REPUBLIC ACT NO.

4670 June 18, 1966

THE MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

I. DECLARATION OF POLICY COVERAGE

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to promote and
improve the social and economic status of public school teachers, their living and working
conditions, their terms of employment and career prospects in order that they may compare
favorably with existing opportunities in other walks of life, attract and retain in the teaching
profession more people with the proper qualifications, it being recognized that advance in education
depends on the qualifications and ability of the teaching staff and that education is an essential
factor in the economic growth of the nation as a productive investment of vital importance.

Sec. 2. Title Definition. This Act shall be known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers"
and shall apply to all public school teachers except those in the professorial staff of state colleges
and universities.

As used in this Act, the term "teacher" shall mean all persons engaged in classroom teaching, in any
level of instruction, on full-time basis, including guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts
or vocational instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative
functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the Government or its political
subdivisions; but shall not include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other
school employees.

II. RECRUITMENT AND CAREER

Sec. 3. Recruitment and Qualification. Recruitment policy with respect to the selection and
appointment of teachers shall be clearly defined by the Department of
Education: Provided, however, That effective upon the approval of this Act, the following shall
constitute the minimum educational qualifications for teacher-applicants:

(a) For teachers in the kindergarten and elementary grades, Bachelor's degree in Elementary
Education (B.S.E.ED.);

(b) For teachers of the secondary schools, Bachelor's degree in Education or its equivalent with a
major and a minor; or a Bachelor's degree in Arts or Science with at least eighteen professional units
in Education.

(c) For teachers of secondary vocational and two years technical courses, Bachelor's degree in the
field of specialization with at least eighteen professional units in education;

(d) For teachers of courses on the collegiate level, other than vocational, master's degree with a
specific area of specialization;

Provided, further, That in the absence of applicants who possess the minimum educational
qualifications as hereinabove provided, the school superintendent may appoint, under a temporary
status, applicants who do not meet the minimum qualifications: Provided, further, That should
teacher-applicants, whether they possess the minimum educational qualifications or not, be required
to take competitive examinations, preference in making appointments shall be in the order of their
respective ranks in said competitive examinations: And provided, finally, That the results of the
examinations shall be made public and every applicant shall be furnished with his score and rank in
said examinations.

Sec. 4. Probationary Period. When recruitment takes place after adequate training and professional
preparation in any school recognized by the Government, no probationary period preceding regular
appointment shall be imposed if the teacher possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility: Provided, however, That where, due to the exigencies of the service, it is necessary to
employ as teacher a person who possesses the minimum educational qualifications herein above
set forth but lacks the appropriate civil service eligibility, such person shall be appointed on a
provisional status and shall undergo a period of probation for not less than one year from and after
the date of his provisional appointment.

Sec. 5. Tenure of Office. Stability on employment and security of tenure shall be assured the
teachers as provided under existing laws.

Subject to the provisions of Section three hereof, teachers appointed on a provisional status for lack
of necessary civil service eligibility shall be extended permanent appointment for the position he is
holding after having rendered at least ten years of continuous, efficient and faithful service in such
position.

Sec. 6. Consent for Transfer Transportation Expenses. Except for cause and as herein otherwise
provided, no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station to another.

Where the exigencies of the service require the transfer of a teacher from one station to another,
such transfer may be effected by the school superintendent who shall previously notify the teacher
concerned of the transfer and the reason or reasons therefor. If the teacher believes there is no
justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Director of Public Schools or the Director
of Vocational Education, as the case may be. Pending his appeal and the decision thereon, his
transfer shall be held in abeyance: Provided, however, That no transfers whatever shall be made
three months before any local or national election.

Necessary transfer expenses of the teacher and his family shall be paid for by the Government if his
transfer is finally approved.

Sec. 7. Code of Professional Conduct for Teachers. Within six months from the approval of this Act,
the Secretary of Education shall formulate and prepare a Code of Professional Conduct for Public
School Teachers. A copy of the Code shall be furnished each teacher: Provided, however, That
where this is not possible by reason of inadequate fiscal resources of the Department of Education,
at least three copies of the same Code shall be deposited with the office of the school principal or
head teacher where they may be accessible for use by the teachers.

Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. Every teacher shall enjoy equitable safeguards at
each stage of any disciplinary procedure and shall have:

a. the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges;

b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case;

c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a representative of his choice and/or by his
organization, adequate time being given to the teacher for the preparation of his defense; and

d. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities.

No publicity shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken against a teacher during the
pendency of his case.

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a
committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly
authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the
teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial
or national teacher's organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by
the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the
Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however,
That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of
the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

Sec. 10. No Discrimination. There shall be no discrimination whatsoever in entrance to the teaching
profession, or during its exercise, or in the termination of services, based on other than professional
consideration.

Sec. 11. Married Teachers. Whenever possible, the proper authorities shall take all steps to enable
married couples, both of whom are public school teachers, to be employed in the same locality.

Sec. 12. Academic Freedom. Teachers shall enjoy academic freedom in the discharge of their
professional duties, particularly with regard to teaching and classroom methods.

III. HOURS OF WORK AND REMUNERATION

Sec. 13. Teaching Hours. Any teacher engaged in actual classroom instruction shall not be required
to render more than six hours of actual classroom teaching a day, which shall be so scheduled as to
give him time for the preparation and correction of exercises and other work incidental to his normal
teaching duties: Provided, however, That where the exigencies of the service so require, any teacher
may be required to render more than six hours but not exceeding eight hours of actual classroom
teaching a day upon payment of additional compensation at the same rate as his regular
remuneration plus at least twenty-five per cent of his basic pay.

Sec. 14. Additional Compensation. Notwithstanding any provision of existing law to the contrary, co-
curricula and out of school activities and any other activities outside of what is defined as normal
duties of any teacher shall be paid an additional compensation of at least twenty-five per cent of his
regular remuneration after the teacher has completed at least six hours of actual classroom teaching
a day.

In the case of other teachers or school officials not engaged in actual classroom instruction, any
work performed in excess of eight hours a day shall be paid an additional compensation of at least
twenty-five per cent of their regular remuneration.

The agencies utilizing the services of teachers shall pay the additional compensation required under
this section. Education authorities shall refuse to allow the rendition of services of teachers for other
government agencies without the assurance that the teachers shall be paid the remuneration
provided for under this section.

Sec. 15. Criteria for Salaries. Teacher's salaries shall correspond to the following criteria:

(a) they shall compare favorably with those paid in other occupations requiring equivalent or similar
qualifications, training and abilities;

(b) they shall be such as to insure teachers a reasonable standard of life for themselves and their
families; and

(c) they shall be properly graded so as to recognize the fact that certain positions require higher
qualifications and greater responsibility than others: Provided, however, That the general salary
scale shall be such that the relation between the lowest and highest salaries paid in the profession
will be of reasonable order. Narrowing of the salary scale shall be achieved by raising the lower end
of the salary scales relative to the upper end.

Sec. 16. Salary Scale. Salary scales of teachers shall provide for a gradual progression from a
minimum to a maximum salary by means of regular increments, granted automatically after three
years: Provided, That the efficiency rating of the teacher concerned is at least satisfactory. The
progression from the minimum to the maximum of the salary scale shall not extend over a period of
ten years.

Sec. 17. Equality in Salary Scales. The salary scales of teachers whose salaries are appropriated by
a city, municipal, municipal district, or provincial government, shall not be less than those provided
for teachers of the National Government.

Sec. 18. Cost of Living Allowance. Teacher's salaries shall, at the very least, keep pace with the rise
in the cost of living by the payment of a cost-of-living allowance which shall automatically follow
changes in a cost-of-living index. The Secretary of Education shall, in consultation with the proper
government entities, recommend to Congress, at least annually, the appropriation of the necessary
funds for the cost-of-living allowances of teachers employed by the National Government. The
determination of the cost-of-living allowances by the Secretary of Education shall, upon approval of
the President of the Philippines, be binding on the city, municipal or provincial government, for the
purposes of calculating the cost-of-living allowances of teachers under its employ.

Sec. 19. Special Hardship Allowances. In areas in which teachers are exposed to hardship such as
difficulty in commuting to the place of work or other hazards peculiar to the place of employment, as
determined by the Secretary of Education, they shall be compensated special hardship allowances
equivalent to at least twenty-five per cent of their monthly salary.

Sec. 20. Salaries to be Paid in Legal Tender. Salaries of teachers shall be paid in legal tender of the
Philippines or its equivalent in checks or treasury warrants. Provided, however, That such checks or
treasury warrants shall be cashable in any national, provincial, city or municipal treasurer's office or
any banking institutions operating under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

Sec. 21. Deductions Prohibited. No person shall make any deduction whatsoever from the salaries
of teachers except under specific authority of law authorizing such deductions: Provided, however,
That upon written authority executed by the teacher concerned, (1) lawful dues and fees owing to
the Philippine Public School Teachers Association, and (2) premiums properly due on insurance
policies, shall be considered deductible.
 IV. HEALTH MEASURES AND INJURY BENEFITS

Sec. 22. Medical Examination and Treatment. Compulsory medical examination shall be provided
free of charge for all teachers before they take up teaching, and shall be repeated not less than once
a year during the teacher's professional life. Where medical examination show that medical
treatment and/or hospitalization is necessary, same shall be provided free by the government entity
paying the salary of the teachers.

In regions where there is scarcity of medical facilities, teachers may obtain elsewhere the necessary
medical care with the right to be reimbursed for their traveling expenses by the government entity
concerned in the first paragraph of this Section.

Sec. 23. Compensation For Injuries. Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of
employment injuries in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain
on the teacher's health shall be recognized as a compensable occupational disease in accordance
with existing laws.

V. LEAVE AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS

Sec. 24. Study Leave. In addition to the leave privileges now enjoyed by teachers in the public
schools, they shall be entitled to study leave not exceeding one school year after seven years of
service. Such leave shall be granted in accordance with a schedule set by the Department of
Education. During the period of such leave, the teachers shall be entitled to at least sixty per cent of
their monthly salary: Provided, however, That no teacher shall be allowed to accumulate more than
one year study leave, unless he needs an additional semester to finish his thesis for a graduate
study in education or allied courses: Provided, further, That no compensation shall be due the
teacher after the first year of such leave. In all cases, the study leave period shall be counted for
seniority and pension purposes.

