MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 2018

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

1) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MA. LOURDES P.A.SERENO ( May 11, 2018)

Facts: Chief Justice Sereno’s appointment to the Supreme Court was sought
to be invalidated through a Quo Warranto Petition on the ground of
ineligibility or lack of qualification for the position of a magistrate. It was
alleged that the respondent failed to satisfy the requirement of “ proven
integrity” due to her failure to submit to the Judicial and Bar Council ( JBC) at
the time of her application her SALNs which are primordial requisites for the
position.

Crucial Questions:

1) Is QW the correct remedy?

-YES. This is a correct remedy. Quo Warranto tests qualifications.

Rule 66. Sec. 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for

the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced
by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against:

a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or

exercises a public office, position or franchise;
b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision
of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office;
c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines
without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so
to act.

2) Was it timely-filed?

RULING: YES. Ineligibility came to light only during the House of

Representative’s investigations. This is the reckoning point for purposes of
counting the one-year period. Besides, prescription does not lie against the
State.
On the ground of ineligibility
Hon. Philip Aguinaldo, et.al v. His Excellency President Benigno Aquino
and Hon. Frederick Musngi and Ma. Geraldine Faith Econg ( November
29, 2016).

Facts:Petition for Quo Warranto, Certiorari and Prohibition ( Rules 66

and 65)assailing the appointments of respondents Sandiganbayan
Justices Musngi, and Econg as unconstitutional. Petioners submit that
“clustering” impinges upon the President’s power of appointment, as well
as restricts the chances for appointment of the qualified nominees.”

Ruling: Petitioners not proper parties to a Quo Warranto proceeding.

They do not have a clear right to said position. Being included in the list
merely give them the possibility, but not the certainty, of being appointed
to the position given the discretionary power of the President in making
judicial appointments. For a Quo Warranto petition to be successful, the
private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office.

Ferdinand S. Topacio v. Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory Ong

and the OSG ( December 18, 2008)

Facts: The SC enjoined Justice Ong from accepting an appointment to the

position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court until he shall have shown
through the necessary adversarial proceedings that he is a natural- born
Filipino citizen. Justice Ong complied and filed the necessary petition with
the RTC for the correction of his birth records. Petitioner through a letter
implored the OSG to posthaste file a petition for Quo Warranto. The OSG
declined reasoning that it cannot favorably act on the request until the case
with the RTC has been decided with finality. Petitioner assailed this position
of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion through a
Certiorari and Prohibition petition.

Ruling: Petition denied. In the exercise of its discretion, the Solicitor General
may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for Quo Warranto
where there are just and valid reasons. The OSG saw the folly of re-litigating
the same issue of Ong’s citizenship in the Quo Warranto case simultaneously
with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum- shopping.

Also, the Certiorari petition partakes of the nature of a Quo Warranto

proceeding for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his appointment as
an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Being a collateral attack on a
public officer’s title, the Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed. d. The
 title to a public office cannot be contested collaterally; it can only be
contested directly through a Quo Warranto proceedings.

YUKIT V. TRITRAN, INC.,

G.R. NO. 184841, NOVEMBER 21, 2016

Facts: In determining the validity of the closure of Tritran and the legality of the
ensuing dismissal of its employees, the NLRC referred to the principle of stare decisis in
its Resolution dated 18 August 2006 as one of the reasons for the reversal of its original
Decision affirming the LA ruling. It cited the Decision in De Chavez v. Tritran, Inc., in
support of its earlier finding that Tritran's closure was due to serious business losses.

Ruling: The stare decisis principle was erroneously applied to this case. It must be
emphasized that only final decisions of the Supreme Court are deemed precedents that
form part of our legal system. Decisions of lower courts or other divisions of the same
court are not binding on others. Consequently, it was incorrect for the NLRC to consider
De Chavez — a ruling rendered by the same NLRC division — as a binding precedent
applicable to the present case.

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V. SPOUSES WALTER UY AND LILY

UY
G.R. NO. 204039, JANUARY 10, 2018

Facts: The Court of Appeals applied its own decisions under the principle of stare
decisis. Is the application correct?

