46564565

Constitution: Definition, Nature & Concepts
Parts
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE
LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C.
DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO,
REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L.
TOLENTINO, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them from
their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of
Taytay, Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to
respondents' Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and
the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M.
Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G.
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was
"by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986
designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita
L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent
portions of which read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties thereof, I
among others, have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of
all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on
February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day, February 9.
1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that
respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen,
respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222),
their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to
designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March
25, 1986, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within
a period of one year from February 25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials
were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their
term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of
Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the
aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973
Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events
mentioned. 1
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order
terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of
respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered
as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the
dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor
could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by
petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure especially considering that the Barangay Election
Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities.2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local
governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to
"general supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution
further provides in part:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years ...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years
provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.
Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective
Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative,
pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked.
WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating
respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal,
are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents
perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,

ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL
MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL
ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL
DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,
FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO
LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO,
DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,
GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON,
JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO
MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN
CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES,
ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS,
RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG,
ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO,
DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA
LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA,
FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU
RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA,
ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C.
ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO,
DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-
PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA
AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE
THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86
SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS
SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING
OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY,
DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU,
INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED
MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO,
PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE
SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it
may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and
extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its
resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the
relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature
and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to
vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant
petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with
the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution
thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection
of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that
the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power
assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that
governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided
by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification
to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment
Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th
Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the
following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II RULE V
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
Section 2. Mode of Initiating AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Impeachment. – Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified Section 16. – Impeachment
complaint for impeachment filed by Proceedings Deemed Initiated. –
any Member of the House of In cases where a Member of the
Representatives or by any citizen House files a verified complaint of
upon a resolution of endorsement by impeachment or a citizen files a
any Member thereof or by a verified verified complaint that is endorsed
complaint or resolution of by a Member of the House through
impeachment filed by at least one- a resolution of endorsement
third (1/3) of all the Members of the against an impeachable officer,
House. impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution against
such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn
or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the
case may be, is not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a verified

complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – Within a period of
one (1) year from the date
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings are
impeachment proceedings shall be deemed initiated as provided in
initiated against the same official Section 16 hereof, no
more than once within the period of impeachment proceedings, as
one (1) year. such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution
which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article
XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that
the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that
he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this
Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX,
Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3)
this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of
the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ
"perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the
event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as
it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment
complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on
said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus
standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray
in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting,
approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and
Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez,
alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second
impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all
forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court,
the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as
well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the
Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and
issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-
petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition,
which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount
public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar
Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer,
pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections
16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in
behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of
Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and
that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy,
he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the
same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely
without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the
alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of
law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the
second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was
spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action
and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2)
respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate;
and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were
filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to
prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003,
sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No.
260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the
second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of
Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have
yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which
were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court
rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a)
consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In
addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and
others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-
equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to
initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to
Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority
and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the
earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or
in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its
constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28,
2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and
praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion
for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion
for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors
Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in
an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues
and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the
myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted
and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial
review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These
matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity
of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive
1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike
the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power
includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to
be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels,for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set
at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent
in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its
Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was
first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which
shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of
judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential
for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three
great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of
intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first
time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of
and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former
Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As
a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the
writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other
matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass
upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential
for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to
be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De
Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others.When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is

to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon
a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis
supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same
case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light
as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose
votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power
of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action
which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1)
entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial
review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers'
decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a
lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution
to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the
power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes,
[this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have
been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace
its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of
Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power
to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the
power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole
power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the
House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to
the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same
official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead
to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship
on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed
legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that
the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the
exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable
controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this
Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties
as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that
the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject
to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature
is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since
only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister
and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past,
accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception
that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of
the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant
petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a
concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth
regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is
meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It
is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties
who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is
whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On
the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress;
citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly
violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have
been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained
or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract.
It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This
Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the
Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial
taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although
undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore,
behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests
involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res
judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly
appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the
numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while
Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated
by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other
assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is
satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of
such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege
any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to
possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when
the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the
same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as
earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner
Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this
insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective
motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and
arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress
against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to
the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a
taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds
by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal
disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and
when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment
complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former
Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at
this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in
the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take
judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their
signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise
constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the
same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the
Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not,
by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by
itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of
Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their
injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming
to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate
is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning
impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted
Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political
question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated
on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind
the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases,
however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction
whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in
the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973
Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain
cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the
weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the
sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and
appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without
exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee
on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights
of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I
am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the
Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in
1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced
on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in
its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on
September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were
already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of
being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971
and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague,
Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been
unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the
President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which
suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much
less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free
discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If
I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft
of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of
its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he
would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be
submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the
supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens
assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were
released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because
the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When
the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a
proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the
overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the
departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then
informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had
been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense
put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the
draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of
them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they
participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt
that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum
and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of
"political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions:
What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving
conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but
cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling
to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that
she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to
her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by
actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system
of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government
are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of
that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought
on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of
judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the
Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a
question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of
lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has
the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the
new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political
question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the
Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that
we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question
doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond
the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is
not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a
number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present
Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still
not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political
questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no
clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in
that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different
from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses
under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is
an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely,
other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both,
without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to
decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article
VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be
avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if
the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course
will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in
which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated
Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it
is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.
Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly
be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed
upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment
complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which
Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the
rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the
issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue
of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's
opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative
inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This
opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition
which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by
this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to
due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was
verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall
under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned
section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the
House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article
XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong
likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of
the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution,
such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified
impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the
constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption
as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second
impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated
petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases
is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et.
al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this
Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of
the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2)
whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that
the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court
to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws
with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be
declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other
tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested
under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to
take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not
just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a
dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court
had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in
the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and
morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in
[his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a
moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas
v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET
Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This
would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not
sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal
by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's
competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a
duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have
been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom
would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of
the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit
or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot
legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short
of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the
Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court
itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power
of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . .
'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there
is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied
application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question,
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are
frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed
himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial
review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They
stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument
by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its
judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility
of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in
all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not
precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the
Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical
effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails
to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure
to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at
least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes
either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted
which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government
would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws
of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate
manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of
the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion,
to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws,
not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under
this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear
or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of
the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that
the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly
mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3
ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.
Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is,
therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who
eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered
and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings,
which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions
held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the
complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going.
As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform
or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated
during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a
beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The
middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The
beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella
says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or
when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation
happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately,
the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for
Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment
proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my
experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information
of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report,
transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
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MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the
amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not
really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the
floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by
the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the
initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment
proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of
Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
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MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the
Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3
(3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and
the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will
now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the
United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to
impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of
all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the
substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of
the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once
and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote
of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to
file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
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of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence
is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment
case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the
House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House
has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is
made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must
be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is
a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and
consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether
the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for
further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all
the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared
and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that
an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to
the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding,
namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House
is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating
step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the
floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House
does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and
is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on
the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is
ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary
meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because
Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by
equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give
the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction
as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their
personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue
expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of
debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the
Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may
know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members
of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has
not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that
it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase
"to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides
for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its
rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this
Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to
a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v.
De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court,
held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It
is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the
same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even
more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the
validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I
agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he
case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before
the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as
one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to
make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the
journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced
in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of
this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence
of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither
do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house
to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method
of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the
rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules,
i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the
test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3)
its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the
Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
powers.154
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In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the
political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any
foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis
the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155
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The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can
decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of
this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials
done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly,
the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156
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The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent
judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
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In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave
abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court
is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what
it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as
the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of
the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former
Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In
resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience
of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the
violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may
not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed,
the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No
limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold
with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier
enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of
the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-
year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of
our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or
tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For
many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting
experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the
correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice
on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of
faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches
affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was
specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by
the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When
the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference
was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-
restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating
the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already
explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally
vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance
with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem
that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that
problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set
up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately
turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert
judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is
to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the
beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings
against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the
members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be
farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This
Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom,
unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to
the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the
highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him
but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there
are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to
disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of
all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and
obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in
protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just
because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is
solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment
case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in
search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a
blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went
through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of
force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Amendments & Revisions

G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947
ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio Barredo, and Jose
W. Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Tañada, and First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution of
both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance
thereto." The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and
the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the petitioners are eight senators, seventeen
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
The validity of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the case it is unnecessary to go into the
facts at length. We will mention only the facts essential for the proper understanding of the issues. For this purpose
it suffices to say that three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by
a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the
elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the
first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election
of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their
suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon
definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned
resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is
required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in
either branch of Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny that this Court
has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in
the petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness
of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice. This objection, however, is purely
academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in practice and in their
operation they boil down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both are founded on
the regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments of the Government. If a
political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the province
of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by
express constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the
separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty
lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government.
But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R., 695. The case, by a majority decision delivered
by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a
proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable. The Court further
held that the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of whether an
amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the state legislature, is not
subject to review by the court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted
that the amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only)
two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding
that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the
Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of
this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the
validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has once said:
There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed,
or that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government; because the measure derives all its vital
force from the action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an
established form, to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their fundamental law. The
means provided for the exercise of their sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a
construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments in its exercise are in
derogation of the right of free government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against
tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of the State to change their
constitution in the mode prescribed by the instrument. (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L.R.A.,
N.S., 150.)
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas, in
Miller vs.Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful
opinion we quote the following paragraphs:
The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments. Final
determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive upon
the courts." In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However,
whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the
commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a type which this
Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a "political question" by the "political department"
to which the Constitution has committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of . . . government." Proclamation under authority of Congress that an amendment has
been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken place as the
Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the
Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's
opinion in the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive
constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable to
agree.
The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being followed
between submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements
upon a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept ratification; as to
whether duly authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or
whether a State may reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are
all consistent only with an intimate control over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably
embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe were
intrusted by the Constitution solely to the political branch of government.
The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial
construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the
conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted
amendment must die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior
assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has
constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other
hand, the Court's opinion declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the "political questions"
of whether as State whose legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently
reverse its position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead
because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division between the political and judicial branches
of the government is made by Article 5 which grants power over the amending of the Constitution to
Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been given by the Article exclusively and completely
to Congress. The process itself is "political" in its entirely, from submission until an amendment becomes
part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices subscribed, arrives at the
same conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's lack of standing in court — a point which not having been
raised by the parties herein we will not decide — his reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature of
the legislative proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case assailed. From a different angle he sees
the matter as political, saying:
The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130; 66
Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a voter's right to protect his franchise. The historic source of this doctrine
and the reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S.
Ct., 446. That was an action for $5,000 damages against the Judges of Elections for refusing to permit the
plaintiff to vote at a primary election in Texas. In disposing of the objection that the plaintiff had no cause of
action because the subject matter of the suit was political, Mr. Justice Homes thus spoke for the Court: "Of
course the petition concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That
private damage may be caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has
been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1
Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been recognized by this Court."
"Private damage" is the clue to the famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its scope as
well as that of cases in this Court of which it is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated with
the conception that a voter's franchise is a personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the exact
amount "is peculiarly appropriate for the determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, 179 U.S., 58, 65; 45
Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and for which there is no remedy outside the law courts. "Although this
matter relates to the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it is an injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my
Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev., 114, 116; 83 Eng. Reprint, 175. The parliament
cannot judge of this injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff for it: they cannot make him a recompense." (2
Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)
The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave intra-parliamentary
controversies to parliaments and outside the scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in legislative
assemblies — who are members, how and when they should vote, what is the requisite number of votes for
different phases of legislative activity, what votes were cast and how they were counted — surely are
matters that not merely concern political action but are of the very essence of political action, if "political" has
any connotation at all. Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12
S. Ct., 495; Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are
they matters of "private damage." They pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political
representatives executing the legislative process. To open the law courts to such controversies is to have
courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative
assemblies. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White vindicating the private rights of a voting citizen has not been
doubted for over two hundred years, it is equally significant that for over two hundred years Ashby vs. White
has not been sought to be put to purposes like the present. In seeking redress here these Kansas senators
have wholly misconceived the functions of this Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court
should therefore be dismissed.
We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of political jurisprudence and
represent liberal and advanced thought on the working of constitutional and popular government as conceived in the
fundamental law. Taken as persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the United
States institutions after which ours are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they are the opinions
which should operate to adjudicate the questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is necessary,
at the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller case.
Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American Law Reports, supra, comes to out aid and lightens our
labor in this phase of the controversy.
Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-one
members of the Senate, including twenty senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor
Amendment, and by three members of the House of Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the Senate to
erase in indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate and to indorse thereon
the words "as not passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of Representatives from
signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor Amendment was proposed by Congress
in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the
resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a new resolution was
introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were forty senators, twenty of
whom voted for and twenty against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant Governor cast his
vote in favor of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set forth prior rejection of the
proposed amendment and alleged that in the period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment had
been rejected by both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five states, and
that by reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within a reasonable time, the proposed amendment had
lost its vitality.
The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed the petition on the merits.
When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States the questions were framed substantially in the
following manner:
First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing to seek to have the judgment of
the state court reversed; second, whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a tie, as he did, it
being the contention of the petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and his
relation to the Senate under the state Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant
Governor was not a part of the 'legislature' so that under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted
to have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and
third, the effect of the previous rejection of the amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.
The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the authority of the Lieutenant
Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating: "Whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a
question which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally
divided and therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third question, the Court reached the
conclusion before referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the exercise
of its control and of the promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the decision by Congress, in its
control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the questions whether an amendment to the Federal Constitution
has been adopted within a reasonable time, is not subject to review by the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed but in the grounds stated in the
United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts, Black,
Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to bring the petition and that all the questions
raised are political and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that all the questions were justiciable;
that the Court had jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should have been granted and the decision
of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend had died of old age. The Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as political and non-justiciable, passed
by the question of the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to case a deciding vote, on the ground that the Court
was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest of the questions.
The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one hand and the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be
reached, these two groups were divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas,
on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other, was on the result and on that
part of the decision which declares certain questions political and non-justiciable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions "show interestingly divergent but
confusing positions of the Justices on the issues discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455,
amusingly entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the light of the divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly
queries" whether the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been to reverse the judgment below
and direct dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-ups of the justices
"leave power to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the decision should be rested with the four justices
who concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the Court to decide the question of the right
of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the article points out that from the opinions rendered the "equally divided" court
would seem under any circumstances to bean equal division of an odd number of justices, and asks "What really did
happen? Did a justice refuse to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his mind, or
is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half during the conference and have him walk away whole?" But speaking
in a more serious vein, the commentator says that decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds of
irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of the case, decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have
required reversal of the judgment below regardless of the disposal of the other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be considered as laying down the rule of the
case.
The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point of
numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con the general principle (of these, two or three have
changed from their original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in Illinois), three or four are
not clear, and one or two have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685, footnote.) It
is important to bear in mind, in this connection, that the United States Supreme Court is on the side of those which
favor the rule. (Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs. Clark, 36
Law. ed., 294.)
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to follow the
rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents
may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may
be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof,
or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their
order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is
an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of
the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries written with evident vehemence.
Arguments for and against the rule have been extensive and exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to
pretend to add more, even if we could, to what has already been said. Which such vast mass of cases to guide our
judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection and borrowing of materials and arguments
under the criterion of adaptability to a sound public policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our opinion, almost
decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:
SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. — It has been declared that the rule against going behind the
enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government, and
it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the
frequent exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the administration of the law. The rule is also
one of convenience, because courts could not rely on the published session laws, but would be required to
look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments which
might be found after the adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence
of the enrolled bills, authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the
journals that an act theretofore enforced had never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that
these is quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an act
of the legislature has become such until the issue has been determined by some court whose decision might
not be regarded as conclusive in an action between the parties.
From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we extract these passages:
I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few things would be more
mischievous than the introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that the Court should
look at the journals of the Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and filed with the
Secretary of State conforms in its contents with the statements of such journals. This proposition means, if it
has any legal value whatever, that, in the event of a material discrepancy between the journal and the
enrolled copy, the former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the act is to be rejected. This is the
test which is to be applied not only to the statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not only to laws
which have been recently passed, but to laws the most ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more certain
than that the acceptance of this doctrine by the Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We
have before us some evidence of the little reliability of these legislative journals. . . . Can any one deny that if
the laws of the State are to be tested by a comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated,
the stability of all written law will be shaken to its very foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger,
under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of
this character. It is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative act would be
at the mercy of all persons having access to these journals. . . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in
Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L., 29, 34.)
But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then less than a quorum of each
House may be the aid of corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition
of the Constitution. It must be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and
political power must of necessity be confided to officers, who being human may violate the trusts reposed in
them. This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that
the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to
say that its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with
faculties to supervise coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot
authenticate a statute; that power does not belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative journal. (1869, Frazer,
J., in Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind., 514, 524.)
Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence — considered a classic, and described by one who himself is a noted
jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution to American law" and having "put the matured nineteenth-
century law in form to be used in a new era of growth" — unequivocally identifies himself with those who believe in
the soundness of the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the argument of Constitutional necessity, i.e.,
the impossibility of securing in any other way the enforcement of constitutional restrictions on legislative action,
says:
(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it is urged, the Judiciary are
bound to enforce the constitutional requirements of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if
therefore an act must be declared no law which in fact was not read three times or voted upon by two-thirds,
this duty is a duty to determine according to the actual facts of the readings and the votes. Now the journals
may not represent the actual facts. That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be shown
beyond doubt that the facts were otherwise than therein represented. The duty to uphold a law which in fact
was constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong as the duty to repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted
upon. The Court will be going as far wrong in repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in the journal
as it will be in upholding an act based on improper votes falsified in the enrollment. This supposed duty, in
short, is to see that the constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with the journals. Yet, singularly
enough, it is unanimously conceded that an examination into facts as provable by the testimony of members
present is not allowable. If to support that it be said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and
impracticable, then it is answered that this concedes the supposed constitutional duty not to be inexorable,
after all; for if the duty to get at the facts is a real and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any
cost; and if it is merely a duty that is limited by policy and practical convenience, then the argument changes
into the second one above, namely, how far it is feasible to push the inquiry with regard to policy and
practical convenience; and from this point of view there can be but one answer.
(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is treated thus inconsistently and
pushed only up to a certain point suggests that it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption whose
defect is exposed only by carrying it to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It rests
on the fallacious motion that every constitutional provision is "per se" capable of being enforced through the
Judiciary and must be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet there is certainly
a large field of constitutional provision which does not come before the Judiciary for enforcement, and may
remain unenforced without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is not necessary to invoke in illustration such
provisions as a clause requiring the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature to pass a law for
a certain purpose; here the Constitution may remain unexecuted by the failure of Governor or Legislature to
act, and yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration may be
had by imagining the Constitution to require the Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the militia
whenever to the best of his belief a certain state of facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in
truth he has no such belief; can the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his belief?
Or suppose the Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to pass a law upon a certain subject whenever in
their belief certain conditions exist; can the Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that
the Legislature, or its majority, did not have such a belief? Or suppose the Constitution commands the
Judiciary to decide a case only after consulting a soothsayer, and in a given case the Judiciary do not
consult one; what is to be done?
These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of applying and enforcing the
Constitution ceases to operate. That situation exists where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the
motives and judgment of a particular independent department of government, — Legislature, Executive, and
Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by any other department if the one charged fails to
perform them. The Constitution may provide that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would not be
treated as void because the majority had been bribed. So far as the Constitution attempts to lay injunctions
in matters leading up to and motivating the action of a department, injunctions must be left to the conscience
of that department to obey or disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the
same nature as the vote of a single legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each legislator not to
vote until he has carefully thought over the matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the whole
Legislature not to act finally until it has three times heard the proposition read aloud. It is for the Legislature
alone, in the latter case as well as in the former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the
function of the Judiciary in the one case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature to its duty:
xxx xxx xxx
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings
of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them
a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary
to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the legislature. The sensible solution is not to
patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with
the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (4
Wigmore on Evidence, 699-702.)
The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of
United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out
whether or not the contention of the appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that,
roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the
Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the documents
offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed
before the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have held the
copyconclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that the Court expressly stated that it
"passed over the question" of whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its
passage.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended.
This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the
rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each
other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so
much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the
explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."
In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators and
representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members of
Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.
G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any act
that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint
Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the
Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from
passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913; and
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the
following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of
120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces
as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at
least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed
of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on
the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize
Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic
Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1
and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor
General appeared on behalf of respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the Philippine
Constitution Association — hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA — were allowed to argue as amici curiae.
Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in this case be deferred
until after a substantially identical case brought by said organization before the Commission on Elections,1 which
was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in all probability, be appealed to this Court — had
been submitted thereto for final determination, for a joint decision on the identical issues raised in both cases. In
fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review
by certiorari of the resolution of the Commission on Elections2 dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases
were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of respondent, the
memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent in L-28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to
have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.
Although respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying the truth of this allegation, upon the
ground that they have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would appear
to be a perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General expressed himself in favor of a
judicial determination of the merits of the issued raised in said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of
law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source. Despite
his aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court
has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is "merely political" as held
in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on Elections and
filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear before this Court and objected to said
petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or to
pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in
effect, render in operational the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid
reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected
thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court — speaking through one of the leading members of the
Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is true that
in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,5 this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass
upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to
the Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote
requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant of the Senate,6 Avelino vs. Cuenco,7 Tañada vs. Cuenco,8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9In
the first, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and
control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to
determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by
Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of
the party having the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as
members, for the second party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an
act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the
ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of
each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were
political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant
of legislative powers to Congress.10 It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of sovereignty
in a republican state, such as ours11 — to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power.12 Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members
of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function,13 for
their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on
whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of
our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme
Court,14 the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently political character of treaty-making
power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates the
Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this
view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter should be deemed modified
accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:

The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either by Congress, or by a
convention called by Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such amendments shall be valid
as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all
the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged
that said resolutions are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a
convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose — amendments or call a convention therefore but
may not avail of both — that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention — at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be
a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and local governments — such as the
elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 — will be chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to
the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions — which, allegedly, do not exist — as to give the
people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who
shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make
an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of
Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from
the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous
and compact territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no apportionment having been made within
three (3) years thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that
Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen, respectively; and
that, consequently, the disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act
No. 4913, are null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within three years after the enumeration or
census made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which became Republic Act No. 3040,17 purporting to make said
apportionment. This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the ground that the apportionment therein
undertaken had not been made according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines.18
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of Congress to make a valid
apportionment within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress" and
that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de facto officers. The major premise
of this process of reasoning is that the constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after the return
of every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make
said apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered
Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto officers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a valid apportionment as
required in said fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to
which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same
number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified
electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . .
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a
Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress
shall continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of said period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in 1935. This theory assumes that an
apportionment had to be made necessarily before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is, however, unwarranted, for there had been no
enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted and adopted the
Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period, after the earliest possible enumeration,
would expire after the elections in 1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly those on the legislative
department, were amended in 1940, by establishing a bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted said
amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution regarding the apportionment of the
districts for representatives, must have known that the three-year period therefor would expire after the elections
scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of the
amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and the effect of the
failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even
after subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last enumeration was submitted to the President
on November 30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire until 1963, or
after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore, that the Senate and the House of
Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the Members
thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three
years, or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the House of Representatives,
became illegal holder of their respective offices, and were de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a reapportionment, had the effect of
abrogating or repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are
not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither do they allege that the term of
office of the members of said House automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress,
upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in
particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically
result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to the election of Members of
Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within
three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably held in
conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating Congress — with a House of Representatives
composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they existed at the time of said
elections — remained in force, we can not see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded
as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment within the period
aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the President, the Vice-President, the Justices
of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the enforcement
of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main function. This provision indicates that, despite the
violation of such mandatory duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster
pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of
office or the extinction of title thereto is not automatic.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely de facto officers, it would not
follow that the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the
existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an
office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as distinguished from the officer
in question — is concerned.21 Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers and employees of the Government
would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they hold, before dealing with
them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if they should act within the limits of the
authority vested in their respective offices, positions or employments.22 One can imagine this great inconvenience,
hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.23 It may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is
merely a de facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office;
and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is
concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the acts therein involved have not been
completed and petitioners herein are not third parties. This pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent with Tayko vs.
Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge Capistrano objected to his
continuing to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement. This Court held
that the objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can not be
assailed collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko
was one of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the
case, much less rendered decision therein. No rights had vested in favor of the parties, in consequence of the acts
of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as
regards the Resolutions herein contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing else to
do in connection therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under consideration is untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either propose amendments to the Constitution
or call a convention for that purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact that
the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak
one, in the absence of other circumstances — and none has brought to our attention — supporting the conclusion
drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the
spirit or context of the law warrants it.26
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional provision on Congress,
to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention
in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words, the subject-matter of
R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under R. B. H.
Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the constitutional
convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they
were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were not passed at the same
time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that would negate the
authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same
in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible reason
been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose amendments, why not let
the whole thing be submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be
submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of this argument must be conceded. but the same
impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof to
permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional convention and participate in the
proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not this should be done is a political
question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call
a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general,
election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then
obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments, that the same be
submitted to the people's approval independently of the election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact
that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits proposed amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the
great attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in general elections, particularly when
provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of
holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to
choose either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the abovequoted provision
of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent when we consider: (1) that the term "election,"
normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in
Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be construed
as meaning a special election. Some members of the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a
"plebiscite," without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that constitutional amendments
are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention
of the people be focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no more
than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at
least, undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to
affect the selection of elective officials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal
conditions are, however, one thing. The question whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for
amendment to the people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer and those who concur
in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading
into the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof,
since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation.
The majority view — although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913
unconstitutional — as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution?
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14,
1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question. Then
again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty days
prior to the election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality,
city and provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and that said copy
"shall remain posted therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling place, to be made available for
examination by the qualified electors during election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in English, Spanish and,
whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distributing:" and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the ballots which shall be used on
November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably inadequate to comply with the constitutional
requirement that proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and that said measures
are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of the amendment sought to be
made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the subject submitted to them for
ratification, from the original Constitution down to the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the original Constitution,
Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English
and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a printed copy of
said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each
municipal and provincial government office building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-
second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein continually until after
the termination of the election. At least ten copies of the Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto,
in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by the qualified
electors during election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal local dialects as may be
determined by the Secretary of the Interior shall also be kept in each polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:
Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for
three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office building and in each polling place not later than
the twenty-second day of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein continually until
after the termination of the plebiscite. At least ten copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in English and
in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by the qualified electors during the
plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940 amendments, is of the following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office building and in every polling place not later
than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At
least ten copies of said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for
examination by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the effect that:
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office building and in every polling place not later
than February eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the
election. At least, ten copies of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made available
for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall also be kept in each polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection with the former proposals does
not arise from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major political parties
had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution — except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage — and,
consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said political
parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested and have, accordingly,
refrained from discussing the same in the current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken
place — on a rather limited scale — on the latest proposals for amendment, have been due principally to the
initiative of a few civic organizations and some militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion
thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the community to
discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at
the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those
that take place subsequently to the passage or approval of the law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a
constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends — in
the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the minority —
upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main
idea or the substance of said proposals, which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum number of
seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the
members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the
duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who constitute the minority — believe that
Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the proposed maximum of representative
districts are actually apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable,
however, that they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful reading thereof may tend
in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may
enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the
copies kept in the polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the ballots
they will use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or envisage the effect of R. B. H. No.
3 upon the work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell
such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as
the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should
run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but,
we feel that such factors affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and
3, not the authority of Congress to approve the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down acts of the Executive or of
Congress transcending the confines set forth in the fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of
separation of powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme within its own sphere. The determination of
the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter
which falls within the legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has
exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done something better to
enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is
beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court
believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G.
BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA,
LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by
the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent
implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they
direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC)
performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being
violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required that copies
thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action
as they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with petitioner.
To further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are indispensable
parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds
appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and
Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the petition was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist
petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible confusion, and
considering that with the principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests would be
adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the
Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S.
Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo
Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to
intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved
should be duly and amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding motions
for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates
and some private parties, the latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of
this case with the records and the Court acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in the
extensive study that has been undertaken in this case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint
sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said
Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof,
Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall
have the same qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted
to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed
originally in Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1,
1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as
its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more
accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1
reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and
are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year
and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding
the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in
November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of
suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the
1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the
entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or
from its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that
should there be no savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the
equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help
the Convention implement (the above) resolution." The said letter reads:
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known as the
Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention implement this
resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL

DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the
plebiscite on condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election
returns and tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the printing and shipment
of said ballots and election forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time so that they
could be distributed at the same time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample
ballots to be used in the elections on November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of
the above proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement
the Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the President who then
transmitted them to the Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the implementation of
the plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters
of transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution
authored by Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from
November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of
Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto
attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose
Ozamiz confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution
No. 1, including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection with
said implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they
provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and
municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to
carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling
and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative
body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of
the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and
intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the
ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the Convention
as a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of
submitting such amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in
discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue
before Us is a political question and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and
as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it
is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief
Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer
acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales
v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the
other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished
counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would
misapply them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality
of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional
convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the
former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any
lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the
Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court — speaking through one
of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional
Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto
as a political one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in
Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the
people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The
force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate
(81 Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb.
28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held
that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and
control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court
proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we
nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said
chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein
of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to
apportion the representatives districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the
apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of
each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases that the issues therein
raised were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and,
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution
of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and members of the
House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of
a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from
the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, (Of amending the
Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very
source of all powers of government including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not
have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise,
they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a
government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed
by the fact that the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to
lower courts.) the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution),
despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly —
violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review,
and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
(supra) the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous
on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme. Nowhere
in his petition and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what respondents
and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other
convention of the same nature, owes its existence and derives all its authority and power from the existing
Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case of a
revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government born of either a war of
liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of
power a la coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely without
restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact
that the current convention came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress
acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to
this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers generally beyond the
control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only
with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the
Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its
officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force
and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates
even within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the performance of its
task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other
authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can
rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the
equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the
existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of
private property without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or
declare war or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a
convict or render judgment in a controversy between private individuals or between such individuals and the state, in
violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less exercise,
in the light of the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be assailed by a
citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing Constitution, who can decide
whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the
Power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we would have
to confess that the integrated system of government established by our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no
intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and craftsmanship in
constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth
of principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as
much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and
balances and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living Constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is
found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by
clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it
ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not
"the chief palladium of constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must also
be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression
on the authority of their Constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than
in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed
the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission
has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly;
notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as
contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935 then the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect.
But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating
its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935,
by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of
American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The
Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not
be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable
and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have
declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions
prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a
recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are
bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921
expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap.
IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitution
are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia
and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional
Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,
Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the
validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a
final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the
Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the
conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created
in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To
ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon
the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do
not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all
such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand, and any other
constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent
assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever,
and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling
should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the people,
since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the present
Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes
without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject
to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and
the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the
solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and
intervenors have joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the
proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said
resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and unequivocal
statement of the real issue which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not
against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has
advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to
prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in
filing the petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any violation of the Constitution
of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in connection with the most laudable undertaking.
Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point of whether
or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the
constitutional amendment proposed in the abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided
in said resolution as well as in the subject question implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its
officers, at this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not
set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments
affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides,
that the amendment therein proposed "shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the
future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section or on other portions of the
entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be understood as
reflecting, in any degree or means the individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental
issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply because that issue is not before Us
now. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will
not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their approval or
rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to
the absolute necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of
adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose cannot permit any other line
of conduct or approach in respect of the problem before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born,
in a great measure, because of the pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various
elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing
about meaningful changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and governmental institutions, including
the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic security of the underprivileged classes
of our people as well as those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural resources and the national
patrimony, as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the
excesses of enthusiasm which at times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets,
plazas and campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not want confusion and
disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the pursuit
of what they strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present order of things in this Republic of ours. It
would be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in
deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the
applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it binds other departments
of the government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to give
meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the
proper parties, and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved to
discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of
being convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to
put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there are respectable sectors
opining that it has not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision,
Article XV, from which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form part of
it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that
only the collective judgment of its members as to what is warranted by the present condition of things, as they see it,
can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may propose, hence the complete substitution of
the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this
grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in which it should discharge
its constitutional duty in such premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in which
respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do
not necessarily impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court considers it to be
of the utmost importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its
constitutionally as signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to
clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that it
would be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing
Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be resolved by
the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the principle of
respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the other coordinate departments of the government, and certainly,
the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention came into being by
a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in
this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its
assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all
subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing
amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it
is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be
undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most
valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers
have chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the
Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within
the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A
constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation
and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the
whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From
the very nature of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any
limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of
subsequent conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that
their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely personal but
more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for
ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must
be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods or fancies.
Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so
by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are
so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim
that they may ignore and disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their original
counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature and the scope
and extent of the amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass on
the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the power or duty to call a
plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and as
such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the said power can be exercised concurrently by the
Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does not perceive absolute necessity
to resolve that question, grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus
among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and as
time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the
plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this
question until a more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important and decisive
as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of
the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the
amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or
plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first
amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same
for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution,
hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress
sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose.
The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people
for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify
any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the
provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already
stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed,
any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an
integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the
one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights,
liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt
is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its
other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original
constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole
constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can
either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine
for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the
document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing
constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole
existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that under Section
3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally
will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the
Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it
impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section
3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the
circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they
will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can he render on
the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the
constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of
foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the
Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the
country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of
introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and
political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently
determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may
establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution
may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of
the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to
form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started
considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to
the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the
present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are
in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present
Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the
sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the
ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be,
in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper
submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional Convention. Much less
does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But
like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution which is to decide in
appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates of the fundamental law are being complied
with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite
before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate
the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the
amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed
amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted
to them not separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the
holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying
therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer,
Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in
compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares
this decision immediately executory. No costs.
G.R. No. L-35925 January 22, 1973
CHARITO PLANAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-35929 January 22, 1973
PABLO C. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
G.R. No. L-35940 January 22, 1973
GERARDO ROXAS, etc., et al. petitioners,

vs.
G.R. No. L-35941 January 22, 1973
EDDIE B. MONTECLARO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-35942 January 22, 1973
SEDFREY A. ORDOÑEZ, et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-35948 January 22, 1973
VIDAL TAN, et al., petitioners,

vs.
G.R. No. L-35953 January 22, 1973
JOSE W. DIOKNO, et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35961 January 22, 1973
JACINTO JIMENEZ, petitioner,

vs.
G.R. No. L-35965 January 22, 1973
RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-35979 January 22, 1973
ERNESTO HIDALGO, petitioner,

vs.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Charito Planas.
Pablito V. Sanidad and Gerardo L. Catipon for petitioner Pablo C. Sanidad.
Jovito R. Salonga and Associates and Rodrigo Law Office for petitioners Gerardo Roxas, etc., et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioner Eddie B. Monteclaro.
Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Associates for petitioners Sedfrey A. Ordonez, et al.
Lorenzo M. Tañada for petitioners Vidal Tan, et al.
Francis E. Garchitorena for petitioners Jose W. Diokno, et al.
Jacinto Jimenez in his own behalf.
Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.
Ernesto Hidalgo in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor
Vicente V. Mendoza and Solicitor Reynato S. Puno for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4
of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August
24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on November
10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the
Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire
Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting
the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
Soon after, or on December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed, with this Court, Case G. R. No. L-35925, against the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or
their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon
the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ... of such
plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the
question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the
Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed
Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no
sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."
Substantially identical actions were filed, on December 8, 1972, by Pablo C. Sanidad against the Commission on
Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35929); on December 11, 1972, by Gerardo Roxas, et al., against the Commission on
Elections, the Director of Printing, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35940), by
Eddie B. Monteclaro against the Commission on Elections and the Treasurer of the Philippines (Case G.R. No. L-
35941), and by Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, et al. against the National Treasurer and the Commission on Elections (Case
G.R. No. L-35942); on December 12, 1972, by Vidal Tan, et al., against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer
of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of Printing (Case G.R. No. L-35948), and by Jose W. Diokno
and Benigno S. Aquino against the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35953); on December 14, 1972, by
Jacinto Jimenez against the Commission on Elections, the Auditor General, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the
Director of the Bureau of Printing (Case G.R. No. L-35961), and by Raul M. Gonzales against the Commission on
Elections, the Budget Commissioner, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G. R. No. L-35965); and
on December 16, 1972, by Ernesto C. Hidalgo against the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of Education, the
National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35979).
In all these cases, except the last (G.R. No. L-35979), the respondents were required to file their answers "not later
than 12: 00 (o'clock) noon of Saturday, December 16, 1972." Said cases were, also, set for hearing and partly heard
on Monday, December 18, 1972, at 9:30 a.m. The hearing was continued on December 19, 1972. By agreement of
the parties, the aforementioned last case - G.R. No. L-35979 — was, also, heard, jointly with the others, on
December 19, 1972. At the conclusion of the hearing, on that date, the parties in all of the aforementioned cases
were given a short period of time within which "to submit their notes on the points they desire to stress." Said notes
were filed on different dates, between December 21, 1972, and January 4, 1973.
Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23,
the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was
issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1973, be postponed until further notice."
Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution."
In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to
refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under
which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the
1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to
Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement
of the plebiscite by the President — reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and
the Commission on Elections — the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that
said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." It was alleged in said
motion, inter alia:
6. That the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 86
organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions [Bulletin
Today, January 1, 1973];
7. That thereafter it was later announced that "the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose
—
"[1] The New Society;
"[2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law;
"[3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the
tentative new date given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the
original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5);
"[4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the
existing Constitution despite Martial Law." [Bulletin Today, January 3, 1973.]
8. That it was later reported that the following are to be the forms of the questions to be asked to the
Citizens Assemblies: —
"[1] Do you approve of the New Society?
"[2] Do you approve of the reform measures under martial law?
"[3] Do you think that Congress should meet again in regular session?
"[4] How soon would you like the plebiscite on the new Constitution to be held?"
[Bulletin Today, January 5, 1973;
9. That the voting by the so-called Citizens Assemblies was announced to take place during the
period from January 10 to January 15, 1973;
10 That on January 10, 1973, it was reported that one more question would be added to the four (4)
questions previously announced, and that the forms of the questions would be as follows: —
"[1] Do you like the New Society?
"[2] Do you like the reforms under martial law?
"[3] Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?
"[4] Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?
"[5] Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of the government?"
[Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973; additional question emphasis.]
11. That on January 11, 1973, it was reported that six (6) more questions would be submitted to the
so-called Citizens Assemblies: —
"[1] Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to
decide issues of national interests?
"[2] Do you approve of the new Constitution?
"[3] Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
"[4] Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution ?
"[5] If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be
called?
"[6] Do you want martial law to continue?" [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973;
emphasis supplied.]
12. That according to reports, the returns with respect to the six (6) additional questions quoted
above will be on a form similar or identical to Annex "A" hereof;
13. That attached to page 1 of Annex "A" is another page, which we marked as Annex "A-1", and
which reads: —
"COMMENTS ON
QUESTION No. 1
In order to broaden the base of citizens' participation in government.
QUESTION No. 2
But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked. Or if it is to be

convened at all, it should not be done so until after at least seven (7) years from the
approval of the New Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies.
QUESTION No. 3
The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered the plebiscite on
the New Constitution.
If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the new
Constitution should be deemed ratified.
QUESTION No. 4
We are sick and tired of too frequent elections. We are fed up with politics, of so
many debates and so much expenses.
QUESTION No. 5
Probably a period of at least seven (7) years moratorium on elections will be enough
for stability to be established in the country, for reforms to take root and normalcy to
return.
QUESTION No. 6
We want President Marcos to continue with Martial Law. We want him to exercise his
powers with more authority. We want him to be strong and firm so that he can
accomplish all his reform programs and establish normalcy in the country. If all other
measures fail, we want President Marcos to declare a revolutionary government
along the lines of the new Constitution without the ad interim Assembly."
Attention is respectfully invited to the comments on "Question No. 3", which reads: —
"QUESTION No. 3
The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be considered the plebiscite on the New
Constitution.
This, we are afraid, and therefore allege, is pregnant with ominous possibilities.
14. That, in the meantime, speaking on television and over the radio, on January 7, 1973, the
President announced that the limited freedom of debate on the proposed Constitution was being
withdrawn and that the proclamation of martial law and the orders and decrees issued thereunder
would thenceforth strictly be enforced [Daily Express, January 8, 1973];
15. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore state, that the question added in the last list
of questions to be asked to the Citizens Assemblies, namely: —
Do you approve of the New Constitution?" —
in relation to the question following it: —
"Do you still want a plebiscite to call to ratify the new Constitution?" —
would be an attempt to by-pass and short-circuit this Honorable Court before which the question of
the validity of the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution is now pending;
16. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore allege, that if an affirmative answer to the two
questions just referred to will be reported then this Honorable Court and the entire nation will be
confronted with a fait accompli which has been attained in a highly unconstitutional and
undemocratic manner;
17. That the fait accompli would consist in the supposed expression of the people approving the
proposed Constitution;
18. That, if such event would happen, then the case before this Honorable Court could, to all intents
and purposes, become moot because, petitioners fear, and they therefore allege, that on the basis of
such supposed expression of the will of the people through the Citizens Assemblies, it would be
announced that the proposed Constitution, with all its defects, both congenital and otherwise, has
been ratified;
19. That, in such a situation, the Philippines will be facing a real crisis and there is likelihood of
confusion if not chaos, because then, the people and their officials will not know which Constitution
is in force.
20. That the crisis mentioned above can only be avoided if this Honorable Court will immediately
decide and announce its decision on the present petition;
21. That with the withdrawal by the President of the limited freedom of discussion on the proposed
Constitution which was given to the people pursuant to Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 73, the
opposition of respondents to petitioners' prayer that the proposed plebiscite be prohibited has now
collapsed and that a free plebiscite can no longer be held.
At about the same time, a similar prayer was made in a "manifestation" filed by the petitioners in L-35949, "Gerardo
Roxas, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al.," and
L-35942, "Sedfrey A. Ordonez, et al. v. The National Treasurer, et al."
The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in
said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January
16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948
filed a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying —
... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections,
as well as the Department of LocaI Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Rono; the
Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification
Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and
substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting,
certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called
Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met
during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions
quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.
In support of this prayer, it was alleged —
3. That petitioners are now before this Honorable Court in order to ask further that this Honorable
Court issue a restraining order enjoining herein respondents, particularly respondent Commission on
Elections as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Rono; the
Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; and their deputies, subordinates
and/or substitutes, from collecting, certifying, announcing and reporting to the President the
supposed Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to
have met during the period between January 10 and January 15, 1973, particularly on the two
questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion;
4. That the proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies are illegal, null and void particularly
insofar as such proceedings are being made the basis of a supposed consensus for the ratification
of the proposed Constitution because: —
(a) The elections contemplated in the Constitution, Article XV, at which the proposed
constitutional amendments are to be submitted for ratification, are elections at which
only qualified and duly registered voters are permitted to vote, whereas, the so-called
Citizens' Assemblies were participated in by persons 15 years of age and older,
regardless of qualifications or lack thereof, as prescribed in the Election Code;
(b) Elections or plebiscites for the ratification of constitutional amendments

contemplated in Article XV of the Constitution have provisions for the secrecy of
choice and of vote, which is one of the safeguards of freedom of action, but votes in
the Citizens' Assemblies were open and were cast by raising hands;
(c) The Election Code makes ample provisions for free, orderly and honest elections,
and such provisions are a minimum requirement for elections or plebiscites for the
ratification of constitutional amendments, but there were no similar provisions to
guide and regulate proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies;
(d) It is seriously to be doubted that, for lack of material time, more than a handful of
the so-called Citizens' Assemblies have been actually formed, because the
mechanics of their organization were still being discussed a day or so before the day
they were supposed to begin functioning: —
"Provincial governors and city and municipal mayors had been

meeting with barrio captains and community leaders since last
Monday (January 8, 1973) to thresh out the mechanics in the
formation of the Citizens' Assemblies and the topics for discussion,"
(Bulletin Today, January 16, 1973).
It should be recalled that the Citizens' Assemblies were ordered formed only at the beginning of the
year (Daily Express, January 1, 1971), and considering the lack of experience of the local organizers
of said assemblies, as well as the absence of sufficient guidelines for organizations, it is too much to
believe that such assemblies could be organized at such a short notice.
5. That for lack of material time, the appropriate amended petition to include the additional officials
and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion could not
be completed because, as noted in the Urgent Motion of January 12, 1973, the submission of the
proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies was not made known to the public until January
11, 1973. But be that as it may, the said additional officials and agencies may be properly included in
the petition at bar because: —
(a) The herein petitioners have prayed in their petition for the annulment not only of
Presidential Decree No. 73, but also of "any similar decree, proclamation, order or
instruction"
so that Presidential Decree No. 86, insofar at least as it attempts to submit the proposed Constitution
to a plebiscite by the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, is properly in issue in this case, and those who
enforce, implement, or carry out the said Presidential Decree No. 86, and the instructions incidental
thereto clearly fall within the scope of this petition;
(b) In their petition, petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining not only the respondents named in the petition but also their "agents"
from implementing not only Presidential Decree No. 73, but also "any other similar
decree, order, instruction, or proclamation in relation to the holding of a plebiscite on
January 15, 1973 for the purpose of submitting to the Filipino people for their
ratification or rejection the 1972 Draft or proposed Constitution approved by the
Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972'; and finally,
(c) Petitioners prayed for such other relief which may be just and equitable. (p. 39,
Petition).
"Therefore, viewing the case from all angles, the officials and government agencies mentioned in
paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion, can lawfully be reached by the processes of this
Honorable Court by reason of this petition, considering, furthermore, that the Commission on
Elections has under our laws the power, among others, of: —
"a) Direct and immediate supervision and control over national, provincial, city,
municipal and municipal district officials required by law to perform duties relative to
the conduct of elections on matters pertaining to the enforcement of the provisions of
this Code ... ." (Election Code of 1971, Sec. 3).
6. That unless the petition at bar is decided immediately and the Commission on Elections, together
with the officials and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent
Motion are restrained or enjoined from collecting, certifying, reporting or announcing to the President
the results of the alleged voting of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, irreparable damage will be
caused to the Republic of the Philippines, the Filipino people, the cause of freedom and democracy,
and the petitioners herein because:
(a) After the result of the supposed voting on the questions mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof shall
have been announced, a conflict will arise between those who maintain that the 1935 Constitution is
still in force, on the one hand, and those who will maintain that it has been superseded by the
proposed Constitution, on the other, thereby creating confusion, if not chaos;
(b) Even the jurisdiction of this Court will be subject to serious attack because the advocates of the
theory that the proposed Constitution has been ratified by reason of the announcement of the results
of the proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies will argue that, General Order No. 3, which
shall also be deemed ratified pursuant to the Transitory Provisions of the proposed Constitution, has
placed Presidential Decrees Nos. 73 and 86 beyond the reach and jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court.
On the same date — January 15, 1973 — the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R.
No. L-35948 to "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the
motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned,
at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the
President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which
had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the
Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 — inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on — and
the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice,
signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is
of the following tenor:
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION

PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional

Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in

chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all
persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age
or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members
kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;
WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen
participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express
their views on important national issues;
WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A,
dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or
Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a pIebiscite to be called to
ratify the new Constitution?
WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561)
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed
Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who
voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a
plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight
thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and
that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;
WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the
members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan
ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed
ratified by the Filipino people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution
proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been
ratified by an overwhelming majority of all the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-three.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Philippines
By the President:
ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary
Such is the background of the cases submitted for Our determination. After admitting some of the allegations made
in the petition in L-35948 and denying the other allegations thereof, respondents therein alleged in their answer
thereto, by way of affirmative defenses: 1) that the "questions raised" in said petition "are political in character"; 2)
that "the Constitutional Convention acted freely and had plenary authority to propose not only amendments but a
Constitution which would supersede the present Constitution"; 3) that "the President's call for a plebiscite and the
appropriation of funds for this purpose are valid"; 4) that "there is not an improper submission" and "there can be a
plebiscite under Martial Law"; and 5) that the "argument that the Proposed Constitution is vague and incomplete,
makes an unconstitutional delegation of power, includes a referendum on the proclamation of Martial Law and
purports to exercise judicial power" is "not relevant and ... without merit." Identical defenses were set up in the other
cases under consideration.
Immediately after the hearing held on January 17, 1973, or since the afternoon of that date, the Members of the
Court have been deliberating on the aforementioned cases and, after extensive discussions on the merits thereof,
have deemed it best that each Member write his own views thereon and that thereafter the Chief Justice should
state the result or the votes thus cast on the points in issue. Hence, the individual views of my brethren in the Court
are set forth in the opinions attached hereto, except that, instead of writing their separate opinions, some Member
have preferred to merely concur in the opinion of one of our colleagues.
What follows is my own view on these cases.
The first question for Our determination is whether We have authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential
Decree No. 73, in view of the Solicitor General's allegation to the effect that said question is a political one. I am of
the opinion — on which the Members of the Court are unanimous — that the contention of the Solicitor General is
untenable and that the issue aforementioned is a justiciable one. Indeed, the contested decree purports to have the
force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the
authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or
acts of the Executive,1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935
Constitution,2 which expressly provides for the authority of this Court to review cases involving said issue.
Petitioners in G.R. No. L-35948 maintain that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had exceeded its authority in
approving Sections 2, 3 (par. 2) and 12 of Article XVII of the proposed Constitution. Regardless of the wisdom and
moral aspects of the contested provisions of the proposed Constitution, it is my considered view that the Convention
was legally free to postulate any amendment it may deem fit to propose — save perhaps what is or may be
inconsistent with what is now known, particularly in international law, as Jus Cogens — not only because the
Convention exercised sovereign powers delegated thereto by the people — although insofar only as the
determination of the proposals to be made and formulated by said body is concerned — but, also, because said
proposals cannot be valid as part of our Fundamental Law unless and until "approved by the majority of the votes
cast at an election at which" " said proposals "are submitted to the people for their ratification," as provided in
Section 1 of Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution.
As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on
January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," I find it unnecessary, for the time being, to pass
upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the
plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the
circumstances may justify.
With respect to the question whether or not martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for
ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution, I consider this matter as one intimately and
necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not
been explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the
issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners in L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the
Proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of
January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases,
and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible
under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering the surrounding circumstances, I
believe, therefore, that, instead of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners should be given a
reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises.
Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this:
1. There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73.
2. On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and myself, or six
(6) Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices
Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree.
3. On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein
the provisions contested by the petitioners in
L-35948, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and
academic. Justices Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and myself have voted to uphold the authority of the
Convention.
4. Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue
in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and
Antonio hold the same view.
5. On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed
Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the
opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and
the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices
Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be
predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate
freedom for the purposes contemplated.
6. On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed:
a. Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and myself are of the
opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court,
which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question.
b. Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been
submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the
Proposed Constitution ... based on the referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being
in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such
unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, ... the
new Constitution is legally recognizable and should be recognized as legitimately in force.
c. Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect
whatsoever.
d. Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the Proposed
Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and
manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact.
7. On the question whether or not these cases should dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices
Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to
grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they
wish to contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period
to the petitioners in said Case No.
L-35948 for the aforementioned purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on
the merits everyone of the cases under Consideration.
WHEREFORE, all of the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973
JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
AND THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36164 March 31, 1973
VIDAL TAN, J. ANTONIO ARANETA, ALEJANDRO ROCES, MANUEL CRUDO, ANTONIO U. MIRANDA,
EMILIO DE PERALTA AND LORENZO M. TAÑADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE , THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF LAND REFORM, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE AUDITOR GENERAL,
THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER, THE CHAIRMAN OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON REORGANIZATION,
THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
CIVIL SERVICE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36165 March 31, 1973.
GERARDO ROXAS, AMBROSIO PADILLA, JOVITO R. SALONGA, SALVADOR H. LAUREL, RAMON V.

