CLAUS OETKE

INDIAN LOGIC AND INDIAN SYLLOGISM

The main part of the book consists of a collection of ten articles which have
been written by various authors on different issues of what is commonly
called “Indian Logic”. Apart from a short preface (pp. vii–ix), the book
also contains an extensive introduction (pp. 1–25) and a bibliography of
primary and secondary literature on “Indian Logic” (pp. 216–221). The
ten chapters of the main part of the book represent reprints of earlier
published articles or excerpts from books: 1. Henry T. Colebrooke (1824),
‘The Philosophy of the Hindus: On the Nyāya and Vaiśes.ika Systems’
(pp. 26–58), 2. Max Müller (1853), ‘On Indian Logic’ (pp. 59–74), 3.
H.N. Randle (1924), ‘A Note on the Indian Syllogism’ (pp. 75–92), 4.
Stanisław Schayer (1932–1933), ‘Studies in Indian Logic’ (translated
by Joerg Tuske) (pp. 93–101), 5. Stanisław Schayer (1933), ‘On the
Method of Research into Nyāya’ (translated by Joerg Tuske) (pp. 102–
109), 6. Daniel H.H. Ingalls (1955), ‘Logic in India’ (pp. 110–116), 7.
I.M. Bochenski (1956), ‘The Indian Variety of Logic’ (pp. 117–150), 8.
J.F. Staal (1973), ‘The Concept of Paks.a in Indian Logic’ (pp. 151–161),
9. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya (1987) ‘Some Aspects of the Navya-Nyāya
Theory of Inference’ (pp. 162–182), 10. Bimal Krishna Matilal (1998),
‘Introducing Indian Logic’ (pp. 183–215).
On the one hand, the book is meant as an introduction into the area
of “Indian Logic” as well as a survey about Western research in this field
comprising a period of more than 150 years. In these respects the “Reader”
can be usefully employed by both specialists and non-specialists in order
to obtain a fairly accurate picture about the domain. In particular one must
welcome the fact that two important articles by St. Schayer have been
made accessible to English speaking readers. On the other hand, it appears
that the editor has also something else as his aim: To combat the cliché
of a fundamental disparity between the Eastern and the Western philo-
sophies inasmuch as, whereas philosophy in the West “looks outward”,

Review article on: Jonardon Ganeri (ed.), Indian Logic. A Reader. Richmond, Surrey:
Curzon Press 2001, pp. 221.

Indo-Iranian Journal 46: 53–69, 2003.

© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
54 CLAUS OETKE

“is concerned with Logic and with the presuppositions of scientific know-
ledge” and considers an “analysis and clarification of the concepts which
ground scientific enquiry” as its job, Eastern, and in particular Indian,
philosophy is concerned with a “mysterious and fundamental sort of self-
knowledge” and therefore can hardly be regarded even as asking the same
questions. The introductory chapter, which is entitled “Introduction: Indian
Logic and the Colonization of Reason”, begins with citations from an
article written in 1955 by the Wykeham Professor of Logic in Oxford,
H.H. Price, in which such a belief of a “vast chasm” separating the two
philosophical traditions is expressed. An interesting point is that, as the
author demonstrates on the subsequent pages (2–4), representatives of the
“Neo-Hindu movement” contributed to the persistence of this cliché by
propagating a picture of the Indian tradition as a “Vedantic culture”, a
picture in which all elements which militated against this view had been
suppressed or relegated to the background, and this was probably due to
the “intellectual struggle for an indigenous, non-European, identity”, on
which Indian nationalists had embarked and which engendered a desire
to distil some allegedly unique “Indian essence” from India’s cultural
heritage. Accordingly the knowledge of all the ingredients and aspects
of Indian philosophy which reveal that the picture suggested by “neo-
Hindu” thinkers like Vivekananda, Radhakrishna and others as well as
the beliefs expressed in the article of H.H. Price are totally unrealistic
remained confined to a small circle of “specialists”. Since the present book
presents articles of members of this tiny group it is suited to counterbalance
a prevalent image.
It must be noticed, however, that not everything which is topical in
the ten main chapters of the anthology directly relates to “Indian Logic”,
even if one takes the term in a broad sense. In particular the first two
articles by Colebrooke and Müller comprise a wider scope by giving
a presentation of entire philosophical systems and dealing with topics
which could be labelled as ‘metaphysics’, ‘ontology’ and ‘philosophy of
nature’. In contradistinction to Colebrooke’s essay, which for the most
part describes the system of Nyāya according to a relatively late state of
development, Müller’s article presents an outline of the Vaiśes.ika-system
which is more closely related to earlier textual sources, in particular
the Praśastapādabhās. ya. If one wished to apply the word ‘logic’ to the
entirety of the subject matter of those articles one would have to take it
in the sense of ‘systematic philosophy’ – and ‘logical’ as equivalent to
‘systematical’. On the other hand, the topic which represents a core of
what is commonly called ‘Indian Logic’ and which is connected with
the term ‘syllogism’ is brought to the fore only at the end of the articles,
 INDIAN LOGIC AND INDIAN SYLLOGISM 55