Ruling: No, the Court of Appeals is incorrect.The principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:

xx xx It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow

a rule already established in a final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.
The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative only

when judicial precedents are set by pronouncements of this Court to the exclusion of
lower courts. It is true regardless whether the decisions of the lower courts are logically
or legally sound as only decisions issued by this Court become part of the legal
system. At the most, decisions of lower courts only have a persuasive effect. Thus,
respondents are correct in contesting the application of the doctrine of stare decisis
when the CA relied on decisions it had issued.
ASIA BREWERY, INC. V. EQUITABLE PCI BANK
G.R. NO. 190342 APRIL 25, 2017

Facts: The RTC, in resolving a Motion to Dismiss, noted that the facts of another
case “ are on all fours with the case being tried.” The Court thus dismissed the
Complaint for lack of cause of action. Is the RTC correct?

Ruling: The RTC is wrong. This is gravely erroneous and alarming. Failure to
state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not
interchangeable. It may be observed that lack of cause of action is not among the grounds
that may be raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The
dismissal of a Complaint for lack of cause of action is based on Section 1 of Rule 33,
which provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. — After the plaintiff has completed

the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is
denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal
the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made
before a responsive pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of
the allegations in the initiatory pleading. On the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a
cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff has rested its
case.

In the first situation, the veracity of the allegations is immaterial; however, in the
second situation, the judge must determine the veracity of the allegations based on the
evidence presented.

In PNB v. Spouses Rivera, this Court upheld the CA ruling that the trial court
therein erred in dismissing the Complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. We
said that "dismissal due to lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions, or
evidence presented by the plaintiff."

FAUSTO V. MULTI AGRI-FOREST AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

CORP.
G.R. NO. 213939 OCTOBER 12, 2016

Facts: The plaintiff filed five (5) separate complaints for different claims
amounting to more than 1 Million Pesos. He thereafter lumped together the different
amounts under the principle of “ Totality Rule” and moved to dismiss the case before the
MTC for lack of jurisdiction. Was the principle of “ Totality Rule” correctly applied?

Ruling: No, it was erroneously applied because there are separate Complaints.
The principle of “ Totality Rule” provides that where there are several claims or causes of action
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out
of the same or different transactions[.] The totality rule applies only when there are several
claims or causes of action between the same or different parties embodied in the same
complaint, in which case the total amount of the claims shall be determinative of the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the case. The instant case, however, does not call
for the application of the rule since there are five complaints, each pertaining to a
separate claim. The petitioners' act of lumping altogether the amount of the claims in all
of the complaints and arguing that the total amount of the claims a gross misinterpretation
of the provision.

AALA V. UY
G.R. NO. 202781, JANUARY 10, 2017

Facts: Petitioner, alarmed by the impending implementation of a City Ordinance

in Tagum which will allegedly “ lead to the collection of exorbitant real property taxes”,
filed before the Supreme Court an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus.

Was the action correctly filed?

Ruling: No. The filing of the action is violative of the principle of “ hierarchy of
courts.” The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to
restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before
the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent
"inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the
Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter[,]" it must remain as a "court of last resort."
This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing with causes in the first
instance."
IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT

MERCURY DRUG CORP. V. SPOUSES HUANG

G.R. NO. 197654 AUGUST 30, 2017

A final and executory judgment produces certain effects. Winning litigants are entitled to
the satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution. On the other hand, courts are
barred from modifying the rights and obligations of the parties, which had been
adjudicated upon. They have the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution to enforce
the judgment.

It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable
and unalterable. The primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no
longer be modified or amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the
modification or amendment is to correct perceived errors of law or fact. This principle
known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment is a matter of sound public policy,
which rests upon the practical consideration that every litigation must come to an end.

