G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PBMEO thru Benjamin
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO
RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas &
Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner
Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to
stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
police, to be participated in by the workers in the first
shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M.
and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they
informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of
Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent
Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the
parties — parties —
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned
of the projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00
AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the
regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to
5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March
3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen,
and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur
L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department
and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio
Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4)
Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6)
Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm
or deny said projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969.
Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel,
confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has
already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu
explained further that the demonstration has nothing to
do with the Company because the union has no quarrel
or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized,
however, that any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty.
C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report
for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another
meeting was convoked Company represented by Atty.
C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of:
Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu
and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of
March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the
PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join
the Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first
and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused
from joining the demonstration and should report for
work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd
shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA,
particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO
STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of
the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the
Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily
liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration.
The union panel countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was
received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of
which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST
EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8,
Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering
about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the
pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift
workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and
third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge
against petitioners and other employees who composed
the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section
4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as
Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A",
pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the
joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr.
(Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a
corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969,
by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and
Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-
30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners
claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because
they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the
mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said
mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their
constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it
was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex
"D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in
an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein
petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo
Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said
unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence,
considered to have lost their status as employees of the
respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September
23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they
filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28,
1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for
reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969,
on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence,
as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file
their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the
Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60,
rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October
11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that
herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the
order dated September 17 (should be September 15),
1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five
(5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September
27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
reconsideration; and that because their motion for
reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be
accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for
extension of the five-day period for the filing of a
motion for reconsideration should be filed before the
said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64,
rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14,
1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in
support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I",
pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en
banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein
petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J",
pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on
October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9,
1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.),
appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as
amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed
within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order
and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order
of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the
respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file
their motion for reconsideration on time was due to
excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by
the president of the petitioner Union and of the office
clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of
the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and
"K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for
relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein
petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme
Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and
principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at
bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of
the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible
extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of
his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals
of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general
principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials,
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to
free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the
individual, not the well-being of the State, was the
criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His
interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it
was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well
as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the
rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the
ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we
cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the
minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties
of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the
liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their
suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs
as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers.
The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal
to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights,
the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of
the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs —
political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority
"gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the law
and its object or purpose — that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would
suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the
main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs.
Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion
in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr.
Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like
Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co.
vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and
of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by
whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice
Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief
Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule
formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. —
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression
as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after
opining that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted
act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work,"
herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and
hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with
private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc..
Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing
a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be
sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March
4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses
of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer,
herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was
purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and
petition for redress of grievances in particular before
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.
They exercise their civil and political rights for their
mutual aid protection from what they believe were
police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein private respondent firm to protect herein
petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of
local police officers. It was to the interest herein private
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up
the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to
work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective
tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for
its employees with the local police. Was it securing
peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it
also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage
the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure
to defend its own employees all the more weakened the
position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who
might have been all the more emboldened thereby
subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression
well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees
and laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the
weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights.
The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss
or damage by reason of the absence of its employees
from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would
not spell the difference between the life and death of the
firm or its owners or its management. The employees'
pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused,
harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by
the peace officers of the municipality. As above
intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a
matter that vitally affected their right to individual
existence as well as that of their families. Material loss
can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and
brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain
to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing
salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights —
freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances — over property rights
has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic
tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor
of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the
all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization —
becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have
any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can
produce economic goods that can generate happiness for
all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well
as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the
working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes
on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working
hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the
workers the right to stage mass demonstration against
police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual
tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves
severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom
should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on
March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by
any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon
the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The
respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at
bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any
industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F",
p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all
its employees to participate in the demonstration and that
they suggested to the Union that only the first and
regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for
work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be
averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of
an effective demonstration especially by a labor union,
namely the complete unity of the Union members as
well as their total presence at the demonstration site in
order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity
of their cause but also immediately action on the part of
the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction
over the issues they raised against the local police.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third,
then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by
the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third
of their members will be regarded as a substantial
indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate
their position and abet continued alleged police
persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company
two days in advance of their projected demonstration
and the company could have made arrangements to
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by
reason of the absence of its workers for one day,
especially in this case when the Union requested it to
excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the
Union reiterated in their telegram received by the
company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the
day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There
was a lack of human understanding or compassion on
the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union
for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry
out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground
for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross
vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as
unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor
practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers
to join the mass demonstration against alleged police
abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as
the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass
demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent
firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and
protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which
was interference with or restraint on the right of the
employees to engage in such common action to better
shield themselves against such alleged police indignities.
The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shift should not
participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and
protection deserves at least equal protection as the
concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a
letter complaint charging bank president with
immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in
the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We
further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra,
that for the employees to come within the protective
mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on
Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union
activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the
furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in
the questioned order of respondent Court dated
September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly
acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution,"
nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation
of the company" and "warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work the following morning
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure
is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's
brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the
employees from joining the mass demonstration.
However, the issues that the employees raised against
the local police, were more important to them because
they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration,
despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could
happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of
their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer,
more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they
were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that
their demonstration would bring about the desired relief
from police abuses. But management was adamant in
refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their
right of free speech, free assembly and the right to
petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find
it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the
truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local
police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such
abuses should properly be submitted to the
corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their
complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred
by the President of the Philippines for proper
investigation and action with a view to disciplining the
local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the
fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did
not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present
evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure
to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that
penalties were exacted from it by customers whose
orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration;
or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers
by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered;
or that its own equipment or materials or products were
damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4,
1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable
amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers,
cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day.
Such savings could have amply compensated for
unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by
reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for
redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of
the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with
the demonstration and consequently being absent from
work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution
imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice
to insure the well-being and economic security of all of
the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other
directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution
that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...".
Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of
the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning
and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor
of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act,
the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the
policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial
unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion
of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is
most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court
of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency
designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and
failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison
d'etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of
It has been likewise established that a violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and
as a consequence its judgment is null and void and
confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be
obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long
after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is
the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is
convicted by final judgment through a forced confession,
which violated his constitutional right against self-
incrimination; 25or who is denied the right to present
evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty
without due process of law, 26even after the accused has
already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and
private firm trenched upon these constitutional
immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord
preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity
to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these
basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of
Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the
questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a
nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are
imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as
well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise
and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere
procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial
Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power,
when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the
untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is
no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right
to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one
speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one
demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked
and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever
there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced,
inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these
guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule
on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The
battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in
such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the
latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best
an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with
the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the
financial resources with which to pay for competent
legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that
motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should
filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the
arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within
ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for
reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these
Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative
delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September
29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September
22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two
(2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed
it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration
was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the
petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely,
does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing
the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a
legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights?
The answer should be obvious in the light of the
aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing
rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic
human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any
statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also
does violence to natural reason and logic. The
dominance and superiority of the constitutional right
over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a
Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case
does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the
constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the
same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by
the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial
Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere
legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the
law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the
aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the
motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule
51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of
Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact
accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of
Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for
reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on
the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is
not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced
during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension
of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant
to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.);
although the arguments were actually filed by the herein
petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73,
rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing
of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of
the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners
received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated
October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed
beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75,
rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a
motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the
arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10
day reglementary period provided for by the Court of
Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject
of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable.
But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free
expression, free assembly and petition were not
involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action
and defenses presently available must be specifically
raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of
action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed
waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised
any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears
that the determination of the constitutional issue is
necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of
the case without the resolution of which no final and
complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It
is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the
Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the
instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of
Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must
likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by
herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair
labor practice charged against them and in their defense
to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human
freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of
Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human
rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the
inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes
of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his
concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-
c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with
all situations without concerning itself about procedural
niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in
any case, without further loss of time, provided that the
right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an
appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words,
when all the material facts are spread in the records
before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a quo is of
judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there
render the appropriate judgment. Is within the
contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal
and within the power of this Court to strike down in an
appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be
beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to
reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment of
a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a
flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do
not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has
found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short
of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court
would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to
reverse said decision here and now even if such errors
can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only
as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the
unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the
sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an
appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court
industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar
would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties"
which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic
human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be
according supremacy over the property rights of their
employer firm which has been given a full hearing on
this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual
material damage has be demonstrated as having been
inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires
it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative
the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule
that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded
with resolution concern by the specific guarantees
outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the
application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein
respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such
application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the
human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in
the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed
by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the
Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the
case at is also authorized by Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which
enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine
which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for
the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs.
Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the
petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly
discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such
criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial
Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its,
rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as
generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the
Court shall act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is
disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities
applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even
restricted to the specific relief demanded by the
parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to
future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496,
Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil.
Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that
this provision is ample enough to have enabled the
respondent court to consider whether or not its previous
ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded
on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of
newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16
Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578).
(emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations
rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in
effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert
competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of
human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental
law, simply because their counsel — erroneously
believing that he received a copy of the decision on
September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 -
filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969,
which practically is only one day late considering that
September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure
technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of
justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been
devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score,
Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court
in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland
in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor
decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v.
Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v.
Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy,
14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far
back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has
remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v.
Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind.
For him the interpretation of procedural rule should
never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural
laws are no other than technicalities" view them in their
entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for
the compliance with which courts have organized and
function, but as means conducive to the realization the
administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128).
We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly
rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of
substantial rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated
technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of
justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156,
161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal,
they "should give way to the realities of the situation."
(Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated
in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing
McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA
272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier
formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure
"are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense";
but are intended "to help secure substantial justice."
(Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations
orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
termination of the employment of the petitioning eight
(8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence
from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the
severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members
of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of
fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the
Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed
and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers
were specifically named as respondents in the unfair
labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp.
16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C",
pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates
that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the
demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its
thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the
unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If
that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and
regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and
that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation
that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at
all — should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to
dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a
most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union
leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance
as well as that of their respective families aside from the
fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same
time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty
tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from
those who consciously seek to destroy our system of
Government, but from men of goodwill — good men
who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact
that what they propose to accomplish involves an
impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable.
What we must remember, however, is thatpreservation
of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of
liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a
reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against
misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions
of the guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands
of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender.
The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of
us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the
liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own
liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a
group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for
the less fortunate that we in all honor and good
conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or
good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that
they are being subjected to indignities by the local
police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its
income or profits than to assist its employees in their
fight for their freedoms and security against alleged
petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer
opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted
to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities
and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement
selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings
Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed
eight (8) employees for having written and published "a
patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president
demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality,
nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees."
Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission
of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their
individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge
they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged
in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self
organization that includes concerted activity for mutual
aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act
...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For,
as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or
demands, even by a small group of employees, if in
furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6
A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have
allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to
discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in
giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure,
the right of self-organization of employees is not
unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S.
793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for
cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ.
Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The
Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise
of the right of the employer to select his employees or to
discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of
that right by interfering with the countervailing right of
self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313
U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity
that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference
with the employees' right of self-organization or as a
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain
collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within
the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the
Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and
protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic
Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the
morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such
recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly
and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable
and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass
demonstration was not against the company nor any of
its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated
September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8)
petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their
separation from the service until re instated, minus one
day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation from
the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine
Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO,
CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO
OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE
FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the
Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed
into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for
a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR
from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No.
90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9
July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council
under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and
received by, the private respondents (being the officers
and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given
a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990)
within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice,
the private respondents were informed by petitioner
Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way
to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led
by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to
then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop
the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-
sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The
complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On
23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission"
and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the
private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's
own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July
1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the
CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to
purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the
petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the
warning that violation of said order would lead to a
citation for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990,
questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred,
among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by
the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of
Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a
moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that
the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium
in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor
dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even
this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1
August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government
land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North
Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and
exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a
certain business establishment (should) be allowed to
operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke
or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds
clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners
moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to
dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be
resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they
would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss
was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil
and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly
violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights,
(but) their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard
and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt
charge that had meantime been filed by the private
respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners
(on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then
unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited
the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it
imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion
to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its
constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who
complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be
and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the
(Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger
limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but
it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the
power to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right
to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly
and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents
with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of
women and children, and their health, safety and
welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and
traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed
to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to
man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our
resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently
reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991,
in which we also issued a temporary restraining order,
directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further
hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business
rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were
demolished by the petitioners at the instance and
authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners;
and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid
to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the
Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment
for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own
comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its
Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense
with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo,
who had since failed to comply with the resolution,
dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the
1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then
President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No.