The compensation allowed for one year study leave as herein provided shall be subject to the
condition that the teacher takes the regular study load and passes at least seventy-five per cent of
his courses. Study leave of more than one year may be permitted by the Secretary of Education but
without compensation.

Sec. 25. Indefinite Leave. An indefinite sick leave of absence shall be granted to teachers when the
nature of the illness demands a long treatment that will exceed one year at the least.

Sec. 26. Salary Increase upon Retirement. Public school teachers having fulfilled the age and
service requirements of the applicable retirement laws shall be given one range salary raise upon
retirement, which shall be the basis of the computation of the lump sum of the retirement pay and
the monthly benefits thereafter.

VI. TEACHER'S ORGANIZATION

Sec. 27. Freedom to Organize. Public school teachers shall have the right to freely and without
previous authorization both to establish and to join organizations of their choosing, whether local or
national to further and defend their interests.

Sec. 28. Discrimination Against Teachers Prohibited. The rights established in the immediately
preceding Section shall be exercised without any interference or coercion. It shall be unlawful for any
person to commit any acts of discrimination against teachers which are calculated to (a) make the
employment of a teacher subject to the condition that he shall not join an organization, or shall
relinquish membership in an organization,

(b) to cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a teacher by reason of his membership in an
organization or because of participation in organization activities outside school hours, or with the
consent of the proper school authorities, within school hours, and (c) to prevent him from carrying
out the duties laid upon him by his position in the organization, or to penalize him for an action
undertaken in that capacity.

Sec. 29. National Teacher's Organizations. National teachers' organizations shall be consulted in the
formulation of national educational policies and professional standards, and in the formulation of
national policies governing the social security of the teachers.

VII. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Sec. 30. Rules and Regulations. The Secretary of Education shall formulate and prepare the
necessary rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Act. Rules and regulations
issued pursuant to this Section shall take effect thirty days after publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and by such other means as the Secretary of Education deems reasonably
sufficient to give interested parties general notice of such issuance.

Sec. 31. Budgetary Estimates. The Secretary of Education shall submit to Congress annually the
necessary budgetary estimates to implement the provisions of the Act concerning the benefits herein
granted to public school teachers under the employ of the National Government.

Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall willfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in
the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to
defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than
one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.

If the offender is a public official, the court shall order his dismissal from the Government service.

Sec. 33. Repealing Clause. All Acts or parts of Acts, executive orders and their implementing rules
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

Sec. 34. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared invalid, the remainder of this Act
or any provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force and in effect.

Sec. 35. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 18, 1966

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 148445 February 16, 2004

ABELARDO V. SEVILLA, petitioner,

vs.
LORMA F. GOCON, respondent.
 DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

For his failure to observe and promote a high standard of ethics, petitioner may be held liable for
violation of the Ethical Standards Law and administratively sanctioned therefor.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the November 17, 2000 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 57369. The
dispositive part of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. We affirm the Resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission. Costs against petitioners." 3

The Civil Service Commission Resolution,4 upheld by the CA, had disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, Abelardo V. Sevilla and Godofredo M. Limbo are hereby found guilty of Dishonesty.
Accordingly, they are meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory
penalties.

"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman for whatever criminal action
it may take under the premises."5

The Facts

The CA summarized the facts in this manner:

"The present controversy has its origin in the complaint filed by Lorma F. Gocon on October 14,
1997 with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) charging Abelardo V. Sevilla and Godofredo M.
Limbo of falsification of official document, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.

"Limbo filed his Comments on the complaint on November 17, 1997. Sevilla filed his Answer on
December 4, 1997.

"The facts as found by the CSC are as follows:

‘As appearing from the records, Gocon, Guidance Counselor III, was designated as Chairman of the
Values Education Department in 1989. On the other hand, Limbo was a former Head Teacher III in
the Practical Arts Department [of the Quezon National High School in Lucena City].

‘Records reveal that Respondent Sevilla, in a letter dated December 9, 1993 to the Regional
Director, Department of Budget and Management, requested for the reclassification of eight (8)
items of Secondary Head Teacher III to Secondary Head Teacher VI. Apparently, said request
contains super impositions/erasures, specifically item 7, wherein the Practical Arts Department was
replaced to Values Department with Godofredo Limbo as the alleged Secondary Head Teacher
(Head Teacher III) thereof with 28 teachers under his supervision when in truth he was the Head
Teacher of the Practical Arts Department which was later merged with the Home Economics
Department. By virtue of this representation, Limbo was issued an appointment as Head Teacher VI
for Values Education on November 16, 1994.

‘On October 25, 1996, Respondent Sevilla, in his capacity as Principal IV, requested the Office of
the Regional Director, DECS Region IV, for the upgrading of Gocon’s position of Guidance
Counselor III to Head Teacher VI for Values Education. In said request, Sevilla represented as
follows:

‘This request is being made so that the Values Education Department of Quezon National High
School will have its own Head Teacher. This Department has been supervised for almost eight (8)
years since the implementation of the New Secondary Education Curriculum by the incumbent
Chairman. In this connection, the undersigned would like to strongly recommend that Values
Education Department be given a regular Head Teacher Position for the following reasons:

‘x x x x x x x x x’

‘On March 25, 1997, Assistant Secretary Josefina Nisperos of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports denied the aforesaid request.

‘Sometime in May, 1997, Gocon discovered that Limbo was appointed as Head Teacher VI for
Values Education on November 16, 1994. When asked about said appointment, Sevilla explained to
Gocon that Limbo was temporarily designated as Head Teacher for Values Education so that all
Head Teacher items would be reclassified by DECS Regional Office IV.

‘Dissatisfied with the explanation of Sevilla, Gocon filed a complaint and requested the intercession
of the then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria regarding the matter.

‘In a letter dated June 20, 1997 to the Regional Director, DECS Region IV, Sevilla explained as
follows:

‘Mr. Godofredo Limbo the Vocational Dept. Head III was one of those Head Teacher III whose item
was upgraded to Head Teacher VI in 1994. The undersigned acceded to the suggestion of Mr.
Leovigildo Arellano, Chief, Management Division, DECS to temporarily designate Mr. Limbo’s item
as Values item for purposes of upgrading the item or else the upgrading of all the Head Teacher III
item to Head Teacher VI could not be favorably acted upon and approved.’

‘However, in a First Indorsement dated July 15, 1997 to the Director IV, DECS Region IV, Leovigildo
Arellano, Chief, Management Division, DECS claimed among others, as follows:

‘I strongly deny the allegation of Mr. Sevilla that I suggested to him to ‘temporarily designate Mr.
Limbo’s appointment item as Values item…" I do not know personally Mr. Sevilla, hence, I have no
reason to make such suggestion to him knowing that such act is a clear falsification of public
documents. And I do not remember having met him.’

‘In their Memorandum, Limbo acknowledged that he was the one who made alterations in the
December 9, 1993 request for reclassification. He stressed, however, that he initialed all the
corrections he made to show that he was in good faith in doing so and that he acted upon the
suggestion of Monina Belen, as staff of Leovigildo Arellano at the DECS Management Division.’

"In her complaint with the CSC, complainant imputes upon Sevilla: 1) the act of misrepresentation
amounting to dishonesty and falsification of official document for representing to the DECS in the
letter dated December 9, 1993 that Limbo was Head Teacher III for the Values Education
Department and was supervising 28 Values Education teachers when in fact he was appointed Head
Teacher for Practical Arts (Boys) and was performing the function of such position; 2) grave
misconduct for allowing Limbo to use the item for Head Teacher VI and claiming that he acceded to
the suggestion of Mr. Arellano for the temporary use of the said item who denied having done so;
and 3) conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service for concealing Limbo’s
appointment deceiving complainant into thinking that she was being recommended for Head
Teacher VI and causing resentment to faculty members of QNHS; and upon Limbo the act of
dishonesty and grave misconduct for conniving with Sevilla in representing himself as Head Teacher
for Values Education and knowingly and deliberately accepting his appointment as Head Teacher VI
knowing that he was not qualified for the position and for allowing complainant to continue acting as
Chairman of the Values Education Department despite his appointment.

"Complainant likewise filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for
violation of the Anti-Graft Law and Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code for falsification of official
documents. Criminal Case No. 98-757 for falsification of official documents was filed against Sevilla
and Limbo with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City which however dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction on October 20, 1999.

"In the CSC case, respondents Sevilla and Limbo were formally charged on February 11, 1998 by
the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV of falsification of official documents, dishonesty
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

"Hearings were conducted and the parties presented their respective evidence. Thereafter,
complainant and respondents filed their respective memoranda on December 16, 1998 and
December 15, 1998.

"Meanwhile, in his letter to Gocon dated May 12, 1998, Sevilla relieved Gocon as Chairman of the
Values Education Department.

"On November 17, 1999, the CSC issued Resolution No. 992559, to wit:

‘WHEREFORE, Abelardo V. Sevilla and Godofredo M. Limbo are hereby found guilty of Dishonesty.
Accordingly, they are meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory
penalties.’

concluding that Sevilla’s knowledge of the alterations in the December 9, 1993 request for
reclassification of eight (8) Head Teacher III positions to Head Teacher VI can be inferred from his
letter dated June 20, 1997 and hence, Sevilla made a misrepresentation of fact in his letter dated
October 25, 1996 when he requested for the upgrading of complainant’s position to Head Teacher
VI."6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA found that Godofredo Limbo himself had made the alterations in the letter-request dated
December 9, 1993, specifying that he was Head Teacher III of the Values Department. It also found
that petitioner had "agreed to the idea of letting x x x Limbo use the item for values education in
order to facilitate the approval of the upgrading of Head Teacher III items to Head Teacher VI.
Petitioner Sevilla allowed x x x Limbo to misrepresent himself to be qualified to head the Values
Department." Hence, the appellate court faulted petitioner for having committed an act of dishonesty.
The CA also found that the appointment of Limbo as Head Teacher VI for values education had
been concealed by him and petitioner from respondent and the rest of the Quezon National High
School (QNHS) faculty members. It thus ruled that "[n]o logical conclusion can be deduced from the
above circumstances other than that they were part of the dishonesty committed by [petitioner]."

Hence, this Petition.7

Issues

In his appeal, petitioner raises the following issues:

"May Petitioner Abelardo V. Sevilla who reached the compulsory age of retirement on December 31,
1999 be legally deprived of his retirement benefits, pensions and gratuities as a consequence of the
CSC Resolution, affirmed by the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated about one year after
such compulsory retirement, more particularly on November 17, 2000?

