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Facts: Chief Justice Sereno’s appointment to the Supreme Court was sought
to be invalidated through a Quo Warranto Petition on the ground of
ineligibility or lack of qualification for the position of a magistrate. It was
alleged that the respondent failed to satisfy the requirement of “ proven
integrity” due to her failure to submit to the Judicial and Bar Council ( JBC) at
the time of her application her SALNs which are primordial requisites for the
position.
Crucial Questions:
2) Was it timely-filed?
Ruling: Petition denied. In the exercise of its discretion, the Solicitor General
may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for Quo Warranto
where there are just and valid reasons. The OSG saw the folly of re-litigating
the same issue of Ong’s citizenship in the Quo Warranto case simultaneously
with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum- shopping.
Facts: In determining the validity of the closure of Tritran and the legality of the
ensuing dismissal of its employees, the NLRC referred to the principle of stare decisis in
its Resolution dated 18 August 2006 as one of the reasons for the reversal of its original
Decision affirming the LA ruling. It cited the Decision in De Chavez v. Tritran, Inc., in
support of its earlier finding that Tritran's closure was due to serious business losses.
Ruling: The stare decisis principle was erroneously applied to this case. It must be
emphasized that only final decisions of the Supreme Court are deemed precedents that
form part of our legal system. Decisions of lower courts or other divisions of the same
court are not binding on others. Consequently, it was incorrect for the NLRC to consider
De Chavez — a ruling rendered by the same NLRC division — as a binding precedent
applicable to the present case.
Facts: The Court of Appeals applied its own decisions under the principle of stare
decisis. Is the application correct?
Ruling: No, the Court of Appeals is incorrect.The principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Facts: The RTC, in resolving a Motion to Dismiss, noted that the facts of another
case “ are on all fours with the case being tried.” The Court thus dismissed the
Complaint for lack of cause of action. Is the RTC correct?
Ruling: The RTC is wrong. This is gravely erroneous and alarming. Failure to
state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not
interchangeable. It may be observed that lack of cause of action is not among the grounds
that may be raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The
dismissal of a Complaint for lack of cause of action is based on Section 1 of Rule 33,
which provides:
If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made
before a responsive pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of
the allegations in the initiatory pleading. On the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a
cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff has rested its
case.
In the first situation, the veracity of the allegations is immaterial; however, in the
second situation, the judge must determine the veracity of the allegations based on the
evidence presented.
In PNB v. Spouses Rivera, this Court upheld the CA ruling that the trial court
therein erred in dismissing the Complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. We
said that "dismissal due to lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions, or
evidence presented by the plaintiff."
Facts: The plaintiff filed five (5) separate complaints for different claims
amounting to more than 1 Million Pesos. He thereafter lumped together the different
amounts under the principle of “ Totality Rule” and moved to dismiss the case before the
MTC for lack of jurisdiction. Was the principle of “ Totality Rule” correctly applied?
Ruling: No, it was erroneously applied because there are separate Complaints.
The principle of “ Totality Rule” provides that where there are several claims or causes of action
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out
of the same or different transactions[.] The totality rule applies only when there are several
claims or causes of action between the same or different parties embodied in the same
complaint, in which case the total amount of the claims shall be determinative of the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the case. The instant case, however, does not call
for the application of the rule since there are five complaints, each pertaining to a
separate claim. The petitioners' act of lumping altogether the amount of the claims in all
of the complaints and arguing that the total amount of the claims a gross misinterpretation
of the provision.
AALA V. UY
G.R. NO. 202781, JANUARY 10, 2017
Ruling: No. The filing of the action is violative of the principle of “ hierarchy of
courts.” The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to
restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before
the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent
"inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the
Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter[,]" it must remain as a "court of last resort."
This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing with causes in the first
instance."
IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT
A final and executory judgment produces certain effects. Winning litigants are entitled to
the satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution. On the other hand, courts are
barred from modifying the rights and obligations of the parties, which had been
adjudicated upon. They have the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution to enforce
the judgment.
It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable
and unalterable. The primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no
longer be modified or amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the
modification or amendment is to correct perceived errors of law or fact. This principle
known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment is a matter of sound public policy,
which rests upon the practical consideration that every litigation must come to an end.
It bears stressing that the proceeding involved in the present case is administrative
in nature. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules on
evidence, the same does not hold true for administrative bodies. The Court has
consistently held that technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings are not exact
replicas of those in administrative investigations.
(3) [V]oid judgments; and
(4) [W]henever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of a judgment may result from
inadvertence. These errors can be rectified without violating the doctrine of immutability
of judgment provided that the modification does not affect the substance of the
controversy.
Similarly, in Spouses Mahusay v. B.E. San Diego, Inc., the lower court amended its
decision to include payment of "all penalties and interest due on the unpaid
amortizations" under the contracts to sell. The modification, according to this
Court, was not a substantial amendment of the judgment considering that
petitioners do not deny the execution of the Contracts to Sell.