The doctrine of immutability of judgment, however, is not an iron-clad rule. It is subject

to several exceptions, namely:

(1) [T]he correction of clerical errors;

(2) [T]he so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party;
(3) [V]oid judgments; and
(4) [W]henever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

NORLINA G. SIBAYAN VS. ELIZABETH O. ALDA, THROUGH HER

ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RUBY O. ALDA
G.R. NO. 233395, JANUARY 17, 2018
- Administrative investigation against a Bank Manager by the Central Bank is summary
in nature. Hence, disallowance of the Modes of discovery in an administrative case does
not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
- Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in administrative
investigations

It bears stressing that the proceeding involved in the present case is administrative
in nature. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules on
evidence, the same does not hold true for administrative bodies. The Court has
consistently held that technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings are not exact
replicas of those in administrative investigations.
(3) [V]oid judgments; and
(4) [W]henever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

Clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of a judgment may result from
inadvertence. These errors can be rectified without violating the doctrine of immutability
of judgment provided that the modification does not affect the substance of the
controversy.

Clerical errors are best exemplified by typographical errors or arithmetic

miscalculations. They also include instances when words are interchanged.

Similarly, in Spouses Mahusay v. B.E. San Diego, Inc., the lower court amended its
decision to include payment of "all penalties and interest due on the unpaid
amortizations" under the contracts to sell. The modification, according to this
Court, was not a substantial amendment of the judgment considering that
petitioners do not deny the execution of the Contracts to Sell.

LAW OF THE CASE

VIRATA V. NG WEE
G.R. NO. 220926, 221058, 221109, 221135 & 221218 JULY 5, 2017

The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate court
has made a ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the
lower court for further proceedings; the question settled by the appellate court
becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any subsequent appeal. It means
that whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which the legal rule or decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

It is inconsequential that the issue raised in G.R. No. 162928 pertained to the
alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in denying the motions to
dismiss, and not to the merits of the motions to dismiss per se. For as the Court has
elucidated in Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc. v. Tansipek:
x x x there is no substantial distinction between an appeal and a Petition for Certiorari when
it comes to the application of the Doctrine of the Law of the Case. The doctrine is founded on
the policy of ending litigation. The doctrine is necessary to enable the appellate court to perform
its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question once considered
 and decided by it were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent
appeal.

PHILIPPINE NUMISMATIC AND ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY V. AQUINO

G.R. NO. 206617 JANUARY 30, 2017

There is no question that a litigation should be disallowed immediately if it

involves a person without any interest at stake, for it would be futile and meaningless to
still proceed and render a judgment where there is no actual controversy to be thereby
determined. Courts of law in our judicial system are not allowed to delve on academic
issues or to render advisory opinions. They only resolve actual controversies involving
rights that are legally demandable and enforceable.

The Rules of Court, specifically Section 2 of Rule 3 thereof, requires that unless
otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, thus:

Sec. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to

be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

This provision has two requirements: (1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must
be the real party-in-interest; and (2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party-in-interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means
material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.

RULE 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSE

AMANDO A. INOCENTES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

G.R. NOS. 205963-64. JULY 7, 2016

The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled
corporations, and state universities shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. We have clarified the provision of law defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by explaining that the Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those
officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, regardless of their salary grades for as long as they hold the positions
enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
DAVID V. MARQUEZ,
G.R. NO. 209859 JUNE 5, 2017

Indeed, venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. As

explained by this Court in the case of Foz, Jr. v. People:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases,

the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is
the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may
validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action
for want of jurisdiction.

Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 15.Place where action is to be instituted. — a) Subject to existing laws, the

criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

At the risk of being repetitive, Sec. 9 of RA 8042, however, fixed an alternative

venue from that provided in Section 15 (a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
i.e., a criminal action arising from illegal recruitment may also be filed where the
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense and
that the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to
the exclusion of other courts

VALDERAMA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 220054 MARCH 27, 2017

Facts: Respondent filed his Motion to Reconsider on the criminal aspect

of the case without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor. This was opposed on the
ground that the Motion is fatally defective. The Court a quo disregarded the opposition
on the ground that the Rules could be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. Is the
Court correct?

Ruling: No, the Court is incorrect. The public prosecutor's conformity to the Motion to
Reconsider is necessary. Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 5. Who Must Prosecute Criminal Actions. — All criminal actions

commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended
party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law
violated may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the
prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.

In Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde, this Court ruled that the required conformity of the
public prosecutor was not a mere superfluity and was necessary to pursue a criminal
action. A private party does not have the legal personality to prosecute the criminal
aspect of a case, as it is the People of the Philippines who are the real party in interest
The criminal case must be under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Thus,
when the public prosecutor does not give his or her conformity to the pleading of a
party, the party does not have the required legal personality to pursue the case.

PEOPLE V. FELICIANO, JR.

G.R. NO. 196735 AUGUST 3, 2016

For an information to be sufficient, Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure requires that it state:

the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

The purpose of alleging all the circumstances attending a crime, including any
circumstance that may aggravate the accused's liability, is for the accused to be able to
adequately prepare for his or her defense:

To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the
 information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for
the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to
prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant
to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the
crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly
accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice[.]

RULE 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

REYES V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 212593-94 MARCH 15, 2016

Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the
elements of the crime need not be definitively established for it is enough that their
presence becomes reasonably apparent. This is because probable cause - the
determinative matter in a preliminary investigation implies mere probability of guilt;
thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would
justify a conviction would suffice.

Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the

occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence, and that
the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at
the preliminary investigation level."

Furthermore, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the

technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings, keeping
in mind that the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or
merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the admissibilitv or veracity of testimonies
presented.Thus, in Estrada v. Ombudsman (Estrada), the Court declared that since a
preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties,
probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay

MAZA V. TURLA
G.R. NO. 187094 FEBRUARY 15, 2017

The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.

 In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there
is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they merely
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.

To emphasize, "a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial[;] [i]t is

not a trial on the merits." Since "it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the
information in court the prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence
necessary to secure a conviction of the accused," the admissibility or inadmissibility of
evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.

QUISAY V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 216920, JANUARY 13, 2016

FACTS:

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued a Pasiya or

Resolution finding probable cause against Girlie M. Quisay for violation of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, otherwise known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal or Information was filed before the RTC on
January 11, 2013 charging petitioner of such crime.

Quisay moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground
of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of
her motion, Quisay pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was
penned by Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz)
and approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP
Hirang), while the Pabatid Sakdal or Information was penned by ACP De La
Cruz, without any approval from any higher authority, albeit with a Certification
claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or approval from the
City Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this regard, Quisay claimed that
nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP De La
Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written authority or approval from the City
Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against her. As such, the
Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that
cannot be cured.
 The RTC denied Quisay's Motion to Quash for lack of merit as it found that
the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal have sufficiently complied with
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior written
authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of
Informations.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on

the grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor of Makati may delegate its authority to
approve the filing of the Pabatid Sakdal pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, as
well as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32; and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal contained a
Certification stating that its filing before the RTC was with the prior written
authority or approval from the City Prosecutor.

The Supreme Court reversed the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

RULING:

Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

states that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written
authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or
information may be filed before the courts, viz.:

SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If

the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in
the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer,
has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given
an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the
case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on
the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an

investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval
of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.
 xxx xxx xxx (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or Informations filed before the courts

without the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers
renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3
(d), Rule 117 of the same Rules, to wit:

SECTION 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or

information on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so;

The filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to

file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by
silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

In People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin [549 Phil. 903 (2007)], and

Tolentino v. Paqueo [551 Phil. 355 (2007)], the SC held that despite such
certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers
filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that
they obtained prior written authority from any of those authorized officers
enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Presumption of regularity can not also be accorded because neither does it

show that ACP De La Cruz have authority to file the Information on his own nor
did he seek the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before
filing the Information before the RTC.

MAXIMO V. VILLAPANDO, JR., G.R. NOS. 214925, APRIL 26, 2017

FACTS: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City thru ACP Canobas
issued a Resolution (Canobas Resolution) finding probable cause against
Villapando for the crime of perjury. The Resolution was approved by Senior
Assistant City Prosecutor (SACP) Christopher Garvida. Accordingly, on August
15, 2011, an Information 21 dated July 26, 2011 for Perjury was filed against
Villapando before Branch 67 of the METC, Makati City. The Information was
signed by ACP Canobas and sworn to before ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.