pp. 47–48 (in particular § VII) and pp. 68–74. In contradistinction to this
the so-called “Indian Syllogism” is a main theme in the subsequent essays
of Randle, Schayer and Ingalls. Apart from the fact that Schayer brings
“Modern Logic” (the tradition which has been founded by Frege and
Russell and is represented, among others, by the “Polish logicians” like
J. Łukasiewicz) into play, an important difference between Randle’s and
Schayer’s treatments of the topic is that, Schayer explicitly correlates two
members of the (five-membered variety of the) Indian syllogism with two
rules of inference, namely the upanaya with the “rule of substitution”,
i.e. the rule which allows the replacement of any expression of the form
‘(x)Fx’ (‘everything is F’) by an expression of the form ‘Fa’ (‘a is F’) – or
rather the derivation of a proposition of the latter form from a proposition
of the former form – and the nigamana with the “rule of separation”
which allows the derivation of ‘Ga’ from the combination of ‘Fa’ and ‘Fa
→ Ga’ (‘If a is F, then a is G’), and which represents merely a special
implementation of the old rule of modus ponendo ponens. This has the
consequence that the entire “syllogism” can be viewed as a combination
of two main parts, an assertion (pratijñā) and a proof of the assertion
– It seems that Schayer does not explicitly state this consequence,
but it is at least a most plausible upshot of his analysis. – The whole
argument-scheme represented by the “five-membered” syllogism could
thus be depicted as follows:

Thesis:
1. Assertion (pratijñā): Ga – “The Scafell Pike is a place on which fire
occurs”
Proof:
2. Reason (hetu): (Because of the fact that) Fa – “(Because of the fact
that) the Scafell Pike is a place which is endowed with smoke”
3. Example (dr.s..tānta) = Statement of vyāpti (pervasion): (x)(Fx → Gx)
– “Everything which is a place on which fire occurs is also a place
which is endowed with smoke”
4. Application (upanaya) = Statement of the paks.adharmatā (the fact that
the object of the assertion is encompassed by the pervasion): Fa → Ga
– “The Scafell Pike is such that, if it is a place on which fire occurs it
is also a place which is endowed with smoke”
5. Conclusion (nigamana) = Statement of the sādhya (the probandum):
Ga – “The Scafell Pike is a place on which fire occurs”
56 CLAUS OETKE

The above presented account represents an elaboration of a scheme which

has been given by Schayer himself in his article ‘On the Method of
Research into Nyāya’ (cf. p. 106 in the “Reader”).
It is not necessary to discuss here Schayer’s opinions regarding the
differences between the Indian and the Aristotelian Syllogism as well
as his remarks concerning the proper understanding of Aristotle. It only
deserves to be mentioned that Schayer also propounded the thesis that
“the beginnings and prescientific anticipations of a propositional logic can
be found in India” and he sees evidence for a grasp of certain theorems
of propositional logic – for example the equivalence between ‘If P then
Q’ and ‘It is not true that P and not-Q’ – in texts like the Kathāvatthu.
In this regard the 2. chapter of the essay ‘Studies in Indian Logic’ is
relevant (pp. 96–101). Bochenski’s account of Indian Logic in ‘The Indian
Variety of Logic’ does not present novel analyses of the five-membered
syllogism or the “anticipations” of propositional logic. On the other hand,
his article encompasses a number of other topics, as e.g. a description of
the major periods of Indian Logic and an enumeration of important authors
(pp. 119–120), an exposition of a “ten-membered formula” of syllogism
which is found in a Jaina treatise allegedly written around 375 by a
certain (younger) Bhadrabāhu (pp. 125–126), a discussion of topics related
to inference in the Vaiśes.ikasūtra, the Nyāyasūtra and the Nyāyabhās.ya
(pp. 127–133), an exposition of the doctrine of the three marks, the
Trairūpya, – called “three-membered rule” in Bochenski’s article –, of the
“Wheel of reasons” (hetucakra), of the doctrine of apoha and the concept
of vyāpti (pp. 137, 138–139, 140–141, 143–144 as well as 144–146). The
last mentioned topic functions as a starting point for a short exposition of
some issues dealt with in the school of Navya-Nyāya (pp. 144–149). It can
be considered as certain that Bochenski’s descriptions and accounts do not
always represent the latest developments in research.
The treatise of Ingalls’s does not yield any new results regarding the
function of the members of the Indian “Syllogism”. On the other hand it
points out that certain technical terms like paks.a, hetu, sādhya relate to
internal features of members of the Syllogism which are not accounted
for by some “translations” into formulas of predicate calculus, e.g. the
above given representation of the third member by ‘(x)(Fx → Gx)’ (See
p. 112). This is certainly true, but it needs to be observed that such facts are
pretty irrelevant in the context of a concern which must be hypothesized
for some (sections) of Schayer’s articles. It is one thing to ask for the
function of certain members of the “Syllogism” as a whole and another
question how to represent them in accordance with the way in which their
internal structure is viewed and depicted in certain treatises of the Indian
 INDIAN LOGIC AND INDIAN SYLLOGISM 57