"May a person be denied his retirement benefits, pensions and gratuities under the phrase
‘accessory penalty’ in an administrative hearing by the Civil Service Commission as the central
personnel agency of the government, in the absence of a criminal conviction of any crime under the
[R]evised Penal Code [or] a Special Law?"8

In the main, these are the issues: (1) whether the acts/omissions of petitioner amounted to
dishonesty; and (2) whether the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties
was properly imposed on him.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Dishonesty

Up front, petitioner questions the penalty of dismissal imposed on him, considering that he had
already reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 before the finality of the judgment. In any
event, he also questions the bases for finding him guilty of dishonesty.

The facts of this case are settled. Petitioner was the principal of QNHS. He sent a letter dated
December 9, 19939 to the regional director of the Department of Budget and Management,
requesting the reclassification of the following eight (8) items -- from Secondary School Head
Teacher III (SSHT III) to Secondary School Head Teacher VI (SSHT VI):

Department SSHT III

1. Social Studies Dept. - Rosalinda de Mesa

2. PHEM Dept. - Concepcion Alcantara

3. Science Dept. - Lourdes Rondilla

 4. English Dept. - Leonida Mascardo

5. Filipino Dept. - Portal Rivera

6. Home Economics Dept. - Lourdes Norada

7. Practical Arts Dept. - Godofredo Limbo

8. Mathematics Dept. - Angelita Paleracio

This request could not be acted upon immediately, because the new secondary school curriculum
had merged the Practical Arts Department with the Home Economics Department and created a new
Values Education Department.10 When informed of this matter, Limbo altered petitioner’s December
9, 1993 letter by, among others, crossing out "Practical Arts" and intercalating in its place "Values
Education." Such alteration resulted in the reclassification of the eight items, with Limbo issued an
appointment as "Head Teacher VI (Values Education)." Having seen the appointment
papers,11 petitioner knew of the reclassification. Yet he allowed the former to continue performing the
functions of head teacher for the Practical Arts Department. Since no one informed respondent of
the matter, she unsuspectingly continued the functions she was already performing as chairman of
the Values Education Department.

Do these facts constitute sufficient basis to find petitioner guilty of dishonesty?

Dishonesty is "[i]ntentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or

attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment
or promotion."12 In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Rilloraza,13 dishonesty was
understood to imply a "[d]isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity."

As found by the CA, it was Limbo who had made the alterations in the December 9, 1993 letter of
petitioner, who never represented him to anyone as the head teacher of the Values Education
Department. The records show that the item of Limbo was reclassified from Head Teacher III
(Practical Arts) to Head Teacher VI (Values Education), without petitioner misrepresenting the
former as the one performing the functions of head teacher of the Values Education Department.

Although Limbo was appointed as Head Teacher VI (Values Education), after his previous item had
been reclassified as such, he continued performing the functions of head teacher of the Practical
Arts Department. Hence, there was no misrepresentation of him as the head teacher of Practical
Arts (Boys).

The above circumstances, however do not totally absolve petitioner from liability. The meat of the
anguished Complaint of respondent was the concealment from her and the entire school of Limbo’s
appointment as Head Teacher VI for Values Education, while she continued performing the functions
of that position. The fact of his appointment was relevant to the performance, not only of his duties
and those of petitioner, but also of her own.

Ordinarily, no one would assume the heavy duties and responsibilities of a position without
receiving, or at least expecting to receive in the future, the corresponding compensation therefor.
Good faith demanded that petitioner should have revealed Limbo’s appointment to respondent. It
was improper for him to expect her to continue performing the functions of a values education head
teacher, when someone else had already been appointed to that position and was receiving the
corresponding salary.
Being the principal, petitioner may be faulted for having failed to act promptly to change the unfair
situation. Thus, he is administratively liable for his omission which, however, did not amount to
dishonesty, as he had made no false statement. On his part, no deliberate intent to mislead, deceive
or defraud can be read from the circumstances of this case.

As a public school principal, petitioner is bound by a high standard of work ethic. "The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713), enunciates inter alia,
the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
Section 4 of the Code commands that ‘(p)ublic officials and employees at all times respect the rights
of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest.’"14

By his omissions, petitioner failed to live up to such standard. His failure to inform respondent of
Limbo’s appointment and to promptly remedy the resulting prejudice against her may be
characterized as conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, since such conduct
affected not only her but also all the other faculty members of QNHS.

Penalty

Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service is penalized under Section 22(t) of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service
Laws by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense. Having
reached the compulsory age of retirement during the pendency of this case, petitioner is no longer in
the government service. Thus, it would be more appropriate to impose on him a fine equivalent to his
salary for six (6) months, instead of a suspension. This penalty is allowed under Section 1915 of the
same Rules.

Considering that the Court does not find petitioner guilty of dishonesty, further discussion of its
corresponding penalty of dismissal becomes moot.

With the foregoing ruling, which reduced his penalty from dismissal from service to a fine, it would no
longer be necessary to pass upon the second issue.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby partly GRANTED, and the assailed Decision MODIFIED.
Petitioner is found guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
is FINED in an amount equivalent to his salary for six (6) months, to be deducted from his retirement
benefits. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-31.

2 Id., pp. 97-111. Special Former Sixth Division, composed of JJ. Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez
(chairman and ponente), Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Eriberto U. Rosario Jr. (members).
 3 Assailed CA Decision, p. 15; rollo, p. 111.

4Penned by Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and concurred in by Chairperson Corazon

Alma G. de Leon. Commissioner Jose F. Erestain Jr. "did not participate."

5 CSC Resolution No. 992559 dated November 17, 1999, p. 10; rollo, p. 64.

6 Assailed CA Decision, pp. 1-6; rollo, pp. 97-102.

7This case was deemed submitted for decision on March 18, 2002, upon the Court’s receipt
of respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Fabiola B. Villa. Petitioner’s Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Romeo A. Dato, was received by this Court on February 15, 2002.

8
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 221.

9 CA rollo, p. 161.

In Quezon National High School, the functions of the head of the Values Education
10

Department were being performed by Complainant Lorma Gocon, Guidance Counselor III,
who had been designated as chairman of the Values Education Department.

11 Annex "B" of the Complaint; CA rollo, p. 142.

12 Aquino v. The Gen. Mgr. of the GSIS, 130 Phil. 488, 492, January 31, 1968, per Reyes, J.

13 412 Phil. 118, 133, June 25, 2001, per De Leon Jr., J.

14 Alawi v. Alauya, 268 SCRA 628, 637, February 24, 1997, per Narvasa, CJ.

15"SEC. 19. The penalty of transfer, or demotion, or fine may be imposed instead of
suspension from one month and one day to one year except in case of fine which shall not
exceed six months."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 81032 March 22, 1990

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE and SPORTS, represented by EDNA V. AZURIN,

ANASTACIO RAMENTO and HON. ONOFRE D. CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA V. NAVARRO, respondents.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

The question presented in this petition is whether or not the reassignment of Gloria Navarro as
principal from Carlos Albert High School to Manuel Roxas High School, both in Quezon City, is valid.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

On January 1, 1981, respondent Gloria V. Navarro was appointed Secondary School Principal II.
Her appointment was without reference to any particular school, and merely states —

You are hereby appointed Secondary School Principal II in the Division of City
Schools, District II, Quezon City, Ministry of Education petition and Culture, National
Capital Region, with compensation at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Six Hundred
Thirty Six Pesos (P18,636.00) per annum, effective January 1, 1981. . . .

For some years, however, her station as high school principal had been at Carlos Albert High
School.

Sometime in 1982, petitioner Edna B. Azurin in her capacity as Schools Division Superintendent of
Quezon City, effected a reshuffling of all high school principals in Quezon City in the exigencies of
the service, as all of the principals had been overstaying in one station for more than five (5) years.
As a result of said reshuffling, respondent Navarro was reassigned from Carlos Albert High School
to the Manuel Roxas High School without demotion in rank nor diminution in salary.

On August 25, 1982, however, respondent Navarro wrote a letter to petitioner herein Edna B. Azurin,
requesting for a reconsideration of her transfer or re-assignment and citing her achievements as an
administrator of Carlos Albert High School as her reason therefor.

Petitioner Azurin denied the said request explaining that respondent Navarro's new assignment was
made in the exigencies of the service and precisely in recognition of her capabilities as school
administrator, and that since respondent Navarro had already spent ten (10) years as principal in
Carlos Albert High School, she was accordingly advised to consider her new assignment as a
challenge to accomplish new and bigger projects for Manuel Roxas High School.

Despite the denial of her request for reconsideration, respondent Navarro gave notice to petitioner
Azurin that she would not comply with her new assignment allegedly because the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers states that no principal/teacher could be transferred without her consent and
that the reasons for her transfer are not plausible.

Thereupon, respondent Navarro appealed to Regional Director Anastacio C. Ramento who rendered
a Decision on October 6, 1982, holding that aforesaid transfer is proper and in accord with law as it
was done in the exigencies of the service.

Still dissatisfied with the said Decision, respondent Navarro appealed to Minister Onofre D. Corpuz,
in a letter dated October 15, 1982.

In a Resolution dated November 11, 1982, Minister Corpuz denied the said appeal, holding that the
transfer of respondent Navarro is proper and lawful since it is the prerogative of the superintendent
to reassign personnel in his division in the exigencies of the service, and considering that the
appointment of respondent Navarro does not state any specific school, her transfer could be effected
without violating the law and rule on transfer.
Inspite of said resolution, respondent Navarro refused to comply with the lawful directive of her
superior. And, without elevating the matter to the Civil Service Commission for exhaustion of
administrative remedies, said respondent immediately filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against Edna Azurin, Anastacio Ramonte and Honorable
Onofre D. Corpuz before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as
Special Civil Action No. Q-37025 and assigned to Judge Ricardo Tensuan.

On February 25, 1983, Judge Tensuan issued an Order granting the petition for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction.

On March 9, 1983, petitioner filed its Answer stating that Navarro is not entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction and her action deserved outright dismissal since she failed to exhaust
administrative remedies; that her re-assignment was being made in the exigencies of the service
and does not constitute demotion in rank and salary, hence, not in violation of R.A. 4670, otherwise
known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers; that her reassignment was in accordance
with MEC Circular No. 28, series of 1962, directing transfer or reassignment after service of more
than five (5) years in one station to avoid the teacher's becoming stale or unchallenged and to avoid
over-fraternization with associates which could be detrimental to the service.