A motion to partially reconsider the said resolution was filed by Villapando

alleging that the person who filed the Information had no authority to do so. The
OCP-Makati denied the Motion stating that there was prior written authority for
the City Prosecutor in filing the Information by virtue of Office Order No. 32
dated July 29, 2011. The finding of probable cause was also affirmed. The Order
was approved by City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi. Villapando filed petition for
review of the Canobas Resolution before the DOJ, however, the petition was
denied.

Villapando also filed a Motion to Quash Information before the METC

and asserted that the Information, as well as the Resolution finding probable cause
against him, did not bear the approval of the City Prosecutor of Makati, Feliciano
Aspi, which is contrary to Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

The METC denied the Motion to Quash and ruled that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions should be appreciated in favor
of the public prosecutors. It found that the certification by ACP Canobas in the
Information stating that the filing of the Information was with the prior authority
of the City Prosecutor constitutes substantial compliance with the rules.
Unsuccessful at reconsideration, Villapando elevated the case to the RTC through
a petition for certiorari. The RTC denied the petition ratiocinating that from the
denial of the motion to quash, Villapando should have gone to trial without
prejudice to reiterating his special defenses invoked in his motion. In the event that
an adverse decision is rendered, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal step.
Nonetheless, it found that the presumption of regularity exists in the filing of the
information on the basis of the certification of ACP Canobas and ACP Vermug,
Jr., coupled with the approval of the resolution by Garvida, stating that the filing
of the Information was with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor. The RTC
posited that the presumption has not been disputed by the City Prosecutor.

Undaunted, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by

Villapando before the Court of Appeals. He raised before the CA the same issues:
a) that the Information was filed without the prior written authority of the City
Prosecutor; b) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC.

 In the petition filed by Maximo and Villapando, before the Supreme Court,
the core issue relates to the validity of the Amended Information at bar.
Maximo and Panganiban argued in their petition that the CA erred in holding that
the Information did not comply with the rule requiring prior written authority or
approval of the City or Provincial Prosecutor. They pointed out that the
Information bears the certification that the filing of the same had the prior
authority or approval of the City Prosecutor who is the officer authorized to file
information in court. According to them, there is a presumption that prior written
authority or approval of the City Prosecutor was obtained in the filing of the
Information, such that, the non-presentation of Office Order No. 32, which was the
alleged basis of the authority in filing the Information, is immaterial.

RULING:

The Supreme Court reiterated the recent ruling in Quisay v. People. It held
that there must be a demonstration that prior written delegation or authority was
given by the city prosecutor to the assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of
the information.

In the cases of People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, and Tolentino v.

Paqueo, the Court had already rejected similarly-worded certifications uniformly
holding that, despite such certifications, the Informations were defective as it was
shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so
or failed to show that they obtained prior written authority from any of those
authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting

officer, cannot be filed by another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the
case because there is a defect in the Information. There is no point in proceeding
under a defective Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction.

FORTALEZA V. GONZALES
G.R. NOS. 179287 & 182090, FEBRUARY 1, 2016

Facts: Petitioners assail the acts of the DOJ Secretary in reviewing the Resolution
of the City Prosecutor even without the filing of a Petition for Review. Neither were they
informed or notified of the pendency of the Review before the DOJ Secretary. Is there
denial of due process?
Ruling: Yes. Verily, the Secretary of Justice is empowered to review automatically the
actions of the Provincial Fiscal during the preliminary investigation or the
reinvestigation. The DOJ Secretary has the statutory power of review and control and
supervision over prosecutors.

In the case at bar, however, we find that there is nothing on record to show
that respondents were given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
Secretary of Justice. For this reason, we remand the case to the Secretary of Justice
with respect to respondents for further proceedings, in line with their right to due
process with the caveat that any resolution of the Secretary of Justice on the matter
shall be subject to the approval of the trial court.