tradition. This must also be borne in mind with regard to the topics which
are brought to the fore in Staal’s essay ‘The Concept of Paks.a in Indian
Logic’. It is noteworthy that Ingall’s article contains a brief section dealing
with Navya-Nyāya.
A more extensive exposition of Navya-Nyāya is given in Bhat-
tacharyya’s article, and it seems that among the essays of the “Reader”
this treatise is apt to convey most insights about that area which is
widely still unexplored. A point which deserves to be mentioned here is
that, if Bhattacharyya is right, the Navya-Nyāya propounded the doctrine
that knowledge pertaining to some particular property which is de facto
pervaded by some other property – and presumably known to be pervaded
in this way – is not essential for inference: The decisive point for attribu-
tions of validity of inference is that the inferring subject knows that the
relevant substratum of inference (= the paks.a) possesses some property
which is pervaded by the property which constitutes the probandum. Since
the that-clause has to be taken in an opaque reading the requirement does
not entail that the inferring subject must know which individual property
fulfils the demand. This stands in contrast to the conception of the older
Nyāya, and according to the exposition of Bhattacharyya to the view of
the later Mı̄māṁsakas, which can be described by saying that an inferring
subject must know of some property that it occurs in some substratum (e.g.
some individual mountain) and – presumably – also know that this prop-
erty is pervaded by the property which constitutes the probandum. Another
information is noteworthy, even if it might not be immediately relevant for
the question of validity of inferences: If the author is right, the employment
of abstractors of higher order in Navya-Nyāya is rooted in the doctrine
that every expression relates to the range of its denotata under a certain
mode (prakāra), e.g. ‘cow’ under the mode of being a cow = cowness, in
contradistinction to, one might presume, a presentation of some group or
genus by an enumeration of all its members or by a non-synonymous term
with identical extension. Since it is assumed that the link with a particular
mode of denotation (= presentation?) pertains to all expressions (= all
nouns?)1 expressions like ‘cowness-ness’ which allegedly denote modes
of (first order) denotation denote this first order mode under a mode of
second order. Bhattacharyya’s reference to “Frege’s problem of infinite
regress of sense and denotation of higher orders” (p. 176) does not appear
far-fetched, but it might be a task for future research to explore whether
and to which extent the parallel reaches below the level of appearance.

1 Bhattacharya does not make clear whether the Navya-Nyāya theoreticians were
willing to consider this theorem as valid even with respect to words like ‘if’, ‘and’, ‘all’,
‘some’ etc.
58 CLAUS OETKE

Although it is difficult to discern in Matilal’s article novel conceptions

about topics of older Nyāya, like “Syllogism”, Trairūpya (in Matilal’s
article ‘The Triple Nature of the Sign’) or the “Wheel of Reason”, the last
sections of the essay present suggestions which are by no means common-
place. The intimated affinity between a) the denotata of abstract terms –
like ‘pot-ness’ etc. – or more precisely the conception about those denotata
which was held by some representatives of “Indian Logic” – and b) the
meaning of “feature-placing” expressions and the denotata of mass-terms
appears intuitively quite plausible. On the other hand, even if one grants
that entities denoted by abstract terms like ‘pot-ness’ were conceived
according to the model of a substance like water which is “distributed”
over the earth – or in the universe –, such that one can say that “portions”
of it are “located” in different regions or occur at different places, it does
not follow that identity-propositions like ‘fire-possessing-ness = fire” must
hold true, which are ascribed by Matilal to the proponents of Nyāya (cf.
pp. 212ff.). Prima facie this appears absurd, because the supposition is
bizarre that e.g. an “abstract property” like fire-possessing-ness should
burn like fire. The question arises as to whether this is really the correct
reading of the doctrines to which Matilal intends to refer. An alternative,
and less outlandish, interpretation would be that the theoreticians merely
claimed that, e.g. fire-possessing-ness and fire are indistinguishable with
respect to location or occurrence. For if one admits the existence of entities
denoted by terms like ‘fire-possessing-ness’ at all it seems quite plausible
to attribute to them exactly the same range of occurrence as to the entities
which are denoted by corresponding terms resulting by an elimination of
‘-possessing-ness’, if one attributes spatio-temporal location to abstracts of
the pertinent kind. “Every place at which fire occurs is also a place at which
the occurrence of fire occurs and vice-versa” – why not? The difference
which is at stake is by no means insignificant because, if Matilal were right,
the existence of abstract terms would be a harmless and quite uninteresting
matter: ‘Pot-possessing-ness’ denotes nothing but pots; since the former
expression is only a stilted variant of the latter, the conception of the world
is by no means altered by the adoption of corresponding denotata; the
world contains pots and entities of a similar sort, but there is nothing in
addition to it, in particular not that which is denoted by ‘pot-possessing-
ness’. Isn’t this unexciting? Mustn’t the employment of abstract terms
appear like an idle tinkling with words? On the other hand, if pace Matilal
– and Bhattacharyya, who makes a similar claim (p. 175) – the alleged
identities do not hold good, it is possible to attribute conceptual substance
to the Nyāya-terminology: The conception of the world is substantially
altered by the acknowledgement of denotata for abstract terms, since the
 INDIAN LOGIC AND INDIAN SYLLOGISM 59

