University of Santo Tomas

Faculty of Civil Law

Legal and
Judicial Ethics
Questions Asked
More Than Once
(QuAMTO 2016)

*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as

suggested by UPLC and other distinct luminaries in the academe,
and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016
Bar Exams.

*Bar questions are arranged per topic and were selected based on
their occurrence on past bar examinations from 1990 to 2015.
 ACADEMICS COMMITTEE
KATRINA GRACE C. ONGOCO MANAGING EDITOR

REUBEN BERNARD M. SORIANO

ERINN MARIEL C. PEREZ EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MA. NINNA ROEM A. BONSOL

REUBEN BERNARD M. SORIANO

JUAN PAOLO MAURINO R. OLLERO LAYOUT AND DESIGN
JOHN REE E. DOCTOR

QUAMTO COMMITTEE MEMBERS

CALOS LEANDRO L. ARRIERO

ELISE MARIE B. BERTOS
GABRIELA LOUISE O.J. CANDELARIA
WARREN RODANTE D. GUZMAN
MARY GRACE D. LUNA
LEAN JEFF M. MAGSOMBOL
JUAN PAOLO MAURINO R. OLLERO
ANN CAIRA C. SURIO
MARY JANE D. VILARAY

ATTY. AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON

ADVISER
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
LEGAL ETHICS
Practice of Law
Qualifications
Q: Upon learning from newspaper reports that the
bar candidate Vic Pugote passed the bar
examinations. Miss Adorable immediately lodged a
complaint with the Supreme Court, praying that Vic
Pugote be disallowed from taking the oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar because he was
maintaining illicit sexual relations with several
women other than his lawfully wedded spouse.
However, from unexplained reasons, he succeeded
to take his oath as a lawyer. Later, when confronted
with Miss Adorable’s complaint formally, Pugote
moved for its dismissal on the ground that it is
already moot and academic. Should Miss Adorable’s
complaint be dismissed or not? (2004)
A: It should not be dismissed. Her charge involves a
matter of good moral character which is not only a
requisite for admission to the Bar, but also a continuing
condition for remaining a member of the Bar. As such,
the admission of Vic Pugote to the Bar does not render
the question moot and academic. The requirement of
good moral character is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law (In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar
Examinee Haron S. Meling, B.M. No. 1154, June 8, 2004).
Q: Prior to his admission to the freshman year in a
reputable law school, bar examinee A was charged
before the Municipal Trial Court with damage to
property through reckless imprudence for
accidentally sideswiping a parked jeepney. The case
was amicably settled with A agreeing to pay the
claim of the jeepney owner for P1,000.00. In his
application to take the 1997 Bar Examinations, A did
not disclose the above incident. Is he qualified to
take the Bar Examinations? (1997, 2005)
A: Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar”. In the case of In re: Ramon Galang,
66 SCRA 245, the respondent repeatedly omitted to
make mention of the fact that there was a pending
criminal case for slight physical injuries against him in
all four (4) applications for admission to take the bar
examinations. He was found to have fraudulently
concealed and withheld such fact from the Supreme
Court and committed perjury. The Supreme Court cited
the rule that “the concealment of an attorney in his
application to take the bar examinations of the fact that
he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged
crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to
practice law.”
A’s failure to disclose that he had been charged with
damage to property through reckless imprudence in his
application for admission to the bar examinations
disqualifies him. It does not matter that the offense
charged does not involve moral turpitude or has been
amicably settled. When the applicant concealed a charge
of a crime against him but which crime does not involve
moral turpitude, this concealment nevertheless will be
taken against him. It is the fact of concealment and not
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
the commission of the crime itself that makes him
morally unfit to become a lawyer (In re: Ramon Galang,
A.C. No. 1163, August 29, 1975).
Lawyer’s oath
Q: Atty. BB borrowed P30,000.00 from EG to be paid
in six months. Despite reminders from EG, Atty. BB
failed to pay the loan on its due date. Instead of
suing in court, EG lodged with an IBP chapter a
complaint for failure to pay a just debt against Atty.
BB. The chapter secretary endorsed the matter to
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). A
commissioner of the CBD issued an order directing
Atty. BB to answer the complaint against him but the
latter ignored the order. Another order was issued
for the parties to appear before the Commissioner at
a certain date and time but only EG showed up. A
third order submitting the case for resolution was
likewise ignored by Atty. BB. Was Atty. BB justified
in ignoring the orders of the Commission on the
ground that the Commission had no power to
discipline him for acts done in his private capacity?
Why? (2002)
A: Atty. BB is not justified in ignoring the orders of the
Commission on Bar Discipline. In doing so, he violated
his oath of office for disobeying orders of a duly
constituted authority. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. (Rule 1.02; Panganiban v.
Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367)
Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer
To Society
Respect for law and legal processes
Q: Distinguish “Ambulance Chasing” from “Barratry”.
(1993)
A: Ambulance chasing is the lawyer’s act of chasing an
ambulance carrying the victim of an accident for the
purpose of talking to the said victim or relatives and
offering his legal services for the filing of a case against
the person who caused the accident. It refers more to a
lawyer who instigates a victim in a motor vehicle
accident to file a case. Barratry is an offense of exciting
or stirring up suits and quarrels. It is any form of
fomenting suit. Both are improper and unethical acts of
a lawyer.
Q: During the course of his cross-examination, your
client had testified to events and circumstances
which you personally know to be untrue. If his
testimony was given credence and accepted as fact
by the court, you are sure to win your client’s case.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, what
is your obligation to the public? (1994)
A: A lawyer shall not engage in lawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 1.01). A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 1.02).
Q: Atty. Asilo, a lawyer and a notary public,
notarized a document already prepared by spouses
1
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
Roger and Luisa when they approached him. It is
stated in the document that Roger and Luisa
formally agreed to live separately from each other
and either one can have a live-in partner with full
consent of the other. What is the liability of Atty.
Asilo, if any? (1998, 1992)
A: Atty. Asilo may be held administratively liable for
violating Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility – a lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. An agreement between
two spouses to live separately from each other and
either one could have a live-in partner with full consent
of the other, is contrary to law and morals. The
ratification by a notary public who is a lawyer of such
illegal or immoral contract or document constitutes
malpractice or gross misconduct in office. He should at
least refrain from its consummation (In re Santiago, 70
Phil. 661; Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367, In re
Bucana, 72 SCRA 14).
Q: A client refuses to pay Atty. A his contracted
attorney’s fees on the ground that counsel did not
wish to intervene in the process of effecting a fair
settlement of the case. Decide. (2001)
A: Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer shall encourage his clients to
avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement”. If a lawyer should refuse to intervene in a
settlement proceeding, his entitlement to his attorney’s
fees may be affected. However, if he has already
rendered some valuable services to the client, he must
be paid his attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum
meruit, even if it is assumed that he is dismissed.
Efficient and convenient legal services
Q: You are the managing partner of a law firm. A new
foreign airline company, recently granted rights by
the Civil Aeronautics Board at the NAIA, is scouting
for a law firm which could handle its cases in the
Philippines and provide legal services to the
company and its personnel. After discussing with
you the extent of the legal services your law firm is
prepared to render, the general manager gives you a
letter-proposal from another law firm in which its
time-billing rates and professional fees for various
legal services are indicated. You are asked to submit
a similar letter-proposal stating your firm’s
proposed fees. The airline company’s general
manager also tells you that, if your proposed fees
would at least be 25 percent lower than those
proposed by the other firm, you will get the
company’s legal business. How would you react to
the suggestion? (1997)
A: I will emphasize to the General Manager that the
practice of law is a profession and not a trade.
Consequently, I will not propose a lower fee just for the
sake of competing with another firm, because such
practice smacks of commercialism. Moreover, Rule 2.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so
warrant. I will charge fees that will be reasonable under
the circumstances.
True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information on
legal services
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
Q: Atty. Thess Tuazon writes a regular column in a
newspaper of general circulation, as well as legal
articles in a leading magazine. Her by-line always
includes the name of her law firm where she is a
name partner. Would you consider this as improper
advertising? Explain. (1993)
A: I would consider putting the by-line under the name
of her law firm improper. It is an indirect way of
advertising her law firm. Naming her law firm achieves
no other purpose than to inform the public and possible
clientele of the existence of her law firm and of her being
actively engaged in the practice of law. The practice of
solicitation is destructive of the honor of a great
profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It
works against the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar (In re: Tagorda, G.R.
No. 32329, March 23, 1929). This is aimed against the
practice of “cutthroat competition” which is not in
keeping with the principle that the practice of law is a
noble profession and not a trade.
Q: Atty. E has a daily 10-minute radio program billed
as a “Court of Common Troubles.” The program is
advertised by the radio station as a public service
feature for those who seek but cannot afford to pay
for legal advice. Its sponsors include a food
processing company and a detergent manufacturing
firm which share with the radio station the monthly
remuneration of Atty. E. Is there any impropriety in
Atty. E’s role under the above arrangement? (1997)
A: Giving advice on legal matters through the medium of
a newspaper column or radio or television broadcast is
improper. It would involve indirect advertising and
violation of the confidential relation between lawyer and
client (Agpalo, 1992).
Q: A lone law practitioner Bartolome D. Carton, who
inherited the law office from his deceased father
Antonio C. Carton, carries these names:
“Carton & Carton Law Office.” Is that permissible or
objectionable? Explain. (2001, 1996, 1994)
A: Rule 3.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides as follows: “In the choice of a firm name, no
false, misleading or assumed name shall be used; the
continued use of the name of deceased partner is
permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its
communications that the partner is deceased.” Since
Atty. Antonio C. Carton is a solo practitioner, it is
improper for him to use the firm name “Carton & Carton
Law Office”, which indicates that he is and/or was in
partnership with his father. Even if he indicates in all his
communication that his father is already dead, the use of
the firm name is still misleading because his father was
never his partner before. A lawyer is not authorized to
use in his practice of profession a name other than the
one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys.
Q: Facing disciplinary charges for advertising as a
lawyer, Atty. A argues that although the calling card
of his businessman friend indicates his law office
and his legal specialty, the law office is located in his
friend’s store. Decide. (2001)
A: This appears to be a circumvention of the prohibition
on improper advertising. There is no valid reason why
the lawyer’s businessman friend should be handling out
calling cards which contains the lawyer’s law office and
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
legal specialty, even if his office is located in his friend’s
store. What makes it more objectionable is the
statement of his supposed legal specialty. It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill
as a merchant.
Q: Determine whether the following advertisements
by an attorney are ethical or unethical. Write
“Ethical” or “Unethical”, as the case may be, opposite
each letter and explain.
1. A calling card, 2x2 in size, bearing his name in
bold print, office, residence and e-mail address,
telephone and facsimile numbers.
2. A business card, 3’’x4’’ in size, indicating the
aforementioned data with his photo, 1’’x1’’ in
size. (2002)
A:
1. Ethical – A lawyer, in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts
(Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 3). For
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with
the dignity of the legal profession. If made in a
modest and decorous manner, it would bring no
injury to the lawyer or to the bar (Warvelle, Legal
Ethics, p.55).
2. Unethical – The size of the card and the inclusion of
the lawyer’s photo in it smacks of commercialism. It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents or skill as a merchant.
Q: Determine whether the following advertisements
by an attorney are ethical or unethical. Write
“Ethical” or “Unethical”, as the case may be, opposite
each letter and explain:
1. A pictorial press release in a broadsheet
newspaper made by the attorney showing him
being congratulated by the president of a client
corporation for winning a multi-million damage
suit against the company in the Supreme Court.
2. The same Press release made by his client in a
tabloid.
3. A small announcement in BALITA, a tabloid in
Filipino that the attorney is giving free legal
advice for (the indigent within the month of)
September 2002. (2002)
A:
1. Unethical – A lawyer should not resort to indirect
advertisements such as procuring his photograph to
be published in a newspaper in connection with a
case he is handling. He should not pay or give
something of value to representatives of mass media
in anticipation of, or return for, publicity to attract
legal business (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Rule 3.04).
2. Ethical – The lawyer can no longer be held
responsible for the action of his client. However, it
would be unethical if he knew about his client’s
intention to publish and still did nothing to stop it.
3. Unethical – The announcement in a newspaper that
he will give free legal advice to the indigent is a form
of self-praise (In re: Tagorda, G.R. No. 32329, March
23, 1929).
Q: A Justice of the Supreme Court, while reading a
newspaper one weekend, saw the following
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
advertisement.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Competent Lawyer
Reasonable Fee
Call 221-2221
The following session day, the Justice called the
attention of his colleagues and the Bar Confidant
was directed to verify the advertisement. It turned
out that the number belongs to Attorney X, who was
then directed to explain to the court why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with for the improper
advertisement. Attorney X, in his answer, averred
that (1) the advertisement was not improper
because his name was not mentioned in the ad; and
(2) he could not be subjected to disciplinary action
because there was no complaint against him. Rule
on Attorney X’s contention. (2003, 1998)
A: The advertisement is improper because it is a
solicitation of legal business and is tantamount to self-
praise by claiming to be a “competent lawyer”. The fact
that his name is not mentioned does not make the
advertisement proper. His identity can be easily
determined by calling the telephone number stated. In
the case of Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378, the
Supreme Court found a similar advertisement to be
improper is spite of the fact that the name of a lawyer
was also not mentioned.
A complaint is not necessary to initiate disciplinary
action against a lawyer. In Sec. 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court, disciplinary action against a lawyer may be
initiated by the Supreme Court motu proprio.
Participation in legal education program
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility
what is the principal obligation of a lawyer towards
the development of the legal system? (2004)
A: A lawyer shall participate in the improvement of the
legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
reform and in the administration of justice (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 4). He shall keep
abreast of legal developments; participate in continuing
legal education programs, support efforts to achieve
high standards in law schools as well as in the practical
training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and jurisprudence (Code
of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5). While the
lawyer’s task in contributing to the improvement of the
legal system is not a matter of strict duty, it is a duty
nonetheless which flows from a lawyer’s sense of his
public responsibility (Pineda, Legal Ethics, p.94).
Q: Atty. Herminio de Pano is a former prosecutor of
the City of Manila who established his own law office
after taking advantage of the Early Retirement Law.
He was approached by Estrella Cabigao to act as
private prosecutor in an estafa case in which she is
the complainant. It appears that said estafa case was
investigated by Atty. de Pano when he was still a
prosecutor. Should Atty. de Pano accept employment
as private prosecutor in said estafa case? Explain.
3
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ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
(1991)
A: Atty. de Pano should not accept the employment as
private prosecutor as he will be violating Canon 6, Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service. The restriction against a public official
using his public position as a vehicle to promote or
advance his tenure in certain matters which (he)
intervened as a public official.
Q: Prosecutor Coronel entered his appearance on
behalf of the State before a Family Court in a case for
declaration of nullity of marriage, but he failed to
appear in all the subsequent proceedings. When
required by the Department of Justice to explain, he
argued that the parties in the case were ably
represented by their respective counsels and that
his time would be better employed in more
substantial prosecutorial functions, such as
investigations, inquests and appearances in court
hearings. Is Atty. Coronel’s explanation tenable?
(2006)
A: Atty. Coronel’s explanation is not tenable; the role of
the State’s lawyer in nullification of marriage cases is
that of protector of the institute of marriage (Family
Code, Art. 48). “The task of protecting marriage as an
inviolable social institute requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro forma compliance”
(Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 355 SCRA 285). This role could not
be left to the private counsels who have been engaged to
protect the private interest of the parties. The primary
duty of a public prosecutor is not to convict but to see to
it that justice is done (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Rule 6.01).
To the Legal Profession
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule 139-A)
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is the principal obligation of a lawyer towards:
the legal profession and the Integrated Bar? (2004)
A: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities
of the integrated bar (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 7).
Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional
colleagues
Q: After the pre-trial Atty. Hans Hilado, counsel for
plaintiff Jennifer Ng, persuaded defendant Doris Dy
to enter into a compromise agreement with the
plaintiff without the knowledge and participation of
defendant’s counsel, Atty. Jess de Jose. Doris acceded
and executed the agreement. Therein Doris
admitted her obligation in full and bound herself per
annum in ten (10) equal monthly installments. The
compromise agreement was approved by the court.
Realizing that she was prejudiced, Doris Dy filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Hilado
alleging that the latter prevented her from
consulting her lawyer Atty. De Jose when she
entered into the compromise agreement, thereby
violating the rule of professional conduct, Atty.
Hilado countered that Doris Dy freely and voluntary
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
entered into the compromise agreement which in
fact was approved bythe court. Did Atty. Hans Hilado
commit malpractice and grave misconduct as a
lawyer? Explain. (1995)
A: Atty. Hilado committed an act of malpractice. Rule
8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that “a lawyer shall not directly or indirectly encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer.”
To maintain the dignity of the legal profession, lawyers
must conduct themselves honorably, fairly and candidly
toward each other. A lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of controversy with a
party represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should only deal with his counsel. Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Ethics provides that a lawyer
should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
a controversy with a party represented by a counsel;
much should he undertake to negotiate or compromise
the matter with him, but should deal only with his
counsel. Under similar facts the lawyer concerned was
suspended for committing acts constituting malpractice
and grave misconduct (Likong v. Lim, 235 SCRA 414).
Q: May a lawyer give a proper advice and assistance
to a client of another lawyer? Support your answer.
(2001)
A: It is highly unethical for a lawyer to exert efforts
directly or indirectly to encroach upon the professional
employment of another. A person without a retained
lawyer is a legitimate prospective client for any lawyer
whom he approaches for legal services. But, as soon as
he had retained one, and had not dismissed the retained
counsel, efforts on the part of another lawyer to take
him as client constitutes an act of encroaching upon the
employment of another lawyer. However, any person
who seeks relief against an unfaithful or neglectful
lawyer may approach another lawyer for proper advice
and assistance. Any advice or assistance extended after
proper verification is not encroaching upon the business
of another lawyer for such act is justified under the
circumstances (Pineda, Legal Ethics, p. 132).
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is the principal obligation of a lawyer towards
his professional colleagues? (2004)
A: “A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel” (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 8).
Q: Atty. Y, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision rendered by the NLRC, alleged that there
was connivance of the NLRC Commissioners with
Atty. X for monetary considerations in arriving at
the questioned Decision. He insulted the
Commissioners for their ineptness in appreciating
the facts as borne by the evidence presented.
Atty. X files an administrative complaint against
Atty. Y for using abusive language.
Atty. Y posits that as lawyer for the down-trodden
laborers, he is entitled to express his righteous
anger against the Commissioners for having cheated
them; that his allegations in the Motion for
Reconsideration are absolutely privileged; and that
proscription against the use of abusive language
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
does not cover pleadings filed with the NLRC, as it is
not a court, nor are any of its Commissioners
Justices or Judges.
Is Atty. Y administratively liable under the Code of
Professional Responsibility? Explain. (2010)
A: Atty. Y “has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is
administratively liable. A lawyer shall not in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise inproper” (CPR, Rule 8.01). A
lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behaviour before the courts (CPR,
Rule 11.03).
In the case of Johnny Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (507
SCRA 465), which involves the same facts, the Supreme
Court held that the argument that the NLRC is not a
court, is unavailing. The lawyer remains a member of the
Bar, an “oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty
is not to his client but to the administration of justice
and whose conduct ought to be and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics.”
The Supreme Court also held that the argument that
labor practitioners are entitled to some latitude of
righteous anger is unavailing. It does not deter the Court
from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers
who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard
expected of them as members of the Bar.
Q: Myrna, petitioner for a case for custody of
children against her husband, sought advice from
Atty. Mendoza whom she met at a party. She
informed Atty. Mendoza that her lawyer, Atty. Khan,
has been charging her exorbitant appearance fees
when all he does is move for postponement which
have unduly delayed the proceedings; and that
recently, she learned that Atty. Khan approached
her husband asking for huge amount in exchange for
the withdrawal of her Motion for Issuance of Hold
Departure Order so that he and his children can
leave for abroad. What should Atty. Mendoza do
about the information relayed to him by Myrna that
Atty. Khan approached her husband with an
indecent proposal? (2006)
A: Atty. Mendoza can advise her to terminate the service
of Atty. Khan and/or file an administrative case against
Atty. Khan. It is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaith or neglectful counsel (Code
of Professional Responsibility, Rule 8.02).
No assistance in unauthorized practice of law
Q: You had just taken your oath as a lawyer. The
secretary to the president of a big university offered
to get you as the official notary public of the school.
She explained that a lot of students lose their
Identification Cards and are required to secure an
affidavit of loss before they can be issued a new one.
She claimed that this would be very lucrative for
you, as more than 30 students lose their
Identification Cards every month. However, the
secretary wants you to give her one-half of your
earnings there from. Will you agree to the
arrangement? Explain. (2005)
A: No, I will not agree. Rule 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal service
with persons not licensed to practice law “. The
secretary is not licensed to practice law and is not
entitled to a share of the fees for notarizing affidavits,
which is a legal service.
Q: The Supreme Court suspended indefinitely Atty.
Fernandez from the practice of law for gross
immorality. He asked the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge of his town if he can be appointed
counsel de oficio for Tony, a childhood friend who is
accused of theft. The judge refused because Atty.
Fernandez’s name appears in the Supreme Court’s
List of Suspended Lawyers. Atty. Fernandez then
inquired if he can appear as a friend for Tony to
defend him. Supposing Tony is a defendant in a civil
case for collection of sum of money before the same
court, can Atty. Fernandez appear for him to conduct
his litigation? (2006)
A: Even if Tony is a defendant in a civil case, Atty.
Fernandez cannot be allowed to appear for him to
conduct his litigation; otherwise, the judge will be
violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice
of law.”
To the Courts
Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
Q: In a pending labor case, Atty. A filed a Position
Paper on behalf of his client, citing a Supreme Court
case and quoting a portion of the decision therein
which he stated reflected the ratio decidendi.
However, what he quoted was not actually the
Supreme Court ruling but the argument of one of the
parties to the case. May Atty. A be faulted
administratively? Explain. (2000)
A: Yes, he may be faulted administratively. A lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule
10.02 of the Code of Professional Conduct expressly
provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or
the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not has
been proved. To cite an argument of one of the parties as
a ratio decidendi of a Supreme Court decision shows, at
least, lack of diligence on the part of Atty. A (Commission
on Election v. Noynay, 292 SCRA 254).
Respect for courts and judicial officers
Q: Having lost in the Regional Trial Court and then in
the Court of Appeals, Atty. Mercado appealed to the
Supreme Court. In a minute resolution, the Supreme
Court denied his petition for review for lack of
merit. He filed a motion for reconsideration which
was also denied. After the judgment had become
final and executory, Atty. Mercado publicly criticized
the Supreme Court for having rendered what he
called an unjust judgment, even as he ridiculed the
members of the Court by direct insults and
vituperative innuendoes. Asked to explain why he
should not be punished for his clearly contemptuous
statements, Atty. Mercado sets up the defense that
his statements were uttered after the litigation had
5
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
been finally terminated and that he is entitled to
criticize judicial actuations. Is Atty. Mercado’s
contention tenable? Explain. (1993)
A: Atty. Mercado’s contention is not tenable. While he is
free to criticize the decision itself, he is not at liberty to
call said judgment an unjust judgment and to ridicule
the members of the court. It is one thing to analyze and
criticize the decision itself, which is proper, and it is
another thing to ridicule the members of the court,
which is wrong. The right of a lawyer to comment on or
criticize decision of a judge or his actualizations is not
unlimited. It is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spell
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and judges on the other. A
publication in or outside the court tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit, or to degrade the
courts, destroy public confidence in them or bring them
into disrepute, whether or not there is a pending
litigation, transcends the limits of fair comment. Such
publication or intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the lawyer’s duty to respect the courts.
It is a misconduct that subjects him to disciplinary
action.
Q: When is public comment and criticism of a court
decision permissible and when would it be
improper? (1997)
A: A lawyer, like every citizen, enjoys the right to
comment on and criticize the decision of the court. As an
officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise that right but also to consider it his duty to
expose the shortcomings and indiscretion of courts and
judges. But such right is subject to the limitation that it
shall be bona fide. It is proper to criticize the court and
judges, but it is improper to subject them to abuse and
slander, degrade them or destroy public confidence in
them. Moreover, “a lawyer shall not attribute to a judge
motive not supported by the record or have no
materiality in the case” (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 11.04).
Q: In a petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme
Court, Atty. Dizon alleged that Atty. Padilla, a legal
researcher in the Court of Appeals drafted the
assailed Decision; that he is ignorant of the
applicable laws and that he should be disbarred. Can
Atty. Dizon, in castigating Atty. Padilla, be held liable
for unethical conduct against the Court of Appeals?
(2006)
A: Yes. He can be held liable for lack of respect for the
Court of Appeals. “Decisions are rendered by the courts
and not the persons or personnel who may participate
therein by virtue of their office. It is highly improper and
unethical for counsel to impute the allegations against
Atty. Padilla. Counsel for the petitioner should be
reminded of the elementary rules of the legal profession
regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper
language in its pleading and should be admonished for
his improper references to the researcher of the CA in
his petition. A lawyer should avoid scandalous, offensive
or menacing language or behavior before the courts”
(Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, 329 SCRA 78).
Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
justice
Q: On June 8, 2001, RJ field with the Supreme Court a
petition for prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction, to forestall his removal as chairman and
general manager of the government agency. He
believed he had a fixed term until January 31, 2004,
but there are indications that the new president
would replace him. As he had apprehended, an
Administrative Order was issued by the Chief
Executive on July 2, 2001 recalling RJ’s appointment.
Shortly thereafter, PT was appointed to the position.
On July 3, 2003, RJ filed a motion to withdraw his
petition. On the same day, without waiting for the
resolution of his motion, he filed another petition
with the Regional Trial Court seeking to prevent his
removal as chairman and general manager of the
government agency. On July 8, 2001, his motion to
withdraw the first petition was granted by the
Supreme Court without prejudice to his liability, if
any, for contempt for engaging in forum-shopping. Is
he guilty of forum-shopping? Explain. (2002, 1991)
A: RJ is guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping is a
result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks
a favorable opinion in another or when he institutes two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would
make a favorable decision (Pineda, Legal Ethics, p. 188).
It is clear that RJ’s petition for prohibition was still
pending in the Supreme Court when he filed the same
petition in the Regional Trial Court. He should have
waited first for the resolution of his motion to withdraw
before filing the second petition because he cannot
assume that the motion will be granted.
Q: The Supreme Court issued a resolution in a case
pending before it, requiring the petitioner to file,
within ten (10) days from notice, a reply to the
respondent’s comment. Attorney A, representing the
petitioner, failed to file the reply despite the
extension given by the Court. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for non-compliance with its
resolution. Attorney A timely moved for the
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition,
claiming that his secretary, who was quite new in
the office, failed to remind him of the deadline
within which to file a reply. Resolve Attorney A’s
motion. (2003)
A: Attorney A’s motion is not meritorious. He has
violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer shall not,
after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, led the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so”. His claim that it was the fault of his
secretary is not sufficient. He cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency of his secretary because the latter is not
a guardian of the lawyer’s responsibilities (Nidua v.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581).
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is the principal obligation of a lawyer towards
the administration of justice? (2004)
A: “A lawyer shall not exert every effort and consider his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice” (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 12).
Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
impropriety which tends to influence or gives the
appearance of influence upon the courts
Q: Atty. J requested Judge K to be a principal sponsor
at the wedding of his son. Atty. J met Judge K a
month before. During an IBP-sponsored reception to
welcome Judge K into the community, and having
learned that Judge K takes his breakfast at a coffee
shop near his (Judge K’s) boarding house, Atty. J
made it a point to be at the coffee shop at about the
time that Judge K takes his breakfast. Comment on
Atty. J’s acts. Do they violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility? (2000)
A: Yes, his actions violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 13.01 of the same Code provides that
a lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating
familiarity with judges. Atty. J obviously sought
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judge K by
being at the coffee shop where the latter takes his
breakfast, and is extending extraordinary attention to
the judge by inviting him to be a principal sponsor at the
weeding of his son.
Q: Atty. A is offered professional engagement to
appear before Judge B who is A’s relative, compadre
and former office colleague. Is A ethically compelled
to refuse the engagement? Why? (2001)
A: There is no ethical constraint against a lawyer
appearing before a judge who is a relative, compadre or
former office colleague as long as the lawyer avoids
giving the impression that he can influence the judge. On
the other hand, the judge is required by the Code of
Judicial Conduct not to take part in any proceeding
where his impartiality may be reasonably questioned
(Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.12). Among the grounds
for mandatory disqualification of the judge is if any of
the lawyers is a relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth degree.
Q: Attorney A is the legal counsel of “Ang
Manggagawa,” a labor union whose case is pending
before the Court of Appeals. In order to press for the
early resolution of their case, the union officers
decided to stage a demonstration in front of the
Court of Appeals, which Attorney A, when consulted,
approved of, saying that it was their constitutional
right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of their grievances and for
the speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. Is it
appropriate for Attorney A to give that advice to the
union officers? Explain. (2003)
A: The advice of Attorney A is not proper. In the case of
Nestle’ Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542, the
Supreme Court held that picketing before a court is an
attempt to pressure or influence the courts of justice and
constitutes contempt of court. The duty of advising the
picketers and their leaders lies heavily on their lawyers.
Q: As a defense counsel for the accused in a
sensational case for abduction which the media is
covering, you are fully convinced from the judge’s
actuations that he is biased against your client. You
are asked by the reporters to comment on the
proceedings and the judge’s conduct. How should
you react on the matter? (2003)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
A: I will decline to give any comment. Rule 13.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a
lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for against a party.”
Q: Rico, an amiable, sociable lawyer, owns a share in
Marina Golf Club, easily one of the more posh golf
courses. He relishes hosting parties for government
officials and members of the bench.
One day, he had a chance meeting with a judge in the
Intramuros golf course. The two readily got along
well and had since been regularly playing golf
together at the Marina Golf Club.
a. If Atty. Rico does not discuss cases with
members of the bench during parties and golf
games, is he violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Explain.
b. How about the members of the bench who grace
the parties of Rico, are they violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct? Explain. (2010)
A:
a. Yes. A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with judges (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Rule 13.01). Moreover, he
should refrain from any impropriety which gives the
appearance of influencing the court (CPR, Canon 13).
In regularly playing golf with judges, Atty. Rico will
certainly raise the suspicion that they discuss cases
during the game, although they actually do not.
However, if Rico is known to be a non-practicing
lawyer, there is not much of an ethical problem.
b. Members of the bench who grace the parties of Atty.
Rico would be guilty of violating Sec. 3, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary which provides that “judges shall, in their
personal relations with individual members of the
legal profession who practice regularly in their
court, avoid situations which might reasonably give
rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or
partiality”. It has been held that “if a judge is seen
eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer
who has cases pending in his or her sala, public
suspicion may be aroused, thus tending to erode the
trust of litigants in the impartiality of the judge”
(Padilla v. Zantua, 237 SCRA 670). But if Atty. Rico is
not a practicing lawyer, such suspicion may not be
aroused.
To the Clients
Availability of service without discrimination
- Services regardless of a person’s status
Q: Atty. DD’s services were engaged by Mr. BB as
defense counsel in a lawsuit. In the course of the
proceedings, Atty. DD discovered that Mr. BB was an
agnostic and a homosexual. By reason thereof, Atty.
DD filed a motion to withdraw as counsel without
Mr. BB’s express consent. Is Atty. DD’s motion legally
tenable? Reason briefly. (2004)
A: No. Atty. DD’s motion is not legally tenable. He has no
valid cause to terminate his services. His client, Mr. BB,
being an agnostic and homosexual, should not be
deprived of his counsel’s representation solely for that
reason. A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person
solely on account of the latter’s race, sex, creed or status
of life or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt
of said person (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon
14, Rule 14.01).
Availability of service without discrimination
7
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
- Services as counsel de officio
- Valid grounds for refusal
Q: May a lawyer decline an appointment by the court
as counsel de oficio for an accused because he
believes, and is fully convinced that the accused is
guilty of the crime charged? (1991)
A: A lawyer may not decline an appointment as counsel
de oficio even if he is convinced that the accused is
guilty. It is his obligation to at least protect his rights. He
might even have him acquitted or at least reduce his
penalty depending on the evidence presented during the
trial.
Q: Give three instances when a lawyer is allowed to
withdraw his/her services (2015).
A:
1. When the client pursues an illegal or immoral
course of conduct in connection with the matter he
is handling;
2. When the client insists that the lawyer pursue
conduct violative of these canons and rules;
3. When his inability to work with co-counsel will not
promote the best interest of the client;
4. When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer
renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively
5. When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for
the services or fails to comply with the retainer
agreement
6. When the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public
office; and
7. Other similar cases.
Q: A is accused of robbery in a complaint filed by B. A
sought free legal assistance from the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) and Atty. C was assigned to
handle his case. After reviewimg the facts as stated
in the complaint and as narrated by A, Atty. C is
convinced that A is guilty.
a. May Atty. C refuse to handle the defense of A and
ask to be relieved? Explain fully.
b. In problem (A), if the lawyer is counsel de parte
for the accused and he learns later after
accepting the case and while trial is ongoing that
his client was indeed the perpetrator of the
crime, may the lawyer withdraw his appearance
from the case? Why or why not? (2014)
A:
a. Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not decline to represent
a person solely on account of his own opinion
regarding the guilt of the said person. It is not the
duty of a lawyer to determine whether the accused
is guilty or not, but the judge’s. Besides, in a criminal
case, the accused is presumed innocent, and he is
entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The role of the lawyer is
to see to it that his constitutional right to due
process is observed.
b. He may withdraw his appearance but in accordance
with procedure in Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, Rule 19.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer
who has received information that his client has, in
the course of the representation, perpetuated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call
upon the client to rectify the same, and failing
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
which, he shall terminate the relationship with such
client in accordance with the Rules of Court.”
Q: Atty. Vidal, a semi-retired Metro Manila law
practitioner, has a cattle ranch in the remote
municipality of Caranglan, Neuva Ecija. He attends to
his law office in Manila on Mondays, Tuesdays and
Wednesdays, and spends the rest of the week in his
cattle ranch riding horses and castrating bulls. In a
criminal case pending before the Municipal Trial
Court of Caranglan, the only other licensed member
of the Bar is representing the private complainant.
The accused is a detention prisoner. The judge
wants to expedite proceedings.
a. What must the judge do to expedite
proceedings?
b. If Attorney Vidal is appointed to act as counsel
de oficio for the accused, could he refuse by
saying that in the province, he does not want to
do anything except ride horses and castrate
bulls? Explain. (1993)
A:
a. The judge may appoint Atty. Vidal as counsel de
oficio in order to expedite the proceedings. This is
especially because the accused is a detention
prisoner who is presumed to be indigent and cannot
retain a paid counsel.
b. Atty. Vidal cannot validly refuse the appointment as
counsel de oficio. While it is true that he stays in the
province to rest during the latter part of the week as
lawyer he must comply with his oath to assist in the
administration of justice. Precisely one of the
objectives of the Integrated Bar is to compel all
lawyers in the active practice of law to comply with
their obligation to assist the courts in the
administration of justice.
Q: Should a lawyer accept the losing case in a civil
case. Explain. (1996)
A: A lawyer may not accept a “losing” civil case. Firstly,
his signature in every pleading constitutes a certification
that there is good cause to support it and that it is not
interposed for delay (Rules of Court, Rule 7, Sec. 5).
Secondly, it is the lawyer’s duty to counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec.
20[a]). Thirdly, he is not to encourage either the
commencement or continuance of an action or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause for any corrupt
motive or interests (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20[g]).
Fourthly, he must decline to conduct a civil case or to
make a defense when convinced that it is intended
merely to harass or endure the opposite party or to
work oppression or wrong (Canons of Professional
Ethics, Canon 130). If a lawyer were to accept a bad civil
case, it will either be to exert his best efforts towards a
compromise or, if unsuccessful, to advise his client to
confess judgment.
Q: Would your answer be the same if he is asked to
be counsel for a defendant in a civil case whose
defense is based on falsified documents? If your
answer is different, explain the ethical
considerations for difference. (1991)
A: If the defense in a civil case is based on falsified
documents the lawyer should decline. This is in
compliance with the lawyer’s oath that he should not
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless
false or unlawful cause or give nor consent to the same.
He is obligated not to delay a man’s cause for money or
malice.
Q: When may refusal of a counsel to act as counsel de
oficio be justified on grounds aside from reasons of
health, extensive travel abroad, or similar reasons of
urgency? Support your answer. (2001)
A: Other justified grounds for refusal to act as counsel de
oficio are:
a. Too many de oficio cases assigned to the lawyer
(People v. Daeng, 49 SCRA 222);
b. Conflict of interest (CPR, Rule 14.03);
c. Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work
effectively or competently (supra);
d. Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by reason
of his public office which prohibits appearances in
court;
e. Lawyer is preoccupied with too many cases which
will spell prejudice to the new clients; and
f. Most compelling reasons (People v. Ferred, 406 SCRA
658).
Q: What is a lawyer’s duty if he finds that he cannot
honestly put up a valid or meritorious defense but
his client insists that he litigate? Explain. (2002,
2001)
A: It depends, if it is a criminal case, he may not decline
to represent the accused solely on his opinion regarding
the guilt of said person (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 14.01). The Supreme Court has held
that a counsel de officio has the duty to defend his client
no matter how guilty he perceives him to be (People v.
Nadera, Jr., 324 SCRA 490). But if the case is a civil case,
he should decline to accept the same. In a civil action,
the rules and ethics of the profession enjoin a lawyer
from taking a bad case. The Attorney’s signature in
every pleading constitutes a certification that there is
good cause to support it and that it is not interposed for
delay. It is the Attorney’s duty to counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law.
Q: May lawyer decline a request for the free legal aid
to an indigent accused made by a chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)? Explain.
(2002)
A: Rule 14.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not decline,
except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment
as counsel de officio for as amicus curiae or a request
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its
chapter for rendition of free legal aid.” He may,
therefore, decline such as appointment for “serious and
sufficient cause.” For example, he may decline such
appointment if it will involve a conflict of interest with
another client.
Q: Will your answer be different if the legal aid is
requested in a civil case? (2002)
A: My answer will not be exactly the same, because in a
civil case, the lawyer can also decline if he believes the
action or defense to be unmeritorious. He is ethically
bound to maintain only actions and proceedings which
appear to him to be just and only such defenses which
he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
what is the principal obligation of a lawyer towards
his client (2004)
A: “A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all his dealings and transactions with his client” (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 15).
Privileged communications
Q: A, who is charged in Court with estafa for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by B,
consulted Atty. C about the case with the intention of
engaging his services as defense counsel. Because A
could not afford to pay the fee that Atty. C was
charging him, A engaged the services of another
counsel, Atty. D. At the trial of the case for the estafa
against A, the prosecutor announced in open court
that his next witness was Atty. C, whom he was
calling to the witness stand. Counsel for A, Atty. D,
vigorously opposed the prosecutor’s move on the
ground Atty. C may not be called as witness for the
prosecution as he might disclose a would-be client’s
confidence and secret. Asked by the presiding Judge
what would be the nature of Atty. C’s testimony, the
prosecutor said it has something to do with how A
obtained from B the funds that the latter received
from the former but failed to account for.
Thereupon, Atty. A vigorously opposed the
prosecutor’s motion. If you were the Judge, how
would you rule on the matter? (1999)
A: If I were the judge, I will not allow Atty. C to take the
witness stand. When A consulted Atty. C about his case, a
lawyer-client relationship was established between
them. It does not matter that A did not eventually
engage his services because of his fees; such relationship
has already been created (Hilado v. David,84 Phil 569). A
lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privileged
communication in respect to matters disclosed to him by
a prospective client (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Rule 15.02). The rule on privileged communication
provides that an attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communication made
by the client to him (Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 21 [b]).
The prosecutor has announced that Atty. C will be asked
about how A obtained from B the funds that he failed to
account for. Atty. C’s knowledge of such matter could
have come only from A.
Q: In the course of a drinking spree with Atty.
Holgado who has always been his counsel in
business deals, Simon bragged about his recent
sexual adventures with socialites known for their
expensive tastes. When Atty. Holgado asked Simon
how he manages to finance his escapades, the latter
answered that he has been using the bank deposits
of rich clients of Banco Filipino where he works as
manager. Is Simon’s revelation to Atty. Holgado
covered by the Attorney-client privilege? (2006)
A: Simon’s revelation to Atty. Holgado is not covered by
the lawyer-client privilege. In the first place, it was not
made on account of a lawyer-client relationship, that is,
it was not made for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
In the second place, it was not made in confidence
(Mercado v. Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1). In the third place, the
attorney-client privilege does not cover information
9
concerning a crime or a fraud being committed or
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
proposed to be committed.
Q: Maria and Atty. Evangeline met each other and
became good friends at zumba class. One day, Maria
approached Atty. Evangeline for legal advice. It
turned out that Maria, a nurse, previously worked in
the Middle East. So she could more easily leave for
work abroad, she declared in all her documents that
she was still single. However, Maria was already
married with two children. Maria again had plans to
apply for work abroad but this time, wished to have
all her papers in order. Atty. Evangeline, claiming
that she was already overloaded with other cases,
referred Maria’s case to another lawyer. Maria found
it appalling that after Atty. Evangeline had learned
of her secrets, the latter refused to handle her case.
Maria’s friendship with Atty. Evangeline
permanently turned sour after Maria filed an
administrative case against the latter for failing to
return borrowed jewelry. Atty. Evangeline, on the
other hand, threatened to charge Maria with a
criminal case for falsification of public documents,
based on the disclosures Maria had earlier made to
Atty. Evangeline.
Was the consultation of Maria with Atty. Evangeline
considered privilege?
A: The consultation of Maria with Atty. Evangeline is
considered privileged. The moment the complainant
approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal
advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved
between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the
lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics
of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship
is that which enjoins the lawyer to keep inviolate
confidential information acquired or revealed during
legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the
day not inclined to handle the client’s case is hardly of
consequence. Of little moment too, is the fact that no
formal professional engagement follows consultation.
Nor will it make any difference, that no contract
whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize
the relationship (Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July
3, 2007).
Conflict of interest
Q: Mrs. F, a young matron, was referred to you for
legal advice by your good friend in connection with
the matron’s jewelry business. She related to you the
facts regarding a sale on consignment of pieces of
jewelry to someone she did not name or identify.
Since she was referred to you by a close friend, you
did not bill her for the consultation. Neither did she
offer to compensate you. Six months later, Mrs. G,
the wife of the general manager of a client company
of your law firm, asked you to defend her in a
criminal case for estafa filed by Mrs. F. Would you
agree to handle her case? (1997)
A: First, I will inquire if the case for estafa filed by Mrs. F
against the wife of the general manager is the same
matter concerning which Mrs. F consulted me six
months before. If it is a same matter, I will not be able to
handle the case for the general manager’s wife, because
of a conflict of interests. When Mrs. F consulted me and I
give her professional advice, a lawyer-client relationship
was created between us, regardless of the fact that I was
not compensated for it. It would involve a conflict of
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
interests if I will handle the case for the opposite party
on the same matter (Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 571).
Q: Explain your understanding of “Conflict of
Interests” under the Code of professional
Responsibility. (2009, 1997, 1993)
A: A lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting
interests. There is conflict of interests within the context
of the rule when, on behalf of client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to contend for that which his duty to another client
requires him to oppose. Another test is whether the
acceptance of a new lawyer-client relation will prevent a
lawyer from discharging fully his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to another client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
thereof.
It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one
party against his present client even in a totally
unrelated case. With regard to former client, the
traditional rule is to distinguish between related and
unrelated cases. A lawyer may not represent a
subsequent client against former client in a controversy
that is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject
matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared
for the former client, otherwise, he may. However, in the
case of Rosacia vs. Atty.B. Bulalacao, 248 SCRA 665, the
Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer may not accept a case
against a former client, even on an unrelated matter.
“The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to
his client not in the case in which he has represented
him but also after the relation of attorney and client has
terminated as it is not good practice to permit after-
wards to defend in another case other person against his
former client under the pretext that the other case. It
behoves respondent not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys
which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.”
Q: Atty. Belle Montes is a former partner in the
Rosales Law Office which is representing
Corporation X before the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Atty. Montes who is now practicing on
his own, entered her appearance as counsel for
Corporation Y in a suit between said corporation
and Corporation X. Atty. Montes claims that since
she did not personally handle the case of
Corporation X when she was still with the Rosales
Law Office she will not be representing conflicting
interests. Is such argument valid? Explain. (1992)
A: Atty. Belle Montes will be deemed to be appearing for
conflicting interests if she appears for Corporation Y
against Corporation X.
This question is similar to the case of Philippine
Blooming Mills vs. Court of Appeals. In said case, the
Philippine Blooming Mills was the retainer of the ACCRA
Law Office. Three lawyers of the ACCRA Law Office
separated from said law firm and established their own
law office. The three lawyers were disqualified from
appearing for a corporation against the Philippine
Blooming Mills.
The rule which prohibits appearing for conflicting
interests applies to law firms. The employment of one
member of a law firm is considered as an employment of
the law firm and that the employment of a law firm is
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
equivalent to a retainer of the members thereof.
Q: Primo, Segundo and Tercero are co-accused in
information charging them with the crime of
homicide. They are respectively represented by
Attys. Juan Uno, Jose Dos and Pablo Tres. During the
pre-trial conference, Attys. Uno and Dos manifested
to the court that their clients are invoking alibi as
their defense. Atty. Tres made it known that accused
Tercero denies involvement and would testify that
Primo and Segundo actually perpetrated the
commission of the offense charged in the
information.
In one hearing during the presentation of the
prosecution’s evidence in chief, Atty. Uno failed to
appear in court. When queried by the Judge if
accused Primo is willing to proceed with the hearing
despite his counsel’s absence, Primo gave his
consent provided Attys. Dos and Tres would be
designated as his joint counsel de oficio for that
particular hearing. Thereupon, the court directed
Attys. Dos and Tres to act as counsel de oficio of
accused Primo only for purposes of the scheduled
hearing.
Atty. Dos accepted his designation, but Atty. Tres
refused. Is there any impediment to Atty. Dos acting
as counsel de oficio for accused Primo? Reason.
(2004)
A: There is no impediment to Atty. Dos acting as counsel
de oficio for accused Primo. There is no conflict of
interest involved between Primo and his client Segundo,
considering that both are invoking alibi as their defense.
Q: May Atty. Tres legally refuse his designation as
counsel de oficio of accused Primo? Reason. (2004)
A: Atty. Tres may legally refuse his designation as
counsel de oficio of accused Primo. Since the defense of
his client Tercero is that Primo and Segundo actually
perpetrated the commission of the offense for which
they are all charged, there is a conflict of interests
between Tercero and Primo. There is conflicting
interests if there is inconsistency in the interests of two
or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an
issue or claim but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client (Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 6).
Q: You are the counsel for the estate of a deceased
person. Your wife is a practicing Certified Public
Accountant. She was asked by her client to prepare
and submit an itemized claim against the estate you
are representing. She asks for your advice on the
legal propriety of her client’s claim. What advice
would you give her? Explain. (2003)
A: I would advise her that it will be improper for her to
handle her client’s claim against the estate. As a counsel
for the estate, it is my duty to preserve the estate. Her
client’s claim seeks to reduce the said estate. If she will
handle such claim, I can be suspected of representing
conflicting interests. The interests of the estate and of its
creditors are adverse to each other (Nakpil v. Valdez, 288
SCRA 75). Even if she is a different person, the fact that
she is my wife will still give rise to the impression that
we are acting as one.
Q: You are the lawyer of Mr.”H”, the plaintiff, in a
civil case for rescission of contract. The prospects
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FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
for an amicable settlement look bright. Impressed
by your ability, Mr. “I”, the defendant, would like
very much to retain you as his defense counsel in a
criminal case for homicide through reckless
imprudence. Mr. “I” wants you to forthwith enter
your appearance, the arraignment already having
been scheduled. Would you accept the offer? (1997)
A: It depends. If the criminal case for homicide through
reckless imprudence is against Mr. “H”, I cannot accept
the same for that will involve a conflict of interest,
although it is an unrelated case.
But if it will not involve Mr. “H”, I can accept the same.
However, to avoid suspicion and misunderstanding, it
would be better if I inform Mr. “H” about the offer and
secure his conformity to my handling the same.
Q: Atty. B acted as counsel for C in a civil case. He
also acted as counsel for D against C in another civil
case. When D lost his case against C, he filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. B for conflict
of interests. Decide. (1991)
A: If the case of C in the first case is entirely different
and not related with the case of D against C, there is no
conflict of interests. If the two cases however are related
wherein the attorney has knowledge of the evidence of C
then there is conflict of interests. Rule 15.01 provides
that: A lawyer in conferring with a prospective client
shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the
matter would involve a conflict with another client or
his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client. Rule 15.03 further provides that: A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
Q: The law firm of Sale, Santiago and Aldeguer has
an existing and current retainership agreement with
XYZ Corporation and ABC Company, both of which
were pharmaceutical firms. XYZ Corporation
discovered that a number of its patented drugs had
been duplicated and sold in the market under ABC
Company’s brand names. XYZ Corporation turned to
the law firm and asked it to bring suit against ABC
Company for patent infringement on several counts.
What are the ethical considerations involved in this
case and how are you going to resolve them? (1994)
A: A lawyer may refuse to accept the representation of a
client if he labors under conflict of interests between
him and the prospective client or between a present
client and the prospective client (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 14, Rule 14.03). It is unprofessional
for a lawyer to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after full
disclosure of the fact (Canons of Professional Ethics,
Canon 6). A lawyer cannot accept a case against a
present client either in the same case or in a totally
unrelated case.
Q: Atty. Juan Cruz, a practicing lawyer, was
employed by Pilipinas Bank as its bank attorney and
notary public in three of its branches in Manila.
While thus employed, Maria del Rio, who was
unaware of Atty. Cruz’s employment in the bank,
engaged Atty. Cruz’s services as a lawyer in a case
that was filed by Pilipinas Bank for collection of sum
of money involving one of its branches in Quezon
City which Atty. Cruz accepted. The Quezon City
11
Regional Trial Court, after due proceeding and
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
hearing, rendered judgment in favor of Pilipinas
Bank and against Maria del Rio who wanted to
appeal the adverse judgment. But upon advice of
Atty. Cruz, the adverse judgment was not appealed.
Thereafter, Maria del Rio learned Atty. Cruz was
employed by Pilipinas Bank as one of its attorneys.
She now consults with you and asks you to take legal
steps against Atty. Cruz for his apparent misconduct.
What do you think of what Atty. Cruz did? Is there a
valid and legal basis to discipline him? (2006, 1999)
A: In agreeing to represent Maria del Rio in a case which
Pilipinas Bank filed against her, Atty. Cruz violated the
rule against representing conflicting interests. Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned after a full
disclosure of the facts. It is improper for a lawyer to
appear as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client, even in an
unrelated case (Philippine National Bank v. Cedo, 243
SCRA 1). It does not matter that the Pilipinas Bank
branch in Quezon City is not one of the branches he
services in Manila. The bank itself is his client. This
constitutes malpractice for which Atty. Cruz can be
disciplined.
Q: R is a retained counsel of ABC Bank-Ermita
Branch. One day, his balikbayan compadre B,
consulted him about his unclaimed deposits with the
said branch of ABC Bank, which the bank had
refused to give to him claiming that the account had
become dormant. R agreed to file a case against the
bank with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
B lost the case, but upon the advice of R, he no longer
appealed the decision. B later discovered that R was
the retained counsel of ABC Bank-Ermita Branch.
Does B have any remedy? Discuss the legal and
ethical implications of the problem. (2014)
A: Atty. R clearly violated the rule against representing
conflicting interests (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Rule 15.03). B may file an action to set aside the
judgment on the theory that if a lawyer is disqualified
from appearing as counsel for a party on account of
conflict of interests, he is presumed to have improperly
and prejudicially advised and represented the party in
the conduct of the litigation from beginning to end. He
may also file an action for damages against Atty. R, aside
from an administrative complaint due to his misconduct.
He was prejudiced by the adverse decision against him,
which he no longer appealed upon the advice of Atty. R.
Q: Huey Company and Dewey Corporation are both
retainer clients of Atty. Anama. He is the Corporate
Secretary of Huey Company. He represents Dewey
Corporation in three pending litigation cases. Dewey
Corporation wants to file a civil case against Huey
Company and has requested Atty. Anama to handle
the case. What are the options available to Atty.
Anama? Explain your answer. (1993)
A: The options available to Atty. Anama are:
1. To decline to accept the case because to do so will
constitute representing conflicting interests. It is
unethical for a lawyer to represent a client in a case
against another client in the said case.
2. To accept to file the case against Huey Company,
after full disclosure to both retained clients and
upon their express and written consent. The written
consent may free him from the charge of
representing conflicting interests, because written
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
consent amounts to a release by the clients of the
lawyer’s obligation not to represent conflicting
interests.
Q: If you were Atty. Anama, which option would you
take? Explain. (1993)
A: If I were Atty. Anama, I will choose the first option
and inhibit myself in the case as both entities are my
clients. The conflict of interests between the contending
clients may reach such a point that, notwithstanding
their consent to the common representation, the lawyer
maybe suspected of disloyalty by one client. His
continuing to act in a double capacity strikes deeply in
the foundation of the attorney-client relationship.
Q: Atty. Japzon, a former partner of XXX law firm, is
representing Kapuso Corporation in a civil case
against Kapamilya Corporation whose legal counsel
is XXX law firm. Atty. Japzon claims that she never
handled the case of Kapamilya Corporation when
she was still with XXX law firm. Is there a conflict of
interests? Explain. (2005)
A: There is a conflict of interests when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests. This rule covers not
only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection (Santos vs. Beltran, 418 SCRA 17). Since
Atty. Japzon was a partner of the XXX law firm which has
Kapamilya Corporation as its client, she cannot handle a
case against it as such will involve conflict of interests.
The employment of a law firm is equivalent to the
retainer of the members therof. It does not matter if
Atty. Japzon never handled a case of the Kapamilya
Corporation when she was still with the XXX law firm.
Representation with zeal within legal bounds
Q: Winnie retained the services of Atty. Derecho to
file a collection case against Carmen. Winnie paid
Atty. Derecho a sizeable retainer’s fee which the
latter accepted. Later, in the process of determining
the amount of debt to be collected from Carmen,
Atty. Derecho noticed that of the total claim of 8.5
Million, certain invoices covering 3.5 Million
appeared to be irregular. Winnie while admitting
the irregularity assures her lawyer that there would
be no problem as Carmen was by nature negligent in
keeping her records and would not notice the
mistakes anyway. Atty. Derecho tried to convince
Winnie to exclude the amount of 3.5 Million but
Winnie refused. As a consequence Atty. Derecho
terminated their relationship and withdrew from
the case. Was Atty. Derecho right in terminating
their relationship and withdrawing from the case?
How about the fact that he had already accepted a
sizeable retainer’s fee from his client? Discuss fully.
(1995)
A: Atty. Derecho was right in terminating the lawyer-
client relationship and withdrawing from the case. Rule
22.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer may withdraw his services when the client
pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in
connection with the matter he is handling, or when the
client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
the canons and rules. Rule 15.07 provides that a lawyer
shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws
and the principles of fairness. While he owes his client
warm zeal, it should always be within the bounds of the
law (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 19). The
fact that Atty. Derecho had already accepted a sizeable
retainer’s fee should make no difference on his decision
to withdraw. Moreover, he may retain the fees he has
already received, his withdrawal being justified (Pineda,
Legal & Judicial Ethics, 1994 edition, p. 223), unless the
same is unconscionable.
Fiduciary relationship
Q: A lawyer charged his client P10, 000.00 for filing
fees pertaining to the complaint he filed in court. He
actually spent only P1, 000.00. He did not account
the balance. May his client charge him for
misconduct as a member of the Philippine bar?
Explain your answer. (1990)
A: The client may charge his lawyer with misconduct for
not accounting for the balance on P9, 000.00. It is well-
settled that where the client gives his lawyer money for
a specific purpose, such as to pay the docket fees for the
filing of an action in court, so much of the money not
used for the purpose belongs to the client and the
lawyer holds in it trust for him. And it is the lawyer’s
duty to promptly account for all money received from
his client. For this reason, the lawyer’s failure to account
for the balance of the money not spent for filing fees will
render him liable for misappropriation, which is a
ground for disbarment.
Client’s moneys and properties; Fidelity to client’s cause
Q: C engaged the services of attorney D concerning
various mortgage contracts entered into by her
husband from whom she is separated fearful that
her real estate properties will be foreclosed and of
impending suits for sums of money against her.
Attorney D advised C to give him her land titles
covering her lots so he could sell them to enable her
to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to
execute deeds of sale in his favor without any
monetary or valuable consideration, to which C
agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and
from the proceeds pay her creditors. Later on, C
came to know that attorney D did not sell her lots
but instead paid her creditors with his own funds
and had her land titles registered in his name. Did
attorney D violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Explain. (2009, 2007)
A: The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Hernandez v. Go (450 SCRA 1) is squarely applicable to
this problem. Under the same set of facts, the Supreme
Court held the lawyer to have violated Canons 16 and 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide
as follows:
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client hat may
come into his possession.
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
The Supreme Court further held that the lawyer
concerned has engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
and grossly immoral acts, which might lessen the trust
and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession,
consequently, the Court disbarred him.
Competence and diligence
Q: Attorney M accepted a civil case for the recovery
of title and possession of land in behalf of N.
Subsequently, after the Regional Trial Court had
issued a decision adverse to N, the latter filed an
administrative case against attorney M for
disbarment. He alleged that attorney M caused the
adverse ruling against him; that Attorney M did not
file an opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence filed
in the case, neither did he appear at the formal
hearing on the demurrer, leading the trial court to
assume that plaintiff’s counsel (Attorney M)
appeared convinced of the validity of the demurrer
filed; that attorney M did not even file a motion for
reconsideration, causing the order to become final
and executory; and that even prior to the above
elements and in view of attorney M’s apparent loss
of interest in the case, he verbally requested
attorney M to withdraw, but attorney M refused.
Complainant further alleged that Attorney M abused
his client’s trust and confidence and violated his
oath of office in failing to defend his client’s cause to
the very end.
Attorney M replied that N did not give him his full
cooperation; that the voluminous records turned
over to him were in disarray, and that when he
appeared for N, he had only half of the information
and background of the case; that he was assured by
N’s friends that they had approached the judge; that
they requested him (M) to prepare a motion for
reconsideration which he did and gave to them;
however, these friends did not return the copy of the
motion. Will the administrative case proper? Give
reasons for your answer. (2007)
A: The administrative case will prosper. In failing to file
an opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence and to
appear at the hearing thereof, and, more so, in failing to
file a motion for reconsideration of the order granting
the demurrer, thereby causing the same to become final
and executory, Attorney M violated Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence, and Rule 18.03 which provides that a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall make him
liable.
In refusing to comply with N’s request to withdraw from
the case, Atty. M violated the rule that a client has the
absolute right to terminate the lawyer client
relationship at any time with or without cause.
Atty. M’s defense that the voluminous records turned
over to him were in disarray and when he appeared for
B he had only half of the information and background of
the case, is not meritorious. Rule 18.02 provides that he
shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. He should have been competent and
diligent enough to organize the records given to him,
and not go to trial with only half of the information and
knowledge of the case. It is his duty to go to trial to go to
trial adequately prepared (Code of Professional
13
Responsibility, Rule 12.01).
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
His defense that friends of N assured him that they will
file a motion of reconsideration, which he allegedly did
and gave to them, is incredible. Even if true, Atty. M
violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer shall rely
upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence or gives the
appearance of influencing the court.”
For the matter, even his alleged giving of his motion for
reconsideration to the friends of N for filing is another
instance of negligence on the part of Atty. M. He should
have taken care to file his motion himself (Francisco v.
Portugal, 484 SCRA 57).
Q: What should a lawyer, generally obligated by law
to accept a retainer, do if he knows or should know
that he is not qualified to render the legal service
required? Explain. (2001)
A: “A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he
knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.
However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.” (Code
of Professional Conduct, Rule 18.0)
Competence and diligence; Adequate protection
Q: X was indicted for murder. As he had no counsel
on arraignment, the trial court appointed Atty. A as
his counsel de oficio. When Atty. A asked X what was
his stand, X said he was guilty. X thereupon pleaded
guilty. Trial was thereafter conducted. When the
turn of the defense to present evidence came, Atty. A
manifested that he was not presenting any and that
he was submitting the case for decision, praying that
X’s plea be considered mitigating. Did Atty. A’s
assistance or conduct approximate the competence
and diligence which the Code of Professional
Responsibility expected him? Explain. (2000)
A: No, it is the duty of the defense counsel when his
client desires to enter a plea of guilty to fully acquaint
himself with the facts and surrounding circumstances of
the case, advise his client of his constitutional rights and
the full import of a plea of guilty, see to it that the
prescribed procedure is observed, present evidence,
including possible mitigating circumstances, so that the
precise degree of his client’s culpability is established
and the appropriate penalty is imposed, and thus leave
no room for doubt that there was a mistake and
misunderstanding as to the nature of the charges to
which his client has pleaded guilty. Atty. A has fallen
short of this required conduct.
Q: Christine was appointed counsel de oficio for
Zuma, who aws accused of raping his own daughter.
Zuma pleaded not guilty but thereafter privately
admitted to Christine that he did commit the crime
charged.
a. In light of Zuma’s admission, what should
Christine do? Explain.
b. Can Christine disclose the admission of Zuma to
the court? Why or why not?
c. Can Christine withdraw as counsel of Zuma
should he insist in going to trial? Explain. (2008)
A:
a. Christine should suggest to Zuma that he should
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
plead guilty to the crime as charged. Canon 19, Rule
19.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that, “a lawyer who has received information
that his cliend has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person
or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the cloent to
rectify the same, and failing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such client in
accordance with the Rules of Court.”
b. No, Christine cannot disclose Zuma’s admission to
the court. Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that, “a lawyer shall not, to
the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he
use the same to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.” Christine cannot
disclose the admission without violating the
abovementioned canon. The information disclosed
is in the nature of a privileged communication,
hence, she cannot disclose it to the court without
Zuma’s consent.
c. Christine cannot withdraw as counsel of Zuma. Rule
14.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that, “a lawyer shall not decline to represent a
person solely on account of the latter’s race, sex,
creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion
regarding the guilt of said person.” Despite the
admission of Zuma, Christine cannot withdraw as
Zuma’s counsel because Zuma is still considered
innocent until proven guilty. Further, there may be
mitigating circumstances that Christine may raise as
a defense that is favorable to Zuma.
Q: What steps should first be done by the attorney
before he can endorse or object to his client’s
intention to plead guilty? State your reasons. (2001)
A: It is the duty of the defense counsel to (a) study
thoroughly the record and surrounding circumstances of
the case and determine if there are valid defenses he can
use, (b) confer with the accused and obtain from him his
account of what had happened, (c) advise him of his
constitutional and statutory rights, including
advisability of entering plea bargaining, (d) thoroughly
explain to him the impact of a guilty plea and the
inevitable conviction that will follow, and (e) if the client
still insists on pleading guilty, see to it that the
prescribed procedure necessary to the administration of
justice is strictly followed and disclosed in the court
records.
Negligence
Q: Nene approached Atty. Nilo and asked him if it
was alright to buy a piece of land which Maneng was
selling. What was shown by Maneng to Nene was an
Original Certificate of Title with many annotations
and old patches, to which Nene expressed
suspicions. However, Atty. Nilo, desirous of pushing
through with the transaction because of the high
notarial fee promised to him, told Nene that the title
was alright and that she should not worry since he is
an attorney and that he knew Maneng well. He
notarized the Deed of Sale and Nene paid Maneng
P108,000.00. It turned out that Maneng had
previously sold the same property to another
person. For the injustice done to Nene, may Atty.
Nilo be disciplined? (1998)
A: Yes. Atty. Nilo is guilty of gross negligence in
protecting the interests of his client. A lawyer shall not
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable (Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 18.03).
Worse, he was negligent because he placed his own
interest in receiving a high notarial fee over and above
the interest of his client. As a lawyer, Atty. Nilo owes it to
Nene to exercise his utmost lerning and ability in
maintaining the cause of his client. In the case of
Nadayag v. Grageda, 237 SCRA 202, which involves
similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the lawyer
“should have been conscientious in seeing to it that
justice permeated every aspect of a transaction for
which his services had been engaged, in conformity with
the avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar.”
Q: Due to the number of cases handled by Atty.
Cesar, he failed to file a notice of change of address
with the Court of Appeals. Hence, he was not able to
file an appellant’s brief and consequently, the case
was dismissed. Aggrieves, Atty. Cesar filed a motion
for reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the
appeal and to set aside the entry of judgment on the
ground that he already indicated in his “Urgent
Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal Brief”
his new address and that his failure to file a notice of
change of address is an excusable negligence. Will
the motion prosper? Explain. (2005)
A: The motion will not prosper. It is the lawyer’s duty to
inform the court or to make of record of his change of
address. His failure to do so does not constitute
excusable negligence. The lawyer cannot presume that
the court will take cognizance of the new address in his
motion for extension of time (Philippines Suburban Dev.
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 109). The legal
profession demands of a lawyer that degree of vigilance
and attention expected of a good father of a family (PBC
v. Aruego, CA-G.R. No. 28274, June 18, 1965).
Q: On account of his mistake, is counsel liable to his
client for damages? Explain. (2002)
A: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
make him liable (Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule
18.03). A client who suffers prejudice by reason of his
counsel’s inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his
duty may file an action for damages against him.
However, there must be a showing that had the lawyer
exercised due diligence, the client under the facts and
the law would have succeeded in recovering from the
adverse party or in resisting the claim of the latter.
Duty to apprise client
Q: After reading the decision against his client Jose
Kapuspalad, Atty. Calmante was convinced that it
had a reasonable basis and that he would have
difficulty obtaining a reversal. For this reason, Atty.
Calmante did not appeal. When Jose learned about
the judgment against him, he blamed Atty. Calmante
for not taking a timely appeal and filed an
administrative complaint for negligence against the
latter. Decide the case. (2002)
A: I would rule in favor of Jose Kapuspalad. In Reontoy v.
Ibadlit, 285 SCRA 88, the Supreme Court found a lawyer
to be negligent for failing, first of all, to notify his client
about the adverse decision, and, secondly, for failing to
file an appeal in the belief that such appeal would be
useless. He thus deprived his client of his right to appeal.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
If a lawyer cannot contact his client at once after
receiving the adverse decision, the prudent step for him
to take is to file a notice of appeal, and withdraw it
afterwards if his client should decide against the appeal.
It is the client’s decision whether or not to appeal.
Collaborating counsel
Q: Atty. A discovered his client’s fraud against the
adverse party. What steps should he take so that his
client will secure only that which is legally and
justifiably due him? (2001)
A: “A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he
knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.
However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter” (Rule
18.0 Code of Professional Conduct).
Q: Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, “a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law.” How far, in
general terms, may lawyer go in advocating,
supporting and defending the cause of his client in a
criminal case filed against the latter? (2003)
A: “The right to counsel must be more than just the
presence of the lawyer in the court room or the mere
propounding of the standard questions and objections.
The right to counsel means that the accused is simply
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause of the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by
the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of
the case, his bearing constantly in mind the basic rights
of the accused, his being well-versed on the case and his
knowing the fundamental procedure, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to
counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely
put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation”
(People v. Bernas, 306 SCRA 293, cited in People v. Sta.
Teresa, 354 SCRA 697). However, a lawyer shall employ
only honorable and honest means in the maintenance of
his client’s cause (Rules of Court, Rule 128, Sec. 20).
Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
shall represent his and shall represent his client
with zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights. How far, in general terms, may a lawyer go in
advocating, supporting and defending his client’s
rights and interests? (1997)
A: Rule 19.01 of Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to obtain the lawful objectives of is client. In
championing the cause of his client, a lawyer should
employ only such means are consistent with truth and
honor. He should not go beyond the bounds of the ethics
of his profession.
Client’s fraud
Q: Atty. Bravo represents Carlos Negar (an insurance
agent for Dormir Insurance Co.) in a suit filed by
15
insurance claimant Andy Limot who also sued
Dormir Insurance. The insurance policy requires the
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ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
insured/claimant to give a written notice to the
insurance company or its agent within 60 days from
the occurrence of the loss.
Limot testified during the trial that he had mailed
the notice of the loss to the insurance agent, but
admitted that he lost the registry receipt so that he
did not have any documentary evidence of the fact of
mailing and of the timeliness of the mailed notice.
Dormir Insurance denied liability, contending that
the timely notice had not been given either to the
company or its agent. Atty. Bravo’s client, agent
Negar, testified and confirmed that he never
received any notice.
A few days after Negar testified, he admitted to Atty.
Bravo that he had lied when he denied receipt f
Limot’s notice; he did receive the notice by mail but
immediately shredded it to defeat Limot’s claim.
If you were Atty. Bravo, what would you do in light of
your client’s (Carlos Negar’s) disclosure that he
perjured himself when he testified? (2013)
A: If I were Atty. Bravo, I shall promptly call upon Carlos
Negar, my client, to rectify his perjured testimony by
recanting the same before the court.
Should he refuse or fail to do so I shall then terminate
my relationship with him (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 19, Rule 19.02) stating that with his
having committed perjury he pursued an illegal conduct
in connection with the case (CPR, Canon 22, Rule 22.01).
Since my client Limot refuses to forego the advantage
thus unjustly gained as a result of his perjury, I should
promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so
that they may take the appropriate steps (Canons of
Professional Ethics, Canon 41).
Finally, as part of my duty to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Attorney’s Oath).
I shall file a manifestation with the court attaching
thereto the notice of termination as Limot’s counsel.
Attorney’s fees
Q: What is your understanding of quantum meruit as
attorney’s fees? (1998)
A: Quantum meruit literally means “as much as he
deserve”. It is a measure for the lawyer’s fees in the
absence of a contract, or when the fees stipulated in a
contract are found unconscionable, or when the lawyer’s
services are terminated for a cause. The lawyer is
entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as
much as he has earned. The factors to be taken into
consideration are enumerated in Rule 22 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Q: When is recovery of attorney’s fees based on
quantum meruit allowed? (2014, 2007)
A: Recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum
meruit is authorized (1) when there is no express
contract for payment of attorney’s fees agreed upon
between the lawyer and the client; (2) when although
there is a formal contract for attorney’s fees, the fees
stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable by
the court; and (3) when the contract for attorney’s fees
is void due to purely formal defects of execution; (4)
when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to
finish the case to its conclusion; (5) when lawyer and
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
client disregard the contract for attorney’s fees
(Rilloraza v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., 308 SCRA
566).
Q: Mindful that the law is a profession and not a
trade or business, what are the factors must you, as
a lawyer, consider in charging reasonable
compensation for your services? (2014, 1994)
A:
a. The time spent and the extent of the services
rendered or required;
b. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c. The importance of the subject;
d. The skill demanded;
e. The probability of losing other employment as a
result of acceptance of the preferred case;
f. The customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;
g. The amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the services;
h. The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i. The character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and
j. The professional standing of the lawyer (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 20, Rule 20.1).
Q: Cite some of the characteristics of the legal
profession which distinguish it from business
(2015).
A: The primary characteristics which distinguish the
legal profession from a business are:
1. A duty of public service of which emolument is a by-
product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as officer of the court to the
administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to client in the highest degree of fiduciary;
and
4. A relation to colleagues characterized by candor,
fairness and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment
on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients (In Re Sycip, 92 SCRA 1).
Q: Miss Amparo engaged the services of Atty. Rito, a
young lawyer and her former boyfriend, to act as her
counsel in a case. True to his lawyer's oath, Atty. Rito
represented her to the best of his ability even when
he had no opportunity to talk to her on the progress
of the case. When the case was terminated, Amparo
refused to pay Atty. Rito fees on the ground that
there was no written contract of their professional
relationship. Can Amparo justify her action? (1991)
A: Amparo may not justify her refusal to compensate
Atty. Rito for his legal services. An attorney is entitled to
attorney’s fees for services rendered even in the absence
of a contract for attorney’s fees.
Q: If Amparo cannot, upon what basis then may Atty.
Rito be compensated? What are the considerations
to be taken into account? (1991)
A: Atty. Rito has the right to demand attorney’s fees
based on an implied contract and for services rendered.
The determination of the amount of attorney’s fees will
be based on quantum meruit, namely; time spent and
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
extent of services rendered; novelty of the case;
importance of the subject matter; skill demanded;
probability of losing other employment; customary
changes, amount involved; contingency or certainty of
compensation; professional standing and capacity of the
client to pay.
Q: Atty. Chito Sobretodo was retained by Buddy
Capilla to handle his case in the Securities and
Exchange Commission. There is a tax angle so
Sobretodo consulted Atty. Romy Collado, a tax
expert, and for his assistance shared 50% of the
retainer fees with Collado. Is this proper? Explain
your answer. (1990)
A: There is no impropriety in the sharing of attorney’s
fees with tax expert Atty. Romy Collado. This is
delegation of work and not delegation of a case. As long
as Atty. Sobretodo is responsible to his client, Buddy
Capilla, even if he delegated the research work to Atty.
Collado, there is no impropriety in said arrangement.
What is prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility is splitting of attorney’s fees with a non-
lawyer.
Q: A real estate company, elated over the decision in
a case regarding a dispute over a personal matter
between its top sales representative and his
neighbor, gifted Atty. O, who represented its sales
representative in the litigation, with a 240-square-
meter lot in its newly developed subdivision. The
case handled by Atty. O had nothing to do with the
sales representative in the litigation, with a 240
square-meter lot in its newly developed subdivision.
The case handled by Atty. O had nothing to do with
the sales representative’s work for the real estate
company. The latter’s offer of the lot, which Atty. O
accepted, was in consideration of its sales
representative’s being the firm’s number one
salesman. Was there a breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by Atty. O when he
accepted the 240 square-meter lot? (1997)
A: Rule 20.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not, without the full
knowledge and consent of the client, accept any fee,
reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate of
forwarding allowance or other compensation
whatsoever related to his professional employment
from anyone other than the client. “(T)here should be no
room for suspicion on the part of the client that his
lawyer is receiving compensation in connection with the
case from third persons with hostile interest” (Report of
IBP Committee). Even if the secret compensation comes
from a friendly person, if the act is discovered, it is
bound to create dissension in the client-lawyer
relationship. Worse, the lawyer will be able to enrich
himself by receiving more than what is due him as
attorney’s fees (Pineda, 1995).
Q: Discuss the propriety of a lawyer filing a suit
against his client concerning his fees. (1998)
A: Rule 20.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with his clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.” The legal
profession is not a money-making trade but a form of
public service. Lawyers should avoid giving the
impression that they are mercenary (Perez v. Scottish
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Union and National Insurance Co.,76 Phil. 325). It might
even turn out to be unproductive for him for potential
clients are likely to avoid a lawyer with a reputation of
using his clients.
Q: What is “Assumpsit” and when is it proper?
(2006)
A: Assumpsit is an action in common law for the
recovery of damages for the non-performance of a parol
or simple contract (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. 1). The
term has been used in relation to the collection of
attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis. Where the
lawyer has been employed without a contract for his
compensation, he is entitled to recover an amount his
services merit, on the basis of an implied promise by the
client to pay for such services. This has been referred to
as assumpsit on quantum meruit (Quiban v. Robino, 171
SCRA 768).
Contingency fee arrangements
Q: For services to be rendered by Atty. Delmonico as
counsel for Wag Yu in a case involving 5,000 sq.m. of
land, the two agreed on a success fee of P50,000 plus
500 sq.m. of the land. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Wag Yu which became final and
executory. After receiving P50,000, Atty. Delmonico
demanded the transfer to him of the promised 500
sq.m. Instead of complying, Wag Yu filed an
administrative complaint charging Atty. Delmonico
with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Art. 1491(5) of the Civil Code for
demanding the delivery of a portion of the land
subject of litigation.
Is Atty. Delmonico liable under the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Civil Code?
Explain. (2010, 2008)
A: Atty. Delmonico is not guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Civil Code.
He and his client agreed on a success fee of P50,000 plus
500 sq.m. of the land involved in the case that he was
handling. This is a contingent fee contract which is
allowed under Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Ethics. A contingent fee agreement does not
violate Art. 1491 of the Civil Code because the transfer or
assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only
after the finality of a favourable judgment (Director of
Lands v. Ababa, 88 SCRA 513).
Q: Mrs. Amy Dizon’s husband was killed in a traffic
accident. She wants to sue the bus company for
damages but she cannot afford a lawyer. She
approached Atty. Larry Rio who agreed to handle
the case without any retainer’s fee or expenses on
her part, on the condition that in case of recovery of
damages, he shall get 33% of the award by the court.
Is this arrangement valid and permissible? Decide
with reasons. (1990)
A: In the recent case of Angel L. Bautista v. Atty. Ramon A.
Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990, the Supreme
Court held that an agreement as to attorney’s fees which
provides that the lawyer shall defray all the expenses of
the suit, “is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not
17
properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses
of litigation. The Court added that “although a lawyer
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 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the
same should be subject to reimbursement.” And, “an
agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay the
expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is
champertous” and “against public policy especially
where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry
on the action at his own expense in consideration of
some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute.”
The arrangement between Amy Dizon and Atty. Larry
Rio, which provides that the latter will handle the case
without any retainer’s fee or expenses on her part, can
be taken to mean that the lawyer will carry out the case
at his own expense without reimbursement. On the basis
of the foregoing decision of the Supreme Court, such an
arrangement is invalid.
However, the contingent fee contract is not prohibited
by law and is impliedly sanctioned. A contingent fee is
however closely supervised by the court to safeguard
the client from unjust charges, and its validity depends,
in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the
amount fixed under the circumstances of the case. A
contingent fee of 33% of the amount of recovery may be
reasonable if the bus company fights the case until the
Supreme Court and the litigation is hard-fought and long
drawn; it may be unreasonable if the bus company
agrees to compromise. But the fact that a contingent fee
is unreasonable does not preclude the lawyer from
being paid his fees on quantum meruit basis.
Q: What is a champertous contract? (2000)
A: In a champertous contract, the lawyer agrees to
spend for all the litigation expenses in consideration for
a bigger percentage as fees on the property subject of
litigation. It is contrary to public policy and invalid
because it violates the fiduciary relationship between
the lawyer and his client (Bautista v. Gonzales, 182 SCRA
151). In effect, he is investing in the case with the
expectation of making profit. The practice of law is a
profession and not a business venture.
Q: Distinguish between a champertous contract and
a contingent fee contract. (2000, 1999)
A: A contingent fee contract is an agreement in which
the lawyer’s fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may
be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the
success in the effort to enforce or defend the client’s
right. It is a valid agreement. It is different from a
champertous contract in that the lawyer does not
undertake to shoulder the expenses of litigation.
Q: The contract of attorney’s fees entered into by
Atty. Quintos and his client, Susan, stipulates that if a
judgment is rendered in her favor, he gets 60% of
the property recovered as a contingent fee. In turn,
he will assume payment of all expenses of litigation.
Is the agreement valid? (2006)
A: The agreement that a lawyer will assume payment of
all the expenses of litigation makes it a champertous
contract, which is invalid.
Q: Farida engaged the services of Atty. Garudo to
represent her in a complaint for damages. The two
agreed that all expenses incurred in connection with
the case would first be shouldered by Atty. Garudo
and he would be paid for his legal services and
reimbursed for all expenses which he had advanced
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
out of whatever Farida may receive upon the
termination of the case. What kind of contract is
this? (2010)
A: This appears to be a champertous contract, which is
invalid. Atty. Garudo agreed to shoulder all expenses in
connection with the case, and Farida will reimburse him
only out of whatever Farida may receive upon
termination of the case. In other words, Atty. Garudo
will be reimbursed only if he will be successful in
winning the case for Farida. If he is not successful, he
will not be reimbursed. He is, thus, investing in the
outcome of the case.
Q: A inherited a parcel of land situated in Batasan
Hills which is occupied by informal settlers. He
wants to eject the occupants, but he has no financial
means to pursue the ejectment case. He contracted
the services of Atty. B, who agreed to defray all the
expenses of the suit on the condition that he will be
paid one-half (1/2) of the property to be recovered
as his compensation. What is this kind of attorney’s
fees? Can Atty. B enforce this contract against A?
What are the respective remedies relative to the
collection of attorney’s fees, if any, of A and Atty. B
against each other? (2014)
A: This is a champertous fee agreement because Atty. B
agreed to defray all the expenses of the action and will
be paid only if he is successful in recovering A’s
property. Atty. B cannot enforce it because it is contrary
to public policy and the ethics of the legal profession.
The remedy of A is to file an action to have the
agreement declared null and void, or simply to refuse to
pay attorney’s fees to Atty. B on the basis of the said
agreement. On the other hand, Atty. B will still be
entitled to collect attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit
basis. He may bring an action to collect such fees.
Preservation of client’s confidences
Q: Six months ago, Atty. Z was consulted by A about a
four-door apartment in Manila left by her deceased
parents. A complained that her two siblings, B and C,
who were occupying two units of the apartment,
were collecting the rentals from the other two units
and refusing to give her any part thereof. Atty. Z
advised A to first seek the intervention of her
relatives and told her that, if this failed, he would
take legal action as A asked him to do. Today,
September 22, 2002. B asks Atty. Z to defend him in
a suit brought by A against him (B) and C through
another counsel. Should Atty. Z tell B that A
consulted him earlier about the same case? Why?
(2002)
A: Rule 21.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer shall not reveal that he has been
consulted about a particular case except to avoid
possible conflict of interests.” In this case, he has to
reveal to B that he had been consulted by A with respect
to the particular case where B has offered to retain his
services. This revelation should be done in order to
avoid a possible conflict of interests.
Withdrawal of services
Q: Cite at least five (5) valid reasons under any of
which a lawyer may be allowed to withdraw from a
case even without her client’s consent. (1997)
A:
a. When the client pursues an illegal or immoral
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
course of conduct in connection with the matters he
(the lawyer) is handling.
b. When the client insists that the lawyer pursue
conduct violative of these canons and rules.
c. When his inability to work with co-counsel will not
promote the best interest of the client.
d. When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer
renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively.
e. When the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public
office.
f. Other similar cases (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 22.01).
Q: On the eve of the initial hearing for the reception
of evidence for the defense, the defendant and his
counsel had a conference where the client directed
the lawyer to present as principal defense witnesses
two (2) persons whose testimonies were personally
known to the lawyer to have been perjured. The
lawyer informed his client that he refused to go
along with the unwarranted course of action
proposed by the defendant. But the client insisted on
his directive, or else he would not pay the agreed
attorney’s fees. When the case was called for hearing
the next morning, the lawyer forthwith moved in
open court that he be relieved as counsel for the
defendant. Both the defendant and the plaintiff’s
counsel objected to the motion. Under the given
facts, is the defense lawyer legally justified in
seeking withdrawal from the case? Why or why not?
Reason briefly. (2004)
A: Yes, he is justified. Under Rule 22.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may withdraw his
services “if the client insists that the lawyer pursue
conduct violative of these canons and rules”. The
insistence of the client that the lawyer present witnesses
whom he personally knows to have been perjured, will
expose him to criminal and civil liability and violate his
duty of candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Q: Atty. A objects to the collaboration of Atty. B as
proposed by client C in a pending case. How would A,
B and C handle the situation? (2001)
A: A, B and C may handle the situation in the following
manner –
“A” can offer to withdraw his services. Rule 22.01 (c) of
the Code of Professional Responsibility allows a lawyer to
withdraw his services if his inability to work with co-
counsel will not promote the best interest of his client.
Here, by objecting to the collaboration of Atty. B, Atty. A
foresees his inability to work with the former. “A” may
withdraw to give his client a free hand in protecting his
interest.
“B” should refuse to accept the case, otherwise, he may
be encroaching on the professional employment of
another lawyer. A lawyer should decline association as
colleague if it is objectionable to the original counsel, but
if the lawyer first retained is relieved, another may come
into the case (Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 7).
“C” the client must choose only one of the lawyers. If he
wants Atty. B as his lawyer, he should formally
terminate the services of “A” so “B” can formally enter
his appearance in the case.
Q: Atty. X filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance
as counsel for the accused Y after the prosecution
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
rested its case. The reason for the withdrawal of
Atty. X was the failure of accused Y to affix his
conformity to the demand of Atty. X for increase in
attorney’s fees. Is the ground for withdrawal
justified? Explain. (2000)
A: The ground for withdrawal is not justified. Rule 22.01
(e) of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer may withdraw his services when the client
deliberately fails to pay the fees for his services or fails
to comply with the retainer agreement. He has only
refused to agree with the lawyer’s demand for an
increase in his fees. It is his right to refuse; that is part of
his freedom of contract.
Suspension, Disbarment and Discipline of Lawyers
(Rule 139-B, Rules of Court)
Q: D was charged with estafa by C before the
barangay for misappropriating the proceeds of sale
of jewelry on commission. In (the) settlement of the
case, D turned over to the barangay captain, a
lawyer, the amount of P2,000.00 with the request
that the barangay captain turn over the money to C.
Several months passed without C being advised of
the status of her complaint. C contacted D who
informed her that she (D) had long before turned
over the amount of P2,000.00 to the barangay
captain who undertook to give the money to her (C).
C thus filed a case against the barangay captain who
at once remitted the amount of P2,000.00 to C. May
the barangay captain be faulted administratively?
Explain. (2000, 1992)
A: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
lawyers who are in the government service. As a general
rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his office as a government official. However,
if that misconduct as a government official is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to
show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such ground (Dinsay v. Cioco, 264
SCRA 703). In the case of Penticostes v. Ibanez, 304 SCRA
281, a barangay captain who failed to remit for several
months the amount given to him for payment of an
obligation, was found to have violated the Code of
Professional Conduct.
Q: Atty. X was retained by E in a case for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 filed by B before the scheduled hearing.
Atty. X assured B that E would pay the value of the
dishonored check. Elated at the prospect of being
paid, B wined and dined Atty. X several times. Atty. X
convinced B not to appear at the scheduled hearings.
Due to non-appearance of B, the estafa case was
dismissed for failure to prosecute. B, however, was
never paid. Thus, she filed a case for disbarment
against Atty. X. (1996)
A: Yes, the conduct of Atty. S constitutes malpractice. A
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to not do
any falsehood or be misled or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice. He owes loyalty to his client. In a
case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court found
that the lawyer concerned obstructed the administration
of justice and suspended him for two years (Cantorne v.
Ducusin 57 Phil. 20).
Q: Atty. Walasunto has been a member of the
19
Philippine Bar for twenty (20) years but has never
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
plied his profession as a lawyer. His sole means of
livelihood is selling and buying real estate. In one of
his transactions as a real estate broker, he issued a
bouncing check. He was criminally prosecuted and
subsequently convicted for violating B.P. Blg. 22. In
the disbarment proceedings filed against him, Atty.
Walasunto contended that his conviction for B.P. Blg.
22 was not a valid ground for disciplinary action
against a member of the bar. He further argued that
his act in issuing the check was done in relation to
his calling as a real estate broker and not in relation
to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer. Are the
contentions of Atty. Walasunto meritorious or not?
Reason. (2004)
A: No. His contentions are not meritorious. In the first
place, a ground for disbarment is conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude (Rules of Court, Rule 138,
Sec.27), and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is considered to
be a crime involving moral turpitude (People v. Tuanda,
181 SCRA 692). In the second place, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.” Additionally, Rule 1.01
of the same Code provides that “a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.”
Q: Atty. N. had an extramarital affair with O, a
married woman, as a result of which they begot a
child P and undertook to support him. On the basis
of the admission, is Atty. N. subject to disciplinary
action by the Supreme Court? Why? (2002)
A: In the case of Tucay v. Tucay, 318 SCRA 229, the
Supreme Court held that the finding that a lawyer had
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman
is a “grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession.”
Q: Atty. BB borrowed P30,000.00 from EG to be paid
in six months. Despite reminders from EG, Atty. BB
failed to pay the loan on its due date. Instead of
suing in court, EG lodged with an IBP chapter a
complaint for failure to pay a just debt against Atty.
BB. The chapter secretary endorsed the matter to
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). A
commissioner of the CBD issued an order directing
Atty. BB to answer the complaint against him but the
latter ignored the order. Another order was issued
for the parties to appear before the Commissioner at
a certain date and time but only EG showed up. A
third order submitting the case for resolution was
likewise ignored by Atty. BB. May disciplinary action
be taken against Atty. BB for his failure to pay the
loan? Why? (2002)
A: In the case of Toledo v. Abalos, 315 SCRA 419, the
Supreme Court held that a lawyer may not be disciplined
for failure to pay her loan obligation. The remedy is to
file an action for collection against her in the regular
courts. However, unwarranted obstinacy in evading the
payment of a debt has been considered as gross
misconduct (Constantino v. Saludares, 228 SCRA 233). A
lawyer is obligated to promote respect for legal
processes. These include order of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP. (The lawyer’s oath likewise
says: “I will obey the duly constituted authorities.”)
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
Q: State, with a brief explanation, whether the
lawyer concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct
stated below:
1. Filing a complaint that fails to state a cause of
action, thereby resulting in the defendant
succeeding in his motion to dismiss.
2. A suspended lawyer working as an independent
legal assistant to gather information and secure
documents for other lawyers during the period
of his suspension.
3. A suspended lawyer allowing his non-lawyer
staff to actively operate his law office and
conduct business on behalf of clients during the
period of suspension.
4. Keeping money he collected as rental from his
client’s tenant and remitting it to the client when
asked to do so.
5. Refusing to return certain documents to the
client pending payment of his attorney’s fees.
6. An unwed female lawyer carrying on a
clandestine affair with her unwed male
hairdresser.
7. Not paying the annual IBP dues. (2008)
A:
1. Yes. Rule 18.02 states that, “a lawyer shall not
handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.” A lawyer should have exercised
diligence and made adequate preparations to
ascertain that the complaint stated a cause of action
to prevent the dismissal of the complaint.
2. Yes. Under the law, only lawyers in good standing
can perform or engage in the practice of law. A
suspended lawyer is temporarily prohibited to
practice the legal profession therefor he cannot
engage in the mentioned acts.
3. Yes. Rule 9.01 states that, “a lawyer shall not
delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by
a member of the bar in good standing.”
4. Yes. Rule 16.01 provides that, “a lawyer shall
account for all monney or property collected or
received for or from the client.” A lawyer should
account for all money he collected immediately. He
should not wait that the client would ask or demand
for the money.
5. No. Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court states
that, “an attorney shall have a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client which have
lawfully come into his possession and may retain
the same until his lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof.” Hence, he may keep the
documents pending payment of his attorney’s fees.
6. No. Both parties are of age and qualified to marry
each other hence the affair is not one which is
grossly immoral. It is not so corrupt nor so
unprincipled to warrant sanction from the court.
7. Yes. Default payment of IBP dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership to the IBP
and default in payment for one year shall warrant
for the removal of the member in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Canons of Professional Ethics
Q: In the course of a judicial proceeding, a conflict
opinion as to a particular legal course of action to be
taken arose between AB and CD, two (2) lawyers
hired by Mr. XX, a party-litigant, to act jointly as his
counsel. How should such problem be resolved, and
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
whose opinion should prevail? What can AB, the
lawyer whose opinion was not followed, do when
she honestly believes that the opinion of CD, the
other counsel, is not a legally and factually well-
grounded as her opinion is? Explain briefly. (2004)
A: “When lawyers jointly associated in a cause cannot
agree as to any matter vital to the interest of the client,
the conflict of opinion should be frankly stated to him
for his final determination. His decision should be
accepted unless the nature of the difference makes it
impracticable for the lawyer whose judgment has been
overruled to cooperate effectively. In this event, it is his
duty to ask the client to relieve him (Canon of
Professional Ethics, Canon 7).
Q: M has a pending case for collection of sum of
money. He is not satisfied with his lawyer N, who
almost always goes to court evidently unprepared.
He wants you to promptly take over the case. You
agree to handle the case. What steps must you take
to formalize the engagement? (1997)
A: I will ask M to first terminate or secure the
withdrawal of N as his counsel. If N’s services are
terminated, I can subsequently enter my appearance as
the new counsel of M. If he agrees to withdraw
simultaneously with my appearance, I will prepare a
substitution of attorney to be filed in court, containing
the written conformities of M and N.
Q: Atty. A’s client filed a case against Atty. B’s client
for pirating the book of A’s client. A’s client is a
friend of B. A filed a disbarment complaint against B
for convincing A’s client to settle the case. Decide.
(2001)
A: The complaint shall prosper. A lawyer should not in
any way communicate upon the subject of controversy
with a party represented by counsel, much less should
he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
with him, but should deal only with his counsel (Canons
of Professional Ethics, Canon 9; Likong v. Atty. Lim, A.C.
No. 3149, August 17, 1994).
Q: As a rule, why should an attorney not testify as a
witness for his client? (2001, 1993)
A: “The underlying reason for the impropriety of a
lawyer acting in such dual capacity lies in the difference
between the function of a witness and that of an
advocate. The function of a witness is to tell the facts as
he recalls them in answer to questions. The function of
an advocate is that of a partisan. It is difficult to
distinguish between the zeal of an advocate and the
fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness. The
lawyer will find it hard to disassociate his relation to his
client as an attorney and his relation to the party as a
witness.” (Agpalo)
Q: While Atty. Ambo Lancia was on his way to office
in Makati, he chanced upon a vehicular accident
involving a wayward bus with a small Kia whose
driver, Mr. Malas, suffered serious physical injuries.
Coming to the succor of the badly injured Mr. Malas,
Atty. Lancia drove him to the nearest hospital. On
their way to the hospital, Mr. Malas found out that
Atty. Lancia was a practicing lawyer. In gratitude for
his help, Mr. Malas retained Atty. Lancia to file suit
against the bus company and its driver. If you were
Atty. Lancia; would you accept the case? (1994)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
A: I will not accept the case if I were Atty. Lancia because
it is difficult to dismiss the suspicion that Atty. Lancia
had assisted Mr. Malas for the purpose of soliciting legal
business. It is not clear from the facts how Mr. Malas
learned that Atty. Lancia was a practicing lawyer. This
could have happened only if Atty. Lancia introduced
himself as a lawyer. Moreover, Atty. Lancia may be
utilized as a witness.
Q: Lawyer U, a retired Tanodbayan prosecutor, now
in the private practice of law entered his appearance
for and in behalf of an accused in a case before the
Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved for his
disqualification on the ground that he (had) earlier
appeared for the prosecution in the case and is
knowledgeable about the prosecution’s evidence,
both documentary and testimonial. U contented that
he merely appeared at the arraignment on behalf of
the prosecutor assigned to the case who was absent
at that time. Decide. (1991)
A: Canon 36 provides that a lawyer, having once held
public office or having been in public employ, should
not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ. The
contention of U that he merely appeared at the
arraignment on behalf of the absent prosecutor is not
enough. As a former Tanodbayan prosecutor, he
certainly had occasion to obtain knowledge about the
prosecution’s evidence.
Q: Atty. Cua wins a case involving a donation mortis
causa. Afterwards, she discovers, and is convinced,
that the Deed of Donation was falsified, and that it
was her client who did the falsification. If you were
Atty. Cua, what would you do? Explain. (1993)
A: If I were Atty. Cua, I would resign as his lawyer. The
question as to whether the attorney should disclose the
falsification to the court or to the prosecuting attorney
involves a balancing of loyalties. One ethical rule states
that “counsel upon the trial of a case in which perjury
has been committed owes it to the profession and the
public to bring the matter to the knowledge of the
prosecuting authorities”. Another ethical rule provides
that when “a lawyer discovers that some fraud or
deception has been practiced, which is unjustly imposed
upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to rectify
it; at first by advising his client, and if his client refuses
to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should
promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so
that they may take appropriate steps”. A literal
application of these ethical injunctions requires the
disclosure of the falsification. On the other hand, the
attorney’s duty to keep inviolate the client’s confidence
demands that he refrain from revealing the client’s
wrongdoing, the same being a past offense. Resigning as
a lawyer will enable the lawyer to observe such
loyalties. If the decision is already final, as a lawyer, I
would advise my client to withdraw any claim on the
donation mortis causa and have the property be given to
the rightful owner of the property in subject matter of
the donation.
This action is in compliance with my duty as a lawyer to
assist in the administration of justice and in compliance
of my oath: “I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
21
doing of any in court; that I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false and/or unlawful
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same”.
Q: Atty. Hermano requested his fraternity brother,
Judge Patron, to introduce him to Judge Apestado,
before whom he has a case that had been pending
for sometime. Judge Patron, a close friend of Judge
Apestado, acceded to the request, telling the latter
that Atty. Hermano is his fraternity “brod” and that
Atty. Hermano simply wanted to ask for advice on
how to expedite the resolution of his case. They met,
as arranged, in the fine dining restaurant of a five-
star hotel. Atty. Hermano hosted the dinner.
Did Atty. Hermano, Judge Patron and Judge Apestado
commit any ethical/administrative violation for
which they can be held liable? (2013)
A: Yes, the three (3) of them committed
ethical/administrative violations for which they can be
held liable.
For hosting the dinner, Atty. Hermano acted in
contravention of ethical standards. A lawyer should
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence
or give the appearance of influencing the court (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 13). A lawyer shall not
extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor
seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with judges
(CPR, Canon 13, Rule 13.01). Marked attention and
unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge,
uncalled for by the personal relations on the parties,
subject both the judge and the lawyer to
misconstruction of motive and should be avoided
(Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 3, 2nd par., 1st
sentence). Even if the purpose of the meeting was merely
to “ask advice on how to expedite the resolution of his
case,” Atty. Hermano still acted outside of the bounds of
ethical conduct. This is so because a lawyer deserves
rebuke and denunciation for any advice or attempt to
gain from a judge special personal consideration or
favor (CPE, Canon 3, 2nd par., 2nd sentence).
Both Judge Patron and Judge Apestado may be held
liable for having the dinner meeting with Atty. Hermano.
Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer (New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, Canon 2, Sec. 1). Judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities (New Code of Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, Canon 4, Sec. 1). Their having dinner with Atty.
Hermano, a practicing lawyer, could be construed as
appearance of impropriety.
Judge Patron for having allowed himself to be used as a
“bridge” by Atty. Hermano, his fraternity “brod”, to meet
with Judge Apestado exhibited judicial misconduct in the
following manner: Judges shall refrain from influencing
in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court (New Code of Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, Canon 1, Sec. 3). Furthermore, in
allowing Atty. Hermano to take advantage of his
fraternity bond, Judge Patron allowed the use of the
prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests
of others, conveyed or permitted his fraternity “brod” to
convey the impression that he is in a special position to
influence the judge (New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, Canon 1, Sec. 4, 2nd sentence).
The specific violations of Judge Apestado were
committed when he allowed himself to be convinced by
Judge Patron to have the dinner meeting with Atty.
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
Hermano to discuss how the case may be expedited. In
performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent
from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which
the judge is obliged to make independently (New Code of
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Canon 1, Sec. 2).
Finally, in having a dinner meeting with Atty. Hermano
who has a pending case with his sala, Judge Apestado
has exhibited an appearance of impropriety in his
activities (New Code of Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, Canon 4, Sec. 1).
JUDICIAL ETHICS
Q: The Code of Professional Responsibility is to
lawyers, as the Code of Judicial Conduct is to
members of the bench. How would you characterize
the relationship between a judge and a lawyer?
Explain. (1996)
A: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires
lawyers to observed and maintain respect for the
Judicial Officers (Canon 11). On the other hand, the Code
of Judicial Conduct requires judges to be patient,
attentive and courteous to lawyers (Rule 3.03). In a
word, lawyers and judges owe each other mutual
respect and courtesy.
Qualities
Q: What qualities should an ideal judge possess
under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary? (2007)
A: The qualities required of judges by the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary are
Independence (Canon 1), Integrity (Canon 2),
Impartiality (Canon 3), Propriety (Canon 4), Equality
(Canon 5), and Competence and Diligence (Canon 6).
Q: Would it be proper for the judge to accept a
donation of a lawyer’s table and chairs for his sala
from the local chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP)? Explain your answer. (1990)
A: It would be proper for the judge to accept the
donation of a lawyer’s table and chairs for his sala from
the local chapter of the IBP because the donation comes
from an organization of lawyers whose duty, among
others, is to help in the proper administration of justice.
Accepting the donation is not for the personal benefit of
the judge but for providing physical facilities for the
administration of justice, which is the concern by both
the judge and the IBP local chapter. What is prohibited is
accepting presents or donations from the litigants or
from particular lawyers practicing before him.
Q: May a judge properly solicit for his promotion the
endorsement of the local chapter of the IBP to the
judicial and bar council? Explain your answer.
(1990)
A: A judge may not properly solicit for his promotion the
endorsement of the local chapter of the IBP to the
judicial and bar council because it will give the
impression that his promotion is not purely on merits,
and the judge may feel beholden to the particular
officers of the local chapter which may, in the future,
influence him in the disposition of the cases handled by
such officers as counsel litigants. Moreover, considering
his position, the local chapter officers may not be able to
refuse such solicitations even if they believed that he is
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
not qualified for promotion. The judge should stand by
his own ability, qualifications and fitness, without
exerting extra effort on his part to influence the local
chapter to endorse his promotion. The local chapter
should, on its own and without solicitation from the
judge, make its own assessment and appraisal of the
judge’s qualifications and fitness for promotion, and if it
is convinced that the judge possesses the required
qualifications, it is the duty of the local chapter to make
known such assessment to the Judicial and Bar Council.
Q: Pending before the sala of Judge Magbag is the
case of CDG versus JQT. The legal counsel of JQT is
Atty. Ocsang who happens to be the brother of Atty.
Ferreras, a friend of Judge Magbag. While the case
was still being heard, Atty. Ferreras and his wife
celebrated their wedding anniversary. They invited
their friends and family to a dinner party at their
house in Forbes Park. Judge Magbag attended the
party and was seen conversing with Atty. Ocsang
while they were eating at the same table. Comment
on the propriety of Judge Magbag’s act.
(2005)
A: A Judge is not required to live in seclusion. He is
permitted to have a social life as long as it does not
interfere with his judicial duties or detract from the
dignity of the court (Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5).
However, he should be scrupulously careful to avoid
such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or
friendships constitute an element in determining his
judicial action (Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 30). A
Judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of
impropriety in all activities (Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon 2). Sitting on the same table and conversing with
a lawyer with a pending case before him raises such
appearance of impropriety.
Q: In an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
late Juan Mayaman, the heirs requested Judge
Maawain, a family friend, to go over the document
prepared by a new lawyer before they signed it.
Judge Maawain agreed and even acted as an
instrumental witness. Did Judge Maawain engage in
the unauthorized practice of law? Why? (2002)
A: Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court and
Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit a judge
from engaging in the private practice of law as a
member of the bar or giving professional advice to
clients. In the case of De Castro v. Capulong, 118 SCRA 5,
the Supreme Court held that a judge who merely acted
as a witness to a document and who explained to the
party waiving his rights of redemption over mortgaged
properties and the consequences thereof, does not
engage himself in the practice of law. This appears to be
more applicable to the case of Judge Maawain. He did
not give professional advice in anticipation of litigation.
He was just asked to review a deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate. He signed merely as an
instrumental witness and not as a legal counsel. Besides,
his act was an isolated act.
Q: What would your comment be about a judge who,
whenever he promulgates a decision, invites
representatives of the print and broadcast media to
his sala for the purpose of having the promulgation
televised, and that in the process, he gives
interviews although he does not discuss his personal
views on the merits of the case? Explain your
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
answer. (1990)
A: The judge’s conduct is improper. Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should
not seek publicity for personal vainglory. A judge should
conduct proceedings in court with fitting dignity and
decorum and in such a manner as to reflect the
importance and seriousness of the inquiry to ascertain
the truth. Allowing television coverage of the
promulgation of the decision would detract the dignity
of the court proceedings, degrade the court and create
misconception in the public mind. His giving of
interviews, even if he does not discuss his personal
views on the merits of the case, has no other purpose
than to seek publicity for personal vainglory, which is
prohibited.
Q: How far should the judge allow publicity of the
proceedings and decisions of his court? Explain your
answer. (1990)
A: A judge may allow publicity by letting his actuations
as a judge and his decisions speak for themselves,
without any comment on his part. What makes publicity
improper is the employment of traditional dignity of
court proceedings and of the judge himself. Good,
efficient, speedy, and correct administration of justice on
his part is a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention, and the publicity thereby generated is a
normal by-product of the efficient discharge of his
duties, which is proper.
Q: Discuss the propriety of a judge standing as
sponsor at the wedding of the son of the litigant in
his court? (1990)
A: For reasons above stated, a judge’s standing as
sponsor at the wedding of the son of a litigant in his
court is highly improper for it gives the impression,
rightly or wrongly, that he is disposed to resolve the
case in favor of such litigant. Public confidence in the
impartiality of the judge is eroded, and the due
administration of justice suffers thereby. It is also a
violation of the letter and spirit of Rule 2.03 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which states that the prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others
to convey the impressions that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
Discipline of Members of the Judiciary
Q: Judge A had an illicit relationship with B, his
Branch Clerk of Court. C, the wife of Judge A,
discovered the illicit affair and reported him to
vindicate her violated marital rights. Did the judge
violate the Code of Judicial Conduct? Discuss. (2014)
A: The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that the judge
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. He should so behave at all times as to
promote public condifence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities. His
personal behavior, not only while in the performance of
official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond
reproach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the
visible personification of law and of justice (Cynthia
Resngit-Marquez vs. Judge Victor Llamas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-
23
02-1708, July 23, 2002).
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
Q: X, a Municipal Trial Court Judge, received the
amount of one thousand (P1, 000.00) Pesos in cash
from accused charged with slightly physical injuries
in his court, whereupon he was released from
custody. After dismissal of the case against him, the
accused sought to withdraw the amount he had
deposited as bail. It was not returned at once to the
accused because according to the Judge, it was
stolen from the drawer of his table where he kept it
after receipt. Nonetheless, the amount was returned
to the accused. Is the Judge guilty of misconduct for
which he may be disciplined? (1999)
A: Yes. The judge is guilty of misconduct and may be
disciplined. He was negligent in keeping the money in
his drawer instead of depositing it with the municipal
treasurer as required by law. His failure to return it at
once after acquittal of the accused creates a suspicion
that he misappropriated the money. A judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all his activities (Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2).
Q: Judge Horacio would usually go to the cockpits on
Saturdays for relaxation, as the owner of the cockpit
is a friend of his. He also goes to the casino once a
week to accompany his wife who loves to play the
slot machines. Because of this, Judge Horacio was
administratively charged. When asked to explain, he
said that although he goes to these places, he only
watches and does not place any bets. Is his
explanation tenable? Explain. (2005)
A: The explanation of Judge Horacio is not tenable. In the
case of City of Tagbilaran v. Hontanosas, Jr. (375 SCRA 1),
the Supreme Court penalized a city court judge for going
to gambling casinos and cockpits on weekends.
According to the Court, going to a casino violates
Circular No. 4, dated August 27,1980, which enjoins
judges of inferior courts from playing or being present
in gambling casinos.
The prohibition refers to both actual gambling and mere
presence in gambling casinos. A judge’s personal
behavior, not only in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
With regard to going to cockpits, the Supreme Court
held that “verily, it is plainly despicable to see a judge
inside a cockpit and more so, to see him bet therein.
Mixing with the crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and
bettors is unbecoming of a judge and undoubtedly
impairs the respect due him. Ultimately, the Judiciary
suffers therefrom because a judge is a visible
representation of the Judiciary” (City of Tagbilaran v.
Hantonosas, Jr., 375 SCRA 1).
Q: Judge Roman Pulido, an incumbent RTC judge, ran
for President of the Rotary Club of Bacolor and won.
His first project was to put up a livelihood center to
help the lahar victims. To raise funds he sent to the
business community solicitation letters for
contributions. His rival in their club filed an
administrative charge against Judge Pulido alleging
unethical conduct for socializing and being actively
involved in an organization the members of which
are mostly practicing lawyers, and for soliciting
contributions. Are the grounds raised valid for the
charge of unethical conduct? Discuss fully. (1995)
A: Rules 5.01, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that:
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
Rule 5.01. A judge may engage in the following
activities provided that they do not interfere
with the performance of judicial duties or
detract from the dignity of the court:
a. participate in civil and charitable
activities;
b. serve as an officer, director, trustee, or
non-legal adviser of a non-political,
educational, religious, charitable,
fraternal, or civic organization”.
A judge is not required to live in seclusion. However,
Section 24 of the Code of Judicial Ethics provides that a
judge should avoid giving ground for reasonable
suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his
office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or
contribute to charitable enterprises. Hence, while it is
ethical for Judge Pulido to become president of Rotary
Club of Bacolor, it would be unethical for him to send
letters soliciting contributions from the business
community.
Q: As the guest speaker in Rotary Club weekly
luncheon meeting, Judge P was asked during the
open forum what might his personal opinion be on
PIRMA’s move to initiate a people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution. He expressed the view that
PIRMA’s crusade should be allowed because it would
be in consonance with the declaration in the
Constitution that “sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.”
He likewise enjoined the members to support
PIRMA. An administrative complaint was filed
against him by a club member, a staunch oppositor
to the PIRMA petition before the COMELEC, alleging
that the judge’s public statement had constituted
conduct unbecoming a judge. Judge P’s answer to the
complaint was that membership in the judiciary did
not deprive him of his right to free speech, that he
was entitled to express his view even on political
issues, and that any issue requiring resolution on
the PIRMA petition was outside the jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts. Was there a breach of the
Code of Judicial conduct by Judge P? (1997)
A: Yes, there was a breach. Rule 5.10 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that a judge is entitled to
entertain personal views on political questions. But to
avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall
not make political speeches, contribute to party funds,
publicly endorse candidates for political office or
participate in other partisan political activities. Since
Judge P considered the PIRMA petition to be a political
issue, he should have refrained from making his speech
and enjoining his listeners to support PIRMA because he
might be suspected (of) engaging in partisan political
activity.
Q: Judge L is assigned in Turtle Province. His brother
ran for Governor in Rabbit Province. During the
election period this year, Judge L took a leave of
absence to help his brother conceptualize the
campaign strategy. He even contributed a modest
amount to the campaign kitty and hosted lunches
and dinners. Did Judge L incur administrative
and/or criminal liability? Explain. (2010)
A: Judge L incurred administrative liability. Rule 5.18 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “a judge is
entitled to entertain personal views on political
questions, but to avoid suspicion of political
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates
for political office or participate in other partisan
political activities.”
He may also be held criminally liable for violation of
Section 26 (I) of the Omnibus Election Code, which
penalizes any officer or employee in the civil service
who, directly or indirectly, intervenes, in any election
campaign or engages in any partisan political activity,
except to vote or to preserve public order.
Q: At the pre-trial of a civil case for collection, one of
the parties mentioned that he expected to settle his
obligation as he was investing in some stocks of a
realty corporation that were sure to soar in the
market because of some confidential information he
obtain from his brother-in-law, a top-rank officer of
the corporation. Upon hearing the information the
judge lost no time in buying stocks in the realty
corporation and as predicted made a lot of money. Is
the judge guilty of unethical conduct? Discuss fully.
(1995)
A: Yes. Rule 5.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that “no information acquired in a judicial capacity shall
be used or disclosed by a judge in any financial dealing
or for any other purpose not related to judicial
activities.” The judge in this case has violated the
forgoing rule, and acted unethically.
Q: A complaint for rape against ZZ was filed by the
father of Dulce, an 11- year old girl, of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bantayan, Cebu. After preliminary
examination of the offended party and witnesses,
Judge YY of said court issued an order finding
probable cause and ordering to arrest ZZ without
bail. ZZ was arrested and detained. He filed: (1) a
Waiver of Preliminary Investigation, and (2), an Ex
parte Motion to Fix Bail Bond, Judge YY granted the
waiver and forthwith elevated the records of the
case to the RTC, which forwarded the same to the
Office of Provincial Prosecutor.
Ten (10) days after the elevation of the records, YY,
acting on the Motion to Fix Bail, issued an order
fixing the bail bond at P20,000.00. The father of
Dulce filed against YY an administrative complaint
for ignorance of the law, oppression grave abuse of
discretion and partiality. If you were the judge of the
RTC designated to investigate the case and to make a
report and recommendation thereon, what would be
your recommendation? (1991)
A: The fact narrated in this case is similar to the decision
of the Supreme Court in 1989. The judge was found
guilty of ignorance of the law for granting bail despite
the fact that he had already lost jurisdiction after
elevating the record of the case to the Regional Trial
Court. If I am the RTC Judge assigned to investigate the
case I would recommend the dismissal of the judge for
gross ignorance of the law.
Q: Assume that your friend and colleague, Judge
Peter X. Mahinay, a Regional Trial Court judge
stationed at KL City, would seek your advice
regarding his intention to ask the permission of the
Supreme Court to act as counsel for and thus
represent his wife in the trial of a civil case for
damages pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan. What would be your advice to him?
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Discuss briefly. (2004)
A: I would advise him against it. Rule 5.07 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct expressly and absolutely prohibits
judges from engaging in the private practice of law,
because of the incompatible nature between the duties
of a judge and a lawyer. Moreover, as a Judge he can
influence to a certain extent the outcome of the case
even if it is with another court. A Judge shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency (Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.04).
Q: Judge C was appointed MTC Judge in 1993.
Subsequently, the Judicial and Bar Council received
information that previously he had been dismissed
as Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila. It appeared
that when he applied for appointment to the
Judiciary, his answer to the question in the personal
Data Sheet – “Have you ever been retired, dismissed
or forced to resign from any employment?” was –
“Optional under Republic Act No. 1145.” The truth is,
he was dismissed for gross misconduct as Assistant
City prosecutor. May he be dismissed as Judge?
(1998)
A: Yes, by his concealment of his previous dismissal
from the public service, which the Judicial and Bar
Council would have taken into consideration in acting on
his application for appointment as a judge, he (the
judge) committed an act of dishonesty that rendered
him unfit to be appointed, and to remain in the Judiciary
he has tarnished with his falsehood (Re: Inquiry on the
Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube, 227 SCRA 193; Jose
Estacion, 181 SCRA 33, Estanislao Belan, August 6, 1998).
Q: In the course of a petition for bail in a case for
illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion pending before him, Judge AM (who has
been long frustrated with his work because he has
not been appointed to the Court of Appeals despite
the strong recommendations of several Members of
Congress) made statements contrary to the rulings
of the Supreme Court on the matter. He further
made utterances imputing bias to the Supreme
Court in favor of the Administration which,
according to him, is the reason why all petitions for
bail in similar cases were denied despite the
apparent weakness of the evidence for the
prosecution. What are the implications of Judge AM’s
actuations? (1991)
A: The implication of Judge AM’s actuations is that he
could be violating his oath of office of upholding the law
and the Code of Judicial Conduct to administer his office
with due regard to the integrity of the system of law. He
could also be violating his duty as a minister of justice
under a government of laws and not of men.
Q: In connection with a sensational criminal case,
the Public Relations Officer of the All-Judges
Association Inc. issued two press releases, one
stating that the trial judge should not have granted
bail to the accused since evidence of guilt was strong
and the other, calling upon said judge to inhibit
himself from trying the case since he did not exhibit
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge in ruling
upon certain motions. Comment on the actuations of
the Public Relations Officer who is presumably
25
authorized by the Association. (1992)
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
A: The actuations of the Public Relation Officer of the
All-Judges Association are improper. What the All-
Judges Association should do is to report the matter to
the Supreme Court and file the proper charges. The
Supreme Court may refer the matter for investigation to
a justice of the Court of Appeals. The issuance of the
press release is in violation of the rule that charges and
investigations against Judges should be confidential in
character and should not be published. The Public
Relation Officer can even be held in contempt of court.
Furthermore, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
states that “a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency.”
Rule 3.07 of the same Code states that “a Judge should
abstain from making public comments on any pending
case and should require similar restraint on the part of
court personnel.”
Q: Before he joined the bench, Judge J was a former
vice-mayor. Judge J also writes a weekly column in a
local newspaper. In his column, Judge J wrote:
“I was wondering if the present vice-mayor
can shed off his crocodile hide so that he
can feel the clamor of the public for the
resignation of hoodlum public officers of
which he is one”.
When charged administratively, Judge J invoked
freedom of expression. Is his defense tenable?
Explain. (2000)
A: The judge’s reliance on freedom of expression is
untenable. The judge’s vicious writings compromise his
duties as a judge in the impartial administration of
justice. His writings lack judicial decorum which
requires the use of temperate language at all times. The
judge should not instigate litigation (Galang v. Santos,
307 SCRA 583, Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1).
Q: Atty. Belinda appeared as counsel for accused
Popoy in a case being heard before Judge Tadhana.
After Popoy was arraigned, Atty. Belinda moved for
a resetting of the pre-trial conference. This visibly
irked Judge Tadhana and so before Atty. Belinda
could finish her statement, Judge Tadhana cut her
off by saying that if she was not prepared to handle
the case, then he could easily assign a counsel de
oficio for Popoy. Judge Tadhana also uttered that
Atty. Belinda was wasting the precious time of the
court. Atty. Belinda tried to explain that she was
capable of handling the case but before she could
finish her explanation, Judge Tadhana again cut her
off and accused her of always making excuses for
her incompetence. Judge Tadhana even declared
that he did not care if Atty. Belinda filed a thousand
adminsitrative case against him.
According to Atty. Belinda, Judge Tadhana had also
humiliated her like that in the past for the flimsiest
of reasons. Even Atty. Belinda’s clients were not
spared from Judge Tadhana’s wrath as he often
scolded witnesses who failed to respond
immediately to questions asked of them on the
witness stand.
Atty. Belinda filed an administrative case against
Judge Tadhana. DO the acts of Judge Tadhana as
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
described above constitute a violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct (2015)?
A: Judge Tadhana has violated Section 6, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
which provides that, “Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court, and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge
deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others
subject to their influence, direction or control.” In the
case of Ruiz v. Bringas, 330 SCRA 62, the Supreme Court
held that the duty to maintain respect for the dignity of
the court applies to members of the bench and bar alike.
A judge should be courteous both in his conduct and in
his language especially to those appearing before him.
He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their
duties to the court, their clients and the public in general
without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing, or
tyrannical. He should refrain from conduct that demeans
his office and remember that courtesy begets courtesy.
Above all, he must conduct himself in such a manner
that he gives no reason for reproach.
Q: Judge Ana P. Sevillano had an issue with the
billings for the post-paid cellular phone services of
her 16-year-old daughter for the last three
consequitive months. Although Judge Sevillano had
been repeatedly calling the Customer Service
Hotline of Universal Telecoms, the billing issue was
never fully settled to Jude Sevillano’s satisfaction.
Finally, Judge Sevillano wrote the National
Telecommunications Commission a letter of
complaint against Universal Telecoms, using her
official court stationery and signing the letter as
“Judge Ana P. Sevillano.” Did Judge Sevilliano violate
ay professional or ethical standard for judges?
Justify your answer (2015).
A: Judge Sevillano violated Section 8, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
which provided that, “judges shall not use or lend the
prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of
anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to
convey the impression that anyone is in a special
position improperly to influence them in the
performance of “judicial duties,” as well as Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that, “a lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.”
Q: During the hearing of an election protest filed by
his brother, Judge E sat in the area reserved for the
public, not beside his brother’s lawyer. Judge E’s
brother won the election protest. Y, defeated
candidate for mayor, filed an administrative case
against Judge E for employing influence and
pressure on the judge who heard and decided the
election protest.
Judge E explained that the main reasons why he was
there in the courtroom were because he wanted to
observe how election protests are conducted as he
has never conducted one and because he wanted to
give moral support to his brother. Did Judge E
commit an act of impropriety as a member of the
judiciary? Explain. (2007)
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
A: Judge E committed an act of impropriety in appearing
in another court at the hearing of his brother’s election
protest. In the case of Vidal v. Dojillo, Jr., (463 SCRA 264),
which involved the same facts, the Supreme Court ruled
as follows:
“Respondent, in his defense, stated that he
attended the hearing of his brother’s election
protest case just to give moral support and, in
the process, also observe how election protest
proceedings are conducted. Although concern
for family members is deeply ingrained in the
Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge,
should bear in mind that he is also called upon
to serve the higher interest of preserving the
integrity of the entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to
avoid not only impropriety but also the mere
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Even if respondent did not intend to use his
position as a judge to influence the outcome of
his brother’s election protest, it cannot be
denied that his presence in the courtroom
during the hearing of his brother’s case would
immediately give cause for the community to
suspect that his being a colleague in the
judiciary would influence the judge trying the
case to favor his brother.”
Q: Judge Silva upon seeing a reckless tricycle driver
almost hitting a boy by the side of the road, gave
chase and stopped the tricycle. Judge Silva then
confiscated the driver’s license and told him to get it
from his office. Was the conduct of Judge Silva
proper? (1998)
A: The facts are akin to those in Paguirigan v. Clavano
(61 SCRA 411), where the Supreme Court held:
“While respondent might have been
motivated by a spirit of civicism in
cooperating with the city authorities in the
enforcement of traffic laws, it is obvious that
the investigation of violations of traffic rules
and regulations, the arrest of errant motor
vehicle drivers and the confiscation of their
licenses are essentially police functions which
are specifically vested by law upon law
enforcement officers of the government.
Respondent as Judge of the City Court will
necessarily hear and decide all cases filed in
his court regarding such violations and
infractions of the Motor Vehicle Law or traffic
regulations by the law enforcement officers. It
is patent, therefore, that respondent should
not have taken upon himself the
responsibility of confiscating the license of the
motor cab driver but he should have referred
the matter to the police. We deem it relevant
to emphasize that the official conduct of a
judge should be free from impropriety or any
appearance thereof. His personal behavior in
the performance of his official duties and in
his everyday life should be beyond reproach.
By confiscating the driver’s license without
issuing any Traffic Violation Report (TVR) and
losing the same while in his possession,
respondent Judge has acted in a manner
unbefitting his high judicial office.”
Q: A judge was seen having lunch with a litigant in a
case pending before him in court. He was also seen
at the racetrack placing his bet on certain horses.
How would you evaluate the behavior of the judge?
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
Explain. (1990)
A: The judge’s behavior is highly improper. Canon 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities. Rule 2.01 of the same Code provides that a
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. His having lunch with a litigant with a case
pending before him in court violates such rule and gives
the adverse party cause to complain against his
impartiality.
His going to the racetrack to place bets on certain horses
puts the judiciary personified by him in a bad light, for
the personal behavior of a judge, not only upon the
bench but also in everyday life, should be above
reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety.
His judicial office circumscribes his personal conduct
and imposes a number of restrictions, which he must
observe faithfully as the price he has to pay for accepting
and occupying an exalted position in the administration
of justice.
Q: Judge A went to Hong Kong on vacation on board
a Philippine Airlines plane and they (sic) stayed in a
first class hotel for three days and three nights. The
round trip ticket Manila-Hong Kong-Manila and
board and lodging in the hotel where he stayed were
paid for as a birthday gift to the Judge by a friend
whose son has a case for estafa pending in another
Branch of the Court where Judge A is assigned. Did
Judge A commit any infraction of the Code of Judicial
Conduct under the circumstances? (1999)
A: Yes. He violated Canon 5, Rule 5.04 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which provides that a judge or any
immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift,
bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be
allowed by law. Also, Canon 2 of the same Code provides
that a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Accepting a
birthday gift of a vacation in Hong Kong from a friend
whose son has a case for estafa pending in another
branch of the Court where Judge A is assigned raises a
suspicion of impropriety on his part. The fact that the
case is pending in another branch is immaterial because
he could be suspected of having been bribed to influence
the presiding judge of the other branch. A judge shall
refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court
administrative agency (Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule
2.04).
Q: B, who was given no more than six (6) months to
live by her physician, requested her cousin Judge A
to introduce her to Judge C before whose sala she
has a case submitted for resolution. B would wish to
have the case decided before her expected demise.
Judge A, who personally knows Judge C,
accompanied B to the latter, introduced her as his
cousin, and explained that all that B wants is for her
case to be expeditiously resolved, without, in any
way, suggesting in whose favor it should be decided.
Comment on the conduct of Judge A. (2003)
A: The conduct of Judge A may be considered unethical.
Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “a
judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another
27
court or administrative agency.” Although Judge A did
not suggest to Judge C in whose favor the case should be
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
decided, the fact that he introduced B as his cousin is
enough suggestion as to how the case should be decided.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct explicitly
provides that “a judge should avoid impropriety and
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Disqualification of Justices and Judges
(Rule 137)
Q: Judge Aficionado was among the several
thousands of spectators watching a basketball game
at the Rizal Memorial Coliseum who saw the
stabbing of referee Maykiling by player Baracco in
the course of the game. The criminal case
correspondingly filed against Baracco for the
stabbing of Maykiling was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court branch presided over by Judge
Aficionado. Should Judge Aficionado sit in judgment
over and try the case against Baracco? Explain.
(2004)
A: No, he should not preside over the case. Rule 3.12 (a)
of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge
should not take part in any proceeding where the judge
has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the same.
Q: Atty. A is offered professional engagement to
appear before Judge B who is A’s relative, compadre,
and former office colleague. Is A ethically compelled
to refuse the engagement? Why? (2001)
A: “A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of the cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence,
or gives the appearance of influencing the court” (Code
of Professional Conduct, Canon 13). There is no ethical
constraint against a lawyer appearing before a judge
who is a relative, compadre and former office colleague
as long as the lawyer avoids giving impressions that he
can influence the judge.
On the other hand, the judge is required by the Code of
Judicial Conduct not to take part in any proceeding
where his impartiality may be reasonably questioned
(Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.12). Among the grounds
for mandatory disqualification of the judge is if any of
the lawyers is a relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth degree.
Q: In a land registration case before Judge Lucio, the
petitioner is represented by the second cousin of
Judge Lucio’s wife.
a. Differentiate between compulsory and
voluntary disqualification and determine if
Judge Lucio should disqualify himself under
either circumstance.
b. If none of the parties move for his
disqualification, may Judge Lucio proceed with
the case (2015)?
A:
a. In compulsory disqualification, the judge is
compelled to inhibit himself from presiding over a
case when any of the ground provided by law or the
rules exist. Under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised
Rules of Court, no judge or judicial officer shall sit in
any case: (1) in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or (2) in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity or to counsel within the fourth degree
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or
(3) in which he has been executor, administrator,
trustee or counsel, or (4) in which he has presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
he subject of review, without the written consent of
all parties in interest and entered upon the record.
In voluntary disqualification, a judge may inhibit
himself in the exercise of his discretion. Paragraph
2, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that, “a judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just and valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.” The New Code of Professional
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary adds that,
“judges shall disqualify themselves from
participating in any proceedings in which they are
unable to decide the matter impartially or in which
they are unable to decide the matter impartially or
in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that matter impartially or in which it may appear to
a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide
the matter impartially.”
There is no mandatory ground for Judge Lucio to
disqualify himself. The second cousin of his wife, a
six degree relative, is appearing not as a party but as
a counsel.
b. If none of the parties movies for his disqualification,
Judge Lucio may proceed with the case. All the more
so if, without the participation of the judge, the
parties and their lawyers execute a written
agreement that Judge Lucio may proceed with the
same, and such agreement is signed by them and
made a part of the records of the case.
Q: In a hearing before the Court Tax of Appeals, Atty.
G was invited to appear as amicus curiae. One of the
judges hearing the tax case is the father of Atty. G.
The counsel for the respondent moved for the
inhibition of the judge in view of the father-son
relationship. Is there merit to the motion? Decide.
(1996)
A: There is no merit to the motion. Rule 3.12 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct provides that “a judge should take no
part where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” Among the instances for the
disqualification of a judge is that he is related to a party
litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity– but this
refers to counsel of the parties. An amicus curiae is
supposed to be an experienced and impartial attorney
invited by the court to appear and help in the disposition
of issues submitted to it. He represents no party to the
case. There is, therefore, no ground to fear the loss of the
judge’s impartiality in this case if his son is appointed
amicus curiae.
Q: In a case before him, it was the son of Municipal
Trial Court Judge X who appeared as a counsel for
the plaintiff. After the proceeding, judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant. B, the defendant in the case, complained
against Judge X for not disqualifying himself in
hearing and deciding the case. In his defense, Judge
X alleged that he did not disqualify himself in the
case because the defendant never sought his
disqualification. (1999)
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
A: Judge X is liable for misconduct in office. Rule 3.12 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should
take no part in a proceeding where impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. In fact, it is mandatory for
him to inhibit or disqualify himself if he is related by
consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree
(Hurtado v. Jurdalena, 84 SCRA 41). He need not wait for
a motion of the parties in order to disqualify himself.
Q: RTC Judge Q is a deacon in the Iglesia ni Kristo
church in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. R, a
member of the same religious sect belonging to the
same INK community in San Francisco del Monte,
filed a case against S who belongs to the El Shaddai
charismatic group. The case was raffled to Judge Q‘s
sala. The lawyer of S filed a motion to disqualify
Judge Q on the ground that since he and the plaintiff
belonged to the same religious sect and community
in San Francisco del Monte, Judge Q would not
possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Judge Q denied the motion on the ground that the
reason invoked for his disqualification was not
among the grounds for disqualification under the
Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Was
Judge Q’s denial of the motion for inhibition well-
founded? (1997)
A: The fact that Judge Q and Litigant R both belong to the
Iglesia Ni Kristo while Litigant S belongs to the El
Shaddai group, is not a mandatory ground for
disqualifying Judge Q from presiding over the case. The
motion for his inhibition is addressed to his sound
discretion and he should exercise the same in a way that
the people’s faith in the courts of justice will not be
impaired. He should reflect on the probability that a
losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the
thought that the Judge had unmeritoriously tilted the
scales of justice against him (Dimacuha v. Concepcion,
117 SCRA 630). Under the circumstances of this case,
where the only ground given for his disqualification is
that he and one of the litigants are members of the same
religious community, I believe that his denial of the
motion for his disqualification is proper. In Vda. de
Ignacio v. BLT Bus Co., 34 SCRA 618, the Supreme Court
held that the fact that one of the counsels in a case was a
classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground for the
disqualification of the judge.
Q: In a civil case, the defendant discovered that the
counsel for the plaintiff used to be a member of the
Judicial and Bar Council during whose time the
Judge presiding over the case was appointed and
confirmed. He filed a “Motion to Inhibit the Judge”
on the ground that the latter’s ability to act
independently and judiciously had been
compromised and seriously impaired because of his
“utang na loob” to the plaintiff’s counsel. If you were
the judge, how would you rule on the Motion?
(1994)
A: I will deny the Motion for Inhibition because every
judge is sworn to uphold the decisions of cases in
accordance with the law. The fact that the judge was
recommended by the JBC which has seven (7) members
and deliberated even confidentially does not make the
judge morally indebted to the JBC member who may not
even have voted for him.
Q: Judge Segotier is a member of Phi Nu Phi
Fraternity. Atty. Nonato filed a motion to disqualify
Judge Segotier on the ground that the counsel for the
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
opposing party is also a member of the Phi Nu Phi
Fraternity. Judge Segotier denied the motion.
Comment on his ruling. (2005)
A: The ruling of Judge Segotier is correct. The fact that a
judge is a former classmate of one of the counsels in a
case has been held to be insufficient ground for the
disqualification of the judge (Vda. de Bonifacio v. BLT Bus
Co., Inc., 34 SCRA 618). Intimacy or friendship between
judge and an attorney of record has also been held to be
insufficient ground for the former’s disqualification
(Query of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, RTC of
Bulacan, on the Conflicting Views of RTC Judges Masadao
& Elizaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954-M, 155 SCRA 72).
Q: Justice AR of the Sandiganbayan was named
executor of the will of his good friend BT whose
estate is valued approximately at two billion
(P2,000,000,000.00) Pesos. Upon BT’S death, may
Justice AR accept the trust and serve as executor of
BT’s will while still in office? (1999)
A: No, he may not. Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that a judge shall not serve as the
executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other
fiduciary except for the estate, trust, or person of a
member of the immediate family, and then only if such
service will not interfere with the proper performance
of judicial duties. Members of immediate family shall be
limited to the spouse and relatives within the second
degree of consanguinity.
Q: In an intestate estate proceeding a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in favor of an
RTC judge was filed by one of the heirs. Another heir
opposed the petition on the ground that the judge
was disqualified to become administrator of the
estate as he was the first cousin of the deceased. The
petitioner however argued that the judge was not
disqualified as the case was not pending before him.
Rule on the petition. Discuss fully. (1995)
A: Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that
“a judge should not serve as the executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, except for the
estate, trust or person of a member of the immediate
family, and then only if such service will not interfere
with the proper performance of judicial duties. Members
of immediate family shall be limited to the spouse and
relatives within the second degree of consanguinity”.
Under the forgoing rule, the petition should be denied.
The judge should not be appointed administrator of the
estate of his first cousin, who is not a relative within the
second degree of consanguinity.
Q: Rebecca’s complaint was raffled to the sala of
Judge A. Rebecca is a daughter of Judge A’s wife by a
previous marriage. This is known to the defendant
who does not, however, file a motion to inhibit the
Judge. Is the Judge justified in not inhibiting himself
from the case? (2010)
A: The judge is not justified in not inhibiting himself. It is
mandatory for him to inhibit if he is related to any of the
parties by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil
degree (New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, Canon 3, Sec. 3[f]). Judge A, being the
stepfather of Rebecca, is related to her by affinity by just
one degree. “Judges shall disqualify themselves from
29
participating in any proceeding in which they are unable
to decide the matter impartially or in which it may
TEAM BAROPS
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016
 QuAMTO for LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)
appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to
decide the matter impartially” (Id., Canon 3, Sec. 5). The
fact that Rebecca is a daughter of Judge A’s wife is
enough to make a reasonable observer doubt his
impartiality.
Q: Justice X of the Court of Appeals, by mutual
agreement of two opposing parties, asked him to be
their sole arbitrator in the controversy that arose
out of the construction of a building in Makati City.
The fee that would be paid to him was substantial, it
amounting to double his annual salary and
allowances. When Justice X declined the offer, the
parties suggested that he go on leave of absence for
three months to enable him to do the job. May
Justice X accept the work offered to him while on
leave of absence? (1999)
A: Justice X may not accept the work offered him even
while on leave of absence from the Court of Appeals. A
justice should regulate extra-judicial activities to
minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties (Code of
Judicial Ethics, Canon 5). He shall not accept
appointment or designation to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Code of
Judicial Conduct, Rule 5.09). This is specially so since
decisions of voluntary arbitrators are appealable to the
Court of Appeals. He must minimize the risk of conflict
with judicial duties (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canons 4 and 5). Moreover, he will create the impression
that he is merely interested in the fee involved, which
will detract from the integrity of the judiciary.
Q: In the contract of lease of the house and lot
located in Quezon City that A entered into with B, it
is stipulated that if at the end of the lease term, the
lessee B should refuse and fail to vacate the
premises and the parties fail to agree on the
extension of the lease period, the case for eviction
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court in
Manila, as agreed upon. The judge of the Regional
Trial Court to whom the case was assigned motu
proprio dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff A and defendant B presented separate
motions urging the Court to reconsider its order and
jurisdiction of their case by mutual agreement. The
Judge denied their motion insisting that his Court
has no jurisdiction over the case for detainer. May
the Regional Trial Court upon the facts of the case
assume jurisdiction of it as suggested by the parties?
(1999)
A: No, the Regional Trial Court may not assume
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred
by the law and not by agreement of the parties. While
Rule 3.13 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides for the
Remittal of Disqualification of Judges, it refers to
remittal of the disqualification of the judge to take part
in the case on the ground that his impartiality may be
placed in doubt. It is not applicable to lack of
jurisdiction.
Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers
(Rule 135)
Q: Upon opening session of his court, the Presiding
Judge noticed the presence of television cameras set
up at strategic places in his courtroom and the
positing of media practitioners all over his sala with
their video cameras. The Judge forthwith issued an
order directing the exclusion from the courtroom of
all television paraphernalia and further instructing
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct
luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2016 Bar Exams.
the reporters inside the hall not to operate their
“video cams” during the proceedings. The defense
lawyers objected to the court’s order, claiming that
it was violative of their client’s constitutional right
to a public trial. In issuing the questioned order, did
the Judge act in violation of the rights of the accused
to a public trial? Discuss briefly. (2004)
A: The Judge did not violate the right of the accused to a
public trial. A trial is public “when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings
in his courtroom may do so” (Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA
143). There is to be no ban on attendance. In the
question given, the judge did not bar attendance, only
the use of television paraphernalia and “video cams”.
Q: Did the Judge act in derogation of press freedom
when he directed the exclusion of the television
paraphernalia from the courtroom and when he
prohibited the news reporters in the courtroom
from operating their “video cams” during the
proceedings? Reason briefly. (2004)
A: No. Press freedom was never transgressed. The
serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice
by live TV and radio broadcast, especially when
emotions are running high on the issues stirred by the
case, should be taken into consideration before
addressing the issue, not of press freedom. The right of
the accused to a fair trial, not by a trial by publicity takes
precedence over press freedom as invoked by the TV
reporters in this case (Sec. Perez v. Estrada, 365 SCRA
62).
Q: While Miss Malumanay, a witness for the plaintiff,
was under cross-examination, Judge Mausisa asked
questions alternately with the counsel for the
defendant. After four questions by the judge, the
plaintiff’s counsel moved the judge to refrain from
asking further questions which tended to favor the
defense and leave the examination of the witness to
the defendant’s counsel, who was a new lawyer. The
judge explained that he was entitled to ask
searching questions. Is the motion tenable? Why?
(2002)
A: It depends. Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that while a judge may, to promote justice,
prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity,
properly intervene in the presentation of evidence
during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that
undue interference may prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
Thus, if in asking four questions alternately with counsel
for the defendant, Judge Mausisa was only trying to clear
up some obscurity, he cannot be accused of undue
interference. But if his “searching questions” were such
as to give the impression that he was already acting as a
counsel for the defendant, his conduct is improper.
Q: Can the judge justify his intervention? How?
(2002)
A: The judge can justify his intervention on any of the
grounds mentioned by the rule, namely, to promote
justice, avoid waste of time, or clear up some obscurity.
Q: In a murder trial, Judge T asked searching
questions of all the witnesses for the accused
prompting Atty. O, counsel the accused, to request
Judge T to desist from acting as counsel for the
 QUAMTO FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1991-2015)

prosecution. The Judge, however, reminded Atty. O

that she wanted to determine whether the accused
was guilty of the crime charged.
Is it proper for Judge T to take an active part on the
examination of the accused’s witnesses? (1996)

A: No, it is not proper. Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct provides that “While a judge may, to promote
justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some
obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of
evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in
mind that undue interference may prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.”
The intervention of the judge in a case must be done
with considerable circumspection. It must be done
sparingly and not throughout the trial, which will have
the effect of or will tend to build or bolster the case for
one of the parties. The reason for this rule is that the
judge should not only be impartial but also appear to be
impartial.

Q: After the pre-trial, Atty. Hans Hilado, counsel for

plaintiff Jennifer Ng, persuaded defendant Doris Dy
to enter into a compromise agreement with the
plaintiff without the knowledge and participation of
defendant’s counsel, Atty. Jess de Jose. Doris acceded
and executed the agreement. Therein Doris
admitted her obligation in full and bound herself to
pay her obligation to Jennifer at 40% interest per
annum in ten (10) equal monthly installments. The
compromise agreement was approved by the court.
Realizing that she was prejudiced, Doris Dy filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Hilado
alleging that the latter prevented her from
consulting her lawyer Atty. de Jose when she
entered into the compromise agreement, thereby
violating the rules of professional conduct. Atty.
Hilado countered that Doris Dy freely and
voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement
which in fact was approved by the court. Was it
proper for the judge to approve the compromise
agreement since the terms thereof were just and fair
even if counsel for one of the parties was not
consulted or did not participate therein? Explain.
(1995)

A: It was not proper for the judge to approve the

compromise agreement without the participation of the
lawyer of one of the parties, even if the agreement was
just and fair. Even if a client has exclusive control of the
cause of action and may compromise the same, such
right is not absolute. He may not, for example, enter into
a compromise to defeat the lawyer’s right to a just
compensation. Such right is entitled to protection from
the court.

Q: A judge, in order to ease his clogged docket,

would exert efforts to compel the accused in
criminal cases to plead guilty to a lesser offense and
advise party litigants in civil cases, whose positions
appear weak, to accept the compromise offered by
the opposing party. Is the practice legally
acceptable? (1998)

A: The practice is legally acceptable as long as the judge

does not exert pressure on the parties and takes care
that he does not appear to have prejudged the case.
Where a judge has told a party that his case is weak
before the latter was fully heard, such was considered a
ground for his disqualification (Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA
31

124).

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS TEAM BAROPS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016