In the case at bar, we find that there is nothing on record to show that
respondents were given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Secretary
of Justice. For this reason, we remand the case to the Secretary of Justice with
respect to respondents Dongail, Lorilla, Hulleza, and Cimatu for further
proceedings, with the caveat that any resolution of the Secretary of Justice on the
matter shall be subject to the approval of the trial court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERNESTO L. DELOS SANTOS

G.R. NO. 220685. NOVEMBER 29, 2017

A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause -that is, one made for the
purpose of filing an [I]nformation in court -is essentially an executive function and,
therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.

However, Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause, viz.:

Section 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -(a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten
(10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused had already been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who
conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from
notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of
 the complaint or information. x xx x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In De Los Santos-Dia v. CA, the Court explained that "the judge's dismissal of a
case [under the authority of the aforesaid provision] must be done only in clear-cut cases
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause -that is when the
records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the
evidence on record [show] that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not
dismiss the case.

SALES V. ADAPON
G.R. NO. 171420 OCTOBER 5, 2016

In view of the foregoing, the investigating prosecutor gravely erred in dismissing

the petitioner's criminal complaint for falsification simply because of her non-appearance
at the clarificatory hearing. To start with, her personal presence was excusable because of
her advanced age and the distance of her place of residence at the time (New York,
United States of America) from the Province of Batangas, the venue of the proceedings.
Secondly, the records already contained sufficient evidence upon which the investigating
prosecutor could make a finding of probable cause. Thirdly, she was represented in the
proceedings by her son-in-law Jerico B. Sales, whom she had constituted as her agent for
purposes of pursuing the criminal case against the respondents. Being her agent expressly
authorized for that special purpose, Jerico could competently respond to the investigating
prosecutor's clarificatory questions in a manner legally binding on her. Thirdly, had the
investigating prosecutor sincerely considered her personal presence as absolutely
necessary in the determination of probable cause, he should have granted her request to
have her deposition taken instead. Such power was within his discretion as the
investigating prosecutor. And, lastly, the investigating prosecutor's requiring her
personal presence at the clarificatory hearing was probably unnecessary and superfluous
in view of his failure to specify the matters still needing to be clarified. As earlier
mentioned, the documents submitted by both parties in the proceedings were already
sufficient for the determination of whether or not probable cause existed against the
respondents. If the clarificatory hearing was geared towards the determination of the
existence of probable cause, 12 the non-specification of the matters to be inquired into
during the clarificatory hearing indicated that no more matters needed to be clarified from
the petitioner herself.

Although it was concededly discretionary on the part of the investigating

prosecutor to call for the clarificatory hearing considering that Section 4 (e) of Rule 112
of the Rules of Court has used the word may in assigning such prerogative to him, the
discretion was not unbounded because the rule precisely stated that the clarificatory
hearing was to be set only "if there are such facts and issues to be clarified from a party
or a witness." XXXX

In fine, the personal presence of the petitioner at the clarificatory hearing was
unnecessary to establish probable cause against the respondents, and requiring it was
legally untenable. case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial.

IIENT V. TULLETT PREBON (PHILIPPINES), INC.

G.R. NOS. 189158& 189530 JANUARY 11, 2017

Anent respondent's contentions that the present petitions (assailing the issuances
of the Secretary of Justice on the question of probable cause) had become moot and
academic with the filing of the Informations in the trial court and that under our ruling in
Advincula v. Court of Appeals the filing of a petition for certiorari with the appellate
court was the improper remedy as findings of the Secretary of Justice on probable cause
must be respected, we hold that these cited rules are not inflexible.

In Yambot v. Tuquero, we observed that under exceptional circumstances, a

petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an
appeal of the prosecutor's ruling on probable cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the
filing of an information with the trial court. We reiterated the doctrine in Ching v.
Secretary of Justice that the acts of a quasi-judicial officer may be assailed by the
aggrieved party through a petition for certiorari and enjoined (a) when necessary to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the
orderly administration of justice; (c) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess
of authority; (d) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and (e) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused.
n doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the
presentation of additional evidence.

YOUNG V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 213910, FEBRUARY 3, 2016

Pertinently, the Court declared in Santos-Dia v. CA (Santos-Dio) (sic) that while a

judge's determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of
issuing arrest warrants, he is nonetheless authorized under Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. Thus:

In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be stressed
that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence
on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more
likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to
proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to
order the presentation of additional evidence.