VIRATA V. NG WEE
G.R. NO. 220926, 221058, 221109, 221135 & 221218 JULY 5, 2017
The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate court
has made a ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the
lower court for further proceedings; the question settled by the appellate court
becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any subsequent appeal. It means
that whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which the legal rule or decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
It is inconsequential that the issue raised in G.R. No. 162928 pertained to the
alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in denying the motions to
dismiss, and not to the merits of the motions to dismiss per se. For as the Court has
elucidated in Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc. v. Tansipek:
x x x there is no substantial distinction between an appeal and a Petition for Certiorari when
it comes to the application of the Doctrine of the Law of the Case. The doctrine is founded on
the policy of ending litigation. The doctrine is necessary to enable the appellate court to perform
its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question once considered
and decided by it were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent
appeal.
The Rules of Court, specifically Section 2 of Rule 3 thereof, requires that unless
otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, thus:
This provision has two requirements: (1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must
be the real party-in-interest; and (2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party-in-interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means
material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.
The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled
corporations, and state universities shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. We have clarified the provision of law defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by explaining that the Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those
officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, regardless of their salary grades for as long as they hold the positions
enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
DAVID V. MARQUEZ,
G.R. NO. 209859 JUNE 5, 2017
VALDERAMA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 220054 MARCH 27, 2017
Ruling: No, the Court is incorrect. The public prosecutor's conformity to the Motion to
Reconsider is necessary. Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:
In Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde, this Court ruled that the required conformity of the
public prosecutor was not a mere superfluity and was necessary to pursue a criminal
action. A private party does not have the legal personality to prosecute the criminal
aspect of a case, as it is the People of the Philippines who are the real party in interest
The criminal case must be under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Thus,
when the public prosecutor does not give his or her conformity to the pleading of a
party, the party does not have the required legal personality to pursue the case.
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
The purpose of alleging all the circumstances attending a crime, including any
circumstance that may aggravate the accused's liability, is for the accused to be able to
adequately prepare for his or her defense:
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the
information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for
the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to
prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant
to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the
crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly
accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice[.]
REYES V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 212593-94 MARCH 15, 2016
Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the
elements of the crime need not be definitively established for it is enough that their
presence becomes reasonably apparent. This is because probable cause - the
determinative matter in a preliminary investigation implies mere probability of guilt;
thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would
justify a conviction would suffice.
MAZA V. TURLA
G.R. NO. 187094 FEBRUARY 15, 2017
FACTS:
Quisay moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground
of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of
her motion, Quisay pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was
penned by Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz)
and approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP
Hirang), while the Pabatid Sakdal or Information was penned by ACP De La
Cruz, without any approval from any higher authority, albeit with a Certification
claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or approval from the
City Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this regard, Quisay claimed that
nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP De La
Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written authority or approval from the City
Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against her. As such, the
Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that
cannot be cured.
The RTC denied Quisay's Motion to Quash for lack of merit as it found that
the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal have sufficiently complied with
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior written
authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of
Informations.
The Supreme Court reversed the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
RULING:
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the
case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on
the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.
FACTS: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City thru ACP Canobas
issued a Resolution (Canobas Resolution) finding probable cause against
Villapando for the crime of perjury. The Resolution was approved by Senior
Assistant City Prosecutor (SACP) Christopher Garvida. Accordingly, on August
15, 2011, an Information 21 dated July 26, 2011 for Perjury was filed against
Villapando before Branch 67 of the METC, Makati City. The Information was
signed by ACP Canobas and sworn to before ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.
The METC denied the Motion to Quash and ruled that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions should be appreciated in favor
of the public prosecutors. It found that the certification by ACP Canobas in the
Information stating that the filing of the Information was with the prior authority
of the City Prosecutor constitutes substantial compliance with the rules.
Unsuccessful at reconsideration, Villapando elevated the case to the RTC through
a petition for certiorari. The RTC denied the petition ratiocinating that from the
denial of the motion to quash, Villapando should have gone to trial without
prejudice to reiterating his special defenses invoked in his motion. In the event that
an adverse decision is rendered, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal step.
Nonetheless, it found that the presumption of regularity exists in the filing of the
information on the basis of the certification of ACP Canobas and ACP Vermug,
Jr., coupled with the approval of the resolution by Garvida, stating that the filing
of the Information was with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor. The RTC
posited that the presumption has not been disputed by the City Prosecutor.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reiterated the recent ruling in Quisay v. People. It held
that there must be a demonstration that prior written delegation or authority was
given by the city prosecutor to the assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of
the information.
FORTALEZA V. GONZALES
G.R. NOS. 179287 & 182090, FEBRUARY 1, 2016
Facts: Petitioners assail the acts of the DOJ Secretary in reviewing the Resolution
of the City Prosecutor even without the filing of a Petition for Review. Neither were they
informed or notified of the pendency of the Review before the DOJ Secretary. Is there
denial of due process?