163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on
Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are
defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection
of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
promote human rights and to provide for compensation
to victims of violations of human rights, or their
families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance
with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance
with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be
provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention
of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to
make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however,
has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño
v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the
enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the
adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in
the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is
not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we
now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and,
its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative
power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights"
is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit
not a few have tried, could at best be described as
inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human
rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of
the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has
been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by
"human rights?" The participants, representing different
sectors of the society, have given the following varied
answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man
by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts
of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya
or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya
or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to
life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the
press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of
the accused to due process of law; political rights, such
as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to
public office, and to form political associations and
engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to
an education, employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the
individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . .
. Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted
by the State but can only be recognized and protected by
it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic,
social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply
because he is human. They are part of his natural birth,
right, innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as,
or more specifically, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the
scope of human rights can be understood to include
those that relate to an individual's social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to
closely identify the term to the universally accepted
traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable
rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by
the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in
adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in
creating an independent commission to safeguard these
rights? It may of value to look back at the country's
experience under the martial law regime which may
have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions
in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard.
Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the
sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil
liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of
Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973
enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human
rights expressed in the International Covenant, these
rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of
Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action
then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands
became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were
detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for
years, without charges, until ordered released by the
Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to
petition for the redress of grievances became useless,
since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes.
Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship
and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost
independence and security of tenure, except members of
the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters
of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance
thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as
declared by international bodies like Amnesty
International and the International Commission of
Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the
Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must
be made clear in view of the importance of human rights
and also because civil and political rights have been
determined by many international covenants and human
rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and
subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a
wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and
the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would
also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks
so that the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because
civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on
the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every
single right of an individual involves his civil right or his
political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights
have been made clear in the language of human rights
advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on
the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair
and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific
rights that are considered enshrined in many
international documents and legal instruments as
constituting civil and political rights, and these are
precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil
and political rights as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other
rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will
encompass social and economic rights, and there are
other violations of rights of citizens which can be
addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission
to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the
commission will be authorized to take under its wings
cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and
prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier
that we would like to define the specific parameters
which cover civil and political rights as covered by the
international standards governing the behavior of
governments regarding the particular political and civil
rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or
prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced
during martial law which we would now like to
safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I
had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is,
perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those
rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights
that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in
the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral
parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying
that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by
human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and
political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the
scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the
past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human
rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense
that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of
people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life
consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human
rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond
also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on
Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of
rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials;
4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and
hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the
religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is
recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with
Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make
the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as
much as possible, without prejudice to future
expansion. The coverage of the concept and
jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was
actually disturbed this morning when the reference was
made without qualification to the rights embodied in the
universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later
on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights
contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President,
Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or
linked the concept of human right with other human
rights specified in other convention which I do not
remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to
the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner
mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of
which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that,
although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other
covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are
rights specified in that other convention which may not
be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be
wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms
like "convention," rather than specify the rights
contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
concerned, the Committee, before the period of
amendments, could specify to us which of these articles
in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil
and political rights, not for the purpose of including
these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give
the sense of the Commission as to what human rights
would be included, without prejudice to expansion later
on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite
reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to
whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or
a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the
various specific civil and political rights that we felt
must be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom
from political detention and arrest prevention of torture,
right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving
disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective
violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes
precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a
specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not
opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the
record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or
the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the
so-called civil or political rights as contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to
each and every specific article therein, but only to those
that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we
understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even
clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants:
the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the
different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right
to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the
moment the sense of the committee to those that the
Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the
victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how
much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They
cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who
do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and
oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are
very delicate — torture, salvaging, picking up without
any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who
are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians,
men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human
Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need
this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the
little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot
get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil
and political violations because if we open this to land,
housing and health, we will have no place to go again
and we will not receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis
supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article
XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
— prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state
or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and
are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the
rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the
laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined
civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue
of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term
may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of
being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against
involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment
for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to
the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right
of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights
that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of
human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of
political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases
of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6)
other crimes committed against the religious." While the
enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement
of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it
has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently
take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive
delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial
jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead,
that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations
of human rights that should fall within the authority of
the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what
are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-saristores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by
private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the
land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this
Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not
thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed
paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been
violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be
invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking
at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally
authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules
of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised
rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate
penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite
for contempt, however, should be understood to apply
only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines
and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite
for contempt could be exercised against persons who
refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly
withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative
work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is
not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export
Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human
Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice
Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to
"provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection" may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid
services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from
proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge
of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of
the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction
is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection of the
rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for
appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to
any appropriate agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount
of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors
affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in
the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus
standion the part of the petitioners to question the
disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with
the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to
initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for
prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and
academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-
1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is
merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing
of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a
remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here,
however, said Commission admittedly has yet to
promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The
instant petition has been intended, among other things, to
also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is
GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR
Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00
fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL
MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for
respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for
intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of
the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of
the due process clause. The lower court held that it is
and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null
and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth,
such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of
the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its
validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760
was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of
its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu,
who is "the president and general manager of the second
petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged
with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of
the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for
the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner
non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and
protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members
"operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate
businesses duly licensed by both national and city
authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving
livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing
an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was
then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor
of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance
were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its
being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate
motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the
City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made
to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
violative of due process insofar as it would impose
P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in
the same section which would require the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a
hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting
any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby
open to public view at all times and in his presence,
wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the
date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of
companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data
furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that
a person signing such form has personally filled it up
and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with
such registration forms and records kept and bound
together, it also being provided that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor,
or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary,
unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged
invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against
self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance classifying motels into two classes and
requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities
in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends
against the due process clause for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies
to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class
motels to have a dining room; that the provision of
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a
person less than 18 years old from being accepted in
such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian
and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper
or duly authorized representative of such establishments
to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty
for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty
provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for
a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect
causing the destruction of the business and loss of its
investments, there is once again a transgression of the
due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary
injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower
court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July
8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an
admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the
City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance
but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the
petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the
challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a
proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and
proper exercise of the police power and that only the
guests or customers not before the court could complain
of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion
that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex
parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for,
its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there
was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28,
1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are
duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila,
while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general
manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor
Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the
capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and
incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of
Manila charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and
enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the
business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and
Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was
approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the
absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending
sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the
compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila
besides inserting therein three new sections. This
ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent
Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor
Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed
ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal
Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual
income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105
hotels and motels (including herein petitioners)
operating in the City of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on
January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance,
the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the
Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not
only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American
authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point
by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against
its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4,
1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed
reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition,
with citations of what they considered to be applicable
American authorities and praying for a judgment
declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are
members of the petitioners association, and referring to
the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party,
the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue
here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the
nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and
thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court."
It does appear obvious then that without any evidence
submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the
alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right
and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of
authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and
came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance
No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made
permanent the preliminary injunction issued against
respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A
decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
fundamental character ought to have admonished the
lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of
the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed
to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both
procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is
the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice
Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x
x . The action of the elected representatives of the people
cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the
very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of
their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people x
x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is
void on its face which is not the case here. The principle
has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading
case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through
Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the
matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a
subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable
and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law.
As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding
the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts,
the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its
face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant
to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle
of protection associated with the due process guaranty
does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation
of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the
scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers,4extending as it does "to all the great
public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another
leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state
if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of
its competence to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put,
police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance
was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the
stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in
the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in
Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels,
which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine
entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged
ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests
to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in
a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions
calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the
income of the city government." It would appear
therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining
any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues
eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably
stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer
as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the
maintenance or operation of public dance
halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and
monte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other
than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the
operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any
person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an
opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or
otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect
public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether
national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties however, the exercise of such police power
insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise
of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the
courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill
tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of
due process.16 There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard
to which the governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of
due process which must exist both as a procedural and a
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or
any governmental action for that matter, from the
imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom?
It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those
strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a
narrow or "technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19 decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive
inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an
ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious
proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
authority. It would seem that what should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of
the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted
deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more
specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt
the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the
enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case
must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth,
none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of
such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to
meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any
semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners'
indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process
grounds to single out such features as the increased fees
for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of
freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its
alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual
license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for
hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200%
for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a
P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500
yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back
as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified
into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular
enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes
only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu
Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations
are also incidental to the police power and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule,
declined to interfere with such discretion. The
desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of
persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in
the determination of the amount of this kind of license
fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld,
especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in
the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v.
Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation
may be made to implement the state's police power.
Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm
that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local
Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is
sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects
with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for
public purposes, just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide
latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing
licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one
case that "much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it
were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The
discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with
this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-
appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could
deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of
livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public
markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which
outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was
said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations
which may in the public need and interest be affected by
the exercise of the police power embark in these
occupations subject to the disadvantages which may
result from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract,
insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful
for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a
different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be
viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises
could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are
being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or
oppressive when there appears a correspondence
between the undeniable existence of an undesirable
situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty
which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all
these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent.
It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society
and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he
pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license.
The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good
x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the
interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel:
"Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment
of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance
of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and personal discipline, so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order
and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court
nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer
"retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy
of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with
public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is
that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental
acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How
justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on
another due process ground by invoking the principles of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital
in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen
of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too
detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain.
Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a
guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of
the companion or companions as indefinite and
uncertain in view of the necessity for determining
whether the companion or companions referred to are
those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of
the registry or entering the room With him at about the
same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join
him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as
to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is
dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators;
another proviso which from their standpoint would
require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment"
to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full
day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do
these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on
its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the
question is to answer it. From Connally v. General
Construction Co.33 toAdderley v. Florida,34 the principle
has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the
situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes
would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what
they omit but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with
all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such
vigor and determination, the attack against the validity
of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a
success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law
principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the
appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed
and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.
G.R. No. 92422 May 23, 1991
AMERICAN INTER-FASHION
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GARMENTS &
TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD & GLORIOUS SUN
FASHION GARMENTS MANUFACTURING CO.
(PHILS.), INC., respondents.
Cuevas, De la Cuesta & De las Alas for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the Office of the President.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The private respondent interposed a motion for
reconsideration of the October 2, 1990 resolution which
referred the issues in this petition to the Sandiganbayan
for proper disposition and ordered the Garments and
Textile Export Board (GTEB) to refrain from conducting
further proceedings in OSC Case No. 84-B-1, subject to
a final determination of the merits of the respective
claims of the parties herein.
The motion questions the findings that the instant
petition ". . . raises matters which are incidents arising
from or incidental to, or related to, several cases pending
before the Sandiganbayan which pertain to funds,
properties and assets alleged to have been illegally
acquired or misappropriated by the members of the
Marcos family and their business associates or cronies."
After a re-examination of the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan under Executive Order No. 14 and the
issues raised in the instant petition, we resolve to set
aside the October 2, 1990 resolution and grant the
motion for reconsideration.
In the case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (182 SCRA
911 [1990]) the Court stated:
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has already been
settled in Presidential Commission on Good Government
v. Hon. Emmanuel G. Pena, etc., et al., (159 SCRA 556
[1988]) where the Court held that:
. . . Under Section 2 of the President's Executive Order
No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the
Commission regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and
Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by
Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates,
Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees,
whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the
"exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan" and all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall
likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and
original jurisdiction, subject to review
on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.
In reiterating the aforequoted ruling in six (6) subsequent
cases (Soriano III v. Yuzon, 164 SCRA 226) which were
decided jointly, again, the Court held that—
. . . [T]he exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the
Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the
principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged
ill-gotten wealth, but also to "all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to, such cases," such as the
dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the
issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies
relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not
be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in
another forum. (at p. 917-918)
Thus, in the above cited case we ruled that the motion
for intervention filed by the private respondents being
merely ancillary and supplemental to an existing
litigation (Civil Case No. 0025) and not an independent
action, the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 0025, has
likewise original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
private respondent's action for intervention therein.