On March 17, 1983, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration in respect of the Order dated
February 25, 1983, which motion was denied in an Order dated May 3, 1983.

Accordingly, on July 25, 1983, petitioner filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court a petition
for certiorari. This case was docketed as AC G.R. No. 01266.

After hearing and oral argument, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a Decision on
November 25, 1983 setting aside the Orders dated February 25, 1983 and May 3, 1983.

After resumption of the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-37025 before the Regional Court, petitioner thru
counsel moved for the dismissal of the complaint therein on the ground that Navarro's petition before
the Regional Trial Court had been rendered moot and academic by the Decision in AC-G.R. No.
01266, wherein it was stated that her reassignment is valid since she had not been appointed to a
specific station and that Navarro's petition states no cause of action as she failed to appeal her
reassignment to the Civil Service Commission.

After successive hearings and the filing by Navarro of an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and a
reply by petitioner, an Order dated August 27, 1986 was issued dismissing Civil Case No. Q-37025.
A Motion for Reconsideration filed by Navarro was denied in an Order dated October 17, 1986.

On appeal by Navarro (CA-G.R. SP No. 11305) the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision (penned
by Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa and concurred in by Justices Jorge Coquia and Josue Bellosillo)
declaring null and void the Orders dated August 27, 1986 which dismissed Civil Case No. Q-37025
and October 17, 1986 which had denied Navarro's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, the present recourse.

In deciding for Navarro, the Court of Appeals applied Republic Act No. 4670 known as the Magna
Carta of Public School Teachers. The provisions of the law which are relevant to this case are the
following:
 Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to
promote and improve the social and economic status of public school teachers, their
living and working conditions, their terms of employment and career prospects in
order that they may compare favorably with existing opportunities in other walks of
life, attract and retain in the teaching profession more people with the proper
qualification, it being recognized that advance in education depends on the
qualifications and ability of the teaching staff and that education is an essential factor
in the economic growth of the nation as a productive investment of vital importance.

Sec. 2. Title-Definition. — This Act shall be known as the "Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers" and shall apply to all public school teachers except those in the
professional staff of state colleges and universities.

As used in this Act, the term "teacher" shall mean all persons engaged in classroom
teaching, in any level of instruction, on full-time basis, including guidance counselors,
school librarians, industrial arts or vocational instructors, and all other persons
performing supervisory and/or administrative functions in all schools, colleges and
universities operated by the Government or its political subdivision; but shall not
include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school
employees.

Sec. 6. Consent for Transfer — Transportation Expences. — Except for cause and
as herein otherwise provided, no teacher shall be transferred without his consent
from one station to another.

Were the exigencies of the service require the transfer of a teacher from one station
to another, such transfer may be effected by the school superintendent who shall
previously notify the teacher concerned of the transfer and the reason or reasons
therefor. If the teacher believes there is no justification for the transfer, he may
appeal his case to the Director of Public Schools, or the Director of Vocational
Education, as the case may be. Pending his appeal and the decision thereon; his
transfer shall be held in abeyance: Provided, however, That no transfers whatever
shall be made three months before any local or national election.

Necessary transfer expenses of the teacher and his family shall be paid for by the
Government if his transfer is finally approved. (pp. 439-440, 128 SCRA)

Citing the case of Maderazo Jr. vs. Baylon, 128 SCRA 440, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
reassignment of Navarro is contrary to law because it is without her consent and over her opposition
and that the reason for the reassignment was not plausible.

The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof which provides
that except for cause and in the exigencies of the service no teacher shall be transferred without his
consent from one station to another, finds no application in the case at bar as this is predicated upon
the theory that the teacher concerned is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station.
Thus:

The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as the appointment indicates a
specification. Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of tenure cannot shield
her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has consistently rejected the officer's
demand to remain — even as public service dictates that a transfer be made — in a
particular station. Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is expressed in the
 following statement in Ibanez vs. Commission on Elections (1967 Phil. 257, 264, L-
26558, April 27, 1967):

That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed

feature of our Civil Service System, is not open to debate. The mantle
of its protection extends not only against removals without cause but
also against unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly enunciated,
are tantamount to removals which are within the ambit of the
fundamental guarantee. However, the availability of that security of
tenure necessarily depends, in the first instance, upon the nature of
the appointment (Hojilla vs. Marino, et al., G.R. No. L-20574,
February 26, 1965.) Such that the rule which proscribes transfers
without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated
upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed — not merely
assigned — to a particular station (Miclat V. Ganaden, et al., G.R. No.
L-14459, May 30, 1960; Jaro v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-18352,
August 30, 1963). [Brillantes v. Guevarra, supra] (pp. 123-124, Rollo)

The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As such,
she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific
school. (Bongbong vs. Parado, 57 SCRA 623) When she was assigned to the Carlos Albert High
School, it could not have been with the intention to let her stay in said school permanently.
Otherwise, her appointment would have so stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any
station or school in Quezon City as the exigencies of public service require even without her
consent. As this Court ruled in Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138, 143 —

Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicable
jurisprudence. Her refuge behind the mantle of security of tenure guaranteed by the
Constitution is not impenetrable. She proceeds upon the assumption that she
occupies her station in Sinalang Elementary School by appointment. But her first
appointment as Principal merely reads thus: "You are hereby appointed a Principal
(Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public Schools, Department of Education",
without mentioning her station. She cannot therefore claim security of tenure as
Principal of Sinalang Elementary School or any particular station. She may be
assigned to any station as exigencies of public service requires, has no right of
choice. (p. 123, Rollo)

It should be here emphasized that Azurin's letter of August 12, 1982, clearly stated that Navarro's
reassignment is in the exigencies of the service. It was explicitly mentioned that her re-assignment is
a recognition of her capabilities as administrator in improving the Carlos Albert High School and that
she should look at her new assignment as a challenge to accomplish new and bigger projects for
Manuel Roxas High School. Moreover, her reassignment was the result of a recognition/reshuffling
of all principals in the Quezon City public high schools in the exigencies of the service pursuant to
MEC Circular No. 26, Series of 1972. This circular refers to the policy of the Ministry of Education
that principals, district supervisors, academic supervisors, general education supervisors, school
administrative officers and superintendents are to be transferred upon completion of five (5) years of
service in one station. Such policy was based on the experience that when school officials have
stayed long enough in one station, there is a tendency for them to become stale and unchallenged
by new situations and conditions, and that some administrative problems accumulate for a good
number of years.
In the case at bar, the reasons given by Azurin in recommending Navarro's reassignment were far
from whimsical, capricious or arbitrary. Navarro had been assigned as principal of Carlos Albert High
School for more than ten (10) years. She was ripe for reassignment. That she was a model principal
was precisely one of the reasons for recommending her for reassignment so that her management
and expertise could be availed of in her new assignment. Apart from the presumption of good faith
that Azurin enjoys, We believe that her recommendation for Navarro's reassignment — for the latter
to share the benefits of her expertise in her new assignment plus the recognizable fact that a
relatively long stay in one's station tends towards over-fraternization with associates which could be
injurious to the service — has a substantial factual basis that meets the requirements of the
exigencies of the service.

The Maderazo ruling cited by the Court of Appeals in its Decision is not applicable in the instant
case. The case involved a district supervisor who was being transferred without the reason for such
transfer being stated. At the time of his transfer he was already 61 years old and due to retire. These
circumstances are not present in the case at bar because the reason for Navarro's reassignment
was stated and made known to her.

With the foregoing, the conclusion is thus inescapable that there can be no violation of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers in this case.

Finally, respondent Navarro has not exhausted administrative remedies as she did not elevate the
matter of her transfer to the Civil Service Commission in accordance with Section 24 (c) PD No. 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree which provides:

(C) Transfer. — A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is

equivalent in rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of
an appointment.

It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in
which case, the employees concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If
the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer he may appeal his
case to the (Civil Service) Commission. (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 125-126, Rollo)

By not appealing her case to the Civil Service Commission before filing Special Civil Action No. Q-
37025, respondent Navarro is indubitably without cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 1987 is hereby SET
ASIDE and another one rendered DISMISSING Special Civil Action No. Q-37025 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION
VICTORINA A. CRUZ, G.R. No. 154242
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., Promulgated:

in his capacity as Secretary of
Department of Budget and Management,
Respondent. October 10, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 5 April 2002 Decision[2] and
the 9 July 2002Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45635.

The Antecedent Facts

Victorina A. Cruz (petitioner) held the position of Guidance and Counseling

Coordinator III at the Valenzuela Municipal High School[4] (VMHS) in Marulas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila[5] since 1978. The position had the rank of secondary
head teacher with an annual basic salary of P26,388. The local government paid
petitioners salary.
On 1 July 1987, Executive Order No. 189[6] (EO 189) took effect. EO 189 placed all
public secondary school teachers under the administrative supervision and control
of the then Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). EO 189
transferred the payroll of public secondary school teachers from the local
government to the national government through the National Compensation and
Classification Plan (NCCP). Following the criteria and standards under the
NCCP, petitioners position was reclassified as Guidance Counselor, R-56 and her
annual salary was reduced from P26,388 to P19,244.80.

Petitioner appealed her demotion to the Civil Service Commission Merit System
Protection Board (CSC-MSPB). The CSC-MSPB referred the appeal to the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for comment.

The DBM informed the CSC-MSPB that pursuant to EO 189, petitioners item was
classified as Guidance Counselor, R-59[7] effective 1 July 1987. Consequently,
petitioners annual salary was reduced from P26,388 to P18,636. However, since
petitioner had an Equivalent Records Form (ERF) dated 7 June 1978 reflecting an
accreditation of 20 masteral units in addition to her Bachelor of Science in
Education (BSE) degree, petitioner was entitled under the NCCP to an upgraded R-
57 item with corresponding annual salary of P20,232 effective 1 July 1987.

