1. G.R. No. 116123. March 13, 1997
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,
NAGUIAT v NLRC
FACTS: Clark field taxi, Inc., (CFTI)a family-owned corporation of Sergio Naguiat and
AntolinNaguiat, the president and vice-president, respectively, held a concessionaire's
contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) for the operation of taxi
services within Clark Air Base. Private respondents were previously employed by CFTI as
taxicab drivers. Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, the AAFES
was dissolved, and the services of private respondents were officially terminated. During
negotiations, it was agreed that the separated drivers will be given P500.00 for every year of
service as severance pay. However, private respondents refused to accept it.
Private respondents, through the National Organization of Workingmen (NOWM), a labor
organization which they subsequently joined, filed a complaint against petitioners for
payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out.They alleged that they were hired
by CFTI and then assigned to Naguiat Enterprises which managed, controlled, and
supervised their employment. CFTI’s defense that the cessation of business was due to
financial losses and lost business opportunity.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering CFTI to pay respondents
P1,200/year of service for humanitarian consideration. NLRC affirmed LA’s decision with
modification by granting separation pay $120/year of service, and held that Naguiat
Enterprises, Sergio Naguiat and AntolinNaguiat, President and Vice-President, respectively,
should be jointly and severally liable.
ISSUE: WhetherNaguiat Enterprises, S. Naguiat and A. Naguiat, President and Vice-
President of CFTI, respectively, is jointly and severally liable.
RULING: No. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable. The Court ruled that respondents were
employees of CFTI as they received salary from said office. Naguiat Enterprises is a
separate corporation completely (trading business); it is neither respondents’ indirect
employer nor labor-only contractor.
However, the Court found that the corporate president shall be held solidarily liable.Naguiat
Enterprises and CFTI were closed corporation owned by Naguiat Family. Under the
Corporation Code, stockholders actively engaged in the management or operation of the
business and affairs of a close corporation are personally liable for corporate torts unless
the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance.
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corporate tort." Essentially, "tort"
consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply
stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer
to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses. CFTI
failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its stockholder who
was actively engaged in the management or operation of the business should be held
personally liable.
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively managed the
business. Thus, applying the ruling in A. C. Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an
"employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and severally liable
for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
2 LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs.
respondent. G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007
FACTS: On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654, which took effect
on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and "More"
were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%.
However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC
37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected
"Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to
Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed
at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall
not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack." On July 2, BIR Deputy Commissioner sent
via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in
particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox
copy of RMC 37-93. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of
RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem
tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 and demanded payment within 10 days from
receipt thereof. Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals which
issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision, the CTA
ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner
from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This
ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court. It was held, among
others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative
issuance. Respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in
her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93
violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law
and the right to equal protection of the laws. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending
that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in
the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed
that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one
responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of
malice or bad faith.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner may be held liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 32. Any public officer or employee,
or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages: x xxx (6) The right against deprivation of property without
due process of law; x xxx (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws.
Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act
which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or
reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined
by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances
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under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason
sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer,
and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good
motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is
otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the
fact that defendant acted without evil intent. The clear intention therefore of the legislature
was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional
rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.
3. Garcia v. Salvador G.R.No.168512
Facts: As a prerequisite in being hired for an accounting job, Ranida Salvador took an HBs
Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC) run by
Garcia. The result indicated that she was positive for hepatitis thus it resulted to her not
being hired. After knowing this, her father suffered a heart attack and was taken to the
Bataan Doctors Hospital. While there, Ranida took another of the same exam which later
indicated that she is negative of Hepa B. Several tests ensued proving that indeed she
doesn’t have Hepatitis. She was later rehired. Now, the respondent comes to court and asks
the said Diagnostic center to pay for the damages caused by their negligence in giving the
correct result of the examination.
Issue: Whether or not the Community Diagnostic Center is liable for damages.
Ruling: Yes. Violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a
person the duty to do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to
whoever may be injured thereby.
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of
negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action
caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence. Thus, the elements of an
actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation.
All the elements are present in the case at bar. Owners and operators of clinical laboratories
have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and regulations (Section 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical Laboratory Law), purposely
promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by preventing the operation of
substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by
improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is
impressed with public interest, as such; high standards of performance are expected from
them.
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
4. LUCAS vs. TUAÑO
G.R. 178763 (April 21, 2009)CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
A. Legal Issue
Whether or not the respondent, Dr. Prospero Ma. C. Tuaño, is guilty of medical malpractice.
B. Legal Facts
On 2 September 1988, complaining of a red right eye and swollen eyelid, Peter made use of
his health care insurance issued by Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. (Philamcare), for a
possible consult. The Philamcare Coordinator, Dr. Edwin Oca, M.D., referred Peter to
respondent, Dr. Prospero Ma. C. Tuaño, M.D. (Dr. Tuaño), an ophthalmologist at St. Luke’s
Medical Center, for an eye consult.