MITRA, JR. and EVA ESTRADA-KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as
Secretary of National Defense; General ROMEO ESPINO, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; TANCIO E. CASTAÑEDA, in his capacity as Secretary General Services; Senator
GIL J. PUYAT, in his capacity as President of the Senate; and Senator JOSE ROY, his capacity, as President
Pro Tempore of the of the Senate, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36236 March 31, 1973
EDDIE B. MONTECLARO, [personally and in his capacity as President of the National Press Club of the
Philippines], petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE AUDITOR GENERAL,
THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER & THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36283 March 31, 1973
NAPOLEON V. DILAG, ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., LEONARDO ASODISEN, JR., and RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
THE HONORABLE BUDGET COMMISSIONER, THE HONORABLE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Josue Javellana.
Lorenzo M. Tañada and Associates for petitioners Vidal Tan, et al.
Tañada, Salonga, Ordoñez, Rodrigo, Sanidad, Roxas. Gonzales and Arroyo for petitioners Gerardo Roxas, et al.
Joker P. Arroyo and Rogelio B. Padilla for petitioner Eddie Monteclaro.
Raul M. Gonzales and Associates for petitioners Napoleon V. Dilag, et al.
Arturo M. Tolentino for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza and Solicitor Reynato S. Puno for
other respondents.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
The above-entitled five (5) cases are a sequel of cases G.R. Nos. L-35925,
L-35929, L-35940, L-35941, L-35942, L-35948, L-35953, L-35961, L-35965 and
L-35979, decided on January 22, 1973, to which We will hereafter refer collectively as the plebiscite cases.
Background of the Plebiscite Cases.
The factual setting thereof is set forth in the decision therein rendered, from which We quote:
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by
Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was
implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of
which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971
Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was
in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire
Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of
the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or
rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
Soon after, or on December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed, with this Court, Case G.R. No. L-35925,
against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to
enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any
manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree
"has no force and effect as law because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for
the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered
by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed
Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and
there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."
Substantially identical actions were filed, on December 8, 1972, by Pablo C. Sanidad against the
Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L- 35929) on December 11, 1972, by Gerardo Roxas, et
al., against the Commission on Elections, the Director of Printing, the National Treasurer and the
Auditor General (Case G.R. L-35940), by Eddie B. Monteclaro against the Commission on Elections
and the Treasurer of the Philippines (Case G.R. No. L-35941), and by Sedfrey Ordoñez, et al.
against the National Treasurer and the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35942); on
December 12, 1972, by Vidal Tan, et al., against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of Printing (Case G.R. No. L-35948) and by Jose
W. Diokno and Benigno S. Aquino against the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35953);
on December 14, 1972, by Jacinto Jimenez against the Commission on Elections, the Auditor
General, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Director of the Bureau of Printing (Case G.R. No.
L-35961), and by Raul M. Gonzales against the Commission on Elections, the Budget
Commissioner, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35965); and on
December 16, 1972, by Ernesto C. Hidalgo against the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of
Education, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35979).
In all these cases, except the last (G.R. No. L-35979), the respondents were required to file their
answers "not later than 12:00 (o'clock) noon of Saturday, December 16, 1972." Said cases were,
also, set for hearing and partly heard on Monday, December 18, 1972, at 9:30 a.m. The hearing was
continued on December 19, 1972. By agreement of the parties, the aforementioned last case —
G.R. No. L-35979 — was, also, heard, jointly with the others, on December 19, 1972. At the
conclusion of the hearing, on that date, the parties in all of the aforementioned cases were given a
short period of time within which "to submit their notes on the points they desire to stress." Said
notes were filed on different dates, between December 21, 1972, and January 4, 1973.
Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the
effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed
Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until
January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to
be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20,
moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending
the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution."
In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court
deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the
date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced
officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in
regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73
was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate
funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal
postponement of the plebiscite by the President — reportedly after consultation with, among others,
the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections — the Court deemed it more imperative
to defer its final action on these cases.
"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.
L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably
not later than January 15, 1973." It was alleged in said motion, inter alia:
"6. That the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 86
organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions [Bulletin
Today, January 1, 1973];
"7. That thereafter it was later announced that "the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose
—
[1] The New Society;
[2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law;
[3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the
tentative new dates given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the
original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5);
[4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the
existing Constitution despite Martial Law." [Bulletin Today, January 3, 1973.]
"8. That it was later reported that the following are to be the forms of the questions to be asked to the
Citizens Assemblies: —
[1] Do you approve of the New Society?
[2] Do you approve of the reform measures under martial law?
[3] Do you think that Congress should meet again in regular session?
[4] How soon would you like the plebiscite on the new Constitution to be held?
[Bulletin Today, January 5, 1973].
"9. That the voting by the so-called Citizens Assemblies was announced to take place during the
period from January 10 to January 15, 1973;
"10. That on January 10, 1973, it was reported that on more question would be added to the four (4)
question previously announced, and that the forms of the question would be as follows: —
[1] Do you like the New Society?
[2] Do you like the reforms under martial law?
[3] Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?
[4] Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?
[5] Do you like the way President Marcos running the affairs of the
government? [Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973; emphasis an additional question.]
"11. That on January 11, 1973, it was reported that six (6) more questions would be submitted to the
so-called Citizens Assemblies: —
[1] Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to
decide issues of national interests?
[2] Do you approve of the new Constitution?
[3] Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
[4] Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution?
[5] If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be
called?
[6] Do you want martial law to continue? [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973;
emphasis supplied]
"12. That according to reports, the returns with respect to the six (6) additional questions quoted
above will be on a form similar or identical to Annex "A" hereof;
"13. That attached to page 1 of Annex "A" is another page, which we marked as Annex "A-1", and
which reads: —
COMMENTS ON
QUESTION No. 1
In order to broaden the base of citizens' participation in government.
QUESTION No. 2
But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked. Or if it is to be

convened at all, it should not be done so until after at least seven (7) years from the
approval of the New Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies.
QUESTION No. 3
The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered the plebiscite on
the New Constitution.
QUESTION No. 4
We are sick and tired of too frequent elections. We are fed up with politics, of so
many debates and so much expenses.
QUESTION No. 5
Probably a period of at least seven (7) years moratorium on elections will be enough
for stability to be established in the country, for reforms to take root and normalcy to
return.
QUESTION No. 6
We want President Marcos to continue with Martial Law. We want him to exercise his
powers with more authority. We want him to be strong and firm so that he can
accomplish all his reform programs and establish normalcy in the country. If all other
measures fail, we want President Marcos to declare a revolutionary government
along the lines of the new Constitution without the ad interim Assembly."
"Attention is respectfully invited to the comments on "Question No. 3," which reads: —
QUESTION No. 3
The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be considered the plebiscite on the New
Constitution.
This, we are afraid, and therefore allege, is pregnant with ominous possibilities.
14. That, in the meantime, speaking on television and over the radio, on January 7, 1973, the
President announced that the limited freedom of debate on the proposed Constitution was being
withdrawn and that the proclamation of martial law and the orders and decrees issued thereunder
would thenceforth strictly be enforced [Daily Express, January 8, 1973];
15. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore state, that the question added in the last list
of questions to be asked to the Citizens Assemblies, namely: —
Do you approve of the New

Constitution? —
in relation to the question following it: —
Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the

new Constitution?" —
would be an attempt to by-pass and short-circuit this Honorable Court before which the question of
the validity of the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution is now pending;
"16. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore allege, that if an affirmative answer to the
two questions just referred to will be reported then this Honorable Court and the entire nation will be
confronted with a fait accompli which has been attained in a highly unconstitutional and
undemocratic manner;
"17. That the fait accompli would consist in the supposed expression of the people approving the
proposed Constitution;
"18. That, if such event would happen, then the case before this Honorable Court could, to all intents
and purposes, become moot because, petitioners fear, and they therefore allege, that on the basis of
such supposed expression of the will of the people through the Citizens Assemblies, it would be
announced that the proposed Constitution, with all its defects, both congenital and otherwise, has
been ratified;
"19. That, in such a situation the Philippines will be facing a real crisis and there is likelihood of
confusion if not chaos, because then, the people and their officials will not know which Constitution
is in force.
"20. That the crisis mentioned above can only be avoided if this Honorable Court will immediately
decide and announce its decision on the present petition;
"21. That with the withdrawal by the President of the limited freedom of discussion on the proposed
Constitution which was given to the people pursuant to Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 73, the
opposition of respondents to petitioners' prayer at the plebiscite be prohibited has now collapsed and
that a free plebiscite can no longer be held."
At about the same time, a similar prayer was made in a "manifestation" filed by the petitioners in L-
35949, "Gerardo Roxas, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al.," and L-35942, "Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez, et al. v. The National Treasurer, et al."
The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the
respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not
later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before
noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of
restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying —
"... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent

Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its
head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head,
Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its
Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all
other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting,
certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned,
the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they
were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and
January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental
Urgent Motion."
In support of this prayer, it was alleged —
"3. That petitioners are now before this Honorable Court in order to ask further that this Honorable
Court issue a restraining order enjoining herein respondents, particularly respondent Commission on
Elections as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the
Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; and their deputies, subordinates
and/or substitutes, from collecting, certifying, announcing and reporting to the President the
supposed Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to
have met during the period between January 10 and January 15, 1973, particularly on the two
questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion;
"4. That the proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies are illegal, null and void particularly
insofar as such proceedings are being made the basis of a supposed consensus for the ratification
of the proposed Constitution because: —
[a] The elections contemplated in the Constitution, Article XV, at which the proposed
constitutional amendments are to be submitted for ratification, are elections at which
only qualified and duly registered voters are permitted to vote, whereas, the so called
Citizens' Assemblies were participated in by persons 15 years of age and older,
regardless of qualifications or lack thereof, as prescribed in the Election Code;
[b] Elections or plebiscites for the ratification of constitutional amendments

contemplated in Article XV of the Constitution have provisions for the secrecy of
choice and of vote, which is one of the safeguards of freedom of action, but votes in
the Citizens' Assemblies were open and were cast by raising hands;
[c] The Election Code makes ample provisions for free, orderly and honest elections,
and such provisions are a minimum requirement for elections or plebiscites for the
ratification of constitutional amendments, but there were no similar provisions to
guide and regulate proceedings of the so called Citizens' Assemblies;
[d] It is seriously to be doubted that, for lack of material time, more than a handful of
the so called Citizens' Assemblies have been actually formed, because the
mechanics of their organization were still being discussed a day or so before the day
they were supposed to begin functioning: —
"Provincial governors and city and municipal mayors had been

meeting with barrio captains and community leaders since last
Monday [January 8, 1973) to thresh out the mechanics in the
formation of the Citizens Assemblies and the topics for discussion."
[Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973]
"It should be recalled that the Citizens' Assemblies were ordered formed only at the beginning of the
year [Daily Express, January 1, 1973], and considering the lack of experience of the local organizers
of said assemblies, as well as the absence of sufficient guidelines for organization, it is too much to
believe that such assemblies could be organized at such a short notice.
"5. That for lack of material time, the appropriate amended petition to include the additional officials
and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion could not
be completed because, as noted in the Urgent Motion of January 12, 1973, the submission of the
proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies was not made known to the public until January
11, 1973. But be that as it may, the said additional officials and agencies may be properly included in
the petition at bar because: —
[a] The herein petitioners have prayed in their petition for the annulment not only of
Presidential Decree No. 73, but also of "any similar decree, proclamation, order or
instruction.
so that Presidential Decree No. 86, insofar at least as it attempts to submit the proposed Constitution
to a plebiscite by the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, is properly in issue in this case, and those who
enforce, implement, or carry out the said Presidential Decree No. 86. and the instructions incidental
thereto clearly fall within the scope of this petition;
[b] In their petition, petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining not only the respondents named in the petition but also their "agents"
from implementing not only Presidential Decree No. 73, but also "any other similar
decree, order, instruction, or proclamation in relation to the holding of a plebiscite on
January 15, 1973 for the purpose of submitting to the Filipino people for their
ratification or rejection the 1972 Draft or proposed Constitution approved by the
Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972"; and finally,
[c] Petitioners prayed for such other relief which may be just and equitable. [p. 39,
Petition].
"Therefore, viewing the case from all angles, the officials and government agencies mentioned in
paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion, can lawfully be reached by the processes of this
Honorable Court by reason of this petition, considering, furthermore, that the Commission on
Elections has under our laws the power, among others, of: —
(a) Direct and immediate supervision and control over national, provincial, city,
municipal and municipal district officials required by law to perform duties relative to
the conduct of elections on matters pertaining to the enforcement of the provisions of
this Code ..." [Election Code of 1971, Sec. 3].
"6. That unless the petition at bar is decided immediately and the Commission on Elections, together
with the officials and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent
Motion are restrained or enjoined from collecting, certifying, reporting or announcing to the President
the results of the alleged voting of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, irreparable damage will be
caused to the Republic of the Philippines, the Filipino people, the cause of freedom an democracy,
and the petitioners herein because:
[a] After the result of the supposed voting on the questions mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof shall have been announced, a conflict will arise between those who maintain
that the 1935 Constitution is still in force, on the one hand, and those who will
maintain that it has been superseded by the proposed Constitution, on the other,
thereby creating confusion, if not chaos;
[b] Even the jurisdiction of this Court will be subject to serious attack because the
advocates of the theory that the proposed Constitution has been ratified by reason of
the announcement of the results of the proceedings of the so-called Citizens'
Assemblies will argue that, General Order No. 3, which shall also be deemed ratified
pursuant to the Transitory Provisions of the proposed Constitution, has placed
Presidential Decree Nos. 73 and 86 beyond the reach and jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court."
On the same date — January 15, 1973 — the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in
said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday,
January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the
case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on
the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of
Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been
signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the
Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 — inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still
going on — and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed
by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the
writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor:
"BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION

PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
"WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional

Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;
"WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in

chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all
persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age
or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members
kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;
"WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen
participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express
their views on important national issues;
"WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A,
dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or
Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to
ratify the new Constitution?
"WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561)
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed
Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who
voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a
plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight
thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and
that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;
"WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the
members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan
ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed
ratified by the Filipino people;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution
proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been
ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-three.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E.
MARCOS
"President of the
Philippines
"By the President:
"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
"Executive Secretary"
Such is the background of the cases submitted determination. After admitting some of the
allegations made in the petition in L-35948 and denying the other allegations thereof, respondents
therein alleged in their answer thereto, by way affirmative defenses: 1) that the "questions raised" in
said petition "are political in character"; 2) that "the Constitutional Convention acted freely and had
plenary authority to propose not only amendments but a Constitution which would supersede the
present Constitution"; 3) that "the President's call for a plebiscite and the appropriation of funds for
this purpose are valid"; 4) that "there is not an improper submission" and "there can be a plebiscite
under Martial Law"; and 5) that the "argument that the Proposed Constitution is vague and
incomplete, makes an unconstitutional delegation of power, includes a referendum on the
proclamation of Martial Law and purports to exercise judicial power" is "not relevant and ... without
merit." Identical defenses were set up in the other cases under consideration.
Immediately after the hearing held on January 17, 1973, or since the afternoon of that date, the
Members of the Court have been deliberating on the aforementioned cases and, after extensive
discussions on the merits thereof, have deemed it best that each Member write his own views
thereon and that thereafter the Chief Justice should state the result or the votes thus cast on the
points in issue. Hence, the individual views of my brethren in the Court are set forth in the opinions
attached hereto, except that, instead of writing their separate opinions, some Members have
preferred to merely concur in the opinion of one of our colleagues.
Then the writer of said decision expressed his own opinion on the issues involved therein, after which he
recapitulated the views of the Members of the Court, as follows:
1. There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No.
73.
2. On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra
and myself, or six (6) Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and
academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said
Decree.
3. On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to
incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justices
Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and myself have voted to uphold the authority of the
Convention.
4. Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had
authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In
effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view.
5. On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the
proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice
Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art.
XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the
petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the
opinion that issue involves questions of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that Martial
Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom, for the
purposes contemplated.
6. On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed:
a. Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and