This can not be said, however, of the instant case.
This case arose from an April 24, 1984 ruling of the
GTEB that respondent Glorious Sun was guilty of
misdeclaration of imported raw materials resulting in
dollar salting abroad and, therefore, its export quotas
should be cancelled. Its quotas were given to two newly-
formed corporations—De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing
Corporation (De Soleil and the American Inter-Fashion
Corporation (AIFC). These two corporations were joint
ventures of the Hongkong investors and majority
stockholders of Glorious Sun on one hand and,
allegedly, a member of the family and a crony of
President Marcos on the other. The Office of the
President set aside the GTEB decision and remanded the
case for genuine hearings where due process would be
accorded both parties. The petitioner now alleges that the
GTEB decision is res judicataand that Glorious Sun was
given every opportunity to be heard by the Board.
Whether or not the Malacañang decision suffers from
grave abuse of discretion is the question before us. It
must be emphasized, however, that Glorious Sun has
never been sequestered. The records also show that
American Inter-Fashion's sequestration has been lifted
and apparently only De Soliel remains sequestered.
However, De Soleil is not a party in this petition and it
appears that it is not interested in what happens to the
sequestration. Significantly, it was the Glorious Sun's
owner which filed the sequestration case against
American Inter-Fashion and De Soleil with the PCGG.
The issue resolved by the Office of the President is not
proper for the Sandiganbayan for the following reasons:
First, the 1984 cancellation of the export quotas of
Glorious Sun is a main case. As a principal case it
cannot be an incident of any sequestration or ill-gotten
wealth case which should be referred to the
Sandiganbayan. Neither petitioner American Inter-
Fashion nor non-party De Soleil was in existence when
the proceedings which led to this case were initiated by
GTEB in 1984. The fact that the cancelled quotas were
given to the hastily created corporations does not
preclude an examination of the validity of the order of
cancellation which led to their creation. A 1986
sequestration order (now lifted) against the then non-
existent American Inter-Fashion should not be allowed
to stop Glorious Sun from insisting before the proper
tribunal that it was not accorded due process when its
export quotas were arbitrarily stripped from it in 1984.
Second, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to
ascertain whether or not the questioned Malacañang
decision is tainted by grave abuse of discretion. Whether
or not the Office of the President correctly reviewed a
1984 GTEB decision is not proper for the
Sandiganbayan to ascertain. The Office of the President
reviewed the 1984 GTEB finding that Glorious Sun was
guilty of misdeclaration of denim importations. It
decided that GTEB did not observe rudimentary
requirements of due process when it rendered its
decision. The Office of the President ordered a remand
for the proper taking of evidence. The correctness of that
decision is for the Supreme Court to decide and not for
the Sandiganbayan.
In this regard, the petitioner itself invokes the
jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to correct or remedy the alleged grave abuse of
discretion committed by the Office of the President.
Only the Supreme Court through the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction can decide whether or not the
Office of the President committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned decision. (See Republic v.
Sandiganbayan supra.Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84
[1989])
With these findings, we now proceed to resolve the main
issue in the petition.
As stated in the October 2, 1990 resolution, the facts of
the case are as follows:
On April 27, 1984, respondent GLORIOUS was found
guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of
importations by the GTEB in OSC Case No. 84-B-1 and,
as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to it
were cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the GTEB
decision, respondent GLORIOUS filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 67180, contending that its right to due
process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision
was not supported by substantial evidence. Giving
credence to the allegations of respondent GLORIOUS,
the Court issued a resolution on June 4, 1984, ordering
GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the
administrative case against respondent GLORIOUS.
However, on July 25, 1984, respondent GLORIOUS
filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the
petition. On August 20, 1984, the Court granted
respondent GLORIOUS' motion for withdrawal.
Respondent GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss
with prejudice, which was duly noted by the Court in a
resolution dated September 10, 1984.
More than two years later, on October 15, 1986,
respondent GLORIOUS filed with the GTEB a petition
for the restitution of its export quota allocation and
requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision
dated April 27, 1984. Once again, respondent
GLORIOUS alleged that the charges against it in OSC
Case No. 84-B-1 were not supported by evidence.
Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision cancelling
its export quotas was rendered as a result of duress,
threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised by
former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer
GLORIOUS' export quotas to "Marcos crony-owned"
corporations De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing
Corporation [DSA] and petitioner AIFC Respondent
GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by Mr.
Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition in G.R. No.
67180 and to enter into joint venture agreements paving
the way for the creation of DSA and petitioner AIFC
which were allowed to service respondent GLORIOUS'
export quotas and to use its plant facilities, machineries
and equipment.
On September 4, 1987, the GTEB denied the petition of
respondent GLORIOUS. An appeal was then taken on
October 5, 1987 to the Office of the President, docketed
as OP Case No. 3781. At this point, petitioner AIFC
sought to intervene in the proceedings and filed its
opposition to GLORIOUS' appeal on November 27,
1987, claiming that the GTEB decision dated April 27,
1984 has long become final, and that a favorable action
on the appeal would result in the forfeiture of the export
quotas which were legally allocated to it. On September
7, 1989, the Office of the President ruled in favor of
respondent GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings before
the GTEB in 1984 irregular, and remanded the case to
GTEB for further proceedings. The motion for
reconsideration of AIFC was subsequently denied on
February 20, 1990. (Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 7972-7974)
The petitioner raises the following alleged errors:
I
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
PETITION IN HAVING TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF
GLORIOUS SUNS APPEAL SINCE:
a. it amounted to an administrative review of the final
judgment of the courts;
b. Glorious Sun had long ago abandoned its right to
appeal the 1984 Decision of the GTEB.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT GLORIOUS SUN'S
APPEAL WAS PROPER, THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS A
VIOLATION OF GLORIOUS SUN'S RIGHT TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. (Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 12-
13)
As can be gleaned from the issue raised in the first
assigned error, the petitioner capitalizes on the fact that
we granted a motion to withdraw the petition in G.R.
No. 67180, Glorious Sun v. GTEB on August 20, 1984.
Thus, the petitioner contends that in entertaining the
appeal of private respondent GLORIOUS, the Office of
the President "had unwittingly made itself a tool in a
cunning move to resurrect a decision which had become
final and executory more than three (3) years earlier."
(Petition p. 5) The petitioner asseverates that the
resolution dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 67180
was res judicata on the matter.
Time and again we have held that for a judgment to be a
bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must
concur:
. . . (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) the court which
resolved it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be identity between the two cases, as to
the parties, subject matter and cause of action. (Bringas
v. Hernando, 144 SCRA 346, 359 citing the cases of
Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 558;
Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344; Pantranco
North Express, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 126 SCRA 526; and Castro v. Court of
Appeals, 95 SCRA 539 cited in Deang v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 250 [1987]; See
also Escarte, Jr., et al. v. Office of the President of the
Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 53668, December 4, 1990).
The crucial question before us is whether or not the final
judgment in G.R. No. 67180 constitutes res judicata to
the instant case on the ground that the final judgment in
G.R. NO. 67180 was a judgment on the merits.
The well-entrenched principle is that "a judgment on the
merits is one rendered after a determination of which
party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon preliminary or final or merely technical point."
(Deang v. Intermediate Appellate Court supra
citing Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145
SCRA 238, 245-246). In the later case of Escarte, Jr., et
al. v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et
al., (supra) we further stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As a technical legal term, "merits" has been defined in
law dictionaries as matter of substance in law, as
distinguished from matter of form, and as the real or
substantial grounds of action or defense in contradiction
to some technical or collateral matter raised in the course
of the suit. A judgment is upon the merits when it
amounts to a declaration of the law as to the respective
rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate
fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and
evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objection or
contentions (Vicente J. Francisco, Revised Rules of
Court, Volume II, pp. 841-842)
Certainly, the dismissal of G.R. No. 67180 can not be
categorized as a judgment on the merits. Our action in
1984 did not resolve anything. In fact when we heard the
parties during oral arguments, GTEB was unable to
present any showing of misdeclaration of imports.
Concerned about the alleged railroading of the case, we
directed GTEB to allow Glorious Sun a period not
exceeding 60 days to fully disclose its evidence relative
to the charges against it. The motion to withdraw the
petition arose from the fears of Mr. Nemesio Co that not
only Glorious Sun but his other businesses would be
destroyed by the martial law regime. The motion to
withdraw states that:
. . . [I}t has painfully arrived at the conclusion that,
without admitting the truth of the findings of respondent
Board, it is but to give notice of withdrawal of its
petition in this case, thereby to enable petitioner's
President, Mr. Nemesio Co, to immediately free himself
from further tension affecting his state of health. This
notice is being filed under Section 1 of Rule 20 since
anyway the issues in the case have not yet been formally
joined. (Rollo—G.R. No. 67180, p. 580)
No issues had been joined. The movant never admitted
the correctness of the Board's findings. Significantly, our
resolution dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 67180 was
based solely on this notice of withdrawal by the private
respondent. The dismissal of the petition in G.R. No.
67180 was clearly based on a technical matter rather
than on the merits of the petition. Hence, the dismissal of
the petition with the factual issues hanging in mid-air
cannot, under the circumstances, constitute res judicata.
Under its second assigned error, the petitioner assails the
questioned resolutions of the Office of the President on
the ground that private respondent Glorious Sun was not
denied due process during the hearings held in GTEB.
Specifically, the petitioner disagrees with the Office of
the President's findings that during the hearings
conducted in 1984, Glorious Sun was not confronted
with the evidence, which, per the records, were marked
as GTEB's exhibits.
In its petition, however, the petitioner admits that the
GTEB in the 1984 hearings failed to disclose to Glorious
Sun vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its
conclusion that Glorious Sun was guilty of dollar-
salting. The petition states:
. . . In its own Decision, the Office of the President took
note of the fact that after GTEB required Glorious Sun to
submit its reason why its petition for restitution of export
quotas should be given due course, the former furnished
the latter various relevant documents for its perusal and
examination (See Annex "A"). These very same
documents are constitutive of the evidence submitted by
the GTEB which it considered in arriving at its 1984
Decision. With this subsequent disclosure, Glorious Sun
was given all the opportunity, to comment thereon, with
the end in view of convincing GTEB that its petition, for
restitution should be given due course. It was very clear
from the 1987 GTEB Resolution (See Annex "E") that it
took into consideration the arguments advanced by
Glorious Sun in refutation of the GTEB evidence which
were just disclosed to them. Unfortunately for Glorious
Sun, despite the arguments they presented, the GTEB
remained unconvinced to disturb the earlier findings.
GTEB's ruling runs thus—
However, the recommendation of the investigating panel
and the decision of the Board were not based on the data
you have for the simple reason that the specifications are
different. On the other hand, the records made available
to you earlier on which the investigating panel and the
Board based their recommendation and decision show
importations of other importers with the same
specifications as your importations. These documents
are intact and filed in orderly fashion and were again
reviewed by us. The evidences are so detailed, clear and
over-whelming that they show that your prices were
much higher than the importations of the other
Philippine importers. (See Annex "E", p. 3)
Evidently, the protestation of Glorious Sun of non-
disclosure of evidence had been effectively remedied by
the subsequent accommodation by the GTEB of its
request for copies of the relevant documents. After
Glorious Sun had examined the same, and submitted
their arguments in refutation of previous findings which
were based thereon, the GTEB considered these
arguments. These subsequent events, we respectfully
mention, are clear indications that effective disclosure
within the context of the due process clause had been
more than sufficiently met. Even with a categorical
statement from the GTEB that the Supreme Court case is
without any bearing on the present inquiry on account of
the withdrawal thereof by Glorious Sun, the move of the
GTEB in this respect is a sure sign that it did not relegate
to oblivion the admonition of the High Court to afford
Glorious Sun "a reasonable opportunity of having full
disclosure of the evidence relative to the charge filed
against it and the same opportunity to present rebuttal
evidence." (Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 21-23)
The petitioner claims that the subsequent disclosure of
the documents by GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987 cured
the defect of non-disclosure of evidence in 1984 under
the constitutional provision of due process enunciated in
the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of
Industrial Relations (69 Provincial 635 [1940]) and
other subsequent cases. (See Provincial Chapter of
Laguna, Nacionalista Party v. Comelec, 122 SCRA 423
[1983]; Mangubat v. De Castro, 163 SCRA 608 [1988]).
The petitioner's posture is to say the least misleading. At
issue in this petition is the 1984 resolution of the GTEB
This resolution was the sole reason for stripping off
Glorious Sun's export quotas and awarding the export
quotas to two newly and hastily created corporations, the
petitioner herein and De Soleil The petitioner can not
use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the
evidence used by the GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987 to
justify the 1984 GTEB resolution. The glaring fact is
that Glorious Sun was denied due process when the
GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering
a resolution against Glorious Sun. (Ang Tibay v. The
Court of Industrial Relations, supra: Provincial Chapter
of Laguna, Nacionalista Party v. Comelec, supra.
Mangubat v. Castro, supra)
Moreover, as pointed out by Deputy Executive Secretary
Magdangal B. Elma, the documents disclosed to
Glorious Sun by GTEB in 1987 enhanced the charge that
Glorious Sun was denied due process. Secretary Elma
said:
The GTEB's violation of Appellant's right to due process
becomes all the more clear by documents it furnished the
latter in 1987, particularly the summer of the 1983
import prices of twelve (12) importers for 100% cotton
denims, 44/45" per yard, as follows
(1) Pioneer Texturizing US $1.65 C&F
(2) Jag & Hagger Jeans 1.90 C&F
(3) GTI Sportswear Corporation 1.678 CF
(4) Midas Diversified Export Corporation 1.65 C&F
(only one importation indicated)
(5) Glorious Sun Fashion Mgt. Mftg.
Phils., Inc. (Appellant herein) 2.00 FOB
(6) Lee (Phils.) Inc. 3.55 C&F
(7) International Garments 2.10 C&F
(8) Carousel Children's Wear Inc. A 1.50 C&F
(9) Sampaguita (no price per yard indicated)
(10) Pie — Wynner 1.42 CF
(11) Marlu Garment Corporation —
yards priced at $14,394.69 or
divided by 7,977 equals 1.80
(12) Levi Straus 2.66
As shown above, the highest recorded import prices in
1983 for 100% cotton denims 44/45" per yard were as
follows:
(1) Lee (Phils.) Inc. US $3.55 C&F
(2) Lee (Phils.) Inc. 3.13 CIF
(3) Levi Strauss 2.66
(4) International Garments 2.10 C&F
(5) Glorious Sun (Appellant) 2.00 FOB
Considering that whether the importation is CIF C&F,
CF or FOB the freight cost difference is only US $0.01
per yard (tsn, Feb. 29, 1984 hearing, p. 32), it is clear
that Appellant posted only the fifthhighest price at US
$2.00. And since the price registered in 1983 reached a
high of $3.55 and a low of US$1.42, Appellant's price of
US $2.00 is, on average, below the median of US $2.485.
As indicated by the data gathered by the GTEB
Secretariat on the unit price of denim fabrics imported
by garment manufacturers in 1982 and 1983, the
following were the highest import prices recorded:
FOB : $ 2.9/m or $2.65/yd.
C & F : 3.56/yd.
CIF : 3.13/yd.
HCV : 2.12/m or 1.94/yd.
(Memorandum of GTEB Raw Materials Importation
Regulation Division dated March 25, 1987.)1âwphi1
Apparently, the 1984 GTEB Investigating Panel picked
up four importers—identified initially by letters A, B, C,
and D, but subsequently identified as Pioneer
Texturizing Corporation, Jag & Hagger Jeans &
Sportswear, GTI Sportswear, and Midas Diversified
Corporation—whose import prices were lower than that
of Appellant, in order to show that Appellant's import
prices was the highest. In so picking, it could, as it did,
justify the cancellation of Appellant's export quotas in
obedience to the instruction on the matter of then
Minister Ongpin. (See Affidavit of Assistant Minister
and 1984 GTEB hearing Committee Chairman Rodolfo
V. Puno dated April 7, 1986, supra).
Nonetheless, the appealed decision of September 4,
1987, states:
However, the recommendation of the board investigating
panel and the decision of the Board were not based on
the data you (Appellant) have for the simple reason that
the specifications are different. On the other hand, the
records made available to you earlier on which the
investigating panel and the Board based their
recommendation and decision show importations of
other importers with the same specifications as your
(Appellant's) importations. These documents are
intact and filed in orderly fashion and were again
reviewed by us. The evidences are so detailed, clear, and
overwhelming that they show that your priceswere much
higher than the importations of the other Philippine
importers.
The documents used by the GTEB in its 1984 decision
and referred to in the 1987 decision as being "intact"
relates to what the GTEB labelled as Documents used by
GTEB and "Additional Documents" which, as earlier
discussed, were either not disclosed to Appellant for
being privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not
presented in evidence.
At any rate, the conclusions of GTEB as to the
excessiveness of Appellant's import prices drew a
controverting statement from its own Raw Materials
Importation Regulation Division, thus:
Considering the unit prices gathered with the unit prices
of Glorious Sun would lead one to believe that Glorious
Sun's prices are not exceptionally high at $2.00/yd.
(FOB). However, it should be noted that the denim
fabrics are extremely heterogeneous (as can be seen in
(1) above, with respect to width, construction, yarn
count, weight, weave, color, and sourcing or country of
origin. These factors, in one way or another affect the
unit prices of the fabrics. For example, although Levi's
has a higher unit price than Glorious Sun ($2.65/yd. as
against $2.00/yd.), it should be noted that they have
different sourcing. Glorious Sun imports its fabrics from
Hongkong, while Levi's imports denim fabrics from
Japan (this is specified by the buyer), believed to be
superior in quality, thereby more expensive. The same is
true for Lee Phils., which sources its denim fabrics from
the U.S.A. Therefore, it would not be wise to make
conclusions from the comparison of prices, without
considering other factors such as those mentioned
above.
Furthermore, it can be seen from (1) that some
descriptions of the materials are not complete. Thus
there is not enough basis for comparing import prices.
(Memorandum dated March 25, 1987, supra; . . .)
(Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 49-51)
The petitioner cites what it calls "inconsequential
matters which formed the basis of the decision of the
Office of the President . . . which ought to have been
disregarded for lack of legal worth." (p. 22, Petition) In
this regard, the petitioner cites the dissenting opinion in
the case of Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]), to wit:
I participated in the deliberations and hearings of the
Glorious Sun case in 1984 and I recall that there was not
the slightest scintilla of evidence to support the charges
of dollar salting made by GTEB A scrap of yellow pad
paper on which were pencilled a few computations and
with nothing to support them, a graph of import prices of
four local importers identified only by letters, and
another piece of paper with supposed 1983 prices of
fabrics were the only "proof that the respondent Minister
with all the power (he was issuing warrants of arrest)
and resources at his command could produce before the
Court. So patently arbitrary was the finding of dollar
salting that it would have been easy for the First
Division to uphold the exporter's rights . . . (at pp. 588-
589)
The petitioner contends that this pronouncement
is obiter dicta since the issue on the matter was not
presented in that case.
Even assuming that the observations were obiter dicta in
the Peña case, we find no legal impediment to re-
examining the same conclusions which are borne by the
records of the instant case since we are now confronted
with the issue as to the correctness of the 1984 GTEB
decision.
The petitioner also cites the affidavit of Chairman Puno.
The Puno affidavit is a sworn statement dated April 7,
1986 given before the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) by Assistant Minister of Trade and
Industry Rodolfo V. Puno, Chairman of the Investigating
Panel created by the Ministry of Trade and Industry to
conduct hearings on the dollar salting charge against the
respondent. It was the "Report to the Board" (GTEB)
which formed the basis of the 1984 GTEB decision
finding the respondent guilty of dollar salting.
The pertinent portion of the Affidavit states:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Prior to the start of the investigation, I was instructed
by Minister Ongpin to submit a report finding Glorious
Sun (Appellant herein) guilty of dollar-salting and other
violations that would justify the cancellation of Glorious
Sun's export quotas which were among the most
substantial and valuable in the garments industry in
trouser's line.
3. After Glorious Sun submitted its evidence refuting the
dollar-salting charge, I told Minister Ongpin that there
was no evidence to substantiate the dollar-salting
charge against Glorious Sun or any other violations of
existing laws or rules. However, Minister Ongpin still
instructed me to submit a report to the GTEB, of which
Minister Ongpin was the Chairman, finding Glorious
Sun guilty of dollar-salting. (Rodolfo Puno's Affidavit
dated April 7, 1986; . . . (Elma Decision, Rollo, Vol. I,
pp. 47-48; Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner would like to impress on this Court that
the Puno affidavit is an "inconsequential matter" on the
ground that the GTEB did not give credence to the
affidavit. The GTEB said:
The affidavit of Mr. Rodolfo Puno was studied and
evaluated. None of the members of the committee would
agree that there was any pressure or instruction from
former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin to look for ways and
means to remove the quotas from your company. In
other words, our investigation showed that the
committee chaired by Mr. Rodolfo Puno based its
recommendations on the facts and documents on hand
that the members were free in making their decision the
way they did.
xxx xxx xxx
It is important to dwell further on the affidavit of Mr.
Rodolfo Puno who chaired the investigating panel. His
participation during the investigation was so deep and
his involvement as shown by his questions were so
detailed that one could see the thrust of his questions and
the points he wanted to bring out. It is logical to assume
that his posture in the original decision was based on the
points elicited during the investigation. For him to make
a complete turn about now is difficult to understand
especially when none of the members of the committee
share his new protestation. (See Annex "E", Rollo, Vol.
I, pp. 69-70)
The fact that the other members would not agree that
there was pressure from Minister Ongpin to cancel the
export quotas of the respondent does not mean that Mr.
Puno was not telling the truth. Mr. Puno stated
that hewas pressured by Minister Ongpin. He did not
state that the members of the Investigating Panel were
pressured. Mr. Puno was the Chairman of the
Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in view of
his position in the Panel, he was the one pressured by
Minister Ongpin. There is every reason to suspect that
even before Glorious Sun was investigated, a decision to
strip it of its quotas and to award them to friends of their
administration had already been made. At the very least,
Mr. Puno's "complete turn about" casts doubts on the
veracity and fairness of the Investigating Panel's Report
to GTEB which formed the basis for the 1984 GTEB
decision. Hence, the need for further proceedings before
the GTEB.
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect
and finality, and generally should not be disturbed by the
courts. This general rule, however, is not without
exceptions:
As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that
absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion
amount to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the
administrative agency on matters falling within its
competence will not be disturbed by the courts.
Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are
accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special
knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from
handling the specific matters falling under their
jurisdiction. Such factual findings may be disregarded
only if they "are not supported by evidence; where the
findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or
collussion; where the procedures which lead to the
factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are
committed; or when grave abuse of discretion
arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest." (Mapa v.
Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 [1989])
Contrary to the petitioner's posture, the record clearly
manifests that in cancelling the export quotas of the
private respondent GTEB violated the private
respondent's constitutional right to due process. Before
the cancellation in 1984, the private respondent had been
enjoying export quotas granted to it since 1977. In effect
the private respondent's export quota allocation which
initially was a privilege evolved into some form of
property right which should not be removed from it
arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly
confer it on another. Thus, in the case of Mabuhay
Textile Mills Corporation v. Ongpin (141 SCRA 437,
450 [1986]), we stated:
In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the
chance to present its side before its export quota
allocations were revoked and its officers
suspended. While it is true that such allocations as
alleged by the Board are mere privileges which it can
revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges
have been accorded to petitioner for so long that they
have become impressed with property rights
especially since not only do these privileges determine
the continued existence of the petitioner with assets of
over P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700
workers who are employed by the petitioner and their
families . . . (Emphasis supplied).
The decision penned by Deputy Executive Secretary
Magdangal B. Elma and the resolution penned by Acting
Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento II are
not tainted in the slightest by any grave abuse of
discretion. They outline in detail why the private
respondent was denied due process when its export
quotas were cancelled by GTEB The findings are
supported by the records.
Finally, American Inter-Fashion is hardly the proper
party to question the Malacañang decision. It was
incorporated after the incidents in this case happened. It
was created obviously to be the recipient of export
quotas arbitrarily removed from the rightful owner. It
was sequestered precisely because of the allegation that
it is a crony corporation which profited from an act of
injustice inflicted on another private corporation.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion for
reconsideration is GRANTED. The instant petition is
DISMISSED. The question decision and resolution of
the Office of the President are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33237 April 15, 1988
GREGORIO T. CRESPO, in His Capacity as Mayor
of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA and
PEDRO T. WYCOCO, respondents.
Bernardo P. Abesamis for petitioner.
Cecilio F. Wycoco for respondents.
PADILIA, J.:
Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao,
Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On 25
January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed
against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for
harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. 1 As
required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why
he should not be dealt with administrdatively, with the
Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with
Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. 2
On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his
counsel, public respondent Provincial Board conducted a
hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During the
hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was
allowed to present evidence, testimonial and
documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence
presented, the respondent Provincial Board passed
Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner
from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva
Ecija. 3
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks
to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public
respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending
him from office and to enjoin public respondent from
enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive
suspension and from proceeding further with the
administrative case.
According to petitioner, the order of preventive
suspension embodied in Resolution No. 51 issued by the
Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious,
shocking and grossly violative of Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation
of the truth or falsity of charges before preventive
suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of preventive
suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner
adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and
elementary principles of due process. 4
On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary
injunction. 5 We agree with the petitioner that he was
denied due process by respondent Provincial Board.
In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 6 this Court
held:
It is a principle in American jurisprudence which,
undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that
one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a
"property right," and the wrongful interference therewith
is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be even if he thinks that the oppositor's proof might not be
property within the protection of a constitutional adequate to overthrow the case for the plaintiff. A
guaranty of due process of law. 7 display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of the
Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the
issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. "cold neutrality of an impartial judge". 10
To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not The petition, however, has become moot and academic.
fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Records do not show that in the last local elections held
Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends that on 18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public
"Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner office.
mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be given preliminary injunction issued by this Court on 3 May
opportunity to argue the explanation of the said 1971 is LIFTED. No costs.
petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent SO ORDERED.
Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time
allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to
appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." 8
The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand
alone in the absence of proof or evidence to support it.
Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February 1971,
nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the
assailed order, the written explanation submitted by
petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was
issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented ex
parte by respondent Wycoco.
In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said:
From the earliest inception of instutional government in
our country, the concepts of notice and hearing have
been fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of
justice would be impossible without the right to notice
and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due
process and other recent ramifications of the due process
clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or
forget that due process was initially concerned with fair
procedure. Every law student early learns in law school
definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that
due process is the equivalent of law of the land which
means "The general law; a law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold
his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the
protection of the general rules which govern society.
A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of
judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral
and impartial judge are essential elements of procedural
due process.
We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63
SCRA 392), which, unlike the case before us now, was
only a summary action for ejectment that:
In an adversary proceeding, fairness and prudence
dictate that a judgment, based only on plaintiffs evidence
adduced ex parte and rendered without hearing
defendant's evidence, should be avoided as much as
possible. In order that bias may not be imputed to the
judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to
give the opposing party a chance to present his evidence
CASE DIGEST
Executive Secretary v CA G.R. No. 131719. May 25,
2004.
Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published
in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin.
However, even before the law took effect, the Asian
Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-
Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory
relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as
unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6,
paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs
(a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents
therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.
Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly
licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended
their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the
provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.
On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order effective for a period of only twenty
(20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their
comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an
amended petition, the amendments consisting in the
inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other
corporations which it alleged were its members and
which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6
subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section
8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and
40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.
The respondent averred that the aforequoted
provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the
respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against
unskilled workers and their families and, as such,
violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II,
Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of
the Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the
deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas
skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent
stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to
seek employment abroad.
According to the respondent, the right of unskilled
workers to due process is violated because they are
prevented from finding employment and earning a living
abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are
immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled
workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed
out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected
to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the
prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers
abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal
recruiters.
According to the respondent, the grant of incentives
to service contractors and manning agencies to the
exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters
is an invalid classification. Licensed and authorized
recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and
due process and to the "equality of the person." It is
understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters,
but to discriminate against licensed and registered
recruiters is unconstitutional.
The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6,
subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because
licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed
on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that
while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters
who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in
the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not
make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and
(b) being based on an invalid classification are,
therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause,
besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are
violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution.
9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for
officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who
are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale
illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life
imprisonment.
The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and
paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10,
paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of
the Constitution 10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws and
bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume
that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is
guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic
sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the
prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials,
employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of
illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage upon
such finding that they committed any of the said
prohibited acts.
The respondent further argued that the 90-day period
in Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter
should decide a money claim is relatively short, and
could deprive licensed and registered recruiters of their
right to due process. The period within which the
summons and the complaint would be served on foreign
employees and, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the
complaint would take more than 90 days. This would
thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters
the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers.
The respondent asserted that the following provisions of
the law are unconstitutional:
SEC. 9. Venue. — A criminal action arising from
illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where
the offense was committed or where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal
action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the
aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal
actions that have already been filed in court at the time
of the effectivity of this Act.
In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged,
inter alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause of action
for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as
the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having
been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not
violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the
law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the
police power of the State.
In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive
relief, the petitioners averred that: As earlier shown, the
amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit
for failure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that
the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect
and impropriety of the petition.
On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out
with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and
affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court,
likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.
Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the
trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a
bond of only P50,000; and
Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming
the trial court's order and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by it.
Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Order of the Regional Trial Court dated August 21, 1995
in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued by it in the said case on
August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction or not is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. However, if the court
commits grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the said
writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the
same may be nullified via a writ of certiorari and
prohibition.
The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its
face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good
faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of
bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance
that would call for equitable relief. The "on its face"
invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly
strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as
a last resort," and is generally disfavored.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin
the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional,
the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must
demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or
that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its
favor.
Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes
does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so
the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the
very existence of certain laws on the statute books does
not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying
out the important and necessary task of enforcing these
laws against socially harmful conduct that the State
believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws
and the Constitution.
One who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond
reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development
Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption
of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoin upon each department a
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments
(Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516
[1991]).
In view of petitioner's standing
 The petitioners contend that the respondent has no
locus standi. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization;
hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the
action. Although the respondent filed the petition in the
Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed and registered
recruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence a
certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the
resolutions of the said members authorizing it to
represent the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is
the suit of the respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a
personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent
is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it
purports to represent are profit-oriented.
The petition is meritorious. The respondent has locus
standi to file the petition in the RTC in representation of
the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies
impleaded in the amended petition. The modern view is
that an association has standing to complain of injuries
to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an
association with that of its members. 16 An association
has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of
direct interest if its members are affected by the action.
An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its
constituents.
We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the
respondent was organized for the purposes inter alia of
promoting and supporting the growth and development
of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local
and international levels; providing, creating and
exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive
benefit of its general membership; enhancing and
promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino
workers; and, to act as the representative of any
individual, company, entity or association on matters
related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to
perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish
the purposes embodied therein.
In view of standing in behalf of unskilled workers
However, the respondent has no locus standi to file
the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We
note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers
in its petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as
parties-petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered
recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the
respondent failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 63
20 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven
licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which
the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the
petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to
avoid multiplicity of suits.
In view of retroactivity
In People v. Diaz, 24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042
is but an amendment of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is
not applied retroactively.
In view of equal protection clause
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most
the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend
that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the
due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under
the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the
practice of various trades or professions. Professionals
leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and
practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice
their trade.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners
to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
to support their argument that the government cannot
enact the assailed regulatory measures because they
abridge the freedom to contract.
The equal protection clause is directed principally
against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It
is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to
the object to which it is directed or by the territory in
which it is to operate. It does not require absolute
equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike
under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities imposed.
In view of the VALIDITY of Sec. 6 of RA 8042
The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which
provides that employees of recruitment agencies may be
criminally liable for illegal recruitment has been upheld
in People v. Chowdury: An employee of a company or
corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held
liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is
shown that he actively and consciously participated in
illegal recruitment.
By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity
of the assailed penal and procedural provisions of Rep.
Act No. 8042, including the imposable penalties
therefor. Until the Court, by final judgment, declares that
the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement
of the said provisions cannot be enjoined.
Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment
agencies and their officers and employees and their
relatives employed in government agencies charged with
the enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and
imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large
scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the
Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal
recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if,
after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the
elements of the crime charged.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that
licensed and registered recruitment agencies would close
shop and stop business operations because of the
assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of
penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or
speculations. The respondent even failed to adduce any
evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the
enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042.
Its fear or apprehension that, because of time constraints,
its members would have to defend foreign employees in
cases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations.
Even if true, such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly
irreparable injury.
Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters
and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to
obtain employment abroad is one of the primary
considerations that led to the enactment of The Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at
affording greater protection to overseas Filipino
workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws
in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas
employment.
By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against
the petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court
frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal
recruiters and allowed them to continue victimizing
hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain
employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked
the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in
Rep. Act No. 8042.
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary
injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court.
G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as
Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON. JESUS
B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary,
Department of Transportation and Communications,
and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as
General Manager of Philippine Ports
Authority, petitioners,
vs.
UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS
ASSOCIATION,respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO
No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of harbor
pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
violate respondents' right to exercise their profession and
their right to due process of law?
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23, 1975,
Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the
PPA's charter. Pursuant to its power of control,
regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage
profession, 1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 2 on
March 21, 1985, which embodied the "Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct
of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." These
rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be
holders of pilot licenses 3 and must train as probationary
pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of
Manila for four months. It is only after they have
achieved satisfactory performance 4 that they are
given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA
itself 5 to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the
age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or
physical unfitness by the PPA General
Manager. 6 Harbor pilots in every harbor district are
further required to organize themselves into pilot
associations which would make available such
equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective
pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot
associations invested in floating, communications, and
office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by
the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot
association and is required to pay a proportionate
equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to
assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association
concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A.
Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 7 on July 15, 1992,
whose avowed policy was to "instill effective discipline
and thereby afford better protection to the port users
through the improvement of pilotage services." This was
implemented by providing therein that "all existing
regular appointments which have been previously issued
either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain
valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all
appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage
districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1)
year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance."
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots
Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through
Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-
92 before the Department of Transportation and
Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that "the matter of reviewing,
recalling or annulling PPA's administrative issuances lies
exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing
body."
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued
Memorandum Order No. 08-92 8 which laid down the
criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment
of harbor pilot, viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors: 9 safety
record and physical/mental medical exam report and (2)
Criteria for Evaluation: 10 promptness in servicing
vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines,
number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of
vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as
harbor pilot, and age.
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension
of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92, but
Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter
was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of
the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of
the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the
DOTC.
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing
the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of PPA-
AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that
said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its
administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots
under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as
amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines,
was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve
the quality of port services.
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona,
dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining
order issued earlier. 11 He concluded that PPA-AO No.
04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and
purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA,
which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No.
857, mandating it "to control, regulate and supervise
pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district."
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-
AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memoranda and
circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
The exercise of one's profession falls within the
constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation
of, or interference with, property rights without due
process. In the limited context of this case. PPA-AO 04-
92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let
alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of
those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance
aims no more than to improve pilotage services by
limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one
year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid
evaluation of the appointee's performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the
exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA's
jurisdictional area. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, as regards the alleged "absence of ample prior
consultation" before the issuance of the administrative
order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No.
857, which merely requires the PPA to consult with
"relevant Government agencies." Since the PPA Board
of Directors is composed of the Secretaries of the
DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways,
the Department of Finance, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the
Director-General of the National Economic
Development Agency, the Administrator of the Maritime
Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector
representative who, due to his knowledge and expertise,
was appointed by the President to the Board, he
concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied
with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative
order.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and damages, before
Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On
September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following
judgment: 12
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby
rules that:
1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted excess
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a
capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in
promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92
including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars
and Orders;
2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its
implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and
void;
3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from
implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its
implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs,
the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a
profession and, therefore, a property right
under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 13 Thus,
abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be
exercised would be an interference with the property
rights of the harbor pilots. Consequently, any
"withdrawal or alteration" of such property right must be
strictly made in accordance with the constitutional
mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not
followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public
hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92;
respondents allegedly learned about it only after its
publication in the newspapers. From this decision,
petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating
on the arguments of the parties, the Court is convinced
that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of
respondents' right against deprivation of property
without due process of law. Consequently, the instant
petition must be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known
as the "due process clause" of the Constitution, viz.:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, . . .
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two
conditions must concur, namely, that there is a
deprivation and that such deprivation is done without
proper observance of due process. When one speaks of
due process of law, however, a distinction must be made
between matters of procedure and matters of substance.
In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method
or manner by which the law is enforced," while
substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not
merely the procedures by which the law would be
enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." 14 PPA-AO No.
04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in
the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no
hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government
agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate their
views. They are obviously referring to the procedural
aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has
maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has
stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued
v. Hon. Exevea,15 where it declared that "(a)s long as a
party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in
due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the
very essence of due process. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of."
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No.
04-92 no less than four times 16 before the matter was
finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this
score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents
emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, "which
issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots'
examinations," was not consulted, 17 the facts show that
the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of
the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the
Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners
correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval
defense involved in the issuance of the administrative
order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be
consulted. 18
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not
consulted in any way taint the validity of the
administrative order. As a general rule, notice and
hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural
due process, are essential only when an administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the
performance of its executive or legislative functions,
such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative
body need not comply with the requirements of notice
and hearing. 19
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole
and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor pilotage by
pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right
has become vested and can only be "withdrawn or
shortened" by observing the constitutional mandate of
due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from
the procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-
AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the
organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has
taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner
Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17,
1993, decision that "(t)he exercise of one's profession
falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights
without due process." 20 He merely expressed the opinion
the "(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92
does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let
alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of
those affected thereby, and that "PPA-AO 04-95 does
not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor
pilots of their profession." As will be presently
demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and
tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not
only unreasonable but also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced
only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the
granting of license especially to practice a profession." It
is also "the system of granting licenses (as for
professional practice) in accordance with establishment
standards." 21 A license is a right or permission granted
by some competent authority to carry on a business or do
an act which, without such license, would be illegal. 22
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their
profession, they literally have to pass through the
proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one
but five examinations, each followed by actual training
and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:
Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the
respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, the here
(sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor
pilot, he must pass five (5) government professional
examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after
which he must work, train and practice on board a vessel
for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which
he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (3)
For Chief Mate and after which he must work, train and
practice for at least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner and
after which he must work as Captain of vessel for at
least two (2) years to qualify for an examination to be a
pilot; and finally, of course, that given for pilots.
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment
which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire
at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the
terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, "(a)ll existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued by the
Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to
31 December 1992 only," and "(a)ll appointments to
harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall,
henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date
of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the
Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance."
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly
restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the
past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that
after passing five examinations and undergoing years of
on-the-job training, they would have a license which
they could use until their retirement, unless sooner
revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness.
Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an
annual cancellation of their license which can be
temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of
their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and
neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year
terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period.
Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid
evaluation of performance" which is conducted only
after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the
use of the term "renewal." It is this pre-evaluation
cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense,
it is a deprivation of property without due process of
law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO
No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO No. 03-85,
which is still operational. Respondents are correct in
pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a
"surplusage" 23 and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment.
PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth
the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services,
the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine
Ports." It provides, inter alia, for the qualification,
appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and
removal of harbor pilots — matters which are duplicated
in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or
substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
Finally, respondents' insinuation that then PPA General
Manager Dayan was responsible for the issuance of the
questioned administrative order may have some factual
basis; after all, power and authority were vested in his
office to propose rules and regulations. The trial court's
finding of animosity between him and private
respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the
number of cases filed in court between private
respondents and Dayan, including cases which have
reached this Court, cannot certainly be considered the
primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-
92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan should
be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and
the best of professional motives. In any event, his
actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher
administrative authorities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a
quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-
65673 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Summary
Block v. Rutherford
No. 83-317
Argued March 28, 1984
Decided July 3, 1984
468 U.S. 576
Syllabus
Respondents, pretrial detainees at the Los Angeles
County Central Jail, brought a class action in Federal
District Court against the County Sheriff and other
officials, challenging, on due process grounds, the jail's
policy of denying pretrial detainees contact visits with
their spouses, relatives, children, and friends, and the
jail's practice of conducting random, irregular
"shakedown" searches of cells while the detainees were
away at meals, recreation, or other activities. The
District Court sustained the challenges, and ordered that
low risk detainees incarcerated for more than a month be
allowed contact visits, and that all detainees be allowed
to watch searches of their cells if they are in the area
when the searches are conducted. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held:
1. Where it is alleged that a pretrial detainee has been
deprived of liberty without due process, the dispositive
inquiry is whether the challenged practice or policy
constitutes punishment or is reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective. Bell v. Wolfish,441
U. S. 520. In considering whether a specific practice or
policy is "reasonably related" to security interests, courts
should play a very limited role, since such
considerations are peculiarly within the province and
professional expertise of corrections officials. Id. at441
U. S. 540-541, n. 23. Pp. 468 U. S. 583-585.
2. Here, the Central Jail's blanket prohibition on contact
visits is an entirely reasonable, nonpunitive response to
legitimate security concerns, consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment. Contact visits invite a host of
security problems. They open a detention facility to the
introduction of drugs, weapons, and other contraband.
Moreover, to expose to others those detainees who, as is
often the case, are awaiting trial for serious, violent
offenses or have prior convictions carries with it the
risks that the safety of innocent individuals will be
jeopardized. Totally disallowing contact visits is not
excessive in relation to the security and other interests at
stake. There are many justifications for denying contact
visits entirely, rather than attempting the difficult task of
establishing a program of limited visits such as that
imposed here. Nothing in the Constitution requires that
detainees be allowed contact visits; responsible,
experienced administrators have determined, in their
sound
Page 468 U. S. 577
discretion, that such visits will jeopardize the security of
the facility and other persons. Pp. 468 U. S. 585-589.
3. The Central Jail's practice of conducting random,
irregular "shakedown" searches of cells in the absence of
the cell occupants is also a reasonable response by the
jail officials to legitimate security concerns. Bell v.
Wolfish, supra. This is also a matter lodged in the sound
discretion of those officials. Pp. 468 U. S. 589-591.
710 F.2d 572, reversed.
\ constitutional guaranty of the right to keep and bear
G.R. No. L-9480 November 13, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BALBINO VILLAREAL, defendant-appellant.
G.E. Jose for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record conclusively establishes the guilt
of the appellant of the offense of carrying a concealed
deadly weapon as defined and penalized in section 26 of
Act No. 1780. The weapon was a sort of dagger or
sharp-pointed knife with a blade about 8 inches long. It
was carried in a leather sheath, attached to a belt which
was strapped round the body, and hung down on the left
hip of the accused concealed from public view inside his
trousers.
The only contention of counsel which would appear to
necessitate comment is the claim that the statute
penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and
prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms without a
license, is a violation of the provisions of section 5 of the
Philippine Bill of Rights.
Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in
the United States Constitution against the infringement
of the right of the people of the United States to keep
and bear arms (U.S. Constitution, amendment 2), which
is not included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well,
in passing to point out that in no event could this
constitutional guaranty have any bearing on the case at
bar, not only because it has not been expressly extended
to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has been
uniformly held that both this and similar provisions in
State constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized
warfare (see cases cited in 40 Cyc., 853, note 18); and
further, because even in those jurisdictions wherein the
arms is in force, while it is beyond the power of a
legislature or municipal body to prohibit entirely the
keeping and use of military arms, it may, in the exercise
ad lawlessness, lawfully regulate the use of such
weapons by providing that they shall not be carried in a
concealed manner, or that they shall not be pointed at
another, or fired within the limits of a city. (See many
case cited in 40 Cyc., p. 853.)
Counsel's contention seems to be based on those
provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights which
prohibits the enactment of a law depriving any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.
He insists that restrictions placed on the carrying of
delay weapons have the effect of depriving the owner of
the free use and enjoyment of his property, and that the
granting of licenses to some persons to carry firearms
and the denial of that right to others is a denial to the
latter of the equal protection of the laws.
Both the statute in question and the provision of the The right to regulate the use of firearms, and to prescribe
Philippine Bill of Rights with which it is claimed it is in the conditions under which they may be kept and used
conflict were enacted under American sovereignty, and by their owners rest upon substantially similar grounds.
both are to be construed more especially in the light of The general provisions touching the licensing of the use
American authority and precedent. The earliest English of such arms are mere police regulations, intended to
statute (St. 2 Edw. III, c. 3) regulating the bearing of limit such use so that firearms will not fall into the hands
arms, enacted in the year 1328 A.D., was but an of persons whose safety and security of individuals.
affirmation of the common law offense of going around While it may be true that those charged with the issuing
with unusual and dangerous weapons to the terror of the of such licenses willfully or mistakenly decline to issue
people. Many statutes have been enacted since that time or approve licenses in some cases in which the
in English and the United States, regulating the carrying applicants are equally entitled with others to receive
and the use of weapons, and these have, as a rule, been them, nevertheless the regulations themselves are of
held to be constitutional, especially when the general application and in no wise deny the equal
prohibitions have been directed to the wearing or protection of the law to all applicants. The fault in such
carrying of deadly weapons in a concealed manner. (See cases is not with the law, but with whose charged with
48 Cent. Digest, tit. Weapons, and many cases there its administration.
cited.) We find no errors in the proceedings prejudicial to the
There can be no real question as to the police power of rights of the accused. The judgment entered in the court
the state to regulate the use of deadly weapons for the below should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this
purpose of suppressing or restraining crime and instance against the appellant. So ordered.
lawlessness. Undoubtedly there are many deadly
weapons, such as knives, bolos, krises and the like which
every citizens has a right to own and to use in the
various activities of human life. But the right to own and
to use such weapons does not carry with it the right to
use them to the injury of his neighbor or so as to
enganger the peace and welfare of the community. "It is
a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-
ordered civil society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds
it under his implied liability that his use of it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of
the community." (Com. vs. Alger, 7 Cush (Mass.), 53,
84.) Provided the means adopted are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the end in view, not
unduly oppressive upon individuals, and in the interest
of the public generally rather than of a particular class,
the legislature may adopt such regulations as it deems
proper restricting, limiting, and regulating the use of
private property in the exercise of its police power.
(U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. Rep., 85.)lawph!1.net
We think there can be no question as to the
reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the
carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure well
calculated to restrict the two frequent resort to such
weapons in moments of anger and excitement. We do
not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation
would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and
to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community
wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons
prevails, and this without being unduly oppressive upon
the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that
its enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate
exercise of the police power of the state.
G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES E.
EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF
OF THE PNP, ET. AL., respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but
is subject to regulation. The maintenance of peace and
order1 and the protection of the people against violence
are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to
bear arms is to be construed in connection and in
harmony with these constitutional duties.
Before us is a petition for prohibition and injunction
seeking to enjoin the implementation of the "Guidelines
in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of
Firearms Outside of Residence"2 (Guidelines) issued on
January 31, 2003, by respondent Hermogenes E.
Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police
(PNP).
The facts are undisputed:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
delivered a speech before the members of the PNP
stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public
places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed
the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the
issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of
Residence (PTCFOR), thus:
"THERE IS ALSO NEED TO FOCUS ON THE HIGH
PROFILE CRIMES THAT TEND TO DISTURB THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERIMETERS OF THE
COMMUNITY – THE LATEST BEING THE KILLING
OF FORMER NPA LEADER ROLLY KINTANAR. I
UNDERSTAND WE ALREADY HAVE THE IDENTITY
OF THE CULPRIT. LET US BRING THEM TO THE
BAR OF JUSTICE.
THE NPA WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO
CARRY OUT THEIR PLOTS IF OUR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CAN RID THEMSELVES
OF RASCALS IN UNIFORM, AND ALSO IF WE
ENFORCE A GUN BAN IN PUBLIC PLACES.
THUS, I AM DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO
SUSPEND INDEFINITELY THE ISSUANCE OF
PERMIT TO CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES.
THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE
LIMITED ONLY TO OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
OF GUNS AND NOT TO CARRYING THEM IN
PUBLIC PLACES. FROM NOW ON, ONLY THE
UNIFORMED MEN IN THE MILITARY AND
AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
CAN CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES, AND
ONLY PURSUANT TO EXISTING LAW. CIVILIAN
OWNERS MAY NO LONGER BRING THEIR
FIREARMS OUTSIDE THEIR RESIDENCES. THOSE
WHO WANT TO USE THEIR GUNS FOR TARGET
PRACTICE WILL BE GIVEN SPECIAL AND
TEMPORARY PERMITS FROM TIME TO TIME ONLY
FOR THAT PURPOSE. AND THEY MAY NOT LOAD
THEIR GUNS WITH BULLETS UNTIL THEY ARE IN
THE PREMISES OF THE FIRING RANGE.
WE CANNOT DISREGARD THE PARAMOUNT NEED
FOR LAW AND ORDER. JUST AS WE CANNOT BE
HEEDLESS OF OUR PEOPLE’S ASPIRATIONS FOR
PEACE."
Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, respondent
Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines quoted as follows:
"TO : All Concerned
FROM : Chief, PNP
SUBJECT : Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban
on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence.
DATE : January 31, 2003
1. Reference: PD 1866 dated June 29, 1983 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
2. General:
The possession and carrying of firearms outside of
residence is a privilege granted by the State to its
citizens for their individual protection against all threats
of lawlessness and security.
As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms
(regular license, special permit, certificate of registration
or MR) are prohibited from carrying their firearms
outside of residence. However, the Chief, Philippine
National Police may, in meritorious cases as determined
by him and under conditions as he may impose,
authorize such person or persons to carry firearms
outside of residence.
3. Purposes:
This Memorandum prescribes the guidelines in the
implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms
outside of residence as provided for in the Implementing
Rules and Regulations, Presidential Decree No. 1866,
dated June 29, 1983 and as directed by PGMA. It also
prescribes the conditions, requirements and procedures
under which exemption from the ban may be granted.
4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of
Firearms:
a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders
of licensed firearms covered with valid PTCFOR may
re-apply for a new PTCFOR in accordance with the
conditions hereinafter prescribed.
b. All holders of licensed or government firearms are
hereby prohibited from carrying their firearms outside
their residence except those covered with mission/letter
orders and duty detail orders issued by competent
authority pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided,
that the said exception shall pertain only to organic and
regular employees.
5. The following persons may be authorized to carry
firearms outside of residence.
a. All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has
been approved, provided, that the persons and security of
those so authorized are under actual threat, or by the
nature of their position, occupation and profession are
under imminent danger.
b. All organic and regular employees with
Mission/Letter Orders granted by their respective
agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD
1866, provided, that such Mission/Letter Orders is valid
only for the duration of the official mission which in no
case shall be more than ten (10) days.
c. All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted
by their respective security agencies so authorized
pursuant to Section 4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such
DDO shall in no case exceed 24-hour duration. d.
Members of duly recognized Gun Clubs issued Permit to
Transport (PTT) by the PNP for purposes of practice and
competition, provided, that such firearms while in transit
must not be loaded with ammunition and secured in an
appropriate box or case detached from the person. e.
Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps. 6.
Requirements for issuance of new PTCFOR: a. Written
request by the applicant addressed to Chief, PNP stating
his qualification to possess firearm and the reasons why
he needs to carry firearm outside of residence. b. Xerox
copy of current firearm license duly authenticated by
Records Branch, FED; c. Proof of actual threat, the
details of which should be issued by the Chief of
Police/Provincial or City Directors and duly validated by
C, RIID; d. Copy of Drug Test Clearance, duly
authenticated by the Drug Testing Center, if
photocopied; e. Copy of DI/ RIID clearance, duly
authenticated by ODI/RIID, if photocopied; f. Copy of
Neuro-Psychiatric Clearance duly authenticated by NP
Testing Center, if photocopied; g. Copy of Certificate of
Attendance to a Gun Safety Seminar, duly validated by
Chief, Operations Branch, FED; h. NBI Clearance; i.
Two (2) ID pictures (2" x 2") taken not earlier than one
(1) year from date of filing of application; and j. Proof of
Payment
7. Procedures: a. Applications may be filed directly to
the Office of the PTCFOR Secretariat in Camp Crame.
In the provinces, the applications may also be submitted
to the Police Regional Offices (PROs) and
Provincial/City Police Offices (P/CPOs) for initial
processing before they are forwarded to the office of the
PTCFOR Secretariat. The processors, after ascertaining
that the documentary requirements are in order, shall
issue the Order of Payment (OP) indicating the amount
of fees payable by the applicant, who in turn shall pay
the fees to the Land Bank. b. Applications, which are
duly processed and prepared in accordance with existing
rules and regulations, shall be forwarded to the OCPNP
for approval. c. Upon approval of the application,
OCPNP will issue PTCFOR valid for one (1) year from
date of issue. d. Applications for renewal of PTCFOR
shall be processed in accordance with the provisions of
par. 6 above. e. Application for possession and carrying
of firearms by diplomats in the Philippines shall be
processed in accordance with NHQ PNP Memo dated
September 25, 2000, with Subj: Possession and Carrying
of Firearms by Diplomats in the Philippines. 8.
Restrictions in the Carrying of Firearms: a. The firearm
must not be displayed or exposed to public view, except
those authorized in uniform and in the performance of
their official duties. b. The firearm shall not be brought
inside public drinking and amusement places, and all
other commercial or public establishments."
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to
whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to
reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he
filed the present petition impleading public respondents
Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as
Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the
PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division. He anchored his
petition on the following grounds:
"I
THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER OR
AUTHORITY – MUCH LESS BY A MERE SPEECH –
TO ALTER, MODIFY OR AMEND THE LAW ON
FIREARMS BY IMPOSING A GUN BAN AND
CANCELING EXISTING PERMITS FOR GUNS TO
BE CARRIED OUTSIDE RESIDENCES.
II
OFFICIALLY, THERE IS NO PRESIDENTIAL
ISSUANCE ON THE GUN BAN; THE
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH NEVER INVOKED
POLICE POWER TO JUSTIFY THE GUN BAN; THE
PRESIDENT’S VERBAL DECLARATION ON GUN
BAN VIOLATED THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO
PROTECT LIFE AND THEIR PROPERTY RIGHT TO
CARRY FIREARMS.
III
THE PNP CHIEF HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY
TO ISSUE THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES
BECAUSE:
1) THERE IS NO LAW, STATUTE OR EXECUTIVE
ORDER WHICH GRANTS THE PNP CHIEF THE
AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE THE PNP
GUIDELINES.
2) THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF PD 1866 CANNOT BE THE
SUBJECT OF ANOTHER SET OF IMPLEMENTING
GUIDELINES.
3) THE PRESIDENT’S SPEECH CANNOT BE A
BASIS FOR THE PROMULGATION OF
IMPLEMENTNG GUIDELINES ON THE GUN BAN.
IV
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP
GUIDELINES IMPLEMENT PD 1866, AND THE
AMENDMENTS THERETO, THE PNP CHIEF STILL
HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE
SAME BECAUSE –
1) PER SEC 6, RA 8294, WHICH AMENDS PD 1866,
THE IRR SHALL BE PROMULGATED JOINTLY BY
THE DOJ AND THE DILG.
2) SEC. 8, PD 1866 STATES THAT THE IRR SHALL
BE PROMULGATED BY THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY.
V X
THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
BECAUSE:
1) THE RIGHT TO OWN AND CARRY A FIREARM
IS NECESSARILY INTERTWINED WITH THE
PEOPLE’S INHERENT RIGHT TO LIFE AND TO
PROTECT LIFE. THUS, THE PNP GUIDELINES
DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF THIS RIGHT WITHOUT
DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOR:
A) THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER
OF HIS MOST POTENT, IF NOT HIS ONLY, MEANS
TO DEFEND HIMSELF.
B) THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES STRIPPED
PETITIONER OF HIS MEANS OF PROTECTION
AGAINST CRIME DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
STATE COULD NOT POSSIBLY PROTECT ITS
CITIZENS DUE TO THE INADEQUACY AND
INEFFICIENCY OF THE POLICE FORCE.
2) THE OWNESHIP AND CARRYING OF
FIREARMS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHTS WHICH
CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST CAUSE.
VI
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP
GUIDELINES WERE ISSUED IN THE EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER, THE SAME IS AN INVALID
EXERCISE THEREOF SINCE THE MEANS USED
THEREFOR ARE UNREASONABLE AND
UNNCESSARY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF
ITS PURPOSE – TO DETER AND PREVENT CRIME
–THEREBY BECOMING UNDULY OPPRESSIVE TO
LAW-ABIDING GUN-OWNERS.
VII
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE
AND CONFISCATORY SINCE IT REVOKED ALL
EXISTING PERMITS TO CARRY WITHOUT,
HOWEVER, REFUNDING THE PAYMENT THE PNP
RECEIVED FROM THOSE WHO ALREADY PAID
THEREFOR.
VIII
THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTED AT AND
OPPRESSIVE ONLY TO LAW-ABIDING GUN
OWNERS WHILE LEAVING OTHER GUN-
OWNERS – THE LAWBREAKERS (KIDNAPPERS,
ROBBERS, HOLD-UPPERS, MNLF, MILF, ABU
SAYYAF COLLECTIVELY, AND NPA) –
UNTOUCHED.
IX
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE
AND UNFAIR BECAUSE THEY WERE
IMPLEMENTED LONG BEFORE THEY WERE
PUBLISHED.
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE EFFECTIVELY AN EX
POST FACTO LAW SINCE THEY APPLY
RETROACTIVELY AND PUNISH ALL THOSE WHO
WERE ALREADY GRANTED PERMITS TO CARRY
OUTSIDE OF RESIDENCE LONG BEFORE THEIR
PROMULGATION."
Petitioner’s submissions may be synthesized into five (5)
major issues:
First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue
the assailed Guidelines;
Second, whether the citizens’ right to bear arms is a
constitutional right?;
Third, whether the revocation of petitioner’s PTCFOR
pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of his
right to property?;
Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines
is a valid exercise of police power?; and
Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex
post facto law?
The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition
pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Nonetheless, in refutation of petitioner’s arguments, he
contends that: (1) the PNP Chief is authorized to issue
the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a
constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3) the
assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause
of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do
not constitute an ex post facto law.
Initially, we must resolve the procedural barrier.
On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts, suffice it to say that the doctrine is not an iron-
clad dictum. In several instances where this Court was
confronted with cases of national interest and of serious
implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and
proceed with the judicial determination of the
cases.3 The case at bar is of similar import as it involves
the citizens’ right to bear arms.
I
Authority of the PNP Chief
Relying on the principle of separation of powers,
petitioner argues that only Congress can withhold his
right to bear arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR,
President Arroyo and respondent Ebdane transgressed
the settled principle and arrogated upon themselves a
power they do not possess – the legislative power.
We are not persuaded.
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers
of government are distributed among three coordinate
and substantially independent departments: the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Each has
exclusive cognizance of the matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.4
Pertinently, the power to make laws – the legislative
power – is vested in Congress.5 Congress may not
escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that
power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to
abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the
principle that "delegata potestas non potest delegari" –
"delegated power may not be delegated."6
The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative
power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits
of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial
practice permits the legislative body to delegate its
licensing power to certain persons, municipal
corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions,
commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors.7 Such
licensing power includes the power to promulgate
necessary rules and regulations.8
The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since
the early days of our Republic, the legislature’s tendency
was always towards the delegation of power. Act No.
1780,9 delegated upon the Governor-General (now the
President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove
applications of any person for a license to deal in
firearms or to possess the same for personal protection,
hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke
such license any time.10 Further, it authorized him to
issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the
proper enforcement of the Act.11 With the enactment of
Act No. 2711, the "Revised Administrative Code of
1917," the laws on firearms were integrated.12 The Act
retained the authority of the Governor General provided
in Act No. 1780. Subsequently, the growing complexity
in the Office of the Governor-General resulted in the
delegation of his authority to the Chief of the
Constabulary. On January 21, 1919, Acting Governor-
General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No.
813 authorizing and directing the Chief of Constabulary
to act on his behalf in approving and disapproving
applications for personal, special and hunting licenses.
This was followed by Executive Order No.
6114 designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the
government custodian of all firearms, ammunitions and
explosives. Executive Order No. 215,15 issued by
President Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965,
granted the Chief of the Constabulary, not only the
authority to approve or disapprove applications for
personal, special and hunting license, but also the
authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing
developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of the
Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time.
In fact, subsequent issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential
Decree No. 186616 perpetuate such authority of the Chief
of the Constabulary. Section 2 specifically provides that
any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm
"shall first secure the necessary permit/license/authority
from the Chief of the Constabulary." With regard to the
issuance of PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: "The Chief of
Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by
him and under such conditions as he may impose,
authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them
outside of residence." These provisions are issued
pursuant to the general power granted by P.D. No. 1866
empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of the decree.17 At this
juncture, it bears emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is the
chief law governing possession of firearms in the
Philippines and that it was issued by President Ferdinand
E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power.18 In an
attempt to evade the application of the above-mentioned
laws and regulations, petitioner argues that the "Chief of
the PNP" is not the same as the "Chief of the
Constabulary," the PC being a mere unit or component
of the newly established PNP. He contends further that
Republic Act No. 829419 amended P.D. No. 1866 such
that the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding
firearms is now jointly vested in the Department of
Justice and the DILG, not the Chief of the
Constabulary.20
Petitioner’s submission is bereft of merit.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975,21 the Philippine
National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine
Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief
succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore,
assumed the latter’s licensing authority. Section 24
thereof specifies, as one of PNP’s powers, the issuance
of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives
in accordance with law.22 This is in conjunction with the
PNP Chief’s "power to issue detailed implementing
policies and instructions" on such "matters as may be
necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers
and duties" of the PNP.23
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, R.A. No. 8294 does
not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP
Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of P.D. No.
1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely
P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of
penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus, the
provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the
Constabulary the authority to issue rules and regulations
regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations dated
September 15, 1997 jointly issued by the Department of
Justice and the DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No.
8294 deal only with the automatic review, by the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a
provincial or city jail, of the records of convicts for
violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give
effect to the beneficent provisions of R.A. No. 8294,
thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of
the convicts into the community.
Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975
authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed guidelines.
Corollarily, petitioner disputes President Arroyo’s
declaration of a nationwide gun ban, arguing that "she
has no authority to alter, modify, or amend the law on
firearms through a mere speech."
First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyo’s
speech was just an expression of her policy and a
directive to her subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be
argued that President Arroyo enacted a law through a
mere speech.
Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is
the President. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
specifies his power as Chief Executive, thus: "The
President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed." As Chief Executive,
President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that controls
the course of her government. She lays down policies in
the execution of her plans and programs. Whatever
policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to
implement them. In short, she has the power of
control. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law
or regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or
merely direct the performance of a duty.24 Thus, when
President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to suspend
the issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a
subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is well
within the prerogative of her office.
II
Right to bear arms: Constitutional or Statutory?
Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms
is a constitutionally-protected right. This, he mainly
anchors on various American authorities. We therefore
find it imperative to determine the nature of the right in
light of American jurisprudence.
The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply rooted in the
English and American society. It antedates not only the
American Constitution but also the discovery of
firearms.25
A provision commonly invoked by the American people
to justify their possession of firearms is the Second
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of
America, which reads:
"A well regulated militia, being necessary for the
security of free state, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
An examination of the historical background of the
foregoing provision shows that it pertains to the citizens’
"collective right" to take arms in defense of the State, not
to the citizens’ "individual right" to own and possess
arms. The setting under which the right was
contemplated has a profound connection with the
keeping and maintenance of a militia or an armed
citizenry. That this is how the right was construed is
evident in early American cases.
The first case involving the interpretation of the Second
Amendment that reached the United States Supreme
Court is United States vs. Miller.26 Here, the indictment
charged the defendants with transporting an unregistered
"Stevens shotgun" without the required stamped written
order, contrary to the National Firearms Act. The
defendants filed a demurrer challenging the facial
validity of the indictment on the ground that
the National Firearms Act offends the inhibition of the
Second Amendment. The District Court sustained the
demurrer and quashed the indictment. On appeal, the
Supreme Court interpreted the right to bear arms under
the Second Amendment as referring to the collective
right of those comprising the Militia – a body of citizens
enrolled for military discipline. It does not pertain to the
individual right of citizen to bear arm. Miller expresses
its holding as follows:
"In the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less
than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and
bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within
judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the
ordinary military equipment or that its use could
contribute to the common defense.
The same doctrine was re-echoed in Cases vs. United
States.27 Here, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that
theFederal Firearms Act, as applied to appellant, does
not conflict with the Second Amendment. It ruled that:
"While [appellant’s] weapon may be capable of military
use, or while at least familiarity with it might be
regarded as of value in training a person to use a
comparable weapon of military type and caliber, still
there is no evidence that the appellant was or ever had
been a member of any military organization or that his
use of the weapon under the circumstances disclosed
was in preparation for a military career. In fact, the only
inference possible is that the appellant at the time
charged in the indictment was in possession of,
transporting, and using the firearm and ammunition
purely and simply on a frolic of his own and without any
thought or intention of contributing to the efficiency of
the well regulated militia which the Second amendment
was designed to foster as necessary to the security of a
free state."
With the foregoing jurisprudence, it is erroneous to
assume that the US Constitution grants upon the
American people the right to bear arms. In a more
explicit language, the United States vs.
Cruikshank28 decreed: "The right of the people to keep
and bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution.
Neither is it in any way dependent upon that instrument."
Likewise, in People vs. Persce,29 the Court of Appeals
said: "Neither is there any constitutional provision
securing the right to bear arms which prohibits
legislation with reference to such weapons as are
specifically before us for consideration. The provision in
the Constitution of the United States that the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed is
not designed to control legislation by the state."
With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be
classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Our Constitution contains no provision
similar to the Second Amendment, as we aptly observed
in the early case of United States vs. Villareal:30
"The only contention of counsel which would appear to
necessitate comment is the claim that the statute
penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and
prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms without a
license, is in violation of the provisions of section 5 of
the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in
the United States Constitution against the infringement
of the right of the people of the United States to keep
and bear arms (U. S. Constitution, amendment 2), which
is not included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well,
in passing, to point out that in no event could this
constitutional guaranty have any bearing on the case at
bar, not only because it has not been expressly extended
to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has been
uniformly held that both this and similar provisions in
State constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized
warfare (see cases cited in 40 Cyc., 853, note 18); x x x."
Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the
Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to
bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a
constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation. What
then are the laws that grant such right to the Filipinos?
The first real firearm law is Act No. 1780 enacted by the
Philippine Commission on October 12, 1907. It was
passed to regulate the importation, acquisition,
possession, use and transfer of firearms. Section 9
thereof provides:
"SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or
more firearms for personal protection, or for use in
hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition
therefor, shall make application for a license to possess
such firearm or firearms or ammunition as hereinafter
provided. Upon making such application, and before
receiving the license, the applicant shall make a cash
deposit in the postal savings bank in the sum of one
hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license is
to be issued, or in lieu thereof he may give a bond in
such form as the Governor-General may prescribe,
payable to the Government of the Philippine Islands, in
the sum of two hundred pesos for each such
firearm: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That persons who
are actually members of gun clubs, duly formed and
organized at the time of the passage of this Act, who at
such time have a license to possess firearms, shall not be
required to make the deposit or give the bond prescribed
by this section, and the bond duly executed by such
person in accordance with existing law shall continue to
be security for the safekeeping of such arms."
The foregoing provision was restated in Section 88731 of
Act No. 2711 that integrated the firearm laws.
Thereafter, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D.
No. 1866. It codified the laws on illegal possession,
manufacture, dealing in, acquisition of firearms,
ammunitions or explosives and imposed stiffer penalties
for their violation. R.A. No. 8294 amended some of the
provisions of P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the imposable
penalties. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to
bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or
absolute right.
III
Vested Property Right
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that
"no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." Petitioner invokes this
provision, asserting that the revocation of his PTCFOR
pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his
"vested property right" without due process of law and in
violation of the equal protection of law.
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted
Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost
consideration must be whether life, liberty or property
interest exists.32 The bulk of jurisprudence is that a
license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege
is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The
Director of Forestry,33 we ruled that "a license is merely
a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority
granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither
is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right." In a more emphatic pronouncement, we
held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.34 that:
"Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution."
Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a
constitutionally protected property right, relied heavily
on Bell vs. Burson35 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that "once a license is issued, continued possession
may become essential in the pursuit of livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action
that adjudicates important interest of the licensees."
Petitioner’s reliance on Bell is misplaced. This case
involves a driver’s license, not a license to bear arms.
The catena of American jurisprudence involving license
to bear arms is perfectly in accord with our ruling that a
PTCFOR is neither a property nor a property right.
In Erdelyi vs. O’Brien,36 the plaintiff who was denied a
license to carry a firearm brought suit against the
defendant who was the Chief of Police of the City of
Manhattan Beach, on the ground that the denial violated
her constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws. The United States Court of
Appeals Ninth Circuit ruled that Erdelyi did not have a
property interest in obtaining a license to carry a firearm,
ratiocinating as follows:
"Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment do not arise whenever a
person has only ‘an abstract need or desire for’, or
‘unilateral expectation of a benefit. x x x Rather, they
arise from ‘legitimate claims of entitlement… defined by
existing rules or understanding that stem from an
independent source, such as state law. x x x Concealed
weapons are closely regulated by the State of California.
x x x Whether the statute creates a property interest in
concealed weapons licenses depends ‘largely upon the
extent to which the statute contains mandatory language
that restricts the discretion of the [issuing authority] to
deny licenses to applicants who claim to meet the
minimum eligibility requirements. x x x Where state law
gives the issuing authority broad discretion to grant or
deny license application in a closely regulated field,
initial applicants do not have a property right in such
licenses protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Jacobson, supra, 627 F.2d at 180 (gaming license under
Nevada law);"
Similar doctrine was announced in Potts vs. City of
Philadelphia,37 Conway vs. King,38 Nichols vs. County
of Sta. Clara,39 and Gross vs. Norton.40 These cases
enunciated that the test whether the statute creates a
property right or interest depends largely on the extent of
discretion granted to the issuing authority.
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad
discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident
from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that "the Chief
of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined
by him and under such conditions as he may
impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry
them outside of residence." Following the American
doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does
not constitute a property right protected under our
Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in
other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does
not confer an absolute right, but only a personal
privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and
such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.41 A
licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as
the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the
statutory conditions of this license is that it might be
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a
license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not
deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege within the meaning of these words in the
Declaration of Rights.42The US Supreme Court, in Doyle
vs. Continental Ins. Co,43 held: "The correlative power to
revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence
of the main power. A mere license by the State is always
revocable."
The foregoing jurisprudence has been resonating in the
Philippines as early as 1908. Thus, in The Government
of the Philippine Islands vs. Amechazurra44 we ruled:
"x x x no private person is bound to keep arms. Whether
he does or not is entirely optional with himself, but if,
for his own convenience or pleasure, he desires to
possess arms, he must do so upon such terms as the
Government sees fit to impose, for the right to keep and
bear arms is not secured to him by law. The Government
can impose upon him such terms as it pleases. If he is
not satisfied with the terms imposed, he should decline
to accept them, but, if for the purpose of securing
possession of the arms he does agree to such conditions,
he must fulfill them."
IV
Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR
constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution,
the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be
placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power. All
property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, necessary to the common good and general
welfare.
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine
the validity of a police measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the exercise of
the police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely
reiterates the essence of the constitutional guarantees of
substantive due process, equal protection, and non-
impairment of property rights.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis
for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the
society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes,
particularly those committed by the New People’s Army
(NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the
community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a
nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor
in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest
of the public in general.
The only question that can then arise is whether the
means employed are appropriate and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are argument, it would not result in the punishment of acts
not unduly oppressive. In the instant case, the assailed previously committed.
Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of SO ORDERED.
firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish
to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-
apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a
reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is
regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.
Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims;
they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the
revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for
criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other
hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of
guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise
of the police power.45 In State vs. Reams,46 it was held
that the legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in
a manner conducive to the public peace. With the
promotion of public peace as its objective and the
revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, we are
convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines
constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power. The
ruling in United States vs. Villareal,47 is relevant, thus:
"We think there can be no question as to the
reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the
carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure well
calculated to restrict the too frequent resort to such
weapons in moments of anger and excitement. We do
not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation
would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and
to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community
wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons
prevails, and this without being unduly oppressive upon
the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that
its enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate
exercise of the police power of the state."
V
Ex post facto law
In Mekin vs. Wolfe,48 an ex post facto law has been
defined as one – (a) which makes an action done before
the passing of the law and which was innocent when
done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when
committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the
legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant.
We see no reason to devote much discussion on the
matter. Ex post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of
penal laws.49 The assailed Guidelines cannot be
considered as an ex post facto law because it is
prospective in its application. Contrary to petitioner’s