The petitioners, Peter Lucas and his family, is suing respondent, Dr. Prospero Ma. C.
Tuaño, for damages due to medical malpractice on the grounds that Tuaño was negligent in
treating Lucas’ conjunctivitis or “sore eyes” which led to glaucoma which in turn made him
irritable and unable to support his family. Lucas consulted Tuaño when he had severe pain
in his right eye to which the respondent performed an ocular routine examination where he
diagnosed Lucas to be suffering conjunctivitis or “sore eyes” which developed Epidemic
Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection to which Tuaño prescribed a steroid-based eye
drop called Maxitrol which Lucas was using before. Lucas couldn’t get a hold of Maxitrol so
Tuaño suggested Blephamide instead which was also steroid-based and Lucas later used
Maxitrol when it became available. Later on, Fatima Lucas, the wife, found out from the
accompanying literature of the medicine that prolonged use of steroid-based medication can
result to glaucoma. Lucas’s right eye pain reduced for a while but later on returned and it
became severe that Tuaño referred him to another ophthalmologist, Dr. Manuel B. Agulto,
for a second opinion to which Dr. ManielAgulto wrote a letter to Tuaño stating the Lucas
sustained significant glaucoma damage.
The Regional Trial Court denied the petitioners’ claim for damages due to insufficient
evidence proving Tuaño’s medical malpractice in treating Lucas because they failed to
present a medical expert that could support their claim that what Tuaño did was indeed
medical malpractice. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals to which the court
affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s decision. Hence, the petitioners appealed to the
Supreme Court.
C. Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent, Dr. Prospero Ma. C. Tuaño, is not guilty of
medical malpractice.
D. Reasoning
“[t]he onus probandi was on the patient to establish before the trial court that the physicians
ignored standard medical procedure, prescribed and administered medication with
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recklessness and exhibited an absence of the competence and skills expected of general
practitioners similarly situated.”
The Supreme Court emphasizes that in order for medical malpractice to be proven, a
medical expert should be a witness to attest to the accused’s medical malpractice.
Petitioners’ complaint for damages is merely based on a statement in the literature of
Maxitrol identifying the risks of its use and Dr. Agulto’s comment. The medical expert sets a
standard and when there is failure to present one, the courts have no standard by which to
gauge the basic issue of breach thereof by the physician or surgeon.
In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-
patient relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding for
damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate
causation, must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in
order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
E. Policy
The qualifications of a physician are taken into account and there is inevitable presumption
that he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in
attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. Therefore, a medical
expert as a witness in essential in medical malpractice cases to give light to the errors of the
accused. Also, it serves as a reminder for people in the medical field to be cautious and
take the necessary precautions when attending to their clients to avoid medical malpractice.
5. Ocean Builders vs Spouses CubaCub
Facts:Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner
company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City. Bladimir was
afflicted with chicken pox. Thus, he was advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the
company’s general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the company’s
“barracks” where he lives free of charge.
Three days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the company
premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, Hao gave
Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga, a co-worker, to bring Bladimir to the nearest
hospital.
Bladimir was brought to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-
care hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the company. He was then
confined and was not permitted to leave the hospital. He was then transferred to the
Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) by his parents where he was placed in the intensive
care unit and died the following day.
The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir’s immediate cause of death as
cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the
death certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple
organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox.
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
Bladimir’s parents filed before the RTC complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging
that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimir’s condition
leading to his death. The court dismissed the complaint and ruled that Hao was not
negligent.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that Hao’s failure to
bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital constituted a violation of Article 161 of the Labor
Code. Thus, making them liable for damages.
Issue: Whether or not Hao exercises due diligence as the law requires exempting him from
being liable for damages.(culpa aquiliana).
Holding:
Yes, he exercised due diligence.
To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, (1)
duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The assailed decision of the appellate
court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the
employees under the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed.
The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase “adequate and
immediate” medical attendance means in relation to an “emergency.” It would thus appear
that the determination of what it means is left to the employer, except when a full-time
registered nurse or physician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor Code.
The Court determined that the actions taken by petitioners when Bladimir became ill, to take
a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital, amounted to the
“necessary assistance” to ensure “adequate and immediate medical attendance” to Bladimir
as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, to provide to a sick employee in an
emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may
not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with
better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate court’s ruling.
Moreover, under article 1174,2178, 2179 of the civil code the alleged negligence of Hao
cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is
that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage
is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in
the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually
causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a
reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Thus, the petitioners are not guilty
of negligence.