myself are of the opinion that the question of validity of said Proclamation has not
been properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon
such question.
b. Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No.
1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the
"purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution ... based on the referendum
among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the
requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate
drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, ...
the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should be recognized as legitimately
in force."
c. Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not
been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that,
accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever.
d. Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether
the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of
any judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a
question of fact.
7. On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their
respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee, and the writer similarly voted, except as
regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable
period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the
petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the aforementioned purpose, but he believes, in effect, that
the Court should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration.
Accordingly, the Court — acting in conformity with the position taken by six (6) of its members,1 with three (3)
members dissenting,2 with respect to G.R. No. L-35948, only and another member3 dissenting, as regards all of the
cases dismissed the same, without special pronouncement as to costs.
The Present Cases
Prior thereto, or on January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary
and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates
or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution"
— referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and
registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was
amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite
cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution,
thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without
power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by
the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was
not a free election, hence null and void."
Similar actions were filed, on January 23, 1973, by Vidal Tan, J. Antonio Araneta, Alejandro Roces, Manuel Crudo,
Antonio U. Miranda, Emilio de Peralta and Lorenzo M. Tañada, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretaries of
Finance, Justice, Land Reform, and National Defense, the Auditor General, the Budget Commissioner, the
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Reorganization, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Commission on
Elections and the Commissioner of Civil Service4 on February 3, 1973, by Eddie Monteclaro, personally and as
President of the National Press Club of the Philippines, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Public
Information, the Auditor General, the Budget Commissioner and the National Treasurer5 and on February 12, 1973,
by Napoleon V. Dilag, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., Leonardo Asodisen, Jr. and Raul M. Gonzales,6 against the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National Defense, the Budget Commissioner and the Auditor General.
Likewise, on January 23, 1973, Gerardo Roxas, Ambrosio Padilla, Jovito R. Salonga, Salvador H. Laurel,7 Ramon V.
Mitra, Jr. and Eva Estrada-Kalaw, the first as "duly elected Senator and Minority Floor Leader of the Senate," and
others as "duly elected members" thereof, filed Case G.R. No. L-36165, against the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Secretary of General
Services, the President and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. In their petition — as amended on January
26, 1973 — petitioners Gerardo Roxas, et al. allege, inter alia, that the term of office of three of the aforementioned
petitioners8 would expire on December 31, 1975, and that of the others9 on December 31, 1977; that pursuant to our
1935 Constitution, "which is still in force Congress of the Philippines "must convene for its 8th Session on Monday,
January 22, 1973, at 10:00 A.M., which is regular customary hour of its opening session"; that "on said day, from
10:00 A.M. up to the afternoon," said petitioner "along with their other colleagues, were unlawfully prevented from
using the Senate Session Hall, the same having been closed by the authorities in physical possession and control
the Legislative Building"; that "(a)t about 5:00 to 6:00 P.M. the said day, the premises of the entire Legislative
Building were ordered cleared by the same authorities, and no one was allowed to enter and have access to said
premises"; that "(r)espondent Senate President Gil J. Puyat and, in his absence, respondent President Pro Tempore
Jose Roy we asked by petitioning Senators to perform their duties under the law and the Rules of the Senate, but
unlawfully refrained and continue to refrain from doing so"; that the petitioners ready and willing to perform their
duties as duly elected members of the Senate of the Philippines," but respondent Secretary of National Defense,
Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff, "through their agents and representatives, are preventing petitioners from
performing their duties as duly elected Senators of the Philippines"; that "the Senate premise in the Congress of the
Philippines Building ... are occupied by and are under the physical control of the elements military organizations
under the direction of said respondents"; that, as per "official reports, the Department of General Services ... is now
the civilian agency in custody of the premises of the Legislative Building"; that respondents "have unlawfully
excluded and prevented, and continue to so exclude and prevent" the petitioners "from the performance of their
sworn duties, invoking the alleged approval of the 1972 (1973) Constitution of the Philippines by action of the so-
called Citizens' Assemblies on January 10, 1973 to January 15, 1973, as stated in and by virtue of Proclamation No.
1102 signed and issued by the President of the Philippines"; that "the alleged creation of the Citizens' Assemblies
as instrumentalities for the ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" is inherently illegal and
palpably unconstitutional; that respondents Senate President and Senate President Pro Tempore "have unlawfully
refrained and continue to refrain from and/or unlawfully neglected and continue to neglect the performance of their
duties and functions as such officers under the law and the Rules of the Senate" quoted in the petition; that because
of events supervening the institution of the plebiscite cases, to which reference has been made in the preceding
pages, the Supreme Court dismissed said cases on January 22, 1973, by a majority vote, upon the ground that the
petitions therein had become moot and academic; that the alleged ratification of the 1972 (1973) Constitution "is
illegal, unconstitutional and void and ... can not have superseded and revoked the 1935 Constitution," for the
reasons specified in the petition as amended; that, by acting as they did, the respondents and their "agents,
representatives and subordinates ...have excluded the petitioners from an office to which" they "are lawfully
entitled"; that "respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy have unlawfully refrained from convening the Senate for its
8th session, assuming general jurisdiction over the Session Hall and the premises of the Senate and ... continue
such inaction up to this time and ... a writ of mandamus is warranted in order to compel them to comply with the
duties and functions specifically enjoined by law"; and that "against the above mentioned unlawful acts of the
respondents, the petitioners have no appeal nor other speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
except by invoking the equitable remedies of mandamus and prohibition with the provisional remedy of preliminary
mandatory injunction."
Premised upon the foregoing allegations, said petitioners prayed that, "pending hearing on the merits, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering respondents Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the ... Secretary of General Service, as well
as all their agents, representatives and subordinates to vacate the premises of the Senate of the Philippines and to
deliver physical possession of the same to the President of the Senate or his authorized representative"; and that
hearing, judgment be rendered declaring null and Proclamation No. 1102 ... and any order, decree, proclamation
having the same import and objective, issuing writs of prohibition and mandamus, as prayed for against above-
mentioned respondents, and making the writ injunction permanent; and that a writ of mandamus be issued against
the respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy directing them to comply with their duties and functions as President and
President Pro Tempore, respectively, of the Senate of Philippines, as provided by law and the Rules of the Senate."
Required to comment on the above-mentioned petitions and/or amended petitions, respondents filed, with the leave
Court first had and obtained, a consolidated comment on said petitions and/or amended petitions, alleging that the
same ought to have been dismissed outright; controverting petitioners' allegations concerning the alleged lack
impairment of the freedom of the 1971 Constitution Convention to approve the proposed Constitution, its alleged
lack of authority to incorporate certain contested provisions thereof, the alleged lack of authority of the President to
create and establish Citizens' Assemblies "for the purpose submitting to them the matter of ratification of the new
Constitution," the alleged "improper or inadequate submiss of the proposed constitution," the "procedure for
ratification adopted ... through the Citizens Assemblies"; a maintaining that: 1) "(t)he Court is without jurisdiction to
act on these petitions"; 2) the questions raised therein are "political in character and therefore nonjusticiable"; 3)
"there substantial compliance with Article XV of the 1 Constitution"; 4) "(t)he Constitution was properly submitted the
people in a free, orderly and honest election; 5) "Proclamation No. 1102, certifying the results of the election, is
conclusive upon the courts"; and 6) "(t)he amending process outlined in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is not
exclusive of other modes of amendment."
Respondents Puyat and Roy, in said Case G.R. No. L-36165, filed their separate comment therein, alleging that
"(t)he subject matter" of said case "is a highly political question which, under the circumstances, this ...Court would
not be in a position to act upon judicially," and that, in view of the opinions expressed by three members of this
Court in its decision in the plebiscite cases, in effect upholding the validity of Proclamation No. 1102, "further
proceedings in this case may only be an academic exercise in futility."
On February 5, 1973, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondents in L-36236 to comment on the petition
therein not later than Saturday, February 10, 1973, and setting the case for hearing on February 12, 1973, at 9:30
a.m. By resolution dated February 7, 1973, this Court resolved to consider the comments of the respondents in
cases G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-36164, and L-36165, as motions to dismiss the petitions therein, and to set said cases
for hearing on the same date and time as L-36236. On that date, the parties in G.R. No. L-36283 10 agreed that the
same be, likewise, heard, as it was, in fact, heard jointly with the aforementioned cases G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-
36164, L-36165 and L-36236. The hearing, which began on February 12, 1973, shortly after 9:30 a.m., was
continued not only that afternoon, but, also, on February 13, 14, 15 and 16, morning and afternoon, after which the
parties were granted up to February 24, 1973, noon, within which to submit their notes of oral arguments and
additional arguments, as well as the documents required of them or whose presentation was reserved by them. The
same resolution granted the parties until March 1, 1973, to reply to the notes filed by their respective opponents.
Counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-36164 and L-36165 filed their aforementioned notes on February 24,
1973, on which date the Solicitor General sought an extension of time up to March 3, 1973, within which to file his
notes, which was granted, with the understanding that said notes shall include his reply to the notes already filed by
the petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-36164 a L-36165. Counsel for the petitioners, likewise, moved and were granted an
extension of time, to expire on March 10, 1973, within which to file, as they did, their notes in reply to those
submitted by the Solicitor General on March 3, 1973. On March 21, 1973, petitioners in L-36165 filed a
"Manifestation a Supplemental Rejoinder," whereas the Office of the Solicitor General submitted in all these cases a
"Rejoinder Petitioners' Replies."
After deliberating on these cases, the members of the Court agreed that each would write his own opinion and serve
a copy thereof on his colleagues, and this they did. Subsequently, the Court discussed said opinions and votes were
cast thereon. Such individual opinions are appended hereto.
Accordingly, the writer will first express his person opinion on the issues before the Court. After the exposition his
aforesaid opinion, the writer will make, concurrently with his colleagues in the Court, a resume of summary of the
votes cast by them in these cases.
Writer's Personal Opinion
I.
Alleged academic futility of further proceedings in G.R. L-36165.
This defense or theory, set up by counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy in G.R. No. L-36165, and, also,
by the Solicitor General, is predicated upon the fact that, in Our decision in the plebiscite cases, Mr. Justice Barredo
had expressed the view that the 1935 Constitution had "pro tanto passed into history" and "been legitimately
supplanted by the Constitution now in force by virtue of Proclamation No. 1102 ..."; that Mr. Justice Antonio did not
feel "that this Court competent to act" in said cases "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" and because "the access to relevant information is insufficient to assure the correct determination of the
issue," apart from the circumstance that "the new constitution has been promulgated and great interests have
already arisen under it" and that the political organ of the Government has recognized its provisions; whereas, Mr.
Justice Esguerra had postulated that "(w)ithout any competent evidence ... about the circumstances attending the
holding" of the "referendum or plebiscite" thru the Citizens' Assemblies, he "cannot say that it was not lawfully held"
and that, accordingly, he assumed "that what the proclamation (No. 1102) says on its face is true and until
overcome by satisfactory evidence" he could not "subscribe to the claim that such plebiscite was not held
accordingly"; and that he accepted "as a fait accompli that the Constitution adopted (by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention) on November 30, 1972, has been duly ratified.
Counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy goes on to say that, under these circumstances, "it seems
remote or improbable that the necessary eight (8) votes under the 1935 Constitution, and much less the ten (10)
votes required by the 1972 (1973) Constitution, can be obtained for the relief sought in the Amended Petition" in
G.R. No.
L-36165.
I am unable to share this view. To begin with, Mr. Justice Barredo announced publicly, in open court, during the
hearing of these cases, that he was and is willing to be convinced that his aforementioned opinion in the plebiscite
cases should be reconsidered and changed. In effect, he thus declared that he had an open mind in connection with
the cases at bar, and that in deciding the same he would not necessarily adhere to said opinion if the petitioners
herein succeeded in convincing him that their view should be sustained.
Secondly, counsel for the aforesaid respondents had apparently assumed that, under the 1935 Constitution, eight
(8) votes are necessary to declare invalid the contested Proclamation No. 1102. I do not believe that this
assumption is borne out by any provision of said Constitution. Section 10 of Article VIII thereof reads:
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court in banc, and no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two
thirds of all the members of the Court.
Pursuant to this section, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Supreme Court is required only to
declare "treaty or law" unconstitutional. Construing said provision, in a resolution dated September 16, 1949, then
Chief Justice Moran, voicing the unanimous view of the Members of this Court, postulated:
... There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the vote of eight
Justices to nullify a rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the President. It is very
significant that in the previous drafts of section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution, "executive order"
and "regulation" were included among those that required for their nullification the vote of two-thirds
of all the members of the Court. But "executive order" and "regulation" were later deleted from the
final draft (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere
majority of six members of this Court is enough to nullify them. 11
The distinction is not without reasonable foundation. The two thirds vote (eight [8] votes) requirement, indeed, was
made to apply only to treaty and law, because, in these cases, the participation of the two other departments of the
government — the Executive and the Legislative — is present, which circumstance is absent in the case of rules,
regulations and executive orders. Indeed, a law (statute) passed by Congress is subject to the approval or veto of
the President, whose disapproval cannot be overridden except by the vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all members of each
House of Congress. 12 A treaty is entered into by the President with the concurrence of the Senate, 13 which is not
required in the case of rules, regulations or executive orders which are exclusive acts of the President. Hence, to
nullify the same, a lesser number of votes is necessary in the Supreme Court than that required to invalidate a law
or treaty.
Although the foregoing refers to rules, regulations and executive orders issued by the President, the dictum applies
with equal force to executive proclamation, like said Proclamation No. 1102, inasmuch as the authority to issue the
same is governed by section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:
Administrative acts and commands of the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines touching
the organization or mode of operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the
districts, divisions, parts or ports of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines and all acts and commands
governing the general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general
concern shall be made effective in executive orders.
Executive orders fixing the dates when specific laws, resolutions, or orders are to have or cease to
(have) effect and any information concerning matters of public moment determined by law,
resolution, or executive orders, may be promulgated in an executive proclamation, with all the force
of an executive order. 14
In fact, while executive order embody administrative acts or commands of the President, executive proclamations
are mainly informative and declaratory in character, and so does counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy
maintain in G.R. No.
L-36165. 15 As consequence, an executive proclamation has no more than "the force of an executive order," so that,
for the Supreme Court to declare such proclamation unconstitutional, under the 1935 Constitution, the same number
of votes needed to invalidate an executive order, rule or regulation — namely, six (6) votes — would suffice.
As regards the applicability of the provisions of the proposed new Constitution, approved by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, in the determination of the question whether or not it is now in force, it is obvious that such question
depends upon whether or not the said new Constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the
1935 Constitution, upon the authority of which said Constitutional Convention was called and approved the
proposed Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the Constitution should be
settled by applying the provisions of the Constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification, or the old
Constitution. 16
II
Does the issue on the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 partake of the nature of a political, and, hence, non-
justiciable question?
The Solicitor General maintains in his comment the affirmative view and this is his main defense. In support thereof,
he alleges that "petitioners would have this Court declare as invalid the New Constitution of the Republic" from
which — he claims — "this Court now derives its authority"; that "nearly 15 million of our body politic from the age of
15 years have mandated this Constitution to be the New Constitution and the prospect of unsettling acts done in
reliance on it caution against interposition of the power of judicial review"; that "in the case of the New Constitution,
the government has been recognized in accordance with the New Constitution"; that "the country's foreign relations
are now being conducted in accordance with the new charter"; that "foreign governments have taken note of it"; that
the "plebiscite cases" are "not precedents for holding questions regarding proposal and ratification justiciable"; and
that "to abstain from judgment on the ultimate issue of constitutionality is not to abdicate duty."
At the outset, it is obvious to me that We are not being asked to "declare" the new Constitution invalid. What
petitioners dispute is the theory that it has been validly ratified by the people, especially that they have done so in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. The petitioners maintain that the conclusion reached by the
Chief Executive in the dispositive portion of Proclamation No. 1102 is not borne out by the whereases preceding the
same, as the predicates from which said conclusion was drawn; that the plebiscite or "election" required in said
Article XV has not been held; that the Chief Executive has no authority, under the 1935 Constitution, to dispensewith
said election or plebiscite; that the proceedings before the Citizens' Assemblies did not constitute and may not be
considered as such plebiscite; that the facts of record abundantly show that the aforementioned Assemblies could
not have been held throughout the Philippines from January 10 to January 15, 1973; and that, in any event, the
proceedings in said Assemblies are null and void as an alleged ratification of the new Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, not only because of the circumstances under which said Assemblies had been
created and held, but, also, because persons disqualified to vote under Article V of the Constitution were allowed to
participate therein, because the provisions of our Election Code were not observed in said Assemblies, because the
same were not held under the supervision of the Commission on Elections, in violation of section 2 of Article X of the
1935 Constitution, and because the existence of Martial Law and General Order No. 20, withdrawing or suspending
the limited freedom to discuss the merits and demerits of said proposed Constitution, impaired the people's freedom
in voting thereon, particularly a viva voce, as it was done in many instances, as well as their ability to have a
reasonable knowledge of the contents of the document on which they were allegedly called upon to express their
views.
Referring now more specifically to the issue on whether the new Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is a political
question or not, I do not hesitate to state that the answer must be in the negative. Indeed, such is the position taken
by this Court, 17 in an endless line of decisions, too long to leave any room for possible doubt that said issue is
inherently and essentially justiciable. Such, also, has been the consistent position of the courts of the United States
of America, whose decisions have a persuasive effect in this jurisdiction, our constitutional system in the 1935
Constitution being patterned after that of the United States. Besides, no plausible reason has, to my mind, been
advanced to warrant a departure from said position, consistently with the form of government established under said
Constitution..
Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, 18 We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question
whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or
rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because,
they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With
identical unanimity, We overruled the respondents' contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, 19 questioning Our
authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court
in Barcelona v. Baker 20 and Montenegro v. Castañeda, 21 insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We,
accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified,
in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 22 the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito. 23 Hence,
respondents herein urge Us to reconsider the action thus taken by the Court and to revert to and follow the views
expressed in Barcelon v. Baker and Mabanag v. Lopez Vito. 24
The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in support of the
political-question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by
this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence, Our decision in
the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis, which gained added
weight by its virtual reiteration in the plebiscite cases.
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable, not political, is
plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of
separation of powers — characteristic of the Presidential system of government — the functions of which are
classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely: 1) those involving the making of
laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerned mainly with the enforcement of such
laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and
3) those dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that
are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere —
but only within such sphere — each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of
authority, not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but,
also, to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions
made by the other departments — provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated
thereto by the Constitution. 25
This principle of separation of powers under the presidential system goes hand in hand with the system of checks
and balances, under which each department is vested by the Fundamental Law with some powers to forestall,
restrain or arrest a possible or actual misuse or abuse of powers by the other departments. Hence, the appointing
power of the Executive, his pardoning power, his veto power, his authority to call the Legislature or Congress to
special sessions and even to prescribe or limit the object or objects of legislation that may be taken up in such
sessions, etc. Conversely, Congress or an agency or arm thereof — such as the commission on Appointments —
may approve or disapprove some appointments made by the President. It, also, has the power of appropriation, to
"define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," as well as that of impeachment. Upon the
other hand, under the judicial power vested by the Constitution, the "Supreme Court and ... such inferior courts as
may be established by law," may settle or decide with finality, not only justiciable controversies between private
individuals or entities, but, also, disputes or conflicts between a private individual or entity, on the one hand, and an
officer or branch of the government, on the other, or between two (2) officers or branches of service, when the latter
officer or branch is charged with acting without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or in violation of law. And so, when a
power vested in said officer or branch of the government is absolute or unqualified, the acts in the exercise of such
power are said to be political in nature, and, consequently, non-justiciable or beyond judicial review. Otherwise,
courts of justice would be arrogating upon themselves a power conferred by the Constitution upon another branch of
the service to the exclusion of the others. Hence, in Tañada v. Cuenco, 26 this Court quoted with approval from In re
McConaughy, 27 the following:
"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political,
and not judicial. If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state
canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The
question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view
contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.
xxx xxx xxx
"... What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a
matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, N.W. 724, 15 L.R.A. 561; In re
Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L.R.A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16 C.C.A. 516,
30 L.R.A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle 151 Ill. 41, 37 N.E. 683, 25 L.R.A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus
the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass law or submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not
merely because they involve political questions, but because they are matters which the people have
by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated
him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws act within the limits of the power
conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a politics
nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his
control. But every officer under constitutional government must act accordingly to law and subject its
restrictions, and every departure therefrom or disregard thereof must subject him to that restraining
and controlling power of the people, acting through the agency of the judiciary; for it must be
remembered that the people act through courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature.
One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is
charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official
action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary,
to "the end that the government may be one of laws and not of men" — words which Webster said
were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document." (Emphasis supplied.)
and, in an attempt to describe the nature of a political question in terms, it was hoped, understandable to the
laymen, We added that "... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy" in matters concerning the government of a State, as a body politic. "In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not
the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political,
the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said
qualifications, conditions or limitations — particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution — would be
set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of
courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of
checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the
discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation — made particularly more
exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the
Constitution — to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, 28 it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than
a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not
satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be
amended — as it is in our 1935 Constitution — "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter
of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." 29 In fact, this very Court — speaking through Justice Laurel,
an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly respected and foremost
leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution — declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times
of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organwhich
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments" of the
government. 30
The Solicitor General has invoked Luther v. Borden 31 in support of his stand that the issue under consideration is
non-justiciable in nature. Neither the factual background of that case nor the action taken therein by the Federal
Supreme Court has any similarity with or bearing on the cases under consideration.
Luther v. Borden was an action for trespass filed by Luther with the Circuit Court of the United States against
Borden and others for having forcibly entered into Luther's house, in Rhode Island, sometime in 1842. The
defendants who were in the military service of said former colony of England, alleged in their defense that they had
acted in obedience to the commands of a superior officer, because Luther and others were engaged in a conspiracy
to overthrow the government by force and the state had been placed by competent authority under Martial Law.
Such authority was the charter government of Rhode Island at the time of the Declaration of Independence, for —
unlike other states which adopted a new Constitution upon secession from England — Rhode Island retained its
form of government under a British Charter, making only such alterations, by acts of the Legislature, as were
necessary to adapt it to its subsequent condition as an independent state. It was under this form of government
when Rhode Island joined other American states in the Declaration of Independence and, by subsequently ratifying
the Constitution of the United States, became a member of the Union. In 1843, it adopted a new Constitution.
Prior thereto, however, many citizens had become dissatisfied with the charter government. Memorials addressed
by them to the Legislature having failed to bring about the desired effect, meetings were held and associations
formed — by those who belonged to this segment of the population — which eventually resulted in a convention
called for the drafting of a new Constitution to be submitted to the people for their adoption or rejection. The
convention was not authorized by any law of the existing government. The delegates to such convention framed a
new Constitution which was submitted to the people. Upon the return of the votes cast by them, the convention
declared that said Constitution had been adopted and ratified by a majority of the people and became the
paramount law and Constitution of Rhode Island.
The charter government, which was supported by a large number of citizens of the state, contested, however, the
validity of said proceedings. This notwithstanding, one Thomas W. Dorr, who had been elected governor under the
new Constitution of the rebels, prepared to assert authority by force of arms, and many citizens assembled to
support him. Thereupon, the charter government passed an Act declaring the state under Martial Law and adopted
measures to repel the threatened attack and subdue the rebels. This was the state of affairs when the defendants,
who were in the military service of the charter government and were to arrest Luther, for engaging in the support of
the rebel government — which was never able to exercise any authority in the state — broke into his house.
Meanwhile, the charter government had taken measures to call its own convention to revise the existing form of
government. Eventually, a new constitution was drafted by a convention held under the authority of the charter
government, and thereafter was adopted and ratified by the people. "(T)he times and places at which the votes were
to be given, the persons who were to receive and return them, and the qualifications of the voters having all been
previously authorized and provided for by law passed by the charter government," the latter formally surrendered all
of its powers to the new government, established under its authority, in May 1843, which had been in
operation uninterruptedly since then.
About a year before, or in May 1842, Dorr, at the head of a military force, had made an unsuccessful attempt to take
possession of the state arsenal in Providence, but he was repulsed, and, after an "assemblage of some hundreds of
armed men under his command at Chepatchet in the June following, which dispersed upon approach of the troops
of the old government, no further effort was made to establish" his government. "... until the Constitution of 1843" —
adopted under the auspices of the charter government — "went into operation, the charter government continued to
assert its authority and exercise its powers and to enforce obedience throughout the state ... ."
Having offered to introduce evidence to prove that the constitution of the rebels had been ratified by the majority of
the people, which the Circuit Court rejected, apart from rendering judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff took the
case for review to the Federal Supreme Court which affirmed the action of the Circuit Court, stating:
It is worthy of remark, however, when we are referring to the authority of State decisions, that the
trial of Thomas W. Dorr took place after the constitution of 1843 went into operation. The judges who
decided that case held their authority under that constitution and it is admitted on all hands that it
was adopted by the people of the State, and is the lawful and established government. It is the
decision, therefore, of a State court, whose judicial authority to decide upon the constitution and laws
of Rhode Island is not questioned by either party to this controversy, although the government under
which it acted was framed and adopted under the sanction and laws of the charter government.
The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question
relates, altogether, to the constitution and laws of that State, and the well settled rule in this court is,
that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions
which concern merely the constitution and laws of the State.
Upon what ground could the Circuit Court of the United States which tried this case have departed
from this rule, and disregarded and overruled the decisions of the courts of Rhode
Island? Undoubtedly the courts of the United States have certain powers under the Constitution and
laws of the United States which do not belong to the State courts. But the power of determining that
a State government has been lawfully established, which the courts of the State disown and
repudiate, is not one of them. Upon such a question the courts of the United States are bound to
follow the decisions of the State tribunals, and must therefore regard the charter government as the
lawful and established government during the time of this contest. 32
It is thus apparent that the context within which the case of Luther v. Borden was decided is basically and
fundamentally different from that of the cases at bar. To begin with, the case did not involve a federal question, but
one purely municipal in nature. Hence, the Federal Supreme Court was "bound to follow the decisions of the State
tribunals" of Rhode Island upholding the constitution adopted under the authority of the charter government.
Whatever else was said in that case constitutes, therefore, an obiter dictum. Besides, no decision analogous to that
rendered by the State Court of Rhode Island exists in the cases at bar. Secondly, the states of the Union have a
measure of internal sovereignty upon which the Federal Government may not encroach, whereas ours is a unitary
form of government, under which our local governments derive their authority from the national government.
Again, unlike our 1935 Constitution, the charter or organic law of Rhode Island contained no provision on the
manner, procedure or conditions for its amendment.
Then, too, the case of Luther v. Borden hinged more on the question of recognition of government, than on
recognition of constitution, and there is a fundamental difference between these two (2) types of recognition, the first
being generally conceded to be a political question, whereas the nature of the latter depends upon a number of
factors, one of them being whether the new Constitution has been adopted in the manner prescribed in the
Constitution in force at the time of the purported ratification of the former, which is essentially a justiciable question.
There was, in Luther v. Borden, a conflict between two (2) rival governments, antagonistic to each other, which is
absent in the present cases. Here, the Government established under the 1935 Constitution is the very same
government whose Executive Department has urged the adoption of the new or revised Constitution proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention and now alleges that it has been ratified by the people.
In short, the views expressed by the Federal Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden, decided in 1849, on
matters otherthan those referring to its power to review decisions of a state court concerning the constitution and
government of that state, not the Federal Constitution or Government, are manifestly neither, controlling, nor even
persuasive in the present cases, having as the Federal Supreme Court admitted — no authority whatsoever to pass
upon such matters or to review decisions of said state court thereon. In fact, referring to that case, the Supreme
Court of Minnessota had the following to say:
Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581, is always cited by those who assert that the courts have
no power to determine questions of a political character. It is interesting historically, but it has not the
slightest application to the case at bar. When carefully analyzed, it appears that it merely determines
that the federal courts will accept as final and controlling a decision of the highest court of a state
upon a question of the construction of the Constitution of the state. ... . 33
Baker v. Carr, 34 cited by respondents, involved an action to annul a Tennessee statute apportioning the seats in the
General Assembly among the counties of the State, upon the theory that the legislation violated the equal protection
clause. A district court dismissed the case upon the ground, among others, that the issue was a political one, but,
after a painstaking review of the jurisprudence on the matter, the Federal Supreme Court reversed the appealed
decision and held that said issue was justiciable and non-political, inasmuch as:"... (d)eciding whether a matter has
in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation,
and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution ... ."
Similarly, in Powell v. McCormack, 35 the same Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Warren, reversed a
decision of the Court of Appeals of New York affirming that of a Federal District Court, dismissing Powell's action for
a declaratory judgment declaring thereunder that he — whose qualifications were uncontested — had been
unlawfully excluded from the 90th Congress of the U.S. Said dismissal was predicated upon the ground, inter alia,
that the issue was political, but the Federal Supreme Court held that it was clearly a justiciable one.
The Supreme Court of Minnessota undertook a careful review of American jurisprudence on the matter. Owing to
the lucidity of its appraisal thereof, We append the same to this opinion as Annex A thereof.
After an, exhaustive analysis of the cases on this subject, the Court concluded:
The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has
been properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing Constitution is a judicial
question. There can be little doubt that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is
the absolute dutyof the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the
manner required by the Constitution, unless a special tribunal has been created to determine the
question; and even then many of the courts hold that the tribunal cannot be permitted to illegally
amend the organic law. ... . 36
In the light of the foregoing, and considering that Art. XV of our 1935 Constitution prescribes the method or
procedure for its amendment, it is clear to my mind that the question whether or not the revised Constitution drafted
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with said Art. XV is a justiciable one and non-
political in nature, and that it is not only subject to judicial inquiry, but, also, that it is the Court's bounden duty to
decide such question.
The Supreme Court of the United States has meaningfully postulated that "the courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' "
— because it allegedly involves a political question — "a bona fide controversy as to whether some action
denominated "political" exceeds constitutional authority." 37
III
Has the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified conformably to said Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution?
Petitioners in L-36142 maintain the negative view, upon ground: 1) that the President "is without authority to create
the Citizens' Assemblies" through which, respondents maintain, the proposed new Constitution has been ratified;
that said Assemblies "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution"; 3) that the President "is without
power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and 4) that "the election held
(in the Citizens' Assemblies) to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Apart from substantially reiterating these grounds support of said negative view, the petitioners in L-36164 contend:
1) that the President "has no power to call a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection" of the proposed new
Constitution or "to appropriate funds for the holding of the said plebiscite"; 2) that the proposed new or revised
Constitution "is vague and incomplete," as well as "contains provisions which are beyond the powers of the 1971
Convention to enact," thereby rendering it "unfit for ... submission the people;" 3) that "(t)he period of time between
November 1972 when the 1972 draft was approved and January 11-15, 1973," when the Citizens' Assemblies
supposedly ratified said draft, "was too short, worse still, there was practically no time for the Citizens' Assemblies to
discuss the merits of the Constitution which the majority of them have not read a which they never knew would be
submitted to them ratification until they were asked the question — "do you approve of the New Constitution?"
during the said days of the voting"; and that "(t)here was altogether no freedom discussion and no opportunity to
concentrate on the matter submitted to them when the 1972 draft was supposedly submitted to the Citizens'
Assemblies for ratification."
Petitioner in L-36236 added, as arguments in support of the negative view, that : 1) "(w)ith a government-controlled
press, there can never be a fair and proper submission of the proposed Constitution to the people"; and 2)
Proclamation No. 1102 is null and void "(i)nasmuch as the ratification process" prescribed "in the 1935 Constitution
was not followed."
Besides adopting substantially some of the grounds relied upon by the petitioners in the above-mentioned cases,
the petitioners in L-36283 argue that "(t)he creation of the Citizens' Assemblies as the vehicle for the ratification of
the Constitution was a deception upon the people since the President announced the postponement of the January
15, 1973 plebiscite to either February 19 or March 5, 1973." 38
The reasons adduced by the petitioners in L-36165 in favor of the negative view have already been set forth earlier
in this opinion. Hence, it is unnecessary to reproduce them here. So it is, with respect to the positions taken in L-
36165 by counsel for therein respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy — although more will be said later about them
— and by the Solicitor General, on behalf of the other respondents in that case and the respondents in the other
cases.
1. What is the procedure prescribed by the 1935 Constitution for its amendment?
Under section 1 of Art. XV of said Constitution, three (3) steps are essential, namely:
1. That the amendments to the Constitution be proposed either by Congress or by a convention called for that
purpose, "by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting
separately," but "in joint session assembled";
2. That such amendments be "submitted to the people for their ratification" at an "election"; and
3. That such amendments be "approved by a majority of the votes cast" in said election.
Compliance with the first requirement is virtually conceded, although the petitioners in L-36164 question the
authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to incorporate certain provisions into the draft of the new or revised
Constitution. The main issue in these five (5) cases hinges, therefore, on whether or not the last two (2)
requirements have been complied with.
2. Has the contested draft of the new or revised Constitution been submitted to the people for their ratification
conformably to Art. XV of the Constitution?
In this connection, other provisions of the 1935 Constitution concerning "elections" must, also, be taken into
account, namely, section I of Art. V and Art. X of said Constitution. The former reads:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified
by law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of suffrage to
women, if in a plebiscite which shall be held for that purpose within two years after the adoption of
this Constitution, not less than three hundred thousand women possessing the necessary
qualifications shall vote affirmatively on the question.
Sections 1 and 2 of Art. X of the Constitution ordain in part:
Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and