Ruling: Yes. Verily, the Secretary of Justice is empowered to review automatically the
actions of the Provincial Fiscal during the preliminary investigation or the
reinvestigation. The DOJ Secretary has the statutory power of review and control and
supervision over prosecutors.
In the case at bar, however, we find that there is nothing on record to show
that respondents were given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
Secretary of Justice. For this reason, we remand the case to the Secretary of Justice
with respect to respondents for further proceedings, in line with their right to due
process with the caveat that any resolution of the Secretary of Justice on the matter
shall be subject to the approval of the trial court.
In the case at bar, we find that there is nothing on record to show that
respondents were given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Secretary
of Justice. For this reason, we remand the case to the Secretary of Justice with
respect to respondents Dongail, Lorilla, Hulleza, and Cimatu for further
proceedings, with the caveat that any resolution of the Secretary of Justice on the
matter shall be subject to the approval of the trial court.
A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause -that is, one made for the
purpose of filing an [I]nformation in court -is essentially an executive function and,
therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
However, Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause, viz.:
Section 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -(a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten
(10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused had already been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who
conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from
notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of
the complaint or information. x xx x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In De Los Santos-Dia v. CA, the Court explained that "the judge's dismissal of a
case [under the authority of the aforesaid provision] must be done only in clear-cut cases
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause -that is when the
records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the
evidence on record [show] that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not
dismiss the case.
SALES V. ADAPON
G.R. NO. 171420 OCTOBER 5, 2016
In fine, the personal presence of the petitioner at the clarificatory hearing was
unnecessary to establish probable cause against the respondents, and requiring it was
legally untenable. case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial.
Anent respondent's contentions that the present petitions (assailing the issuances
of the Secretary of Justice on the question of probable cause) had become moot and
academic with the filing of the Informations in the trial court and that under our ruling in
Advincula v. Court of Appeals the filing of a petition for certiorari with the appellate
court was the improper remedy as findings of the Secretary of Justice on probable cause
must be respected, we hold that these cited rules are not inflexible.
YOUNG V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 213910, FEBRUARY 3, 2016
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be stressed
that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence
on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more
likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to
proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to
order the presentation of additional evidence.
Accordingly, a judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in
clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that
is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.
PEOPLE V. MAGNO
G.R. NO. 212340, AUGUST 17, 2016
Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless
arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto,
(b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting
officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime
which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that
"the offense has just been committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the
case.
However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstance" under
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions."
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though
the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless
arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of
facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in
order to comply with the element of immediacy.
SINDAC V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 220732 SEPTEMBER 6, 2016
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements
must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of
the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission
of an offense is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he
knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
xxxx
Advancing to a warrantless arrest based only on such information, absent
circumstances that would lead to the arresting officer's "personal knowledge" as
described in case law, unfortunately, skews from the exacting requirements of Section 5,
Rule 113. It is settled that "reliable information" alone — even if it was a product of
well-executed surveillance operations — is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest. It is further required that the accused performs some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 224974 JUNE 3, 2017
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal
of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.
The provisions of the Rules of Court are clear. Bail shall be deemed automatically
cancelled in three (3) instances: (1) the acquittal of the accused, (2) the dismissal of the
case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction. The Rules of Court do not limit
the cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused.
The Office of the Solicitor General made the same observation in its Comment
before the Court of Appeals:
The trial court denied the motion to release cash bond on the ground that the dismissal
was only due to the desistance of the complainant and not because the accused was
acquitted or that the crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Such ruling, however, has no legal basis. In fact, the provision of Section 22, Rule 114 is
clear: the dismissal of the criminal case results to the automatic cancellation of the bail
bond.
EVIDENCE
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of
judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice
of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of
saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can
be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious
that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are commonly known.
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the
recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which cited State
Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Contrary to the findings and conclusions of the RTC, the merger of the petitioner
and Panasia was not of common knowledge. It was overly presumptuous for the RTC to
thereby assume the merger because the element of notoriety as basis for taking judicial
notice of the merger was loudly lacking.
A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial,
either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the
judicial proceeding. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by
the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, and
absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, as in this case, no amount
of rationalization can offset it. Also, in Republic of the Philippines v. De Guzman citing
Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court held that "a party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
challenge that fact as judicial admissions a
The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever
its contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section
3 of Rule 130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is
necessary. The Court's ruling in Lorenzana v. Lelina is instructive:
The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the
contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself
except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
As such, mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence
rule. Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in
evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was
formally offered.
The Court notes that Petitioners failed to object to the admission of the plain copy
of the Deed of Undertaking at the time it was formally offered in evidence before the
RTC. In fact, in their Reply, Petitioners admit that they only raised this objection for the
first time before the CA. XXXXX Having failed to timely raise their objection when the
Formal Offer of Evidence was filed in the RTC, Petitioners are deemed to have waived
the same. Hence, they are precluded from assailing the probative value of the plain copy
of the Deed of Undertaking.
re a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also
removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy."