Loads Part 3 (preliminary API RP ‘Fire and ISO 19901-3
treatment Parts 1 and 2) Blast’
Design Explosion Loads Part 1 To be addressed ISO 19901-3
Response of structures to Part 3 (preliminary API RP ‘Fire and ISO 19901-3
Fires and Explosions treatment in Parts 1 and 2) Blast’
B.3.2.3 Installation/compartment risk screening

The higher the risk (likelihood x consequence) in an installation or compartment the greater should
be the rigor that is employed to understand and reduce that risk. All three documents use risk
matrices for risk screening.

A simple approach which is frequently adopted for qualitative risk analysis uses a 3 x 3 matrix of
potential consequence versus frequency or likelihood of an accidental action/event as indicated in
the risk matrices given below. The notation differs between the three documents and has been
adjusted for comparison purposes.
Table B2 Risk matrices from the three documents
UKOOA API ISO

Consequence Consequence Exposure level
L M H L M H L3 L2 L1
H M H H M H H M H H
Likelihood
/ M L M H L M H L M H
Probability
L L L M L L M L L M
There is a large degree of similarity between the three documents, the differences in notation and
the differing treatment of the outcomes (risk ) are summarised in Table B3 below:-
Is it just me or are these matrices presented the wrong way round? Should be like below.
Low Medium High
Low
Medium
High

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Table B3 Notation and treatment of outcome of risk matrix by document
Notation UKOOA API ISO

Likelihood/Probability Likelihood Probability of occurrence Probability of
exceedance
H High Higher Risk level 1
M Medium Medium Risk level 2
L Low Low Risk Risk level 3
Outcome UKOOA API ISO
H Requires high (Higher risk) Significant risks which
sophistication Risk level must be are likely to require
analysis reduced. Assess prevention, control,
structure by considering mitigation
scenario/event based
approach
M If nominal loads If nominal loads apply, Risks require further

apply, use them use them otherwise high study to define
otherwise high sophistication analysis probability,
sophistication consequences, cost
analysis
L Use low Low risk need not be Insignificant or minimal
sophistication considered further risk which can be
analysis, elastic eliminated from further
analysis (nominal consideration
loads)
I think this sort of table is very useful, I don’t remember it appearing in the main text, it
could usefully be repeated there.

Annex C Review of models
C.1 Introduction
Traditionally large-scale experiments were carried out to study fires. However, mathematical
modelling of fires is now becoming the preferred tool, due to the high cost associated with large-
scale experiments. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modelling done properly is not cheap and
there are outstanding uncertainties associated with the physical sub-models implemented in the
code. Modelling and experiments are mutually exclusive, but should be viewed as complementary
tools.
The very rapid development of faster computer processors and more memory at reasonable prices
enables the user to use finer meshes that will yield to solutions that are more accurate. The
development of physical sub-models is not as rapid, but there are, nevertheless, some interesting
models coming on-stream – some of which are only now becoming feasible to use due to the
improved performance of the computers.
There are two important steps to complete before any model can be used in anger and its results
to be trusted: verification – ensuring that the correct equations with correct source terms are
solved, and validation – showing the model’s accuracy. It is rare to find that the models are not
verified. The validation process is time-consuming, expensive and laborious – validation is often
incomplete. The lack of validation of the fire models was recognised by the Model Evaluation
Group, part of a CEC sponsored project on fire modelling [X]. The outcome of the Modelling
Evaluation Group was a number of documents outlining minimum requirements for validation of jet
fire models. The pool fire models did not undergo the same level of scrutiny, though most of the
points made on jet fire model validation also apply to pool fire models.
C.2 Types of model

C.2.1 General:
There are a number of mathematical models of varying level of complexity that can be used for
modelling hydrocarbon fires on offshore installations:
• Probabilistic models
• Empirical models
• Zone models
• CFD models
• Evacuation models
• Video analysis
D.2.2 Probabilistic models