two other Members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions
which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to
vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and
location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election
officials. All law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by
the Commission, shall act as its deputiesfor the purpose of insuring fee, orderly, and honest
elections. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court.
xxx xxx xxx 39
a. Who may vote in a plebiscite under Art. V of the Constitution?
Petitioners maintain that section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution is a limitation upon the exercise of the right of
suffrage. They claim that no other persons than "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are twenty-one years of age or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for
one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election," may
exercise the right of suffrage in the Philippines. Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that said
provision merely guarantees the right of suffrage to persons possessing the aforementioned qualifications and none
of the disqualifications, prescribed by law, and that said right may be vested by competent authorities in
persons lacking some or all of the aforementioned qualifications, and possessing some of the aforesaid
disqualifications. In support of this view, he invokes the permissive nature of the language — "(s)uffrage may be
exercised" — used in section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution, and the provisions of the Revised Barrio Charter,
Republic Act No. 3590, particularly sections 4 and 6 thereof, providing that citizens of the Philippines "eighteen
years of age or over," who are registered in the list of barrio assembly members, shall be members thereof and may
participate as such in the plebiscites prescribed in said Act.
I cannot accept the Solicitor General's theory. Art. V of the Constitution declares who may exercise the right of
suffrage, so that those lacking the qualifications therein prescribed may not exercise such right. This view is borne
out by the records of the Constitutional Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution. Indeed, section 1 of Art. V of
the 1935 Constitution was largely based on the report of the committee on suffrage of the Convention that drafted
said Constitution which report was, in turn, "strongly influenced by the election laws then in force in the Philippines
... ." 40 " Said committee had recommended: 1) "That the right of suffrage should exercised only by male citizens of
the Philippines." 2) "That should be limited to those who could read and write." 3) "That the duty to vote should be
made obligatory." It appears that the first recommendation was discussed extensively in the Convention, and that,
by way of compromise, it was eventually agreed to include, in section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution, the second
sentence thereof imposing upon the National Assembly established by the original Constitution — instead of the
bicameral Congress subsequently created by amendment said Constitution — the duty to "extend the right of
suffrage women, if in a plebiscite to, be held for that purpose within two years after the adoption of this Constitution,
not less than three hundred thousand women possessing the necessary qualifications shall vote affirmatively on the
question." 41
The third recommendation on "compulsory" voting was, also debated upon rather extensively, after which it was
rejected by the Convention. 42 This accounts, in my opinion, for the permissive language used in the first sentence of
said Art. V. Despite some debates on the age qualification — amendment having been proposed to reduce the
same to 18 or 20, which were rejected, and the residence qualification, as well as the disqualifications to the
exercise of the right of suffrage — the second recommendation limiting the right of suffrage to those who could
"read and write" was — in the language of Dr. Jose M. Aruego, one of the Delegates to said Convention — "readily
approved in the Convention without any dissenting vote," although there was some debate on whether the
Fundamental Law should specify the language or dialect that the voter could read and write, which was decided in
the negative. 43
What is relevant to the issue before Us is the fact that the constitutional provision under consideration was meant to
be and is a grant or conferment of a right to persons possessing the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
therein mentioned, which in turn, constitute a limitation of or restriction to said right, and cannot, accordingly, be
dispensed with, except by constitutional amendment. Obviously, every such constitutional grant or conferment of a
right is necessarily a negation of the authority of Congress or of any other branch of the Government to deny said
right to the subject of the grant — and, in this sense only, may the same partake of the nature of a guarantee. But,
this does not imply not even remotely, that the Fundamental Law allows Congress or anybody else to vest in those
lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
At this juncture, it is noteworthy that the committee on suffrage responsible for the adoption of section 1 of Art. V of
the Constitution was "strongly influenced by the election laws then in force in the Philippines." Our first Election Law
was Act 1582, passed on January 9, 1907, which was partly amended by Acts 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768, and
incorporated into the Administrative Code of 1916 — Act 2657 — as chapter 20 thereof, and then in the
Administrative Code of 1917 — Act 2711 — as chapter 18 thereof, which, in turn, was amended by Act 3387,
approved on December 3, 1927. Sections 431 and 432 of said Code of 1917, prescribing, respectively, the
qualifications for and disqualifications from voting, are quoted below. 44 In all of these legislative acts, the provisions
concerning the qualifications of voters partook of the nature of a grant or recognition of the right of suffrage, and,
hence, of a denial thereof to those who lacked the requisite qualification and possessed any of the statutory
disqualifications. In short, the history of section 1, Art. V of the Constitution, shows beyond doubt than the same
conferred — not guaranteed — the authority to persons having the qualifications prescribed therein and none of
disqualifications to be specified in ordinary laws and, necessary implication, denied such right to those lacking any
said qualifications, or having any of the aforementioned disqualifications.
This view is further bolstered by the fact that the 1971 Constitutional Convention sought the submission to a
plebiscite of a "partial amendment" to said section 1 of Art. V of the 1935 Constitution, by reducing the voting age
from twenty-one (21) years to eighteen (18) years, which, however, did not materialize on account of the decision of
this Court in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 45 granting the writs, of prohibition and injunction therein applied
for, upon the ground that, under the Constitution, all of the amendments adopted by the Convention should be
submitted in "an election" or a single election, not separately or in several or distinct elections, and that the
proposed amendment sought to be submitted to a plebiscite was not even a complete amendment, but a "partial
amendment" of said section 1, which could be amended further, after its ratification, had the same taken place, so
that the aforementioned partial amendment was, for legal purposes, no more than
a provisional or temporary amendment. Said partial amendment was predicated upon the generally accepted
contemporary construction that, under the 1935 Constitution, persons below twenty-one (21) years of age could not
exercise the right of suffrage, without a previous amendment of the Constitution.
Upon the other hand, the question, whether 18-year-old members of barrio assemblies may vote in barrio assembly
plebiscites is, to say the least, a debatable one. Indeed, there seems to be a conflict between the last paragraph of
said section 6 of Rep. Act No. 3590, 46 pursuant to which the "majority vote of all the barrio assembly members"
(which include all barrio residents 18 years of age or over, duly registered in the list of barrio assembly members) is
necessary for the approval, in an assembly plebiscite, of "any budgetary, supplemental appropriations or special tax
ordinances," whereas, according to the paragraph preceding the penultimate one of said section, 47 "(a)ll duly
registered barrio assembly members qualified to vote" — who, pursuant to section 10 of the same Act, must be
citizens "of the Philippines, twenty-one years of age or over, able to read and write," and residents the barrio "during
the six months immediately preceding election, duly registered in the list of voters" and " otherwise disqualified ..." —
just like the provisions of present and past election codes of the Philippines and Art. V of the 1935 Constitution —
"may vote in the plebiscite."
I believe, however, that the apparent conflict should resolved in favor of the 21-year-old members of the assembly,
not only because this interpretation is in accord with Art. V the Constitution, but, also, because provisions of a
Constitution — particularly of a written and rigid one, like ours generally accorded a mandatory status — unless the
intention to the contrary is manifest, which is not so as regards said Art. V — for otherwise they would not have
been considered sufficiently important to be included in the Fundamental Law of the land. 48 Besides, it would be
illogical, if not absurd, believe that Republic Act No. 3590 requires, for the most important measures for which it
demands — in addition to favorable action of the barrio council — the approval of barrio assembly through
a plebiscite, lesser qualifications than those prescribed in dealing with ordinary measures for which such plebiscite
need not be held.
It is similarly inconceivable that those who drafted the 1935 Constitution intended section 1 of Art. V thereof to
apply only to elections of public officers, not to plebiscites for the ratification of amendments to the Fundamental
Law or revision thereof, or of an entirely new Constitution, and permit the legislature to require lesser qualifications
for such ratification, notwithstanding the fact that the object thereof much more important — if not fundamental, such
as the basic changes introduced in the draft of the revised Constitution adopted by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, which a intended to be in force permanently, or, at least, for many decades, and to affect the way of life
of the nation — and, accordingly, demands greater experience and maturity on the part of the electorate than that
required for the election of public officers, 49 whose average term ranges from 2 to 6 years.
It is admitted that persons 15 years of age or over, but below 21 years, regardless of whether or not they possessed
the other qualifications laid down in both the Constitution and the present Election Code, 50 and of whether or not
they are disqualified under the provisions of said Constitution and Code, 51 or those of Republic Act No. 3590, 52have
participated and voted in the Citizens' Assemblies that have allegedly ratified the new or revised Constitution drafted
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
In fact, according to the latest official data, the total number of registered voters 21 years of age or over in the entire
Philippines, available in January 1973, was less than 12 million. Yet, Proclamation No. 1102 states that 14,976,56
"members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against
... 743,869 who voted for its rejection," whereas, on the question whether or not the people still wanted a plebiscite
to be called to ratify the new Constitution, "... 14,298,814 answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that
the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite." In other words, it is
conceded that the number of people who allegedly voted at the Citizens' Assemblies for exceeded the number of
registered voters under the Election Code in force in January 1973.
It is thus clear that the proceedings held in such Citizens' Assemblies — and We have more to say on this point in
subsequent pages — were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in section 1
of Art. V of the Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the
invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters,
the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies must be considered null and void. 53
It has been held that "(t)he power to reject an entire poll ... should be exercised ... in a case where it is impossible to
ascertain with reasonable certainty the true vote," as where "it is impossible to separate the legal votes from the
illegal or spurious ... ." 54
In Usman v. Commission on Elections, et al., 55 We held:
Several circumstances, defying exact description and dependent mainly on the factual milieu of the
particular controversy, have the effect of destroying the integrity and authenticity of disputed election
returns and of avoiding their prima facie value and character. If satisfactorily proven, although in a
summary proceeding, such circumstances as alleged by the affected or interested parties, stamp the
election returns with the indelible mark of falsity and irregularity, and, consequently, of unreliability,
and justify their exclusion from the canvass.
Then, too, the 1935 Constitution requires "a majority of the votes cast" for a proposed amendment to the
Fundamental Law to be "valid" as part thereof, and the term "votes cast" has a well-settled meaning.
The term "votes cast" ... was held in Smith v. Renville County Commissioners, 65 N.W. 956, 64
Minn. 16, to have been used as an equivalent of "ballots cast." 56
The word "cast" is defined as "to deposit formally or officially." 57
It seems to us that a vote is cast when a ballot is deposited indicating a "choice." ... The word "cast"
means "deposit (a ballot) formally or officially ... .
... In simple words, we would define a "vote cast" as the exercise on a ballot of the choice of the
voter on the measure proposed. 58
In short, said Art. XV envisages — with the term "votes cast" — choices made on ballots — not orally or by raising
— by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American
regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official
ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records
that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns. And the 1935 Constitution has
been consistently interpreted in all plebiscites for the ratification rejection of proposed amendments thereto, from
1935 to 1967. Hence, the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies was and is null and void ab initio.
b. How should the plebiscite be held? (COMELEC supervision indispensable; essential requisites)
Just as essential as compliance with said Art. V of the 19 Constitution is that of Art. X thereof, particularly its
sections 1 and 2. Indeed, section 1 provides that "(t)here shall be an independent Commission on Elections ... ."
The point to be stressed here is the term "independent." Indeed, why was the term used?
In the absence of said constitutional provision as to the independence of the Commission, would it have been
depends upon either Congress or the Judiciary? The answer must be the negative, because the functions of the
Commission — "enforcement and administration" of election laws — are neither legislative nor judicial in nature,
and, hence, beyond the field allocated to either Congress or courts of justice. Said functions are by their nature
essentially executive, for which reason, the Commission would be under the "control" of the President, pursuant to
section 10, paragraph (1) of Art. VII of the Constitution, if Art. X thereof did not explicitly declare that it (the
Commission) is an "independent" body. In other words, in amending the original 1935 Constitution, by inserting
therein said Art. X, on the Commission on Elections, the purpose was to make said Commission independent
principally of the Chief Executive.
And the reason therefor is, also, obvious. Prior to the creation of the Commission on Elections as a constitutional
organ, election laws in the Philippines were enforced by the then Department of the Interior, through its Executive
Bureau, one of the offices under the supervision and control of said Department. The same — like other
departments of the Executive Branch of the Government — was, in turn, under the control of the Chief Executive,
before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, and had been — until the abolition of said Department, sometime ago
— under the control of the President of the Philippines, since the effectivity of said Fundamental Law. Under the
provisions thereof, the Executive could so use his power of control over the Department of the Interior and its
Executive Bureau as to place the minority party at such a great, if not decisive, disadvantage, as to deprive it, in
effect, of the opportunity to defeat the political party in power, and, hence, to enable the same to perpetuate itself
therein. To forestall this possibility, the original 1935 Constitution was amended by the establishment of the
Commission on Elections as a constitutional body independent primarily of the President of the Philippines.
The independence of the Commission was sought to be strengthened by the long term of office of its members —
nine (9) years, except those first appointed 59 — the longest under the Constitution, second only to that of the Auditor
General 60; by providing that they may not be removed from office except by impeachment, placing them, in this
respect, on the same plane as the President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor
General; that they may not be reappointed; that their salaries, "shall be neither increased nor diminished during their
term of office"; that the decisions the Commission "shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court" only 61; that
"(n)o pardon, parole, or suspension sentence for the violation of any election law may be granted without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission"62; and, that its chairman and members "shall not, during the
continuance in office, engage in the practice of any profession or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the management
or control of any private enterprise which in anyway may affected by the functions of their office; nor shall they,
directly or indirectly, be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof." 63 Thus, the framers of the amendment to the original Constitution of 1935 endeavored to do
everything possible protect and insure the independence of each member of the Commission.
With respect to the functions thereof as a body, section 2 of said Art. X ordains that "(t)he Commission on Elections
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration all laws relative to the conduct of elections,"
apart from such other "functions which may be conferred upon it by law." It further provides that the Commission
"shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative question affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other
election officials." And, to forests possible conflicts or frictions between the Commission, on one hand, and the other
offices or agencies of the executive department, on the other, said section 2 postulates that "(a)ll law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for
the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections." Not satisfied with this, it declares, in effect, that "(t)he
decisions, orders, and ruling of the Commission" shall not be subject to review, except by the Supreme Court.
In accordance with the letter and spirit of said Art. X of the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 6388, otherwise known as the
Election Code of 1971, implements the constitutional powers of the Commission on Elections and grants additional
powers thereto, some of which are enumerated in sections 5 and 6 of said Act, quoted below. 64 Moreover, said Act
contains, inter alia, detailed provisions regulating contributions and other (corrupt) practices; the establishment of
election precincts; the designation and arrangement of polling places, including voting booths, to protect the secrecy
of the ballot; formation of lists of voters, the identification and registration of voters, the proceedings therefor, as well
as for the inclusion in, or exclusion or cancellation from said list and the publication thereof; the establishment of
municipal, provincial and files of registered voters; the composition and appointment of board of election inspectors;
the particulars of the official ballots to be used and the precautions to be taken to insure authenticity thereof; the
procedure for the casting of votes; the counting of votes by boards of inspectors; the rules for the appreciation of
ballots and the preparation and disposition of election returns; the constitution and operation of municipal,
provincials and national boards of canvassers; the presentation of the political parties and/or their candidates in
each election precinct; the proclamation of the results, including, in the case of election of public officers, election
contests; and the jurisdiction of courts of justice in cases of violation of the provisions of said Election Code and the
penalties for such violations.
Few laws may be found with such meticulous and elaborate set of provisions aimed at "insuring free, orderly, and
honest election," as envisaged in section 2 of Art. X of the Constitution. Yet, none of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions was followed by the so-called Barangays or Citizens' Assemblies. And no reasons have been
given, or even sought to be given therefor. In many, if not most, instances, the election were held a viva voce, thus
depriving the electorate of the right to vote secretly — one of the most, fundamental and critical features of our
election laws from time immemorial — particularly at a time when the same was of utmost importance, owing to
the existence of Martial Law.
In Glen v. Gnau, 65 involving the casting of many votes, openly, without complying with the requirements of the law
pertinent thereto, it was held that the "election officers" involved "cannot be too strongly condemned" therefor and
that if they "could legally dispense with such requirement ... they could with equal propriety dispense with all of
them, including the one that the vote shall be by secret ballot, or even by ballot
at all ... ."
Moreover, upon the formal presentation to the Executive of the proposed Constitution drafted by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, or on December 1, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 73 (on the validity of which — which
was contested in the plebiscite cases, as well as in the 1972 habeas corpus cases 66 — We need not, in the case of
bar, express any opinion) was issued, calling a plebiscite, to be held on January 15, 1973, at which the proposed
Constitution would be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection; directing the publication of said proposed
Constitution; and declaring, inter alia, that "(t)he provision of the Election Code of 1971, insofar as they are not
inconsistent" with said decree — excepting those "regarding right and obligations of political parties and candidates"
— "shall apply to the conduct of the plebiscite." Indeed, section 2 of said Election Code of 1971 provides that "(a)ll
elections of public officers except barrio officials and plebiscites shall be conducted in the manner provided by this
Code." General Order No. 20, dated January 7, 1973, postponing until further notice, "the plebiscite scheduled to be
held on January 15, 1973," said nothing about the procedure to be followed in plebiscite to take place at such
notice, and no other order or decree has been brought to Our attention, expressly or impliedly repealing the
provisions of Presidential Decree 73, insofar as said procedure is concerned.
Upon the other hand, said General Order No. 20 expressly suspended "the provisions of Section 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 73 insofar as they allow free public discussion of proposed Constitution ... temporarily suspending
effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for the purposes of free open dabate on the proposed Constitution ... ." This
specific mention of the portions of the decrees or orders or instructions suspended by General Order No. 20
necessarily implies that all other portions of said decrees, orders or instructions — and, hence, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 73 outlining the procedure to be followed in the plebiscite for ratification or rejection of the
proposed Constitution — remained in force, assuming that said Decree is valid.
It is claimed that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 86-A — the text of which is quoted below 67 — the Executive
declared, inter alia, that the collective views expressed in the Citizens' Assemblies "shall be considered in the
formulation of national policies or programs and, wherever practicable, shall be translated into concrete and specific
decision"; that such Citizens' Assemblies "shall consider vital national issues ... like the holding of the plebiscite on
the new Constitution ... and others in the future, which shall serve as guide or basis for action or decision by the
national government"; and that the Citizens' Assemblies "shall conduct between January 10 and 15, 1973,
a referendum on important national issues, including those specified in paragraph 2 hereof, and submit the results
thereof to the Department of Local Governments and Community Development immediately thereafter, ... ." As in
Presidential Decree No. 86, this Decree No. 86-A does not and cannot exclude the exercise of the constitutional
supervisory power of the Commission on Elections or its participation in the proceedings in said Assemblies, if the
same had been intended to constitute the "election" or Plebiscite required Art. V of the 1935 Constitution. The
provision of Decree No. 86-A directing the immediate submission of the result thereof to the Department of Local
Governments Community Development is not necessarily inconsistent with, and must be subordinate to the
constitutional power of the Commission on Elections to exercise its "exclusive authority over the enforcement and
administration of all laws to the conduct of elections," if the proceedings in the Assemblies would partake of the
nature of an "election" or plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution.
We are told that Presidential Decree No. 86 was further amended by Presidential Decree No. 86-B, dated 1973,
ordering "that important national issues shall from time to time; be referred to the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
for resolution in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 86-A dated January 5, 1973 and that the initial referendum
include the matter of ratification of the Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention" and that "(t)he Secretary
of the Department of Local Governments and Community Development shall insure the implementation of this
order." As in the case of Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A, the foregoing directives do not necessarily exclude
exercise of the powers vested by the 1935 Constitution in the Commission on Elections, even if the Executive had
the authority to repeal Art. X of our Fundamental Law — which he does not possess. Copy of Presidential Decree
No. 86-B is appended hereto as Annex B hereof.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the Commission
on Elections, and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential
Decree No. 73. What is more, they were held under the supervision of the very officers and agencies of the
Executive Department sought to be excluded therefrom by Art. X of the 1935 Constitution. Worse still, said officers
and agencies of the 1935 Constitution would be favored thereby, owing to the practical indefinite extension of their
respective terms of office in consequence of section 9 of the Transitory Provisions, found in Art. XVII of the
proposed Constitution, without any elections therefor. And the procedure therein mostly followed is such that there
is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns files by the officers who conducted said plebiscites.
This is another patent violation of Art. of the Constitution which can hardly be sanctioned. And, since the provisions
of this article form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the
"free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will, the aforementioned violation thereof renders null and void
the contested proceedings or alleged plebiscite in the Citizens' Assemblies, insofar as the same are claimed to have
ratified the revised Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention. "... (a)ll the authorities agree that
the legal definition of an election, as well as that which is usually and ordinarily understood by the term, is a
choosing or as election by those having a right to participate (in the selection) of those who shall fill the offices, or of
the adoption or rejection of any public measure affecting the territory involved. 15 Cyc. 279; Lewis v. Boynton, 25
Colo. 486, 55 Pac. 732; Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; Seaman v. Baughman, 82 Iowa 216, 47 N.W. 1091, 11
L.R.A. 354; State v. Hirsh, 125 Ind. 207, 24 N.E. 1062, 9 L.R.A. 170; Bouvier's Law Dictionary. 68
IV
Has the proposed Constitution aforementioned

been approved by a majority of the people in
Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held
throughout the Philippines?
Respondents maintain the affirmative, relying upon Proclamation No. 1102, the validity of which is precisely being
contested by petitioners herein. Respondents claim that said proclamation is "conclusive" upon this Court, or is, at
least, entitled to full faith and credence, as an enrolled bill; that the proposed Constitution has been, in fact, ratified,
approved or adopted by the "overwhelming" majority of the people; that Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution has thus
been "substancially" complied with; and that the Court refrain from passing upon the validity of Proclamation No.
1102, not only because such question is political in nature, but, also, because should the Court invalidate the
proclamation, the former would, in effect, veto the action of the people in whom sovereignty resides and from its
power are derived.
The major flaw in this process of rationalization is that it assumes, as a fact, the very premise on which it is
predicated, and which, moreover, is contested by the petitioners. As the Supreme Court of Minnessota has aptly put
it —
... every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject to its
restrictions, and every departure therefrom or disregard thereof must subject him to the restraining
and controlling of the people, acting through the agency of the judiciary; for it must be remembered
that the people act through courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One
department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is
charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official
action. ... .
Accordingly, the issue boils downs to whether or not the Executive acted within the limits of his authority when he
certified in Proclamation No. 1102 "that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971)
Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of
all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines and has thereby come into effect."
In this connection, it is not claimed that the Chief Executive had personal knowledge of the data he certified in said
proclamation. Moreover, Art. X of the 1935 Constitution was precisely inserted to place beyond the Executive the
power to supervise or even exercise any authority whatsoever over "all laws relative to the conduct of elections,"
and, hence, whether the elections are for the choice or selection of public officers or for the ratification or rejection of
any proposed amendment, or revision of the Fundamental Law, since the proceedings for the latter are, also,
referred to in said Art. XV as "elections".
The Solicitor General stated, in his argument before this Court, that he had been informed that there was in each
municipality a municipal association of presidents of the citizens' assemblies for each barrio of the municipality; that
the president of each such municipal association formed part of a provincial or city association of presidents of such
municipal associations; that the president of each one of these provincial or city associations in turn formed part of a
National Association or Federation of Presidents of such Provincial or City Associations; and that one Francisco
Cruz from Pasig, Rizal, as President of said National Association or Federation, reported to the President of the
Philippines, in the morning of January 17, 1973, the total result of the voting in the citizens' assemblies all over the
country from January 10 to January 15, 1973. The Solicitor General further intimated that the said municipal
associations had reported the results of the citizens' assemblies in their respective municipalities to the
corresponding Provincial Association, which, in turn, transmitted the results of the voting in the to the Department of
Local Governments and Community Development, which tabulated the results of the voting in the citizens'
assemblies throughout the Philippines and then turned them over to Mr. Franciso Cruz, as President or acting
President of the National Association or Federation, whereupon Mr. Cruz, acting in a ceremonial capacity, reported
said results (tabulated by the Department of Governments and Community Development) to the Chief Executive,
who, accordingly, issued Proclamation No. 1102.
The record shows, however, that Mr. Cruz was not even a member of any barrio council since 1972, so that he
could possibly have been a member on January 17, 1973, of a municipal association of presidents of barrio or ward
citizens' assemblies, much less of a Provincial, City or National Association or Federation of Presidents of any such
provincial or city associations.
Secondly, at the conclusion of the hearing of these cases February 16, 1973, and in the resolution of this Court of
same date, the Solicitor General was asked to submit, together with his notes on his oral argument, a true copy of
aforementioned report of Mr. Cruz to the President and of "(p)roclamation, decree, instruction, order, regulation or
circular, if any, creating or directing or authorizing creation, establishment or organization" of said municipal,
provincial and national associations, but neither a copy of alleged report to the President, nor a copy of any
"(p)roclamation, decree, instruction, order, regulation or circular," has been submitted to this Court. In the absence
of said report, "(p)roclamation, decree, instruction," etc., Proclamation No. 1102 is devoid of
any factual and legalfoundation. Hence, the conclusion set forth in the dispositive portion of said Proclamation No.
1102, to the effect that the proposed new or revised Constitution had been ratified by majority of the votes cast by
the people, can not possibly have any legal effect or value.
The theory that said proclamation is "conclusive upon Court is clearly untenable. If it were, acts of the Executive and
those of Congress could not possibly be annulled or invalidated by courts of justice. Yet, such is not the case. In
fact, even a resolution of Congress declaring that a given person has been elected President or Vice-President of
the Philippines as provided in the Constitution, 69 is not conclusive upon the courts. It is no more than prima
facie evidence of what is attested to by said resolution. 70 If assailed directly in appropriate proceedings, such as an
election protest, if and when authorized by law, as it is in the Philippines, the Court may receive evidence and
declare, in accordance therewith, who was duly elected to the office involved. 71 If prior to the creation of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, no such protest could be filed, it was not because the resolution of Congress
declaring who had been elected President or Vice-President was conclusive upon courts of justice, but because
there was no law permitting the filing of such protest and declaring what court or body would hear and decide the
same. So, too, a declaration to the effect that a given amendment to the Constitution or revised or new Constitution
has been ratified by a majority of the votes cast therefor, may be duly assailed in court and be the object of judicial
inquiry, in direct proceedings therefor — such as the cases at bar — and the issue raised therein may and should be
decided in accordance with the evidence presented.
The case of In re McConaughy 72 is squarely in point. "As the Constitution stood from the organization of the state"
— of Minnessota — "all taxes were required to be raised under the system known as the 'general property tax.'
Dissatisfaction with the results of this method and the development of more scientific and satisfactory methods of
raising revenue induced the Legislature to submit to the people an amendment to the Constitution which provided
merely that taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects. This proposed amendment was submitted at the
general election held in November, 1906, and in due time it was certified by the state canvassing board and
proclaimed by the Governor as having been legally adopted. Acting upon the assumption that the amendment had
become a part of the Constitution, the Legislature enacted statutes providing for a State Tax Commission and a
mortgage registry tax, and the latter statute, upon the same theory, was held constitutional" by said Court. "The
district court found that the amendment had no in fact been adopted, and on this appeal" the Supreme Court was
"required to determine the correctness of that conclusion."
Referring to the effect of the certification of the State Board of Canvassers created by the Legislature and of
theproclamation made by the Governor based thereon, the Court held: "It will be noted that this board does no more
than tabulate the reports received from the various county board and add up and certify the results. State v. Mason,
45 Wash. 234, 88 Pac. 126, 9 L.R.A. (U.S.) 1221. It is settled law that the decisions of election officers, and
canvassing boards are not conclusive and that the final decision must rest with the courts, unless the law declares
that the decisions of the board shall be final" — and there is no such law in the cases at bar. "... The correctness of
the conclusion of the state board rests upon the correctness of the returns made by the county boards and it
is inconceivable that it was intended that this statement of result should be final and conclusive regardless of the
actual facts. The proclamation of the Governor adds nothing in the way of conclusiveness to the legal effect of the
action of the canvassing board. Its purpose is to formally notify the people of the state of the result of the voting as
found by the canvassing board. James on Const. Conv. (4th Ed.) sec. 523."
In Bott v. Wartz, 73 the Court reviewed the statement of results of the election made by the canvassing board, in
order that the true results could be judicially determined. And so did the court in Rice v. Palmer. 74
Inasmuch as Art. X of the 1935 Constitution places under the "exclusive" charge of the Commission on Elections,
"the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive,
and there is not even a certification by the Commission in support of the alleged results of the citizens' assemblies
relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102 — apart from the fact that on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president
of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the
President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines — it follows necessarily that, from a
constitutional and legal viewpoint, Proclamation No. 1102 is not even prima facie evidence of the alleged ratification
of the proposed Constitution.
Referring particularly to the cases before Us, it will be noted that, as pointed out in the discussion of the preceding
topic, the new or revised Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not ratified in
accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Constitution. In fact, it has not even been, ratified in accordance with
said proposed Constitution, the minimum age requirement therein for the exercise of the right of suffrage
being eighteen (18) years, apart from the fact that Art. VI of the proposed Constitution requires "secret" voting,
which was not observed in many, if not most, Citizens' Assemblies. Besides, both the 1935 Constitution and the
proposed Constitution require a "majority of the votes cast" in an election or plebiscite called for the ratification of an
amendment or revision of the first Constitution or the effectivity of the proposed Constitution, and the phrase "votes
cast" has been construed to mean "votes made in writing not orally, as it was in many Citizens' Assemblies. 75
Even counsel for Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy, as respondents in L-36165, asserts openly that Art. XV of the
Constitution has not been complied with, and since the alleged substantial compliance with the requirements thereof
partakes of the nature of a defense set up by the other respondents in these cases, the burden of proving such
defense — which, if true, should be within their peculiar knowledge — is clearly on such respondents. Accordingly, if
despite the extensive notes and documents submitted by the parties herein, the members of the Court do not know
or are not prepared to say whether or not the majority of the people or of those who took part in the Citizens'
Assemblies have assented to the proposed Constitution, the logical step would be to give due course to these
cases, require the respondents to file their answers, and the plaintiffs their reply, and, thereafter, to receive the
pertinent evidence and then proceed to the determination of the issues raised thereby. Otherwise, we would be
placing upon the petitioners the burden of disproving a defense set up by the respondents, who have not so
far established the truth of such defense.
Even more important, and decisive, than the foregoing is the circumstance that there is ample reason to believe that
many, if not most, of the people did not know that the Citizens' Assemblies were, at the time they were held,
plebiscites for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution. Hence, in Our decision in the plebiscite
cases, We said, inter alia:
Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the
effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed
Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until
January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to
be held on January 15, 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20,
moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending
the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution.
In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court
deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the
date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced
officially. Then again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular
session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that
the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds
therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of
the plebiscite by the President — reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of
Congress and the Commission on Elections — the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final
action on these cases.
And, apparently, the parties in said cases entertained the same belief, for, on December 23, 1972 — four (4) days
after the last hearing of said cases 76 — the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite scheduled by
Presidential Decree No. 73 to be held on January 15, 1973, after consultation with the Commission on Elections and
the leaders of Congress, owing to doubts on the sufficiency of the time available to translate the proposed
Constitution into some local dialects and to comply with some pre-electoral requirements, as well as to afford the
people a reasonable opportunity to be posted on the contents and implications of said transcendental document. On
January 7, 1973, General Order No. 20 was issued formally, postponing said plebiscite "until further notice." How
can said postponement be reconciled with the theory that the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies scheduled to
be held from January 10 to January 15, 1973, were "plebiscites," in effect, accelerated, according to the theory of
the Solicitor General, for the ratification of the proposed Constitution? If said Assemblies were meant to be the
plebiscites or elections envisaged in Art. XV of the Constitution, what, then, was the "plebiscite" postponed by
General Order No. 20? Under these circumstances, it was only reasonable for the people who attended such
assemblies to believe that the same were not an "election" or plebiscite for the ratification or adoption of said
proposed Constitution.
And, this belief is further bolstered up by the questions propounded in the Citizens' Assemblies, namely:
[1] Do you like the New Society?

[2] Do you like the reforms under martial law?
[3] Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?
[4] Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?
[5] Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of the government? [Bulletin Today,
January 10, 1973; emphasis an additional question.]
[6] Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to decide issues of
national interests?
[7] Do you approve of the new Constitution?
[8] Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
[9] Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of the
1935 Constitution?
[10] If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be called?
[11] Do you want martial law to continue? [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973]
To begin with, questions nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11 are not proper in a plebiscite for the ratification of a
proposed Constitution or of a proposed amendment thereto. Secondly, neither is the language of question No. 7 —
"Do you approve the new Constitution?" One approves "of" the act of another which does not need such approval
for the effectivity of said act, which the first person, however, finds to be good, wise satisfactory. The approval of the
majority of the votes cast in plebiscite is, however, essential for an amendment to the Constitution to be valid as part
thereof. Thirdly, if the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies constituted a plebiscite question No. 8 would have
been unnecessary and improper, regardless of whether question No. 7 were answered affirmatively or negatively. If
the majority of the answers to question No. 7 were in the affirmative, the proposed Constitution would have become
effective and no other plebiscite could be held thereafter in connection therewith, even if the majority of the answers
to question No. 8 were, also, in the affirmative. If the majority of the answers to question No. 7 were in the negative,
neither may another plebiscite be held, even if the majority of the answers to question No. 8 were in the affirmative.
In either case, not more than one plebiscite could be held for the ratification or rejection of the proposed
Constitution. In short, the insertion of said two (2) questions — apart from the other questions adverted to above —
indicates strongly that the proceedings therein did not partake of the nature of a plebiscite or election for the
ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution.
Indeed, I can not, in good conscience, declare that the proposed Constitution has been approved or adopted by the
people in the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines, when it is, to my mind, a matter of judicial knowledge that
there have been no such citizens' assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of
the Philippines. In a letter of Governor Efren B. Pascual of Bataan, dated January 15, 1973, to the Chief Executive,
the former reported:
... This report includes a resumee (sic) of the activities we undertook in effecting the referendum on
the eleven questions you wanted our people consulted on and the Summary of Results thereof for
each municipality and for the whole province.
xxx xxx xxx
... Our initial plans and preparations, however, dealt only on the original five questions.
Consequently, when we received an instruction on January 10 to change the questions, we urgently
suspended all scheduled Citizens Assembly meetings on that day and called all Mayors, Chiefs of
Offices and other government officials to another conference to discuss with them the new set of
guidelines and materials to be used.
On January 11, ... another instruction from the top was received to include the original five questions
among those to be discussed and asked in the Citizens' Assembly meetings. With this latest
order, we again had to make modifications in our instructions to all those managing and supervising
the holding of the Citizens' Assembly meetings throughout the province. ... Aside from the
coordinators we had from the Office of the Governor, the splendid cooperation and support extended
by almost all government officials and employees in the province, particularly of the Department of
Education, PC and PACD personnel, provided us with enough hands to trouble shoot and implement
sudden changes in the instructions anytime and anywhere needed. ...
... As to our people, in general, their enthusiastic participation showed their preference and
readiness to accept this new method of government to people consultation in shaping up
government policies.
Thus, as late as January 10, 1973, the Bataan officials had to suspend "all scheduled Citizens' Assembly meetings
..." and call all available officials "... to discuss with them the new set of guidelines and materials to be used ... ."
Then, "on January 11 ... another instruction from the top was received to include the original five questions among
those be discussed and asked in the Citizens' Assembly meetings. With this latest order, we again had to make
modifications in our instructions to all those managing and supervising holding of the Citizens' Assembly meetings
throughout province. ... As to our people, in general, their enthusiastic participation showed their preference and
readiness to accept the new method of government to people consultation in shaping up government policies."
This communication manifestly shows: 1) that, as late a January 11, 1973, the Bataan officials had still to discuss —
not put into operation — means and ways to carry out the changing instructions from the top on how to organize the
citizens' assemblies, what to do therein and even what questions or topics to propound or touch in said assemblies;
2) that the assemblies would involve no more than consultations or dialogues between people and government —
not decisions be made by the people; and 3) that said consultations were aimed only at "shaping up government
policies" and, hence could not, and did not, partake of the nature of a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of a
proposed amendment of a new or revised Constitution for the latter does not entail the formulation of a policy of the
Government, but the making of decision by the people on the new way of life, as a nation, they wish to have, once
the proposed Constitution shall have been ratified.
If this was the situation in Bataan — one of the provinces nearest to Manila — as late as January 11, 1973, one can
easily imagine the predicament of the local officials and people in the remote barrios in northern and southern
Luzon, in the Bicol region, in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao. In fact, several members of the Court, including
those of their immediate families and their household, although duly registered voters in the area of Greater Manila,
were not even notified that citizens' assemblies would be held in the places where their respective residences were
located. In the Prohibition and Amendment case, 77 attention was called to the "duty cast upon the court of taking
judicial cognizance of anything affecting the existence and validity of any law or portion of the
Constitution ... ." In line with its own pronouncement in another case, the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States stressed, in Baker v. Carr, 78 that "a court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when
the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is declared."
In the light of the foregoing, I cannot see how the question under consideration can be answered or resolved
otherwise than in the negative.
Have the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution?
It is urged that the present Government of the Philippines is now and has been run, since January 17, 1971, under
the Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention; that the political department of the Government has
recognized said revised Constitution; that our foreign relations are being conducted under such new or revised
Constitution; that the Legislative Department has recognized the same; and that the people, in general, have, by
their acts or omissions, indicated their conformity thereto.
As regards the so-called political organs of the Government, gather that respondents refer mainly to the offices
under the Executive Department. In a sense, the latter performs some functions which, from a constitutional
viewpoint, are politics in nature, such as in recognizing a new state or government, in accepting diplomatic
representatives accredited to our Government, and even in devising administrative means and ways to better carry
into effect. Acts of Congress which define the goals or objectives thereof, but are either imprecise or silent on the
particular measures to be resorted to in order to achieve the said goals or delegate the power to do so, expressly or
impliedly, to the Executive. This, notwithstanding, the political organ of a government that purports to be republican
is essentially the Congress or Legislative Department. Whatever may be the functions allocated to the Executive
Department — specially under a written, rigid Constitution with a republican system of Government like ours — the
role of that Department is inherently, basically and fundamentally executive in nature — to "take care that the laws
be faithfully executed," in the language of our 1935 Constitution. 79
Consequently, I am not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in
line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote a recognition thereof o an acquiescence thereto. Whether they recognized
the proposed Constitution or acquiesce thereto or not is something that cannot legally, much less necessarily or
even normally, be deduced from their acts in accordance therewith, because the are bound to obey and act in
conformity with the orders of the President, under whose "control" they are, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. They
have absolutely no other choice, specially in view of Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under Martial
Law. Besides, by virtue of the very decrees, orders and instructions issued by the President thereafter, he had
assumed all powers of Government — although some question his authority to do so — and, consequently, there is
hardly anything he has done since the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102, on January 17, 1973 — declaring that
the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified by the overwhelming majority of
the people — that he could not do under the authority he claimed to have under Martial Law, since September 21,
1972, except the power of supervision over inferior courts and its personnel, which said proposed Constitution would
place under the Supreme Court, and which the President has not ostensibly exercised, except as to some minor
routine matters, which the Department of Justice has continued to handle, this Court having preferred to maintain
the status quo in connection therewith pending final determination of these cases, in which the effectivity of the
aforementioned Constitution is disputed.
Then, again, a given department of the Government cannot generally be said to have "recognized" its own acts.
Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Accordingly, when a
subordinate officer or office of the Government complies with the commands of a superior officer or office, under
whose supervision and control he or it is, the former merely obeys the latter. Strictly speaking, and from a legal and
constitutional viewpoint, there is no act of recognition involved therein. Indeed, the lower officer or office, if he or it
acted otherwise, would just be guilty of insubordination.
Thus, for instance, the case of Taylor v. Commonwealth 80 — cited by respondents herein in support of the theory of
the people's acquiescence — involved a constitution ordained in 1902 and "proclaimed by a convention duly called
by a direct vote of the people of the state to revise and amend the Constitution of 1869. The result of the work of
that Convention has been recognized, accepted and acted upon as the only valid Constitution of the State" by —
1. The "Governor of the State in swearing fidelity to it and proclaiming it, as directed thereby";
2. The "Legislature in its formal official act adopting a joint resolution, July 15, 1902, recognizing the Constitution
ordained by the Convention ...";
3. The "individual oaths of its members to support it, and by its having been engaged for nearly a year, in legislating
under it and putting its provisions into
operation ...";
4. The "judiciary in taking the oath prescribed thereby to support it and by enforcing its provisions ..."; and
5. The "people in their primary capacity by peacefully accepting it and acquiescing in it, by registering as voters
under it to the extent of thousands throughout the State, and by voting, under its provisions, at a general election for
their representatives in the Congress of the United States."
Note that the New Constitution of Virginia, drafted by a convention whose members were elected directly by the
people, was not submitted to the people for ratification or rejection thereof. But, it was recognized, not by the
convention itself, but by other sectors of the Government, namely, the Governor; the Legislature — not merely by
individual acts of its members, but by formal joint resolution of its two (2) chambers; by the judiciary; and by the
people, in the various ways specified above. What is more, there was no martial law. In the present cases, none of
the foregoing acts of acquiescence was present. Worse still, there is martial law, the strict enforcement of which was
announced shortly before the alleged citizens' assemblies. To top it all, in the Taylor case, the effectivity of the
contested amendment was not contested judicially until about one (1) year after the amendment had been put into
operation in all branches of the Government, and complied with by the people who participated in the elections held
pursuant to the provisions of the new Constitution. In the cases under consideration, the legality of Presidential
Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, was impugned as early as December 7, 1972, or
five (5) weeks before the scheduled plebiscite, whereas the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 declaring on January
17, 1973, that the proposed Constitution had been ratified — despite General Order No. 20, issued on January 7,
1972, formally and officially suspending the plebiscite until further notice — was impugned as early as January 20,
1973, when L-36142 was filed, or three (3) days after the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102.
It is further alleged that a majority of the members of our House of Representatives and Senate have acquiesced in
the new or revised Constitution, by filing written statements opting to serve in the Ad Interim Assembly established
in the Transitory Provisions of said Constitution. Individual acts of recognition by members of our legislature, as well
as of other collegiate bodies under the government, are invalid as acts of said legislature or bodies, unless its
members have performed said acts in session duly assembled, or unless the law provides otherwise, and there is
no such law in the Philippines. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public
Officers, and no plausible reason has been adduced to warrant departure therefrom. 81
Indeed, if the members of Congress were generally agreeable to the proposed Constitution, why did it become
necessary to padlock its premises to prevent its meeting in session on January 22, 1973, and thereafter as provided
in the 1935 Constitution? It is true that, theoretically, the members of Congress, if bent on discharging their functions
under said Constitution, could have met in any other place, the building in which they perform their duties being
immaterial to the legality of their official acts. The force of this argument is, however, offset or dissipated by the fact
that, on or about December 27, 1972, immediately after a conference between the Executive, on the one hand, and
members of Congress, on the other, some of whom expressed the wish to meet in session on January 22, 1973, as
provided in the 1935 Constitution, a Daily Express columnist (Primitivo Mijares) attributed to Presidential Assistant
Guillermo de Vega a statement to the effect that "'certain members of the Senate appear to be missing the point in
issue' when they reportedly insisted on taking up first the question of convening Congress." The Daily Express of
that date, 82 likewise, headlined, on its front page, a "Senatorial Plot Against 'Martial Law Government' Disclosed".
Then, in its issue of December 29, 1972, the same paper imputed to the Executive an appeal "to diverse groups
involved in a conspiracy to undermine" his powers" under martial law to desist from provoking a constitutional crisis
... which may result in the exercise by me of authority I have not exercised."
No matter how good the intention behind these statement may have been, the idea implied therein was too clear
an ominous for any member of Congress who thought of organizing, holding or taking part in a session of Congress,
not to get the impression that he could hardly do so without inviting or risking the application of Martial Law to him.
Under these conditions, I do not feel justified in holding that the failure of the members of Congress to meet since
January 22, 1973, was due to their recognition, acquiescence in or conformity with the provisions of the
aforementioned Constitution, or its alleged ratification.
For the same reasons, especially because of Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire Philippines under Martial
Law, neither am I prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their
compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions — some or many of which have
admittedly had salutary effects — issued subsequently thereto amounts, constitutes or attests to a ratification,
adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. In the words of the Chief Executive, "martial law
connotespower of the gun, meant coercion by the military, and compulsion and intimidation." 83 The failure to use the
gun against those who comply with the orders of the party wielding the weapon does not detract from the
intimidation that Martial Law necessarily connotes. It may reflect the good, reasonable and wholesome attitude of
the person who has the gun, either pointed at others, without pulling the trigger, or merely kept in its holster, but not
without warning that he may or would use it if he deemed it necessary. Still, the intimidation is there, and inaction or
obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence. This is
specially so when we consider that the masses are, by and large, unfamiliar with the parliamentary system, the new
form of government introduced in the proposed Constitution, with the particularity that it is not even identical to that
existing in England and other parts of the world, and that even experienced lawyers and social scientists find it
difficult to grasp the full implications of some provisions incorporated therein.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a
document certified to the President — for his action under the Constitution — by the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and attested to by the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary of the
House of Representatives, concerning legislative measures approved by the two Houses of Congress. The
argument of the Solicitor General is, roughly, this: If the enrolled bill is entitled to full faith and credence and, to this
extent, it is conclusive upon the President and the judicial branch of the Government, why should Proclamation No.
1102 merit less consideration than in enrolled bill?
Before answering this question, I would like to ask the following: If, instead of being certified by the aforementioned
officers of Congress, the so-called enrolled bill were certified by, say, the President of the Association of Sugar
Planters and/or Millers of the Philippines, and the measure in question were a proposed legislation concerning
Sugar Plantations and Mills sponsored by said Association, which even prepared the draft of said legislation, as well
as lobbied actually for its approval, for which reason the officers of the Association, particularly, its aforementioned
president — whose honesty and integrity are unquestionable — were present at the deliberations in Congress when
the same approved the proposed legislation, would the enrolled bill rule apply thereto? Surely, the answer would
have to be in the negative. Why? Simply, because said Association President has absolutely no official authority to
perform in connection therewith, and, hence, his certification is legally, as good as non-existent.
Similarly, a certification, if any, of the Secretary of the Department of Local Governments and Community
Development about the tabulated results of the voting in the Citizens Assemblies allegedly held all over the
Philippines — and the records do not show that any such certification, to the President of the Philippines or to the
President Federation or National Association of presidents of Provincial Associations of presidents of municipal
association presidents of barrio or ward assemblies of citizens — would not, legally and constitutionally, be worth
the paper on which it is written. Why? Because said Department Secretary is not the officer designated by law to
superintend plebiscites or elections held for the ratification or rejection of a proposed amendment or revision of the
Constitution and, hence, to tabulate the results thereof. Worse still, it is the department which, according to Article X
of the Constitution, should not and must not be all participate in said plebiscite — if plebiscite there was.
After citing approvingly its ruling in United States v. Sandoval, 84 the Highest Court of the United States that courts
"will not stand impotent before an obvious instance of a manifestly unauthorized exercise of power." 85
I cannot honestly say, therefore, that the people impliedly or expressly indicated their conformity to the proposed
Constitution.
VI
Are the Parties entitled to any relief?
Before attempting to answer this question, a few words be said about the procedure followed in these five (5) cases.
In this connection, it should be noted that the Court has not decided whether or not to give due course to the
petitions herein or to require the respondents to answer thereto. Instead, it has required the respondents to
comment on the respective petitions — with three (3) members of the voting to dismiss them outright — and then
considers comments thus submitted by the respondents as motions to dismiss, as well as set the same for hearing.
This was due to the transcendental nature of the main issue raised, the necessity of deciding the same with utmost
dispatch, and the main defense set up by respondents herein, namely, the alleged political nature of said issue,
placing the same, according to respondents, beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry and determination. If this defense
was sustained, the cases could readily be dismissed; but, owing to the importance of the questions involved, a
reasoned resolution was demanded by public interest. At the same time, respondents had cautioned against a
judicial inquiry into the merits of the issues posed on account of the magnitude of the evil consequences, it was
claimed, which would result from a decision thereon, if adverse to the Government.
As a matter of fact, some of those issues had been raised in the plebiscite cases, which were dismissed as moot
and academic, owing to the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102 subsequently to the filing of said cases, although
before the rendition of judgment therein. Still one of the members of the Court (Justice Zaldivar) was of the opinion
that the aforementioned issues should be settled in said cases, and he, accordingly, filed an opinion passing upon
the merits thereof. On the other hand, three (3) members of the Court — Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra —
filed separate opinions favorable to the respondents in the plebiscite cases, Justice Barredo holding "that the 1935
Constitution has pro tanto passed into history and has been legitimately supplanted by the Constitution in force by
virtue of Proclamation 1102." 86 When the petitions at bar were filed, the same three (3) members of the Court,
consequently, voted for the dismissal of said petitions. The majority of the members of the Court did not share,
however, either view, believing that the main question that arose before the rendition of said judgment had not been
sufficiently discussed and argued as the nature and importance thereof demanded.
The parties in the cases at bar were accordingly given every possible opportunity to do so and to elucidate on and
discuss said question. Thus, apart from hearing the parties in oral argument for five (5) consecutive days — morning
and afternoon, or a total of exactly 26 hours and 31 minutes — the respective counsel filed extensive notes on their
or arguments, as well as on such additional arguments as they wished to submit, and reply notes or memoranda, in
addition to rejoinders thereto, aside from a sizeable number of document in support of their respective contentions,
or as required by the Court. The arguments, oral and written, submitted have been so extensive and exhaustive,
and the documents filed in support thereof so numerous and bulky, that, for all intents and purposes, the situation is
as if — disregarding forms — the petitions had been given due course and the cases had been submitted for
decision.
Accordingly, the majority of the members of the Court believe that they should express their views on the
aforementioned issues as if the same were being decided on the merits, and they have done so in their individual
opinion attached hereto. Hence, the resume of the votes cast and the tenor of the resolution, in the last pages
hereof, despite the fact that technically the Court has not, as yet, formally given due course to the petitions herein.
And, now, here are my views on the reliefs sought by the parties.
In L-36165, it is clear that we should not issue the writ of mandamus prayed for against Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy,
President and President Pro Tempore respectively of the Senate, it being settled in our jurisdiction, based upon the
theory of separation of powers, that the judiciary will not issue such writ to the head of a co-equal department, like
the aforementioned officers of the Senate.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, as well as in cases L-36142, L-36164, L-
36236 and L-36283, my vote is that the petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima
facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935
Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said
proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the
Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its
ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the
Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.
Perhaps others would feel that my position in these cases overlooks what they might consider to be the demands of
"judicial statesmanship," whatever may be the meaning of such phrase. I am aware of this possibility, if not
probability; but "judicial statesmanship," though consistent with Rule of Law, cannot prevail over the latter. Among
consistent ends or consistent values, there always is a hierarchy, a rule of priority.
We must realize that the New Society has many achievements which would have been very difficult, if not
impossible, to accomplish under the old dispensation. But, in and for the judiciary, statesmanship should not prevail
over the Rule of Law. Indeed, the primacy of the law or of the Rule of Law and faithful adherence thereto are basic,
fundamental and essential parts of statesmanship itself.
Resume of the Votes Cast and the Court's Resolution
As earlier stated, after the submittal by the members of the Court of their individual opinions and/or concurrences as
appended hereto, the writer will now make, with the concurrence of his colleagues, a resume or summary of the
votes cast by each of them.
It should be stated that by virtue of the various approaches and views expressed during the deliberations, it was
agreed to synthesize the basic issues at bar in broad general terms in five questions for purposes of taking the
votes. It was further agreed of course that each member of the Court would expound in his individual opinion and/or
concurrence his own approach to the stated issues and deal with them and state (or not) his opinion thereon singly
or jointly and with such priority, qualifications and modifications as he may deem proper, as well as discuss thereon
other related issues which he may consider vital and relevant to the cases at bar.
The five questions thus agreed upon as reflecting the basic issues herein involved are the following:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable,
question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not
strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? and
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
The results of the voting, premised on the individual views expressed by the members of the Court in their respect
opinions and/or concurrences, are as follows:
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102
presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this
question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating
that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of
whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off
out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles
whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or
three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."
2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee
and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides
only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by
qualified and duly registered voters. 87
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified
pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said
Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported
and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing
to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as
approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I
am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to
have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it
may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially
complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has
been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.
3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no
majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have
already accepted the 1973 Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and
there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or
repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the
doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new
Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this
stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and
the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a
concomitant feature of martial law." 88
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question.
Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial
law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of
knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution." 89
4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the
strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate
question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the
competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 91
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny
respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that
it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast
no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state
with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force;
with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and
Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of the incumbent
President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim
National Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the
issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No.
1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No.
229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section
4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below.2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions
to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to
have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will
be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the
contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim
Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the
incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who
shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent
President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while
the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner
of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same functions,
responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of
the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the members,
convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected.
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his
powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he
shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and
the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the
responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such
disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so desires
may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable
to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of
the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers, and
composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may be called
at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter
whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full force and
effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been
ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640 for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting
the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and
1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as
it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor
General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond
judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority
to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was
instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to
propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the
interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M.
GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President
cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is
untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short
period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the
people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which
confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad)
possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is
now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by
one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for
the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer
of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry
out its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these
amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain
the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the
authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of
judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question.
8This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of
the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory
provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so
that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments
to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent
assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore
a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be
a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of
the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the
proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the
people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when
they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or
not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by
the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be
done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of the Court's
majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political impression. In the
Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No.
73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a
political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in
the Ratification Cases12 involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102.
announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was
dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority
view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the
question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification
or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because,
they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With
Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our
authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in
Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We,
accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The
return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by
the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially
the same as those given in support on the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite
cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally
untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature
and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention
to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred
with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may,
by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments
shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a
vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention
may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the
National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the
majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent
with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member
of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the
Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the
discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor,
Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel
(V) was rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the
referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the
convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question
of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members
of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I
interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had
already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution,
that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.16
Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that
power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to
legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in
character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of
a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.17 Such being the case, approval of the
President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government today are more or
less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a
democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the
separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the
government be parceled out among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is
believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of power,
and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very
definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental
action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action
in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government when all
powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive,
legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of powers in a
constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is
evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the
former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither
guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy
than presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must
also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims
for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of
special exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad emergency
powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the
crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That sun clear
authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus:23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and
shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to
exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the
powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the
interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall
then exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and
effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of
the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional
Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to session, and
knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise,
with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental
machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which
extends over a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a
distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause
for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by
the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and
economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our political,
social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be
attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during
the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of
the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body
in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of
the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the
interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions?
The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of
course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally
constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and
the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very
constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions.
For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the
governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby
impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times,
that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all,
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and February 1975,
the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the
Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng
mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations,
Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that
the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned
the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to
settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of its
present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16 .28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10,
1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng
mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the
Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed
amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent
issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16.
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the Philippines, a
republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them .30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the
highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence,
the people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because,
as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all experiment."34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that
one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when
they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as
constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single
man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority
who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed
amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people
themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending
process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside
somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
- is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the desire of the
Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in
pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of
voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the
new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will
have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the
referendum question and the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing
objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification
of proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is
readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing the ballots of voters
fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and
above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of
the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-
plebiscite shall be separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes.38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely consultative in
character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe their
consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President.39 It is
participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded,
or ex- convicts .40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the
amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the freedom to
dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando, 41 is
impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of
the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself
had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not
interested in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus,
the dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the
proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled
matter.43 Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in public
discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues.44
VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates or
discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The
people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973
and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not
without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum
Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30,
1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-
Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the
scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral
Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20
days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity
Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the
Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep.
Act No. 73)."45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the
plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme court held that this matter of submission
involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially
political and not justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within
which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as
succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time;
second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the
reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third,
ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In
the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt
needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be
regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now obtaining,
does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient
and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio
Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of
the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and
Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted in
the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile
(59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive
during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by
the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be
extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and
therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate
Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the
constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with
sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the
controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted
to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando
concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-56503 April 4, 1981
RAMON MITRA, JR., NAPOLEON RAMA, EMMANUEL T. SANTOS, ERNIE RONDON, ANTONIO MARTINEZ,
JEJOMAR BINAY, RODRIGO H. MELCHOR, JOAQUIN (Titong) ROCES, RAFAEL YAP, and MEL
LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FERNANDO, CJ.:
In essence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition is not dissimilar from the prohibition proceedings just
dismissed filed respectively by former delegates Samuel C. Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales. 1 All three suits
proceed on the assumption that the present Constitution is not in force and effect. There is this variation. In the last
two paragraphs of this petition, the plea is made for the holding of a plebiscite so that the people may vote on the
ratification of the Constitution, now in force, but as, to them still in the stage of proposal. In the event it is rejected, so
their thinking goes, then the 1935 Constitution, which in the view of petitioners was suspended by the establishment
of an authoritarian regime by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces after the proclamation of martial law,
could be once more operative with the lifting of martial law on January 17, 1981. As in the Occena and Gonzales
petitions, there is what was therein referred to as a "rather unorthodox aspect" in "the assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding." 2 This excerpt from the
opinion is, therefore, fully applicable: "To put it at its mildest, such an approach has the arresting charm of novelty –
but nothing else. It is in fact self-defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners have come to the wrong
forum. We sit as Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. To contend otherwise as was done here
would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility." 3
A similar judgment is thus indicated. The petition must be dismissed. If there is a further expression of view on the
part of the Court, it is to clear the misapprehension that seems to be current in certain legal quarters about the
import of the Javellana decision 4 and the role of the President as Commander-in-Chief during the period of martial
law.
1. What is the ruling in Javellana v. Executive Secretary? 5 Rightfully, it is ranked by eminent jurists and
academicians abroad as one of the most significant manifestations of the exercise of the function of judicial review.
Apparently, this awesome and delicate power has implications still not adequately grasped. By virtue of this
prerogative, the Supreme Court either checks or legitimates the acts of a coordinate department, challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding. The decision rendered then, whether one of approval or of rejection, of validity or of
unconstitutionality, is controlling. To go back to Javellana v. Executive Secretary. The ruling cannot be any clearer.
The dispositive portion reads: "[Accordingly], by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices
Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." 6 As far as
there being "no further judicial obstacle" to the operative character of the 1973 Constitution, there can be no doubt
that such is the view of eight of the ten members of the Court. Petitioners apparently did not take note of the
immediately preceding paragraph of the opinion of the then Chief Justice Concepcion, who, while one of the
dissenters, spoke for the Court on the voting: "On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in
force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in
force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question
that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution;
and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force." 7 Both the statements of "there being no further judicial obstacle" as well as the negative
form in which mention is made of there being "not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution" is not in force
reflect the traditional mode in which constitutional issues are passed upon in accordance with the American concept
of judicial review. The function of judicial review, as observed by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 8 reflects the adoption of the American type of constitutional government "where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department." 9 In the event therefore that the decision
rendered may give rise to doubts and perplexities, there is comfort and assurance in the thought expressed by the
same eminent jurist in another leading case of Villena v. Secretary of Interior: 10 "Familiarity with the essential
background of the type of government established under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-known
principles and practices that go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation." 11 One of such practices is
the manner in which the dispositive portion of a decision in a suit contesting the validity of a legislative or executive
act is worded. It was noted that Justice Holmes had a penchant for the double negative. A favorite phrase of his was
that the statute "was not unconstitutional." That is of the essence of judicial review. For one of its basic postulates is
the presumption of validity. The burden of proof is thus on the person assailing the action taken by a coordinate
branch. There is no need therefore of an affirmative finding as to its being constitutional. It suffices that it has not
been shown to be otherwise. It is likewise by virtue of such presumption that Justice Malcolm correctly asserted: "To
doubt is to sustain." 12 Scholars in the field of constitutional law have even gone further. They maintain that when the
Supreme Court or some members thereof whose votes are crucial deem the question raised as a political 13 and not
judicial resulting in the dismissal of the action, there was, even then, a manifestation of the power of judicial review
at work. The Court, by ruling that it was without jurisdiction, allowed the political branches to have their way. In that
sense, to use a favorite phrase of Thomas Reed Powell, the Court was silently vocal and not silently silent. In
Javellana, the Court assumed jurisdiction, but only two of the ten members then were of the view and so voted that
the 1973 Constitution is not in force. There is no affront to logic, it would seem, for us to dismiss the petitions and
accordingly rule that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect." As was pointed out in the joint decision in the Occena and Gonzales petitions: "That is the meaning of the
concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest
case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the
present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited." 14
2. Nor is this all. The scholarly opinion of then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, while in dissent, acknowledged
that even without valid ratification, a new Constitution could come into force and effect by the acquiescence of the
people, referring in particular to the leading case of Taylor v. Commonwealth. 15 Other cases may be cited. 16 There is
this excerpt in a separate opinion in Javellana: "Independently of the lack of validity of the ratification of the new
Constitution, if it be accepted by the people, in whom sovereignty resides according to the Constitution, then this
Court cannot refuse to yield assent to such a political decision of the utmost gravity, conclusive in its effect. Such a
fundamental principle is meaningless if it does not imply, to follow Laski, that the nation as a whole constitutes the
"single center of ultimate reference, necessarily the possessor of that 'power that is able to resolve disputes by
saying the last word." If the origins of the democratic polity enshrined in the 1935 Constitution with the declaration
that the Philippines is a republican state could be traced back to Athens and to Rome, it is no doubt true, as McIver
pointed out, that only with the recognition of the nation as the separate political unit in public law is there the juridical
recognition of the people composing it 'as the source of political authority.' From them, as Corwin did stress,
emanate 'the highest possible embodiment of human will,' which is supreme and must be obeyed. To avoid any
confusion and in the interest of clarity, it should be expressed in the manner ordained by law. Even if such were not
the case, however, once it is manifested, it is to be accepted as final and authoritative. The government which is
merely an agency to register its commands has no choice but to submit. Its officials must act accordingly. No
agency is exempt from such a duty. not even this Court. In that sense, the lack of regularity in the method employed
to register its wishes is not fatal in its consequences. Once the fact of acceptance by the people of a new
fundamental law is made evident, the judiciary is left with no choice but to accord it recognition. The obligation to
render obeisance falls on the courts as well." 17 Even petitioners must be aware that aside from the referendum that
led to the ratification of the present Constitution, there was a second one held on July 27 and 28 in 1973, 18 and
another on February 27 and 28 in 1975. 19 The 1976 amendments to the Constitution were adopted in the
referendum held on October 16 and 17 of the year. 20 Then on December 17, 1977, there was again held a
referendum. 21 The fact that the people went to the polls would be indicative of their acquiescence in the present
Constitution. Nor could petitioners be unaware that two elections have been held under the present Constitution,
one for members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa on April 7, 1978 and the other for local government officials on
January 30, 1980. In the face of the above clearly manifested recognition of the force and effect of the present
Constitution, by the people, including those in the opposition, it would seem that any argument to the contrary
should be consigned to a well-merited limbo.
3. There is an even graver misapprehension of the significance of the President being the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces and the restricted concept of martial law as known to American Jurisprudence well-nigh
authoritative in this jurisdiction. The provision of the 1935 Constitution by virtue of which martial law was declared
reads as follows: "The President shall be commander-in-chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines and, whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public
safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law." 22 The commander-in-chief clause is traceable to the United States Constitution, 23 which
however does not empower the American President to declare martial law. It is quite apparent that the framers of
the 1935 Constitution, including some of the greatest legal luminaries of the Philippines, all devoted to the concept
of civilian supremacy, expanded the commander-in-chief clause on the assumption that the President, as the
highest civilian authority, should not be bereft of competence to deal with any danger to the State whether posed by
external aggression or internal subversion. He was thus empowered to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and to declare martial law. At any rate, there was nothing novel in such a provision as far as the Philippines
is concerned. It owed its origin to the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, more popularly known as Jones Law, 24which
was in turn based on the Organic Act of Hawaii of 1899. 25 State Constitutions of Massachusetts, 26 New
Hampshire, 27 Rhode Island, 28 Vermont, 29 Maine, 30 Maryland, 31 Tennessee, 32 West Virginia, 33 and Alaska 34likewise
contain martial law provisions. Neither the Colorado nor the Texas Constitutions has a provision of that character, in
the former the privilege of the writ could be suspended 35 and in the latter a statute was enacted to enable its
Governor to do so. 36 As interpreted by the American Supreme Court in the leading cases of Moyer v. Peabody, 37 the
opinion coming from Justices Holmes, and Sterling v. Constantine, 38 with Chief Justice Hughes as ponente, these
two decisions along with that of Duncan v. Kahananloku, 39 made clear that martial law as understood in American
jurisprudence is subject to judicial scrutiny and t thus far from being all encompassing. To be more specific, martial
law, according to Willoughby, "goes no further than to warn citizens that the military powers have been called upon
by the executive to assist him in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must
upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration
of order and the enforcement of law."40 Burdick, 41 Willis, 42 and Schwartz 43 wrote in the same vein. Parenthetically, it
may be observed that President Ferdinand E. Marcos announced in a speech in Hawaii on April 22, 1980 that the
Philippines is partial to the Willoughby approach. 44 There is this modification though as announced in the ponencia
of Justice Makasiar in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 45 "We affirm the proposition that as Commander-in-
Chief and enforcer or administrator of martial law, the incumbent President of the Philippines can promulgate
proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of Martial Law essential to the security and preservation of the
Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent
the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a
worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly developed
countries. 46 That is the extent of the influence exerted by the view of Rossiter.47 There is thus adherence to the
pronouncement of Justice Black in the above-cited Dunca v. Kahanamoku, 48 a case of Hawaiian origin:
"Legislatures and courts are not merely cherished American institutions; they are indispensable to our
government." 49 The Interim Batasang Pambansa was provided for in the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution, tile
opening sentence of its first section reading: "There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly,
an interim Batasang Pambansa."50 The judiciary, during the period of martial law from September 21, 1972 to
January 17, 1981, performed its functions and discharged its responsibility as a separate branch of the government.
It never ceased all the while to exercise the power of judicial review. The validity of the proclamation of martial law
was challenged and unanimously upheld in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections. 51 Mention had already been
made of Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 52 where, as noted, the transcendental issue posed was whether or not
the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, with the Court dismissing the Petitions by a vote of six to four and
ruling by a vote of eight to two that there was "no further judicial obstacle to the New Constitution being considered
in force and effect," and Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,53 where the question raised was as to the
competence of the President to issue orders and decrees having the force and effect of law, with the Court ruling
that he could do so, the ratio decidendi being the aforesaid excerpt quoted from the ponencia of Justice
Makasiar. 54There are two other decisions equally signifying that this Court had never been hesitant to assume
jurisdiction in cases assailing the validity of Presidential acts. The first is Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission, 55 where
the power of the President to create a military commission with jurisdiction to try civilians for certain specified
offences connected with the rebellion, was sustained, No.56 the opinion being penned by Justice Antonio. 56 The
other is Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, 57 where the authority of the President to propose amendments to the
Constitution, the interim National Assembly not having been convened, was sanctioned. 58 It is not to be lost sight of
either that in Dumiao v. Commission on Elections, 59 decided on January 22, 1980, while martial law was still in
force, this Court nullified a portion of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, which would consider the filing of
charges for the commission of any crime arising from acts of disloyalty or amounting to subversion, insurrection, or
rebellion, before the Civil Court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation as prima facie evidence of such
fact. Justice Melencio-Herrera was the ponente. 60
4. There can be no justification then for the reckless assertion that upon the proclamation of martial law and while it
was in force, constitutionalism, in terms of the exercise of the power of judicial review and respect for individual
rights, no longer held sway in the Philippines. It was Justice Lionel Keith Murphy, of the High Court of Australia,
whose advocacy of a written bill of rights for his country has won him an international reputation as a devoted and
eloquent champion of human rights who was the Second Comparative Law Lecturer of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. In that lecture, he appraised the role of this Court during martial law thus: "The judicial system in the
Philippines had undergone difficult times, and much stress has been placed on it by the necessity to resolve great
issues arising in a series of cases: The Anti-Subversion, The Plebiscite, The Ratification, The Martial Law. The
Referendum, The Right, to Counsel and The Military Tribunal Cases." 61 He said further: "Throughout these cases,
one can observe with admiration the concern of the judiciary to maintain the fundamental liberties of the people
even under the most difficult conditions." 62 He continued his appraisal of the work of the Supreme Court during
martial law thus: "Violations of human rights have occurred and do occur in the Philippines. Violations of human
rights have occurred and do occur in Australia. I will mention some shortly. They occur in the United States and
elsewhere. But the Philippines and the United States have courts which are able to enforce mandatory provisions in
the Bill of Rights. Your Supreme Court does so daily, openly and in reasoned decision given by your Justices." 63 To
paraphrase a recognized authority in American Constitutional law and one of the most respected American legal
scholars, Professor Paul A. Freund it is not too much to expect of any counsel appearing before the Supreme Court
that there should be on his part a certain degree of awareness of the pitfalls and delusions of certitude in view of the
complexity of the strands in the web of constitutionalism which the Court must disentangle. 64 There is still much to
be said of this aphorism of Justice Holmes: "Certitude is not the test of certainty." In the field of constitutional law,
the need for reexamining the continuing validity of doctrines in the light of changing circumstances cannot be
denied. Familiarity with such doctrines, to refer anew to what was stated by Justice Laurel, is, however, a prime
requisite.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.
R E S O L U T IO N
PER CURIAM:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of
Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in
full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer
the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President
Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . ...
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.
Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it
is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the
petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino,
and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during
the period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the
aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that
the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992
for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the
holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under
said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was
likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The
said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and
law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better
Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the
Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C.
Aquino, et al.])
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no
question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate
President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are fully
applicable to the petition at bar,
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF

ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of
initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the
1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent1 and the main
sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as
"innovative".3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we
resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,6 a group of
citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the
Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in
proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election
registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first
fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process
involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed,
be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI,7Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion
from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4
OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least
twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the
COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of
general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12
December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor
Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on
the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill
No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative,
which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for
in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this
deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a
single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional
initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take
effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative
on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the
people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor
any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the
COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the
national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions
of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a
taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible
period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private
respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They argue
therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE

COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO
THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING
SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID
BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE

GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO

REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING
GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF
THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION

DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT."
(SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT
SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an
assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . .
which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition,"
which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to
gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin
maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal,
since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend
the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as
of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only
those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as
unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be
simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority
government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor
General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3,
which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines
the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because,
being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law
when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not
a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under
the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of
R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through
Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention
filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20
January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was
their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend
that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a political
philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done by initiative which,
by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national
and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena
to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the
concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective
proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence,
to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they
are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good
performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements
the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who
may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the
contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the
signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may
oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of
the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC,
(I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a
people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively
pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the
Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in

Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to initiate
constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-
authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC
was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he
contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to
order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an
initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of
registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority
and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's
role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the
call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the
following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the
initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by
Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and
MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended
Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c)
requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the
aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible
period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five
days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court
formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing
the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to,
the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended
to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal
election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda
within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No.
21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the
main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a
sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic
notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention
of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a
prejudicial procedural question.
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it
is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the
COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent
Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is
an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the
body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and
political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions
of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling
thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12
December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier,
or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause
the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of
hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its
insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition
because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters.
LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition,
which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be
treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending
the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it
still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed
by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its
Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the
Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of
the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night,
we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section
2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered
voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there
are no details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore,
that we are leaving this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the
legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not
operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing,
especially with respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be
legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter
be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no
amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the
date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could
be proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It
is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can
come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how this is to
be carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for
ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision
exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature
itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it
fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent
assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the process
of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is
to vest constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the
draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy
of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require
a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we
have a separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process
and the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted
now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of
determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the
hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the
mechanics that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND —
not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year,
has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as
embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of

initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as
if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into
a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section
2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after
taking into account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the
honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and
Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now
read as follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER
Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST
BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED
VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is

reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report
No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a
legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the

legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature
from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of
this particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot
determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for
submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other
words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish
or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to
— NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment

on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must be
more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved
is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily
require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a
constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the
issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is
required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more
rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end
to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree
to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it
would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on
a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an
amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on
the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the
Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as

follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED
BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986. 41Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again
approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent"
to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said
paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This
amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the
affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the
passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the
Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing
the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by
the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject
matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local
Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely
dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral
Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill
is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local
laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed
out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill
No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the
phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution
and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in
the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the
contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the
latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle
on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative
and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is
not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for
emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which
reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of
the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local
governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and
local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution
or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it
failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative
on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as
a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to
whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for their
approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three
sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and
includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process
by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates
the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date
of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No.
6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely
paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this
substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata
non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in
itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform
in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON

THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does
not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the
right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district
is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the
required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his
petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the
petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4)
to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and
voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it
cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known
that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or
under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of
paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective
national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if
not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept
in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in
complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that
system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME
AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the
President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities
are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While
the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a
democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he
would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term
commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit"
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,
then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He
accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November
1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on
cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to
the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then
headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by
Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the other hand,
Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a
pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down
from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on
October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice"
of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent
Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's
resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic
Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator
Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the
Department of Trade and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel
Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the
House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator
Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative
Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one
(21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.14 The
battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then
House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Sergio
Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and
Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose
Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund
Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high
and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the
December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She
testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on
documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on
January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who
served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW
Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day
of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name
"Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel
resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit
the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of
sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective
resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal.19Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until
the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice
Davide granted the motion.20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people
holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to
the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers
walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the
EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he
would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando
Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General
Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish
to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General
Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.24 Some Cabinet
secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies for
the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner
announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.26There
was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and
orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo
Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary
Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the
petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of
Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief
encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor
injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer
the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.29 He issued the following
press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a
factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy was
transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties
of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-
SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of
Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice — Acting on the urgent
request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001,
which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20,
2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001. 1âwphi1.nêt
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper
party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.34 Recognition
of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d'
honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a
hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave
the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.37The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of
Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It
also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into
office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its
congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals
under the Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days later, she also
signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.42 The next day,
February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43Senators
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason
therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court.
Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of Representatives also approved
Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two
(2) days later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and
has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure
of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that
the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up from 16%
on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from
February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement
of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also
60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her
presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D
or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-
1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft
and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees,
etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by
Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and
property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-
1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges
against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel
Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints
against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and
1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is
over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to
comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered
the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or
before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice
Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel,
former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised
themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves.
Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to
submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag
Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of
the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for
contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while
they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail
the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through
people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the
powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these
realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on
political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century,
the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations,
continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v.
Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political
questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of
the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court,
through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the
1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the
judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction.60With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing.
In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x
x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President
Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve
the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral
reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of
former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one.
No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered
contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the
EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and
defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency
under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise
of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the
reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the
recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus
non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of
Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing,
through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and
which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or
collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the
Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley,
it is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights
of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was
carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution. These rights are
now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The
reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual
fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to
provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more
adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage
and necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in
which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the
society."70In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was
echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which
emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk
rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v.
Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that "… it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that
when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it
is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section
875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call
for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been
laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ."
Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it
involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to
judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he
submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20,
2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal
abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession
of events after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more
detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against
him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher
chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than
1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent
Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47
representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade
and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached
a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope.
It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was
swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and
demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The
window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara
serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19,
petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an
ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his
small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this
is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential
election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May
where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency
even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation
of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of
support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to
Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or
resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At
9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave
the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him
and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and
dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary
Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is proof that
petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the
five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and
requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly
transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at
this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the
petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20,
that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the
petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to
open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of
petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary
Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary
shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he
just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his
name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of
the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x
x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on
Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic
of the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the
President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to
the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of
Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities – Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the
opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not
belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition
Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet
officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President
(Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
"Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during
this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition
period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was
further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel
to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was
aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a
peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in
the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of
the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001,
wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of
the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and
police authority – Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the
contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the
President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore
attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the
agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'

And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot
and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been
signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side,
as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the
oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet
members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is
there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the
President.
1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal
possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacañang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I
have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving
the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.
He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4)
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part
tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the
petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar
did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the
petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the
letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there
was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the
Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of
government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter
cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as
a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance.
Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will
especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court
cannot given any legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this
Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a
matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019
originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not
contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator
Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a
provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under
administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the
following provision was inserted as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act
or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act
for an offense committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the
provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above
became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the
immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any
debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and
administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act
of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a
pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or
prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service
for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to
retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that
when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case
Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the
respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that
as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as
pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be
invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any
insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA
3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable.
But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time
petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against
the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect,
no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and
duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the
January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner
to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the
manner provided for in section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he
is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of
his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue.
For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance
with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at
about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;96
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE

ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S
GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police
and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition
to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing
and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by
reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to
the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment
thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to
eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the
House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest
demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the
Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF

SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines
– qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate
signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and
challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of
purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM.