The DBM also informed the CSC-MSPB that since petitioner had a Master of Arts
(MA) equivalent approved on 6 November 1987, she was again entitled to an
upgraded R-58 with an annual salary of P21,264 effective 6 November 1987,
adjustable to an annual salary of P23,388 pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. 406,
series of 1984, as implemented by Circular Letter No. 84-4 dated 30 May 1984. The
DBM stated that since prior to the nationalization of the position, petitioner had an
annual salary of P26,388, she should be allowed to continue receiving that amount
effective 1 July 1987 in her nationalized position as Guidance Counselor, R-58 (MA-
equivalent), with P20,232 from the national government and P6,156 from
the Caloocan City treasury. From 6 November 1987 to 31 December
1987, P21,264 would come from the national treasury and P5,125 from
the Caloocan City funds in accordance with Section 4.2 of DECS-DBM Joint
Circular No. 1 dated 1 July 1987, implementing EO 189.
On 1 July 1989, Republic Act No. 6758[8] (RA 6758) took effect.

On 19 June 1990, the CSC-MSPB rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Board renders judgment as follows:

1. The appeal of Ms. Victorina A. Cruz is granted. The reclassified

position of appellant from local to national in the VMHS, Metro
Manila should be adjusted to a range with salary rate
of P26,389 from October 1987 to December 31, 1987. The amount
of P21,264.00 per annum shall be taken and paid from the national
fund, and the balance of P5,125 shall be taken from
the Caloocan City local fund.From January 1, 1988 to October 15,
1989 the appellant shall be paid the sum of P29,029.20 per annum
on an adjustment of her range under provisions of EO 189 and
DECS-DBM Joint Circular No. 1, s. 1987. If the national fund to
which shall be paid not be authorized, the position shall be paid by
the Caloocan City local fund in accordance with the letter of DBM
to this Board dated June 5, 1989.

2. After October 15, 1989 Ms. Victorina A. Cruz shall be paid her
salary under the recent enactment (R.A. 6758) which increased the
salary per month of teacher as applied by the DECS to nationalized
teachers.

3. Ms. Cruz is entitled to receive salary differential from October 1,

19[8]7 to December 31, 1987; and from January 1, 1988 to October
15, 1989. Thereafter, she shall be entitled to the benefits of R.A.
6758 otherwise known as the Teachers Salary Standardization Law
which include the teachers. The adjustment of her range to 63 is
denied for being moot and academic.[9]

On 26 July 1990, the DECS sought clarification of the 19 June 1990 CSC-MSPB
Decision as regards petitioners position and equivalent salary grade under RA 6758.

On 31 August 1990, the CSC-MSPB issued an Order, as follows:

Based on the adjusted range, under the provisions of EO 189 and DECS-DBM Joint
Circular No. 1, s. 1987, the position of appellant Cruz has the equivalent rank of
Head Teacher II at the time of the effectivity of R.A. 6758.
 Pursuant to National Compensation Circular No. 57 dated September 30, 1989, the
position of Guidance Coordinator held by appellant was reclassified into Guidance
Services Specialist II and was assigned a salary grade 16. Such being the case, the
salary of Ms. Cruz should be based on such grade.

WHEREFORE, this Board hereby directs that after October 15, 1989,
Ms. Victorina A. Cruz shall be paid her salary corresponding to grade 16 pursuant
to R.A. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law.[10]

The Schools Division Superintendent of Caloocan City, DECS-National Capital

Region, requested for the issuance of a supplemental Position Allocation List (PAL)
of the VMHS to reflect petitioners reclassified position from Guidance Counselor
III, SG-11 to Guidance Specialist II, SG-16. On 10 May 1991, the DBM, through
then Undersecretary Salvador M. Enriquez, Jr., denied the request on the ground that
the CSC-MSPB had no jurisdiction to reclassify petitioners position.

On 3 July 1991, petitioner filed a motion for execution of the CSC-MSPBs 19 June
1990 Decision and 31 August 1990 Order. In its Order dated 18 March 1992, the
CSC-MSPB directed the DECS and the DBM to implement its Decision.

Petitioner was on sick leave from December 1992 to 4 March 1993 for
multiple myoma operation. In June 1993, petitioner discovered that the VMHS
payroll for school year 1993-1994 reflected her position as Guidance Counselor III,
SG-12. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31614, to compel the DBM Secretary to implement
the 19 June 1990 Decision of the CSC-MSPB.The Court of Appeals denied the
petition, as well as petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner went to this
Court for relief, via a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 119155,[11] raising
the issue of whether the CSC-MSPB had jurisdiction to reclassify petitioners
position and order the payment of the corresponding salary.In its Decision
promulgated on 30 January 1996, the Court ruled that the CSC-MSPB acted without
jurisdiction in reclassifying petitioners position to Guidance Services Specialist II,
SG-16. The Court ruled that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to
administer the compensation and position classification system of the national
government. Thus, the CSC-MSPB should have referred the issue to the DBM
instead of merely asking for the DBMs comment. The Court dismissed the petition,
without prejudice on the part of the petitioner to pursue her grievance with the
Department of Budget and Management through the Compensation and Position
Classification Board [CPCB].[12]

Petitioner filed before the CPCB a request for the reclassification of her position
from Guidance Counselor III, SG-12 to Guidance Coordinator III, SG-15. The
DBM, through the CPCB, denied her request on 24 September 1996. On 29 July
1997, the DBM denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Petitioner alleged that in denying
her request, the DBM failed to consider the standards prescribed by law. Petitioner
further alleged that the DBM gave due emphasis to her position title and designation
and titles and designations of the teachers under her supervision instead of their
actual functions.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 5 April 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the original PAL issued to VMHS per RA 6758 showed
petitioners position as Guidance Counselor I, SG-10 (BSE).Petitioner submitted
documents showing that she had an approved ERF as MA equivalent. Thus, in a
letter dated 28 December 1990, DECS issued a supplemental PAL reflecting the
position as Guidance Counselor III, SG-12 (MA). The Court of Appeals ruled that
to reclassify petitioners position based on actual functions regardless of the
qualifications requirement of the position would deviate from the standards
prescribed by law. The Court of Appeals ruled that in determining a class or level of
a position, the criteria to be established are (a) the duties and responsibilities of the
position, and (b) the qualification requirement of the position.

The Court of Appeals noted that on 27 October 1997, petitioner was appointed as
Master Teacher I with an equivalent salary of SG-16. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the petition was rendered academic since petitioners present position as Master
Teacher I, SG-16 is higher than Guidance Coordinator, SG-15.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 9 July 2002 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues in her memorandum:

1. Whether petitioners actual duties should determine or prevail in

reclassifying her position under EO 189.

2. Whether petitioners rank and salary were respected when her

position was reclassified from Guidance and Counseling
Coordinator to Guidance Counselor, R-56.

3. Whether petitioner is entitled to salary differentials from the time

her position was reclassified up to the present.

4. Whether petitioners claim is rendered academic by her

acceptance of the position of a Master Teacher.[13]

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Reclassification Should be Based on Official Designations

Petitioner alleges that the DBM failed to consider her actual duties and functions at
the time of the reclassification. Petitioner alleges that the DBM failed to classify
petitioners position on the mere ground that she was not supervising actual guidance
counselors but only teachers designated as guidance counselors.

We sustain the DBM. In denying the petitioners request for reclassification of her
position, the DBM declared:
 We have taken notice of your representation of exercising supervision over a
number of Guidance Counselors (eleven) in the Valenzuela National High School
(VNHS). Based on DBM and DECS standards, a position having supervision of at
least seven (7) Guidance Counselor positions may be classified as Guidance
Coordinator. If the person supervising said seven (7) positions is an M.A. or MA
Equivalent holder, the correct classification would be Guidance Coordinator III,
SG-15. It must be made clear however that the seven (7) Guidance Counselors
being supervised are not mere designation but are actually incumbents of
Guidance Counselor positions.[14](Emphasis supplied)

The standard for reclassification should be the official designations of the

incumbents instead of their actual functions. Section 2.1 of DECS-DBM Circular
No. 1 defines Public Secondary School Teachers as classroom teachers, principals,
head teachers and other personnel occupying teaching-related positions specified in
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (R.A. No. 4670) holding duly
approved and attested appointmentsin the public secondary schools under the
different local government units.[15] In this case, the teachers under petitioners
supervision, while designated as Guidance Counselors, had no official appointments
as Guidance Counselors. The DBM noted that the staffing pattern of VMHS did not
provide for other Guidance Counselor positions except the position held by
petitioner. The internal arrangement among VMHS, petitioner, and the teachers she
supervised could not be considered by the DBM as the basis for reclassifying
petitioners position.

Petitioner is not Entitled to Salary Differentials

Petitioner alleges that the reclassification of her position under EO 189 failed to
respect her rank and salary.Petitioner alleges that she should be entitled to salary
differentials from the time her position was reclassified asGuidance Counselor, R-
56 to the present.

Section 3 of EO 189 provides:

Sec. 3. Compensation. The salaries and cost of living allowances of nationalized

public secondary school teachers shall be paid in accordance with the rates
prescribed for their national counterparts; PROVIDED THAT, in case of
nationalized public secondary school teachers whose basic salaries and cost of
living allowances are in excess of those prescribed for their national
 counterparts, the excess shall continue to be paid by their respective local
governments.

Section 4.1 of DECS-DBM Circular No. 1[16] also provides:

4.1. There shall be no diminution/reduction in all existing compensation

received by public secondary school teachers as a result of their
nationalization. Neither will the existing additional benefits of public
elementary school teachers funded by local governments/local school
boards be discontinued or reduced. New additional benefits to public
school teachers may be granted in accordance with the Constitutional
mandate for the standardization of compensation of government
officials and employees as provided under Article IX(B), Sect. 5 of
the 1986 Constitution.

Clearly, pursuant to EO 189 and DECS-DBM Circular No. 1, there was no

diminution of petitioners salary despite the reclassification of her position. In
accordance with EO 189, the difference between the salary of the incumbent at the
time of the nationalization and the salary prescribed under the reclassified position
shall be paid by the local government. Hence, petitioner has no ground to claim for
salary differentials from the nationalgovernment.

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the case was
rendered academic by her acceptance of the position of a Master Teacher which has
a higher salary level than Guidance Coordinator. The Court of Appeals might have
made such statement in passing but its Decision is still based on the merits of the
case. Hence, there is no need to further discuss this issue.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 5 April 2002 Decision

and the 9 July 2002Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45635.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 20-29. Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis with Associate
Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona and Rebecca De Guia Salvador, concurring.
[3]
Id. at 31.
[4]
Also referred to by the DBM as Valenzuela National High School (VNHS).
[5]
Now Valenzuela City.
[6]
Placing All Public Secondary School Teachers Under the Administrative Supervision and Control of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and For Other Purposes.
[7]
Erroneously stated as 5-59 in the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
[8]
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
[9]
Rollo, p. 22.
[10]
Id. at 23.
[11]
Cruz v. CA, 322 Phil. 649 (1996).
[12]
Id. at 669.
[13]
Rollo, p. 103.
[14]
CA rollo, p. 14.
[15]
Emphasis supplied.
[16]
Dated 1 July 1987.

