EN BANC

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY

POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.

[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE
JR., respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition, that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or
[1]

by those who dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the
qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people
are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero
of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born
Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion
resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party,
in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.,"
or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to
be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known
as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA
No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even
if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner,
in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate
of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y
Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley,
3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate
of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management
and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives
that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6)
a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a
certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could
be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-
2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name
of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the
purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records
of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed
during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion
was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule
64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed
G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission
on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier,"
and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only
the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the
case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny
due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the

Omnibus Election Code -

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any
interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
[2] [3]

Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power
is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated
to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross
denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper
choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the
land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke
the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-
presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as not [4]

(being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted
Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an
Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting
the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief
Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the
tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under
the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory
set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule
13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.

Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of
the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election
[5]

contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could
file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
 Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on
the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office. Aristotle saw its significance if only
[6]

to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. The [7]

concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which
qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen
to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on
the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to
[8]

submit his private interests to the general interest of society.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the
rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and
justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which
[9]

encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. The 20th century
[10]

saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the
right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. The idea of citizenship has
[11]

gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An

ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village,
might well be the internationalization of citizenship. [12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects
of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." In church records, the natives were called 'indios',
[13]

denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship
became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to
point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal
Decrees. [14]

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima

Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended
to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; however, [15]

three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines -
the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868
[16]

specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, and finally,
[17]

the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to
the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. [18]
 The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because
of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of
the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws. [19]

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens.
-

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town
of the Monarchy. [20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated
that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in
force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
[21]

inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress
-

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present
treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom,
retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such
property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce,
and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case
they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making,
before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall
be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
reside.

Thus

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the Congress." [22]

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on
the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to
be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine
Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between
the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." [23]

Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was
taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular
Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. [24]

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899
to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight
was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the
United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that
period. More about this later.
[25]

In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to
the Philippine Bill of 1902 -

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United
States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
[26]

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had
for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones
Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act
of Congress in 1912 -

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become
citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is
hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of
the United States, if residing therein."

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899,
2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some
other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode
of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with
common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being
the basis of Filipino citizenship -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as
fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of
the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect
such concerns -

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless
by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except
for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." [27]

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
[28]

soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the
[29]

adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
[30]

citizenship by birth.
 Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not
been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11
September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he
was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother,
Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of
the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years
old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old,
unmarried, and an American citizen.The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was
born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie
Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries
on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would
be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the
birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public
record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence
by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as
Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for
respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they
purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F.
Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had
utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true
copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

xxxxxxxxx

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public
office.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof
of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:

Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made,
2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes
more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred. [31]

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954,
at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo
Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of
Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial
period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact
in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to
show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and
Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from
1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of
the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the
child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner,
the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
 Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December
1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took
effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment
was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary.Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. Complementary to the
[32]

new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that
-

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge
the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment
of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The
failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document
of recognition. In Mendoza vs. Mella, the Court ruled -
[33] [34]

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is
whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry
record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such
reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there
is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5
of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child
may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must
be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed,
or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of
voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs.
Pareja, this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
[35]

acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by
private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public
officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the
means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and
sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as
natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the
child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy
which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of
the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing,"
so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a
genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one
duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article
175 provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.

x x x x x x x x x.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action
is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has ruled:
[36]

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under
Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the
voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278
may be given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or

recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of
keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of
the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern
the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or,
in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be
found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations,
the domain of civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and
the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and
regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those
which exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests." [37]

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster, the Court has held:

[38]

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they
reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife,
their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property,
marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of
marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are
governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article

15 of the Civil Code, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions
on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts
of the Civil Code, such as on successional rights and family relations. In adoption, for
[39] [40]
instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to
define his rights under civil law and not his political status.
[41]

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the
rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the
distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the
concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the
primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should
remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of
political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should
thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil
law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family
relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code
or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify,
in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred,
and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead
or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be
a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before
the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the
acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together
with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one
family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California,
U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:

1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena
Street, Manila.

xxxxxxxxx

7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to
Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.

8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald,
Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in
1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.

10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.

xxxxxxxxx

18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe
is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

Ruby Kelley Mangahas

Declarant

DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would

be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells
of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted
to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this[42]

Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."

Petitioners Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5,
1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage
to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most
doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent
himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his
parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American
mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child.Petitioner contended that as an
illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American
citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo, citing Chiongbian
[43]

vs. de Leon and Serra vs. Republic.

[44] [45]

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is
most convincing; he states -

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement
of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision
constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to
the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not
establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.

First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was
about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese
father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing
about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It
was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before
the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.

Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra
was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who
was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.

Finally, Paa vs. Chan. This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of
[46]

Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio,
was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he
got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid
proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that
Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin
therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court
said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino
because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple,
simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.

xxxxxxxxx

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but
twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate
child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a
Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs.
Cayat. I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests
[47]

on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.

x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible
state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It
was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the
fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding
an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither
justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then
the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
 The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was
to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over
the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for
alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-
003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position
of President in the 10thMay 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has
committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R.
No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters
capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest
under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84
years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines
was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation
to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his
case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only
[48]

be material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando
Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission
on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to
show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in
dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly
elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the
question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the
Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching
has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University
in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court,
dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that
he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the

Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election

Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
 3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing
that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5
May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to
take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit
further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents
evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to
be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose
Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate
Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this
regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a
citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But
in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.
However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the
allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school

records and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino

citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

 5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth

Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary

public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the

Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil
Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether
his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the
child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the
1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. 5Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on
the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has
been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the
age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is
not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching
the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the
reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision
adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of
age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when
he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had
reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon
reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14)
years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the
special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines
and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official,
cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare
was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was
about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning
for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was
born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter
since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect
Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother.
In this regard, the Court stated:
 Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino,
and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111,
June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-
filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age

constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life
here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare
rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting
during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or

his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this
case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an
absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age
of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond
the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching
has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure
in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as
a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 177721 July 3, 2007

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG,respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners are people’s and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at
protecting the people’s rights to self-governance and justice.

Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of releasing presidential
appointments including those of Supreme Court Justices.

Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court.

Petitioners allege that:

On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an
appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy
created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was
reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.

On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by
Malacañang in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong. There is no indication
whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President.

On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated that the
appointment is "still there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC)."

Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is
patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own
birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as Annex "H" to
the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953,
his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.

Petitioners invoke the Constitution:

 Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of
the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2
of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship."1

Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally
granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino
citizen.

Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong’s birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality as
"Chinese" at birth. They invoke the Civil Code:

Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto
x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained." Therefore, the entry in Ong’s birth certificate
indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that Ong’s citizenship at birth is Chinese.

Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order." Thus, as long as Ong’s birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the
Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated in his birth certificate.2

This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ong’s new Identification Certificate issued
by the Bureau of Immigration dated October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over the
opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino. They maintain that
the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power or authority to alter entries in a birth certificate;
that respondent Ong’s old Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino; and that
respondent Ong’s remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate.

Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to respondent Ong as
Associate Justice of this Court.

Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and restrain
respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain
respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this Court.

The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.

Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, essentially stating that the appointment of
respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the
powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus:

SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.

Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed respondent Ong from among the list of
nominees who were duly screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of the
Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment, however, was not released, but instead, referred to
the JBC for validation of respondent Ong’s citizenship."3 To date, however, the JBC has not received the referral.

Supporting the President’s action and respondent Ong’s qualifications, respondent Executive Secretary submits
that:

1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by the
JBC, which passed upon the appointee’s qualifications.
 2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed
by the Department of Justice, which have the authority and jurisdiction to make determination on matters of
citizenship.

3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen.

4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.4

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that
petitioners have no standing to file the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC as
the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore,
the petitioners in his view failed to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one who extended the
appointment.

As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on
November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that these two
had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos reverted to her
Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino
citizen;6 that respondent Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok
Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondent’s mother was a Filipino citizen at
birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese
citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as
a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the naturalization.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an
identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his
mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.

Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:

I. PETITIONERS’ LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY

WHOSE OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE VERY ACT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED CONSTITUTE
INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND SHOULD
PREVENT THIS CASE FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CONSIDERING THAT:

A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER MARRIAGE TO

EUGENIO; and

B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER AND WHO
ELECTED FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, RESPONDENT
ONG MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.

III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO

WAY, WITHOUT MORE, ESTABLISH WITH FINALITY THAT HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR
DISPROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED FROM
"INDIOS."

IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE
108 OF THE RULES OF COURT FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS
AS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO.
 V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY
ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF
RESPONDENT ONG, AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO.
113878) RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY
RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE
POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.7

Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of
previous decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Morato,9 on the ground that the case is one of transcendental importance. They claim that the President’s
appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore, attended with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ong’s
birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and
is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged
naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The petition has merit.

First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as people’s organizations and taxpayers since
the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification – nay,
the citizenship – of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. Standing has been accorded and recognized
in similar instances.10

Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary since the suit
impleads the Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and he has in fact spoken for her in his
Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from extending the appointment but only the
Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong from accepting the same.

Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ong’s qualification for memberhip of this Court.
This case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body
tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution,11 the Court is the proper
forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so.

Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case – is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?

On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ong’s petition to be admitted to the
Philippine bar.

In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under
O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar
because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han
Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus
he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth
certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate12 states that he was a Chinese citizen at
birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also
a Chinese citizen.

Specifically, the following appears in the records:

PETITION

COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court respectfully states:

1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26 years of age, having been born on May
25, 1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL, to spouses Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who are citizens
of the Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth certificate marked as Annex A (if born
 outside of wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen other than natural born, state how and when citizenship was
acquired and attach the necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han Seng (Father) See
Attached documents Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4.

xxx

VERIFICATION

Republic of the Philippines )

City of Manila ) S.S.

I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I am the petitioner in the foregoing
petition; that the same was prepared by me and/or at my instance and that the allegations contained therein
are true to my knowledge.

(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of August, 1979, City of Manila, Philippines, affiant
exhibiting his/her Residence Certificate No. A-___________, issued at ________________, on
__________________, 19__.

(Sgd.)
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1979
PTR No. 3114917
January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM

Doc. No. 98;

Page No. 10;
Book No. VIII;
Series of 1979.13

In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter dated October
3, 1979 stating that in connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he has to submit:

1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and

2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor General.

Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.

It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court
allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final
decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be
made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. In Labayo-
Rowe v. Republic,14 this Court held that:
 Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be
threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove
the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.15

Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or
typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the
nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed
in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.16

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by
various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to
show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the
records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his
citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.17 Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by
injunction from doing so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is
hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or
assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all
necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.

This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

March 8, 2016

G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No.
15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The Facts

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over
petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6
September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed
from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations
were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's
adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's
adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the
name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's
omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in
the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC
Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct
No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines 8but
she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner
graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts
degree in Political Studies.9

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband
who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29
July 1991. 11

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her two
daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998
and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No.
017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy
for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika.
She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her
father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner
stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in
the settlement of his estate.18

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest
desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including
notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the
U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing
their pet dog into the country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification
Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed25 while her husband was
forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased a
condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of
2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the
Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of
school age began attending Philippine private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's
husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for
a major Philippine company in July 2006.33

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where
they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.35 A Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
on 1June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order,
the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also
secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18
March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit
of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a
notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No.
9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of
office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation
of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before
the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010
with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner
stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July
1991 and from May 2005 to present.51

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States" effective 21 October 2010.52

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the
2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May
2013. 54

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the
petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to
her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public
in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases
against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course
or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second
Division.59She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention
is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to
the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on
account of the fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born
status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin
with.64Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status
when she became a naturalized American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be
continuous from birth.66

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she
made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years
and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is
qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency
requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she
reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire
lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo
warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the Department
of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;

(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if hypothetically
admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there
any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and residency
qualifications for:

a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered citizens;

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place where
they are found;

c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;

d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for
President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not been
withdrawn or recanted;

e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;

f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005;

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake,
not binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
 i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide
a purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's next leader.68

After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed
for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local
Elections, contained material representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En
Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.70

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras
(Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and
raffled to its First Division.

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No.
15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency.72

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage,
particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative
of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He
averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5
Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove
that she is a natural-born citizen.75

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings
have a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local
legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.77 He also stressed
that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78

Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she
was a foundling.79

Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year residency
requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced
her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips
to the U.S.82

In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC),
Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born
citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires
only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.84

He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a resident of the
Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her.
Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to
her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year
residency requirement for President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007
(DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be
cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and
that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing
petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country before
18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as
an American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke
grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which
are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her
ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92

Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated,
she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be
citizens of the country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.95

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the
right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the
presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born
citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She
believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98

Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in
the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a
condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she
renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied
with.100 She reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for
the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake
made in good faith.102

In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a
natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for
a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC
First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the
Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9
May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23
December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent
prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC
and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court.
The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016.
Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.

The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:

1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA
No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.

3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May
2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled
"on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the
ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications
of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper
authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.

We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
 (3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities
of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit
citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to
uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall
likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs,
and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion
of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all
forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its
directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the
same basic law stating that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-President,
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such
provision for candidates for these positions.

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104 which was
affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:

Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by
law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such
an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the
race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this
sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of
the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.

Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective proceedings, the
importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his
eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is
why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has
been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination
of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to
the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state
in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the
determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in
cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President
and Vice President, as the case may be.106

To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment
through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version
of Rule 25, which states that:

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided
for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107

was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or
the Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy
or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily
dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be
disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other.
Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the
qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before
an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive
order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
"provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on
grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or
she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can
be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.

The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this
case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to
rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted
that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after
saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain
that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to
prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in
Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there
is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The
private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents
are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in
its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) 111 that from 1965 to 1975,
the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-
born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970,
also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the
population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also
presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against
730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens,
or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year,
there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found
in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an
infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge,
1âw phi1

straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in
Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence
on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor
General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant
and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling
would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our
questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners?
Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were 1,766,046
children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents.
Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means
that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means
that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is
99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that the
statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by
whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might
even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine
foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly
doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical
chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is
downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9%
- that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose
of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention
show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural children of a
foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.

xxxx

President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to natural
children or to any kind of illegitimate children?

Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate
children of unknown parents.

Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to
the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards,
because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the
Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no
need ...

Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown
parentage."

Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.

President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner
who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and
father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.

President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.

Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?

Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution need [not]
refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that
persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino
citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and
also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the
cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already
clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings
followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the
Constitution of the proposed amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the proposal for a textual
and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying
that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can
constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing
rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the
convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already
impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of
redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of
the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to
invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is
silently vocal. 118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane society," that
"they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against
foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to
deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate
against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this
across the board marginalization."

We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice.
Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the
"State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1
which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3
which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though
living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is
a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens.
This Court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has
jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the
personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the
petitioners, who are foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children
who may be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling
certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship
which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by
the authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the
citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under
the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a
Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved
petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife,
Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are
accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as
to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems
generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the
"general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of
Rights.129

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC
imposes the following obligations on our country:

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24
thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth
and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be
accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and
R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of
international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict
of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is
established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was
found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained
in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered
to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively
affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that
the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said
convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is
likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention
had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a
minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of
international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United
States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where
only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed
out that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention.
The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of
fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was
widespread practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted principles of
international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness,
equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which
are "basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the
recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law"
under the incorporation clause.

Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus
sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six
(26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed
out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These
circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law.
In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children."
In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that
the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the
executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is
rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.
As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were
designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We
cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were
drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It
would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect
and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.138

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not
result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform
an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."

The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in general
and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They include Sobejana-
Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino
citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of
Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship
(under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."

The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born
citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously
passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress
saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected
in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at
the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an
act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two
types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category
for repatriated citizens:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear:
as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House
of Representatives.146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit
a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals
and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it
"should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while
the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to
its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected."148

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood when she put
in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents,
and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required
were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.

This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to
sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse
of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the
fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an
amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the
files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to
state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate
anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that
she was an adoptee.

Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for
cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken
by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

On Residence

The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed false material
representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before
the 2016 elections, is true.

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day
of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of
the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of
Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according
to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from
the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are
three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to
remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.153

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival
on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting
in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items
weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how
to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting
June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium
and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts
dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's
family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from
the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-
up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident
since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she
and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband
(confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the
U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).

The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its
Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.

However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005.
At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites,
namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The
COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the
earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application
under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon
v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents also
added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino
cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free
entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa)
until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be
counted.

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation. In Coquilla v.
COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his
declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who
wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence
is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish
residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only
visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen
who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She
was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as
provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency."

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court
had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together
leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking
the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from
U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-
established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying
property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's
actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it
was for good.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as
a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after
one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training
to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country"164in line with the government's "reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would
be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free
period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before
he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did -
she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband
and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.

No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive and
overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is
no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to
a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-
the case basis.

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that
petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false
because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC
for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In
doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the
period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-
May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as
inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC
itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of
her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would
include her passport and the school records of her children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission
against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of
residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence
presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the
COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated
the pertinent period of residency.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned here
on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be
established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the
fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When
she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.

For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo
warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC
pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an
established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted
that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance.
Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed
petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated
period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of
public record and were not hidden.

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified
Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in
six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer
period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her
COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous
statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.

The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and
have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further,
as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility
and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications to run for public office.168

In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all
of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America.
The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus
having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts
to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in
November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not
the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional
requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions
of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number,
weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a primary
reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even
considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her
COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13
May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was
satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time
the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016
and that the general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President
in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are
facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have
never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA to finish
pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon
School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in
Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San
Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was
completed.

Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who handled
[petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live
Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L.
Sonora."

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings. [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
1a\^/phi 1

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's abandonment of
their address in the US.

The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006
and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their
family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive
ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of the
Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased
with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating
that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-
002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the
petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for
the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized
Local and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second
Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified
Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First
Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES
is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE POE-
LLAMANZARES, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously exclude all foundlings from
public service.

When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent search, but
sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum of proof
required to conclude that at least one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be
sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. When these inferences are made by the
Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive prerogative to decide the
qualifications of the members of the Senate, then there is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by
either Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution.

This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single foundling as natural-
born. The circumstances of each case are unique, and substantial proof may exist to show that a
foundling is not natural-born. The nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in the scheme
of political powers, as devised by the Constitution, are likewise different from the other ways to raise
questions of citizenship.

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for
the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of
public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.2 The assailed November 17,
2015 Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David, which sought to unseat
private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold such office under Article VI,
Section 34 of the 1987 Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015 Resolution5 denied David's
Motion for Reconsideration.

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are
unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo.6 Edgardo Militar found
her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.7 He later turned her over to Mr.
and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the
infant was found on September 6, 1968.9 She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar.10 Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON
SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS
PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET, JARO .
. .11
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the
Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces).12 The Decision
also ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.13 October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the
Decision had become final in a Certificate of Finality.14 chanrobleslaw

On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of the San Juan Court
Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling certificate that she was adopted by Spouses
Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe.15 This hand-written notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling
certificate:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court Order,
Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc.
No. 138.16 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when she turned 18
years old.17 The Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No.
196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986.18 chanrobleslaw

On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport.19 Her passport
was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18,
2014.20Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on December
19, 2013.21 chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines, Manila, but eventually
went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college degree.22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor's
degree in Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.23 chanrobleslaw

On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American and
Filipino national since birth.24 The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan,
Manila.25 On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with her husband.26 For
cralawred

some time, she lived with her husband and children in the United States.27 chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie
(Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika).28 Brian was born in the United States on April 16, 1992. Hanna
was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born in the
Philippines.29 chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001.30 She was
subsequently given a United States passport.31 chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the Republic of the Philippines
in the 2004 National Elections.32 To support her father's candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter
Hanna returned to the Philippines on April 8, 2004.33 After the Elections, she returned to the United
States on July 8, 2004.34 It was during her stay in the Philippines that she gave birth to her youngest
daughter, Anika.35 chanrobleslaw

Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually "slipped into a
coma."36Senator Poe returned to the Philippines on December 13, 2004.37 On December 14, 2004,
her father died.38 She stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and
to attend to the settling of his estate.39 chanrobleslaw

In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never looked for work again in
the United States.40 chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.41 After consulting her children, they all agreed to return
to the Philippines to support the grieving Susan Roces.42 In early 2005, they notified Brian and
Hanna's schools Virginia, United States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the
following semester.43 She came back on May 24, 2005.44 Her children also arrived in the first half of
2005.45However, her husband stayed in the United States to "finish pending projects, and to arrange
for the sale of the family home there."46 chanrobleslaw

Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax Identification
Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.47 chanrobleslaw

On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines:48
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.49 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225.50 She also "filed applications for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time."51 chanrobleslaw

The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on July 18, 2006 through an
Order signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr:52
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition indicate that David was
a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to
be a natural born Philippine citizen; thereafter, became an American citizen and is now a holder of an
American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine
Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the original)
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of the Philippines in accordance
with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225."54 Until now, the Order "has not been set aside by the
Department of Justice or any other agency of Government."55 chanrobleslaw

On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates in the name of Senator
Poe and her children.56 It stated that Senator Poe is a "citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative Order No. 91,
Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed
Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2006."57 chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31,
2006.58chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and 2009 using her
United States Passport No. 170377935.59 She used her passport "after having taken her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her American
citizenship on 20 October 2010."60 The following are the flight records given by the Bureau of
Immigration: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Departures Flight No.

November 1, 2006 SQ071

July 20, 2007 PR730

October 31, 2007 PR300

 October 2, 2008 PR358

April 20, 2009 PR104

July 31, 2009 PR730

October 19, 2009 PR102

November 15, 2009 PR103

December 27, 2009 PR112

March 27, 2010 PR102

Arrivals Flight No.

November 4, 2006 SQ076

July 23, 2007 PR731

November 5, 2007 PR337

May 8, 2008 PR103

October 5, 2008 PR359

May 21, 2009 PR105

August 3, 2009 PR733

November 15, 2009 PR10361

On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of
the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).62 On October 20, 2010, Senator
Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship,63 stating:

I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently residing at No.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and
voluntarily renounce my United States nationality/American citizenship, together with all rights and
privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation
intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any duress or undue influence.64 (Emphasis
in the original)

The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October 21, 2010.65 On October 21,
2010, she took her Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and assumed office on October 26,
2010.66 Her oath of office stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN

Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang Chairperson, Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board, ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong
husay at katapatan, sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang
katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng
Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas; na tunay na mananalig
at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at mga dekretong pinaiiral
ng mga sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin
ang pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.

Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.

NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng Maynila,

Pilipinas.67 (Emphasis in the original)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States68 in the
presence of Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011.69 On this occasion, she also filled
out the Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship.70 On December
9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator Poe.71 The
certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3,
2012.72chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections.73 On September 27, 2012, she
executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the Commission on Elections on October
2, 2012.74 She won and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.75 chanrobleslaw

David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015.76 He contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to
"comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution."77 chanrobleslaw

Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01 requiring David "to correct the
formal defects of his petition."78 David filed his amended Petition on August 17, 2015.79 chanrobleslaw

On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate Electoral Tribunal, through its
Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator
Poe to file an answer to the amended Petition.80 chanrobleslaw

Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion Subpoena the Record of Application
of Citizenship Re-acquisition and related documents from the Bureau of Immigration on August 25,
2015.81The documents requested included Senator Poe's record of travels and NSO kept Birth
Certificate.82 On August 26, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting
the Motion.83 The same Resolution directed the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the
concerned officials of the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office.84 The subpoenas
ordered the officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the
Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of the requested documents.85 The subpoenas were
complied with by both the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office on September 1,
2015.86chanrobleslaw
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1) Prayer for Summary
Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative
Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect
Contempt of Court.87 chanrobleslaw

On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-05 requiring the
parties to file a preliminary conference brief on or before September 9, 2015.88 The Resolution also
set the Preliminary Conference on September 11, 2015.89 During the Preliminary Conference, the
parties "agreed to drop the issue of residency on the ground of prescription."90 chanrobleslaw

Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21, 2015.91 The parties
were then "required to submit their respective [memoranda], without prejudice to the submission of
DNA evidence by [Senator Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said date."92 chanrobleslaw

On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the submission of DNA test
results.93The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27, 2015 through Resolution
No. 15-08.94On November 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results of DNA
Testing,95 which stated that "none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took provided results that would
shed light to the real identity of her biological parents."96 The Manifestation also stated that Senator
Poe was to continue to find closure regarding the issue and submit any development to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe submitted "the issue of her natural-born Filipino citizenship as
a foundling for resolution upon the legal arguments set forth in her submissions to the
Tribunal."97 On November 6, 2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
"noted the [M]anifestation and considered the case submitted for resolution."98 chanrobleslaw

On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision finding
Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.99 The
Decision stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and continue to be a
natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth, without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship.

....

In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, Respondent
validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.

Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the Revised Rules Implementing
R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire natural-born Philippine
citizenship.

....

To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she renounced her American
citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on
until today.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted)

On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration.101 The Senate Electoral Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015, giving Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the
Motion for Reconsideration.102 chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on December 1,
2015.103David's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December
3, 2015:104
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision
promulgated on 17 November 2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015.

The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24 November 2015 issued by
the Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE the Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for
Respondent on 01 December 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and submit
memorandum as amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for
Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before the Commission on Elections in
SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner, versus Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
Llaman[z]ares, Respondent."

SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original)

On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was received by David.106 On
December 9, 2015, David filed the pre Petition for Certiorari before this Court.107chanrobleslaw

On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal and Senator Poe to
comment on the Petition "within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice."108 The
Resolution also set oral arguments on January 19, 2016.109 The Senate Electoral Tribunal, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on December 30, 2015.110 Senator Poe
submitted her Comment on January 4, 2016.111 chanrobleslaw

This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission on Elections case on the
issue of private respondent's citizenship.

For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo
Warranto based on its finding that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to
hold a seat as Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on private
respondent's citizenship.

Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a consideration of two (2) factors: first,
the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and second,
the nature of the remedial vehicle—a petition for certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved by a
judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.

I. A

The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is a
creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution:112
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

....

SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission on Elections113) the power to rule on
contests114relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of
the House of Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate and distinct constitutional
organ. There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal's power. The
power to resolve such contests is exclusive to any other body. The resolution of such contests is its
only task; it performs no other function.

The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into our legal system an
"independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for
that singular purpose."115 The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission,
independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests relating to members of
the National Assembly.116 This was a departure from the system introduced by prior organic acts
enforced under American colonial rule—namely: the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of
1916—which vested the power to resolve such contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935
Constitution was amended to make room for a bicameral legislature, a corresponding amendment
was made for there to be separate electoral tribunals for each chamber of Congress.117 The 1973
Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals, but they have since been restored by the 1987
Constitution.

All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which provide for the creation
of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission), have been unequivocal in their
language. The electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.

In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. . . . The
exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described
as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature[.]"
Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full, clear and
complete." . . . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission. . . . The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.119 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It
is only before them that post-election challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of
Senators and Representatives (as well as of the President and the Vice-President, in the case of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.

The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17's
stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII,
Section 1's express statement that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Judicial review is,
therefore, still possible. In Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:120
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed
by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the
same."

The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs.
[House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court has explained that while the judgments of
the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise
of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by
the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a
very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to
be a remedy for such abuse."

In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled that the power of the
Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court
does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], venture into the
perilous area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in
only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or
glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.121 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of whether there has been an error in
jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.

I. B

A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of
this Court through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is
taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action.122 The viability of such a petition is
premised on an allegation of "grave abuse of discretion."123 chanrobleslaw

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave.124 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal
or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that
critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted,
or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.125 chanrobleslaw

A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a

misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of
discretion.126 The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.

Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously departs from settled principles
engenders a strong suspicion of partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent against a party.

Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach to an issue is
premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not
misrepresentation, of the evidence;127 (b) where a tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from
reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law
is replete with standards that can be used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's action on the appreciation
and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable";129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant considerations in
resolving an issue.130
chanrobleslaw

I. C

We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive reading of
the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give life to all the aspirations of all its
provisions.

Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose biological parents are
unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to
one's father or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a
constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.

Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a reasonable
interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established personal circumstances of private
respondent. It could not have asked the impossible of private respondent, sending her on a
proverbial fool's errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose because
private respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her life.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not insist on burdening
private respondent with conclusively proving, within the course of the few short months, the one
thing that she has never been in a position to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it
conscientiously appreciated the implications of all other facts known about her finding. Therefore, it
arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof required in proceedings before
a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of
evidence, but "substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."131 chanrobleslaw

In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the misfortune of having
been abandoned by their biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior, second-class citizens,
the Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and defending the
well-being of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and
equal access to opportunities for public service.

II

Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "[n]o person shall be a
Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."

Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and, therefore, not qualified to
sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose
parents are unknown, private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she
failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the essence of the Constitution's
determination of who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion,
petitioner insists that as private respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never leave
reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply with Republic
Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
and its enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies as
citizens "[t]hose whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims
that, as private respondent's foundling status is settled, the burden to prove Filipino parentage was
upon her. With private respondent having supposedly failed to discharge this burden, the supposed
inevitable conclusion is that she is not a natural-born Filipino.

III

At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have biological
parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they
may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities
where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown. 132 Resolving
this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation.

Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign's purpose so as to

identify which among competing interpretations of the same text is the more contemporarily viable
construction. Primarily, the actual words—text—and how they are situated within the whole
document—context—govern. Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba
legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable. Nevertheless, even when
a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be resorted
to as a means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.

III. A

The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must necessarily begin with the text
itself. The language of the provision being interpreted is the principal source from which this Court
determines constitutional intent.133chanrobleslaw

To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic
precept of verba legis.134 The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was ratified and
approved by a direct act of the People exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a
plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People's
consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. Thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential
for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language
as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.135(Emphasis
supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the
Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework of
the Constitution that animates each of its components through the dynamism of these components'
interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The
Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit—ut magis valeat
quam pereat.136 Each provision must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that
the Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings.137
chanrobleslaw

The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color each provision at the heart
of a controversy in an actual case. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:138
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is
to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.139 (Citations omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has previously considered that
exact same text, if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that "judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal
system."140 Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is
deemed part of or written into the text itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is
because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the text brings to
effect.141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of considering prior interpretation as
immutable.

Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text has evolved. Unless
completely novel, legal provisions are the result of the re-adoption—often with accompanying re-
calibration—of previously existing rules. Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced
as a means of addressing the inadequacies and excesses of previously existing rules.

One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its current iteration with prior
counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of changes in syntax, along with accounting for more
conspicuous substantive changes such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in
enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the
imposition of heavier penalties. The tension between consistency and change galvanizes meaning.

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines,
may be compared with counterpart provisions, not only in earlier Constitutions but even in organic
laws142and in similar mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless still
resonate today.

Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal interpretation must grapple
with the truth that meaning is not always singular and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v.
Commission on Elections,144 this Court explained the place of a holistic approach in legal
interpretation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively) construe to be plainly
evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text on the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for"
evinces no distinction between direct purchasers and those who purchase via subscription schemes;
and, on the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from actually using the word
"subscriber" means that subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The variance in the parties'
positions, considering that they are both banking on what they claim to be the Fair Election Act's
plain meaning, is the best evidence of an extant ambiguity.

Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments absurdity. The
dangers of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and need not be
belabored. These dangers are by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday
conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation on technical rules of
grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can stifle, rather than
facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to bolster.

Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous. In reality,
universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is
static.

The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than parochial:
to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the
envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social ideals. The
latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing
legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution —
saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, we consider not an
abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part,
that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm
that should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read,
depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.145 (Emphasis supplied)
III. B

Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when the
text is capable of multiple, viable meanings.146 It is only then that one can go beyond the strict
boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a
reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to verify or validate the meaning
yielded by such reading.

Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization that the business of
understanding the Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The basic democratic foundation of our
constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of government, and even the People, read the
fundamental law and are guided by it. When competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable
controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with finality at which
interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings, however, judicial
involvement must remain guided by a framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This
same principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory opinions.
Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to
resolve an actual case, may be entertained.147 chanrobleslaw

When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that is, judicial decisions on
similar, but not the very same, matters or concerns),148 as well as thematically similar statutes and
international norms that form part of our legal system. This includes discerning the purpose and aims
of the text in light of the specific facts under consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when
external aids may be consulted—that the supposedly underlying notions of the framers, as articulated
through records of deliberations and other similar accounts, can be illuminating.

III. C

In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring meaning from the supposed
intent of the framers or fathoming the original understanding of the individuals who adopted the
basic document is the weakest approach.

These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation. Moreover, they allow for the
greatest errors. The alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily encompassed or exhaustively
articulated in the records of deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and have not
actively engaged in interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a proposition for reasons
entirely their own and not necessarily in complete agreement with those articulated by the more
vocal. It is even possible that the beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely erroneous
premises. Fathoming original understanding can also misrepresent history as it compels a
comprehension of actions made within specific historical episodes through detached, and not
necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not always uniform with the original
understanding of the People who ratified it. In Civil Liberties Union: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's
understanding thereof.149 (Emphasis supplied)
IV

Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for an
express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical
consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution
provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the
implications of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels.

On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally
governs: the Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of "natural-born citizens." This
definition must be harmonized with Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to
parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case.
The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted
circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent's Filipino parentage.

On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is
substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of
the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending
the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for
public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-born status
for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that
considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international
instruments.

Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement from birth means that
private respondent never had to do anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-
born. Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the
requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the
Republic.

V. A

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the
Philippines: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time

of the adoption of this Constitution;
 (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino

mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with

law.150
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term "natural-born citizens."
This is distinct from Section 1's enumeration of who are citizens. As against Section 1's generic
listing, Section 2 specifically articulates those who may count themselves as natural-born.

The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better appreciated when supplemented
with an understanding of how our concepts of citizenship and natural-born citizenship have evolved.
As will be seen, the term "natural-born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily defined, foreign
concept.

V. B

Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right to have rights."151 It is one's
personal and . . . permanent membership in a political community. . . The core of citizenship is the
capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally through the
right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of
grievance.152chanrobleslaw

Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which one is part.153 Citizenship,
therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits
and protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these benefits and protection have been
enjoyed from the moment of the citizen's birth.

Tecson v. Commission on Elections154 reckoned with the historical development of our concept of
citizenship, beginning under Spanish colonial rule.155 Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects."156 Church records show
that native inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The alternative identification of native inhabitants
as subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial master's regard for native inhabitants as
inferior.157Natives were, thus, reduced to subservience in their own land.

Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory, not just peninsular
Spain, were considered Spaniards, classification, however, did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as
Article 89 expressly mandated that the archipelago was to be governed by special laws.158 It was
only on December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that
there existed a categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens,159 thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they

were born outside of Spain,

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become

domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.160
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were ceded by Spain to the
United States of America under the Treaty of Paris, which was entered into on December 10, 1898.
The Treaty of Paris did not automatically convert the native inhabitants to American
citizens.161 Instead, it left the determination of the native inhabitants' status to the Congress of the
United States: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present
treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom. .
. . In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making . . . a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which
they may reside.

Thus -

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by Congress.162 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who had ceased to be
Spanish subjects were "issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to
the protection of the United States."163 chanrobleslaw

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in legislation in the Philippine Organic Act,
otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902:164
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens
of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the Philippine Islands to its
inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899. However, it did not account for the
status of children born in the Islands to parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was
expressed that the common law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which was
operative in the United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.165 chanrobleslaw

On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. It
was made to include a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship.
This proviso read: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could
become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein.166 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law of 1916, replaced the
Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
amended:167
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was deemed
to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April
11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some
other country."168 chanrobleslaw

There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of acquiring citizenship. It was the
1935 Constitution that made sole reference to parentage vis-a-vis the determination of
citizenship.169 Article III, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provided:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at

the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign

parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines

and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
 (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's provision
stipulating the qualifications for President and Vice-President of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3
read: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-President, unless he be a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the election.
While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did not define the term.

Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with the then civil law provisions that
stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizens lip by women who marry alien husbands—was
discriminatory towards women.170 The 1973 Constitution rectified this problematic
situation: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time

of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the

Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to

the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have renounced her
citizenship.171 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term "natural-born citizen."
Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution provided: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.172 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution on citizenship,
"except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution."173 chanrobleslaw

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the

Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino

mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with

law.174
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous definition of natural-born
citizens, as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign" concept that was transplanted into
this jurisdiction as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility requirements for President and Vice-
President of the Philippines.

In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the term "natural-born citizen"
appears in only a single instance: as an eligibility requirement for the presidency.175 It is not defined
in that Constitution or in American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a requirement for
the presidency are not even found in the records of constitutional deliberations.176 However, it has
been suggested that, as the United States was under British colonial rule before its independence,
the requirement of being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against foreign infiltration in
the administration of national government: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in response to a letter sent by
John Jay to George Washington, and probably to other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the
admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government; and to declare expressly
that the Command in Chief of the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a
natural born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had served valiantly in the
Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the
Jay letter, and the resulting constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the Convention was
concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign monarch.177 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus sanguinis.

V. C

Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and naturalized.

A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines
"from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By
necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal178 articulates this definition by dichotomy: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.179 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept of naturalized citizens
in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or foreigners
who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that
they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to
become Filipino citizens."180
chanrobleslaw

One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is generally required to file a verified
petition.181 He or she must establish. among others, that he or she is of legal age, is of good moral
character, and has the capacity to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has
resided in the Philippines for a significant period of time.182 Further, the applicant must show that he
or she will not be a threat to the state, to the public, and to the Filipinos' core beliefs.183 chanrobleslaw

V. D

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an enumeration. Section 2 categorically
defines "natural-born citizens." This constitutional definition is further clarified in jurisprudence,
which delineates natural-born citizenship from naturalized citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the
Civil Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed written into the interpreted text, thus
establishing its contemporaneous intent.

Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish bloodline is
misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic. It divines Section 1's mere enumeration but
blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding Section's unequivocal definition.

Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on
point. To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must look into whether
she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into
whether she underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino.

She did not.

At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the actual naturalization
process. There is no more straightforward and more effective way to terminate this inquiry than this
realization of total and utter lack of proof.

At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to foundlings, as well as
compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with naturalization. These attempts at analogies are
misplaced. The statutory mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The
investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children, individuals whose capacity to act is
restricted.184 It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an adult filing before the relevant authorities a
sworn petition seeking to become a Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or
she must himself or herself adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on
the immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an
entirely different premise from the restrictive process of naturalization.

So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born status is clear. It should
be with the actual process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against
other procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the unbridled
diminution of the status of citizens.
 V. E

Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.

Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a citizen, either one's
father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.

That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are not
determinative of citizenship.

Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It does not even
require them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One
or both parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.

Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The citizenship of
everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino
bloodline.

Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be sustained by
evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which substantially proves that either or both of one's
parents is a Filipino citizen.

V. F

Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these proceedings attests to how at
least one—if not both—of her biological parents were Filipino citizens.

Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically impossible. To begin with, she
was abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a century ago. By now, there
are only a handful of those who, in 1968, were able-minded adults who can still lucidly render
testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the identification of individuals
against whom DNA evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer economic cost, prohibitive.

However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private respondent to establish her
parentage.

In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v.
People:185
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from which, taken either
singly or collectively, the existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or
probable consequence.186 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial evidence: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact in issue, which by
experience have been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they
lead us to a satisfactory conclusion.188 (Citation omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates when circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal proceedings: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary (a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and cralawlawlibrary
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to
criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in
other proceedings.189 There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence
exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof
in civil and/or administrative proceedings.

In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in
deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal
system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for
such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e.,
substantial evidence.190chanrobleslaw

Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on
September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all—Philippine provinces, had a
predominantly Filipino population.192 Private respondent is described as having "brown almond-
shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face."193 She stands at 5 feet
and 2 inches tall.194Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.

These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her biological parents were
Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in
1968, lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence
of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a
foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and
leave her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless
attest to it.

In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,195 the Solicitor General
underscored how it is statistically more probable that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen
rather than as a foreigner. He submitted the following table is support of his statistical inference:196
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-
2014

FOREIGN CHILDREN FILIPINO CHILDREN

YEAR BORN IN THE BORN IN THE
PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES

1965 1,479 795,415

1966 1,437 823,342

1967 1,440 840,302

1968 1,595 898,570

1969 1,728 946,753

 1970 1,521 966,762

1971 1,401 963,749

1972 1,784 968,385

1973 1,212 1,045,290

1974 1,496 1,081,873

1975 1,493 1,223,837

2010 1,244 1,782,877

2011 1,140 1,746,685

2012 1,454 1,790,367

2013 1,315 1,751,523

2014 1,351 1,748,782

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible]197

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns
were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private respondent was born a
Filipino citizen.

Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents after half a century,
a range of substantive proof is available to sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's
parentage.

VI

Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is sustained by a general

assumption on foundlings arising from a comprehensive reading and validated by a contemporaneous
construction of the Constitution, and considering that we have just discussed the evidence pertaining
to the circumstances of private respondent's birth, it is opportune to consider petitioner's allegations
that private respondent bore the burden of proving—through proof of her bloodline—her natural-born
status.

Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon a mere showing
that she is a foundling is a serious error.

Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that all newborns who have
been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis on private
respondent's supposed burden to prove the circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible
condition. To require proof from private respondent borders on the absurd when there is no dispute
that the crux of the controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is simply not known.

"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." Burden of proof lies on
the party making the allegations;198 that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the
issue"199 Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of
evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor.200 The other
party then bears the "burden of going forward"201 with the evidence considering that which has
ostensibly been established against him or her.

In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who brings the action
and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the controversy. In
proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum
of proof is substantial evidence.202 This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the petitioner
makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.

Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in favor of
petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of private respondent's biological parents are not
known, it does not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.

The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means
substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of evidence to private
respondent.

Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner trivializes other uncontroverted
circumstances that we have previously established as substantive evidence of private respondent's
parentage: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro,

Iloilo;

(2) She was only an infant when she was found,

practically a newborn;

(3) She was-found sometime in September 1968;

(4) Immediately after she was found, private

respondent was registered as a foundling;
 (5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo;
and

(6) Private respondent's physical features are

consistent with those of typical Filipinos.
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive bias. As against
petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more reasonable inference from these facts is that at least
one of private respondent's parents is a Filipino.

VII

Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent with a reading that
harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to
parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are
born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is
substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such countervailing proof
must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's biological parents are not Filipino citizens.

VII. A

Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's Dissenting Opinion to the
assailed November 17, 2015 Decision, petitioner intimates that no inference or presumption in favor
of natural-born citizenship may be indulged in resolving this case.203 He insists that it is private
respondent's duty to present incontrovertible proof of her Filipino parentage.

Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense dictates that actual proof is
preferable. Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based on presumptions is firmly established in
jurisprudence.

In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions. Ruling on the allegations that
former presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not
a natural-born Filipino citizen, this Court proceeded from the presumptions that: first, Fernando Poe
Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870, while the country was still under Spanish
colonial rule;204 and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of residence, as indicated in his dearth
certificate, must have also been his place of residence before death, which subjected him to the "en
masse Filipinization," or sweeping investiture of Filipino citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of
1902.205 This Court then noted that Lorenzo Pou's citizenship would have extended to his son and
Fernando Poe Jr.'s father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then have been a
natural-born Filipino as he was born while the 1935 Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship
to those born to Filipino fathers, was in effect:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.206 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan207 and Go v. Ramos208 (which merely cites Paa)—to
the effect that presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship cases.

Paa, decided in 1967, stated: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of
the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant, of
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
State.209 (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's more recent ruling in Tecson.

Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can be indulged in favor
of theclaimant of Philippine citizenship." This reference to "the claimant" was preceded by a sentence
specifically referencing the duty of "the respondent." The syntax of this Court's pronouncement—
using the definitive article "the"—reveals that its conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his
circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used generic language. Instead of the definite
article "the," it could have used the indefinite article "a" in that same sentence: "no presumption can
be indulged in favor of aclaimant of Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used
other words that would show absolute or sweeping application, for instance: "no presumption can be
indulged in favor of any/everyclaimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no presumption can be
indulged in favor of all claimants of Philippine citizenship."

The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its statements, therefore,
are inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced showing that
respondent Quintin Chan was registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was
likewise registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence already indubitably establish foreign
citizenship and shut the door to any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this case presents no
proof, direct or circumstantial, of private respondent's or of both of her parents' foreign citizenship.

Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it appear that the same
pronouncement was generally applicable: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court
that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged hi favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.210 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation. In any case, Go was
decided by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn Tecson, which was decided by this Court
sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's factual and even procedural backdrops are different from those of this
case. Goinvolved the deportation of an allegedly illegal and undesirable alien, not an election
controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing the Chinese citizenship of Go
and of his siblings were adduced.

VII. B

The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino
father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise)
arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose."211 chanrobleslaw

As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2),
constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in light of
the constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of the
law and equal access to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They must also
be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring natural-born status for select
public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that considers
related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.

Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require the state to enhance
children's well-being and to project them from conditions prejudicial to or that may undermine their
development. Fulfilling this mandate includes preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially,
dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind the veneer of the legal
apparatus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ARTICLE II

....

State Policies

....

SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.

....

ARTICLE XV
The Family

....

SECTION 3. The State shall defend:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary ....

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the Philippines. The 1987
Constitution makes the following offices exclusive to natural-born citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) President;212

(2) Vice-President;213

(3) Senator;214

(4) Member of the House of Representatives;215

 (5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court;216

(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil

Service Commission;217

(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the

Commission on Elections;218

(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the

Commission on Audit;219

(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220

(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng

Pilipinas;221 and

(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on

Human Rights.222
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born citizens include, among others, city
fiscals,223 assistant city fiscals,224 Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of the Sandiganbayan, and
other public offices.225 Certain professions are also limited to natural-born citizens,226 as are other
legally established benefits and incentives.227
chanrobleslaw

Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently
discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to the country in the
highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as
professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These
consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the present politically
charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular politician from
office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens
who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.

If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.

The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities for public
service:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ARTICLE II

....

State Policies

....
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

....

ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

....

ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good. (Emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like circumstances and falling
within the same class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is
a guarantee against 'undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
oppression of inequality.'"228chanrobleslaw

Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial distinction 229 differentiates
foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are both entitled to the full extent of the
state's protection from the moment of their birth. Foundlings' misfortune in failing to identify the
parents who abandoned them—an inability arising from no fault of their own—cannot be the
foundation of a rule that reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens
who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection from the state as those who know their
parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those
who, from the very beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation.

This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to effect the
Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting the well-being and development of children. It is
not our business to reify discriminatory classes based on circumstances of birth.

Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings are human persons whose
dignity we value and rights we, as a civilized nation, respect. Thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ARTICLE II

....

State Policies

....

SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights. (Emphasis supplied)
VII. C

Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of constitutional text,
the presumption that foundlings are natural-born citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial
evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a
parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of the Constitution with acts of Congress,
international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive organs such as the
Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.

Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth. It
has adopted mechanisms to effect the constitutional mandate to protect children. Likewise, the
Senate has ratified treaties that put this mandate into effect.

Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be observed at all times:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary ....

(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures that will
ensure the observance of international standards of child protection, especially those to
which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any authority shall be conducted in the best
interest of the child and in a manner which allows the child to participate and to express
himself/herself freely. The participation of children in the program and policy formulation and
implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government
agency. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of the child" as the "totality of
the circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of
security of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional
development."

Consistent with this statute is our ratification230 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. This specifically requires the states-parties' protection of: first, children's rights to immediate
registration and nationality after birth; second, against statelessness; and third, against
discrimination on account of their birth status.231 Pertinent portions of the Convention
read: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Preamble

The State Parties to the present Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith
in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all
the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status,

Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed
that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,

....

Have agreed as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary ....

Article 2

1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to
each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective
of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property,
disability, birth or other status.

2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the child is
protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the
status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians,
or family members.

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social

welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is
necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his
or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her,
and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.

....

Article 7

1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As
with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty requires that children be allowed
immediate registration after birth and to acquire a nationality. It similarly defends them against
discrimination: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 24. . . .

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required
by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

....

Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between state| in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation."233 Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution,
treaties require concurrence by the Senate before they became binding: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by transformation. It then
has the force and effect of a statute enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:234
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section
21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties
or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to
be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.235 (Emphasis supplied)
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or otherwise, is necessary.
Thereafter, the whole of government—including the judiciary—is duty-bound to abide by the treaty,
consistent with the maxim pacta sunt servanda.

Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of discrimination.
They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them
these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden them,
discriminate them, and undermine their development.

Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being of
children and protecting them from discrimination. Other legislative enactments demonstrate the
intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth.

Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, is formally
entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for
Other Purposes. It was enacted as a mechanism to "provide alternative protection and assistance
through foster care or adoption of every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned."236 chanrobleslaw

Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act No. 8552:237
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the Department or the child-
placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her
unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling
and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared
abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children, and for Other Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes
foundlings among "Filipino children" who may be adopted: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country
adoption, hi order that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents must be
submitted: to the Board:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary a) Child study;

b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;

d) Medical evaluation/history;

e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and cralawlawlibrary

f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of authenticated birth
certificates to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of passports, which will then facilitate their
adoption by foreigners: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified true copy of the Court
Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his original and amended birth certificates as issued by the
OCRG. If the applicant is a minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In case the
applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, the following, shall be required:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of

Abandonment of Child, the Death Certificate of the
child's parents, or the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment executed after the birth of the child.

b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption

Board by the DSWD.

c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling

Certificate.238 (Emphasis supplied)
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino citizenship on account of
their birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without
having to complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens.

Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have recognized her
natural-born status. This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until circumstances
made it appear that she was a viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as
the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent's natural-born status has
been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official public acts.

First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from the domestic adoption
process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010,
the President of the Philippines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson—an office that requires natural-
born citizenship.239 chanrobleslaw

VIII

As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to natural-born citizenship,
petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private
respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when,
following her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied with the requisites of
Republic Act No. 9225.

VIII. A

"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law."240 Commonwealth
Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was naturalized an American citizen on
October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y
naturalization in a foreign country." Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she
was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July
10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of
her Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted.241
chanrobleslaw

Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63242 and Republic Act No.
8171243specifically "to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries."244 chanrobleslaw

The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its own words, to ensure
"that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship."245 This Court shed light on this in Calilung v. Commission on
Elections:246 "[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens
who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country."247 chanrobleslaw

Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and immutable despite
naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect this, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took
effect, are naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship,
although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant
to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for
specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became
citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their
Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with
certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2's declaration of a policy of immutability, this
reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this
reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though it was never lost at all.

VIII. B

Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. It also
facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities."248 However, other conditions must be met for the exercise of other
faculties: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of

suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic
Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing
laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the

Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall

subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and its
duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office; Provided, That they
 renounce their oath of allegiance to the country
where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in

the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice; and

(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed

to any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:

a. are candidates for or are occupying any public

office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or

b. are in active service as commissioned or non-

commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective public
office must comply with all of the following requirements:

First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention or
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born Filipino.249 This also enables the enjoyment of full civil
and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws,
provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied.250 chanrobleslaw

Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,251 Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to
facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.252
chanrobleslaw
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath."253 This, along with satisfying the other qualification
requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.

As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,254 this required sworn renunciation is

intended to complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and
employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law."255 It is also in view of this that Section 5(5)
similarly bars those who seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed
forces of other countries from being appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.

VIII. C

Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.256 Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a
registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan.257 This evidences her compliance with Article V,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this dispensed with the
need to comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation
of American Citizenship.258This was complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United States259 before Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July
12, 2011,260 which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's issuance of a Certificate of
Loss of Nationality on December 9, 2011261 and the approval of this certificate by the Overseas
Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012.262 chanrobleslaw

Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born citizenship; she has also
complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in
Republic Act No. 9225.

VIII. D

It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225
shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate
that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.

To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability as

articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to
erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible
termination of his or her natural-born status.

To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225
reacquire natural-born citizenship. The prefix "re" signifies reference to the preceding state of affairs.
It is to this status quo ante that one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way
things were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the investiture of an entirely new status,
it should not have used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not
operate to make new citizens whose citizenship commences only from the moment of compliance
with its requirements.

Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that repatriation involves the
restoration of former status or the recovery of one's original nationality: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.263 (Emphasis supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its ruling is in keeping
with Republic Act No. 9225 's policy of permanence and immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship."264 In Bengson's words,
the once naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought back to his or her natural-born status. There
may have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he or she was
naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born status expurgates this intervening fact.
Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving
forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening
fact may have consequences de facto.

Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance
and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of
other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself.
Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization as there is no singular, extended process with
which the former natural-born citizen must comply.

IX

To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless265 is not only to set a dangerous
and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice to injustice.

Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social justice are the bedrocks of
our constitutional order. By the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility of
those gave them life, foundlings are compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage.
Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly remedied by any economic relief.

If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never tolerate an interpretation
that condemns foundlings to an even greater misfortune because of their being abandoned. The
Constitution cannot be rendered inert and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.

Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed against other reasonable
interpretations of our basic law. It does command us to consider legal text, but always with justice in
mind.

It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we must always sustain.
Not only will this manner of interpretation edify the less fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a
humane and civilized people.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its constitutional competence when it
ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic.
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision and
Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal
did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015
Resolution.

Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to hold
office as Senator of the Republic.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,

vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ,
BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.

Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.

Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.

Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the
release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to
refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the
return. 2Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit
marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the
Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of
the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless
arrest and detention of the same person.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29
November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further
resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November 1988. 5

Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988.

Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent
Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of
deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a
motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December 1988.

In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 December
1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December
1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.

The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought by
respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending
the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court will
likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988, 9 urgent
motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the memorandum in furtherance of said
motion for release dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988. 12

Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December
1988, 13and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give
petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within which to explain and prove why he should
still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport.15

Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an
earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment
reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.

Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5)
years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite
his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo.
Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the
Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's
Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go
Gallano, 21express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not
left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official
documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However,
pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown that petitioner has
expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only established by the pleadings — they
are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial,
if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of
continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.

While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard
before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the
insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued
Philippine citizenship is meritorious.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other
motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's
motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA, respondents.

Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the
disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by
petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for
the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of
the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration
and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a
holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No.
133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of
private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to
suspend the proclamation.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to show
that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of
Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No.
015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines
dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp.
117-118, Rollo)

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child
of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid
and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing
in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a
registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates.
Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having
been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office
for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to
wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing,
not later than fifteen days before the election.

and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the
petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for
disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it
is clear that said petition was filed out of time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo warranto under
Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent was
proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.

However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold
the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits
of the case, as the COMELEC did below.

Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for
and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing
evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had
lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private
respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any
other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the
petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given
clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner
assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private
respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81,
Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is
considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It
was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier
stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v.
COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.

In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice
Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed that he was
forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos government. The
Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other
Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as
Filipinos.

Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that he was
naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Government through its Consul in
the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.

In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor
of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own
admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they
have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.

In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States
(p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the
electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108,
Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña obtained
Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second
in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is
a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he
has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is
enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a Certification
that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In the
case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as
he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation
needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before
the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact
is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or
allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I concur. I also join in the concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento.

Cortes, J., concur in the result.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, only that he did not
necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American
citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.

For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No.
63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If
he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force of circumstances rather than
choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.

In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply
because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained
an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the
individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.

That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien
Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a
citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the
past regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and
abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate
conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to consider giving up the legal
convenience of dual citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen.
The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really
matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the
question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.

One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof. In
the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation when
the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he renounced all allegiance to all
other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not
only took a similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents in which he stated
that he was not a Filipino.

The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship.
"Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on
"naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her despite
his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly
transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a second time simply for material
convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and
deceitful character.

By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager
resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the
repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may appear to others, it is to me
nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private respondent
claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer is: Was
there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily
registered as an alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following
observations in a separate opinion:

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.
The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register
him as an alien. Gov. Osmeña did.

It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American passport, these
acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is
that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was register with the Philippine government
as an alien within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its
nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to register as an alien.
Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the Republic of the
Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to
consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in
connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed by the statute for the
express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the preference
for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where Philippine
citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest resources
compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty from her
children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what is worse is where he
formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmeña to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of
the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions. But
that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office any person who, although supported
by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.

Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña enjoyed at one time dual
citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an American
(U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the
Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in
Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano 1 express renunciation means a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age, and
with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for registration as an
alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit
manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to
private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re-
enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate of Clearance No. D-
146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private respondent at his request
are predicated on the proposition that private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be
mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City
Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This
document, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that private
respondent is a duly-registered align (American) residing in the Philippines.

Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by
private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified from the records at the CID wherein private
respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this document cannot be underestimated
For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-
entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore,
that private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a
resident alien (American) in the Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien with the Bureau
of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:

SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the approval of this Act,
apply for registration, in the case of those residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration
and in the case of those residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers, or
at any other office designated by the President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh.
A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27
and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the
year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath
as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested
and declared that he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its
laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment on
the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934 — hence,
our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979
when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose
that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private
respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then in 1958,
when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was
41 years old.

Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more
importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to register in person
(and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:

The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall have the duty
of registering such alien: Provided, That whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in
the Philippines he shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)

I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen
or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age
20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.

If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by private
respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention that
vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his Philippine citizenship. But said acts
of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the
Philippine Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's aforesaid
representations, and registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.
The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because this condition or
status assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different countries.
As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the
celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of Philippine
citizenship, for the following reason, among others:

... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual
allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the principle jus soli to
persons born in this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long
run would be detrimental to both countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens. 4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides —

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
(Article IV)

Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe the
result of birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one time or
another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when as a
matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.

Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:

Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results in

questionable loyalties and leads to international conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the
use of citizenship as a badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the
singleness of commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have
a right to choose his own nationality, and this choice should be honored by all countries. However,
he should not be entitled to claim more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine Government which, like
many other countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or public interest to register him at least twice
(and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. The choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and
respected person who must be presumed to have known the full import of his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its
recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.) I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding private respondent herein a Filipino
citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he
was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did. In a number of sworn
statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn
statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino."
Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander. The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions should
be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own
acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989)
and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R. 86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I
cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity, within the fourth civil
degree.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, offly that he did not
necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American
citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.

For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No.
63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If
he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force of circumstances rather than
choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.

In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply
because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained
an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the
individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.

That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien
Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a
citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the
past regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and
abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate
conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to consider giving up the legal
convenience of dual citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen.
The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really
matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the
question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.

One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof. In
the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation when
the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he renounced all allegiance to all
other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not
only took a similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents in which he stated
that he was not a Filipino.

The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship.
"Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on
"naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her despite
his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly
transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a second time simply for material
convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and
deceitful character.

By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager
resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the
repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may appear to others, it is to me
nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private respondent
claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer is: Was
there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily
registered as an alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following
observations in a separate opinion:

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.
The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.

That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register
him as an alien. Gov. Osmeña did.

It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American passport, these
acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is
that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was register with the Philippine government
as an alien within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its
nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to register as an alien.
Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the Republic of the
Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to
consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in
connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed by the statute for the
express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the preference
for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where Philippine
citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest resources
compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love and loyalty from her
children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what is worse is where he
formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmeña to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of
the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions. But
that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office any person who, although supported
by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.

Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña enjoyed at one time dual
citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an American
(U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the
Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held
in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano 1 express renunciation means a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age, and
with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for registration as an
alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit
manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to
private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re-
enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate of Clearance No. D-
146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private respondent at his request
are predicated on the proposition that private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be
mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City
Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This
document, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that private
respondent is a duly-registered alien (American) residing in the Philippines.

Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by
private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified from the records at the CID wherein private
respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this document cannot be underestimated.
For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-
entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore,
that private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a
resident alien (American) in the Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien with the Bureau
of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
 SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the approval of this Act,
apply for registration, in the case of those residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration
and in the case of those residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers, or
at any other office designated by the President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh.
A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27
and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the
year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath
as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested
and declared that he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its
laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment on
the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934-hence, our
mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he
re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he
was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private
respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then in 1958,
when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was
41 years old.

Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more
importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to register in person
(and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:

The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall have the duty
of registering such alien: Provided, That whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in
the Philippines he shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)

I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen
or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age
20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.

If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by private
respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention that
vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his Philippine citizenship. But said acts
of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the
Philippine Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's aforesaid
representations, and registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because this condition or
status assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different countries.
As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the
celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of Philippine
citizenship, for the following reason, among others:

... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual
allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the principle jus soli to
persons born in this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long
run would be detrimental to both countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens. 4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides-

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
(Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe the
result of birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one time or
another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when as a
matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.

Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:

Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results in

questionable loyalties and leads to international conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the
use of citizenship as a badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the
singleness of commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have
a right to choose his own nationality, and this choice should be honored by all countries. However,
he should not be entitled to claim more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine Government which, like
many other countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or public interest to register him at least twice
(and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. The choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and
respected person who must be presumed to have known the full import of his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its
recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.), I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding private respondent herein a Filipino
citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he
was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did. In a number of sworn
statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn
statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino."
Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions should
be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own
acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27976 December 7, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANSELMA AVENGOZA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-27977 December 7, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANSELMA AVENGOZA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

German G. Vilgera for defendant-appellant.

RELOVA, J.:

Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho a Chinese, his wife Anselina Avengoza and the latter's mother Gavina Avengoza,
were charged in Criminal Case No. 6201 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur with violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended, in the information which reads:

That during the period comprised between July 19, 1954 and April 1957, in the Municipalities of
Libmanan and Sipocot province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Anselina Avengoza and Go Gam ahas Luistro Sancho being
Chinese citizens, who as such are barred from acquiring private agricultural lands in the Philippines
and with deliberate intent to defraud, mislead, and for the evident purpose of evading Section 5 of
Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
for their own benefits and for profits, utilize as a dummy their co-accused Gavina Avengoza, a
Filipino citizen, who in turn deliberately allowed and permitted herself to be used as such dummy in
the acquisition and sale of private agricultural land described as follows, to wit:

Six parcels of land situated in the municipality of Sipocot province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, embraced in and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 3105, 3323, 3338,
3348, 3621 and 3223 of the said municipality.

One (1) parcel of land situated in the municipality of Libmanan, province of

Camarines Sur, Philippines, embraced in and covered by Tax Declaration No. 6979
of said municipality.

by making it appear in the instruments of conveyance that the said Gavina Avengoza was the real
purchaser, when in truth and in fact, the true vendees are the then-accused Anselina Avengoza and
Go Gam, as a result of which the latter were able to possess and own real properties and have
profited themselves by the aid of their coaccused Gavina Avengoza.

Acts contrary to law.

In Criminal Case No. 6643 of the same court, Anselina Avengoza was charged together with Rafaela Alfante of
violation of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 108 in an information which reads:
 That on or about the 12th day of February 1950 in the municipality of Sipocot province of Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rafaela Alfante, who is
a Filipina citizen and being then the owner of a private agricultural land registered under original
certificate of Title No. 289 situated in said municipality and the ownership of which is expressly
reserved by the Constitution or the laws to the citizens of the Philippines, did, then and there
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cede transfer and convey by way of deed of sale said
property to accused Anselina Avengoza, a Chinese citizen and who, knowingly aids, assists or abets
in the consummation or perpetration of the aforementioned sale, then an alien by reason of lawful
marriage with Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho a Chinese citizen, who as such is barred from acquiring
private agricultural lands in the Philippines.

Acts contrary to law.

All the accused pleaded not guilty and the two cases were tried jointly .

While the cases were pending in the lower court, the accused Gavina Avengoza and Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho
died; thus trial continued only as regard Anselina Avengoza and Rafaela Alfante.

Counsel for the said accused subsequently filed a motion for leave to withdraw their plea of not guilty and to be
permitted to file a motion to quash alleging that accused Anselina Avengoza had reacquired her Philippine
citizenship by repatriation, by reason whereof the criminal liability of said accused and that of the remaining
defendant Rafaela Alfante, if any, was thereby extinguished; and that the issue in the criminal cases had thus been
rendered moot and academic.

The trial court allowed defendants to withdraw their plea, admitted and found defendants' motion to quash
meritorious, and ordered the dismissal of the two cases, with costs de oficio. Reason for the dismissal is principally
predicated on the trial court's opinion that defendant Anselina Avengoza has validly reacquired her Philippine
citizenship.

From the said order, the plaintiff appealed to this Court and claimed that the trial court has committed the following
errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED, ANSELMA AVENGOZA, BY
EXECUTING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
REGISTERING IT WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY OF SIPOCOT CAMARINES SUR HAD
LEGALLY REPATRIATED HERSELF AND THEREBY REACQUIRED HER PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, HAVING REACQUIRED HER PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY REPATRIATION, ANSELMA AVENGOZA'S TITLE OVER THE AGRICULTURAL
LANDS PURCHASED BY GAVINA AVENGOZA FOR HER AND HER HUSBAND, BECAME
LAWFUL AND VALID AS OF THE DATE OF THEIR CONVEYANCE OR TRANSFER TO HER AND
HER ALIEN HUSBAND, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT AS A RESULT OF SAID REPATRIATION
THE CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITTED BY HER AND HER HUSBAND, AND THOSE WHO AIDED
THEM TO POSSESS THOSE LANDS, HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED.

We find merit in this appeal. Records show that defendant Anselina Avengoza merely executed an that of allegiance
to the Philippine Republic, filed it with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Sipocot Camarines Sur on October
18, 1966, and the trial court considered it sufficient for her to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation. Section
4 of Commonwealth Act 63 provides that would be repatriate should show by conclusive evidence that he or she
has the qualifications to be so repatriated. Without such conclusive proof, he or she has to file with the proper Court
of First Instance a petition for repatriation.
Pertinent sections of Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides:

Section 2. How Citizenship may be reacquired:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corps: Provided That a woman who lost her
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with this Act after
the termination of the marital status:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Commonwealth (now Republic) of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry.

Sec. 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for the proper enforcement of
this Act. ...

And, the Rules and Regulations issued by The Department of Justice on July 1, 1937, pursuant to Section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 governing the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, provide:

Rule 3. Any person who has lost his or her Philippine citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
events:

1. By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and

2. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the law in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality.

Anyone wishing to reacquire his or her Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 63, shall file an application with any Court of First Instance setting forth his
name and surname; his present and former places of residences; his occupation; the place and date
of his birth; whether single or married, in the case of deserter of the Army, Navy, or Air Corps, and if
married, the name, age; and birth place, and residence of his wife and each of the children. In the
case of a woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien, the
applicant shall state the date and place of her marriage, the nationality of her former husband, and
the cause of the dissolution of the marriage. The petition must be supported by the affidavit of at
least two persons stating that they are citizens of the Philippine Islands, and that said petitioner, in
their opinion, has all the qualifications necessary to be repatriated. lf after the hearing the court
believes in view of the evidence taken that the petitioner has all the qualifications required by
Commonwealth Act No. 63, it shall require the petitioner to take in open court the following oath of
allegiance: ... "and shall order the registration of such oath in the proper civil registry through the
clerk of court. "

Defendant Avengoza's sole evidence on record to support her repatriation is her oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. No evidence has been presented to show conclusively that she has the right to be repatriated
under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his brief, "to sustain the
findings of the trial court on this point would establish a very dangerous precedent as any alien woman married to a
Chinese citizen can easily "acquire" Philippine citizenship upon the death of her Chinese husband by merely
executing an oath of allegiance to the Republic and filing the same with the local civil registry even if she does not
possess the required citizenship." Defendant Anselina Avengoza became an alien by reason of her lawful marriage
to a Chinese citizen; however, this does not necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen previous to such
marriage. Thus, she should first prove her citizenship previous to her marriage and as there is no conclusive proof of
this matter on record, this question must be judicially determined before she can be legally repatriated.
Further, even Filipino citizens can be criminally liable under the anti-dummy law; and, aliens violating said law are
not exempted from criminal liability upon becoming a Filipino citizen.

Finally, the sales in favor of alien Anselina Avengoza, through a dummy, of various parcels of land are void for being
contrary to public policy. And, like an alien who became a naturalized Filipino citizen, her repatriation did not exempt
her from criminal liability for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the lower
court for trial on the merits.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.

LEE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.

FRIVALDO, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be
declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive
elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his
alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru
repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in
favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid
votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post
inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds
the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari
and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission
on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19,19952 and another
Resolution of the Comelec en bane promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995elections. On March
23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec
docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding
any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that
his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the
Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition:6

"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a
citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled."

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after
the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the
elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the
aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and
a Certificate of Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained
by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

RaulR.Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying
for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on
June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly,
at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No.
95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath
of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there
was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-
Governor not Lee should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having
garnered the highest number of votes, and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is)
qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT

the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor
of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest
number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass,
proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the
highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June
30,1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office
of Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the
Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon
the due implementation thereof."

On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en
banc in its Resolution14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present
petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued
on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status
quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions":15
"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the
exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;

Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and
rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;

Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive
as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and

Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's
proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of
which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:

1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from
running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a
citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the
proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However,
Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election." (Italics supplied.)

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered
"within the period allowed by law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
 Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition
for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law
is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755
since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate
question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of
the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.

The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be
given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing

bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that : said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed
Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon,
considering that they were not rendered within ( the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal
issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:

"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized
cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses
the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of
Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him,
to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was
rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor
by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000
in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially
declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular
mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon
and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now
boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring
citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General
himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as
counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able
private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the
provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists
that henot Leeshould have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when
the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that
time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with serious defects,
which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her
memorandum dated March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino
directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your
functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated
April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics
be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious
that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum
based on the copy furnished us by Lee did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D.
725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not
even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of
statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not
be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are
clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-
making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special
Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other
words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress once
createdto deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully
couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal
to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such
as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 x x
x (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x," which "prevented a
judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his
application for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacanang Palace on August
17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was
reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing
his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the
Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was
"indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor
General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply
baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a
list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3,
1996.
 On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the
proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings
were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are
not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 29 itself
requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said
decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike
in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire
his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen
who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in
the United States a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron
clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace and who, after
the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in
returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were
granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism
vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's
repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the
Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid,
nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date
of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R.
10465430 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that
only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to Public office" Obviously, however, this
was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was
valid or not and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be
invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT
resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of
age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist
of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least
twenty three years of age on election day).
 Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day32 the term
of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified
to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities
thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native
Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our
law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too,
even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that
Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time
of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists?
Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age
and residence should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to
govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term in this case, on June
30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if
the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not
end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim
or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship
qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of
his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument34 to
the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate
(or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from
requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he
be a "registered voter." And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines.
So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one if he
was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If
the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent
with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a
SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that
the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if
being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter
requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate
the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA
OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized
that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does
not require him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the core of this
"qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that
the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not
anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasizedand Lee has not disputed that he
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been
sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May
8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo
has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he
voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed
(sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous
elections including on May 8,1995.37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be
elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from
the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate
of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code38 gives any voter, presumably
including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy
on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet
the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy
of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning
candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken
cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation
(8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having
taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have
been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes
in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous
"judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general
rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES
NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers,
or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some
technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily
retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing
acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x
(and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain
evils x x x By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past
events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts
which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies
or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate
in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the
legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides
for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725
expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63,
as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination
of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new
provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship
xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right
to these womenthe right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture,
which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a
new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to
the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious
and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now
re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:

"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are
intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the
death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and
other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus
its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative."

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is
unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation.
"(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it
should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the
terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those
persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and
jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right
equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the
fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to
make it effect the evident purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so
applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some
vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725,
which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted
therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his
Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later,
on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given
retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17,
1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally
guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect
and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of
such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be
made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in
the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative
authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust
or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown
that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested
right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a
liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality
should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice
to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of
time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced
his American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This
should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be
presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and
grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were
filed.48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of
prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the
mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's
repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in
connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum
between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should
now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating
Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e.,
on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election
(May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become
moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be
deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his Filipino citizenship
restored as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as
of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity
of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?"49 We
answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his
Filipino citizenship."50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51

"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took
his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992,
and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA
No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995
"became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995, no restraining order
having been issued by this Honorable Court."54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the
elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment
disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes
were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory
way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as
an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and
holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was
rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and
can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division)
in its assailed Resolution:55

"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no
record of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8,
1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30,
1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a
citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with
the 1992 elections."

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a

person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire,
or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:

"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative

case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again,
as the occasion demands."

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction

Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in
SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained
by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case."
Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC
No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day
reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an
election protest or a quo warranto action."
 This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power
to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length
on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may
entertain, suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear
and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is
one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:

"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been
proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA
513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption
that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office
cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing
Aguam vs.COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done
within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed
only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly
acquired jurisdiction over the same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following
reasons:

First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the
choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, xxx just that,
a second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this
Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:

"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast
their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have
waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number
of votes may be deemed elected."

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was
alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the
electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no
less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of
the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's
certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case."

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this
case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the
Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as
there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec
issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others
can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the
electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged
disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other words,
that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him,
he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and not
Leeshould be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again,
"obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:

"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his

citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections,
henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and
should now be corrected.

The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec
(Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11,
1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were
rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code which reads as follows:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election" (italics supplied.)
 This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division)
on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his
election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even
after the elections, thus:

"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the -winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (Italics supplied)

Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that
President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension
(not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal
is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend
or abrogate an existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in
the first Frivaldo case;64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No.
725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx repatriation" He also contends that by
allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect
this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen.
We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed
earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for
the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in
1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question
the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a
false material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states
his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no
quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the
Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because
they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section
78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try
and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us
on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory," we note that just like us, Mr. Justice
Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295." One other point. Loong, as
quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must
be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with
the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be
decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that
a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that
a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If
we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of
determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his
supervening repatriation has changed his political status not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the
1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose
American citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining
who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are
not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are
its own citizens not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec
made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by
Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding
and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo
in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for
being an American was publicly known." First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for
such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post
facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court
were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How
then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that
the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by
candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest.
We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par.
(b) to (f) refer to "candidates." If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to
"candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of
differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant
that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it
would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other
qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation
on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the
oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship.
We do not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should
be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all
purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective"
in reference to Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice
Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already
taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to
uphold the Rule of Law." We agree we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the
issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can
be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of
how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit;
the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation
or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious
choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty
than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected
candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and
an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full
force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly
granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature
of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent
behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and
political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be
given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of
which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of
law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of
office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of
course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is
not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again,
we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
 This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of doubt, political
laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the
sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:

"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations
omitted)."67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and
refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our
democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral
choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices
to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning
candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility
and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The
Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him
still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter
before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec
that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual
citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real
essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It
proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the
ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed
the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to
evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique
situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought
American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot
seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first
opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people
of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this
Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization
bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-
assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit,
in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire
to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty
to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice
and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of
a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted,
nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but
beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can
be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the
indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their
overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of
the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28,
MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.

Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared private respondent, Juan G.
Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in

these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were
consolidated since they principally involve the same issues and parties.

G.R. No. 104654

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section
25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private respondent as a
Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify
the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G.
Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).
In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed
the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three
consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The
order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested
his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of
candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be
cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).

The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to
February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.

On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the following
documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The
Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation
issued by the National Press Club with private respondent’s picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of
Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of
Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records Management
and Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of
Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H").

Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen

of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and
privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).

On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo, p.
34).

On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by
Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new
trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.

After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly
with the Supreme Court.

G.R. No. 105715

This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the
COMELEC, which dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to annul the
proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon.

Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor of the
Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-National
Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.

Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.

On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent as
Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose
grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent
is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor of private respondent be
considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner.

On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having been
filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the
board of canvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings was three days.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the
fundamental issue of private respondent’s disqualification in the guise of technicality.

Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent’s name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena,
Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was as American citizen.

Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive because the
case is still on appeal before us.

Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondent’s proclamation as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondent’s name from the list of candidates for the position of governor; (3)
the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for private
respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking his oath and
assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending
disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, against private respondent.

G.R. No. 105735

This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII
of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining order. The parties herein are identical with the parties in
G.R. No. 105715.

In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a petition
for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo,
the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).

The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to
run as candidate for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court’s decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3)
that assuming the decision to be valid, private respondent’s oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same day
the questioned decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year waiting
period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on
February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date of the last publication of the order and petition.
The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy and the deletion of his name
from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.

In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations therein and averred: (1) that
Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which private respondent was aspiring, had no
standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid;
and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter.

Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37.).

On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy must be decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v. Commission on
Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided
(Rollo,
p. 50).

The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the
decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of
disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.

The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time, thus its failure to
immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond
its control. It also assumed that the same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it a
petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto proceedings sought private respondent’s
disqualification because of his American citizenship.

II

G.R. No. 104654

We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondent’s citizenship.

In his comment to the State’s appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654, private
respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled him to seek
political asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.

He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However,
he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost
their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship
of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of
several members of the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of
his political rivals.

He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without publication, was made
without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the
court was jam-packed.

It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the public was well-
informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.

Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance, private
respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity to
investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do
so. In his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both
private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites his achievement as a freedom fighter and a former
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization
proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to
decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and
discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide
a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of
a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure
to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation
respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six
terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of

the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to
decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and
discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide
a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of
a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure
to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation.
Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and
posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55
SCRA 724 [1974]).

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization
Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines
for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he
will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine
citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification
therefor.

The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).

Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good
moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private
respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said
law.

The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set
ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the
petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was
allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance
without observing the two-year waiting period.

A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the
Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision
(Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).

Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be
executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the
country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has
not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.

Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the petition for
naturalization before its finality.

G.R. No. 105715

In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the
petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said
petition assails the en banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a
petition to annul private respondent’s proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings and composition of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant
of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a
duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the three-day
period for questioning the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.

The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue — the disqualification of private respondent to be
proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo warranto.
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning
the respondent’s title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the
ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained that
"qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure; once any of the required
qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."

Petitioner’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local
Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We
can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he
had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and that
he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985];
Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).

G.R. No. 105735

In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735 moot
and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R.
No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE
his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision
becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989

RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents

Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.

Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his
citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is
not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this
matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.

It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of
the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of
P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown
that the petition was indeed filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no question that this petition must be
granted and the challenge abated.

The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition
for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date.
This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself
alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done
beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:

SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of a Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the election.

The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of
the COMELEC providing that —

Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of a filing fee in
the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as required by law.

and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is essential to the
timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this effect, specifically Manchester
v. Court of Appeals. 1

For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it was
flied ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate
Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a
pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it
was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo
warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid
the filing fee on that date.

The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-
proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed suspended
under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after
publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not
retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.

In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing
fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC,
promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent counters
that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988
local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996
took effect only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its
Section 30 provides in part:

Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. — The rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in the
Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on
time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency
of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the
payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was
even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in
the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.

The petitioner forgets Tañ;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became effective "immediately upon
approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case that publication was still necessary under
the due process clause despite such effectivity clause.

In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have been is not
imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely
payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:

This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the payment of the said fee within
a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed.

The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20,
1988, thus:

Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees above prescribed are not paid,
the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or
the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for
failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as
"a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public
office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the
reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo
warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering the
necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we
shall directly address it now in this same action.

The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:

From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear that our sole
function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be
deemed pro forma.But going over the extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately
impressed that substantial justice may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon
such a technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the
parties, very ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually
competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of justice by broadening the scope
of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for us to end the
basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing, however, with procedural steps
which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6

xxx

While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby allowing the period
for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to
the proper court which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the
length of time that this case has been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v.
Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:

... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial
court only to have its decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and
from there to this Court. (p. 43)

Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141,
January 29, 1988), we stated that:

... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate the rendition of a
verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in referring the case back to the Court of
Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved will not change, nor should the ultimate
judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the
controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil.
57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA
575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162). Sound lâwphî1.ñèt

practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to
the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v.
Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of
justice so demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21
SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case,
the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and act with finality. 7

xxx

Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends
of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an
 early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the
parties. 8

This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that
a foreigner is holding a public office.

We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:

In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own"
private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has
not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by reason of prejudgment, from resolving
the petition for quo warranto filed by private respondent still pending before it? 9

This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this case.

Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's
citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be
a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on
September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11

The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate
Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition
"without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner
Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have
been made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an
Australian.

The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano
and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is important to observe that in the proceeding
before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen
of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married
an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this
country in 1980.

On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the Australian Government
dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of
that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:

I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and
sealed by the Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter
of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby
provide the following statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the
Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the
statement is true and correct.

STATEMENT

A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in the Philippines
to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal
requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28
July 1976.

B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must take an oath of
allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ...,
renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily have any effect on his former
nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws of his former country.
 C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on
the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.

D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.

E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50 of Australian
Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading information of a material
nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution was successful,
he could be deprived of Australian citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.

F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian citizenship:

(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the
Australian Citizenship Act, or

(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act other than
marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN
EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.

(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul

This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private respondent by the
Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13

Sir:

With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry made with the
Australian Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following
information:

1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.

2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath of
allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance.

Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant
Secretary

The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian reading as follows:

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors
according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an
Australian citizen. 14

and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:

AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that I will be
faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs
 and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my
duties as an Australian citizen. 15

The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained
Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before
the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-
323985. 16 He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was
granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of
Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the
barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18

The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the
petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined in this finding. We reject this ruling
as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts,
let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he performed these acts.

The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses Labo's political affiliation
with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.

There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this
too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several
cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's comment.
Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.

The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of
Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because
of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and
positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above.
Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the
Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."

The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not
divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA
No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is
also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found
that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his
Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between
him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may
have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically
reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization
as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with
PD No. 725, providing that:

... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by
Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
 allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien
certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of
the Philippines.

The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the
Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was
therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code
providing in material part as follows:

Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one
year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English,
Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.

The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of
the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not
as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that
locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia,
or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified
only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held
by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the
office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently
lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from
running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can
replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest
number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default.
That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with three dissenting 24 and another two reserving
their vote. 25 One was on official leave. 26

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case
of Geronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the
doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the Court 29 without any
dissent, although one reserved his vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on leave. 32 There the Court
held:

... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried
 unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris
2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.

It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless
gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he
must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other
attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he
sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect
to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by
it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be
restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he
solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be
accomplished by election to public office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and
surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griñ;o-
Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen."[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence,
he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country." Said provision of law reads:

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the
armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if
either of the following circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said
foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering
said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto,
states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided,
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed
forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall
not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the
period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment
of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as
a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan
in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson
III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member
of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of
the Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring
respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998
elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated
April 27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite
the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on
his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact
that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally
restore his natural-born status.[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his
Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by
repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was
repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
 (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring
citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person
who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which
repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications[12] and none of the disqualifications[13] provided by
law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two
(2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has
(1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted
of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 63.[16]Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications[17] and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;[20] (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring
to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that
he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that
fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines. [Italics in the original.][25]

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
 In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of
the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which
provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces
of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local
Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act
to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born
citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen
from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino
mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were
not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine
citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After
defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1)
those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required
by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over
the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that
of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness
of the assailed decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED
WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official
tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop
respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens
Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended,
and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads:

SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:

"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen
(18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens
of the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
 (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they
renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens;
and/or

(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.

SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other
section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2)
Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?

We shall discuss these issues jointly.

Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep.
Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all
Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without
losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the
Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The
OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former
Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant
taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical
affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3

In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the
intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act
No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative
deliberations reveals the following:
 xxxx

Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - - the retention of foreign
citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships
and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public
interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship
and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution…

Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance
as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by
requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines
to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine
government will have no concern and competence over.

Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance is involved.

Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill, which did not require an
oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the
Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained.

xxxx

Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign citizenship and
therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine
government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.

Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is
not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House.

xxxx

Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national interest should be
dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the
Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions
of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other
citizenship.

Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely
renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had
left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the
last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the
problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No.
9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow
dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act
No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was
not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of
dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He
further contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through
Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual
citizenship.7

For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be
dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any
jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.8

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a
law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had
already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual
citizenship.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious
of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose
of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance.12 The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED
 EN BANC
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. G.R. No. 162759
MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A.
ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, Present:
REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A.
PUNO,
CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT,
QUISUMBING,
MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Petitioners,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
- versus -
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
August 4, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or
dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be
allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003[1] (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be
ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.

The facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225
which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004
national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification
as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States
that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 [2],
they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence
requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different
Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence
restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be
eligible to vote in future elections.

Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling
in Macalintal vs. COMELEC [3] on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:

Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality , it is the Commission's position
that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL
for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-
acquired their citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now
stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among
others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. [4]

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to
the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner
Nicolas-Lewis et al., [5] filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC
filed a Comment,[6] therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners
were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.

On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of
Comment), therein stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care
to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004
elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.[7]

The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot
and academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned.
The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of
allowing duals to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains
unresolved.
Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the issues, the same
may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have
meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as
absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition.

In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on the right of
suffrage is, therefore, indicated.
We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as
follows:

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. xxx.

SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility

factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system
wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency
prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.

In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL[8] - identifying in its
Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot, as follows:
Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by
law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-
president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;

(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged
allegiance to a foreign country;

(c) Those who have [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have been found
guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, .;

(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also
state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the
 cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent
by competent authority . (Words in bracket added.)

Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism.
However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent
residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section
5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge on the ground that, as narrated
in Macalintal, it -

violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding an election. [The challenger] cites Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals [9] to support his claim [where] the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the
[US] is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.

[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the
Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or
alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the
right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess
the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.[10] (Words in bracket
added.)

As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly
on the strength of the following premises:

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies
an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country because
immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in
his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad
to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned
his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V
that all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise
the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise,
if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of
origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates
 the Constitution that proscribes provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise. [11]

Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress
enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

xxx xxx xxx

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity
of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship ;

3) xxx xxx xxx.

(4) xxx xxx xxx;

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the

armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of
suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.

Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to the same
Section 5 (1) providing that duals can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to political rights,
only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and
other existing laws.Capitalizing on what at first blush is the clashing provisions of
the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires residency in the Philippines
for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino non-resident absentee voting
rights,[12] COMELEC argues:
4. DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is logical. The
duals, upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign
citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their
legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a
second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, duals must, for purposes of voting, first of
all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile through positive acts; [13]

The Court disagrees.

As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 -
requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before
they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that
duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that
granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in
essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency
requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus,
wrote the Court in Macalintal:

It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise
as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of
origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad
whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for
the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V]
immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication
in statutory construction, , the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with
respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified
Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy
the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found
in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which
became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the
constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the
Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution .
xxx xxx xxx
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in
the Philippines. They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so
they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee
amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any
effect on this?

Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various
fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of
residence is synonymous with domicile.

As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to return to one's
home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the
Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example,
but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a
resident of the Philippines under this law.

This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that
Congress must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.

If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding

physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our
offshore kababayan, Mr. President.

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article
V, it reads: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.

The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other words,
anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be
anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they
cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification.

xxx xxx xxx

Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election.
 Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.

I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . We are separated only by a creek. But

one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six
months. That is how restrictive our Constitution is. .
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do
so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise,
he is not qualified to vote.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already
well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason
Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year
residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which
authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency
requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember.

The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence residency has
been interpreted as synonymous with domicile.

But the third more practical reason, is, if

we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and
constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who
do not physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous
because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise them and
empower them to vote. [14] (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations
omitted)

Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the poll
body:

1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently
expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries, subject, however, to
the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225; [15]

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope
of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now
exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee
voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:
Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise
their right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote
under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of
R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be
deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity
of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.

It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) yea
rs of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of "duals" may
nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of
the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present
day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress
could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds
that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under
the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the
COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government
Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that
respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization
as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity
to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which
contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented
in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been
using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado
left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back
in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of
21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his
answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as
evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy
Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has
been conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010
stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985
to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
 4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan
stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974
and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a
registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that
Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence
to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-
year residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a
Filipino citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225,
Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his
US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn
a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim
that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in
the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to
travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for
Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section
44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following
contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of
Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount
to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country
other than the Philippines;
 3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport,
and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First
Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have
been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En
Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44
of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of
Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the
highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration.
Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already
been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be
prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646,
the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation
of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows
intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went
on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it
agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification,
and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010,
which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s
Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship
as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent
became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as
there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he
has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his
oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the
conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original
citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the
present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply
for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a
Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of
his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This
fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same
for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31,
2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the
respondent used whatever is within his control during that time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is
not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine
citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under
said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to
continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus,
in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a
Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of
expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United
States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his
previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only
his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of
complying with the requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if
he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that
respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the
qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of
votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before
election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest
number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi
suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they
ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010
mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that
Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding
of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of
Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming
that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the
respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the
subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against
Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and
the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the
petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings
for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already
ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in
Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not
deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not
appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that
the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run
for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic,
Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the
foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in
effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner
on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar
sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath
of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for
a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive;
it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office,
as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required
by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an
implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take
not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship
in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights
and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification
under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009
until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of
the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens
the citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the
twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from
running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office
would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of
his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport
three (3) months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as
a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of
Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of
this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine
passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the
COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he
was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his
foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the
use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport
does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag
and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek
election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the
public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted
the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the
principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-
examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who
loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that
office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio
was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912,
without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-
election absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a
decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations,
thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former
case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to
have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case
the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who
received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or
the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be
that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must
retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single
individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word,
because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality
of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without
jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of
votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the
judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality
of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his
stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last
general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no
effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs.
So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It
was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As
an independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who
received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate,
he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other
intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he
may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public
office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of
votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary
rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe
his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis
supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in
Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in
favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of
candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before
elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with
the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with
the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the
basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the
OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the
resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a
candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if
they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification,
and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the
electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise
respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral
anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter
in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
1âw phi 1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot
produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an
election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and
even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also
be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those
who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any
of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm
of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that
further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to
the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer
among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The
subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his
answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the
elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected,
from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino
and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public
office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from
participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from
the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect
his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were
conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared
to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as
the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2
February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified
from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already ended
on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no
longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnado’s
election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Court’s Decision dated April
16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated
that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant
question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of
expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus
claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an
American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation
repudiates this claim.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which must be presented as public documents2 of a foreign
country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof."3 Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading
does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a person who
is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by
using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."4
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code calls for
application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not
only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of
any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnado’s disqualification to run for any local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act."5 This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)6 requires those
who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign
citizenship.

This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code7 which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position,
indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To
allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport – which indicates
the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national – even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign
citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship
from running for local elective positions.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country
which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named
therein as its national.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American
citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado’s renunciation of his American citizenship when
he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal.
The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one
making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign
passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of
taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country". On the contrary, this Court
1âwphi1

has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino
citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not
supported by substantial evidence.8 They are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon
this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence
before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.9

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at
least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which
found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Arnado’s claim that he only used
his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc
argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12
January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using his
U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-American. Adding these two
travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S.
passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July
2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine
passport was not yet issued to him for his use."10 This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado
claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use his U.S.
passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnado’s travel records show that he presented his
U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted
by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the U.S.
passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnado’s continued use of his U.S.
passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.

It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos are
qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign
citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual
citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby
DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari
filed by Renato M. David (petitioner). Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of
probable cause.

The factual antecedents: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon
their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they
purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they
constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion
where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject land
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he
is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the
petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225,4(R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate
General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare
himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who
misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority
to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between
him and private respondent’s family.

On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable
cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review
he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was
void ab initio.8
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ
which held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices
to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or
intended to injure a third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information
for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant
of arrest was issued against the petitioner.

On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an
Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of
the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a
distinction between those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their
Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act No.
6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have
been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC
concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the
motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him relief on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that
since his application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in
Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired
Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion
for reconsideration.14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the
person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the
court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal
fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-
acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost
on account of said naturalization.

In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification was already
consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent
oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act
which was long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.

On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari after finding
no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any remedy
or recourse because he can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino
citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such
conviction.

SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
 A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has
disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and
that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction
“deemed not to have lost” it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the
time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.

B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to
surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to
Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his
wife and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him
before the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process.18

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument regarding the retroactivity
of R.A. 9225 is without merit. It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the retroactivity of one’s re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of
herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the present
situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged,
much less proved, that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he
made the declaration in the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that
in falsification of public document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third
person be present. As to petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which may
be properly raised and proved in a full-blown trial.

On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that
in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of
Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction by
his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and personal
evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the evidence
submitted before the court.

In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for
representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition
of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied
petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused (petitioner).

R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said
law read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,

natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
(Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another
country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase
“under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-
born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall
re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath.
The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who
became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first
group, and “retain” for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of
Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and
“retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a
foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares,
R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and
allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining
Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took
the oath of allegiance under the new law.

Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He
asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred
because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes
more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been understood by the
accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He further cites
the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that
his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.

These contentions have no merit.

That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship was made
clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon
was responding to the query of Representative Exequiel Javier: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate version, “Any
provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after
the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by reason of their
naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.

REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens who
acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their
citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act
are considered to have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born
citizens who became, let’s say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered
natural-born?

Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship before the
effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens because they have just reacquired their
citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and
reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon
the effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their
citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.

The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances. So
that’s the distinction.

REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making distinctions between
natural-born citizens. Because this is very important for certain government positions, ‘no, because
natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.

REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of the provisions, yes. But
just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization.
Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth
Act 63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225,
he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who
lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual
citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of
allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came
into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign
citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the
second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.

As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to Section
3 on the particular application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.

Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise misplaced.
Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle
that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the RPC
refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of
falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public

officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position;

(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification

enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and

(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official

or commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen
at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under
CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the
falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his
dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for
falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying
petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest.
However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application
for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court
discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing
of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. cralawred

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over
the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but
is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One
can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his
trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of
the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

xxxx

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a
general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.

xxxx

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of
probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC’s order, the RTC correctly ruled that no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail
of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now
intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and
Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any
of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for
the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

 SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of
the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral
and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys
and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This
means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of
the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens
save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake
his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 170603 January 29, 2007

EDISON SO, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
80437 which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, in Naturalization Case
No. 02-102984. Likewise assailed is the appellate court’s Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of its
Decision.

Antecedents

On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization 3 under Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the following in his
petition:

He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St.,
Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with
free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is
exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended, because he was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school
recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government and culture are taught; he is a person of good
moral character; he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution; he has conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living; he has mingled socially with the Filipinos
and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people; he
has all the qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473,
as amended; he is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; he is not defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of men’s ideas; he is not a
polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy; he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude; he is not suffering from any incurable contagious diseases or from mental alienation; the nation of which
he is a citizen is not at war with the Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines
and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of
the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines. The petition was docketed as Naturalization
Case No. 02-102984.

Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit4 of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and petitioner’s
Certificate of Live Birth,5 Alien Certificate of Registration,6 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence.7

On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17,
2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be
granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The
RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila
City Hall Building.9

Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well as the entire petition and its annexes, in the
Official Gazette on May 20, 200210 and May 27, 2002,11 and in Today, a newspaper of general circulation in the City
of Manila, on May 25, 2002 and June 1, 2002.

No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to
know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s business. He would usually attend
parties and other social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and
possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by law. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified
that petitioner was gainfully employed and presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila;
petitioner had been practicing Philippine tradition and those embodied in the Constitution; petitioner had been
socially active, mingled with some of his neighbors and had conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his entire stay in the Philippines; and petitioner and his family observed Christmas and New Year
and some occasions such as fiestas. According to the witness, petitioner was not disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to
become a Filipino citizen: he is not opposed to organized government or believes in the use of force; he is not a
polygamist and has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; neither is he suffering from any mental
alienation or any incurable disease.12

Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10) years; they first met
at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they
took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well with friends.13 Salcedo
further testified that he saw petitioner twice a week, and during fiestas and special occasions when he would go to
petitioner’s house. He has known petitioner to have resided in Manila since birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of
good moral character, and believes in the principles of the Philippine Constitution. Petitioner has a gainful
occupation, has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner and has all the qualifications to become a
Filipino citizen.

Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become a citizen of the Philippines.

At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence, petitioner offered in evidence the following documents: (1) Certificate
of Live Birth;14 (2) Alien Certificate of Registration;15 (3) Immigrant Certificate of Residence;16 (4) Elementary
Pupil’s17 and High School Student’s18 Permanent Record issued by Chang Kai Shek College; (5) Transcript of
Record issued by the University of Santo Tomas;19 (6) Certification of Part-Time Employment dated November 20,
2002;20 (7) Income Tax Returns and Certificate of Withholding Tax for the year 2001;21 (8) Certification from
Metrobank that petitioner is a depositor;22 (9) Clearances that he has not been charged or convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude;23 and (10) Medical Certificates and Psychiatric Evaluation issued by the Philippine General
Hospital.24 The RTC admitted all these in evidence.

The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.25 The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring that petitioner EDISON SO has
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and he is hereby admitted as
citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final,
subject to payment of cost of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.26

The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period required by law, and they had
affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Thus,
the court concluded that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his petition with evidence.

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the decision to
the CA on the following grounds:
 I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO
WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.

II.

PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. 27

Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his
two (2) character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch for his fitness to become a Filipino citizen; they
merely made general statements without giving specific details about his character and moral conduct.28 The
witnesses did not even reside in the same place as petitioner.29 Respondent likewise argued that petitioner himself
failed to prove that he is qualified to become a Filipino citizen because he did not give any explanation or specific
answers to the questions propounded by his lawyer. He merely answered "yes" or "no" or gave general statements
in answer to his counsel’s questions. Thus, petitioner was unable to prove that he had all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications required by law to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.30

On the other hand, petitioner averred that he graduated cum laude from the UST with the degree of Bachelor of
Science in Pharmacy. He is now on his second year as a medical student at the UST Medicine and Surgery. He
avers that the requirements for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in relation to Presidential
Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed after the Philippine government entered into diplomatic relations with
the People’s Republic of China; the requirements were further relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was
signed into law.31 Petitioner pointed out that the petition, with all its annexes, was published in the official gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation; notices were likewise sent to the National Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs, and the OSG. But none from these offices came forward to
oppose the petition before the lower court.32 Petitioner insisted that he has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become Filipino. This was clearly established by his witnesses.

In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to administrative naturalization filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted that even in the absence of any opposition, a petition for
naturalization may be dismissed.

In its Decision33 dated August 4, 2005, the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for
naturalization without prejudice.34 According to the CA, petitioner’s two (2) witnesses were not credible because they
failed to mention specific details of petitioner’s life or character to show how well they knew him; they merely
"parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act without clearly explaining their applicability to petitioner’s
case.35The appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the law that the
applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on
December 12, 2002, petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling
short of the requirement.36 The CA stated, however, that it was not its intention to forever close the door to any
future application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and that it believes that he would make a good
Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this country.37

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration38 was denied in a Resolution39 dated November 24, 2005; hence, the present
petition grounded on the sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.40

In support of his petition, petitioner reiterates the arguments he set forth in the Brief filed before the CA.

In its Comment41 on the petition, respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which took effect on August 8, 2001 and
where the applicant’s age requirement was lowered to eighteen (18) years old), refers only to administrative
naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization; it does not apply to judicial naturalization before
the court, as in the present case.42 Respondent, through the OSG, avers that its failure to oppose the petition before
the court a quo does not preclude it from appealing the decision of the RTC to the CA; it is even authorized to
question an already final decision by filing a petition for cancellation of citizenship.43 Lastly, respondent reiterates its
argument that petitioner’s character witnesses are not qualified to prove the former’s qualifications.

In determining whether or not an applicant for naturalization is entitled to become a Filipino citizen, it is necessary to
resolve the following issues: (1) whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act;
and (2) whether or not the witnesses presented by petitioner are "credible" in accordance with the jurisprudence and
the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or
her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may
become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted
by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.45

Petitioner’s contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should possess are those provided for in
R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit. The qualifications and disqualifications of
an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 246 and 447 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand,
Sections 348 and 449 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for
naturalization by administrative act.

Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine
citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging.50 It likewise addresses the concerns of degree
holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting "brain
gain" for the Philippines.51 These however, do not justify petitioner’s contention that the qualifications set forth in said
law apply even to applications for naturalization by judicial act.

First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens regardless of
class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any
other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the
Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A.
No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more
encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there
is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A.
No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to
prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only
implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to
the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.

In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of his petition,
administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available. Consequently, his application should be
governed by C.A. No. 473.

Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization,
the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. It
must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing
here.

Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature
to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the
applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born
here but left the country, though resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the application is also
disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is
not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the qualifications and
disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.

In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent to vouch for his good moral
character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It must be stressed that character witnesses in
naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicant’s conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on
specific facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law.53

Petitioner’s witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they did not elaborate on his
traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally know petitioner well and are therefore in a
position to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found by the CA, the witnesses’ testimonies consisted mainly of
general statements in answer to the leading questions propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was
to enumerate the qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details. The pertinent portion of Atty.
Adasa’s testimony follows:

q Do you know the petitioner Edison So?

a Yes, Sir.

q Will you please tell us how did you come to know him?

a Well I came to know him[,] the petitioner[,] when I was the legal consultant and adviser of their family business and
I used to ah (sic) me[e]t him during my visit to their place way back in 1991 to 1992.

q From that day of 1991 up to the present, is your relationship with the petitioner more or less contin[u]ous?

a Yes, sir, because aside from the usual professional visit that I did to their family some social function was
sponsored normally and I am (sic) invited and I used to attend.

q During the birthday party of the petitioner, did you usually attend petitioner’s birthday?

a On several occasions I attend the birthday.

q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides at present?

a At present the petitioner resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila.

q Do you know for how long the petitioner resides in the Philippines?

a As far as I personally known (sic) Your Honor is that since birth.

q During all the times that you have know[n] the petitioner, what is your impression of his conduct?

a Well ah (sic) I have personally known him to be obedient and hard working individual and ah (sic) he has a good
moral character and he has been ah (sic) no adverse report concerning the character of the petitioner.

q In your opinion does the petitioner has the qualifications necessary to become [a] citizen of the Philippines?

a Yes.

q Can you tell us why do you say so?

a I would say Your Honor that petitioner has posses (sic) all the qualifications mandated by law and presently he is
more than 21 years old and he has resided in the Philippines particularly in the City of Manila contin[u]ously for more
than ten (10) years and that since his birth; and that he has good moral character and I have observed that ah (sic)
he has been practicing Philippine traditions and ah (sic) those embodied in the Philippine constitution and he has
been socially active and meddle (sic) some of his neighbors and ah (sic) I am sure he has desire to embrace and
learn the customs and ideas and traditions in the Philippine[s] and as I earlier mentioned that he conducted himself
in proper and approachable (sic) manner during his entire residence in our country and he has a gainful occupation.

q Will you please tell us what are these customs which the petitioner embraced?

a Well I have observed that ah (sic) together with his family they used to ah observed (sic) the usual Filipino
celebration during Christmas and new year and some occasions such as fiestas.

q And do you know whether petitioner is not disqualified under Commonwealth Act to become Filipino citizen of the
Philippines (sic)?

a Ah there has been no incident or occasion which I learned that would disqualify of coming (sic) the citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines. I have noticed that ah (sic) he is qualified under Commonwealth Act 473 as amended
because he is not opposed to ah (sic) organized government. His family and himself does not believed (sic) in the
use of force in the success of his ideas and ah (sic) he is not a poligamist (sic) or believer in the practice of illegal
and he has not been convicted in any crime involving him in any crime (sic). and he is not suffering from any mental
alienation or any incurable contidious (sic) disease. as provided for.

q Will you please tell us why you know all these stage?

a Because of ah (sic) the personal attachment with his family we have continuously having ah (sic) the usual contact
with his family.54

It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to petitioner’s family, but not specifically to petitioner. Atty. Adasa’s
statements refer to his observations on the family’s practices and not to petitioner in particular. Nothing in his
testimony suggests that he was close to petitioner and knew him well enough to vouch for his qualifications.

Salcedo, on the other hand, testified thus:

q Now do you know the petitioner in this case Edison So?

a Yes, Sir.

q Are you personally acquainted with him?

a Yes, Sir.

q How long have you known the petitioner?

a I have known him for about ten (10) years, Sir.

q Will you please inform the Honorable court under what circumstances did you come to know the petitioner?

a I met him in a birthday party in 1991, Sir.

q And from 1991 up to the present is your relationship with the petitioner more or less contin[u]ous?

a Yes, Sir.

q How often did you see the petitioner?

a I see him twice a week, Sir.

q And during this time that you met the petitioner, what did you usually do?
a We play some games, Sir. We play Patentero (sic).

q Do you go to church together?

a Yes, Sir.

q During fiestas in your place, did the petitioner go?

a Yes, Sir.

q How about during fiestas in the place where the petitioner reside[s], did you also go during fiestas?

a Yes, Sir.

q During occasion in the house of the petitioner, are you invited?

a Yes, Sir.

q How many time[s] did you go to his (sic) residence of the petitioner?

a Twice a week, sir.

q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides?

a The petitioner resides at 528 Lavezares Street, Tondo, Manila, Sir.

q For how long does the petitioner reside in that address?

a Since birth, Sir.

q During all the times that you have known the petitioner, will you please tell us your impression of his conduct?

a He is a person of good moral, sir, and he believed in the principles of the Philippines (sic) Constitution.

q Will you please cite one or two of these principles underlined the principles (sic) of the Philippines (sic)
Constitution?

a Ah the Philippines is a Republican of the (sic) state, sovereignty preside (sic) over the people and the government
authority emanate from within; and the other one is the civilian government is not supreme over the military.

q Now in your opinion does the petitioner have all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines?

a Yes, Sir.

q What are these qualifications?

a He is at least 21 years old, he is a person of good moral and has been residing in the Philippines since birth.

q What else?

a He must be a Filipino and ah must practice the traditions and customs, Sir.

q Do you know whether the petitioner conducted himself in a proper and appraochable (sic) manner during the
period of his residence in the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.

q Do you know if the petitioner has a gainful occupation?

a Yes, Sir.

q What is the occupation of the petitioner?

a Ah (sic) he is the secretary in a wood factory in Commonwealth, Sir.

q And aside from being the secretary, what else did the petitioner do?

a He help (sic) in the factory cargo, Sir.

q Is the petitioner still a student?

a Yes, Sir.

q Where is he studying?

a In UST, Sir.

q Is he your classmate?

a Yes, Sir.

q What was his course?

a Pharmacy, Sir.

q So when you said he was the secretary he only works as part time secretary?

a Yes, Sir.

q You said the petitioner meddle (sic) socially with the Filipinos?

a Yes, Sir.

q Will you please name at least one of those Filipinos the petitioner meddle (sic) with?

a Samuel Falmera, Sir, Marlon Kahocom, Sir.

q Who else?

a Elmer Ramos, Sir.

q Who else?

a Sharmaine Santos, Sir.

q You said the petitioner is of good moral character?

a Yes, Sir.

q Why do you know that?

a As a classmate I can see him I go with him and ah (sic) I can see that he has ah better approached (sic) with other
people and I can see that he mixed very well with friends.

q So during school days you see him everyday?

a Yes, Sir.

q When there are no classes during the vacation you see the petitioner twice a week?

a Yes, Sir.

q Does the petitioner (sic), do you think the petitioner is not disqualified to become the citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines?

a Yes, Sir, he is not disqualified, Sir.

q Why do you say that he is not disqualified?

a Because he abide [by] any law in the government, sir, ah (sic) he is not polygamus and he is not convicted of any
crime, Sir.

q Do you know ever the petitioner oppose to any organized government?

a No, Sir.

q Do you know whether he believe[s] in the use of force in any such ideas?

a No, Sir.

q Do you know if the petitioner is a believer in the practice of polygamy?

a No, Sir.

q Do you know whether the petitioner suffer[s] from mental alienation or incurable disease illnesses?

a No, Sir.

q Why do you know?

a I know him personally, sir, I have been with him as my classmate, sir and ah (sic) he is a very intelligent person,
Sir.

q Is the petitioner a member also of any organization or association in your school?

a Yes, Sir.

q What organization?

a He is a member of Wishten and a member of starget, Sir.

q What does starget means?

a Starget is an organization of Chinese community in UST, Sir.

q How about the other one which you mentioned?

a Ah (sic) these are twisting, sir he represents the ah the (sic) school intercollegiate, Sir.55

Again, Salcedo did not give specific details on petitioner’s qualifications.

In sum, petitioner’s witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their testimonies do not satisfactorily
establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.

In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but
also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.56 Within the purview of the
naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime;
who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or
testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies
that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the
applicant’s worthiness.57

The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons of good standing in the
community; that they are honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. The most that was
established was the educational attainment of the witnesses; however, this cannot be equated with their credibility.
In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence tending to build his own good moral character and neglected to
establish the credibility and good moral character of his witnesses.58

We do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC decision
because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and
the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is
subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and
jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising
subsequent to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more
reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition
before the lower court.

Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization law. For this
reason, we affirm the decision of the CA denying the petition for naturalization without prejudice.

It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines
can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and
upon strict compliance with the law.60

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175430

Petitioner,
Present:

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Acting Chairperson,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

KERRY LAO ONG, Promulgated:

Respondent. June 18, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the governments favor and against the
applicant.[1] The applicant carries the burden of proving his full compliance with the requirements of
law.[2]

Before the Court is the Republics appeal of the appellate courts Decision[3] dated May 13, 2006 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74794, which affirmed the trial courts grant of citizenship to respondent Kerry Lao Ong
(Ong). The Court of Appeals (CA) held:

With all the foregoing, We find no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch
9 in its Decision dated November 23, 2001, is AFFIRMED in toto and the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Factual Antecedents
On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old,[5] filed a Petition for Naturalization.[6] The
case was docketed as Nat. Case No. 930 and assigned to Branch 9 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. As decreed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by
Republic Act No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law,[7] the petition was published in the
Official Gazette[8] and a newspaper of general circulation,[9] and posted in a public place for three
consecutive weeks,[10] six months before the initial hearing.[11] The Office of the Solicitor General entered
its appearance and authorized[12] the city prosecutor to appear on its behalf.[13] Accordingly, Fiscals Ester
Veloso and Perla Centino participated in the proceedings below.
Respondent Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese citizens Siao Hwa Uy
Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958.[14] He is registered as a resident alien and possesses an alien
certificate of registration[15] and a native-born certificate of residence[16] from the Bureau of Immigration.
He has been continuously and permanently residing[17] in the Philippines from birth up to the
present.[18] Ong can speak[19] and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy.[20] He took his
elementary[21] and high school[22] studies at the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu City, where social
studies, Pilipino, religion, and the Philippine Constitution are taught. He then obtained a degree in
Bachelor of Science in Management from the Ateneo De Manila University on March 18, 1978.[23]

On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen.[24] They have four
children,[25] namely, Kerri Gail (born on April 15, 1983),[26]Kimberley Grace (born on May 15,
1984),[27] Kyle Gervin (born on November 4, 1986),[28] and Kevin Griffith (born on August 21,
1993),[29] who were allborn and
raised in the Philippines. The children of school age were enrolled[30] at the Sacred Heart School for
Boys[31] and Sacred Heart School for Girls.[32] At the time of the filing of the petition, Ong, his wife, and
children were living at No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village, Banilad, Cebu City.

Ong has lived at the following addresses:[33]

1. Manalili Street, Cebu City (when Ong was in Grade 2)[34]

2. Crystal Compound Guadalupe, Cebu City (until 1970)[35]
3. No. 671 A.S. Fortuna Street, Cebu City (until 1992)[36]
4. No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village, Banilad, Cebu City (until 1998);[37] and
5. No. 50 Roselle Street, North Town Homes, Nasipit,
[38]
Talamban, Cebu City (present).

Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a businessman/business manager since 1989, earning an
average annual income of P150,000.00.[39] When he testified, however, he said that he has been a
businessman since he graduated from college in 1978.[40] Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the
nature of his business.[41]
As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997.[42] Based on
these returns, Ongs gross annual income was P60,000.00 for 1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00
for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997.
Respondent further testified that he socializes[43] with Filipinos; celebrates the Sinulog, fiestas, birthdays,
and Christmas.[44] He is a member of the Alert/ React VII Communications Group and the Masonic
organization.[45]
Respondent Ong presented a health certificate to prove[46] that he is of sound physical and mental
health.[47] As shown by the clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation,[48] the Philippine
National Police,[49] the trial courts,[50] and the barangay,[51] he has no criminal record or pending criminal
charges.[52]

Respondent presented Rudy Carvajal (Carvajal) and Bernard Sepulveda (Sepulveda) as his character
witnesses. At that time, Sepulveda was the vice-mayor of Borbon, Cebu.[53] He has known Ong since
1970 because Ong is the close friend of Sepulvedas brother.[54] He testified that Ong is very helpful in
the community and adopts the Filipino culture.[55] Meanwhile, Carvajal testified that he has known Ong
since the 1970s because they were high school classmates.[56] He testified that Ong is morally
irreproachable and possesses all the qualifications to be a good citizen of the Philippines.[57] Carvajal is a
businessman engaged in leasing office spaces.[58]

On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition. Among other things, the trial court
held that:

xxxx

By the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the [respondent], the following facts had
been established.[59]

xxxx

x x x [Respondent] is a businessman/business manager engaged in lawful trade and business since

1989 from which he derives an average annual income of more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Exhibit U, V, W, and X with sub-markings); x x x[60]

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

From the evidence presented by [respondent], this Court believes and so holds that [respondent] possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a citizen of
the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,

[respondent] KERRY LAO ONG is hereby admitted as citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[61]

Republics Appeal
On January 31, 2003, the Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed
to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition despite his failure to prove that
he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth
paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.[62]

The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did not prove his allegation
that he is a businessman/business manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His
income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature
of his profession or trade, which is the source of his income. Considering that he has four minor children
(all attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other property and/or bank deposits, and he
has not declared owning a family home, his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the
circumstances, the Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a
definite and existing business or trade.[63]

Respondent Ong conceded that the Supreme Court has adopted a higher standard of income for
applicants for naturalization.[64] He likewise conceded that the legal definition of lucrative income is the
existence of an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses.[65] It is his position that his income,
together with that of his wife, created an appreciable margin over their expenses.[66] Moreover, the steady
increase in his income, as evidenced in his tax returns, proved that he is gainfully employed.[67]

The appellate court dismissed the Republics appeal. It explained:

In the case at bar, the [respondent] chose to present [pieces of evidence] which relates [sic] to his lucrative
trade, profession or lawful occupation. Judging from the present standard of living and the personal
circumstances of the [respondent] using the present time as the index for the income stated by the
[respondent], it may appear that the [respondent] has no lucrative employment. However, We must be
mindful that the petition for naturalization was filed in 1996, which is already ten years ago. It is of judicial
notice that the value of the peso has taken a considerable plunge in value since that time up to the
present. Nonetheless, if We consider the income earned at that time, the ages of the children of the
[respondent], the employment of his wife, We can say that there is an appreciable margin of his income
over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support.[68]

The appellate court denied the Republics motion for reconsideration[69] in its Resolution dated November
7, 2006.[70]

Issue

Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession
or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
Naturalization Law.

Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner assigns as error the appellate courts ruling that there is an appreciable margin of (respondents)
income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support.[71] The Republic contends that
the CAs conclusion is not supported by the evidence on record and by the prevailing law.[72]

The only pieces of evidence presented by Ong to prove that he qualifies under Section 2, fourth paragraph
of the Revised Naturalization Law, are his tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997, which show that Ong
earns from P60,000.00 to P128,000.00 annually. This declared income is far from the legal requirement
of lucrative income. It is not sufficient to provide for the needs of a family of six, with four children of
school age.[73]

Moreover, none of these tax returns describes the source of Ongs income, much less can they
describe the lawful nature thereof.[74] The Republic also noted that Ong did not even attempt to describe
what business he is engaged in. Thus, the trial and appellate courts shared conclusion that Ong is a
businessman is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures.[75]
The Republic thus prays for the reversal of the appellate courts Decision and the denial of Ongs petition
for naturalization.[76]

Respondents Arguments

Respondent asks for the denial of the petition as it seeks a review of factual findings, which review is
improper in a Rule 45 petition.[77] He further submits that his tax returns support the conclusion that he
is engaged in lucrative trade.[78]

Our Ruling
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest
public interest.[79] Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant.[80] The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law.[81]

In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent Ongs compliance with the qualification
found in Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law, which provides:

SECTION 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:

xxxx

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

x x x x[82]

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation means not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in
the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of
charity or a public charge.[83] His income should permit him and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the
demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.[84]

Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative

income, the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses income should not be
included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is immaterial for under the law the petitioner
should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify him
to become a Filipino citizen.[85] Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicants qualifications
must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.[86]

Going over the decisions of the courts below, the Court finds that the foregoing guidelines have not been
observed. To recall, respondent Ong and his witnesses testified that Ong is a businessman but none of
them identified Ongs business or described its nature. The Court finds it suspect that Ong did not even
testify as to the nature of his business, whereas his witness Carvajal did with respect to his own (leasing
of office space). A comparison of their respective testimonies is reproduced below:

Carvajals testimony

Q: You said earlier that you are a businessman?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How long have you been a businessman?
A: Since 1980.

Q: And what is the business you are engaged in?

A: I am into leasing of office spaces.[87]

Kerry Lao Ongs testimony

Q: What is your present occupation, Mr. Ong?

A: Businessman.

Q: Since when have you engaged in that occupation?

A: After graduation from college.[88]

The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the inadequacy of the testimonial evidence. The
applicant provided no documentary evidence, like business permits, registration, official receipts, or other
business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead, Ong relied on
his general assertions to prove his possession of some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation. Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant
for naturalization.
The paucity of evidence is unmistakable upon a reading of the trial courts decision. The trial court held
that respondent Ong is a businessman engaged in lawful trade and business since 1989[89] but did not cite
the evidence, which supports such finding. After poring over the records, the Court finds that the reason
for the lack of citation is the absence of evidence to support such conclusion. The trial courts conclusion
that Ong has been a businessman since 1989 is only an assertion found in Ongs petition for
naturalization.[90] But, on the witness stand, Ong did not affirm this assertion. Instead, he testified that he
had been a businessman since he graduated from college, which was in 1978.[91]

Further, the trial court, citing Exhibits U, V, W, and X (which are Ongs tax returns), mistakenly
found that Ong derives an average annual income of more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos.[92] This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. The cited tax returns show that Ongs gross
annual income for the years 1994 to 1997 were P60,000.00, P118,000.00, P118,000.00,
and P128,000.00, respectively. The average annual income from these tax returns is P106,000.00 only,
not P150,000.00 as the trial court held. It appears that the trial court again derived its conclusion from an
assertion in Ongs petition,[93] but not from the evidence.
As for the CA, it no longer ruled on the question whether Ong has a known business or
trade. Instead, it ruled on the issue whether Ongs income, as evidenced by his tax returns, can be
considered lucrative in 1996. In determining this issue, the CA considered the ages of Ongs children, the
income that he earned in 1996, and the fact that Ongs wife was also employed at that time. It then
concluded that there is an appreciable margin of Ongs income over his expenses.[94]
The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should not have included the spouses
income in its assessment of Ongs lucrative income.[95]Second, it failed to consider the following
circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs expenses vis--vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own
real property; (b) that his proven average gross annual income around the time of his application, which
was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor children; and (c) that Ongs
children were all studying in exclusive private schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how
it arrived at the conclusion that Ongs income had an appreciable margin over his known expenses.
Ongs gross income might have been sufficient to meet his familys basic needs, but there is simply
no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an appreciable margin of income over expenses. Without
an appreciable margin of his income over his familys expenses, his income cannot be expected to provide
him and his family with adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to
work.[96]

Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known
lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
the Revised Naturalization Law.[97]

The Court finds no merit in respondents submission that a Rule 45 petition precludes a review of the
factual findings of the courts below.[98] In the first place, the trial court and appellate courts decisions
contain conclusions that are bereft of evidentiary support or factual basis, which is a known
exception[99] to the general rule that only questions of law may be entertained in a Rule 45 petition.
 Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court is
not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the applicants qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence
holds that the entire records of the naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal to this
Court.[100]Indeed, [a] naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been
differently categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial contest, the
granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the
government another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will
not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the
certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently
procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court may be entertained on appeal.
As the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision
of the lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be
considered adequate for the purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in
the light of the law and extant jurisprudence.[101] In the case at bar, there is even no need to present new
evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven his
possession of a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify for naturalization.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of

the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74794 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong
is DENIED for failure to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24252 June 15, 1973

IN RE PETITION TO DECLARE ZITA NGO TO POSSESS ALL QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT 473 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
CANCELLING HER ALIEN REGISTRY WITH THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION. ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Artemio Derecho, Angelito C. Imperio and Ferdinand S. Tinio for petitioner-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for oppositor-appellant.

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the decision in this case which reversed that of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, the said court have found her to be married to a Filipino citizen and
to possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino citizen enumerated in the
Naturalization Law. Her motion to such effect was filed on February 20, 1967, and March 2, 1967, the Court required
the Solicitor General to comment on the same. On October 4, 1971, however, before petitioner's motion could be
resolved, this Court rendered decision in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
G.R. No. L-21289, which, effect, passed on all the issues raised in said motion favorably to petitioner's position.
Accordingly, and there being sufficient number of members of the Court in favor of maintaining the ruling in the Moy
Ya Lim Yao case, the decision in this case should be modified.

On April 24, 1964, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Leyte a petition alleging that she is married to
Filipino citizen and possesses all the qualifications and none the disqualifications for naturalization under
Commonwealth Act 473 and praying that a declaration to such effect be made by the Court for the purpose of laying
the basis for the cancellation by the Bureau of Immigration of her alien certificate of registration. On April 17, 1964,
the court set the petition for hearing on November 20, 1964 and ordered notified thereof to be given to the Solicitor
General. In the same order it was required that said notice of hearing be published in the Official Gazette once a
month for three consecutive months a once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Morning Times, a newspaper
edited in the City of Ormoc, where petition resides, and posted in a public and conspicuous place in the Office of the
Clerk of Court. On November 13, 1964, the Solicitor General filed an "Opposition and Motion to Dismiss" on the
following grounds:

(1) As an application for Philippine Citizenship, the petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or
mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended, such as petitioner's former places of residence, and that she has all the qualifications
required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications specified under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Specifically, as can be gathered in the Notice of Hearing, there is no allegation
that she is of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of her residence in the Philippines; or that she has some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation. Likewise, there is no showing that the petition is supported by the affidavits of at
least two credible persons stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the
petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act, and a person
of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has, in their opinion, all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines, and is not in any way disqualified
under the provision of the Act. Similarly, there is no showing that she has filed a declaration of
intention or is exempt from such requirement. Even in the Notice of Hearing, there is failure to
mention the names of witnesses whom she proposes to introduce in support of the petition, as
required under Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.

(2) As a separate proceedings to declare the petitioner a citizen being allegedly the wife of a Filipino
citizen, and to direct the cancellation of her alien Registry, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that
there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of
an individual (Palaran vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15047, January 30, 1962; Channie Tan vs. Republic,
G.R. No. L-14159, April 18, 1960; Tan Yu Chin vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15775, April 29, 1961;
Delumen vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-552. January 28, 1954; in re Hospicion Obiles 49 Off. Gaz. 923),
and that citizenship is not the proper subject for declaratory judgment (Feliseta Tan vs. Republic,
G.R. No. L-16108, October 31, 1960: Santiago vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-14653,
January 31, 1963; Board of Commissioners, et al. vs. Hon. Felix R. Domingo, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-
21274, July 31, 1963).

Thereafter, the court proceeded to hear the case and rendered its decision, in which it found inter
alia the following:

After the necessary publications of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette for July 6, July 13 and
20, 1964, (Exhibit A) and the Morning Times for April 26, May 3, 10, 1964 (Exhibits B, B-1, B-2 and
B-3) this case was called for trial with the Honorable Solicitor General opposing the petition as
aforesaid.

It appears from the evidence presented that petitioner is a native born Nationalist Chinese Citizen
who was born at Gigaquit Surigao on March 30, 1933 (Exhibit D). In 1946, she transferred to
Surigao, Surigao until her marriage to Florencio Burca a native born Filipino Citizen on May 14, 1961
(Exhibit C) when she transferred to Ormoc City to live with her husband. Petitioner studied at
Surigao, Surigao from first grade to fourth year where she graduated. Thereafter she took home
economics special course at the University of San Carlos, Cebu City.

Petitioner knows how to read and write the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, and the English language
(Exhibits G and H).

She has not left the Philippines since birth up to the present time.

She is a holder of ACR No. A-14805 (Exh. E) and Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333
(Exh. F).

Petitioner has no criminal record and that she has no pending case, civil or criminal or
administrative, and that she has never been convicted of any crime (Exhibits J, K, L).

She is engaged in farming and in business and had a net income with her husband in the sum of
P16,034.84 for which they paid an Income Tax of P1,556.00 per O.R. C-050357 dated at Ormoc City
on April 14, 1964 (Exhibits 1 and 1-1).

She is a person of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of her residence in the Philippines in her relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which she is living.

She is supporting a two-year old legitimate child.

 She is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments.

She is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas.

She is not a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy.

She has mingled socially with the Filipinos, and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos. She is a Catholic and was joined in wedlock by a
Catholic priest (Exh. C).

No evidence was presented by the oppositor and City Fiscal Ramon de Veyra, representing the
Solicitor General limited himself to the cross examination of the petitioner.

and held:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the opposition, and declaring that ZITA NGO
BURCA petitioner, has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino
Citizen and that she being married to a Filipino Citizen, is hereby declared a citizen of the
Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final and
executory.

The Solicitor General appealed in due time and made the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PROCEEDINGS FOR
THE DECLARATION OF PETITIONER AS A FILIPINO CITIZEN BY REASON OF HER MARRIAGE
TO A FILIPINO.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER HAS ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS
AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS TO BECOME A FILIPINO CITIZEN.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONER A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES SHE
BEING MARRIED TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE OPPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

In the decision of this Court in this case rendered on January 30, 1967, the position of the Solicitor General was
upheld the above judgment of the trial court was reversed, the Court holding (1) that the only means by which the
alien wife Filipino citizen may have herself declared as having become a Filipino citizen by reason of her marriage is
through compliance with the procedure for naturalization contained in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act
473, and (2) in said proceeding aside from the showing that she is laboring under any of the disqualifications
enumerate Section 4, thereof, she must prove that she possesses all qualifications under Section 2 of the same
statute. More specifically the alien wife of a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire the citizenship of her husband is
required to file corresponding petition for naturalization in court, allege prove all the requisite requirements such as
continuous residence for a period of at least ten years, lucrative income and the like. In other words, she was
required to follow procedure for the judicial naturalization of aliens, thus rendering for naught the first paragraph of
Section 15 of Revised Naturalization Law. Under such doctrine the alien wife of a Filipino was placed in some cases
in a disadvantageous position than an ordinary alien.

To accord substance to the obvious legislative purpose this Court in the Moy Ya Lim Yao case, held thru Mr. Justice
Barredo:

With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned
that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and
construed when the phrase 'who may be lawfully naturalized', found in the American statute from
which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative
authorities. There is merit, of course, in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the
light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws, We should
realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called 'melting pot' of
peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is
nationalistic almost in the extreme. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather
passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American
authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride
and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of
law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken
bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the
United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late
1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no
step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of
September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States
without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous
American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of
1874, which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly understood as conferring
American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any
naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of
residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they
could show they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American
Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating
otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of
the disqualifications under said Section 4. (41 SC 292, 350-351.)

Withal, the Court also held that it is not necessary for alien wife of a Filipino citizen to resort to the procedure
naturalization cases before she can be declared a citizen reason of her marriage We further added:

The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute
is there for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the
matter of her own, citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to
prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise right
reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country,
both substantive and procedural stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no
proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date marriage or the husband's
acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same situation obtains even as
to native born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial
or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again as the occasion may demand. This, as we view it, is the sense in which Justice
Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good
sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or
 simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if
these are not really binding.

It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have good starting point and so that the
most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion
No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as
the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties:

'Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau
of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married
to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's
citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon
the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner
does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition.'

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will
probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending
naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition." .

As already stated, it is the view of the majority of the Court that insofar as the decision in the case at bar conflicts
with the above rulings laid down in Moy Ya Lim Yao, it should be reconsidered and modified. Truth to tell, We can
hardly do otherwise. As may be gathered from the opinion written for the Court by Justice Barredo in that case, the
Court not only made reference to but actually sustained many of the arguments advanced in the motion for
reconsideration of herein appellee as well as in the memorandum submitted by the amici curiae in this case.

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, We cannot grant petitioner-appellee's prayer for the affirmance of the trial
court's judgment declaring her a Filipino citizen. It must be noted that the sole and only purpose of the petition is to
have petitioner declared a Filipino citizen. Under our laws there can be no judicial action or proceeding for the
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. It is as an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to
a controversy, that the courts may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. In Moy Ya Lim
Yao, We adverted to administrative procedure heretofore followed in the Bureau Immigration regarding the steps to
be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration, and thus
secure recognition of her status Filipino citizen. Such a procedure could be availed of Petitioner. Judicial recourse
would be avoidable to Petitioner in case of an adverse action by the Immigration Commissioner.

II

At the same time, it may not be amiss to clarify a matter related to the point involved in this case, which has given to
a certain degree of confusion and unnecessary difficulties on the part of all concerned. We deem it wise to deal with
it here in order to preclude unnecessary litigations, not to speak of legal complications that may ensue as a
consequence of the lack of finality of judicial or administrative determinations on person's citizenship in certain
cases.

Heretofore up to Moy Ya Lim Yao, it has been the constant doctrine of this Court, that a final and executory decision
the question of citizenship, by a court other than in naturalization proceedings, or by an administrative body,
generally not considered binding in other cases and for other purpose than that specifically involved in the case
where such decision is rendered. Thus for instance, in a case involving the determination of the citizenship of a
party as a prerequisite to the exercise of a license, franchise or privilege, such as operation of a public utility, and
where the administration agency concerned shall have found as an established fact to the applicant is a Filipino
citizen, even if such finding, may have been affirmed by this Court on appeal, the same will be considered as
conclusive on the question of such citizenship. Hence if such party should apply for a license to engage in retail
trade or for the lease or purchase of any disposable lands of the public domain, the question of his citizenship may
litigated again.

Understandably such a result is unfair to the party concerned. Instead of according finality and stability judicial or
administrative decisions, it engenders confusion and multiplicity of suits.

Certainly if the decision of the administrative agency on the matter of citizenship, as an important issue involved in
the case, is affirmed by this Court, We find no cogent reason why such decision on the matter can not be given
preclusive effect. We have conceded the authority of certain administrative agencies to ascertain the citizenship of
the parties involved in the cases therein, as a matter inherent in or essential to the efficient exercise of their powers.
Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end to litigations, some authorities recognize that
administrative rulings or decisions should have res judicata or preclusive effect. In discussing this point, Professor
Allan D. Vestal of the University of Iowa, holds the view that: Preclusive effect may or may not be given to an
administrative ruling depending on a number of factors. If the decision is a factual matter and if it has been rendered
by an agency with fact-finding procedures which approximate those of a court, then preclusion should obtain."
(Vestal Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 Georgetown Law Journal, 857, 874.) Obviously,
if the decision of an administrative agency on the question of citizenship, is affirmed by this Court on the ground that
the same is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, there appears to be no valid reason why such
finding should have no conclusive effect in other cases, where the same issue is involved. The same observation
holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case
before it, which is affirmed by this Court. For the "effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme
requires that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the parties, the general public and the courts
themselves. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and their
decisions and invites litigation" (Clear, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale Law Journal, 345).

It must be stressed however that in the public interest, in such cases, the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative should be allowed to intervene on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, and to take appropriate
steps the premises. For only in that manner can there be assurance that the claim to Filipino citizenship was
thoroughly threshed out before the corresponding court or administration agency.

Accordingly, in response to the vigorous and able plea of amici curiae, We declare it to be a sound rule, that where
citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in
controversy, after a full-blown hearing, with the act participation of the Solicitor General or his authority
representative, and this finding on the Citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter
shows constitute conclusive proof of such person's citizenship, in a other case or proceeding. But it is made clear
that in instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in
any other case proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.

In resume, therefore, since Our opinion in the decision January 30, 1967, requiring an alien woman married to
Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this Country, to submit a judicial proceeding in all respects similar to a
naturalization case, wherein in addition, she has to prove not only that she not laboring under any of the
disqualifications under section but also possesses all the qualifications set forth in section 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, conflicts with Our ruling Moy Ya Lim Yao, the decision has to that extent be consider
modified.1We cannot, however, affirm petitioner's claim Filipino citizenship in these proceedings. That is a matter
which in accordance with Our suggestion in Moy Ya Lim Yao the appropriate governmental agency, such as the
Commissioner on Immigration, shall have to pass upon.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, and consistently with the foregoing opinion, the decision herein of January 30, 1967 is hereby
modified; the reversal of the decision of the court a quo and the dismissal of the petition, are however affirmed,
without prejudice to petitioner's availing of the procedure indicated above. No costs.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-30669. July 31, 1970.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF BETTY PO (Betty Po Lim-marital name) to be admitted a citizen of the
Philippines, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for Oppositor-Appellant.

Eduardo S. Baranda for Petitioner-Appellee.

DECISION

DIZON, J.:

Appeal taken by the Republic of the Philippines from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dated September 13, 1968
allowing Betty Po Lim to take the oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the
promulgation thereof.

On July 31, 1965 appellee, a native born Chinese woman married to Lim Son Hue, also a registered Chinese subject, filed with
the lower court a petition for admission as citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.

After due hearing the lower court granted the petition on August 30, 1966. The Republic’s motion for reconsideration was denied
on December 12 of the same year.

On August 7, 1968 appellee filed a motion praying that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance under the provisions of
Republic Act 530, and on September 13 of the same year the lower court, notwithstanding the opposition filed by the Republic,
issued the appealed order.

The only question now raised by the Republic is whether a Chinese woman may be lawfully naturalized as a citizen of the
Philippines separately from her husband — also a citizen of the Republic of China.

It is not disputed that appellee was married to Lim Son Hue in Iloilo City on December 25, 1960, that is, four years and a half
prior to the filing of her application for naturalization. Out of their marriage they begot two children, the first born on October 11,
1962 and the second on May 8, 1963.

It is clear, therefore, that upon her marriage, appellee, aside from being a Chinese citizen by birth and parentage, became a
Chinese citizen by marriage in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, Chapter 2 of the Chinese Law of Naturalization.

Upon the other hand, Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino woman loses her citizenship upon contracting marriage to an alien if
by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country she acquires the latter’s nationality.

Appellant being a Chinese citizen by birth and marriage can not become a citizen of the Philippines during coverture, because, as
long as her marriage to an alien subsists, she must by our laws have the same citizenship as that of her husband.

It is true, as appellee contends, that our Naturalization Law does not say that only male alien persons may seek citizenship by
naturalization, but in construing this provision We must necessarily take into account other legal provisions on the subject of
citizenship, one of them being the one mentioned heretofore, according to which a Filipino female citizen who marries an alien
acquires the latter’s citizenship by the mere fact of her marriage. The granting of citizenship by naturalization to a female alien
applicant while her marriage to another alien is subsisting would, therefore, be inoperative for the reason that, such grant
notwithstanding, she would still be deemed to be a citizen of the country of her husband. The result would be dual citizenship
which, it is believed, is not contemplated by our laws.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order is reversed and set aside, with costs.
 SECOND DIVISION

July 29, 2015

G.R. No. 210412

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
KAMRAN F. KARBASI, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in
particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and
costs of such proceedings. 1

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the January 29, 2013
Decision2 and the November 27, 20133 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 01126-MIN,
which affirmed the January 17, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City (RTC), in a
naturalization case docketed as Naturalization Case No. 2866. The RTC order granted the petition for naturalization
and, thus, admitted Karman F. Karbasi as a citizen of the Philippines.

The Facts

On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Karbasi (Karbasi) filed a petition for naturalization with the RTC, where he alleged the
following:

1. His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;

2. He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a certification duly issued by the UNHCR;

3. He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, since early part of June 2000 and more
so has resided continuously in the Philippines for not less than 11 years immediately preceding the date of this
petition; to wit, since 11 July 1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1) year;

4. His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other places of residence, prior to his present residence,
were as follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City; (iii) Capitol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv)
Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte;

5. He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran, as shown in his identity card which also serves as his birth
certificate;

6. He is married and is the father of one (1) child;

7. His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old and born on 10 August 1979 in Cebu City, whom he
married on 12 October 2000 in Dipolog City, as shown in

their certificate of marriage;

8. His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, 1-year old , was born on 9 June 2001 in Dipolog City and presently residing with him
and his wife at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City;

9. He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11 July 1990
specifically at the Manila International Airport on board Philippine Airlines Flight No. 731, per UNHCR certification
containing reference to his Pakistani passport issued under said assumed name;

10. Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reduced to
five years the ten year requirement of continuous residence;

11. He speaks and writes English and Visayan;

12. His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in which he has been engaged since 1998 and, as such, he
derives an average annual income of Php 80,000.00 more or less;

13. He has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, of the
Commonwealth Act No. 473;

14. He has complied with the requirements of the Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) regarding the
filing with the Office of the Solicitor General of his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, as
shown in his Declaration of Intention duly filed on 25 May 2001;

15. It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to Iran of which, at this
time, he is a citizen or subject; that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of filing of this petition
up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship;

16. Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing at ABC Compound, Quezon Ave.,
Miputak, Dipolog City and Alton C. Ratificar, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing at 047 Burgos Street,
Dipolog City, who are Filipino citizens, whose affidavits are attached to his petition, will appear and testify as
witnesses at the hearing thereof.

[Emphasis Supplied]

On July 2, 2002, after finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an order setting the
petition for hearing on October 21, 2002 and ordering the publication thereof, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in Zamboanga del Norte and in the cities of
Dipolog and Dapitan. In the same Order, persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition
should not be granted and oppose the petition.

On July 22, 2002, the RTC amended its previous order and, with notice to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
reset the hearing on September 10, 2003 instead because the National Printing Office could no longer
accommodate the publication requirement before the first hearing date.

On December 2, 9 and 16, 2002, copies of the amended order and Karbasi’s petition were published in the Official
Gazette. Subsequently, the same were published in Press Freedom on January 27, February 3 and 10, 2003. The
said copies were likewise posted on the bulletin boards of the RTC and the Municipal Building of Roxas,
Zamboanga del Norte and Capitol Building, Dipolog City.

On September 10, 2003, Karbasi and his counsel appeared and presented proof of compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements. Nobody appeared to interpose an objection to the petition. During the hearing on May
18, 2006, Alton C. Ratificar (Ratificar) and Dominador Natividad Tagulo (Tagulo) testified as character witnesses.
Ratificar testified that in 1990, he was introduced to Karbasi whose house was located about 30 meters away from
his; that he came to know him since then; that when Karbasi got married, he was invited to the wedding ceremony
where the then City Mayor of Dipolog was one of the wedding sponsors; that he also attended the celebration; that
he used to see Karbasi almost every day as he owned an electronics repair shop near his house; that Karbasi would
also allow neighbors, who did not own television sets at home, to watch shows at his repair shop; that he never
heard of any complaint by the neighbors against Karbasi, who went to church during Sundays and even on
weekdays; that on several occasions, he was invited to Karbasi’s home, where he observed his good relationship
with his in-laws and his treatment of his wife and child which was in accordance with Filipino customs; and that
Karbasi talked to him in both Visayan and English.

For his part, witness Tagulo testified that he worked at the Andres Bonifacio College and had known Karbasi since
July 1990 when the latter was then enrolled in a vocational course; that Karbasi was very respectful to his
instructors and that he had good grades; that he treated his schoolmates in accordance with Filipino customs; that
he never showed any inclination to violence; that when Karbasi transferred to Dumaguete City, he visited him there;
and that during this visits, Tagulo witnessed how Karbasi socially interacted and mingled with the rest of the
community.

On August 10, 2006, the wife of Karbasi, Cliji G. Lim (Cliji), also took the witness stand. She testified that her father
introduced her to Karbasi during her graduation party; that a courtship followed thereafter for five months, during
which Karbasi was well-behaved and acted like any other Filipino; that when Karbasi proposed marriage to her, he
was accompanied by his brother, Ali Karbasi; that Karbasi’s baptism as a Catholic coincided with her birthday; that
after their marriage, they begot two (2) children; that Karbasi continuously stayed with his family and never returned
to Iran; that he was a good husband, father and provider; that all his income from the repair shop was turned over to
her for the budgeting of the family’s expenses; and that he was then earning a daily income of P1,000.00.

She added that Karbasi and his family regularly attended the Catholic mass and received communion; that they
were active members of Couples for Christ since 2003; that he actively participated in Catholic practices like the
novena and vigil for her deceased grandfather; that Karbasi was not a polygamist and that he did not flirt with other
women; that she never heard her husband speak of any terrorist groups; and that he was never known to have an
immoral reputation.

On several hearing dates thereafter, Karbasi himself took the witness stand. As summarized by the RTC, the gist of
his testimony is as follows:

He is an Iranian national. He was born in Tehran, Iran, and resided there since birth up to 1986. His father is
Abdolhossein Karbasi, a doctor in Iran, and his mother is Narjes Froghnia Karbasi, a retired teacher.

He has five brothers and two sisters. The eldest of the brood, Hamid Reza Karbasi, is in the United States of
America and is now an American Citizen. The second, Dr. Ali Reza Karbasi, admitted as Filipino citizen in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Dipolog City, is in the Philippines. The third is Qite Karbasi, his sister. The fourth, his
brother, Dr. Abduoul Reza Karbasi, graduated in India. The fifth, his sister, Kia Karbasi, is a nurse. The sixth, his
brother Qolam Reza Karbasi, is an engineer who graduated in France. His last four siblings are all in Iran.

He was a Shiite Muslim before he was converted as Roman Catholic. His former religion believes in the existence of
a Supreme Being called God. It believes in the existence of government and repudiates violence. His said religion is
not within an organization of Al Qaeda, Jemayah Islamiya, or any terrorist group. It also adheres to the principle of
one man-one woman marital relation. He and his brother, Ali Reza Karbasi, left Iran in 1986 because of the war
between Iran and Iraq at that time. When the Shah of Iran, Pahlavi, was overthrown by Ayatolah Khomini in 1979,
some Iranian nationals left Iran. He and Ali Reza, who also condemns the act of overthrowing an existing
government by force and violence, were among those who left. Since the government confiscated his passport, they
traveled by camel and passed by the desert during night time to reach Pakistan. He stayed there for almost three (3)
years,

Being foreigners in Pakistan, they submitted themselves to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
However, they were not granted the status of refugee right away since Pakistan is adjacent to Iran. They had to
transfer to a third country not at war with Iran. Since his brother Ali Reza was already studying in the Philippines,
they decided to come here.
As it was difficult for him to get travel documents, petitioner procured a Pakistani passport under the assumed name
of Syed Gul Agha.

Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July 11, 1990, he submitted himself to the United Nations in Manila. After
several interviews, he was admitted as a refugee and, later on, as a person of concern. As a refugee, he was
granted by the United Nations allowances, medical benefits and protection to some extent.

After having been interviewed by the Solicitor General regarding his intention to become a Filipino citizen, he filed
the corresponding Declaration of Intention, dated March 28, 2001, on May 25, 2001.

Sometime in 2002, petitioner, having signified his intention to become a Filipino citizen, was issued a certification
captioned "UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Liaison Office for the Philippines," dated 25 June 2002, certifying
that he has been recognized as a person of concern who arrived in the Philippines on 11 July 1990 on board
Philippine Airlines flight 731 under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha).

At the time of the filing of the petition, he was already married and residing at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City.
However, upon arrival in the Philippines, he first resided at Panay Avenue, Quezon City, where he stayed for almost
six months. During those times, the United Nations provided him a monthly allowance of P2,800.00, being a
refugee. He then transferred to Burgos Street, Miputak, Dipolog City, where he stayed at the house of the fatherin-
law of his brother Ali Reza for a month.

He then moved to Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City, at the house of his sister-in-law. It was during this time that he
enrolled at Andres Bonifacio College where he studied from 1990 to 1992. He finished a two-year vocational course
in said school as evidenced by a Diploma issued by the Andres Bonifacio College, Dipolog City. In Iran, he finished
Bachelor of Science in Economics.

He then pursued a four-year course (Bachelor of Science in Industrial Technology Major in Electronics) at the
Central Visayas Polytechnic College in Dumaguete City. He resided in the Capitol Area of said city. He was already
receiving a monthly allowance of P4,800.00 from the United Nations at that time. He graduated from said institution
as evidenced by a Diploma issued by said school. He also attended technical trainings conducted by Asian
Durables Manufacturing, Inc. as evidenced by a Certificate of Attendance issued by said company.

In 1996, he returned to Dipolog City and resided at Burgos Street where he opened his electronics repair shop (KX3
Electronics Repair Shop).

On October 12, 2000, he got married. The couple transferred to the house of his parents-in-law after the marriage.
When the grandfather of his wife got ill, they were requested to take care of him. Thus, the couple transferred their
residence to Dohinob, Roxas. However, they moved back to their house in Burgos Street, Dipolog City, as it is
nearer to a hospital. When his grandfather-in-law died, he participated in all the rites and ceremonies relative to his
wake and burial.

At present, his repair shop’s gross monthly income hovers between P20,000.00 to P25,000.00."4

Additionally, Karbasi claimed that he had never been involved in any demonstration or mass action protesting any
issuances, policies or acts of the Philippine Government and its officials; that he had never made any rebellious or
seditious utterances; that he believed in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution and he had even
memorized the preamble; and that he can also sing the Philippine National Anthem and recite the Filipino Patriotic
Pledge, both of which he did in open court.

The following documents were proffered in Karbasi’s Formal Offer of Exhibits: 1] Identity Card issued by Iran to
prove his Iranian citizenship; 2] Pakistani passport with visa under the assumed name of Syed Gul Agha; 3]
Certifications and Identification Card issued by the UNHCR to prove his status as a refugee and, later, as a "person
of concern"; 4] Alien Certificate of Registration; 5] Certifications to prove Filipino nationality of Karbasi’s wife, Cliji G.
Lim; 6] Certificate of Marriage between Karbasi and Cliji; 7] Certificates of Live Birth of his children Keenyji and Kerl
Jasmen; 8] Karbasi’s Certificate of Baptism; 9] Affidavits of his character witnesses Alton C. Ratificar and
Dominador Tagulo; 10] Police and NBI Clearances; 11] Certifications and Diploma to prove his completion of
vocational technology, BS Industrial Technology, and training seminars; 12] Alien Employment Permit for Refugees;
13] Business Permit, Clearances and DTI Certificates of Accreditation to KX3 Repair Shop, Karbasi’s source of
livelihood; 14] Income Tax Returns for the years 2001 to 2005; and 15] Contract of Service with Quality Circuits
Services, Inc. and Kolins Philippines Intl. Inc., including a Summary of Accounts paid to KX3 Electronics Repair
Shop.5

On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasi’s evidence sufficient to support his petition. Finding Karbasi as
possessing all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen, the RTC rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for naturalization filed by KAMRAN F. KARBASI to be admitted
as citizen of the Philippines is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.6

Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an
appeal to the CA, based mainly on the ground that the RTC erred in granting Karbasi’s petition as he failed to
comply with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law) on character, income and reciprocity.
Specifically, the OSG pointed out that Karbasi failed to establish that: 1] Iran grants reciprocal rights of naturalization
to Filipino citizens; 2] he has a lucrative income as required under the law; and 3] he is of good moral character as
shown by his disregard of Philippine tax laws when he had underdeclared his income in his income tax returns
(ITRs) and overstated the same in his petition for naturalization.

On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the grant of Filipino citizenship to Karbasi.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 January 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10 in Naturalization Case No. 2866 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in Karbasi’s ITRs was prepared in good faith because he was of the
belief that he no longer needed to include the income he received as payment of his services to Daewoo Electronics
Electronics Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins Philippines International, Inc. (Kolins), because the same were
already withheld at source. The CA likewise affirmed the RTC finding that Karbasi, as a refugee, need not prove
reciprocity between Philippine and Iranian laws.

Hence, this petition.

Position of the OSG

The OSG asserts that the findings of the courts a quo are not in accord with law and jurisprudence because Karbasi
failed to prove that he had a lucrative income and an irreproachable character. It insists that Karbasi failed to
establish his lucrative income considering that at the time of the filing of his petition for naturalization in 2002, his
gross income was P21,868.65. Per table of Annual Income and Expenditure in Western Mindanao, the average
income for the year 2000 was P86,135.00 and for 2003 was P93,000.00. This shows that Karbasi’s declared gross
income was way below the average income and average expenses in Western Mindanao, the region where Dipolog
City, his residence, is located. The OSG argues that even if the subsequent years were to be considered, Karbasi’s
income was still insufficient as compared to the average income and expenditure in the area. Karbasi’s declared
income for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 were P31,613.00, P41,200.00 and P39,020.00, respectively. The same
table presentation, however, provides that the average expenditure for the year 2000 was P69,452.00, and for the
year 2003 was P75,000.00. This shows that Karbasi’s declared gross income was not enough to support his family
within the contemplation of the law. Whether based on his testimony or on his ITRs, Karbasi’s gross income was not
adequate, given the high cost of living prevailing in the region. The OSG also mentions that Karbasi’s child had
started formal schooling which would entail substantial income on the part of Karbasi, so that he could meet his
family’s needs.
The OSG cites the discrepancy between his petition for naturalization and his ITRs as another reason to deny his
application for Filipino citizenship. An examination of the petition discloses that Karbasi claimed an annual income of
P80,000.00. He had also declared in his testimony that he was earning P20,000.00 to P25,000.00, monthly, from his
electronic repair shop. His ITRs on the other hand, show his gross income as P14,870.00 in 2001; P21,868.65 in
2002; P31,613.00 in 2003; P41,200.00 in 2004; and P39,020.00 in 2005.

The OSG further argues that the "underdeclaration" of Karbasi’s income in his ITRs reflects his disregard of
Philippine tax laws and, worse, its overstatement in his petition indicates his intent to make it appear that there was
compliance with the Naturalization Law, when there was actually none. According to the OSG, this negates
irreproachable behavior which required of every applicant for naturalization because the failure to enter the true
income on the tax return is indicative of dishonesty. The OSG cited the ruling in Republic v. Yao,8 where the Court
ordered the cancellation of the naturalization certificate issued to the applicant therein upon the discovery of his
underdeclaration and underpayment of income tax. In the OSG’s words, "[u]nderdeclaration of income is a serious
matter that it is used as a ground to cancel the certificate of naturalization. If the court can reverse the decision in an
application for naturalization, with more reason can underdeclaration be considered in denying an application," as in
Karbasi’s case.9

Position of Karbasi

In the April 7, 2014 Resolution of the Court, Karbasi was required to file a comment on the petition in which he
mainly argued that the petition did not raise questions of law but questions of facts which were too unsubstantial to
require consideration. He countered that while, admittedly, the "lucrative trade/occupation" requirement under the
law must be complied with, it has been emphasized in jurisprudence that, the objective of this economic requirement
is to ensure that the applicant should not become a public charge or an economic burden upon the society.10Karbasi
claims that he had more than satisfactorily established his lucrative trade or occupation, showing that he would
become a citizen who could contribute to national progress. This has been clearly and unanimously appreciated by
the RTC and the CA.

Karbasi also avers that the analysis of the OSG with respect to the data on Annual Income and Expenditure in
Western Mindanao is misplaced. Firstly, the data presented were merely statistical and not actual, and did not
reflect the circumstances relative to a specific subject or person. Hence, these are greatly unreliable with respect to
a specific person in a naturalization case. At best, it was only intended for the purpose it was made – for planning
and for policy making of the government and not to determine whether a certain trade, occupation or income is
lucrative or not.

Anent the allegation that the underdeclaration of his income projects was a flaw on his moral character, Karbasi
point out that he had sincerely explained that his failure to declare his correct annual income was in good faith not
intended to commit fraud. He believed that the other sources of his income apart from his repair shop had already
been withheld by the companies for whom he had rendered services. For Karbasi, the meaning of "irreproachable"
as required by the law does not mean "perfectly faultless."

On September 18, 2014, Karbasi moved for leave of court to file a supplemental pleading, in which he insisted that
pursuant to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, to which the Philippines was a signatory, the country was bound to safeguard the rights and well-being of
the refugees and to ensure the facility of their local integration including naturalization. Karbasi reasoned that this
was precisely why Department Circular 58 Series of 2012 was issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Under
the said circular, the Refugees and Stateless Persons Unit was created not only to facilitate the identification and
determination of refugees but also for the protection of these refugees.

Karbasi insisted that unlike any other alien applying for naturalization, he had to leave Iran out of fear of persecution
without any mental and financial preparation, and only with a view of finding safe refuge in the Philippines.

Reply of OSG

In its Reply, the OSG contended that Karbasi could not downplay the significance of the Data on Annual Income and
Expenditure in Western Mindanao, as it was an accurate illustration of the financial condition of a typical family in a
particular region. The said table was prepared by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB), which
strengthened the credibility of the report. The OSG explained that whether the data were statistical or actual, the
numbers still reflected the financial standing of Karbasi. It followed then that Karbasi could not claim good faith in
failing to declare the income he gained from his transactions with several companies. He even failed to present a
certificate of tax withheld to show that these companies had actually remitted the withholding taxes due to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Even assuming that Karbasi’s declared income allegedly excluded the amount withheld
by these companies, the OSG claimed that his income would still be below the standard income and expenditure
per the table.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court is confronted with the issue of whether or not the CA had correctly affirmed the RTC decision granting
Karbasi’s application for naturalization despite the opposition posed by the OSG.

Citizenship is personal and, more or less a permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession
within that particular political community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications.
Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community.11 The core of citizenship is the capacity to
enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to
hold public office and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.12

No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens.13 Among those listed are citizens by
naturalization. Naturalization refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a
native-born citizen. Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially,
the Naturalization Law provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and the receipt of evidence showing
that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law, the competent court
may order the issuance of the proper naturalization certificate and its registration in the proper civil registry. On the
other hand, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted
Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Special Committee,
which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and issue a certificate of naturalization.14 In both cases,
the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation.

It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be given away.15 All those seeking to acquire
it must prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that they have complied with all the requirements of the law. The
reason for this requirement is simple. Citizenship involves political status; hence, every person must be proud of his
citizenship and should cherish it. Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well
as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed
only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor.16

Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and formal compliance
with the law. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements; establish his or her
possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated under the law; and present at least
two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations.17 Section 2 of the Naturalization Law clearly sets forth the
qualifications that must be possessed by any applicant, viz:

Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may
become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:

First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;

Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;

Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and
must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in
the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency,
or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages;
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools
recognized by the Office of Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and
civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.

[Emphasis supplied]

The contention in this case revolves around the following points:

1. the sufficiency of Karbasi’s income for purposes of naturalization;

2. the effect of the alleged discrepancy in the amounts of his gross income as declared in his ITRs, on one hand,
and in his petition for naturalization on the other; and

3. the necessity of proving reciprocity between Iranian and Philippine laws on naturalization.

The Court resolves these issues in seriatim.

First. A reading of the OSG’s pleadings discloses that its position arose out of a comparison made between
Karbasi’s declared income and the amounts reflected in the Data on Annual Income and Expenditure in Western
Mindanao issued by the NSCB. The OSG also invokes the past rulings of the Court where the concept of "lucrative
trade, trade, profession or lawful occupation" was explained in this wise:

It means not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be
shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to
work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income should permit him and the
members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and
consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.18

A long line of cases reveals that the Court did not hesitate in reversing grants of citizenship upon a showing that the
applicant had no lucrative income and would, most likely, become a public charge. A summary of some of these
notable cases is in order:

1. In the Matter of the Petition for Admission to Philippine Citizenship of Engracio Chan also known as
Nicasio Lim.19– The Court found that the petitioner, who was a salesman at the Caniogan Sari-Sari and
Grocery Store, then located in Pasig, Rizal, from which he received a monthly salary of P200.00, with free
board and lodging, had no lucrative income. Even if the petitioner was then an unmarried man without
dependents, a monthly income of P200.00 with free board and lodging, was not considered gainful
employment. Further, there was no proof that he was legally authorized to use an alias and his use thereof,
being in violation of the Anti-Alias Law, was indicative of a reproachable conduct.

2. In the Matter of the Petition of Antonio Po to be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines.20– The Court found
Antonio Po, then single and employed as collector of the Surigao Chamber of Commerce as without
lucrative income on the ground that his employment had so long depended upon the selection of the
succeeding presidents of the chamber and that he then got free board and lodging by living with his
widowed mother. Simply put, there was not enough stability in his claimed salary. His additional income
gained from helping his mother to run a store was also insufficient to satisfy the law, in the amount and in its
steadiness. His free board and lodging pretense was also discerned as indicative of dependence upon his
mother for support.

3. In the Matter of the Petition of Tanpa Ong Alias Pedro Tan to be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines.21–
The income of the applicant as contemplated in the naturalization law was only P3,000.00 a year.
Considering that he had a wife and seven children to support, this income was held as insufficient to meet
the high cost of living at that time.
 4. Keng Giok v. Republic.22– The Court held that an income of P9,074.50 per annum was not sufficient for a
married applicant with a wife and five children to support.

5. Sy Ang Hoc vs. Republic.23– The Court held that his income, derived from employment in a business
enterprise of the petitioner's father, was not sufficient to establish compliance with the statutory requirement
of lucrative occupation or calling.

6. In the Matter of the Petition to be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines by Pantaleon Sia alias Alfredo
Sia.24–The Court ruled that the determination of lucrative income or occupation should be reckoned as of the
time of the filing of the petition. The Court decided against the petitioner as his regular salary was not ample
enough to defray his family’s expenses. The excess amounts representing his bonuses and commissions
should not be considered in determining whether or not petitioner had a lucrative income or occupation.

With the pronouncements in these cases in mind, the comparison made by the OSG now begets another question:
can the possession of an applicant’s lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation, for purposes of naturalization,
be fairly determined through a simplistic read-through on government data?

The Court answers in the negative.

While it is true that a naturalization case is not an ordinary judicial contest to be decided in favor of the party whose
claim is supported by the preponderance of the evidence, this does not accord infallibility on any and all of the
OSG’s assertions. If this were the case, the rules of evidence might as well be brushed aside in order to accord
conclusiveness to every opposition by the Republic. Needless to state, the Court still has the final authority and duty
to evaluate the records of proceedings a quo and decide on the issues with fair and sound judgment.

Here, it is clear that the circumstances prevailing in the above-cited cases are not at all attendant in Karbasi’s
situation. There was neither a showing that Karbasi was dependent on another person for support nor proof that his
family’s extraordinary expenses that would render his income as inadequate. As in any other business venture, the
risk of losses is a possibility for his repair shop but, still, this risk was not clearly established to render his livelihood
as unstable and volatile. In fact, the OSG does not belie the fact that Karbasi has been engaged by reputable
companies for his services. Conversely, the findings of the RTC would indicate that Karbasi had indeed exhibited
industry and hard work in putting up his repair shop business and that his wife considered him as a good provider,
not to mention a vocational and college degree holder. Admittedly, testimonies in favor of an applicant for
naturalization are expected to be self-serving. Nevertheless, the Court finds it difficult to agree with the OSG’s
meager use of government data to prove that Karbasi would become a burden to the Philippine society in the future.
Except for its own citation of government data, nothing else was presented to establish that Karbasi had indeed no
lucrative income or trade to support himself and his family.

To accept the OSG’s logic is a dangerous precedent that would peg the compliance to this requirement in the law to
a comparison with the results of research, the purpose of which is unclear. This is not to say that the data produced
by government research are inappropriate, or much less irrelevant in judicial proceedings. The plain reliance on this
research information, however, may not be expected to produce the force of logic which the OSG wants to attain in
this case. Besides, had the law intended for government data on livelihood and income research to be used as a
gauge for the "lucrative income" requirement, it must have stated the same and foreclosed the Court’s power to
assess existing facts in any given case. Here, the Court opts to exercise this power and delve into a judicious review
of the findings of the RTC and the CA and, as explained, to rule that Karbasi, possesses a lucrative income and a
lawful occupation, as required by the Naturalization Law. 1âw phi 1

At this point, it is worthy to note the Court’s ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Chua25(Chua), where the
Court assessed the prevailing circumstances of an applicant for naturalization who was a medical student at the
time of the filing of her petition. In Chua, the Court rejected the Republic’s argument that the applicant’s status as a
subsequent passer of the Board Examinations of 1985 for Doctors of Medicine could not by itself be equated with
"gainful employment or tangible receipts." The Court held that this interpretation of the income requirement in the
law is "too literal and restrictive." It then cited Uy v. Republic,26 where the Court laid down the public policy
underlying the lucrative income requirement as follows:
[T]he Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable assurance not only that the applicant will not be a social
burden or liability but that he is a potential asset to the country he seeks to adopt for himself and quite literally, for
his children and his children's children.

The Court, in Chua, continued:

The economic qualification for naturalization may be seen to embody the objective of ensuring that the petitioner
would not become a public charge or an economic burden upon society. The requirement relates, in other words,
not simply to the time of execution of the petition for naturalization but also to the probable future of the applicant for
naturalization. In the case at bar, the Solicitor General does not dispute that respondent applicant, then a student,
was earning P2,000.00 a month, with free board and lodging, at the time she filed her Petition in August 1984. While
this amount was not, even in 1984, exactly a princely sum, she was not then a public charge and the respondent
applicant having passed the qualifying medical board examinations, can scarcely be regarded as likely to become a
public charge in the future should she be admitted as a citizen of this Republic. Respondent is certainly in a position
to earn substantial income if allowed to exercise her profession. Being a Doctor of Medicine, she is also clearly a
"potential asset to the country."27

As in Chua’s case, it does not at all seem likely that Karbasi, in his current circumstances, will ever become a public
charge. It bears emphasis to note that from a refugee who had nothing when he came to the Philippines, Karbasi
had indeed refused to be the object of charity by working hard to graduate from college and to eventually engage in
business to give his family support and comfort. The CA could not have explained this in better terms—

Thus, Karbasi went from being a refugee – who was dependent on the UNCHR for support – to a self-made
entrepreneur who can ably support himself and his family. As such, there is no showing that Karbasi may turn out to
be a public charge and a burden to our country’s resources. The fact moreover that he overcame this adversity
through his education and skills shows that he is a potential asset of the country.

Second. The OSG raised the issue of Karbasi’s alleged underdeclaration of income in his ITRs. It contended that
even if Karbasi had, indeed, a lucrative means of earning, his failure to declare the income which he had earned
from service contracts and to present any proof of the withholding of the taxes thereon, would reflect adversely on
his conduct, which under the statute must be "proper and irreproachable." The OSG cited Lim Eng Yu v.
Republic28(Lim Eng Yu), where the applicant later refuted the amounts reflected in his ITRs in order to prove that he
had lucrative trade or occupation. The Court rebuffed this "eleventh hour explanation" and concluded that the
applicant had to conceal his true income for the purpose of evading payment of lawful taxes. The Court found that
Lim Eng Yu, at that time, had a wife and two children, so, at most, his total tax exemption then, was P5,000.00. Had
he stated the net incomes he claimed in his ITRs, he would have been required to pay income taxes, it appearing
that the same exceeded his exemption under the law. Such conduct showed that Lim Eng Yu’s moral character was
not irreproachable, or as good as it should be, thus, disqualifying him for naturalization.

Like the CA, the Court is inclined not to apply the rigidity of the ruling in Lim Eng Yu to the present case. Unlike Lim
Eng Yu, Karbasi did not deny the charge of the OSG and instead admitted a procedural lapse on his part. Here,
there is no showing that the income earned by Karbasi was undeclared in order to benefit from statutory tax
exemptions. To clarify, this does not intend to downplay the requirement of good moral character in naturalization
cases. It bears stressing that the granting of applications for naturalization still necessitates that only those who are
deserving may be admitted as Filipino citizens. The character of the applicant remains to be one of the significant
measures to determine entitlement to Filipino citizenship. Nonetheless, the tenor of the ground used for the denial of
the application in Lim Eng Yu is not akin to what happened in this case.

Clearly, in Lim Eng Yu, the petitioner altogether intended to evade the payment of taxes by abusing the benefits
granted by tax exemptions. In this case, Karbasi did not deny that he gained income through his transactions with
1âw phi1

Daewoo and Kolin. He even presented, as evidence, the contracts of service he had entered into with the
companies including a Summary of Accounts paid to his repair shop. He did not disclaim that he had rendered
services to these companies and that he had earned a considerable sum therefrom. Instead, he explained the cause
of his lapse and acknowledged his mistaken belief that his earnings from these transactions need not be declared in
his ITRs as these were withheld already.

Again, it is not the objective of the Court to justify irregularities in ITRs by reason of a "mistaken belief." The Court,
however, finds it difficult to equate Karbasi’s lapse with a moral depravity that is fatal to his application for Filipino
citizenship. This mistaken understanding of the proper way to declare income is actually so common to individual
taxpayers, including lawyers and other professionals. While this is not to be taken as an excuse for every irregularity
in ITRs, the Court is not prepared to consider this as an outright reflection of one’s immoral inclinations. With due
consideration to his character as established by witnesses, and as observed by the RTC during the hearings,
Karbasi should be deemed to have sufficiently explained his mistake.

In the case of Chua, the Court had even disregarded the OSG’s argument that the applicant’s failure to execute her
ITR "reflects adversely on her conduct." Her explanation of non-filing as an "honest mistake" was accepted by the
Court with due regard to the other circumstances of her case. Like the CA, the Court also finds the same degree of
sincerity in Karbasi’s case, for he was candid enough to elicit this conclusion. Besides, there was no suggestion in
the records that Karbasi habitually excluded particular income in his ITRs. Echoing the findings in Chua, the Court
does not believe that this one lapse should be regarded as having so blackened Karbasi’s character as to disqualify
him from naturalization as a Philippine citizen.

Third. Considering the above disquisitions, the Court does not need to belabor the last issue on reciprocity between
Iranian and Philippine laws on naturalization. True, the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens or subjects of a
foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of
Karbasi’s petition, both with the RTC and the CA, together with his supplemental pleadings filed with the Court,
however, reveals that he has successfully established his refugee status upon arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the
country’s obligations under its various international commitments come into operation. Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines is a signatory, must be considered in this
case, to wit:

Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:

For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies that any requirements (including
requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfill
for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of
requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.

Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:

The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They
shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the
charges and costs of such proceedings.

In the same vein, Article 729 of the said Convention expressly provides exemptions from reciprocity, while Article 34
states the earnest obligation of contracting parties to "as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization
of refugees." As applied to this case, Karbasi' s status as a refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino
citizenship, in consonance with Philippine statutory requirements and international obligations. Indeed, the
Naturalization Law must be read in light of the developments in international human rights law specifically the
granting of nationality to refugees and stateless persons.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
U.S. Supreme Court
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964)

Schneider v. Rusk

No. 368

Argued April 2, 1964

Decided May 18, 1964

377 U.S. 163

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Syllabus

Appellant, who was born in Germany, came to this country with her parents as a child and acquired
derivative American citizenship. She lived abroad since graduation from college, became married to a
German national, and, except for two visits back to this country, has lived in Germany for the past
eight years. The State Department denied her a passport, certifying that she had lost her American
citizenship under § 352(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which provides that a
naturalized citizen, with exceptions not material here, loses citizenship by continuous residence for
three years in the country of origin. She thereupon sued in the District Court for a declaratory
judgment that she is still an American citizen and has appealed from that court's adverse decision.

Held by a majority of this Court, that § 352(a)(1) is discriminatory, and therefore violative of due
process under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, since no restriction against the length of
foreign residence applies to native-born citizens, though some members of that majority believe that
Congress lacks constitutional power to effect involuntary divestiture of citizenship. Pp. 377 U. S. 164-
169.

218 F.Supp. 302, reversed.

Page 377 U. S. 164

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Immigration and Nationality' Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 269, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1484, provides by
§ 352:

"(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his nationality by --"

"(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a foreign state of which he was
formerly a national or in which the place of his birth is situated, except as provided in section 353 of
this title, [Footnote 1] whether such residence commenced before or after the effective date of this
Act. . . ."

(Italics added.)
Appellant, a German national by birth, came to this country with her parents when a small child,
acquired derivative American citizenship at the age of 16 through her mother, and, after graduating
from Smith College, went abroad for postgraduate work. In 1956, while in France, she became
engaged to a German national, returned here briefly, and departed for Germany, where she married
and where she has resided ever since. Since her marriage, she has returned to this country on two
occasions for visits. Her husband is a lawyer in Cologne, where appellant has been living. Two of her
four sons, born in Germany, are dual nationals, having acquired American citizenship under §
301(a)(7) of the 1952 Act. The American citizenship of the other two turns on this case. In 1959, the
United States denied her a passport, the State Department certifying that she had lost her American
citizenship under § 352(a)(1), quoted above. Appellant sued for a declaratory judgment that she still is
an American citizen. The District Court held against her, 218 F.Supp.

Page 377 U. S. 165

302, and the case is here on appeal. [Footnote 2] 375 U.S. 893.

The Solicitor General makes his case along the following lines.

Over a period of many years, this Government has been seriously concerned by special problems
engendered when naturalized citizens return for a long period to the countries of their former
nationalities. It is upon this premise that the argument derives that Congress, through its power over
foreign relations, has the power to deprive such citizens of their citizenship.

Other nations, it is said, frequently attempt to treat such persons as their own citizens, thus embroiling
the United States in conflicts when it attempts to afford them protection. It is argued that expatriation
is an alternative to withdrawal of diplomatic protection. It is also argued that Congress reasonably can
protect against the tendency of three years' residence in a naturalized citizen's former homeland to
weaken his or her allegiance to this country. The argument continues that it is not invidious
discrimination for Congress to treat such naturalized citizens differently from the manner in which it
treats native-born citizens, and that Congress has the right to legislate with respect to the general
class without regard to each factual violation. It is finally argued that Congress here, unlike the
situation in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martnez,372 U. S. 144, was aiming only to regulate, and not to
punish, and that what Congress did had been deemed appropriate not only by this country, but by
many others, and is in keeping with traditional American concepts of citizenship.

We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized
person are of the same dignity, and are coextensive. The only difference drawn by the Constitution is
that only the "natural born" citizen is eligible to be President. Art. II, § 1.

Page 377 U. S. 166

While the rights of citizenship of the native born derive from § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the rights of the naturalized citizen derive from satisfying, free of fraud, the requirements set by
Congress, the latter, apart from the exception noted,

"becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the
view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize Congress to
enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national Legislature is to prescribe a uniform
rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it so far as respects the individual."
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U. S. 827. And see Luria v. United States, 231 U.
S. 9, 231 U. S. 22; United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U. S. 605, 283 U. S. 624; Knauer v. United
States, 328 U. S. 654, 328 U. S. 658.

Views of the Justices have varied when it comes to the problem of expatriation.

There is one view that the power of Congress to take away citizenship for activities of the citizen is
nonexistent absent expatriation by the voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegiance. See Perez
v. Brownell, 356 U. S. 44, 356 U. S. 79(dissenting opinion of JUSTICES BLACK and
DOUGLAS); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 (opinion by CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN). That view has not
yet commanded a majority of the entire Court. Hence, we are faced with the issue presented and
decided in Perez v. Brownell, supra, i.e., whether the present Act violates due process. That, in turn,
comes to the question put in the following words in Perez:

"Is the means, withdrawal of citizenship, reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within the
power of Congress to achieve, the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of our foreign
relations . . . ?"

356 U.S. at 356 U. S. 60.

Page 377 U. S. 167

In that case, where an American citizen voted in a foreign election, the answer was in the affirmative.
In the present case, the question is whether the same answer should be given merely because the
naturalized citizen lived in her former homeland continuously for three years. We think not.

Speaking of the provision in the Nationality Act of 1940, which was the predecessor of § 352(a)(1),
Chairman Dickstein of the House said that the bill would "relieve this country of the responsibility of
those who reside in foreign lands and only claim citizenship when it serves their purpose." 86
Cong.Rec. 11944. And the Senate Report on the 1940 bill stated:

"These provisions for loss of nationality by residence abroad would greatly lessen the task of the
United States in protecting through the Department of State nominal citizens of this country who are
abroad but whose real interests, as shown by the conditions of their foreign stay, are not in this
country."

S.Rep. No. 2150, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 4.

As stated by Judge Fahy, dissenting below, such legislation, touching as it does on the "most
precious right" of citizenship (Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 159), would have
to be justified under the foreign relations power

"by some more urgent public necessity than substituting administrative convenience for the individual
right of which the citizen is deprived."

218 F.Supp. 302, 320.

In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, a divided Court held that it was beyond the power of
Congress to deprive an American of his citizenship automatically and without any prior judicial or
administrative proceedings because he left the United States in time of war to evade or avoid training
or service in the Armed Forces. The Court held that it was an unconstitutional use of
Page 377 U. S. 168

congressional power because it took away citizenship as punishment for the offense of remaining
outside the country to avoid military service without, at the same time, affording him the procedural
safeguards granted by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Yet even the dissenters, who felt that flight or
absence to evade the duty of helping to defend the country in time of war amounted to manifest
nonallegiance, made a reservation. JUSTICE STEWART stated:

"Previous decisions have suggested that congressional exercise of the power to expatriate may be
subject to a further constitutional restriction -- a limitation upon the kind of activity which may be made
the basis of denationalization. Withdrawal of citizenship is a drastic measure. Moreover, the power to
expatriate endows government with authority to define and to limit the society which it represents and
to which it is responsible."

"This Court has never held that Congress' power to expatriate may be used unsparingly in every area
in which it has general power to act. Our previous decisions upholding involuntary denationalization
all involved conduct inconsistent with undiluted allegiance to this country."

372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 214.

This statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens as a class are less
reliable, and bear less allegiance to this country than do the native born. This is an assumption that is
impossible for us to make. Moreover, while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause,
it does forbid discrimination that is "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 347 U. S. 499. A native-born citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely
without suffering loss of citizenship. The discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens drastically limits
their rights to live

Page 377 U. S. 169

and work abroad in a way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second-class citizenship. Living
abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or native born, is no badge of lack of allegiance, and in no
way evidences a voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegiance. It may indeed be compelled by
family, business, or other legitimate reasons.

Reversed.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19829 May 4, 1968

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, movant-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO

COKENG, Respondent-Appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for movant-appellant.

Norberto J. Quisumbing, Ta�ada and Carreon and M.V. Agcaoili for
respondent-appellee.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Respondent-appellee Francisco Cokeng seeks reconsideration of this Court's

decision in the above entitled case, ordering the revocation of his certificate of
naturalization (17 Sup. Ct. Rep. Annot., p. 853). Bases of the decision were
that in the original application for naturalization, said respondent failed to
state all his former places of residence; and lack of good moral character and
irreproachable conduct, rendering the naturalization one that was illegally
obtained (Com. Act. No. 473, sec. 18). chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

With regard to the first ground, this Court's main decision found that appellee,
in addition to his given address at 428 Sto. Cristo, Manila, had also resided at
28, 12th Street, corner Broadway, Quezon City, but had not revealed it in the
amended application for his naturalization that was the one published as
required by law.chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

That the appellee Cokeng had resided in the house in Quezon City is
indubitable, as it appears manifested by him in several public documents
executed between 1951 and 1954, as detailed in our decision. Some of these
were even sworn to by him (Exh. A and Exh. SSS, for example). His
explanations, that in some of said documents the residence in Quezon City
was set down by mistake, or that it was an address and not a residence, or
that he had purchased it for his parents, were examined and found
unconvincing and not acceptable. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

In his motions for reconsideration, the appellee stresses that in law a person
can only have one legal domicile, and that appellee, in good faith, only made it
appear in his application for naturalization that his residence was 428 Sto.
Cristo, Manila, because it was there that he stayed most of the time. These
arguments are unmeritorious. It is noteworthy that section 7 of the
Naturalization Law expressly requires the applicant to state his "present and
past place of residence", and the words used in the statute clearly show that
the term used ("residence") was not employed in the sense of "legal domicile",
precisely because a person can only have one domicile. Considering the
purpose of the requirement, which is to enable the public and the investigating
agencies of the government to gather all information available as to the
conduct of an applicant, and thus determine whether his behaviour at all times
has been irreproachable as required by law, and hence, whether the
prospective admission to citizenship should be objected to or not, it becomes
obvious that by places of residence, section 7 of the Naturalization Law refers
to the places of actual physical residence,1 whether temporary or
permanent. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

In Qua vs. Republic, L-19834, October 27, 1964, this court said -

Petitioner argues, however, that his residence in Manila was only temporary so
that his legal residence or domicile remained to be Legazpi City. Section 7 of
the Revised Naturalization Law speaks of "present and former places of
residence" without specifying actual or legal residence. Its purpose, as stated,
is to give the public and the investigating agencies of the government an
opportunity to gather information and to express objection relative to the
petition. Precisely, for this reason, it is important that petitioner's actual,
physical residence be likewise set forth and published, since information
regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by
people in his actual, physical surrounding.

We reiterated these views in O Ku Phuan vs. Republic, 1967C, PHILD 570,

573,2 where it was ruled that:

The only former place of residence mention in the petition for naturalization
was 1040 O'Donnell, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The record shows, however, that
petitioner had resided in Davao from 1936 to 1946, at No. 788 Juan Luna,
Tondo, Manila, from 1946 to 1948 and in the 2nd Avenue, Grace Park,
Caloocan City, from 1948 to 1949. It is well settled that this failure to mention
petitioner's former residences affects the jurisdiction of the court to hear the
case.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Indeed, such omission tends to defeat the purpose of the publication, required
by law, of notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization. It deprives the
Government of the opportunity to make a thorough and effective investigation
of petitioner's background, prior to the hearing of his petition. Moreover,
people residing in the neighborhood of the former places of residence not
mentioned in the petition may thus be led to believe that petitioner is another
person. They may, accordingly, refrain from conveying to the Government
pieces of information relevant, if not vital, to the petition for naturalization. For
this reason, the fact that petitioner mentioned, in his testimony, said former
places of residence, does not and can not - contrary to the import of the order
appealed from - cure the effect of the failure to specify them in his
aforementioned petition.

Upon the other hand, the decisions in Zuellig vs. Republic, 83 Phil. 768,
and Chausintek vs. Republic, 88 Phil. 717, discuss residence for purposes of
venue for the filing of the petition for naturalization and are, therefore,
inapplicable to the present issue. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary ch anroble s virtual law l ib rary

Likewise obvious it is that the good faith of the applicant in omitting one or
more of his "present and past places of residence" in his application, becomes
and is irrelevant for the purposes of the law. Whether the omission be in good
or bad faith, the fact is that full inquiry as to the irreproachability of applicant's
behaviour is thereby prevented, and the law's intent frustrated. Hence, this
Court in a long line of decisions has inveriably held that such omission is fatal
to the application for naturalization (Lim Tan vs. Republic, April 30, 1966; Ong
Ping Seng vs. Republic, L-19575, February 26, 1965 and numerous decisions
cited therein; Tan vs. Republic, L-22077, February 18, 1967; O Ku Phuan vs.
Republic, L-23406, August 31, 1967, 1967C PHILD, 570 and cases cited). chan roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

It is apparent from the preceding considerations that the act of appellee

Cokeng in not disclosing his residence in Quezon City, having deprived the
State of opportunity to fully inquire into the applicant's conduct, rendered the
decree of naturalization improvident and improper, being contrary to the
requirements and policy of the law. While the decree had become final, the
State is not thereby deprived of corrective action through denaturalization
proceedings for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. For under
section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, "a competent judge may cancel the
naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the civil registry
whenever it is shown that - said naturalization certificate was obtained
fraudulently or illegally". These terms were reproduced from the American law
that allowed cancellation of naturalizations "fraudulently or illegally procured",
and it has been the consistent interpretation of the Federal and Supreme
Courts of the United States that the term "illegally procured" is not limited to
irregularity, but also denoted a determination by the Court contrary to law of
the matter submitted to it. (U.S. vs. Nopoulos, 225 Fed. 656; U.S. vs.
Plaistrow, 189 Fed. 1010; Grahl vs. U.S., 261 Fed. 487; U.S. vs. Koopmans,
290 Fed. 545; U.S. vs. Khaw, 1 Fed. 2d 1006; U.S. vs. Ness, 62 L. Ed., 321;
U.S. vs. Ginsberg, 61 L. Ed. 853).
No alien has the slightest right to naturalization unless all statutory
requirements are complied with; and every certificate of citizenship must be
treated as granted upon condition that the government may challenge it, as
provided in section 15, and demand its cancellation, unless issued in
accordance with such requirements. If procured when prescribed qualifications
have no existence in fact, it is illegally procured; a manifest mistake by the
judge can not supply these nor render their existence non-essential. (U.S. vs.
Ginsberg, 61 Law Ed. 853, 856). chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtua l law lib rary

Naturalization granted without the filing of a certificate of arrival as required

by the statute, the same being a matter of substance, is illegally procured.
(U.S. vs. Ness, 62 L. Ed. 321). chanroble svi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

No alien has the right to naturalization unless he has complied with the
statutory requirements. If a certificate of naturalization has been procured
when the statutory qualification did not exist in fact, it may be cancelled. Proof
of fraud in obtaining a certificate is unnecessary to justify cancellation,
illegality alone will subject a certificate to successful attack. (U.S. vs. Beda,
118 Fed. 2d 458, 459, cit, U.S. Sup. Court decisions). (Emphasis supplied) c han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

The statute requires certain conditions to exist to entitle a person to

naturalization, and no person and no bureau, and no court, can waive these
conditions; therefore the government can not be estopped by anything shown
in the record in this case. (U.S. vs. Nopoulos, 225 Fed. 656, cit. author.)

It can be readily seen that the lack of fraudulent intent or trickery in obtaining
naturalization is no obstacle to the cancellation of a naturalization certificate
originally issued in violation of law. It may be added that appellee's contention
that his true residence was No. 428 Sto. Cristo, Manila, is not free from doubt,
considering the evidence that these premises were under lease to Go Tian Hoo
(doing business under the name of Francis Trading) from April 1951 to
December 1958 (tsn. p. 31, Sept. 28, 1961; Exhs. V-I and V-II), while the
petition for naturalization was filed in 1955. chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that the respondent has not established
adequate grounds for altering the conclusions made in the main decision (17
Supreme Court Reports Annotated, p. 857) to the effect that his failure to
disclose all his places of residence justified the revocation of his
naturalization.chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

With regard to the second ground for revocation, to wit, that respondent
Cokeng had committed under declarations of his income, thereby evincing lack
of that irreproachable conduct which the law requires of applicants for
citizenship, respondent stresses that the first group of Bureau of Internal
Revenue examiners had found that Cokeng overpaid his income taxes for
1952, 1953 and 1954; the second group of examiners that had gone over
Cokeng's case found overpayments only for 1952 and 1954, but certified to
this taxpayer's being deficient in his income declarations for the years 1953,
1955, 1956 and 1957; and still a third group of examiners in turn confirmed
Cokeng's overpayments for 1952 and 1954, but reported that for the years
1953, 1955, 1956 and 1957, there was neither deficiency nor overpayment. To
cap this confusing situation, respondent has submitted (See Annexes to his
Motion of November 14, 1966) a report of Supervising Revenue Examiner
Restituto D. Atienza, (who had originally investigated Cokeng's tax case, and
assessed him for additional taxes) wherein said examiner declared, as of
October 1963, that respondent had overpaid his income taxes for the years
1951, 1952 and 1954; and recommended that he be assessed for deficiency
income taxes for 1958 and 1959, but without penalty, because "there is no
direct evidence of fraud."
chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary

The records further disclose a memorandum dated May 8, 1967 of

Commissioner of Internal Revenue Misael P. Vera, reporting to the Solicitor
General 3 that other revenue examiners had verified anew respondent's tax
cases, and that -

The examiners found no evidence in the records to show that the deficiency
tax arose from undeclared income that would indicate bad faith on the part of
the taxpayers, thus, substantiating the conclusion and recommendation of the
late Examiner Atienza as adverted to above. On the other hand, the examiners
found instances showing good faith on the part of the taxpayer. He voluntarily
filed his amended returns for 1952 up to 1955, inclusive, declaring an
additional income consisting of dividends from San Miguel Brewery
Corporation. This additional income has not been discovered by the team of
Examiners Timoteo C. Andrada and Felix S. Lopez whose examination covered
the years 1948 up to 1954, inclusive. Moreover, the amended returns were
filed even before the start of the second re-investigation, which was then not
expected. The taxpayer also voluntarily filed a Supplementary Inventory, on
February 14, 1956, as Administrator of the estate of his deceased father
thereby increasing the estate and inheritance taxes. These acts of taxpayer,
the examiners pointed out, demonstrate not only good faith but civic-
mindedness long before the denaturalization case was stated sometime in
1960.

These conclusions the Commissioner confirmed and adopted, saying -

It appearing that the examiners' findings are based on a thorough appraisal

and evaluation of the records of Mr. Cokeng's tax cases, this Office finds it
unnecessary to add to or detract from the said comments, which are
therefore, hereby confirmed and adopted as our official answer to the
questions posed in your query.

In view of these developments, we are left with no alternative but to conclude

that, despite the suspicious variations in the results of the different
examinations of respondent's tax cases, the second charge of under
declarations of his income has not been clearly established, and therefore, his
denaturalization can not be predicated upon said charge. chan roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

It appearing, however, that Cokeng's naturalization was illegally obtained,

because the Court granting it improperly disregarded the applicant's failure to
disclose one of his places of residence, contrary to the requirement of section
7 of the Naturalization Law, the denaturalization decreed in the original
decision of this Court must be maintained. chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19829. August 31, 1970.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF FRANCISCO CO KENG TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF

THE PHILIPPINES. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, movant-appellant, v. FRANCISCO CO
KENG, Respondent-Appellee.

RESOLUTION

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Before this Court for resolution is respondent-appellee’s supplementary second motion for
reconsideration dated January 27, 1968.

It may be recalled that the instant proceeding started when the Solicitor General, in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on March 7, 1961 a petition
for denaturalization of respondent appellee, who had taken his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
on December 29, 1958 pursuant to the decision of the said court dated October 31, 1956, granting
his petition for naturalization. One of the grounds alleged by the Solicitor General was that
respondent had obtained his certificate of naturalization fraudulently by stating in his application that
he was a resident of Manila when actually he was residing at No. 28, 12th Street (Broadway),
Quezon City. In essence this ground questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in the naturalization proceeding. Another ground was that respondent had been guilty of tax
evasion and habitual concealment of his taxable income.

The petition for denaturalization was denied by the Court of First Instance, and petitioner appealed to
this Court. On July 30, 1966 this Court reversed the said decision and ordered respondent’s
certificate of naturalization revoked. Upon motion for reconsideration this Court, in its resolution
dated May 4, 1968, found that in the light of a memorandum submitted by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to the Solicitor General and presented to this Court in connection with said motion,
"the second charge of underdeclarations of his (respondent’s) income has not been clearly
established, and therefore, his denaturalization cannot be predicated upon said charge." However, by
a divided vote of five to four, with one abstention, this Court denied the motion for reconsideration
on the ground that respondent-appellee’s naturalization had been illegally obtained because his
application therefor failed to state one of his places of residence, namely, No. 28, 12th Street
(Broadway), Quezon City, contrary to the requirements of Section 7 of the Naturalization Law. It is
this resolution of denial promulgated May 4, 1968. reiterated in another resolution of June 25, 1968,
which in effect is the subject of respondent appellee’s supplementary second motion for
reconsideration of June 27, 1968.

In his motion respondent-appellee raises a constitutional question and claims that to denaturalize
him for violation of section 7 of the Naturalization Law would be a denial of due process inasmuch as
the petition for that purpose filed in the Court of First Instance did not allege such ground, but rather
that he had no residence in the City of Manila at all, his residence being in Quezon City, at the
address aforementioned, at the time of his application. In other words, his position is that since the
petition for denaturalization was based on non-compliance with section 8 of the Naturalization Law,
according to which an application for naturalization must be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
place of the applicant’s residence for at least one year proceeding the filing of such application, and
since the charge of non-compliance was not true, he having been found to be really a resident of
Manila, precisely at the address stated by him, he should not be denaturalized on another ground
neither alleged nor the subject of evidence at the trial, namely, failure to state any other places of
residence, past and present, as required by Section 7.

Required to comment on the point thus raised by respondent-appellee, the Solicitor General
expressed his concurrence from the standpoint of the due process clause of the Constitution, and
submitted respondent-appellee’s supplementary second motion for reconsideration to the sound
discretion of this Court.

On November 15, 1968 this Court issued the following resolution: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In L-19829 (Republic of the Philippines v. Francisco Co Keng), acting on the supplementary second
motion for reconsideration of respondent-appellee dated June 27, 1968 and on the Solicitor General’s
answer thereto dated October 4, 1968; considering the argument of said respondent-appellee,
concurred in by the Solicitor-General, that to denaturalize him for lack of compliance with Section 7
of the Naturalization Law would constitute a denial of due process, since the petition for that purpose
is based solely on Section 8 of the same law; considering further that the purpose of Section 7, which
requires that an application for naturalization must state the present and former places of residence
of the applicant to enable the public and the investigating agencies of the government to gather all
information available as to the conduct of an applicant and thus determine whether his behavior at all
times has been irreproachable as required by law; and considering finally that the said purpose of the
law would be subserved in this case by affording the Solicitor General opportunity to make the
necessary investigation on the point and submit his findings to the court with notice to and hearing of
the respondent-appellee: as alternatively prayed for in the aforesaid supplementary second motion
for reconsideration, this case is remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to the Solicitor
General to make the necessary investigation regarding the conduct and behavior of said respondent-
appellee in Quezon City, particularly in the vicinity of No. 28, 12th Street, Broadway, before and after
the grant of citizenship to him on December 29, 1958, and in the event such investigation should
yield derogatory information which would render him unfit for citizenship, to file the corresponding
amended petition for denaturalization on that ground, otherwise to file with this Court, within a
reasonable time, a manifestation that no such information is available, so that the proper action may
be taken." cralaw virtua1aw library

On December 16, 1968 the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The undersigned Solicitor General hereby respectfully manifests that he has complied with the
resolution of this Honorable Court of November 15, 1968 in this case in the following manner: chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

1. Shortly after being notified of said resolution, a panel composed of Assistant Solicitor General
Isidro Borromeo, Solicitors Sumilang Bernardo, Dominador Quiroz, Salvador Jacob and Adolfo Diaz,
the panel in the Office of the Solicitor General to which the Cokeng case was assigned under the
particular care of Solicitor Sumilang Bernardo, was instructed to set the investigation of the moral
character and conduct of respondent-appellee required by this Honorable Court with notice to said
party and to have said notice published in a newspaper of general circulation;

2. Letters were also addressed to the National Bureau of Investigation and the Chief of Police of
Quezon City requesting investigation of the same matter;

3. In the meanwhile, information was secured as to who have been residing in the neighborhood of
28, 12th Street, Quezon City during the material time involved in this case and from whom the
investigating panel could make inquiries about the said moral character and conduct of respondent
appellee and three persons who could serve the purpose were requested to make affidavits and to
testify at the hearing for which they were duly served with subpoena;

4. The above-mentioned panel set the hearing on December 12, 1968 at 10:00 o’clock in the
morning and actually held it as scheduled:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

5. The notice of hearing was actually published in the Philippines Herald on December 8, 10 and 11,
1968;

6. At said hearing, the respondent-appellee presented clearances from the Quezon City Fiscal’s office,
Office of the City Court of Quezon City, Court of First Instance, Quezon City Branch and the National
Bureau of Investigation;

7. That the following prominent persons testified at said hearing in answer to the subpoena served on
each of them: Atty. Rosario L. Planas, of 42 (old number 22), 12th Street, Quezon City; former
Congressman Lucas P. Paredes, of 43 (old number 23) 12th Street, Quezon City and former Vice-
President of the Philippine National Bank, Mr. Carlos Sobreviñas of No. 3, Eighth Street, Quezon City;

8. The report of the panel to the undersigned Solicitor General shows that no one has appeared with
derogatory information about the respondent-appellee, the said report being hereto attached as
Annex A of this manifestation;

9. That subsequent to the hearing, the respondent-appellee submitted the clearance of the police
department of Quezon City, which is hereto attached as Annex B;

10. Also subsequent to the hearing, the undersigned received a handwritten letter from Mayor
Norberto Amoranto of Quezon City pertinent to the matter under inquiry, which letter is attached
hereto as Annex C of this manifestation;

11. From all the foregoing, it appears that no derogatory information against the respondent-appellee
during the period of his residence or stay, material to this case, at No. 28, 12th Street, Quezon City
is available;

WHEREFORE, the above manifestation is respectfully submitted to this Honorable Court for its
consideration in relation to the resolution of November 15, 1968,"
In view of the foregoing report of the Solicitor General it has become unnecessary to remand this
case to the court of origin for the purpose contemplated in the resolution of this Court of November
15, 1968, namely, for the Solicitor General to file the corresponding amended petition for
naturalization against respondent-appellee in the event the investigation regarding his conduct and
behavior in Quezon City, before and after the grant of citizenship to him on December 29, 1958,
should yield derogatory information which would render him unfit for citizenship. The reason behind
the requirement in Section 7 of the Naturalization Law concerning the inclusion of an applicant’s
present and former places of residence in his petition for naturalization has been satisfied in this
particular case, and consequently the filing of an amended petition for denaturalization expressly
alleging failure to comply with such requirement would serve no practical purpose, nor may the
Solicitor General be expected to file such petition after the investigation conducted by him had
yielded negative results.

WHEREFORE, respondent-appellee’s supplementary second motion for reconsideration is granted; the

decision of this Court of July 20, 1966, and the resolution of July 20, 1968 insofar as it denies
respondent-appellee’s first motion for reconsideration, and the resolution of June 25, 1968, denying
his second motion for reconsideration, are set aside; and the judgment of the Court a quo denying
appellant’s petition for cancellation of respondent appellee’s certificate of naturalization is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25300 January 4, 1974

IN RE: APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP OF CHAN TECK LAO. CHAN TECK LAO, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Leocadio D. Santiago, Manuel O. Chan and Gerardo Cabo Chan for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor
Bernardo Pardo for oppositor-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.: 1äwp hï1.ñ ët

The 1967 leading case of Gan Tsitung v. Republic1 with former Chief Justice Concepcion as spokesman for
the Court, indicates clearly the merit of this appeal by petitioner Chan Teck Lao from a lower court decision
promulgated in 1965 ordering the cancellation of his certificate of naturalization that dates back to 1952 as a
result of 1950 decision of this Tribunal sustaining his plea to become a Filipino. Gan Tsitung, in language
plain and unequivocal makes manifest that no retroactive effect is to be given a judicial pronouncement that
would impose on a party proceeded against in a denaturalization proceeding a requirement not in existence
at a time that his application was heard and favorably acted on. There would be manifest unfairness in
setting aside a decision that had subsequently become final and did lead to the grant of the coveted boon
citizenship. Unfortunately, the lower court decision came out in 1965, a full two years earlier. The Republic
thus emerged victorious in its suit to declare null and void the original judgment in favor of petitioner in
view of Tan Ten Koc v. Republic,2 which the year before held for the first time that an applicant must present
positive evidence the newspaper where his petition was published was indeed of general circulation in the
province where the proceeding was had. With the principle of nonretroactivity now firmly adhered to, there
is no more justification for what the low court did. The status of petitioner as a national of this country for
<äre||anº•1àw>

well-nigh thirteen years ought to have remained undisturbed. What is more, a 1970 resolution of this Court
penned by the present Chief Justice in Republic v. Co
Keng,3 warning against undue receptivity to claims by the State in denaturalization proceedings, further strengthens
the position of petitioner-appellant in seeking a reversal. Such an approach can likewise be discerned in our
resolution, with Justice Antonio as ponente, in Burca v. Republic.4 We therefore cannot affirm.

The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision now on appeal: "This case was filed on March 28, 1949. The
application for naturalization of Chan Teck Lao was denied on October 31, 1949. Upon appeal the Supreme Court,
..., [on] June 15, 1950, reversed this Court's decision."5 It was then noted that more than ten years later, on July 16,
1962, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the petition for the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization,
raising the alleged jurisdictional question based on the subsequent Tan Ten Koc ruling that there was no showing or
proof that the Nueva Era was a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Tarlac, where the petitioner then
resided. Such an objection was considered insuperable by the lower court in view of the tacit admission by counsel
for petitioner of such failure on his part. It did, however, note in its decision: "The Court is not unaware that the trial
court denied the application for naturalization of Chan Teck Lao; that it was reversed by the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of June 15, 1950."6 In its dispositive portion, it held "that it did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the
application of Chan Teck Lao when it heard the same on September 6, 1949, and therefore [ordered] the
cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of Chan Teck Lao as a Filipino citizen."7
The decision now on appeal lends itself to the interpretation that by virtue of Tan Ten Koc the outcome could not
have been otherwise, notwithstanding the admittedly strong, equitable and legal considerations in favor of petitioner-
appellant, who had in his favor a decision no less from this Tribunal granting him citizenship, dating back to 1950.
Nor is this to find fault with the lower court. Rightly, it could have felt it had no other choice. With the categorical
pronouncement however, in Gan Tsitung,8 a reversal, as noted at the outset, is indicated.

1. In a manifestation and addendum to petitioner-appellant's brief filed with this Court on January 24, 1969,9 our
attention was invited to the Gan Tsitung ruling in further support of his stand that the lower court's decision cannot
be upheld. As already made clear, such a plea is of the utmost persuasiveness. As was clearly set forth in the
opinion of the Chief Justice: "After mature deliberation and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion
for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained in the latter, the
Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of
naturalization issued after, not on or before, May 29, 1957. Although there are divergent views on the precise time at
which the decision of a court of last resort, declaring a given statute, process or proceeding null and void as
unconstitutional or illegal, shall affect the validity of acts performed under such law or of similar processes or
proceedings in analogous cases, the precedents appear overwhelmingly to favor such a solution as is just, fair and
reasonable, having in mind public interest, as well as that of the parties directly concerned. As Professor Freund has
put it, the issue "involves considerations, not only of principle, but, also, of practical administration." " 10 Herein this
case, the very same consideration presents itself with equal validity. To rely on the 1964 Tan Ten Koc ruling which,
after all these years, would require that positive proof as to the paper wherein the application was published in the
place where the proceeding was had being of general application to petitioner-appellant who, as far back as June
15, 1950, had already been granted his citizenship by this Court, his certificate being issued two years thereafter,
would, in the language of Gan Tsitung, be far from "just, fair and reasonable." 11

2. The conclusion reached by us receives additional reinforcement that stems from the fundamental law itself. Chief
Justice Concepcion, in Gan Tsitung, appeared to be of the same mind. Thus: "It should be noted, furthermore, that a
similar view was, in principle, taken in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68) in which this Court declared void, the
Moratorium Law unconstitutional, and, hence, null and void, but only from the date of the promulgation of the
decision therein (May 18, 1953), said moratorium being deemed effective prior thereto, despite the fundamental
infirmity of the legislation that established it." 12 If it were otherwise, the decision would not, in his language, be "just,
fair and reasonable." 13 It would be infected with the virus of arbitrariness and thus offend against the due process
guarantee.

In the 1970 resolution in Republic v. Co Keng 14 that finally put an end to what was a long-drawn-out litigation, the
present Chief Justice was equally alert to a possible disregard of this basic safeguard. What is more, earlier, in the
1968 resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, he displayed sensitivity to the equal protection angle. 15 For it
was in Co Keng that for the first time the attention of this Court was invited by counsel to Schneiderman v. United
States, 16 Baumgartner v. United States, 17 and Knauer vs. United States. 18 All of these three leading American
Supreme Court cases stand for the proposition that a naturalized citizen is entitled to similar treatment as a native-
born citizen except where the Charter itself provides otherwise. If it were not so, there would be an infringement of
the equal protection guarantee. 19 In Schneiderman, it was merely hinted at. Justice Murphy called attention to the
fact that this was not a naturalization proceeding, in which the government was asked to confer a privilege; instead
the government "seeks to turn the clock back twelve years after full citizenship was conferred" and to deprive
petitioner of the "priceless benefits that stem from citizenship." 20 Once conferred then, it "should not be taken away
without the clearest sort of justification." 21 In Baumgartner, Justice Frankfurter was quite explicit to the effect that
under the American Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on equal footing with a native citizen in all respects,
save that of eligibility to the Presidency. 22 So was Justice Douglas in Knauer. Thus: "Citizenship obtained through
naturalization is not a second-class citizenship." 23 From such a perspective then, to impose an additional burden for
the first time to warrant the denaturalization of a citizen whose naturalization was obtained after the most exacting
scrutiny not only by the lower courts but by this Tribunal, and especially so after a long lapse of time, would be
clearly to subject him to a risk that certainly the Constitution, with its pledge of equal protection, cannot
countenance.

3. Then, there is our resolution in Burca v. Republic, 24 promulgated only last June. While this is a naturalization and
not a denaturalization proceeding, the juridical philosophy that informs it is of some relevance. As was made clear in
the opinion of Justice Antonio: "Certainly if the decision of the administrative agency on the matter of citizenship, as
an important issue involved in the case, is affirmed by this Court, We find no cogent reason why such decision on
the matter can not be given preclusive effect. We have conceded the authority of certain administrative agencies to
ascertain the citizenship of the parties involved in the cases therein, as a matter inherent in or essential to the
efficient exercise of their powers. Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end to litigations, some
authorities recognize that administrative rulings or decisions should have res judicata or preclusive effect. ... The
same observation holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in
issue in the case before it, which is affirmed by this Court. For the "effective operation of courts in the social and
economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the parties, the general public
and the courts themselves. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of
courts and their decisions and invites litigation" (Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale Law Journal,
345)." 25This Court spoke in no uncertain terms as far back as 1950 that petitioner-appellant met all the qualifications
for citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of January 20, 1965 ordering the cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization of Chan Teck Lao as a Filipino citizen is set aside and reversed
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 187567 February 15, 2012

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, seeking the reversal of the April 3, 2009 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, of
Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R. The RTC granted the petition2 filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun
entitled "In re: Judicial Declaration of Election of Filipino Citizenship, Nora Fe Sagun v. The Local Civil Registrar of
Baguio City."

The facts follow:

Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She
was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City3 and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance4 to
the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but
was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the
citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine
citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that
the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.

In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and
attended local schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the Saint Louis University. Respondent
claimed that despite her part-Chinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter
of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as
shown in the Voter Certification5 issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio City.

She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact
should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic of
the Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio City to appear in the above mentioned case.6 However,
no comment was filed by the City Prosecutor.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition and
declaring respondent a Filipino citizen. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED [a]
FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.

Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to annotate [on] her
birth certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.7

Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse viaa
petition for review on certiorari before us. Petitioner raises the following issues:

Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible; and,

II

Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the age of
majority, is considered to have been made "within a reasonable time" as interpreted by jurisprudence.8

Petitioner argues that respondent’s petition before the RTC was improper on two counts: for one, law and
jurisprudence clearly contemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship; and
for another, the pleaded registration of the oath of allegiance with the local civil registry and its annotation on
respondent’s birth certificate are the ministerial duties of the registrar; hence, they require no court order. Petitioner
asserts that respondent’s petition before the trial court seeking a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship undeniably entails a determination and consequent declaration of her status as a Filipino citizen which is
not allowed under our legal system. Petitioner also argues that if respondent’s intention in filing the petition is
ultimately to have her oath of allegiance registered with the local civil registry and annotated on her birth certificate,
then she does not have to resort to court proceedings.

Petitioner further argues that even assuming that respondent’s action is sanctioned, the trial court erred in finding
respondent as having duly elected Philippine citizenship since her purported election was not in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law and was not made within a "reasonable time." Petitioner points out that while
respondent executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine
citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was
executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority. Accordingly, it was
made beyond the period allowed by law.

In her Comment,9 respondent avers that notwithstanding her failure to formally elect Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, she has in fact effectively elected Filipino citizenship by her performance of positive
acts, among which is the exercise of the right of suffrage. She claims that she had voted and participated in all local
and national elections from the time she was of legal age. She also insists that she is a Filipino citizen despite the
fact that her "election" of Philippine citizenship was delayed and unregistered.

In reply,10 petitioner argues that the special circumstances invoked by respondent, like her continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, her having been educated in schools in the country, her choice of staying here
despite the naturalization of her parents as American citizens, and her being a registered voter, cannot confer on
her Philippine citizenship as the law specifically provides the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondent’s petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2) whether respondent has effectively
elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of
fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no
dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.11
In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaring respondent a Filipino
citizen after finding that respondent was able to substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends
that respondent’s petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and
jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raised questions of law as the resolution of these issues rest
solely on what the law provides given the attendant circumstances.

In granting the petition, the trial court stated:

This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding her election of Filipino
citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered to annotate in her birth certificate her
election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the petitioner’s election of Filipino citizenship should be
welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner has the choice to elect citizenship of powerful countries
like the United States of America and China, however, petitioner has chosen Filipino citizenship because she grew
up in this country, and has learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of electing Filipino citizenship is, in fact, a
testimony that many of our people still wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud of our country.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED as
FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.12

For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual.13 There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial
proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.14 This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v.
Republic15 citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines,16 where we clearly stated:

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.
Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach
of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon,
and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x
x

Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such
pronouncement was not within the court’s competence.

As to the propriety of respondent’s petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is
imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether
she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.

When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as
citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines.17 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was
carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.18 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by
the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution.19

Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching
the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the
citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality.20 An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself.21 But in the case of respondent,
for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,22 enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the
Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election
under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of
the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.23

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the
party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In
other words, he should first be required to register as an alien.24 Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship
is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said
Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election.25 Afterwards, the
same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.26 1âwphi 1

It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a
petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under
Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows
any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and
recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent duly
elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply
with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her
election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of
alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was
unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of allegiance
suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not
registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time"
has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the
age of majority.27 Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the
failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a
valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine
citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to
seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching,28 the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly
not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the
foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before the trial court must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of
Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicial declaration of
election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-40252 December 29, 1986

ANTONIO CHIAO BEN LIM, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V and the local civil registrar
of the City of Cebu, respondents.

Eleno Andales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from two Orders 1 of the respondent judge dismissing a petition for the correction of an
allegedly wrong entry in the birth records of Kim Joseph describing him as a Chinese national instead of a Filipino
citizen.

The petitioner had offered to prove the error through several pieces of evidence, among them an earlier birth
certificate of Kim Joseph describing him as a Filipino citizen, the birth certificates of his seven brothers and sisters
all describing them as Filipinos, and a decision of the Court of Appeals recognizing their grandfather as a Filipino
citizen. 2

On opposition by the local civil registrar of Cebu, 3 however, the respondent judge dismissed the petition and
sustained the contention that only clerical errors were allowed to be corrected in the summary proceedings
authorized under Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Substantial issues like citizenship
were not covered. In effect, it was held the petition was for a judicial declaration of citizenship, which was not
allowed under existing rules. 4

Article 412 of the Civil Code simply provides: "No entry in the civil registry shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order."

In fairness to the respondent judge, there was abundant jurisprudence to lend support to his Orders at the time they
were issued. Since then, however, the strict doctrine announced in those cases has been relaxed, most recently in
the case of Republic v. Valencia, 5 supported by twelve members of this Court with only one other member not
taking part.

In that case (arising, incidentally, also in Cebu City), there was a petition for the correction in the birth entries of two
persons in the local civil registry, specifically to change their citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino," their status as
children from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," and their mother's status from "married" to "single." The motion to dismiss
filed by the local civil registrar having been denied, a full-blown trial was held and the changes sought were
thereafter ordered by the trial court. The Republic of the Philippines then came to this Court to question the decision,
invoking substantially the same grounds on which the Orders now being challenged were based.

In a well-reasoned and exhaustive decision, Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez declared inter alia:

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it
is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate
remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February
20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court admits that 'the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate
proceeding.

What is meant by 'appropriate adversary proceedings 'Black's Law Dictionary defines adversary proceeding'
as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding. (Platt v. Magagnini, 187, p. 716, 718, 110 Was. 39). 6 <äre||anº•1àw>

xxx xxx xxx

The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth
about the facts recorded therein.Under our system of administering justice, truth is best ascertained or
approximated by trial conducted under the adversary system. 7

xxx xxx xxx

Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'

The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil registrar are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to (1) issue an
order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any persons having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can
no longer be described as "summary".There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

 We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special
proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and
publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as
that proper suit or appropriate action. 8

In a number of earlier cases, the Court has ruled that the birth entry regarding a person's citizenship could not be
changed under Rule 108 as this would involve substantive rights that the rules of court could not "diminish, increase
or modify" under the Constitution. 9

Thus, in Chua Wee v. Republic, 10 a unanimous Court declared that, "if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding,
so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or
modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the new Civil Code."

In Wong v. Republic, 11 however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in a separate concurrence, expressed the view that
Article 412, which Rule 108 was supposed to implement, "does not say that it applies only to noncontroversial
issues and that the procedure to be used is summary in nature," adding that "Article 412 contemplates all kinds of
issues and all kinds of procedures." Justice Pacifico de Castro, in a dissenting opinion, agreed with him and said
(speaking also of Article 412) that "no prohibition may be seen from its express provision, nor by mere implication,
against correction of a substantial error as one affecting the status of a person." Amplifying on this view, he declared
in another dissenting opinion in Republic v. de la Cruz: 12

It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of
more than mere harmless clerical error, as it would thereby increase or modify substantive rights which the
Constitution expressly forbids because Article 412 of the Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be
implemented by Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous clerical errors not those affecting the
status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong Case, Article 412 does not limit in
its express terms nor by mere implication, the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. Upon
a consideration of this fact, it would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412 contemplates of
correction of erroneous entry of whatever nature, procedural safeguards having only to be provided for, as
was the manifest purpose of Rule 108.

It is worth emphasing that proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not be considered as
establishing one's status in a legal manner conclusively beyond dispute or controversion, for as provided by
Article 410 of the Civil Code, 'the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto ...
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.' Hence, the status as corrected would not have
a superior quality for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction should not imply a change of status but a
mere rectification of error to make the matter corrected speak for the truth. There is, therefore, no increase
or diminution of substantive right, as is the basis for holding that Rule 108 would be unconstitutional if held
to allow ccrrection of more than mere harmless and innocuous clerical errors.

The Valencia ruling has in effect adopted the above-stated views insofar as it now allows changes in the birth entry
regarding a person's citizenship as long as adversary proceedings are held. Where such a change is ordered, the
Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil
registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for
the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the
Constitution. We note that in the case at bar the petition was dismissed outright without a trial being held, on the
justification that it was not permitted. In the light of the Valencia ruling, the Orders of the respondent judge must now
be reversed, to give way to the appropriate proceedings necessary to the resolution of the substantial issue raised
by the petitioner. The records show that the publication requirement has already been complied with. 13 The next
step, therefore, is for the petitioner and all adverse and interested parties to be given their day in court in a regular
trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders are hereby set aside, and Special Proceeding No. 3596-R of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, Branch V, is reinstated for trial on the merits without delay. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.