Probabilistic models have as yet found limited use for modelling fires on offshore installations.
These models work on defining an event tree and assigning different levels of probability of an
event occurring, thus taking into account uncertainties in the underlying processes. There is little or
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no reliance on fluid flow models with inaccurate or incomplete representation of the fire. However,
these models do rely on the identification of all credible events and their associated probabilities.
Another application of probabilistic models is to provide a realistic heat release rate. A probabilistic
approach to estimating the heat release rate could be used to ensure that the heat release rates
used in make CFD simulations are more realistic. An extrapolation of the probabilistic heat release
rate model to other scenarios, i.e. jet fires on an offshore installation, may not be straightforward.
D.2.3 Empirical correlations

Empirical correlations are based on experiments. Empirical correlations are easy to use and yield
results instantaneously. The correlations provide information such as heat fluxes, wall
temperatures as functions of distance through a material, etc. Empirical correlations are very useful
for a quick assessment of the problem.
There are limitations with empirical correlations. Only very simple configurations can be modelled.
The models cannot take account of buildings and other structures, or the topography of the site.
The estimates could be conservative, but it cannot be guaranteed to be the case for all situations.
This type of model is only valid for the fuels and conditions that were studied in the experiments.
One should therefore be wary of extrapolating the results to situations not covered in the
experiments.
D.2.4 Zone models

Zone models are also based on empirical information, but these models also incorporate some
flow physics. The flow is divided into different zones that can exchange information, e.g. mass,
momentum and heat. A set of ordinary differential equations for mass, momentum, energy and
species mass fractions is solved for each zone. These models require more input from the user,
but tend to have short computer run times, usually (much) less than an hour. The output from zone
models would include heat fluxes, wall temperatures, species concentrations, temperatures,
pressure and velocities. This type of model is very useful as a scoping tool, to identify scenarios
that require the use of more sophisticated tools, i.e. CFD models.
Zone models are also limited to modelling relatively simple geometries. The models should not be
used for fuels or conditions that were not covered in the experiments. Zone
D.2.5 Computational fluid dynamics models

CFD models are the most complex of the fluid flow modelling tools. A number of strongly coupled
non-linear partial differential equations provide a more realistic representation of the flow physics.
There are uncertainties associated with modelling turbulent flow and combustion, as well as in the
definition of the fire source and ambient conditions. The output from a CFD simulation includes
velocities, density, pressure, fluid and wall temperatures, species concentrations (mean and
fluctuating component), heat fluxes, etc. There is still a reliance on empirical data, especially for
combusting flows, but the CFD models are by far the most generally applicable and flexible tools.
Furthermore, the more realistic representation of the physics comes at a cost. It can be time-
consuming to define a CFD model, the run-times can be very long, up to the order of weeks, and
the simulations will not always converge. CFD is a knowledge-based activity and the user of CFD
must have a thorough understanding and experience of a range of topics, including fluid
mechanics, chemical kinetics, and numerical mathematics.

D.2.5.1 Industry standard
Routine calculations are usually carried out using either the k- model, k-ζ model or Menter’s SST
model. The weaknesses of these models are well documented. The models are sometimes applied
in situations where it would be advisable to use some other turbulence model. Nevertheless, these
models do quite well in many applications. While the models might not be able to provide very
accurate results at all times they nevertheless provide the opportunity to study trends, i.e. how
geometrical changes might affect the solution.
D.2.5.2 State of the art
State of the art in turbulence modelling is Large-Eddy Simulation (LES) or Detached-Eddy

Simulation (DES). These techniques were originally aimed at (external) aerodynamic flows, but are
now finding widespread use for other applications. LES requires fine meshes in order to resolve all
relevant length scales. The LES simulations must also be carried out for a long time, in real-time,
to build up reliable flow statistics. It is also necessary to provide a sensible initial guess for
fluctuating velocities, etc. There are also problems with the treatment of walls in wall-bounded
flows, since there are no large-eddy structures in the near-wall region. DES is a hybrid approach
where a simple turbulence model, like Spalart-Allmaras, is used in the near-wall region and LES is
used in the free shear flow. DES is not as computer intensive as LES, while still providing the same
amount of flow information.
It might be sensible to reduce the problem size, by only considering a subset of the installation. It is
not feasible to model the whole offshore installation, including parts of the surroundings, as well
combustion, multi-phase or single-phase flow, phase change in the vessels subjected to impact of
a jet fire with a CFD model. The run times would be prohibitively long. There are also large
uncertainties in some of the physical sub-models in the CFD codes that make the use of CFD less
attractive.
A more in-depth description of the various modelling techniques is presented in the report prepared
by the Health and Safety Laboratory [X] – both in terms of current industry standard and of state of
the art. The emphasis is on the CFD models as these incorporate the most realistic
representations of the physical processes. There is a definite need to revise the assessments of
applicability of the modelling techniques as the models and the available computer resources
develop further.
D.2.6 Evacuation models