world is conceived in such a way that there is something above pots etc.
Such a theory would be significant on account of the circumstance that it
would entail that identical spatio-temporal regions of the world are inhab-
ited by different types of entities. In this manner we are able to extract an
ontology which is much more interesting and which does not deserve to
be discarded by the dogma that only concrete particulars can be located
in space and time. This is nothing but a dogma, since e.g. genera can be
spatio-temporally located. – We say that the maple possesses a certain
area of occurrence or that the mammoth existed in the period of, say
between five million and a hundred thousand years ago etc. Why should
not entities denoted by terms like ‘pot-possessing-ness’ be akin to genera
at least in some respects? – Again, deeper investigations seem to be called
for in order to settle the question whether there are ways like the one
depicted above which would save the pertinent theories from the charge
of either absurdity or vacuousness. Unfortunately, Matilal does not only
not make explicit which particular authors and texts he has in mind but
leaves even obscure the fact that his account should be specifically related
to the Navya-Nyāya.2
2 Patrik Nyman has pointed out to me that T. Wada in his book Invariable Concomitance
in Navya-Nyāya, Delhi 1990, also ascribes the theorem that X-vattva is X to Navya-Nyāya
and that he regards this as an acceptance of a view allegedly held by Kātyāyana, the author
of the Vārttika on Pān.ini’s As..tādhyāyı̄. Wada – on p. 43, footnote 32 – refers to a section of
the Vārttika on As..tādhyāyı̄ 5.1.119 which reads siddham . tu yasya gun.asya bhāvād dravye
śabdaniveśas tadabhidhāne tvatalau. It remains mysterious, however, how this remark
could support a theorem of general identity or equivalence between any expression ‘A’
and a corresponding expression of the form ‘A-vattva’ or its denotata. First of all, such
a derivation appears to lead to the absurd consequence that – according to Kātyāyana
and the Navya-Nyāya (?) – all expressions denote qualities (gun.as). For if it holds true
that – in accordance with Kātyāyana’s statement – expressions of the form ‘X-tva’ and
‘X-tā’ denote qualities, an expression of the form ghat.avat-tva = ‘pot-possessing-ness’,
which results by substituting ghat.avat for ‘X’ must denote a quality = gun.a. So far, so
good. But because of the equivalence between X and X-vattva it must equally hold good
that ghat.a = ‘pot’ denotes a quality. The same holds good mutatis mutandis for all other
expressions. But if this were so, why did Kātyāyana suggest that (at least some) expressions
denote substances? The most natural interpretation of the phrase yasya gun.asya bhāvād
dravye śabdaniveśas tadabhidhāne tvatalau is that e.g in the case of the expression ‘pot’
the correlating expression resulting by the addition of an abstract-suffix to this expression
denotes precisely the quality on account of which pots are signified or characteriezed by
(an employment of) the expression ‘pot’. This appears to harmonize with Wada’s views
because he himself says that “suffixes ‘tva’ and ‘tal’ (i.e., tā) are employed to express a
quality of a ‘substance denoted by a word which is expressive of the substance’ as what
possesses the quality”. But from this fact it does not follow that that which a linguistic
expression denotes or signifies must be identical with the quality which the expression
attributes to its denotatum. It is true that if one refers to Aristotle by the term ‘the founder
of Western Logic’ one characterizes him in a certain manner, namely as somebody who
60 CLAUS OETKE