EN BANC

LEONORA B. IGNACIO, G.R. No. 163573

Petitioner,
Present:
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, TINGA,
UNDERSECRETARY RAMON C. CHICO-NAZARIO, and
BACANI, ARD-OIC DIRECTOR CANCIO, JJ.
IV PARALUMAN G. GIRON,
Respondents. Promulgated:
July 27, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Petitioner Dr. Leonora B. Ignacio was the Division Superintendent of Public Schools
in Cavite City. She went on leave from May 6 to May 17, 2002. On May 2, 2002, the
Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), through
former Undersecretary Ramon C. Bacani, issued an Order[1] reassigning her to the
Division of Schools in Puerto Princesa City effective immediately. Regional Director
Paraluman R. Giron forwarded the reassignment letter to Dr. Ignacio through a
Letter[2] dated May 6, 2002. However, on May 10, 2002, Undersecretary Bacani
issued a Memorandum[3] to Regional Director Giron directing her to hold Dr.
Ignacios reassignment in abeyance until further orders from his office. Dr. Giron
then informed Dr. Ignacio of Undersecretary Bacanis directive via a
Letter[4] dated May 13, 2002.

However, the next day, May 14, 2002, Undersecretary Bacani again wrote to
Dr. Giron, reiterating Dr. Ignacios reassignment as Superintendent of the Division
of Public Schools of Puerto Princesa City with Dr. Alma Bella O. Bautista as the
designated Schools Division Superintendent of Cavite City.[5] In a
Letter[6] dated May 21, 2002, Dr. Giron informed Dr. Ignacio of Undersecretary
Bacanis directive and enjoined her to comply therewith. Instead of complying with
the directive, however, Dr. Ignacio filed a petition for its nullification with the
Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Considering that the
petitioner was a presidential appointee, the petition was transmitted to the CSC for
resolution.

The petitioner alleged that her reassignment to Puerto Princesa City was
arbitrary, oppressive and contrary to law. Being a presidential appointee with
Career Executive Service (CES) Rank V eligibility, only the President, through the
DECS Secretary, could reappoint her, and such authority could not be delegated to
an Undersecretary. She further alleged that her reassignment was a demotion, and
as such prejudicial to her for the following reasons: (a) Cavite is a Class A province,
while Puerto Princesa City is a Class D city; (b) Puerto Princesa City is the farthest
schools division in the country, while Cavite is her home province; and (c) as Cavite
Schools Division Superintendent, she had 8,490 teachers, excluding non-teaching
personnel, under her supervision, whereas, in Puerto Princesa City, she had only
750 teachers under her.

According to the petitioner, her reassignment violated the following rules

and laws: (a) DECS Order No. 7, Series of 1994, since the National Search Committee
was not consulted on her reassignment; (b) Republic Act No. 4670,[7] considering
that she did not consent to her reassignment; and (c) the Rules of the Commission
on Elections and of the CSC banning reassignment of personnel, in connection with
the July 12, 2002 Barangay Elections. The petitioner further alleged that her
reassignment was politically motivated, as shown by the letter of Governor Ireneo
Maliksi to the officers and employees of Cavite City. She pointed out that her
replacement was facing administrative charges with the DECS and the
Ombudsman; hence, could not be issued the necessary clearance for reassignment
to Cavite.

On November 27, 2003, the CSC issued Resolution No. 031179[8] dismissing
Dr. Ignacios petition. It held that Undersecretary Bacani signed the reassignment
order for and in behalf of the DECS Secretary and is, thus, presumed to have been
authorized by the latter to issue such order. The Commission further stated that
when Rep. Act No. 4670 took effect, the positions of Schools Division
Superintendent and Assistant Schools Division Superintendent were not yet
classified as CES positions; thus, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1,
specifically on assignments, reassignments and transfers, should govern. The
Commission cited Section 6(a) of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998,
and ruled that the position of Schools Division Superintendent has CES
classification; hence, such Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) may be
reassigned or transferred from one station to another, as long as the reassignment
or transfer is made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in
rank, salary or status.

The CSC also held that the petitioners reassignment

to Puerto Princesa City was not a demotion because she retained the same position
and rank, as well as the same salary rate and allowances. Besides

The said reassignment should serve as a challenge to Dr. Ignacio to impart her
knowledge and skills to upgrade the so-called Class D Division of Puerto Princesa City to a
Class A Division. The fact that Puerto Princesa is far from her residence does not also make
 the reassignment illegal nor does it constitute constructive dismissal. Her reassignment is
regular and made in the interest of public service as determined by the Secretary taking
into account the exigencies of the service.[9]

The CSC further held that contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, the National

Search Committee and the DECS Regional Director were consulted prior to her
reassignment; however, its findings and recommendation are merely
recommendatory, and the DECS Secretary is not bound thereby. Moreover, the

reassignment was made on May 14, 2002, prior to the effectivity of the period
prohibiting the reassignment of personnel during the 2002 Barangay Election (from
May 31, 2002 to July 30, 2002).

As to the allegation that the reassignment was politically motivated

(referring to Governor Maliksis letter to the provincial government personnel), the
CSC ruled as follows:

Such statement by Governor Maliksi asking somebody to support the administration of

the newly-assigned Schools Division Superintendent in the City of Cavite under the
circumstances above described cannot be considered political interference. At most,
Governor Maliksis statement is merely an expression of approval to the DepEds program
of regularly reshuffling its managerial personnel especially those assigned in their
respective station for a considerable period of time, such as Ignacio.[10]

The petitioner received a copy of the CSC Resolution on December 5, 2003, and had
until December 20, 2003within which to file a petition for review thereof in the
Court of Appeals (CA). She failed to file her petition. Instead, on February 2, 2004,
the petitioner filed before the appellate court a motion for extension of time of
fifteen days to file a petition for certiorari, which the latter granted, conditioned on
the timeliness of the petition.

On February 10, 2004, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the CSC resolution and
reiterating therein the same grounds and arguments she raised in her appeal to
the CSC.

In a Resolution issued on March 15, 2004, the appellate court dismissed the
petition, on its finding that the petitioners remedy was to file a petition for review
under Rule 43, and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;
in any event, the petition cannot be considered as a petition for review, having been
filed beyond the 15-day period therefor.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Resolution,

contending that the CSCcommitted a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction, since the proper remedy in the instant case was a
petition for certiorari and not merely a petition for review. The CA denied her
motion.

This prompted the petitioner to file the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, raising the same issues and restating her complaint
before the CSC, as well as in her petition with the appellate court.

In its comment on the petition, the CSC, through the OSG, asserts that the
assailed Resolution was in accord with law, and that under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, the said resolution had become final and executory. The OSG maintains that
since the petitioner had been dropped from the rolls for having been absent without
leave effective February 1, 2003 and that the President had appointed Veranda S.
Atienza as the petitioners replacement, the instant petition had been rendered moot
and academic.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

First. The assailed Resolution of the CA is correct. The remedy of an

aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review
thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the
resolution.[11] Such failure to appeal in accordance with the Rules of Court rendered
the assailed CSC resolution final and executory.

Second. Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, provides that an appeal to
the CA does not stay the assailed resolution.[12]

Third. The petition has become moot and academic, since the petitioner was
dropped from the rolls, and her replacement already appointed.

Fourth. In any event, even an examination of the merits of the petition

constrains the Court to conclude that it is destined to fail.

The petitioner was a member of the CES with a rank of CESO V; as such,
her security of tenure pertains only to her rank and not to her office or her position.
The security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first
and second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to
the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a CESO may be
transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank
which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers
no diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade,
as the compensation is according to CES rank and not on the basis of the position
or office occupied.[13]

In the leading case of Cuevas v. Bacal,[14] the Court ruled that a CESO may be
reassigned or transferred from one position to another, in the interest of the
service; such an assignment, however, shall not result in reduction in rank or
compensation. In that case, the controversy centered on the title of Chief Public
Attorney in the Public Attorneys Office, which requires a CES Rank Level 1. The
claimant, respondent Atty. Josefina Bacal, who possessed a CESO III rank, was
appointed as such in February 1998 by then President Fidel V. Ramos. In July 1998,
she was transferred and appointed Regional Director. President Joseph E. Estrada
designated in her stead Atty. Carina J.

Demaisip as Chief Public Defender. Since Demaisip was not CES eligible, Bacal filed
a quo warranto suit before the CA, questioning the appointment. The CA rendered
judgment in Bacals favor which, however, this Court reversed.

While the instant case is not on all fours with Cuevas, the rationale behind
the said decision is applicable, thus:

Within the Career Executive Service, personnel can be shifted from one office or
position to another without violation of their right to security of tenure because their
status and salaries are based on their ranks and not on their jobs. To understand this, it
is necessary to consider the reason for the creation of the Career Executive Service.

R.A. No. 5435, as amended by R.A. Nos. 6076, 6172, and 6175, created a
commission charged with the specific function of reorganizing the government to
promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency in its operations. The result was the
preparation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was adopted and declared part
of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1 on September 24, 1972. A major feature of the
Integrated Reorganization Plan was the creation of the Career Executive Service whose
justification was explained by the Commission on Reorganization, thus:
 The present Civil Service system is not geared to meet the
executive manpower needs of the government. The filling of higher
administrative positions is often based on considerations other than
merit and demonstrated competence. The area of promotion is currently
confined to the person or persons next-in-rank in the agency. Moreover,
personnel classification and compensation are uniformly based on
concepts and procedures which are suited to positions in the lower levels
but not to managerial posts in the higher levels. To fill this crucial gap, it
is recommended that a Career Executive Service be established. This
group of senior administrators shall be carefully selected on the basis of
high qualifications and competence. Skilled in both techniques and
processes of management, these career executives will act as catalysts
for administrative efficiency and as agents of administrative innovation.