Therefore, the petition is granted and the Decision of the CA is reversed.
6.BARREDO v. GARCIA
FACTS: A collision occurred between a taxi driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela
guided by Pedro Dimapilis. Faustino Garcia, the passenger of carretela suffered from
injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla and
he was convicted. The trial court granted the reservation to bring a separate civil action. The
appellate court affirmed the sentence.
Page 3
The spouses Garcia, Faustino’s parents, brought an action in the trial court against Barredo
as employer. The trial court awarded the damages. The appellate court found Barredo liable
for damages for the death of Faustino caused by the negligence of Fontanilla. The main
theory of the defense was that the liability of Barredo was governed by the Revised Penal
Code and thus, his liability was only subsidiary. It argued that there has been no civil action
against Fontanilla, Barredo cannot be held liable.
ISSUE: whether the parents of the deceased may bring a separate civil action against the
employer of the taxi driver, making him primarily and directly responsible under Article 1903
RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that a quasi-delict is “a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.”
Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code of the
Philippines is entirely distinct and independent from a delict or crime under the Revised
Penal Code. In this jurisdiction, the same negligent act causing damage may produce civil
liability (subsidiary) arising from a crime under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines; or create an action for quasi-delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2179 and
2180 of the Civil Code and the parties are free to choose which course to take. And in the
instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of Barredo: First, a
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of Fontanilla arising from the latter’scriminal
negligence under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, and second, Barredo’s primary
and direct responsibility arising from his presumed negligence as an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Since the plaintiffs are free to choose what remedy to take, they
preferred the second, which is within their rights. This is the more expedious and effective
method of relief because Fontanilla was either in prison or just been released or had no
property. Barredo was held liable for damages.
7. G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
JOSECANGCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.MANILA RAILROAD CO.,
DOCTRINE:Intersections
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is
called quasi-delict xxx. [W]hether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual
obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission
productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. xxx
[T]he practical result is identical xxx.] The field of non-contractual obligation is much
morebroader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say,
the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-
contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may
break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of
the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligationhad no contract existed between the
parties.
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
FACTS:On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He
was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for
free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even
though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was
still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to
notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he
fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was
dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of
watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed
to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform
was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground.
The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would
place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also
assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the
plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means
so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in
an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly
— the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily
affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been
observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such
conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs.
Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily
custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in
his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the
character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the
plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
8.Elcano v. Hill G.R.No.L-28403
Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal
case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.”
Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s
acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been
extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a
separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award
Page 4
of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction
of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article
327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the
minor child”, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage
of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian.
He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.”
Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time
of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a
matter of equity.
9.Andamo vs. IAC
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article
431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS.
Facts:
Spouses Andamo, petitioner, owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is
adjacent to the property of respondent Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc., a
religious corporation. Respondent corporation constructed water paths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioner’s land, caused a
young man to drown, damaged petitioner’s crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of the petitioners and their laborers and some other destructions.
This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of
inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.
Issue:
Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by
respondent’s waterpaths and contrivances.
Held:
Yes. The aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present,
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Based from the petitioner’s complaint, the water paths and contrivances built by respondent
La Sallette are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these water paths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which
may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although the owner has a right to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a
third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
10. G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
BAKSH v CA
FACTS: Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against
GasheemShookat, an Iranian Citizen, of breach of promise to marry. She said that both of
them agreed to marry after the end of the school semester. Marilou then introduced
Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s
parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started
looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual
intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating
Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he
is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued
Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot
be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was
not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable for breach of promise to marry.
RULING: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of
his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit
and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress.
Page 5
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of
torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach
complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws.
Quasi-delict, under Article 2176, is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the
notion of willfulness or intent. It is committed by negligence and without willful intent to injure
although the act may be voluntary. An act may be voluntary and negligent at the same time,
but it cannot be intentional in the sense that here is intent to harm and negligent at the same
time. Torts, on the other hand, is much broader than quasi-delict because it includes not
only negligence but intentional criminal acts.
12. Andamo v. IAC G.R.No.74751
Facts: The Andamos’ land is adjacent to the Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc land
in Silang, Cavite. The respondent’s estate is aid to contain an artificial lake and waterpaths
which
when damaged, caused the death of a young man, destruction of crops and fences of the
Andamos. They filed a case against the directors of the said religious corporation first as a
criminal case of destruction of property through inundation punishable under the Revise
Penal Code and another of a civil case.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent corporation is liable for damages.
Ruling: Yes. The civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of
the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due
to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of
the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of
Respondent Corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation
between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable
by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award
of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
13.L.G.Foods v. Philadelfa (JUDGE)
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses
FlorentinoVallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the
petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer.