II

Lack of historical discrimination and predilection for generalizations is

a recurrent feature in the context of assessments of “Indian Logic”. The
“Reader” shows that this holds true both for non-specialists and special-
ists. The book does not only offer examples for undifferentiated views and
global statements concerning “Eastern philosophy” or the Indian cultural
heritage by non-experts, but demonstrates also that persons who can be
considered as professional researchers tend to give too general verdicts
about Indian Logic or specific issues in this area. To be sure, one can gather
from the “Reader” that this inclination tends to diminish in proportion to
increase of specialization and that views become more differentiated in
accordance with the progress of time. Nevertheless, all-embracing declar-
ations regarding “the actual analysis offered by the Indian logicians”
(p. 207) or the way in which entities are “always considered” in “Indian
Logic” (cf. p. 152) or essential features of “the Indian Syllogism” (see
pp. 94ff.) etc. are to be found even in comparatively recent articles. The
attitude of starting from individual writers or from thorough analyses of
particular textual passages, which is usual in the context of the explora-
tion of Western philosophy, is not (yet) common in studies on topics of
Indian philosophy. The hope that one can attain safe knowledge about
the “essence” of some topic by methods which blur differences among
individual authors and texts is, however, illusory. The phenomenon of the
“Indian Syllogism”, which is a recurrent theme in the “Reader” and which
stands in the centre of the discussions of the introductory chapter, shows
this in a striking manner. It does not suffice to differentiate between the
“five-membered” and “three-membered” varieties or the inclusion or non-
inclusion of “examples”, but one must take all the different formulations of
founded Western Logic. But does one really want to deduce from this fact that Aristotle is
identical with that as what he is characterized by the term ‘the founder of Western Logic’
and embrace the theorem ‘Aristotle = the quality of being the founder of Western Logic’
– instead of the more plausible proposition ‘Aristotle = the founder of Western Logic’?
To be sure, one might grant that expressions of the form ‘X-vattva’ denote qualities (in
some sense of the term) if one is ready to admit that there are entities which are denoted
by expressions of the form ‘the possession of X’ or ‘the (quality of) being endowed with
X’ and similar ones. Accordingly one might assent to the view that e.g. gandhavattva =
‘smell-possessing-ness’ denotes some quality or some property, namely the qualility or
property of possessing smell or of being endowed with smell. But this is not equivalent
to the claim, suggested by Wada in the mentioned footnote, that gandhavattva is gandha,
because the concession that gandhavattva denotes some quality does not amount to the
concession that the term denotes the particular quality of smell. It appears almost certain
that the tenet of the identity ‘X = X-vattva’ is the outcome of some serious confusion, but
the question might be left open as to who or what was its original cause.
 INDIAN LOGIC AND INDIAN SYLLOGISM 61

each single member which have been attested by different textual sources
into account.
That this is extremely important ensues from the circumstance that in
view of certain, especially older, textual sources, e.g. the Carakasaṁhitā,
it cannot be maintained that the third member of the five-membered syllo-
gism always expressed a universal proposition. It follows from this that
we must consider the possibility that the five-membered scheme did not
contain any general statement, and we can go a little further and claim
that at certain stages of the historical development it might not even
include any allusion to a universal proposition at all. This opens the way
for a more radical revision of the common picture and one can discard
even Schayer’s supposition that the syllogism “essentially” possesses a
deductive inference as an ingredient. Since the link between Indian syllo-
gism and deduction is thus completely severed, the problem arises of
finding any intuitive idea which is suited to make the phenomenon intel-
ligible. This is, however, not impossible and, although the possibility of
alternative accounts should not be categorically denied, it seems to me at
present that the best idea is provided by the metaphor of a loan. It appears
worthwhile to elaborate that notion a bit more because this is apt to stimu-
late a critical assessment of the results which the “Reader” offers regarding
its most essential topic.
If one recalls the facts that the five-membered syllogism is intimately
connected with inference and inferential proof and that the typical task of
inference is to extend the realm of that which is knowable – or which can
be treated in a similar manner as knowledge that has been obtained by other
means – beyond the narrow limits of what can be perceived – either genera-
lly or with respect to individual persons and individual times –, then it is
not difficult to grasp the point of the association of the ideas of inference
and “epistemic loan” and the connection between the latter idea and the
“Indian syllogism”: The syllogism accounts for a situation in which some
rational subject does not possess the means of verifying some proposition
in certain alternative ways, in particular by perception. But in order to
make practice more successful it appears desirable to overcome the restric-
tions imposed by this deficiency. Accordingly, the possibility is provided
that a cognising subject uses inference in a way which is comparable to
taking a “cognitive credit”. This means that in situations in which someone
is unable to verify some fact in a more direct manner, he can employ
inference as a cognitive device “by default” with the aim of provisionally
accepting the truth of the pertinent proposition and acting in accordance
with the supposition of its truth as a “working hypothesis”, although he
accepts the risk that he might be unable to “pay off his loan” in the long run
62 CLAUS OETKE

because subsequent experiences militate against the relevant assumption or

even establish beyond any reasonable doubt that the supposed proposition
would have been falsified if its verification would have been accessible to
direct observation in the pertinent situation.3
But now it emerges that and why the common accounts of the syllo-
gism which hypothesize ingredients of deductive inference miss the most
decisive point: They completely distort the picture by eliminating the
essential element of risk in the type of reasoning which is accounted for
by the “Indian syllogism” in its original form. On this basis one can make
the five members of the syllogism intelligible without taking refuge in the
ideas that it has been shaped by considerations of rhetoric or of making
others believe something or that it has to be understood on the back-
ground of the distinction between “inference for oneself” and “inference
for others” etc. etc.
In the introductory chapter of the “Reader” the editor mentions attempts
of “justifying” the Indian syllogism by the assumption that it has been
modelled on the basis of a hypothetical dialogue between two inter-
locutors. The suggestion, which is cited on p. 10, runs as follows:
(1) What is your thesis? That the hill has fire on it.
(2) Why? Because there is smoke there.
(3) So what? Where there is smoke, there is fire: e.g. in the kitchen.
(4) And? The hill is such a smoky place.
(5) So? Therefore, it has fire.
I do not want to claim that everything is false in this proposal. But it
appears unconvincing in the presented form. Firstly, the exposition does
not exhibit any rationale why the dialogue should proceed in the presented
manner. The imagined questions “Why?”, “So what?”, “And?”, “So?” are
pretty insignificant and, since such expressions can be used almost every-
where in a conversation, it remains unclear how they should help us to
understand the structure of the dialogue. Moreover, it is hard to see why
in answer to the question “So what?” a response of the form “Wherever
there is A there is B, like in X” is most suitable. And the appropriateness
of a mere repetition of an information which had been conveyed almost
immediately before after an interjection made by uttering “And?” remains
completely mysterious. To be sure, the presentation could be amended
by the hypothesis that the entire section of (3)–(5) is meant as a “meta-
argument”. This means that one could assume that the interlocutor after
3 The employment of the cumbersome formulation has been motivated by the desire to
underscore the hypothetical and holistic ingredients which falsifications generally possess.
 INDIAN LOGIC AND INDIAN SYLLOGISM 63

the utterance of (2) raises the question: “But why is this – that there is
smoke on the hill which is the subject of our discussion – an argument for
your thesis?”. Accordingly the subsequent response, represented by (3)–
(5) constitutes an elucidation on the part of the proponent why he considers
(his utterance of) (2) as a justification for his assertion. However, even
if we grant this, it remains unintelligible why the proponent should have
started his justification with the utterance of (2) at all. If the justification
of the thesis that there is fire on a mountain relies on the facts (a) that
wherever there is smoke there is fire and (b) that on the pertinent moun-
tain there is smoke, the utterance of (2) – or of (4) – is pretty redundant.
Finally one must consider the fact that it is on the one hand difficult to
see why rhetorical aspects should possess a determining influence on the
elaboration of a canonical form of presentation of an argument – after all,
does not rhetorical efficiency rely on novelty and originality rather than on
conformity to stereotypes? – and on the other hand it is hard to understand
why someone should have believed that a rather clumsy and repetitious
way of presentation should possess extraordinary rhetorical merits.
Let us see how the situation is if we drop the supposition that any
universal proposition is presented in order to “derive” a conclusion and
assume that the relevant situation could be characterized by the metaphor
of someone who applies for the grant of an “epistemic loan”. It is true
that one could depict the point by imagining a dialogue between two
interlocutors, but the conversation exhibits a completely different form:
1) Thesis: “Fp” (“The Scafell Pike is a place on which fire occurs”)
Sceptic: “Why should one believe that”/“Why should one grant that
the thesis is true?”
2) Answer: “Because Gp” (“Because the Scafell Pike is a place which is
endowed with smoke”)
Sceptic: “Sure, there is some subjective support for the thesis. But is
this also an objective support? Why should the mere circumstance that
(it is known that) ‘G’ is true of p support the proposition that ‘F’ is
true of p?”
3) Answer: “This is not merely a subjective support, because the
examples E1 , E2 . . . En show that ‘G’ and ‘F’ are connected in other
instances so that one can definitely say that if one would argue in an
analogous manner with respect to E1 etc. as it is argued here with
respect to p one would argue for a true thesis.”
Sceptic: “Why are those considerations regarding E1 etc. relevant to
the present issue which concerns p?”
64 CLAUS OETKE

4) Answer: “E1 etc. and p are alike in all respects which are relevant to
any argument which pertains to ‘F’ and ‘G’ and accordingly to the
present argument.
5) Therefore it is reasonable to grant the truth of the thesis.”
The point of the metaphor of an epistemic loan becomes more perspicuous
in view of the following analogy between a person who asks for a loan and
a creditor:
1*) Businessman: “I ask for a loan of X ”
Bank-manager: “I do not see any reason to grant you the loan.”
2*) Businessman: “I use the money in order to invest it for a venture in
telecommunications.”
Bank-manager: “The risk is too high.”
3*) Businessman: “A, B, C . . . have also invested in telecommunications
and made so much profit that they could have paid off a comparable
loan.”
Bank-manager: “But these are different cases.”
4*) Businessman: “Yes, but they are alike in the relevant respects.
5*) Therefore my request for a loan of X is justified.”
It is easy to see that under the present hypothesis none of the steps of the
syllogism is superfluous or redundant. To be sure, the first and the last
step allude to one and the same fact, but this does not entail a redunda-
ncy because the function of referring to an identical fact is different in
both cases: The first step expresses that a certain claim is being made,
whereas the last step conveys that that which is claimed here is based on
objective considerations and that anybody who makes exactly the same
(kind of) claim is in principle able to present a justification. The charge
of redundancy on account of the identity of steps 2) and 4) simply evapo-
rates because 4), according to the presented analysis, expresses something
entirely different and none of the remaining members nor any conjunction
of them entails that which is expressed here. However, it is precisely this
ingredient which represents the crucial point of the argument: It raises the
problem regarding the conditions under which an analogy can be trans-
ferred to a pertinent instance. It is extremely difficult to specify such
conditions in a general manner. Even in this regard the analogy between
the epistemic and the financial case holds good. Part of the difficulty
results from the fact that the principles which could underlie decisions
as to whether or not one might treat the pertinent and the sample cases
as alike in all relevant respects are sensitive to contextual circumstances:
In certain situations, e.g. if the (financial or epistemic) loan is small, one
 INDIAN LOGIC AND INDIAN SYLLOGISM 65

might adopt the policy of granting likeness as a hypothesis merely on the

basis of the circumstance that one possesses no evidence of a relevant
dissimilarity. But under other circumstances a stricter policy could be
called for and one must insist on positive evidence against the occurrence
of relevant dissimilarities, e.g., in the financial case, a market analysis
which positively supports the assumption that the prospects for invest-
ments in telecommunications are not worse now than they were before or
that there are no “regional” differences affecting the assessment of sample-
cases and the pertinent case etc. Presumably it was precisely the difficulty
of giving a formal implementation of the intuitive notion of similarity in
relevant respects embodied by the fourth member of the “syllogism” which
triggered the later developments. On the one hand, it was soon recognized
that mere increase of favourable examples is an insufficient method for
diminishing the risks. Accordingly one erected the demand that one has to
consider even potentially unfavourable examples comparable to the bank-
manager who asks for evidence that among the firms which have gone
bankrupt there are not equally numerous or even more that have made
investments in telecommunications. Now, it is not difficult to see that even
this is unsuited as a general policy of minimizing risks. I suggest that the
following happened: The quest for a generally applicable guideline evoked
the idea that there is a general condition under which a risk is minimal and
one believed that this condition was given by the absolute non-existence of
unfavourable examples. That was the crucial step which was responsible
for the introduction of the element of universality into the syllogism and
the theory of inference and which explains why the third member of the
syllogism consists in a number of versions in a combination of a universal
statement and the mentioning of examples. This peculiarity has puzzled
many commentators, but, as a matter of fact, it is nothing but a hybrid
feature caused by the circumstance that the result of the reflection on a
problem which was originally raised by the fourth step has been incorpo-
rated into the third member because one believed that the correct solution
for the problem of relevant likeness between examples and pertinent case
lies in some trait exhibited by the domain of examples. Actually this was a
very infelicitous decision, which ignored the critical problem that a general
implementation of the idea of likeness in relevant respects cannot be easily
given, and perhaps this is not possible at all. But it can be historically
and psychologically explained as a desperate attempt to find a solution for
66 CLAUS OETKE

a problem which was objectively posed by the subject-matter which the

theory of “syllogism” originally accounted for.4
Although the point of the syllogistic procedure has been illustrated with
the help of an imagined dialogue it is absolutely inessential whether or
not the situation of a debate exists. The scheme is equally well applica-
ble to a situation of private reasoning. Only a substitution of the term
‘assertion’ by ‘judgement’ is required. To be sure, the fact that the first
member of the syllogism was called pratijñā suggests that the syllogism
had been conceived as a scheme of public reasoning. However, the prin-
ciples themselves are not tied to this feature. Somebody might object that
all this cannot save the syllogism from the reproach of being pre-scientific
because it accounts for a primitive analogical type of reasoning. To this
one should retort as follows: Well, if the syllogism is pre-scientific and
primitive because it accounts for a pre-scientific and primitive way of
reasoning, then Indology must also be primitive and pre-scientific and the
same could be said about much of what is going on in the humanities. For
there cannot be any doubt that the form of reasoning and arguing which
the syllogism reflects – if our analysis is correct – is extremely common.
Philologists presume that questions of the meaning of a particular word
can be settled by inquiring the meaning of other occurrences of the same
word-type or of other related words, and in some respect even the use of a
dictionary relies on analogical reasoning. However, the example of settling
questions of meaning and of using dictionaries is instructive because an
inference to the effect that the occurrence of an expression should possess
the same or a similar meaning as other occurrences which look alike or as
the meaning which is assigned to the corresponding type in a dictionary
rests on a tacit principle which justifies the extension. In the present case it
is the circumstance that linguistic expressions are not employed at random
4 It deserves to be pointed out that a failure to account for the diversities of appro-
priate standards of accepting hypotheses of relevant likeness between domains of sample
cases and objects of inference is common both to some recent theories of “non-
monotonic” default reasoning and to certain Indian doctrines concerning “invalidating
factors” (bādhaka). Both embody the intuitive idea that some inference-rule should be
applied as long as no counter-evidence is available. For a number of situations this is surely
appropriate, but the problem is that appropriateness differs relative to situational circum-
stances. On the one hand, the character of the support for the existence of relevant likeness
matters, but on the other hand, even features of the relevant inference-situation itself are
critical: Knowledge that normally persons are not allergic against penicillin combined with
lack of evidence that some particular person is allergic to penicillin is not sufficient to
exempt a medical practitioner from the accusation of irresponsibility because he gave an
injection without having previously made tests whether the concerned person is allergic or
not. On the other hand, the situation can be completely different in cases of emergency.
 INDIAN LOGIC AND INDIAN SYLLOGISM 67

but tend to be used in such a way that individual occurrences comply with
the use of other occurrences of the same type. Without such extension-
justifying principles inferences of this kind are completely invalid, and
therefore analogical reasoning can be “unscientific”. But this is precisely
the point on account of which I myself have, sometimes quite severely,
criticised some colleagues because they employ analogical cases, e.g.
textual passages of other sources which look similar, without reflecting
on the existence or non-existence of a corresponding extension-warranting
principle. The circumstance that in the realm of the attribution of word-
meanings such principles (normally) exist, does not prove that they exist
equally in other areas, and to derive the latter from the former is extremely
naïve. But all this highlights the tremendous importance of the step of
reasoning represented by the fourth member of the syllogism. It is diffi-
cult to decide whether or not the syllogism embodies an awareness of
the mentioned methodological requirement. The textual sources present
various formulations of the upanaya, some of which do and some of which
do not harmonize with such an assumption. Therefore the question must
be left open at present. – The circumstance that various formulations of
some members of the Indian syllogism have been handed down does by
no means decide the issue. The supposition that the varieties reveal lack of
clarity in the original conception is at best one possible hypothesis. Isn’t it
equally conceivable that the five-membered syllogism was the product of
one particular person endowed with extraordinary subtlety of thought and
that the deviant formulations result from the fact that his creation had never
been appropriately understood in the subsequent tradition? Again one can
only answer: We do not know.
What is the principle by which the above presented account deviates
from those which interpreted the syllogism as the embodiment of a process
of deductive reasoning? Once more, I would like to employ a metaphor: If
the rival account were correct, we should compare the corresponding syllo-
gistic reasoning with investment of capital. A correlating theory would
be an account as to how one can use capital on the supposition that one
possesses it. But, if my proposed interpretation is correct, this is not the
original aim of the theoretical account of the Indian syllogism. It pertains
rather to the situation in which somebody does not possess the money
which he needs or desires and decides to overcome this situation by
taking a loan. The theory of the Indian Syllogism is – originally – neither
concerned with the question of certain knowledge or knowledge of neces-
sary truths nor with the question of making deductions from premises.
If concern with questions of the latter type is regarded as an essential
68 CLAUS OETKE

ingredient of the concept of ‘logic’, then we should say that the theory
of the Indian Syllogism is not a logical theory. But it would be a grave
mistake to conclude from this alone that it must be inferior. It amounts by
no means to a denial of the great importance of logic, if one asserts that
the question as to whether ‘logic’ or ‘methodology’, as it is embodied by
the theory of syllogism, should be ranked higher is ideological. After all,
should one say that the problem of how one invests one’s capital is more
important than anything else in the field of economy? This can hardly be
true, because issues pertaining to ways and methods of obtaining capital
are in certain respects even more fundamental.
All this should not be misunderstood as a denial of the possibility to
criticize the account embodied by the Indian Syllogism. The theory is far
from perfect even if one assesses it on the background of its own concerns.
The parallel with the bank-loan helps one to discern that the account
represented by the five-membered syllogism exhibits features of restriction
and conservatism which are problematical. May be it is an acceptable prac-
tice for a bank to give a loan only in cases in which analogous investments
have been demonstrably successful. But such a policy would be disastrous
for an economy. Presumably the same must be said concerning methodo-
logy of knowledge. A doctrine which demands that every claim must be
supported by strictly analogous examples cannot even cope with inferences
which rely on quantitative theorems, e.g. equations between pressure and
temperature. But the charge that the Indian Syllogism was inferior before it
introduced universal propositions is completely erroneous and the picture
of a slow progress from pre-logical towards logical thinking in classical
India is fundamentally mistaken. Instead of interpreting the introduction
of universal propositions together with the adoption of the notions of
“concomitance” and vyāpti as a break-through on the way to “genuine
logic”, one comes probably much nearer to the truth if one understands the
corresponding developments as a change of policy. This must not preclude
that the changes resulted from insights.
The problem of the understanding of the Indian Syllogism might
be regarded as exemplary for the problems of understanding alien
cultures. Although one is immediately able to recognize affinities between
“Western” and “Indian logic” due to the fact that both are related to
reasoning, inference and argumentation in a similar manner as credit
and investment have something in common, the identification of the
appropriate sub-categories is by no means easy. Problems of this sort
become extremely thorny if in the milieu of the “cultural interpreter” a
corresponding sub-department does not exist. The only feasible way of
achieving understanding in such situations might consist in the “creative
 INDIAN LOGIC AND INDIAN SYLLOGISM 69

(re)construction of a possible context”, similar to somebody who does not

know the institution of a loan but desires to make events happening in some
credit bank (in some foreign country) intelligible to himself. At the end of
the introductory chapter the editor of the “Reader” writes: “The effort must
continually be made to explain the distinctiveness in the goals, methods
and techniques of Indian logic, in order that we might better understand
the nature of the challenge that this alternative tradition of inquiry into the
basis of reasoned thought presents, most particularly when we assume that
our own theories are free from commitments specific to our own history”
(p. 22). That this postulate does not remain merely programmatic was the
aim of the preceding remarks.

Avdelningen för Indologi

Institutionen för Orientalistika Språk
Stockholms Universitet
S-10691 Stockholm
Sweden