Rock Mech Rock Eng (2010) 43:891–906
DOI 10.1007/s00603-009-0070-0
ORIGINAL PAPER
An Engineering Approach to Seismic Risk Management
in Hardrock Mines
Marty Hudyma • Yves Henri Potvin
Received: 20 August 2009 / Accepted: 2 November 2009 / Published online: 21 November 2009
 Springer-Verlag 2009
Abstract The problem of mining-induced seismicity in
hardrock mines has become significant as underground
mines from around the world are pushing production to
deeper levels. At many mines, the risk associated with
large seismic events and rockburst damage must be man-
aged to ensure the safety of mine workers and minimise
production losses. In this paper, an engineering approach to
seismic risk management is described. It relies on accepted
risk management techniques, which principally include the
identification and understanding of hazards from which risk
mitigation measures can be developed. This is achieved
using simple but effective analysis techniques of high
resolution microseismic data.
Keywords Mining  Rock mechanics 
Rock engineering  Stress  Rockbursts 
Mining-induced seismicity  Seismic risk  Seismic hazard 
Mine seismology  Failure mechanism
1 Introduction
For nearly 100 years, mine induced seismic events have
been reported as a hazard to workers in underground,
hardrock mines in numerous countries such as Australia,
Canada and South Africa (Potvin and Hudyma 2001). It is
M. Hudyma
Laurentian University, Ramsey Lake Road,
Sudbury, ON P3E 2C6, Canada
e-mail: mhudyma@laurentian.ca
Y. H. Potvin (&)
Australian Centre for Geomechanics, The University of Western
Australia, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia
e-mail: potvin@acg.uwa.edu.au
obviously not a new problem, but a problem that has
intensified dramatically with the progression of modern
mining activities at depth, where the in situ and mine
induced stresses are much higher. In Australia for example,
the deepest mines are currently between 1,000 and 1,650 m
below surface, in Canada they vary from 1,500 to 2,500 m
and in South Africa, where most of the deepest mines in the
world are, mining depths can reach 3,000–3,800 m (Potvin
et al. 2007).
A comprehensive survey of 73 underground, mechan-
ised, hard rock mines (Hudyma 2004) revealed that
approximately 20% of the non-South African mines
experienced seismic events of magnitudes reaching at least
?2 on the Richter scale, and 15% of the mines surveyed
reported having suffered at least one major rockburst
causing severe damage to their infrastructure.
In many mines around the world, seismic risk must now
be carefully managed. One of the first and most important
steps in risk management is to identify and understand
hazards. In terms of seismic hazard, it is generally accepted
that the implementation of a seismic monitoring system is
an essential tool to identify seismic sources and to achieve
an adequate understanding of the seismic hazard. During
the last few decades seismic monitoring technology has
been used in South Africa and Canada, whilst the tech-
nology has been implemented very rapidly in Australia,
largely during the last decade. Figure 1 shows the pro-
gression of the number of mine-wide microseismic moni-
toring systems being used in Australia.
The focus of this keynote paper is to describe a seismic
risk management philosophy for underground, hardrock
mines, based on the application of simple and practical
microseismic data interpretation and analysis techniques.
Some of these techniques have been successfully used for
almost a decade in Australian and Canadian mines.
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892
Fig. 1 Number of mine-wide microseismic monitoring systems
implemented in Australia since 1994
In essence, the proposed seismic risk management phi-
losophy is an engineering approach to the problem. This
consists of identifying the active seismic sources in the
mine, characterising each source in term of hazard (or the
largest event that each source is likely to produce), esti-
mating the potential damage if the largest event were to
occur and implementing risk mitigating measures to min-
imise the consequence, if this damage were to occur.
2 Identifying Seismic Sources
A seismic event is a dynamic stress wave resulting from
inelastic deformation in a rock mass. Simply, it is the
shockwave produced by a localised rock mass failure.
Therefore, seismic events are not random. They occur at
specific locations where the rock mass is in a process of
failing. The failure is generally the result of a stress change
combined with geological conditions that are conducive to
seismicity (sudden failure). For example, faults, stiff dykes,
shear zones or geological contacts tend to generate seis-
micity. Rock mass failure is generally a process rather than
a distinct event consisting of a large number of seismic
events of different magnitudes, occurring in confined areas
where stress changes and geological conditions combine to
produce rock mass failures.
These areas are often referred to as seismic sources.
Seismic sources can be identified using microseismic
monitoring systems, provided that the systems are capable
of locating microseismic events with reasonable accuracy.
Accurately located microseismic events will tend to cluster
where seismic sources are active. Figure 2 is a diagram-
matic example of several different seismic sources in a
region of a mine. Seismic sources in mines are numerous
and sometimes located in proximity to each other. Poorly
designed microseismic systems are prone to producing
inaccurate event locations, scattering the bulk of events
123
M. Hudyma, Y. H. Potvin
over a considerable area. This may prevent meaningful
clustering of events, and make identification of seismic
sources difficult.
2.1 Spatial Clustering of Microseismic Events
2.1.1 Opportunities and Challenges
To manage a risk, one must know where the hazards are
located. In the context of managing seismic risks, the
accurate identification of the locations of seismic sources
(potential hazards) is an essential first step in the engi-
neering risk management process. Seismic events are
produced as a result of a local failure process, concen-
trating where seismic sources are active. Hence, the clus-
tering of seismic events can be an effective tool to pinpoint
active seismic sources.
Clustering is unsupervised classification of data into
groups, such that the data points in a cluster are more
similar to each other than data points in a population
(Halkidi et al. 2001). Assuming that the seismic events
within a cluster are attached to a specific failure process at
a specific location, they should have some similarities in
their seismic signatures. This will be further discussed in
Sect. 3.
The clustering of seismic events is a complex topic,
which notwithstanding the following brief discussion, is
beyond this keynote. There is a significant body of litera-
ture that mentions or identifies spatial clustering of seismic
events, but few authors (Butler 1997; Falmagne 2001;
Hudyma et al. 2002; Kijko et al. 1993; Kijko and Funk
1996; Vasak et al. 2004) have actually used clustering as a
basis for filtering seismic events prior to seismic data
analysis. The potential for using spatial clustering as a first
step in data analysis is self-evident, but there are numerous
difficulties in automating the clustering process of seismic
data. If the hypocentre of events is selected as the prime
metric to cluster the data (spatial clustering), some of the
challenges in developing an effective clustering routine
include:
1. The noise in the data population.
2. The accuracy of the hypocentral location.
3. Choosing the appropriate cluster resolution.
4. The static and dynamic nature of seismic sources in
mines.
Other difficulties in clustering may arise from the
potentially huge volume of data involved. Finally, if the
data within a cluster is to be related to the failure mecha-
nism, one must find a way to use the local knowledge
regarding the geological setting and stress condition as an
input into the clustering process.
An Engineering Approach to Seismic Risk Management in Hardrock Mines 893