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served
the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land -
which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.

President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate"
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus
officioand has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January
16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be
transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the
Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the
Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.

President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate
and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular
election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of
government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police,
the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial
power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx
branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon
petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided
by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman
should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second,
he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most enlightening.
The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs.
Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes,
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the
Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In
granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to
touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded
and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law,
could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of
courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act
unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that
the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be
personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his
official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the
occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as
possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This
remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property
rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do
is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty,
any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy
forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in
relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy
between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining
whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for
damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he
actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority
to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still
protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that
position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such
men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as
a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz"xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in
wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office
he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government
itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the
tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In
1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men:
The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP
College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on
the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the
absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also
from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the
President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only
the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon
orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute
immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in
the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto
Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a
public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no
wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power
revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity
provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision
for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out second
sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But
would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President
shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an
immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now
facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot
be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment
trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it
will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would
render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may
continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the
peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost
the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed
against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to
hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any trespasser.114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the
privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US
v. Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and
documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates
were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the
Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign.
President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena
on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be
impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was
rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail
over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case
of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages
covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of
Clinton v. Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their
official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our
jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.118 It declared as
a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of
the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal
autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president
enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of
the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent
Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained
publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach the problem with the
presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the
right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical
approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have
developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong
likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul
convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga
vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.
It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile
and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as
well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds
of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state
of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right
to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially.
xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se
fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we
rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even
by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its
companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its
excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure,
few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime.
Indeed, even the principal actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair
trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case
of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were
conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or
decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value
of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and
public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important
prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work
effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v.
United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing
people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons
as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in
the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United
States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share
a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit
guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of
trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily
closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment
was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an
independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment
rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the
people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their
presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
c. Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the
right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial
is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be
eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held
that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation
of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on
the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-
page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-
record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery
motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than
hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to
successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against
the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members
of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him.
Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner. 1âwphi1.nêt
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote
petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports,
and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been
quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is
postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports
referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of
the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of
petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and
recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be
compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be
treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the
petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension
and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant
justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred
duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an
accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."135To
be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint
against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by
the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of
number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law.
If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to
convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the
key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's
prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA,
JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its
Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel
Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion
Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA
WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay,
JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the
Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human
Rights,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,

MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and
AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F.
BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino
Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their
petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in
the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for
lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's
ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside
the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims
that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the
"will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners
to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the
Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the
Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735
and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's
petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain
that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing
to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section
2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere
amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties'
memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based
alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following
the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people
when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign.
Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are
asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment"
should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that
"before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should
sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it
is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the
full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the United States where
various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative petitions, the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before
they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus,
in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the
contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the
petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems
particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition,
who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in
similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so
that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x
(publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to
have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he
must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.")
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the
proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such
full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group
invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their
private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably
their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed
as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with
this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's
Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of

Legislative District: Barangay:
Verified
Signatures:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE
GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII
AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of
the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification

Number
Last Name, First MM/DD/YY
Name, M.I.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
_________________ _________________ __________________
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to
it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to
the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft
of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not
the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the
Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition
which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of
their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft
of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B.
Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered
voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the
"Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No.
2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF
AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common
stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter
Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional
Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in
Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to
recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December
2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against
the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the
Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform
agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue
the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES

OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS
(SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century
Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or
the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the
porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and
referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative
Commission24 are vastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition
or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on
the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's
proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of
the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25
August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together
with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with
the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the
Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the
Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory
Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what
they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group
alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the
Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the
draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the
draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they
circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not
read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground
that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327,
283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with
the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the
proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain
the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the
petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally
stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August
2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed
change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires
that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires
the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached
to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were
not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris
Secundumpulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during
the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The
Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together
with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group
circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft
petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other
supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional
copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000
copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits
that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative
x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino
Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed
the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of the
petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of
the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each
signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature
sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3
million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion
is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes.
If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on
the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the
Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of
the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the
proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes,
among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be
re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the
present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the
interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The
people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three
proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes
merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the
signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local
elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed
changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which
shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007
local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written
the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of the proposed
changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the
regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows
incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office,
and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is
contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire
nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to
rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the
full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to
believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The
proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of
local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people
should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can
answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated
subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment
amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's
proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the
electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant
case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and
effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis
supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska
warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was
enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues
to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth
and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any
structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining
silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed,
initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers
and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly,
there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly
distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken
by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have
known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or
revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007
elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend
or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the
Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature
and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The
proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament
does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision
for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007,
three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain
members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers
of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010,
the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of
the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed
the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the
Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the
interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that
the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from
the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court
trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the
petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given
to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested
on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this
year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section
1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning
Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if
it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a
total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes
(a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to
amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1.
So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a
people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v.
Jordan,32the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to
the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does
not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution
may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a
convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed
initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became
law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention,
and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it
can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the
specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a
revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment
as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be
based in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision'
authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed
to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2,
and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is,
nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people
through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1.
xxxx
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other
than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and
revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have
power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly
manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a
constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change
the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and
duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ― that a people's initiative may only amend,
never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the
Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the
scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the
earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon
which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and
abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative
test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial
entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only
the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry
is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or
the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential
to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches
of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers
and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters
the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is
readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the
Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or
of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to
what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized
where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme
Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in
the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to
visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American
form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of government in this state
and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities
necessary to carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the
General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise
and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission of
appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the
government of this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of
Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too
numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the
Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to
give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear
very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.43(Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's
initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and
legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected
by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105
provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure,
not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full-
time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
"amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation,
profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
"amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same
provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the
apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people
in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not
their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional
convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation,
profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain
only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the
constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in
the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed
changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative
constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the
Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's
theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do
not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent
and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the
form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory
advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a
revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to
advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by
initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the
legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions
initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that
cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and
revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that
revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure
proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on
existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of
citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles
of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot
appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by
initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may
not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article
XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of
amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the
constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual,
through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional
revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the
plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end
red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there
is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where
revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three
co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the
Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change
reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is
an amendment and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than
the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system
of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end
of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word
of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the
word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the
entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change
will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the
structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis
of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body
with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other
hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception
of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable
inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the
oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to
reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable
inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a
provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the
inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to
― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries
with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known
parliamentary forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or
Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize
that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for
amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires
harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's
initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus,
the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting
the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled
that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts
will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend
the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on
the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006
filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed
the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners."
In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the
signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the
COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing
more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate.
Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling
in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For
following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the
present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19,
1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens
of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the
clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and
turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution
outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its
own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur
well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast53 − approved our
Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the
people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for
amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change
our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they
ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the people's
sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the
Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific
modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the
people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to
manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution
ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly
states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains
its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of
the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's
voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which
embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the
Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter
basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Self-Executing & Non-Self-Executing Provisions
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,1 is in oked by
petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic
Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning
bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and
GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other
type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel. . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on

Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match
the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First
Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed
in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino
people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that
since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a
part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of
the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . .
. Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business
may be done."9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony
which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and
exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired
therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What
is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still
inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building
nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of
the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet
arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus
the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded
the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet
taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not
exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It
is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined
as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the
legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and
have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why
the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they
quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove

the word "QUALIFIED?".
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
"QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-
self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution.
Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used
for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may
supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended
to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that
the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the
tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument
is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the
State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction,
as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it
does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of
principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives
to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital
role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on
education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity
of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only
principles upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself
by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is
a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to out rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other
natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was
called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and
official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37During
World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the
American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as
the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped
numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was
the site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine
Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the
hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of
the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes corporations
at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment.

And the amendment would consist in substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS"
with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY
OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we

have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we
not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What
about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the
preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS"
may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will
include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-
controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please
restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS

COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a

Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino
enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE
SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called "Filipino
First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions,
privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still
further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is
better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never found in previous
Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counter productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as
one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that
the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the
hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-
executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional
provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the
duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently
need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot
simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or
guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution,
even before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive
action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional
command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution
and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a
constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that
the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent
Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale
of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to
make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of
the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding
rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of
the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance
that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the
award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to
be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly
written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental
law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately
to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive
of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino,
there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning
to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would
be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given
factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore
desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his
rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since
petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only
if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the
case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or
personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally
made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the
foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes
or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so
than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to
be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the
majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this
Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court
encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos
whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not
been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of
the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the
Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic
progress and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First
Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements
were published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine
legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable,
it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It
will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses,
regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay
even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution
enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the
proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself
beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with
sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the
happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments,
while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder
solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district.
We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the
Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong
manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines.
Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth
century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place
with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical
landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic
exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner
viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage,
which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it
stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is
entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of
the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances
and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by
their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her
parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES,
minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their
parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN,
all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their
parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and
IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA,
PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their
parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as
a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for
that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area
of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare
and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical
pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured
and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies,
such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as
of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil
eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire
island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna,
(e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading
to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by
the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of
said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of
forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and
their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights
of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had
been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy
of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-
being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory
to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on
two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In
their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said
order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it
raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for
would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask
this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept
of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely
on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that
the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may
be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the
public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the
country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State
without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-
five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-
777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues
raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell
short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and
protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint
against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color
and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of
its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries
with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be
provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically
in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the
full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the
mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and
higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former
"declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The
latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case
is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the
utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law
itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or
partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished
member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause
found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement.
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the
non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace
or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . .
.
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law
or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of
the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance
Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters
of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist
if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A.
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M.
Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco &
Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C.
Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco &
Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor &
Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph
Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari
Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura
Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child
Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel
Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning
Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in
his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as
member of the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA,
CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I.
YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes,
Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O.
Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine
Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL
ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and
GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health;
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in
her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I.
GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO
L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q.
VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department
of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes
he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our
people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been
geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem
that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to
the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the
country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact
laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement
these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant
is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on
clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary
then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that
holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by
socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly
antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every
level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress
on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy,
as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C.
Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children;
and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its
president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and
on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale
Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their
capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate
of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several
others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty.
Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F.
Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several
others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the
Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita
Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their
capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several
others,31in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
(Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The
petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's
health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to
their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive
health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and
service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that
skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or
rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law
fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of
the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the
RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the
PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent
women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean
that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates
against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the
RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing
the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of
conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from
them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and
what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for
employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning
methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The
petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups,
they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended
that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional
right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH
Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on
matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a
child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners
question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-
abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health
measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and
the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of
the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the
petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of
Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their
respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S.
Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet
ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty
(120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or
identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in
the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the
same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act
to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although
contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale,
dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug
or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and
Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed
physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be
made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or
limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No.
79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family
planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference
on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna
Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and
programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable
pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76
million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures
were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its
objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law
made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods,
supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to
health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that
"the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic
Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed
by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH
Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the
barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception
program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all
forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them
to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve
some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative
and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a
product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The
OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since
the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political
departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern
Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are
improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law
has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-
regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature,
it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-
equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has
truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of
government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes
upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of
government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a
harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this,
the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its
sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a
very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse
of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution
makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and
countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of
intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just
any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review
is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because
the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete
and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no
showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that
judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in
question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete
act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court
ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under
a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH
Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that
is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to
life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can
indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality
of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the
constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is
also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge,
still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may
not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v.
PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar,
the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep
division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right
to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away
before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution
are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and
so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of
the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health
with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,124 and
that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to
save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access
to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of
the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH
Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are
related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as
skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively
sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient;
thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized
ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction
of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms
that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or
administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law
emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies
shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with
the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford
deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on
determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated
considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the
laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent
vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of
numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control
through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall
promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two
cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later,
these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the
deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views
on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which
reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters
who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female
ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the
"implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and
ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should
ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and
defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable
zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the
male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has
respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term
"conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment
of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is
human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is
the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it
takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process
of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the
nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23
chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I
repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive
and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization"
was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific
phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase
"from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without
specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission,
he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I
was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed
right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that
we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the
rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to
travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity
for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already
considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State
shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is,
upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of
the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life
begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision
on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a
question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive
and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only
to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free
world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also
actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time.
Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is
yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-
uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if
we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be
unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the
oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12,
Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied
Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon
enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines,
also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and
the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all
developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of
male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a
sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and
ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their
chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the
beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a
continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically
distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus
results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed.
The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are
sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the
purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately
at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a
"potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective
scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human
being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent
with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or
of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly,
following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception,
that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to
the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a
living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to
the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would
prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-
based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the
unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-
abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the
Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly
mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law
is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be
afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes
sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive
health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly
whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions
concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so;
and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive
health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of
the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination
of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using
the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce
abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any
drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the
FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The
conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind),
which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized
ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
(third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the
fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes
existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and
afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device
from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does
not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the
point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion,
that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included
or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available
on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise,
cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present
in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however,
the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent
with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive
pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination
of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device,
or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized
ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those
that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the
insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy
the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if
its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are
actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as
abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared
policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL
will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR
should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation
of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life
must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical
cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them.
They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that
the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the
RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere
statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development,
and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly
express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as
it has always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless
the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale
and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by
a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729.
There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to
the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs
and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As
aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without
prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting
Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law
and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly
governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute
whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution
is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of
not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in
the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of
whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available
to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension
of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not,
is completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs
and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all
appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply
and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the
overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No.
4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices
must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive
drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to
their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the
RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it
being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-
uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they
have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine
whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the
third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from
the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are
in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional
proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that
contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim
that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all
things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms
true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their
taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious
beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making
provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also
imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to
another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts
to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly
limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l)
and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers
involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to
in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter
to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service
providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos.
Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono
reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are
required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector
to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act
on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce
neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious
freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how
the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education,
information, choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the
demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of
religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning
and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the
assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions,
the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to
contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point
out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality
reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the
social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or
practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his
free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are
effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the
constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the
petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning
methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on
one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to
information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally.
For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to
the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable
regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on
account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They
are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight
the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance
of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse
ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in
practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together.
It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-
believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be,
and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the
present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society,
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it
means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church
property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs
of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot
1âw phi1
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot
favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia,
or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the
religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the
pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article
VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as
against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the
outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen
form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct
by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its
purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single
goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the
scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is
quite a stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was
stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of
religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is
not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.218Underlying
the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it
should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free
Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not
employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case
then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions
of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine
that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After
Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test
and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present
danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the
"clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech
as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set
the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however,
which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the
"clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not
congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the
present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper
where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some
effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary.
However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an
appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a
just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over
the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to
do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide.
The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording
protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of
the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the
original. Underlining supplied.]
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or
one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is
the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning,
including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered
and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote
modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they
desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to
them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance
with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various
human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society,
faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and
population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and
the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the
family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired
number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their
religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of
benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so,
in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the
policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and
unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious
beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections
7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately
refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite
their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor,
finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption
from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors
for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been
burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side
coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a
clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical
practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A.
Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive.
They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is
equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the
individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to
provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's
religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of
the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is
of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH
Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the
principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and
Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors
under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff
on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined
according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity
and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced
to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such
institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the
Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section
23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs
and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service
providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes
he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual.
Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the
Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because
incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital,
head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty
to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be
equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should
not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors
should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private
sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free
exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The
mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by
oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more
permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press,
assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also
because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any
conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is
replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed
this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of
the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled
health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with
this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors,
skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not
against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their
choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least
intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent
in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious
objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG
maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this
duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary
health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a
regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to
show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is
prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their
children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the
other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a
patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's
religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have
not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective
is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary,
considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of
religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State
to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may
still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open
willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves
the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is
protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365
or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women,"
amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna
Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide
for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of
a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in
the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions,
the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of
responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice
to the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted
diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and
other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall
be provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and
legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and
medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In
addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as
strategies in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's
health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development
of moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen
maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however,
failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such
revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women,
they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for
blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally
healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would
contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance
of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering
that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the
life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the
forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an
emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try
to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child
is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the
mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not
necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted
against the child because both their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be
resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden
imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would
be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court
finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed
provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be
spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As
correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find
unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution
by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family
rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact,
one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to
wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their
minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the
ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues
intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall
defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared
by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the
spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive
a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the
family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just
one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the
number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs
exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a
constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling
interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna
Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood,
as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law
should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one
spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state
intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the
right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a
procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided,
That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame
population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own
parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort.
To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the
right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the
right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It
would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of
the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming
the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a
minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest
can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or
with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of
her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to
protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to
make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information
with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their
parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their
minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage
and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no
person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the
right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed
above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should
not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational
institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to
their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country,
the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce
and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of
society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society.
Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that
said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but
also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual
abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy;
physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage
behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR
and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity
and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the
assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be
developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it
could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition,
it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same
violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may
be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious
groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if
these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but
at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice
of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a
statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to
other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must
be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and
accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity,
or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of
medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4)
barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who
voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such
by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care
service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and
exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and
services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and
access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established
rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide
with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is
intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health
and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in
accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must
be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it
discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various
provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition
of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal
protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied
in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst
itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of
a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics
in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of
the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which
recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority
in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks
to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to
charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into
its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate
attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed
provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private
educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government
health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually
amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as
forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the
manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers
of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the
legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly
involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public
morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking
such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro
bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose
which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will.
While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious
objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to
render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency
to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render
such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the
Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant
to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to
recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and
facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers,
consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably
indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or
not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid
for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have
caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to
carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it
effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public
health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the
declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that
are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved
to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the
LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions
and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have
already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services
and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and
other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from
foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and
services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the
national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There
is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory
for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the
national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the
ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No.
9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the
RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government.
These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the
relationship between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations
imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every
law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers
and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the
actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as
a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained
that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution
and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving
rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in
any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-
safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices,
and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled
upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose
its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As
such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to
address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these
perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is
controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian
countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The
number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent
a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These
countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with
incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is
because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be
weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This
would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per
woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like
the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court
is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as
enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in
a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question
the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation
that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that
would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must
carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful
of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial
task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as
entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729)
and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive
provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption
of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 ,
is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
CORTES, J.:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action
for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had
earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by
the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner
prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.
This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to information. The
same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al., (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136
SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked
in order to compel the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and
other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory right to information
provided for in the Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a newspaper editor in
another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose
of gathering data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 [1948]).
The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the Bill of Rights,
Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development." The new provision reads:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to information
may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may
be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations
upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III
Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right
may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition. He challenges the
petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of
the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the
petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.
1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged
inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a
legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case
must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct
interest in the duty or act to be performed.
In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted
that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had
allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).
But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that:
* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136
SCRA 27, 36).
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of
the general "public" which possesses the right.
The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, supra, when it held that even those who
have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the "public" to whom "(a)ll records
relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as
amended). In the words of the Court:
* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person.

To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the
particular information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction.
*** (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of
the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit.
2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who
govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Only
governments operating under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield individual rights
against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5). Without a government's
acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights
becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.
In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate
the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition,
government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public
disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28 thereof, to wit:
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).
In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared as an imperative
duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature
as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and
in the process, We found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:
* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be in included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada v.
Tuvera, supra, at 39). (Emphasis supplied).
The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing the examination of public records,
specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle
curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves
with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their
prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze,
or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the
legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. ***
(Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at 388). (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to
information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of
Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to
registered lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:
* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make
inspection may be insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)
Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate the
manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No.
1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent judge for his
alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating
Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the subject records, We absolved the
respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the manner of
examining the public records were reasonable.
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to regulate the
manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made
between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to
regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to
the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second
pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to
be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with
the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional
right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetal supra).
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent
upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory
by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the propriety
of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the
ambit of the constitutional guarantee.
3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of
the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No.
1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving them a
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23,
1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in
every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern.
a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as
already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial
of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public
concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.
To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511
[1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is
subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
"Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a
case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for adequate notice to the public
of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public
concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the knowledge of those real estate transactions which some
believed to have been registered in violation of the Constitution.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that
they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as
a State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined,
as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers
are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the
information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations,
as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there
is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither
unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil
service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service
Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the
law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian,
and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the
Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
G.R. No. 143855 September 21, 2010
REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S.
BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI and FRANKLIN
BAUTISTA,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (Executive Secretary), HON. MAR ROXAS (Secretary of Trade and Industry),
HON. FELIPE MEDALLA (Secretary of National Economic and Development Authority), GOV. RAFAEL
BUENAVENTURA (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and HON. LILIA BAUTISTA (Chairman, Securities and
Exchange Commission), Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case calls upon the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and determine the constitutionality of the
Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which has been assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
The Facts and the Case
On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from
engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories:
Category A Less than Exclusively for Filipino citizens and

US$2,500,000.00 corporations wholly owned by Filipino citizens.
Category B US$2,500,000.00 up but less For the first two years of R.A. 8762’s
than US$7,500,000.00 effectivity, foreign ownership is allowed up to
60%. After the two-year period, 100% foreign
equity shall be allowed.
Category C US$7,500,000.00 or more May be wholly owned by foreigners. Foreign
investments for establishing a store in
Categories B and C shall not be less than the
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of
US$830,000.00.
Category D US$250,000.00 per store of May be wholly owned by foreigners.
foreign enterprises
specializing in high-end or
luxury products
R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines,
to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.
On October 11, 2000 petitioners ***Magtanggol T. Gunigundo I, Michael T. Defensor, Gerardo S. Espina, Benjamin
S. Lim, Orlando Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong, Sergio Apostol, Robert Ace S. Barbers, Enrique Garcia, Jr., Raul M.
Gonzales, Jaime Jacob, Apolinario Lozada, Jr., Leonardo Montemayor, Ma. Elena Palma-Gil, Prospero Pichay,
Juan Miguel Zubiri and Franklin Bautista, all members of the House of Representatives, filed the present petition,
assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to
place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities,
promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and
trade policies.
Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together
with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the
economy.
Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors,
destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.
Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on
the government as a condition for the release of certain loans.
Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint
of trade.
Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas, National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael
Buenaventura, and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are
taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds. Nor can they invoke the fact
that they are members of Congress since they made no claim that the law infringes on their right as
legislators.
Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners of course claim that, as
members of Congress, they represent the small retail vendors in their respective districts but the petition
does not allege that the subject law violates the rights of those vendors.
Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Indeed, they
could not specify how the new law violates the constitutional provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of
Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.
Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs
Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA
and when the national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress
whether or not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry
of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
The Issues Presented
Simplified, the case presents two issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.A.
8762; and
2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
The Court’s Ruling
One. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must have a standing to do so.1 Legal
standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More
particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury
as a result of the passage of that law.2 To put it another way, he must show that he has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the law he complains of.3
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners
or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers4 or as legislators.5 Still the Court will resolve the question they raise
since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when as in this case the public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.6
Two. Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which read as follows:
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence
of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
xxxx
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony under Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national
interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
xxxx
Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
But, as the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara,7 the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the
declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot
give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
The Court further explained in Tañada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of economic
nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by
requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.8 ten.lihpw al
In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of
the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the
Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.9
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While
it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.10 The key, as in
all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of
foreign investments and services. 1avv phi 1
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to
Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic
exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution
to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign
investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of
the State. A person’s right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him
without due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180 that
restricts the retail business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation of
the foreigner’s right to substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid
exercise of police power.11 The State had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was
reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not arbitrary.
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners’ right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the
Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of
retail business to which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly
violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any
constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to
alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to
support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus –
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only
nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall
be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in
certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use
of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing
activities.
In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local
small and medium enterprises since its implementation about a decade ago.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Constitution: Definition, Nature & Concepts

xxx xxx xxx

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.

Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

Accountability of Public Officers

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

In cases where a verified

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

I suppose nobody can question it.

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

Ripeness and Prematurity

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I suppose nobody can question it.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.