The status and salary of the career executives will be based on

their rank, and not on the job that they occupy at any given time . . . In
this sense, the rank status of the Career Executive Service is similar to that
of the commissioned officers in the Armed Forces or members of the
Foreign Service. Unlike these latter organizations, however, entrance to
the Career Executive Service will not be generally at an early age in a
relatively junior level but at a senior management level.

The rank classification in the Service will allow for mobility or

flexibility of assignments such that the government could utilize the
services or special talents of these career executives wherever they are
most needed or will likely create the greatest impact. This feature is
especially relevant in a developing country which cannot afford to have
its scarce executive manpower pegged to particular positions.

Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, the better to cope with
the exigencies of public service, is thus the distinguishing feature of the Career
Executive Service. To attain this objective, the Integrated Reorganization Plan provides:

e. Assignments, Reassignments and Transferees ...

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, members

of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from
one position to another and from one department, bureau or office to
another; provided that such reassignment or transfer is made in the
 interest of public service and involves no reduction in rank or salary;
provided, further, that no member shall be reassigned or transferred
oftener than every two years; and provided, furthermore, that if the
officer concerned believes that his reassignment or transfer is not
justified, he may appeal his case to the President.

The implementing rules and regulations of the CES Board provide:

Salary of Career Executive Service Officers. A CESO is

compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the CES
position he occupies. However, if a CESO is assigned to a CES position
with a higher salary grade than that of his CES rank, he is allowed to
receive the salary of the CES position.

Should he be assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a

lower salary grade, he shall continue to be paid the salary attached to his
CES rank.

Petitioners are, therefore, right in arguing that respondent, as a CESO,

can be reassigned from one CES position to another and from one department,
bureau or office to another. Further, respondent, as a CESO, can even be
assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade. In the
instant case, respondent, who holds a CES Rank III, was correctly and
properly appointed by the appointing authority to the position of Regional
Director, a position which has a corresponding CES Rank Level III.[15]

This doctrine was re-echoed in General v. Roco,[16] where this Court ruled as
follows:
Moreover, under the mobility and flexibility principles of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan, CES personnel may be reassigned or transferred from one position
to another, thus:

6. Assignments, Reassignments and Transferees ...

 Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or
transferred from one position to another and from one department,
bureau or office to another; provided that such reassignment or
transfer is made in the interest of public service and involves no
reduction in rank or salary; provided, further, that no member shall
be reassigned or transferred oftener than every two years; and
provided, furthermore, that if the officer concerned believes that his
reassignment or transfer is not justified he may appeal his case to
the President.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81957, dated March 15,
2004 and May 14, 2004, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
[1]
CA Rollo, p. 39.
[2]
Id. at 40.
[3]
Id. at 41.
[4]
Id. at 42.
[5]
Id. at 43.
[6]
Id. at 38.
[7]
Otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which provides that no teacher shall be
transferred without his consent from one station to another.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 42-52.
[9]
CA Rollo, p. 35.
[10]
CA Rollo, p. 33.
[11]
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and
from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

SECTION 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or
of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law
of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
[12]
SECTION 12. Effect of Appeal. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to
be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.
[13]
General v. Roco, G.R. Nos. 143366 and 143524, 29 January 200 1, 350 SCRA 528.
[14]
G.R. No. 139382, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 338.
[15]
Emphasis supplied.
[16]
Supra.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148445. February 16, 2004]

ABELARDO V. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. LORMA F.
GOCON, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

For his failure to observe and promote a high standard of ethics, petitioner may be
held liable for violation of the Ethical Standards Law and administratively sanctioned
therefor.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the November 17, 2000 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 57369. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. We affirm the Resolutions
of the Civil Service Commission. Costs against petitioners.[3]

The Civil Service Commission Resolution,[4] upheld by the CA, had disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, Abelardo V. Sevilla and Godofredo M. Limbo are hereby found

guilty of Dishonesty. Accordingly, they are meted out the penalty of dismissal from
the service with all its accessory penalties.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman for whatever
criminal action it may take under the premises.[5]

The Facts

The CA summarized the facts in this manner:

The present controversy has its origin in the complaint filed by Lorma F. Gocon on
October 14, 1997 with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) charging Abelardo V.
Sevilla and Godofredo M. Limbo of falsification of official document, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Limbo filed his Comments on the complaint on November 17, 1997. Sevilla filed his
Answer on December 4, 1997.
The facts as found by the CSC are as follows:

As appearing from the records, Gocon, Guidance Counselor III, was designated as
Chairman of the Values Education Department in 1989. On the other hand, Limbo
was a former Head Teacher III in the Practical Arts Department [of the Quezon
National High School in Lucena City].

Records reveal that Respondent Sevilla, in a letter dated December 9, 1993 to the
Regional Director, Department of Budget and Management, requested for the
reclassification of eight (8) items of Secondary Head Teacher III to Secondary Head
Teacher VI. Apparently, said request contains super impositions/erasures, specifically
item 7, wherein the Practical Arts Department was replaced to Values Department
with Godofredo Limbo as the alleged Secondary Head Teacher (Head Teacher III)
thereof with 28 teachers under his supervision when in truth he was the Head Teacher
of the Practical Arts Department which was later merged with the Home Economics
Department. By virtue of this representation, Limbo was issued an appointment as
Head Teacher VI for Values Education on November 16, 1994.

On October 25, 1996, Respondent Sevilla, in his capacity as Principal IV, requested
the Office of the Regional Director, DECS Region IV, for the upgrading of Gocons
position of Guidance Counselor III to Head Teacher VI for Values Education. In said
request, Sevilla represented as follows:

This request is being made so that the Values Education Department of Quezon
National High School will have its own Head Teacher. This Department has been
supervised for almost eight (8) years since the implementation of the New Secondary
Education Curriculum by the incumbent Chairman. In this connection, the
undersigned would like to strongly recommend that Values Education Department be
given a regular Head Teacher Position for the following reasons:

xxxxxxxxx

On March 25, 1997, Assistant Secretary Josefina Nisperos of the Department of

Education, Culture and Sports denied the aforesaid request.

Sometime in May, 1997, Gocon discovered that Limbo was appointed as Head
Teacher VI for Values Education on November 16, 1994. When asked about said
appointment, Sevilla explained to Gocon that Limbo was temporarily designated as
Head Teacher for Values Education so that all Head Teacher items would be
reclassified by DECS Regional Office IV.
Dissatisfied with the explanation of Sevilla, Gocon filed a complaint and requested
the intercession of the then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria regarding the matter.

In a letter dated June 20, 1997 to the Regional Director, DECS Region IV, Sevilla
explained as follows:

Mr. Godofredo Limbo the Vocational Dept. Head III was one of those Head Teacher
III whose item was upgraded to Head Teacher VI in 1994. The undersigned acceded
to the suggestion of Mr. Leovigildo Arellano, Chief, Management Division, DECS to
temporarily designate Mr. Limbos item as Values item for purposes of upgrading the
item or else the upgrading of all the Head Teacher III item to Head Teacher VI could
not be favorably acted upon and approved.

However, in a First Indorsement dated July 15, 1997 to the Director IV, DECS Region
IV, Leovigildo Arellano, Chief, Management Division, DECS claimed among others,
as follows:

I strongly deny the allegation of Mr. Sevilla that I suggested to him to temporarily
designate Mr. Limbos appointment item as Values item I do not know personally Mr.
Sevilla, hence, I have no reason to make such suggestion to him knowing that such act
is a clear falsification of public documents. And I do not remember having met him.

In their Memorandum, Limbo acknowledged that he was the one who made
alterations in the December 9, 1993 request for reclassification. He stressed, however,
that he initialed all the corrections he made to show that he was in good faith in doing
so and that he acted upon the suggestion of Monina Belen, as staff of Leovigildo
Arellano at the DECS Management Division.

In her complaint with the CSC, complainant imputes upon Sevilla: 1) the act of
misrepresentation amounting to dishonesty and falsification of official document for
representing to the DECS in the letter dated December 9, 1993 that Limbo was Head
Teacher III for the Values Education Department and was supervising 28 Values
Education teachers when in fact he was appointed Head Teacher for Practical Arts
(Boys) and was performing the function of such position; 2) grave misconduct for
allowing Limbo to use the item for Head Teacher VI and claiming that he acceded to
the suggestion of Mr. Arellano for the temporary use of the said item who denied
having done so; and 3) conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service
for concealing Limbos appointment deceiving complainant into thinking that she was
being recommended for Head Teacher VI and causing resentment to faculty members
of QNHS; and upon Limbo the act of dishonesty and grave misconduct for conniving
with Sevilla in representing himself as Head Teacher for Values Education and
knowingly and deliberately accepting his appointment as Head Teacher VI knowing
that he was not qualified for the position and for allowing complainant to continue
acting as Chairman of the Values Education Department despite his appointment.

Complainant likewise filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon for violation of the Anti-Graft Law and Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
for falsification of official documents. Criminal Case No. 98-757 for falsification of
official documents was filed against Sevilla and Limbo with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 53, Lucena City which however dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on
October 20, 1999.

In the CSC case, respondents Sevilla and Limbo were formally charged on February
11, 1998 by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV of falsification of
official documents, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.

Hearings were conducted and the parties presented their respective evidence.
Thereafter, complainant and respondents filed their respective memoranda on
December 16, 1998 and December 15, 1998.

Meanwhile, in his letter to Gocon dated May 12, 1998, Sevilla relieved Gocon as
Chairman of the Values Education Department.

On November 17, 1999, the CSC issued Resolution No. 992559, to wit:

WHEREFORE, Abelardo V. Sevilla and Godofredo M. Limbo are hereby found

guilty of Dishonesty. Accordingly, they are meted out the penalty of dismissal from
the service with all its accessory penalties.

concluding that Sevillas knowledge of the alterations in the December 9, 1993 request
for reclassification of eight (8) Head Teacher III positions to Head Teacher VI can be
inferred from his letter dated June 20, 1997 and hence, Sevilla made a
misrepresentation of fact in his letter dated October 25, 1996 when he requested for
the upgrading of complainants position to Head Teacher VI. [6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA found that Godofredo Limbo himself had made the alterations in the letter-
request dated December 9, 1993, specifying that he was Head Teacher III of the Values
Department. It also found that petitioner had agreed to the idea of letting x x x Limbo use
the item for values education in order to facilitate the approval of the upgrading of Head
Teacher III items to Head Teacher VI. Petitioner Sevilla allowed x x x Limbo to
misrepresent himself to be qualified to head the Values Department. Hence, the appellate
court faulted petitioner for having committed an act of dishonesty.
The CA also found that the appointment of Limbo as Head Teacher VI for values
education had been concealed by him and petitioner from respondent and the rest of the
Quezon National High School (QNHS) faculty members. It thus ruled that [n]o logical
conclusion can be deduced from the above circumstances other than that they were part
of the dishonesty committed by [petitioner].
Hence, this Petition.[7]

Issues

In his appeal, petitioner raises the following issues:

May Petitioner Abelardo V. Sevilla who reached the compulsory age of retirement on
December 31, 1999 be legally deprived of his retirement benefits, pensions and
gratuities as a consequence of the CSC Resolution, affirmed by the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated about one year after such compulsory retirement, more
particularly on November 17, 2000?

May a person be denied his retirement benefits, pensions and gratuities under the
phrase accessory penalty in an administrative hearing by the Civil Service
Commission as the central personnel agency of the government, in the absence of a
criminal conviction of any crime under the [R]evised Penal Code [or] a Special Law? [8]

In the main, these are the issues: (1) whether the acts/omissions of petitioner
amounted to dishonesty; and (2) whether the penalty of dismissal from the service with
all its accessory penalties was properly imposed on him.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Dishonesty

Up front, petitioner questions the penalty of dismissal imposed on him, considering

that he had already reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 before the finality of the
judgment. In any event, he also questions the bases for finding him guilty of dishonesty.
 The facts of this case are settled. Petitioner was the principal of QNHS. He sent a
letter dated December 9, 1993[9]to the regional director of the Department of Budget and
Management, requesting the reclassification of the following eight (8) items -- from
Secondary School Head Teacher III (SSHT III) to Secondary School Head Teacher VI
(SSHT VI):

Department SSHT III

1. Social Studies Dept. - Rosalinda de Mesa

2. PHEM Dept. - Concepcion Alcantara

3. Science Dept. - Lourdes Rondilla

4. English Dept. - Leonida Mascardo

5. Filipino Dept. - Portal Rivera

6. Home Economics Dept. - Lourdes Norada

7. Practical Arts Dept. - Godofredo Limbo

8. Mathematics Dept. - Angelita Paleracio

This request could not be acted upon immediately, because the new secondary
school curriculum had merged the Practical Arts Department with the Home Economics
Department and created a new Values Education Department. [10]When informed of this
matter, Limbo altered petitioners December 9, 1993 letter by, among others, crossing out
Practical Arts and intercalating in its place Values Education. Such alteration resulted in
the reclassification of the eight items, with Limbo issued an appointment as Head Teacher
VI (Values Education). Having seen the appointment papers,[11] petitioner knew of the
reclassification. Yet he allowed the former to continue performing the functions of head
teacher for the Practical Arts Department. Since no one informed respondent of the
matter, she unsuspectingly continued the functions she was already performing as
chairman of the Values Education Department.
Do these facts constitute sufficient basis to find petitioner guilty of dishonesty?
Dishonesty is [i]ntentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or
practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination,
registration, appointment or promotion.[12] In Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation v. Rilloraza,[13] dishonesty was understood to imply a [d]isposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity.
As found by the CA, it was Limbo who had made the alterations in the December 9,
1993 letter of petitioner, who never represented him to anyone as the head teacher of the
Values Education Department. The records show that the item of Limbo was reclassified
from Head Teacher III (Practical Arts) to Head Teacher VI (Values Education), without
petitioner misrepresenting the former as the one performing the functions of head teacher
of the Values Education Department.
Although Limbo was appointed as Head Teacher VI (Values Education), after his
previous item had been reclassified as such, he continued performing the functions of
head teacher of the Practical Arts Department. Hence, there was no misrepresentation of
him as the head teacher of Practical Arts (Boys).
The above circumstances, however do not totally absolve petitioner from liability. The
meat of the anguished Complaint of respondent was the concealment from her and the
entire school of Limbos appointment as Head Teacher VI for Values Education, while she
continued performing the functions of that position. The fact of his appointment was
relevant to the performance, not only of his duties and those of petitioner, but also of her
own.
Ordinarily, no one would assume the heavy duties and responsibilities of a position
without receiving, or at least expecting to receive in the future, the corresponding
compensation therefor. Good faith demanded that petitioner should have revealed
Limbos appointment to respondent. It was improper for him to expect her to continue
performing the functions of a values education head teacher, when someone else had
already been appointed to that position and was receiving the corresponding salary.
Being the principal, petitioner may be faulted for having failed to act promptly to
change the unfair situation. Thus, he is administratively liable for his omission which,
however, did not amount to dishonesty, as he had made no false statement. On his part,
no deliberate intent to mislead, deceive or defraud can be read from the circumstances
of this case.
As a public school principal, petitioner is bound by a high standard of work ethic. The
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713),
enunciates inter alia, the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that (p)ublic officials
and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest.[14]
By his omissions, petitioner failed to live up to such standard. His failure to inform
respondent of Limbos appointment and to promptly remedy the resulting prejudice against
her may be characterized as conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
since such conduct affected not only her but also all the other faculty members of QNHS.

Penalty

Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service is penalized under
Section 22(t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and
Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year for the first offense. Having reached the compulsory age of retirement during
the pendency of this case, petitioner is no longer in the government service. Thus, it would
be more appropriate to impose on him a fine equivalent to his salary for six (6) months,
instead of a suspension. This penalty is allowed under Section 19[15] of the same Rules.
Considering that the Court does not find petitioner guilty of dishonesty, further
discussion of its corresponding penalty of dismissal becomes moot.
With the foregoing ruling, which reduced his penalty from dismissal from service to a
fine, it would no longer be necessary to pass upon the second issue.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby partly GRANTED, and the assailed
Decision MODIFIED. Petitioner is found guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and is FINED in an amount equivalent to his salary for six (6)
months, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. No pronoucement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-31.
[2]
Id., pp. 97-111. Special Former Sixth Division, composed of JJ. Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (chairman
and ponente), Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Eriberto U. Rosario Jr. (members).
[3]
Assailed CA Decision, p. 15; rollo, p. 111.
[4]
Penned by Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and concurred in by Chairperson Corazon Alma G. de
Leon. Commissioner Jose F. Erestain Jr. did not participate.
[5]
CSC Resolution No. 992559 dated November 17, 1999, p. 10; rollo, p. 64.
[6]
Assailed CA Decision, pp. 1-6; rollo, pp. 97-102.
[7]
This case was deemed submitted for decision on March 18, 2002, upon the Courts receipt of respondents
Memorandum, signed by Atty. Fabiola B. Villa. Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Romeo
A. Dato, was received by this Court on February 15, 2002.
[8]
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 221.
[9]
CA rollo, p. 161.
[10]
In Quezon National High School, the functions of the head of the Values Education Department were
being performed by Complainant Lorma Gocon, Guidance Counselor III, who had been designated
as chairman of the Values Education Department.
[11]
Annex B of the Complaint; CA rollo, p. 142.
[12]
Aquino v. The Gen. Mgr. of the GSIS, 130 Phil. 488, 492, January 31, 1968, per Reyes, J.
[13]
412 Phil. 118, 133, June 25, 2001, per De Leon Jr., J.
[14]
Alawi v. Alauya, 268 SCRA 628, 637, February 24, 1997, per Narvasa, CJ.
[15]
SEC. 19. The penalty of transfer, or demotion, or fine may be imposed instead of suspension from one
month and one day to one year except in case of fine which shall not exceed six months.
 DO 45, S. 2004 – APPOINTMENT OF PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS IN PUBLIC
SECONDARY SCHOOLS

July 22, 2004

DO 45, s. 2004
Appointment of Principals and Teachers in Public Secondary Schools

To: Undersecretaries
Assistant Secretaries
Bureau Directors
Regional Directors
Schools Division/City Superintendents
Heads, Public Secondary Schools

1. In order to improve the quality of education in the Public School System and to
address the imbalance resulting from excess/shortages of teachers in a particular
locality, appointments made by Schools Division Superintendents to fill up
principal and teacher items created in SY 2004-2005 for the secondary schools
shall only reflect the name of the division office where the appointee concerned
shall be deployed. A Special Order shall likewise be issued to the appointee
specifying his/her school assignment.
1.1 Enclosed herewith are the sample forms containing the particulars and/or
information that shall be reflected therein: (a) appointment paper; and (b)
assignment order.
2. In the allocation/assignment of teacher items, the Schools Division
Superintendent shall be guided by the following:
2.1 Teacher Deployment Analysis pursuant to DepED Order No. 50, s. 2003
(Adoptive Measures in Filling Up Vacant Teaching Positions); and
2.2 Pertinent provisions of DepED Order No. 1, s. 2004 (Revised Guidelines on
the Recruitment and Appointment or Assignment of Public School Teachers
Including the Establishment of a Pooling Scheme) which was issued in relation to
R.A. No. 8190 otherwise known as “Localization Law”.
3. The number of items of principals and teachers allocated per Unnumbered
Memorandum dated April 28, 2004 relative to the allocation of New Teaching and
Non-Teaching Positions for SY 2004-2005 shall be strictly followed.
4. In case subsequent vacancies shall occur relative to existing principal, teaching
and non-teaching items allocated to the different secondary schools within a
division office, appointment to fill up such vacancies shall be made by the
Superintendent concerned in such a way that the appointment paper shall only
bear the name of the division office where the appointee shall be deployed. For
the purpose of assigning the appointee to a school, a Special Order shall be
issued by the Schools Division Superintendent concerned specifying the school
where he/she (appointee) shall be assigned.
5. A report of assignment and/or reassignment shall be regularly submitted
(quarterly basis) to the DBM Regional Office, copy furnished DepED Regional
Office for its reference in the subsequent release of allotment and NCA. Such
 report may also be used as a basis for adjustment to be made by DBM on its
records relative to this matter (teachers deployment, re-deployment and
assignment).
6. Immediate dissemination of and strict compliance with this Order is directed.

Encls.: As stated
References: DepED Orders: (Nos. 50, s. 2003 and 1, s. 2004)
Allotment: 1—(D. O. 50-97)

To be indicated in the Perpetual Index under the following subjects:

APPOINTMENT, EMPLOYMENT, REAPPOINTMENT
OFFICIALS
POLICY
TEACHERS

DO_s2004_045