Fig. 2 Schematic seismic

sources or local rock mass
failure caused by stress change
and different geological
conditions: a fault movement,
b stress change causing rock
mass fracturing near an
excavation, c stope overbreak,
d contrast in rock mass
properties causing strain
bursting, e crushing of mine
pillars, f stress increase causing
rock mass deformation
(Hudyma 2008)

2.1.2 Comprehensive Seismic Events Clustering (CSEC)
Hudyma (2008) proposed a Comprehensive Seismic Event
Clustering methodology (CSEC). The technique was
demonstrated to be an effective and practical method for
clustering seismic events, incorporating spatial, temporal
and seismic source parameter data. CSEC is based on
CLINK and the SLINK (Jain et al. 1999; Romesburg 2004)
clustering techniques.
The CSEC methodology is a multi-step process
involving two cycles of clustering. In the first pass of
clustering, a complete linkage clustering technique, com-
monly called CLINK clustering, is used to identify a large
number of small, spatially constrained clusters. Some of
these clusters will have a large number of events, however,
many of the clusters will also have comparatively few
events. In the second pass of clustering, a single-link
clustering methodology, commonly called SLINK cluster-
ing, is applied to the centroid of each CLINK cluster.
Individual clusters of events are linked into ‘‘cluster
groups’’ if the individual clusters are spatially close, and if
the individual CLINK clusters have similar seismic source
parameter characteristics.
In essence, during the first pass of clustering, the com-
prehensive database of events is typically reduced from tens
of thousands of events to a few hundreds of CLINK clusters.
The metric to define the CLINK cluster is purely spatial.
Using additional parameters in the clustering is avoided as
this would potentially bias the use of these parameters in any
subsequent analysis. CLINK clustering is also referenced as
‘‘furthest neighbour’’ clustering as the criterion for including
a new event in the cluster is based on the largest distance