Charles died as a result of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the
driver before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 67787, entitled People of the Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide,
evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order
of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint
damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver alleging that as such
employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
the defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is
basically a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer under the provision of Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be
a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable.
Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non
condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on
the part of the plaintiffs.
Rtc denied (lack of merit) CA affirmed
ISSUE: WON LG foods are correct? (NO)
HELD: NO the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of
an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of
the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the
defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the
allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the
petitioners.
that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to
the provision of Article 2177 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on
Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177
provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation
has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort.
The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory
pleading or complaint, and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the
plaintiffs cause of action or lack of it based on the defendants perception that the plaintiff
should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
Page 6
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee.
14. FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation
Facts:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on June 18, 1994, 30 units
of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard its Isuzu truck driven by Lambert Eroles, to the
Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While traversing the North Diversion Road along
McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck,
causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes (P204,450.00) to
Concepcion Industries, Inc.,. Being subrogee of CII’s rights & interests, FGU, in turn, sought
reimbursement from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for
damages & breach of contract of carriage against GPS and Eroles with the RTC. In its
answer, respondents asserted that GPS was only the exclusive hauler of CII since 1988,
and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed
that the cause of damage was purely accidental.
GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground
that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on April 30, 1996. It subsequently dismissed the
complaint holding that GPS was not a common carrier defined under the law & existing
jurisprudence. The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, FGU
interposed an appeal to the CA. The CA rejected the FGU’s appeal & ruled in favor of GPS.
It also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether Sarmiento Trucking Corporation is liable for damages under article 2185 (culpa
aquiliana).
Holding:
Yes Article 2185 provides ,Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation.
Evidence for the plaintiff shows no proof that defendant was violating any traffic regulation.
Hence, the presumption of negligence is not obtaining.
GPS cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the
contract & the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
The law will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of
the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the
contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have
been lost/suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that may
include his:
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
1. Expectation interest – interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good
a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed;
2. Reliance interest – interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the
contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not
been made;
3. Restitution interest – interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred
on the other party.
Agreements can accomplish little unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of
every infraction is to create a new duty, or to make recompense to the one who has been
injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the
diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the
case of common carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous
event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.
A default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack
of care & corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on
him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
Eroles, on the other hand, may not be ordered to pay petitioner without concrete proof of his
negligence/fault. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between
petitioner’s principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract
can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed
their personality/juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque
nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioner’s civil
action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which would require the
claimant for damages to prove the defendant’s negligence/fault.
23. PNR VS ETHEL BRUNTY
Facts:Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came
to the Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together
with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes
Benz sedan with plate number FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00
midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on
its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January
24, 1980.
By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad
crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr,
drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to
collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz
smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. A certain
James Harrow brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in Tarlac,
where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered
severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was transferred
to the Manila Doctor’s Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center for further treatment.
Ethel Brunty filed a complaint for damages against the PNR before the RTC of Manila. The
case was raffled to Branch 20 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18645. They alleged
that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical injuries suffered by
Page 7
Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in
not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Barangay Rizal,
Municipality of Moncada, Tarlac. They pointed out that there was no flagbar or red light
signal to warn motorists who were about to cross the railroad track, and that the flagman or
switchman was only equipped with a hand flashlight. The Court of Manila ruled in favor of
Brunty and the CA affirmed the ruling of the court of first instance, hence this petition for
review.
Issue: Whether Brunty and Mercelita has contributory negligence barring them for claiming
damages.
(culpa aquiliana).
Holding:No.Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, it
ruled that the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing were
not merely inadequate – they did not satisfy the well-settled safety standards in
transportation. However, we do not agree with the RTC’s findings on the contributory
negligence of Mercelita, the driver of the Mercedes Benz. It held that Mercelita could not
have foreseen the harm that would befall him and the two other passengers under the
prevailing circumstances, thus, could not be considered guilty of contributory negligence.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.In Corliss v. Manila
Railroad Company,this Court held that negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require.In determining whether or not there is negligence on the
part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did
defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is
guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict,
the following requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or
omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty;
and (3) connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 15,
2005 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The award of actual damages is deleted, and
in lieu thereof, temperate damages of P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty.
The award of moral damages is reduced to P500,000.00
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
24. SICAM v. JEORGE CASE DIGEST
FACTS: Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam to
secure a loan.
Later, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry
were found inside the pawnshop vault.
Sicam sent respondent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the
robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu expressed disbelief stating that when
the robbery happened, all jewelry pawned were deposited with Far East Bank near the
pawnshop since it had been the practice that before they could withdraw, advance notice
must be given to the pawnshop so it could withdraw the jewelry from the bank. Respondent
Lulu then requested petitioner Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on but
petitioner Sicam failed to return the jewelry.
Respondent Lulu is seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of
damages. Petitioner is interposing the defense of caso fortuito on the robber committed
against the pawnshop.
ISSUE:Whether Sicam is liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their possession?
RULING: Yes. The Court found that Sicam failed to exercise reasonable care and caution
that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. It ruled that Sicam
was guilty of negligence in the operation of its pawnshop business. The Court quoted from
the testimony of Sicam where he admitted that the vault was open at the time of robbery.
The court explained that Sicam’s testimony revealed that there were no security measures
adopted by Sicam in the operation of pawnshop.
25. FAR EASTERN SHPPING vs. CA
REGALADO, J.
Generally, the degree of care required is graduated
according to the danger a person or property attendant
upon the activity which the actor pursues or the
instrumentality which he uses. The greater the danger the
greater the degree of care required. What is ordinary under
extraordinary of conditions is dictated by those conditions;
extraordinary risk demands extraordinary care. Similarly,
the more imminent the danger, the higher the degree of
care. [
Those who undertake any work calling for special skills
are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what
they do but also possess a standard minimum of special
knowledge and ability.
Every man who offers his services to another, and is
employed, assumes to exercise in the employment such
Page 8
skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of diligence. In
all these employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if
one offers his services he is understood as holding himself
out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commonly
possessed by others in the same employment, and if his
pretensions are unfounded he commits a species of fraud
on every man who employs him in reliance on his public
profession.
NATURE
Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and Gavino
solidarily liable
FACTS
- On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR,
owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of
Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel
was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain
Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of
the vessel. Appellant SenenGavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots'
Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to
Berth No. 4.
- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in
the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of
Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor
from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was
calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. - When the vessel reached the
landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino
ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier,
Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel
on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not
take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued
between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew
members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured
Gavino that there was nothing to it. - After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold,
he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that
the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not
take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the
pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov
filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to
the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. - The
rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of
P1,126,132.25.
PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE
- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory
pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order
No. 03-85:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. — For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat,
or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and
undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged
in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the
compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. — On compulsory pilotage
grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the
damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault.
He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or
natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or
minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds
whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on
board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by
reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of
the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said
Master
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by
competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances
of each particular case.
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. — The duties
and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxxxxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he
assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely;
Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects
or refuses to carry out his order.
- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise
provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots:
Par. XXXIX. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the
time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided,
That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry
out his instructions.
xxxxxxxxx
Par. XLIV. — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their
control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels.
ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent
HELD
YES.
- The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a
moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common
Page 9
sense and logic). It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was
negligent.
PILOT
- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a
vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert who’s supposed to know the
seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port.
He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people
and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake.
- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4
minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow.
As an expert he should’ve been reacting quickly to any such happenings.
MASTER
- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel.
The master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger to
the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. - Based on Capt.
Kavankov’s testimony, he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didn’t hold
and they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence
on his part. He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear
everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing.
- The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn
means negligence on the part of FESC.
CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS
- As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be
the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly,
where several causes combine to produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability
because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured.
It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted
from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all
or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the
negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable
as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. - There is no contribution between joint
tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code.
DispositionPetition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable.
26.PNR v. CA G.R.No.157658
Philippine National Railways (PNR) vs.CA (GR L-55347, 4 October 1985)Facts:
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
On 10 September 1972, at about 9:00 p.m.,Winifredo Tupang, husband of Rosario Tupang,
boarded Train 516 of the Philippine National Railways at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a
paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before thetrain could resume its
trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge atLucena, Quezon, Winifredo
Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. The train did not stop despite the alarm raised
by the other passengers that somebody fell fromthe train. Instead, the train conductor,
Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for
verification of the information. Police authorities of Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam
Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang. As shown by the autopsy
report, Winifredo Tupang died of cardio-respiratory failure due to massive cerebral
hemorrhage due to traumatic injury. Tupang was later buried in the public cemetery of
Lucena City by the local police authorities. Upon complaint filed by the deceased’s widow,
Rosario Tupang, the then CFI Rizal, after trial, held the PNR liable for damagesfor breach of
contract of carriage and ordered it to pay Rosario Tupang the sum of P12,000.00 for the
death of Winifredo Tupang, plus P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity, and the further
sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, andP2,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and cost. On
appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not
exercise the utmost diligence required bylaw of a common carrier. It further increased the
amount adjudicated by the trial court by ordering PNR to pay the Rosario Tupang an
additional sum of P5,000,00 as exemplary damages. Moving for reconsideration of the
above decision, the PNR raised for the first time, as a defense, the doctrine of state
immunity from suit. The motion was denied. Hence the petition for review.
Issue:
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of Tupang.
Held:
PNR has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe
extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers
gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under
the contract of carriage. PNR failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear
and convincing evidence, inasmuch as PNR does not deny,(1) that the train boarded by the
deceased Winifredo Tupang was so overcrowded that he and many other passengers had
no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train, (2) that the train
did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the
time, and (3) that neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers
that a person had fallen off the train at Iyam Bridge. While PNR failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable
with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the
coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar
found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such
contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified
the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages. The Supreme Court modified the
decision of the appellate court by eliminating therefrom the amounts of P10,000.00 and
P5,000.00 adjudicated as moral and exemplary damages, respectively; without costs.
27. AMEDO V RIO
FACTS: This case was instituted on October 18, 1950. In her original complaint instituted on
October 18, 1950, plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta,
Inc., the sum of P2,038.40 as compensation for the death of her son, Filomeno Managuit,
Page 10
who worked for the defendant as a seaman of the M/S Pilar II. The main allegation of said
original complaint was:
That on May 27, 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning, while the deceased Filomeno
Managuit was on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman, he jumped into the water to retrieve
a 2-peso bill belonging to him, and as a consequence of which, he was drowned. This
however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of action which defendant filed stating that
the allegation does not show that the death of plaintiff's son was due to an "accident arising
out of and in the course of employment". She was allowed to file an amended complaint
which was remanded to the trial court. Her amended complaint stated: That on May 27,
1949, at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the
course of his employment, performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant's
M/S "Pilar II", which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli
Dumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort
to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned.
ISSUE:
Whether Amedo could claim compensation from employer Rio
HELD:
NO. Plaintiff‘s basis for appeal is the Workmen‘s Compensation Act. Sections 2 and 4 of
which:
Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation
- When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment, or
the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the
sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.
Sec. 4. Injuries not covered.
* Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the
employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person; (2) by drunkenness on the
part of the laborer who had the accident; (3) by notorious negligence of the same. - from
these provisions three conditions are essential to hold an employer liable. These are: (1) the
accident must arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen in the course of the
employment; and (3) it must not be caused by the "notorious negligence" of the employee.
Point in question is whether the accident was committed under these 3 conditions - "The
words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its
character, while the words `in the course of' refer to the time, place, and circumstances
under which the accident takes place - it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took
place "in the course of" his employment, in that it happened at the "time" when, and at the
"place" where-according to the amended complaint-he was working. However, the accident
which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment.
The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of, or arisen from, his employment. It was
the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such work. But, his
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. The
hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. It was a
risk to which any person on board the
M/S Pilar II, such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been exposed
had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as Filomeno had.
Filomeno’s accident was caused by his notorious negligence.
- "notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to "gross negligence", which, in
turn, has been defined as follows: - By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care
as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable
consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person
or property of others."
It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the seashore of
Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence,"
that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person, that he could not have
been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was
"indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury. - this is distinguishable from cases wherein the
act done is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops a cigarette on the
pavement and picks it up. So, also, if, while Filomeno Managuit was working, his 2-peso bill
merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked up the bill from the floor something
accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely be entitled to compensation, his
act being obviously innocent. - since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous, his accident
could be
28. G.R. No. L-8110. June 30, 1956
MARINDUQUE v WORKMEN’S
FACTS:Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. (MIMA) questions by certiorari the order of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner confirming the referee’s award of compensation
to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death. On August 23, 1951, at 6:00 a.m.
the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of MIMA boarded a truck belonging to
the latter, which was then driven by one ProcopioMacunat, also employed by the
corporation, and on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while
trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree,
resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the others. ProcopioMacunat was
prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. (Criminal
Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing however, to the latter.
MIMA contends that the deceased violated MIMA’s prohibition against laborers riding the
haulage trucks and is thus guilty of “notorious negligence” which, under the law, precludes
recovery.
ISSUES: Whether the deceased’s violation of MIMA’s policy not to ride the truck constitutes
negligence.
RULING: The Court ruled that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not
negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per
se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular instance because there
Page 11
was the employer’s prohibition. Does violation of this order constitute negligence? Many
courts hold that violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se. Others
consider the circumstances.
However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule promulgated
by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence.
This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t be of a greater obligation than the
rule of a Commission or board. And the referee correctly considered this violation as
possible evidence of negligence; but it declared that under the circumstance, the laborer
could not be declared to have acted with negligence. Correctly, it is believed, since the
prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders.
However, the Court also added that:
Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not “notorious”
negligence, which we have interpreted to mean the same thing as “gross”
negligence— implying “conscious indifference to consequences” “pursuing a
course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury” “utter
disregard of consequences.” Getting or accepting a free ride on the company’s
haulage truck couldn’t be gross negligence, because as the referee found, “no
danger or risk was apparent.”
The award of compensation was affirmed with costs against petitioners.
29 CONCEPCION ILAO-ORETA, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES EVA MARIE and
BENEDICTO NOEL RONQUILLO, Respondents G.R. No. 172406 October 11, 2007
FACTS: Respondentshad not been blessed with a child despite several years of marriage.
They thus consulted petitioner, Dr. Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant at the
St. Luke’s Medical Center where she was, at the time material to the case, the chief of the
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section.
Upon Dr. Ilao-Oreta’s advice, Eva Marie agreed to undergo a laparoscopic procedure
whereby a laparascope would be inserted through the patient’s abdominal wall to get a
direct view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine the real cause of her
infertility.
The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m., to be performed by Dr. Ilao-
Oreta. At around 7:00 a.m. of said date, Eva Marie, accompanied by her husband Noel,
checked in at the St. Luke’s Medical Center and underwent pre-operative procedures
including the administration of intravenous fluid and enema.
Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure, however, and no prior
notice of its cancellation was received. It turned out that the doctor was on a return flight
from Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in, Manila.
The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke’s Medical
Center for breach of professional and service contract and for damages before the RTC of
Batangas City. In her Answer, Dr. Ilao-Oreta gave her side and explains that she failed to
consider the time difference between Hawaii and the Philippines, however.
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
St. Luke’s Medical Center contended that the spouses have no cause of action against it
since it performed the pre-operative procedures without delay, and any cause of action they
have would be against Dr. Ilao-Oreta.
RTC of Batangas City, finding that the failure of the doctor to arrive on time was not
intentional, awarded Eva Marie only actual damages in the total amount of P9,939 and
costs of suit. It found no adequate proof that Noel had been deprived of any job contract
while attending to his wife in the hospital.
On appeal by the spouses, the Court of Appeals, finding Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent,
modified the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:Whether the petitioner acted with gross negligence.
HELD: No. "Gross negligence" implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight
care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in
so far as other persons may be affected.
The records show that before leaving for Hawaii, Dr. Ilao-Oreta left an admitting order with
her secretary for one of the spouses to pick up, apprised Eva Marie of the necessary
preparations for the procedure, and instructed the hospital staff to perform pre-operative
treatments. These acts of the doctor reflect an earnest intention to perform the procedure on
the day and time scheduled.
The doctor’s act did not, however, reflect gross negligence as defined above. Her argument
that Although petitioner failed to take into consideration the time difference between the
Philippines and Hawaii, the situation then did not present any clear and apparent harm or
injury that even a careless person may perceive. Unlike in situations where the Supreme
Court had found gross negligence to exist, petitioner could not have been conscious of any
foreseeable danger that may occur since she actually believed that she would make it to the
operation that was elective in nature, the only purpose of which was to determine the real
cause of infertility and not to treat and cure a life threatening disease.
30. Picart v. Smith GR. no. l- 12219
Facts: Picart was riding his pony on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union while
opposite him, Smith drives his automobile. Thinking that there will be no chance that the two
could collide or that one is not any nearer to another, Smith drove the automobile so near
the said pony causing for it to injure his hind legs and die as a result thereof. Picart was
thrown off violently from the animal and sustained temporary unconsciousness.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described
was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done.
Page 12
Ruling: Yes. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to
the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case. Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the
present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the
law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.
31. G.R. No. 159617 August 8, 2007
ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC., petitioners, vs. LULU V.
JORGE and CESAR JORGE, respondents.AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS: It appears that on different dates from September to October 1987, Lulu V. Jorge
(respondent Lulu) pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam located at
No. 17 Aguirre Ave., BF Homes Parañaque, Metro Manila, to secure a loan in the total
amount of P59,500.00.
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash
and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault. The incident was entered in the police
blotter of the Southern Police District, Parañaque Police Station as follows:
Investigation shows that at above TDPO, while victims were inside the office, two (2) male
unidentified persons entered into the said office with guns drawn. Suspects(sic) (1) went
straight inside and poked his gun toward Romeo Sicam and thereby tied him with an electric
wire while suspects (sic) (2) poked his gun toward Divina Mata and Isabelita Rodriguez and
ordered them to lay (sic) face flat on the floor. Suspects asked forcibly the case and
assorted pawned jewelries items mentioned above.
Suspects after taking the money and jewelries fled on board a Marson Toyota unidentified
plate number.
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
Petitioner Sicam sent respondent Lulu a letter dated October 19, 1987 informing her of the
loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. On November 2, 1987,
respondent Lulu then wrote a letter to petitioner Sicam expressing disbelief stating that
when the robbery happened, all jewelry pawned were deposited with Far East Bank near
the pawnshop since it had been the practice that before they could withdraw, advance
notice must be given to the pawnshop so it could withdraw the jewelry from the bank.
Respondent Lulu then requested petitioner Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for
withdrawal on November 6, 1987 but petitioner Sicam failed to return the jewelry.
On September 28, 1988, respondent Lulu joined by her husband, Cesar Jorge, filed a
complaint against petitioner Sicam with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for indemnity for
the loss
Sicam filed his Answer contending that he is not the real party-in-interest as the pawnshop
was incorporated on April 20, 1987 and known as Agencia de R.C. Sicam, Inc; that
petitioner corporation had exercised due care and diligence in the safekeeping of the
articles pledged with it and could not be made liable for an event that is fortuitous.
Respondents subsequently filed an Amended Complaint to include petitioner corporation.
RTC held that petitioner Sicam could not be made personally liable for a claim arising out of
a corporate transaction;in the Amended Complaint of respondents, they asserted that
"plaintiff pawned assorted jewelries in defendants' pawnshop"; and that as a consequence
of the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the corporate debt or credit is not the
debt or credit of a stockholder.
robbery is a fortuitous event which exempts the victim from liability for the loss,
CA applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity reasoning that respondents
were misled into thinking that they were dealing with the pawnshop owned by petitioner
Sicam as all the pawnshop tickets issued to them bear the words "Agenciade R.C.
Sicam";CA concluded that both petitioners should be jointly and severally held liable
ISSUE: WON CA Correct? Yes
HELD: The CA correctly pierced the veil of the corporate fiction and adjudged petitioner
Sicam liable together with petitioner corporation. The rule is that the veil of corporate fiction
may be pierced when made as a shield to perpetrate fraud and/or confuse legitimate issues.
Petitioner Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the time
of the robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the pawnshop business in 1983,
he thought of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of safekeeping the
valuables but was discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned articles should only be
stored in a vault inside the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly
adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually
foreseen and anticipated. Petitioner Sicam’s testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners’
defense of fortuitous event. in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is
Page 13
necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned
the loss.
Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop
business.petitionerSicam's admission that the vault was open at the time of robbery is
clearly a proof of petitioners' failure to observe the care
32. Corinthian Gardens vs Sps. Tanjangcos
Facts:
Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 242245 and 282961 respectively, located at
Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian
Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian).On the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank and
Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary.
As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under the business
name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted all the previous surveys for the
subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during
and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular
inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the
Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian.[6] Unfortunately, after the Cuasos
constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B.
Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87 square
meters. The RTC ruled in favor of Tanjangcos and the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.Hence this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and such negligence
contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.(culpa aquiliana).
Holding:
The instant case is obviously one for tort, as governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
Undeniably, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached on the lot owned by the
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
Tanjangcos by 87 square meters as duly found by both the RTC and the CA in accordance
with the evidence on record. As a result, the Tanjangcos suffered damage in having been
deprived of the use of that portion of their lot encroached upon.Thus, the primordial issue to
be resolved in this case is
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of
ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk
to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a
force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor's
position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of
harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias in Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in a man
of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability according to that standard.In
sum, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wall into
Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence and, at the
very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos. WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner
Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed
in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted
again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old
fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented to
the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on
the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Page 14
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his
parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of
course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as
never having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf
of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of
the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case,
the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased child.
VALENZUELA VS CA
115024 February 7, 1996
Lessons Applicable:
 Calculation of Risk (Torts and Damages)
 Factors in Determining Amount (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
 June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards
the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so
she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights
and seeked help
 She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
 While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she
was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was
intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the ground
 She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated
and was replaced with an artificial one.
 Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000
(aritificial leg)]
 RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and
severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual
damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro
La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a
month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990
until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2
Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary
damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
 CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved
Li's employer
 Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
 Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just
across the scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and
very near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and
there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)
ISSUE:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
Page 15

HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision
1. NO
 If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he
could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his
brakes at the proper time and distance
 it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely
avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space for both
cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards Manila and
the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as
a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
he is required to conform for his own protection
 emergency rule
 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if
he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence
 She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for
a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she
would likely find no one to help her
 She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed
 she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind a
Toyota Corona Car
3. YES.
MARCELO|Torts and Damages|1
 Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of
the servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in which
the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter‘s assigned tasks
would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation
to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large
companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.
 Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the
accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Parañaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court
below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemate’s place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his
officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to
discuss sales and other work related strategies.
 Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its
company car to Li
4. YES.
 As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of
the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in
greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving
of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
 the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it
would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic
changes which her body would normally undergo through the years.
The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require
corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these
adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
Page 16