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To cite this article: Nicholas Ridout (2002) Two Parrots and an Answering Machine, Performance Research: A Journal of
the Performing Arts, 7:4, 42-47, DOI: 10.1080/13528165.2002.10871889
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Two Parrots and an
Answering Machine
Some Problems with Knowledge and Memory
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Nicholas Ridout
ive transmigrations (from Cesena through The blood on the floor and the writing on the wall
+-
0 participating cities: Avignon, Brussels, Berlin, make themselves available for the archivist's
<--
<-- QJ Rome). A project that already begins to refuse the impulse. But they dissimulate: they offer the
ru c
CL
archive: it will never be seen in its entirety, nor do promise of a return to the experience, but one we
..c we yet know how much each successive episode will already know, deep down, they cannot deliver.
0 u
::t ru remember of its predecessor. So those traces of They play on the impulse, fuel the fever, but they
I - :L
blood- now cleaned up anyway- marked are traces that really lead nowhere. The only traces
something that was always going fast. It feels almost that might lead somewhere are lodged like micro-
self-defeating to try and see each episode. scopic shrapnel fragments, somewhere within me
At the end of Voyage au bout de Ia nuit, the voice that I cannot access.
of Louis-Ferdinand CHine, stammering, yawing,
humming and chewing itsel( A voice that carries in
its own body the ruination to which it has been
subjected by gunfire, factory machinery and the
screams of suffering children. The wood on which
a line of hydraulically operated legs have stamped
out their rhythm lies chipped and dented. The
sequence in which the legs beat out their rhythm
makes the deepest impression: the apotheosis of
mass-production, an assembly-line of cars and
dancers. And CHine's voice, until this moment ven-
triloquised among the four female performers,
appears at this final moment with a silent parrot
perched on a metal hoop. Speech breakdown,
language becoming sound only, about, perhaps, to
become language again, should the parrot speak,
but that would then be language without language,
stripped of meaning and intention. So instead of
language, the recorded squawking of a human
voice, wrecked on the rocks of capitalism, a trace of
language, trace of a life, the voice of a dead man.
Recorded because it is a recording, a registration of
the trauma of a life. A voice which is now nothing
but the scars left by CHine's long scream of pain The questions I am circling around here, in relation
and hatred. Like the wood, the voice is marked. to my own memories of the work of Raffaello
43
Sanzio, first took shape when I realized that I absence or negation of such moments, memorable
couldn't remember anything about Richard moments, that is, to cherish and fondle, that makes
c.
Foreman. From about 1994 I saw performances of the experience slippery and easy to forget. We don't 0
c:
at least five Foreman productions, but without the have the mental apparatus to arrest the flow and _,..
aid of such mnemotechnic devices as the published reorganize it as we perceive it in such a way that we
playscripts and photographs, I was unable to recall can incorporate it in existing structures for
anything that had happened during these perform- meaning- and memory-formation. Foreman talks
ances. Yet they seemed also to have made a strong about this in relation to a comment once made by
impression on me. How could I reconcile this state an unnamed critic:
of affairs? Why was I unable to remember anything
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+-
0 but it is especially and rather peculiarly true of performance experience, what I am facing here is
'-- (JJ Foreman's, particularly, as I have suggested, in the archive material that I know is there but cannot get
ru c:
a...
absence of certain other non-flow elements usually at. I receive it, and store it. In storing it I seem to
..c:::
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present in other theatre work. abject it, but I cannot disseminate it .
0
::< ru Foreman's theatre comprises moments whose
I - ::E
meaning at the time of their appearance is perhaps
so closely bound up with the nature of their
unfolding, the complexity of what they unfold
from, both visually and aurally, that they are always
more (or is it less) than isolated moments, always
traces themselves, in the sense that they have a
shifting multiple quality, of this-becoming-this-
becoming-this, in the sense of being moments
which contain at the instant of their perception the
shucked-off skin of that which they are no longer
and the fresh sheen of that which they have already
started to become.
Foreman's work deliberately resists and evades
the operations of memory. By compelling our
attention to the moment-by-moment unravelling of
a flow, where connections have to be made here and
now in the four-dimensional space that is the
present of performance, Foreman seems to prevent
me from remembering anything. All I am left with
is an intuition of a sensation, a recollection of a
particular kind of feeling that went on, that spread
through me. I can't archive this in a visual database
- no Marlboro man images - nor according to In bringing performance back to mind we tend to re-
logical propositions or narrative content; but envision it. It is mainly images that we successfully
although I can't bring it into my body now, I think I retrieve from storage, and it is the reconstitution of
will know the feeling again, were I ever to re- images in the language of description that remains
experience it. I can attempt to describe it but I the dominant mode of performance criticism. We
cannot make myself feel it, however hard I try. It is think of our memory working like a projector, we
f....................... . an exhilaration, a rush, a vibration- how poor the conceptualize it as a visual apparatus, we speak of
45
our mind's eye, and try to see it all as though it were that the difficulty of remembering sound is, in
yesterday. As writers we try to bring the reader effect, so acute, that memory is only activated by
0..
towards our point of view, seat them where we sat, direct re-experiencing. My mind's ear is no good. If 0
looking at what we saw. We tend to leave out the Foreman's work is particularly difficult to
sound of it. It is in this omission that another remember, perhaps it is because the sensation I
possible explanation for the Foreman amnesia would know but cannot re-feel, in the absence of
question may lie. In Foreman's work the sound is a the work, is so closely linked to the sound that I can
constant state of managed excitement. Inasmuch as I only remember by re-hearing. The Genesi sound on
can remember it in a manner that permits its my answering machine has gone now, although I
description, it functions as a suffusion of the space. kept it as a saved message for a while. I may know it
The sound ofRaffaello Sanzio is similarly dis- again, some day.
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tinctive, as some of my recollections sampled earlier Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard suggests that music has
have sought to suggest. As in the case of Foreman, the particular quality of being able to free the mind
it's not really possible to say how it sounds, only from the synthetic operations that constitute
that it does. Knowing what it sounds like is a memory. Its uniqueness, which is to be found
particular kind of knowledge that only seems to be beyond the score, in nuance and timbre, seems to
useful, or even exist, at the time of hearing itself. aspire to a 'pure, punctual presence'. Lyotard
During Act II ofRaffaello Sanzio's Genesi,from the acknowledges that this idea of presence 'remains
museum of sleep, there is a sound I know very well. I highly problematic', but insists nonetheless that he
cannot reproduce or describe it. There is no be allowed to posit its possibility, even if it cannot
notation for it and my human voice cannot even be 'conceived, or experienced, or felt, at least
produce an approximation of it. I don't know according to the forms of our sensibility' (Lyotard
whether this knowledge can exist without the 1991: 156 ). Beyond these forms, in the peculiar
operation of memory, but I have to admit that time and place of the knowledge-without-memory
memory is of no use in bringing it back to the that I am trying to suggest here, music, for Lyotard
present. It is as though I know it without remem- 'aspires to exemption from syntheses, forms,
bering it. It is not a useful document if it does not, becomings, intentions and retentions, from repeti-
as Peggy Phelan suggests a performance document tion, in a word. Aspires to the unique pinch or that
should, work as 'an encouragement of memory to "pinch" of the unique in which the differentiation
become present' (Phelan 1993: 146). of the one and the multiple would not have place or
Yet the file is not, it turns out, completely irre- time' (Lyotard 1991: 163).
trievable. Once, when picking up my telephone The pinch is pinch of flesh. The knowledge that
handset in response to a call, I found that my escapes memory seems to do so because it enters
answering machine cut in. My phone is one of not through the mind, but through the body.
those with a cradle in which it charges itself, but Proust's narrator in A Ia recherche du temps perdu-
which allows you to move around, wire-free, with surely one of the 20th century's most significant
the handset. As I walked into my study to turn off performance critics- is at a concert of works by the
the answering machine so that I could talk to my composer Vinteuil, when he hears a phrase not
caller without the recorded voice of my outgoing unlike the famous 'little phrase' ofVinteuil's
message (of some weeks ago) some kind offeedback sonata, the music that has haunted the writing of
between the handset and the recording device the book, and then 'a phrase of a plaintive kind rose
suddenly produced that sound from Act II of in answer to it, but so profound, so vague, so
Genesi and recorded it. I knew it at once, of course. internal, almost so organic and visceral, that one
What I realized, in this peculiar moment in which a could not tell at each of its re-entries whether it was
recording device produced something of its own, is a theme or an attack of neuralgia' (Proust 1989:
46
262). This idea that sound, even in its highly
= organized form as music, might become indistin-
c
guishable from physical pain offers another way of
QJ thinking about the knowledge in question as
3
something that lies beyond the operations of the
c
<t memory. While the narrator may be able to recall to
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mind the 'little phrase', and although it plays a
ru recurrent and figurative role in the composition of
., the memory work itself, there exists also the possi-
c
ru bility that another phrase, somewhat like it, or
working in answer to something like it, might not,
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+-
0 when looked back upon, be remembered, but
'-- QJ simply known as that ache in the tooth is known.
ru c
0...
Such, for sure, is the experience of sound in the
..r:::. work ofRaffaello Sanzio. Not simply in the
0 u
REFERENCES
3 ru violence of Amleto's explosions and gunshots, but Castellucci, Romeo (2002) Programme for C#.Ol, Cesena:
I - l:
also in all the processed voices of C. #0 I, or the Societas Raffaello Sanzio.
Dcleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix (1994) What is Phil-
'little phrase' from Genesi my answering machine osophy?, trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson,
once mimicked. It is a pain and a permeation, as London/New York: Verso.
Foreman's is a flow and an exhilaration. In both Foreman, Richard (1992) Unbalam·ing Acts: Foundations
instances, it is a kind of inhabiting of myself, .fi1r a Theater, New York: Theatre Communications
Group.
perhaps because, in a technical as much as in a Lyotard,Jean-Franf,:ois (1991) The Inhuman: Reflections
metaphorical sense, it takes place in me. My body on Time, trans. G. Bennington and R. Bowlby,
resonates with it. If the audience at Raffaello Cambridge: Polity Press.
Sanzio's Amleto is marked, as I have suggested, Phelan, Peggy (1993), Unmarked: The Politits of Per.fiJrm-
ance, London/New York: Routledge.
subjected to the permanent alteration of substance
Proust, Marcel ( 1989) Remembrance of Things Past,
that is memory, then that marking is the impression Volume Three, trans. C. Scott Moncrieff, T. Kilmartin
of sound in a body. A pain that may return, and A. Mayer, London: Penguin.
familiar, not really forgotten, but only remembered
on its return. The only mnemotechnic device that
will work is the thing itself, in its unique repetition.
The parrot at the end of Voyage does not speak.
In Amleto, the toy parrot does. It must contain
some small recording device. First it repeats Paolo
Tonti's words: 'My name is'. Its fluffy beak moves
as the feeble imitation is produced. Then,
discarded, uncannily dead, it attempts to repeat the
sound of the echoing gunshots and explosions. A
squeaky whimper: the best I could offer if asked to
repeat Genesi's 'little phrase'. It is in me, I know it,
but I cannot repeat it from memory. Some other
stuff is required. 'It is not memory that is needed
but a complex material that is found not in memory
but in words and sounds' (Deleuze and Guattari
1994: 168).
47