123
894 M. Hudyma, Y. H. Potvin

between any two events currently within the cluster. It is seismic sources if their centroids meet an approximate
assumed that because of their spatial proximity, events distance criteria and also if their events have source
within a CLINK cluster pertain to the same seismic source parameters characteristics that are similar. The source
and relate to a dominant failure mechanism. This assump- parameters typically used for grouping CLINK clusters
tion can be tested using a number of data analysis and data may include:
integrity tests. Events that are isolated in space (not-clus-
• Median S-wave to P-wave energy.
tered) and small in magnitude are discarded, as they are
• The b value from the Gutenberg–Richter frequency–
comparatively inconsequential to seismic hazard and seis-
magnitude relationship.
mic source mechanism analysis. In a typical database from
• The x axis intercept (a/b) from the Gutenberg–Richter
Canadian and Australian mines, 75–90% of events are
frequency–magnitude relationship.
clustered during the CLINK clustering cycle and these
• The temporal increases in Apparent Stress.
events often represent more than 95% of the total radiated
• Diurnal and phasor analysis.
seismic energy of the events in the database.
• Trends from daily event histograms.
CLINK clusters are intended to be smaller than seismic
• The presence of large seismic events in a cluster.
sources as they will be logically grouped during the second
• Patterns in event magnitude from a magnitude–time
cycle of clustering using a SLINK technique. In the SLINK
history analysis.
clustering cycle, CLINK clusters are grouped to define

Fig. 3 Plan view of a mine

showing 193 CLINK clusters
(top diagram) which have been
re-grouped into 10 cluster
groups (bottom diagram) using
the SLINK clustering process
(Hudyma 2008)

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An Engineering Approach to Seismic Risk Management in Hardrock Mines
An example of cluster grouping using the SLINK
methodology is shown in Fig. 3.
The SLINK process, in particular the comparison of
source parameter and grouping, is currently performed with
human intervention. This permits local rock mechanics,
mining and geology knowledge to be an integral part of
identifying seismic sources. However, with further
research, it is possible that the entire SLINK cycle be
automated using clustering routine such as ROCK (RObust
Clustering using linKs) (Guha et al. 1999) or artificial
neural networks. Logically grouped clusters of seismic
events can be used to discriminate individual seismic
sources in mines. These groups are often similar in space,
but have distinguishing characters based on seismic source
parameters.
The CSEC methodology has been programmed in the
Mine Seismicity and Risk Analysis Program (MS-RAP)
software (Hudyma 2003) and has been used extensively at
approximately 30 mines since 2002.
2.2 Microseismic Monitoring System Design
Considerations
Although this keynote is not primarily concerned with
seismic data collection, it is important to provide a brief
background regarding the design of microseismic system
arrays that would allow the implementation of the seismic
risk management philosophy put forward in this paper. At
the centre of this philosophy is the recording of micro-
seismicity (or small events) and the accurate source location
of events, which should ideally be within approximately
10 m or better accuracy. The hypocentral source location
should be stable; meaning that the source location should
not change significantly depending on which combination
of sensors are used. Similarly the source parameters should
also be stable; more or less independent of which sensors
are used in the source parameters calculations. A complete1
record of smaller events (in the order of ML * -1 to -2) is
desirable to understand the trends in microseismic data.
Microseismic systems capable of delivering the above
sensitivity are often referred to as high resolution micro-
seismic monitoring.
High resolution monitoring is achieved using a large
number of sensors in a spatially well distributed array. One
key parameter with designing the array is the number of
sensors in relation to the volume of ground being moni-
tored. In many cases, the volumes are large in two
dimensions compared to the third. For this reason, spacing
between sensors may be more consistently expressed in
terms of area monitored rather than volume:
1
The completeness of the seismic record can be assessed based on
the linear portion of the Gutenberg–Richter plot.
895
rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Area Monitored
Inter  Sensor Spacing ¼ :
Number of Sensors
The area monitored is the product of the two largest
dimensions being monitored and the number of sensors is
the sum of uniaxial and triaxial sensors used in the array.
As most Canadian and Australian mines use high reso-
lution microseismic monitoring systems, design data from
35 Canadian and Australian mines was compiled in
Table 1 (Hudyma 2008). It can be seen that, as a gen-
eral rule, an inter-sensor spacing between 100 and 200 m
achieves the required completeness of the seismic record.
The data from Table 1 is also presented graphically in
Fig. 4 (Hudyma 2008), showing a relation between the
number of sensors, the area monitored and the com-
pleteness of the seismic records. This chart can be used as
a first pass assessment of system sensitivity, at the design
stage.
The distribution of seismic event magnitudes for large
population of data follows a power law. If a microseismic
monitoring system is designed to record and locate small
events, the volume of data generated by these systems will
be considerable, for mines that are ‘reasonably’ seismically
active. At the same time, the dense array will allow for
more sensors to record individual events which will
improve the reliability of automatic data processing. As a
result, the large quantity of data generated by a high res-
olution seismic monitoring system can often be effectively
managed with automated data processing software, with
relatively low human supervision. This is not the case for
low resolution systems.
3 Understanding Seismic Sources
The previous section discussed a methodology for the
identification of seismic sources, using cluster groups of
events. Each cluster group potentially represents a single
seismic source where a unique rock mass failure process is
actively occurring. The failure is often caused by a com-
bination of stress change and geological conditions con-
ducive to seismicity. This was diagrammatically illustrated
in Fig. 2. The dominant mechanism of the rock mass
failure often dictates the amount of energy that can be
liberated as a result of the failure, and therefore the seismic
hazard of the source. The seismic signature of the popu-
lation of events within the cluster group contains key
information about the failure mechanism and can be used
to characterise the hazard of the source. It is important to
realise that taken in isolation, individual source parameter
analysis can provide some useful information but the
combination of different source parameter analyses will
provide a more complete ‘‘picture’’ of the dominant
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896 M. Hudyma, Y. H. Potvin

Table 1 Compilation of microseismic system design data from 35 Canadian and Australian underground mines (Hudyma 2008)
# Monitored Monitored Monitored Monitored Number of Number of Total number Inter-sensor Completeness of
length (m) width (m) height (m) area (m2) triaxial sensors uniaxial sensors of sensors spacinga seismic recordb

1 500 300 150,000 8 7 15 100 -1.4

2 800 400 320,000 12 3 15 146 -1.2
3 600 400 240,000 11 3 14 131 -1.4
4 1,500 900 1,350,000 10 9 19 267 0.0
5 900 400 360,000 8 6 14 160 -1.7
6 1,000 400 400,000 3 10 13 175 -1.0
7 1,000 700 700,000 10 0 10 265 -0.5
8 400 400 160,000 2 6 8 141 -1.2
9 700 600 420,000 7 21 28 122 -1.5
10 600 600 360,000 6 0 6 245 -1.0
11 800 900 720,000 3 46 49 121 -1.7
12 400 300 120,000 2 7 9 115 -2.0
13 400 300 120,000 7 0 7 131 -1.7
14 400 600 240,000 20 10 30 89 -1.5
15 350 300 105,000 11 0 11 98 -2.5
16 600 800 480,000 13 0 13 192 -1.1
17 400 400 160,000 19 9 28 76 -1.8
18 700 1,000 700,000 5 40 45 125 -1.9
19 1,800 800 1,440,000 5 33 38 195 -1.3
20 300 300 90,000 0 16 16 75 -2.0
21 300 250 75,000 1 9 10 87 -2.0
22 800 800 640,000 11 0 11 241 -0.8
23 600 700 420,000 10 0 10 205 -1.1
24 600 400 240,000 8 0 8 173 -1.2
25 1,400 1,400 1,960,000 0 16 16 350 0.5
26 500 500 250,000 5 29 34 86 -2.0
27 1,400 500 700,000 15 15 30 153 -2.0
28 800 500 400,000 8 3 11 191 -1.3
29 800 400 320,000 0 18 18 133 -1.0
30 600 500 300,000 9 0 9 183 -0.8
31 2,000 500 1,000,000 6 0 6 408 0.2
32 600 800 480,000 6 0 6 283 0.3
33 400 500 200,000 8 0 8 158 -1.0
34 400 400 160,000 5 0 5 179 -0.9
35 1,400 800 1,120,000 6 19 25 212 -1.0
a
Inter-sensor spacing is calculated from (Monitored Area/Total Number of Sensors)‘
b
Minimum magnitude event is the minimum event size that can be detected consistently in all of the sensor array

mechanism and hazard. The parameters that were found to
best characterise the failure mechanism and hazard at a
source include:
• The frequency-magnitude relation of events.
• The timing of events as a result of stress field changes
(caused by mining or blasting).
• The timing of larger events versus smaller events.
• The ratio of S-wave to P-wave energy.
• The level of stress (Apparent Stress) associated with the
failure process.
A brief description on how parameters can be used to
characterise the seismic hazard of cluster groups is given in
the following sections.
3.1 The Frequency–Magnitude Relation of Events
(b Value)
For a given population of events, the absolute value of the
slope of a frequency–magnitude plot is called the ‘‘b
value’’ (Fig. 5). Provided that an adequate seismic

123
An Engineering Approach to Seismic Risk Management in Hardrock Mines
Fig. 4 Comparison of the
number of sensors in the array,
the area monitored and the
sensitivity (Mmin) of the
microseismic monitoring
system, from a compilation of
data from 35 Canadian and
Australian mines (Hudyma
2008)
monitoring system is recording the data, the magnitude of
seismic events of large populations generally follows a
power law relation (b value approximately = 1). However,
when analyzing individual seismic sources or cluster
groups, the b value may vary significantly depending on the
predominant failure mechanisms. In the case of a fault slip
mechanism, the b value is often low (less than 1), which
means that the proportion of large events is higher than for
the general population of events. This indicates the
potential seismic hazard may be high. When the seismicity
is the result of a local stress change immediately following
a blast, the b value is higher (often in the range of 1.2–1.5)
indicating a comparatively low seismic hazard (Hudyma
et al. 1995; Legge and Spottiswoode 1987).
The x intercept of the linear projection of the curve from
frequency–magnitude graphs has been shown to be a good
indicator of seismic hazard, and, in particular, when applied
to cluster groups, a fair predictor of the largest expected
event that can be produced by a seismic source. In Fig. 5, the
largest event from the seismic data shown in the left graph is
approximately ML = 2.5. On the right graph, the largest
event is only a ML = 0.75. Hudyma (2008) has shown that
the reliability of such prediction using the x intercept is
generally within half of a magnitude scale point (see Sect. 4).
3.2 The Magnitude–Time History Analysis
The magnitude–time history analysis is a graphical tech-
nique which facilitates the assessment of the relationship
between seismicity and the change in the stress field due to
mining or blasting. Seismic events are plotted chronologi-
cally with dates on the x axis against the magnitude on the y
axis. The rate of seismicity can be assessed from line read on
a secondary y axis as cumulative number of events. Periods
of mine blasting activity are shown as a dark band at the top
897
of the graph (Fig. 6). The rate of seismicity often shows a
sudden increase (or a step in the cumulative number of
events) as a result of blasting. The following example
(Fig. 6) shows how the magnitude–time history analysis can
be used to characterise the seismic hazard of different seis-
mic sources (cluster groups). The graph on the top shows that
the seismicity responds to blasting as the event rate (black
line) before and after blasting is flat and very steep during
blasting. This seismic source is only active during the
blasting period. Furthermore, the largest recorded event has
a relatively low local magnitude (ML = -0.2). The seis-
micity follows an expected pattern and is of low energy. This
seismic source has a comparatively low hazard.
The bottom graph (Fig. 6) exhibits a very different
behaviour. The largest event is relatively large (approxi-
mately ML = 1.5) and at least another three significant
events (ML [ 0) occurred, some when no blasting occur-
red. The seismic behaviour of this source is more typical of
a fault slip mechanism and has a comparatively higher
hazard (large events can occur at any time).
3.3 The Diurnal Chart
Another simple yet powerful way to look at seismic data in
relation to the timing of small and large events is diurnal
analysis (Fig. 7). The diurnal chart is a bar chart showing
the total number of events (in black) on the y axis as a
function of the time of day displayed on the x axis. The
number of significant events is shown in grey (a significant
event is an event of an arbitrary minimum magnitude), and
is read on the secondary y axis.
In the example at the top of Fig. 7, the seismicity shows
some variation with time of day. However, the number of
events and significant events remains high at all hours of
the day, and does not respond strongly at blasting time.
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898
Fig. 5 b Value charts from two different seismic sources (clusters).
The b value chart on the left is typical of a fault-slip seismic source
mechanism. The b value chart on the right is typical of a stress
change related seismic source mechanism. The two clusters have
approximately the same number of Local Magnitude = 0 events, but
This is a characteristic behaviour of fault slip and an active
source which has an elevated hazard level. The bottom
example shows a strong reaction from the seismicity at
blasting time (0600 and 1800 hours). This behaviour is
characteristic of a localised stress change. Most of the
energy is released with or shortly after the blast.
Consequently, the hazard is easier to manage with mit-
igation measures such as exclusion times. The intent of
displaying the significant events separately is that for some
seismic sources and seismic source mechanisms, there may
be considerably different diurnal relations for the larger
and smaller events in a mine.
3.4 The S:P Energy Analysis
It is a relatively common seismic source mechanism
analysis to look at the ratio of energy from the shear wave
(S wave) compared to the compression wave (P wave).
Researchers (Gibowicz et al. 1992; Urbancic et al. 1992)
have suggested that energy ratio is a strong indicator of the
failure mechanism. Fault slip events typically produce
much more energy in the S wave than in the P wave.
According to Boatwright and Fletcher (1984), a S:P energy
ratio of 10 and above is indicative of a fault slip mecha-
nism. For events having relatively more P wave energy and
an S:P ratio closer to 3, the mechanism is non-shear.
Seismic events caused by blasting and volumetric stress
change often have a low S:P energy ratio.
It was mentioned that seismic sources have a dominant
failure mechanism. It is quite informative to quantitatively
123
M. Hudyma, Y. H. Potvin
the cluster on the left has a relatively high proportion of large
events. The cluster on the right has almost no large events, but
many small events. The relative seismic hazard is much higher for
the cluster on the left
investigate the distribution of S:P energy ratio to gain
insight as to whether the dominant mechanism is shearing
or volumetric stress change.
Figure 8 shows two examples of S:P energy ratio distri-
butions of seismic events from two different clusters of
events. The solid line represents the distribution of the total
seismic population at the mine and the dashed line represents
the distribution for the individual cluster. The S:P ratio
distribution of cluster 18 on the left side has a median value
of approximately 14 with almost 70% of the events above 10.
This suggests that the dominant failure is shear. In fact,
cluster 18 was physically located on a known mine fault.
Cluster 10, on other hand, has a S:P energy ratio median
value of 2, with more than 85% of events under 10. The
dominant mechanism in this case is non-shear. The seis-
micity from cluster 10 is associated with stress fracturing
from stope blasting and no known structure exists in the
vicinity of this stope.
A particularly important consideration is that the S:P
energy ratio of some failure processes is scale dependent,
with the mechanism of the small events being considerably
different than for the large events. Quantitative analysis of
S:P energy ratio needs to investigate possible scale
dependence.
3.5 Apparent Stress
Researchers (Simser et al. 2003; van Aswegen and Butler
1993) found that seismic events associated with areas
where significant stress change occurs, due to blasting
An Engineering Approach to Seismic Risk Management in Hardrock Mines 899

Fig. 6 Magnitude-time history

charts of two different seismic
sources. The top graph is
indicative of a low hazard as the
seismicity tends to respond to
the blasting activity and is of
low magnitude. The bottom
graph is indicative of elevated
hazard, as relatively large
seismic events occur
independently of blasting
activities

(change in geometry), often have a higher than expected
seismic energy that results in a higher than normal
Apparent Stress. Hudyma (2008) also noted in several case
studies that blasting often triggers increases in the number
of high Apparent Stress events, specifically in proximity to
where stress change would be affected by the blast.
Empirical evidence also found suggests that when the
Apparent Stress is above a certain threshold, seismic haz-
ard becomes elevated. A method for investigating varia-
tions of Apparent Stress using a time history chart was
developed—Apparent Stress Time History (ASTH). In
certain circumstances, ASTH can be a good indicator of
elevated temporal seismic hazard. In Fig. 9, the ASTH
chart shows that during at least four periods (indicated by
the arrows) large events (ML [ 1) occurred when the
Apparent Stress Frequency2 (ASF shown as an uneven
solid line) was above 2.5 (ASF is read on the secondary y
axis). ASTH is a more reliable predictor of seismic hazard
when the seismic source mechanism strongly relates to
volumetric stress change.
3.6 Combining Analyses to Assess Seismic Hazard
In the previous section, several techniques were described
that can be used to better understand the dominant failure
mechanism of seismic sources and investigate their level of
hazard. Using these techniques together can provide a good
2
The Apparent Stress Frequency (ASF) is defined as the number of
events exceeding the threshold of apparent stress per day.

123
900
Fig. 7 Two examples of
diurnal charts. The top chart
shows a case where seismicity is
not dependant on blasting whilst
in the bottom chart, the
seismicity is highly responsive
to blasting
insight on the nature and hazard of the sources. For example,
the S:P ratio can often be used to separate shear and non-
shear mechanisms. When significant and large events occur
out of phase with blasting on the magnitude-time history
chart and on diurnal chart, it is indicative of fault-slip
behaviour. If the b value is low and the source location is
physically close to a structure then all indicators point
towards a structure that is slipping. On other hand, if the S:P
ratio is pre-dominantly low (non-shear), the b value is high,
the events corroborate with blasting time and the source
location is in proximity to mine development or stopes, but
not to known geological structures, then the rock mass failure
mechanism is likely to be volumetric stress change. Defining
the dominant failure mechanism at a source is an important
step in understanding the potential hazard of the source.
4 Quantitative Seismic Source Hazard Evaluation
High resolution seismic systems can reliably identify
seismic sources and, as stated in Sect. 3.1, the x intercept of
123
M. Hudyma, Y. H. Potvin
the linear projection of the curve from frequency–magni-
tude graphs can be a reliable indicator of the maximum
event magnitude that can be expected from a source. In this
section, the reliability of the forecasting is tested using
good quality seismic data sets composed of 61 data groups
from seven mines (Hudyma 2008). The data is shown in
Fig. 10 where the largest event recorded is plotted on the x
axis against the largest expected event on the y axis. Some
of these data groups represent single sources (square
points), while other groups represent regions which have
likely more than one source (diamond point). The solid
black line is the best fit linear regression between largest
recorded and forecasted events, while the long-dashed line
shows the relation in which the largest and forecasted
events are equal. The dotted black lines represent a band in
which the expected largest magnitudes are within a half an
order of magnitude of the regression line.
Although this database is by no means representative of
all mines, the analysis indicates that for good quality
datasets the x intercept of the linear portion of the fre-
quency–magnitude graph can provide a reasonable
An Engineering Approach to Seismic Risk Management in Hardrock Mines
Fig. 8 S wave to P wave energy ratio for two cluster groups (cluster
18 on the left and cluster 10 on the right). The distribution from
cluster 18 shows a dominant shear mechanism whilst cluster 10 on the
right shows a dominant non-shear (volumetric stress change)
mechanism
estimate of the largest event, generally within half a
magnitude point. In addition to having a high resolution
monitoring system and well behaved3 frequency–magni-
tude data, a quality dataset must have a near continuous
recording of data for at least a 1 year period and a mini-
mum of several hundred events per data group. Significant
gaps, in which the system was not recording data for
3
A well behaved dataset implies that the linear portion of the
frequency-magnitude graph extends over a few orders of magnitude.
901
extended period of time, would likely make the forecasting
unreliable.
4.1 Dormant Sources
Some seismic sources may become dormant when min-
ing activities are temporarily discontinued in the vicinity
of the seismic source, while other sources can stay active
for prolonged periods of times after mining. Therefore,
one must be aware that if a seismic source has dormant
periods, non-dormant periods need to be included in the
dataset to avoid underestimating the real hazard of the
source. Active and dormant time periods can usually be
detected using magnitude time history and ASTH
analyses.
One of the underlying assumptions behind the hazard
forecasting philosophy is that past seismicity at a source
can be used to estimate future seismicity, provided that a
similar failure process is occurring within that source.
Stress changes due to mining being generally one of the
key drivers of rock mass failure, it is common for seis-
mic sources to become dormant when there is no mining
and therefore no change in stresses near the source.
Nevertheless, stresses may be ‘‘locked-in’’ a fault system,
and fault slip failure mechanisms can remain active for
extended periods after mining activities in the area has
ceased.
4.2 Seismic Hazard Maps and Peak Particle Velocity
(ppv)
In previous sections, techniques were described to locate
seismic sources, identify failure mechanisms and quantify
the seismic hazard in terms of the largest seismic events
that can be expected from a source. It is assumed that the
maximum event can occur anywhere within the source. It
can be useful to visualise seismic hazards as cluster groups
(Fig. 11 top), by assigning the maximum possible event
magnitude to all points within the cluster (Fig. 11 middle).
At worst, this is a conservative assumption.
Seismic risks must consider not only seismic hazard but
also exposure of people and assets. It is of prime interest to
extrapolate seismic hazard from the sources to the drives
and accesses surrounding seismic sources. If a source is far
enough from any access, the hazard at the source can be
high but the risk to people will be low. A methodology for
extrapolating seismic hazard from the source to mine
accesses has been devised, based on a near-field ground
motion scaling law, that relates seismic event magnitude
and peak particle velocity (ppv) as a function of the dis-
tance from the source. A widely used relation (Kaiser et al.
1996) is proposed to calculate the ppv at a distance ‘r’ from
the source:
123
902 M. Hudyma, Y. H. Potvin

Fig. 9 An example of an
Apparent Stress Time History
(ASTH) chart where the
Apparent Stress Frequency was
a good indicator of high seismic
hazard

event that may occur at a location, scaled for distance

(Fig. 11 bottom).

5 Seismic Hazard and Rockburst Damage Potential

Only a small fraction of all seismic events in mines result in

Fig. 10 Comparison of the largest recorded events and the largest
predicted events based on the x intercept of frequency–magnitude
graphs
PPV ¼ 1:4  10Mr =2 =r
where:
• PPV is the peak particle velocity (in m/s) at a distance r
from the source of the seismic event.
• Mr is the magnitude of the seismic event on the Richter
scale.
• r is the distance (in metres) from the seismic event to
the location where the PPV is to be estimated.
As an output, mine plans can be ‘‘painted’’ in colour
according to the maximum expected ppv associated with a
seismic source, or painted according to the equivalent
seismic hazard, which is the equivalent largest seismic
visible rockmass damage. In general, an event needs to be
greater than a certain magnitude to potentially cause damage.
The event also needs to be in relatively close proximity to the
excavation. Therefore, there is a magnitude and distance
relationship between the event and damage. There are other
factors related to the local excavation, the rockburst damage
mechanism and the vulnerability of the excavation to strong
ground motions. It has been observed that the larger the
excavation the more vulnerable it is to damage. Weaker
ground support systems will make an excavation more sus-
ceptible to damage. Finally, high stress and the presence of
structures in the vicinity of excavations have been observed
to increase their vulnerability to seismic damage.
Heal et al. (2006) proposed an empirical relation to estimate
rockburst damage based on observations from 254 rockburst
damage locations. They proposed an empirical chart relating
ppv at the excavation location and an excavation vulnerability
potential (EVP), as shown in Fig. 12. EVP was empirically
calibrated based four parameters (Heal et al. 2006).
Stress Condition Factor (E1 Þ
EVP =
Ground Support Capacity (E2 Þ
Excavation Span (E3 Þ

Geological Structure (E4 Þ
where:
• EVP, the increasing likelihood of rockburst damage and
damage severity.
• Stress condition factor (E1), the ratio of static stress
condition to rockmass strength around the excavation

123
An Engineering Approach to Seismic Risk Management in Hardrock Mines 903

Fig. 11 Plan view of a stoping area of a mine showing an example of 10 seismic cluster groups (top diagram), also expressed in terms of seismic
hazard of individual sources (middle diagram), and shown as seismic hazard on mine drives (bottom diagram)

123
904 M. Hudyma, Y. H. Potvin

Fig. 12 Empirical chart

relating to ground motion (ppv),
the excavation vulnerability
(EVP) and the potential
rockburst damage. Iso-
probability lines of damage
equal or exceeding R4 are given

Table 2 Rockburst damage

Rockburst Rock mass damage Support damage
scale
damage scale

R1 No rock mass damage or minor No damage to the support system

loose rock dislodged
R2 Minor damage, less than 1 t Support system is loaded, loose in
displaced mesh, plates deformed
R3 1–10 t displaced Some broken bolts
R4 10–100 t displaced Major damage to support system
R5 100? t displaced Complete failure of support system

prior to the seismic event. The higher this factor is, the
more vulnerable the excavation may be to rockburst
damage.
• Ground support capacity (E2), the capacity of the
ground support system to absorb the dynamic loading.
Lower capacity will make the excavation more
vulnerable.
• Excavation span (E3), a larger span will make the
excavation more vulnerable.
• Geological structure (E4), the presence of seismically
active structures such as faults in contact with an
excavation will make it more vulnerable.
The extent of rockburst damage is indicated on the
graph according to a damage scale R1 (no damage) to R5
(total destruction of the support system) which was modi-
fied from Kaiser et al. (1992) (see Table 2).
These tools, including the clustering of seismic events,
seismic parameter analysis, hazard assessment, hazard
mapping and rockburst damage potential assessment have
been programmed into the Mine Seismicity and Risk
Analysis Program (MS-RAP) software (Hudyma 2003)
which allows for real time assessment of seismic hazard
and rockburst damage potential (Potvin 2008).
6 Summary and Conclusion
The management of seismic risk has become an essential
process in many mines operating at depth or in a seismi-
cally active environment. An engineering risk management
approach has been proposed in this keynote, focussing on
the identification and understanding of seismic hazards,
upon which effective risk mitigation measures can be
developed.
In terms of seismic risk, the hazard manifests itself at
seismic sources. This is the location where the rock mass is
submitted to a failure process, generally due to changes in
stress and the presence of geological features that are
conducive to seismicity.
Simple techniques based on microseismic data collected
from high resolution seismic systems can be used to
identify seismic sources and aid understanding of the
failure process. A clustering routine is described to identify

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An Engineering Approach to Seismic Risk Management in Hardrock Mines
seismic sources. The nature of the dominant failure
mechanisms and insight on the level of hazard can be
gained using the following five seismicity parameters
analyses.
• The frequency–magnitude relation of events.
• Magnitude–time history.
• Diurnal charts.
• S:P energy ratio.
• Apparent Stress Time History.
It was shown that the hazard of individual seismic
sources can be quantified in terms of the maximum mag-
nitude of events that can be generated at that source by
assessing the x intercept from the frequency–magnitude
relation. The consequence of such an event can also be
assessed by looking at the potential damage it can cause to
the surrounding excavations. An empirical technique is
given relating the ground motion and the vulnerability of
excavations to the potential rockburst damage. For exca-
vations having an unacceptable probability of experiencing
rockburst damage, a risk mitigation measure must be
applied.
Acknowledgments The authors acknowledge the following spon-
sors of the Australian Centre for Geomechanics research project
‘‘Broadening the Application of Seismic Monitoring in Australian
Underground Mines’’: Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd, Allstate Exploration
Beaconsfield Joint Venture, Barrick Gold of Australia, BHP Billiton
Nickel West, Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile, Harmony
Gold Australia Ltd, Independence Group NL, Kalgoorlie Consoli-
dated Gold Mines Pty Ltd, Kirkland Lake Gold Inc., LKAB Ltd,
Norilsk Nickel Ltd, Minerals and Energy Research Institute of
Western Australia, Newcrest Mining, Newmont Australia, OZ Min-
erals Ltd, Perilya Mines NL, Xstrata Copper, and Xstrata Zinc.
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