Evacuation models have been used in conjunction with CFD models, but can also be run on their
own. The evacuation models can be run as a post-processor, since it is usually assumed that the
movement of people does not affect the flow significantly, though this is not always the case. Some
of the models are becoming sophisticated in that relationships between individuals can be
prescribed; individuals can make their decisions on which exit to use. Validation of evacuation
models is difficult, as it is very difficult to recreate in a controlled experiment the urgency,
indecision and stress brought on in an individual when being subjected to a real fire.
D.2.7 Video analysis

Statistical analysis of video footage of jet fires has been used to provide information on the
likelihood that the fire engulfs a vessel. This information has been used with empirical correlations.
This information would not normally be used on its own.
D.2.8 Miscellaneous
In light of uncertainties with the various types of models, it might be prudent to carry out
simulations where a zone model and a CFD model can provide input to and output to each other.

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Ideally a great number of scenarios, different wind directions, wind speeds, release locations,
release directions, need to be investigated. This is not feasible to do with CFD due to the long
computer runtimes. The use of simpler models as scoping tools could highlight scenarios that
warrant an in-depth investigation with CFD. It is vitally important that the simple model includes all
the important physical processes. Therefore the suitability of a simple model as a scoping tool will
have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Traditionally fluid flow modelling and structural analysis have been carried out separately.
However, it would be desirable to model, say, escalation due to the collapse of parts of the
structure, i.e. Fluid-Structure Interaction (FSI). It is now more feasible to integrate the two types of
modelling due to the availability of faster computers with large memory, and FSI is therefore finding
increasingly widespread use. Nevertheless, the computer runtimes are roughly an order of
magnitude greater than for a comparable fluid flow simulation. There are a number of different
packages in which the fluid flow solver and the structures solver are fully integrated. Filters for
converting the fluid flow results into something that can be read by the structural analysis code
enabling the coupling of separate a fluid flow and structural solver are also available. Some of the
integrated fluid flow solvers are limited to inviscid flows and are thus not suitable to fire modelling.
The required outputs from the CFD code are heat fluxes, concentration of toxics, transport of toxic
products and provision of output from a fluid flow simulation using CFD in the correct format to be
used in structural analysis using a Finite Element code.
D.3 Status of the sub-models in CFD models

D.3.1 Turbulence models
Routine calculations are usually carried out using either the k-ε model, k-ζ model or Menter’s SST
model. The weaknesses of these models are well documented. The models are sometimes applied
in situations where it would be advisable to use some other turbulence model. Nevertheless, these
models do quite well in many applications. While the models might not be able to provide very
accurate results at all times they nevertheless provide the opportunity to study trends, i.e. how
geometrical changes might affect the solution.
State of the art in turbulence modelling is Large-Eddy Simulation (LES) or Detached-Eddy

Simulation (DES). These techniques were originally aimed at (external) aerodynamic flows, but are
now finding widespread use for other applications. LES requires fine meshes in order to resolve all
relevant length scales. The LES simulations must also be carried out for a long time, in real-time,
to build up reliable flow statistics. It is also necessary to provide a sensible initial guess for
fluctuating velocities, etc. There are also problems with the treatment of walls in wall-bounded
flows, since there are no large-eddy structures in the near-wall region. DES is a hybrid approach
where a simple turbulence model, like Spalart-Allmaras, is used in the near-wall region and LES is
used in the free shear flow. DES is not as computer intensive as LES, while still providing the same
amount of flow information.
D.3.2 Multi-phase flow

The choice of multi-phase model depends on the flow, i.e. whether it is a gas-liquid, gas-solid,
liquid-solid or a gas-liquid-solid system. The fraction of dispersed phase is also of importance when
choosing which model to use. When dealing solids and droplets that have are not mono-disperse,
i.e. distribution of different sizes, one would not normally attempt to follow each individual particle
or droplet but rather consider groups of particles, with all particles in each group having same size
and properties. Two situations that are of particular importance on an offshore installation are when
a jet release is made up of gas and condensate, where both phases are combustible, and water
mitigation. For larger problems the dispersed phase is treated as continuous, i.e. as a part of the
bulk fluid.
A two-flow model, where the phases have different momentum, energy and heat, and the
interphase exchange of these quantities represent state of the art. However, there are great
uncertainties associated with the modelling of the interfacial information transfer between the
phases. A transported-PDF method where a velocity-scalar PDF is combined with either LES or
Reynolds Averaged Navier-Stokes could be used to model dispersed multi-phase flows.
D.3.3 Combustion models

D.3.3.1 General
There are uncertainties associated with the modelling of combustion processes. Some of these are
related to the complexity of the chemical kinetics, with a large number of intermediate species and
reactions describing the combustion of even the simplest hydrocarbons, and the lack of
understanding of the processes involved. Further uncertainty is introduced, as it is not possible to
accurately resolve the flame front for flows considered in the present report. The simpler
combustion models introduce constants that are not universally applicable and need to be adjusted
for each fuel.
D.3.3.2 Gaseous combustion
Industry standard: Routine simulations of combusting flows usually involve the use of the Eddy
Dissipation Model or, less likely, a laminar flamelet model with a prescribed PDF, for non-premixed
combustion, and the Eddy BreakUp (EBU) model for premixed combustion and the Zimont model
for partially premixed or premixed combustion. Fires are also sometimes represented by a
volumetric heat source. This will provide a means of heat release (location and magnitude) but will
not provide any information of the amount of toxic products that are produced.
State of the art techniques in gaseous combustion modelling are the Probability Density Function
(PDF) approach and the Conditional Moment Closure (CMC) model. The PDF method involves
solving a transport equation for the PDF. This is then coupled to a detailed or reduced chemical
kinetics scheme. However, these calculations place great demands on the available computer
resources. The need for detailed treatment of chemical kinetics in fires in offshore installations is
not likely to great. The CMC model can also be used to represent detailed chemical kinetics and
does not place the same demand on the computer resources as the PDF transport approaches
D.3.3.3 Liquid combustion
Industry standard: It would appear that relatively simple combustion models, such as mixed-is-
burnt or Eddy BreakUp-type models, are being used. Heavier hydrocarbons are well characterised
and will of course change with time and location of the wellhead within each reservoir. The
complexity of the combustion of heavier hydrocarbons makes it intractable to attempt to use more
sophisticated combustion models.
State of the art: It might be possible to use a transported PDF method with either detailed or
reduced chemical kinetics or the Conditional Moment Closure model. However, no references to
combustion modelling of mixtures of heavy hydrocarbons using either of these two methods have
been found in the open literature.
D.3.3.4 Multi-phase combustion
Industry standard: One cannot afford model the combustion of each individual droplet in a spray.
However, a Eulerian-Lagrangian approach where one tracks groups of droplets, where particles in
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each group have the same size and properties might be feasible. The actual combustion would be
modelled using a simple combustion model, i.e. mixed-is-burnt, Eddy Dissipation or the Zimont
model.
State of the art: The computational cost of CFD calculations for non-reacting multi-phase flows is
already high. The added complexity of the combustion processes makes modelling of multi-phase
combustion very expensive computationally for the flows considered in the present report. It might
be possible to use a transported PDF method with either detailed or reduced chemical kinetics or
the Conditional Moment Closure (CMC) model. However, no references to combustion modelling
of mixtures of heavy hydrocarbons using either of these two methods have been found in the open
literature.
D.3.4 Heat transfer models

D.3.4.1 Conduction
Conduction of heat is of great importance. One possible scenario is when a jet fire impacts on a
vessel. Passive Fire Protection (PFP), i.e. coating of process equipment and vessels, is used to
protect the equipment from the fire. However, PFP ages and is affected by the weather. There is
also a risk that the coating is removed due to the erosive effect exerted by a high momentum jet.
The subsequent heating up of the content of the vessel could lead to pressure build-up due
vaporisation of hydrocarbons.
The complexity of the problem that involves fluid flow, combustion, heat conduction (possibly with
deteriorating PFP) and phase transition makes this problem intractable for CFD models in many
cases. It might be feasible to combine the CFD model with a zone model that can provide the
conditions in the vessel.
D.3.4.2 Convection
Convection plays a very important part in the heat transfer processes from a fire. The momentum
imposed on the plume greatly affects where and how fast the hot exhaust gases travel. This has
implications for the evacuation of personnel. The use of wall functions is the industry standard for
modelling convective heat transfer at walls. These wall functions have usually been derived for
natural convection. The state of the art wall functions are the scaleable wall functions that are more
accurate than the old equilibrium wall functions. CFD modelling of smoke transport carried out at
Cambridge University and HSL showed that the choice of convective heat boundary condition
greatly affects the flow, i.e. wall functions should be modified to account for forced convection if the
heat transfer is a combination of forced and natural convection.
D.3.4.3 Radiation
Industry standard: The Discrete Transfer Model (DTM) by Lockwood and Shah (1981) [X] is
frequently used and offers accurate predictions at a relatively reasonable cost. Though there is a
trade-off between accuracy and speed, as more rays used will up to a point result in more accurate
radiative flux predictions. Also frequently used are radiation models based on the Discrete Ordinate
Model, i.e. see Fiveland (1988) [X], Raithby and Chui (1990) [X] or Chui and Raithby (1993) [X],
which solve the radiative energy transfer equation for a number of solid angles. Another commonly
used simple model is the P1 radiation model that was developed for coal combustion.
State of the art in radiation modelling is stochastic modelling using Monte Carlo simulations with
either a narrow band or a wide band model. This is an expensive technique, but it is suitable for
complex geometries and is potentially a very accurate method. The accuracy is dependent on the
number of rays used.

D.3.4.4 Dispersion of toxics
The term toxics encompasses CO, carbon monoxide, soot and smoke. It is important to be able to
model the movement of these toxic substances, as it can be used to determine how long time the
occupants have before, say, the smoke concentration becomes too high, and thus provide
information upon which to draw up an emergency evacuation plan. Dispersion of toxic products
can be modelled in a number of ways. CO and smoke are frequently treated as a single passive
scalar, respectively. There are correlations that would provide an estimate for the amount of CO
and smoke produced by a particular fuel. It is also possible to model the production of CO and
smoke via a combustion model, i.e. Eddy Dissipation model. Soot can also be modelled with a
version of the Eddy Dissipation model that has been adapted to soot modelling. A more
sophisticated approach is to use a laminar flamelet method. It is then necessary to solve two
transport equations for mixture fraction and mixture fraction variance, and two transport equations
for the soot volume fraction and soot number density. LES and DES techniques are likely to be
used for modelling of smoke transport, but the high computational cost of LES and DES will
probably preclude the use of these approaches for modelling of an entire offshore installation.
D.4 Miscellaneous issues

D.4.1 General
Committee of the European Community (CEC) sponsored a project in the area of Major Industrial
Hazards with the aim to establish suitable criteria and procedures for model verification and
validation, surveying the state of the fire models for jet fires and pool fires, and propose further
development and validation of the physical sub-models. This Model Evaluation Group (MEG) held
a number of open meetings where mode developers and academics discussed the state of fire
modelling at great length. Unfortunately, the pool fire models were never properly assessed. The
jet fire models on the other hand were scrutinised a much detail. A number of recommendations for
how the models should be validated and the results of the validation studies be reported were
presented.
D.4.2 Verification
The purpose of the verification process is to show that the correct transport equations are solved,
i.e. that all the important terms have been included in the equations.
Most CFD codes and the models implemented therein will have been verified.
D.4.3 Validation
Definition: Validation is the process of demonstrating that the model provides a sufficiently
accurate representation of the real world.
Validation is a very difficult, costly and time-consuming exercise. One of main difficulties lies in that
there are an infinite number of different scenarios that ideally should be investigated. This is clearly
not feasible. It is therefore important to select a set of representative scenarios that are run each
time a new release of the code is due to be distributed. There should be no differences in the
results obtained with the old and news releases unless bug fixing to a particular, relevant model
has been carried out. The results should be investigated if there are any differences between two
solutions.
D.4.4 Issues affecting accuracy of predictions

There are a number of factor that influence the accuracy of the CFD model predictions. These are
listed below in no particular order:
• Mesh quality;

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• Computational cell size in the near-wall region;

• Grid dependency;
• Ray dependency (radiation model), if applicable;
• Time step dependency, if transient simulation;
• Convergence;
• Sensitivity to choice of boundary conditions, if applicable;
• Settings of turbulence and combustion model constants;
• Effects of choice of spatial and temporal discretisation methods on the solution; and
• Inclusion of buoyancy in the transport equations for momentum and turbulence quantities.
These factors should always be taken into consideration in CFD simulations. It is important that
reports describing CFD modelling should also include this information, to show that the these
factors have been investigated. There are a number of guidance documents on the use of CFD for
various types of flows; ERCOFTAC has produced a document providing Best Practice guidelines
on the general use of CFD, Casey and Wintergeste (2000) [X]; NAFEMS has also produced
guidance document on the general use of CFD, NAFEMS (1996) [X] and HSL has produced a Best
Practice guidance on modelling of smoke transport, Gobeau et al. (2002) [X].
D.4.5 Future developments

The rapid development and availability of cheap and powerful computers with large memory will
yield more accurate results without making any improvements to the numerical algorithms and the
physical sub-models. It is therefore not sensible to make hard and fast rules about mesh sizes. A
sensitivity study comparing the results of simulations on three meshes of different fineness will
show whether the solution is grid independent. It is also not sensible to specify the number of rays
to use when modelling radiative heat transfer. A sensitivity study of the effect of changing the
number of rays on heat fluxes should be carried out.
The use LES to model combusting flows has increased greatly, though there are concerns over the
coarseness of the meshes that are used in the calculations. Many simulations using an LES
technique are also not run for a sufficiently long time (in real-time) to provide reliable flow statistics.
The DES or similar hybrid technique combining LES and a simple turbulence model will find
increased use and be applied to combusting flows, as a great deal of effort is going into further
refinement of the models. DES-like techniques are also better suited to wall-bounded flows than
LES on its own.
Combustion modelling using the CMC model holds great promise for the future. The computational
overhead with CMC model is considerably lower compared to that of the transported PDF
methods. However, it is not certain that the extra information about the combustion provided by the
CMC and the transported PDF methods is required, especially given the level of uncertainty in the
modelling and the increased computational cost. It is therefore likely that the simpler models, i.e.
Eddy Dissipation model, the Zimont model and laminar flamelet models with prescribed PDF, will
continue to be used for the foreseeable future
There is great uncertainty in the modelling of interfacial transfer of momentum, heat and mass
between different phases. It is also very difficult to measure interfacial transfer of momentum, heat
and mass between different phases in experiments. This is an area that should see improvements
as more sophisticated measurement techniques are employed. However, it may be necessary to
be to resolve the interface between the different phases, which would significantly increase the
computational overhead, in terms of computer runtimes and memory requirement.

D.5 References
Carregal Ferreira, J., Forkel, H, Bender, R., Menter, F. R., Improved LES-, DES- and SAS-Models
for the CFD-Simulation of Chemically Reacting Flows, EROFTAC Bulletin No. 64, pp. 57-60, 2005.
Casey, M., and Wintergerste, T., Special Interest Group on Quality and Trust in Industrial CFD –
Best Practice Guidelines, ERCOFTAC, 2000.
CRC, The Handbook of Fluid Dynamics, Ed: Johnson, R. W., CRC Press/Springer Verlag, Boca
Raton, FL, USA, 1998.
Gobeau, N. Ledin, H. S., and Lea, C. J., Guidance for HSE Inspectors: Smoke movement in
complex enclosed spaces - Assessment of Computational Fluid Dynamics, HSL Report No.
HSL/2002/29, 2002.
Merci, B., and Roekaerts, D., Turbulence-Chemistry Interaction in Turbulent Flame Simulations –
Transported Scalar PDF Approach, ERCOFTAC Bulletin No. 64, pp. 25-28, 2005.
Model Evaluation Group, Model Evaluation Group – Report of the Second Open Meeting,
Cadarache, France, 19 May, 1994, EU Report No. EUR 15990 EN, 1995a.
Model Evaluation Group, Protocol for Model Evaluation, Commission of the European
Communities, DG-XII, Brussels, 1995b.
Model Evaluation Group, Guidelines for Model Developers, Commission of the European
Communities, DG-XII, Brussels, 1995c.
NAFEMS, CFD Analysis: Guidance for good practice, NAFEMS Document Ref. No. R0063, 1996.
I was surprised there weren’t more references in some sections.

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Annex D Checklists
Lists yet to be defined and agreed as useful quick reference tables for designers, duty
holders, consultants and regulators.

8.1.1 Fire hazard philosophy fire scenarios and failure definitions
Fire scenario tables in the interim guidance notes were updated in HSE document OTO 2000 051
[X]. These updated tables are given for information. Minor updates are still required but the key
requirement is to explain the difference between incident heat fluxes and the amount of heat
actually transferred. The appendix to the IP Severe Guidance would be a good start.
Jet fires
FIRE FLAME EXTENT HEAT FLUX TO TARGET COMBUSTION
SCENARIO AND GEOMETRY ENGULFED NON-ENGULFED PRODUCTS
Jet fire in Use multiple point See [Appendix A, Use multiple point Field models are good
the open. source model for OTI 92 596] 7.4.5. source or surface for predicting toxic gas
Gaseous flame length or 50-300 kWm-2. May emitter model. In and smoke movement
release. surface emitter be higher in larger the far field i.e. >5 but not concentrations.
models for general flames and in those flame lengths, point
flame shape. loaded with higher source models are
molecular acceptable if F
components factor is known.
2-phase Major uncertainties 50-250 kWm-2 for Major uncertainties
release (see [Appendix A, flashing propane up (see [Appendix A,
OTI 92 596] 7.7.9). to 20 kg s-1. Major OTI 92 596] 7.7.9,
modelling difficulties. 7.3.4).
No other data exist.
Jet fire in Caution - flame Treat as open fire. Field models predict
module. shape changes due smoke and toxic gas
Fuel to impingement on trajectories adequately.
controlled. objects. Concentrations and
temperatures less well
Ventilation Major difficulties See [Appendix A,
predicted. Probably
controlled. and uncertainties OTI 92 597] 9.7.6. greater smoke
(see [Appendix A, Up to 400 kWm-2 in concentrations than
OTI 92 597] 9.7.4). re-circulating open fires.
The open flame gaseous propane
lengths may be flame.
extended as air
access is denied.
In the extreme, Major uncertainties
external flames because of induced
result. Models not re-circulation and
developed. incomplete burning.
Needs to be treated
on a case specific
basis. There are no
validated predictive
models.
Jet fire Treat as open fire, but note major difficulties with 2-phase releases, and flame extent for large
below lower releases into objects.
deck
Wellhead Treat as open fires in naturally vented or explosion damaged well-bays.
blow-out Treat as ventilation controlled fire in enclosed well-bays.
N.B. Major uncertainties with 2-phase blow-outs and liquid dropout.

fireandblast.com
Pool fires
FIRE SOURCE TERMS FLAME HEAT FLUX TO TARGET COMBUSTION
SCENARIO POOL MASS EXTENT ENGULFED NON- PRODUCTS
SPREAD BURNING GEOMETRY ENGULFED
RATE
Pool fire on Limited by Use literature Flame length 100-160 Use surface Field models
the open walls, edge data where use Eqn. 6.2 kWm-2 (see emitter are good for
deck. of deck or applicable. [Appendix A, table 6.4 in model. Point smoke and
local Otherwise OTI 92 596]. Reference source toxic gas
depressions. use Equation Flame tilt, use [Appendix A, models movements,
6.1 in Eqn. 6.5 OTI 92 acceptable but not
Reference [Appendix A, 596]). beyond concentration.
[Appendix A, OTI 92 596] or approx. 5
OTI 92 596] Eqn. 6.6 pool
[Appendix A, diameters if
OTI 92 596]. F factor
Flame drag, known.
use Eqn. 6.7
[Appendix A,
OTI 92 596]
Pool fire in Normally Treat as open deck fire. Treat as open deck fires
module. limited by
Fuel walls.
controlled.
Ventilation Major Major Major problems. Severity Zone or field
controlled. uncertainties difficulties and may be greater than the models can
(see uncertainties. same fire in the open. predict
[Appendix A, Models not Models are not yet validated trajectories
OTI 92 597] validated. (see [Appendix A, OTI 92 adequately but
9.5). Open flame 597] 9.7.2). not
length may be concentrations.
extended as
air access is
denied (see
[Appendix A,
OTI 92 597]
9.7.6).
Pool fire on Complex but Treat as open deck fire. Treat as open deck fires.
sea. known (see
Oil. [Appendix A,
OTI 92 596]
6.5.1).
Subsea gas Some data Assume all Treat as open 250-300 Treat as Treat as open
release. and theory gas burns deck fire with kWm-2 for open deck deck fire.
available over effective caution. Check large pools fire with
(see pool area mass burning (see caution.
[Appendix A, (see rate does not [Appendix A,
OTI 92 596] [Appendix A, far exceed OTI 92 596]
6.5.2). OTI 92 596] normal pool 6.10.3).
6.7.1). fire values.
Pool fire at Treat as ventilation controlled fire in enclosed well-bays. N.B. Flame may go May have more
bottom of out through lack of air. smoke and
concrete toxic gases
leg. than open fires.
Confined jet and pool fires are addressed in the IP Severe Fire Guideline.


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Document number 152-RP-48

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Page 2 of 240 152-RP-48 Rev 0, July 2005

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Check 3a didn’t produce anything to summarise.

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Figure 1.1 The UKOOA decision making framework

1.3 Fire and explosion hazard management

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The FEHM process can be applied to new or existing installations.

1.4 Overview of the guidance

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2.1.2 Hazard philosophy

2.1.3 Prescriptive vs. Performance based design

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2.1.4 Hazard management

The scenarios considered, should be sufficiently varied to cover the following:-

The consequence measures of relevance to fires are:-

2.1.5 Fire loading and response

Page 12 of 240 152-RP-48 Rev 0, July 2005

2.2 Understanding the fire hazard

2.2.2 Classification of fire hazards

2.2.3 Causes and likelihood of hydrocarbon releases

61 % of all releases are from pipework systems

11 % of all releases are from small bore piping

15 % of all releases are from flanges

14 % of all releases are from seals and packing

11 % are due to incorrect installation

26 % from degradation of materials (excluding corrosion and erosion)

11 % of all releases are due to vibration/fatigue

19 % of all releases are due to corrosion and erosion

2.2.4 Ignition causes and probability

The probability of ignition will depend upon the following factors:

152-RP-48 Rev 0, July 2005 Page 15 of 240

2.2.5 Fire hazards: Understanding the source

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2.2.5.2 Reservoir hazards

2.2.5.3 Process hazards

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2.2.5.4 Import and export risers

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• Liquid fires can also be the source of overwhelming quantities of smoke.

2.2.7 Types of fire hazard: Gases

2.2.8 Types of fire hazard: Confinement and ventilation control.

152-RP-48 Rev 0, July 2005 Page 21 of 240

2.2.9 Fires on the sea

Fires may result in any of the following consequences:

• The inherent mass, strength and stresses on exposed plant

2.2.11 Developing a set of representative scenarios

2.3 Hazard management principles

2.4 Hazard management systems

152-RP-48 Rev 0, July 2005 Page 25 of 240

Concept development and selection:

Front end engineering design; (FEED)

Page 26 of 240 152-RP-48 Rev 0, July 2005

2.4.6 Review and improvement