Accordingly, a judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in
clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that
is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.

PEOPLE V. MAGNO
G.R. NO. 212340, AUGUST 17, 2016

Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless
arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto,
(b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting
officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime
which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the

element of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy;
otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the
search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the
exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. In Pestilos v. Generoso, the Court explained
the requirement of immediacy as follows:

Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that
"the offense has just been committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the
case.

However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstance" under
 Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions."
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though
the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless
arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of
facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in
order to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure
that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very
limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base
their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive
investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this — as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone
to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On
the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable
cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances,
gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds
another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating
these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

SINDAC V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 220732 SEPTEMBER 6, 2016

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements
must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of
the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission
of an offense is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he
knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
xxxx
 Advancing to a warrantless arrest based only on such information, absent
circumstances that would lead to the arresting officer's "personal knowledge" as
described in case law, unfortunately, skews from the exacting requirements of Section 5,
Rule 113. It is settled that "reliable information" alone — even if it was a product of
well-executed surveillance operations — is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest. It is further required that the accused performs some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.

CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 224974 JUNE 3, 2017

Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. — Upon application of the bondsmen,

with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the
accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal
of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

The provisions of the Rules of Court are clear. Bail shall be deemed automatically
cancelled in three (3) instances: (1) the acquittal of the accused, (2) the dismissal of the
case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction. The Rules of Court do not limit
the cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused.

The Office of the Solicitor General made the same observation in its Comment
before the Court of Appeals:

The trial court denied the motion to release cash bond on the ground that the dismissal
was only due to the desistance of the complainant and not because the accused was
acquitted or that the crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Such ruling, however, has no legal basis. In fact, the provision of Section 22, Rule 114 is
clear: the dismissal of the criminal case results to the automatic cancellation of the bail
bond.

EVIDENCE

BANK OF COMMERCE V. HEIRS OF DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 211519 AUGUST 14, 2017
 In Latip v. Chua, the Court laid down the instances when judicial notice could be
properly taken of facts that would normally take the place of evidence, to wit:

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of
judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial

notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice
of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of
saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can
be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious
that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are commonly known.

Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be

matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as
true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person.

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the
recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which cited State
Prosecutors:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be

matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as
true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a
wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent
on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge."

Contrary to the findings and conclusions of the RTC, the merger of the petitioner
and Panasia was not of common knowledge. It was overly presumptuous for the RTC to
thereby assume the merger because the element of notoriety as basis for taking judicial
notice of the merger was loudly lacking.

TAN VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 218902. OCTOBER 17, 2016

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 4. Judicial Admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a

party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial,
either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the
judicial proceeding. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by
the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, and
absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, as in this case, no amount
of rationalization can offset it. Also, in Republic of the Philippines v. De Guzman citing
Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court held that "a party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
challenge that fact as judicial admissions a

SPOUSES TAPAYAN V. MARTINEZ

G.R. NO. 207786 JANUARY 30, 2017

The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever
its contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section
3 of Rule 130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is
necessary. The Court's ruling in Lorenzana v. Lelina is instructive:

The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the
contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself
except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
As such, mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence
rule. Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in
evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was
formally offered.

In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be

made at the proper time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be made
at the time it is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all
the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for
which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that
objection to the documentary evidence may be made. And when a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such
objection shall be considered as waived. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is
inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper
time. Moreover, grounds for objection must be specified in any case. Grounds for
objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence
was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not
consider any other ground of objection, except those that were raised at the proper time.

The Court notes that Petitioners failed to object to the admission of the plain copy
of the Deed of Undertaking at the time it was formally offered in evidence before the
RTC. In fact, in their Reply, Petitioners admit that they only raised this objection for the
first time before the CA. XXXXX Having failed to timely raise their objection when the
Formal Offer of Evidence was filed in the RTC, Petitioners are deemed to have waived
the same. Hence, they are precluded from assailing the probative value of the plain copy
of the Deed of Undertaking.
re a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also
removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy."