POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Tondo Medical v. Court of Appeals
527 SCRA 746; July 17, 2007
Topic: General Considerations
Facts: In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA
(Health Sector Reform Agenda), a reform
agenda developed by the HSRA Technical
Working Group.
Petitioners alleged that the implementation of
the reforms had resulted in making free
medicine and free medical services inaccessible
to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus,
they alleged that the HSRA is void for being in
violation of the following constitutional
provisions: ART. III, SEC. 1; ART II, SECS. 5,
9, 10, 11, 13, 15, and 18; ART XV, SECS. 1 and
3.; ART. XIII, SECS. 11 and 14.
Furthermore, they argued that E.O. No. 102
should be enacted by Congress in the exercise
of its legislative function and therefore void,
having been issued in excess of the President‘s
authority.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the HRSA is void for
violating the provisions of the
constitution
II. Whether or not President‘s enactment
of E.O. No. 102 is in excess of his
authority
Ruling:
I. No. Some of the provisions invoked in
the case at bare were taken from Art. II which
the Court categorically ruled to be non-self-
executing in some jurisprudence and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement.
They merely lay down a general principle and
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therefore cannot give rise to a cause of action in
the courts; they do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights.
II. No. The Constitution grants the
President the power to reorganize the Office of
the President and the agencies under it, which
includes DOH, in recognition of the recurring
need of every President to reorganize his or her
office ―to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. The President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization
of government entities under the Executive
Department.
BCDA v. COA
508 SCRA 295; February 26, 2009
Topic: General Considerations
Facts: In 1992, Congress approved Republic
Act (RA) No. 7227 creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority
(BCDA). The BCDA Board of Directors
(Board) shall adopt a compensation and benefit
scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
In 1996, the Board adopted a new
compensation and benefit scheme which was
consequently approved by President Ramos. In
the following years, BCDA officials and
employees, as well as full time consultants,
received year-end benefits similar to that given
to BSP officials and employees.
According to Commission on Audit, this grant
of year-end benefit to Board members, as well
as to full-time consultants, was contrary to
Department of Budget and Management
(DBM)‘s Circular Letter No. 2002-2.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Issue: Whether or not the Board members and
full-time consultants are entitled to the year-end
benefit because President Ramos approved the
granting and that they have been receiving it
since 1997.
Ruling: No. The State is not estopped from
correcting a public officer‘s erroneous
application of a statute, and an unlawful practice,
no matter how long, cannot give rise to any
vested right.
B. STATE
Magallona v. Ermita
655 SCRA 476; August 16, 2011
Topic: National Territory
Facts: In 1961, Congress passed RA 3046
demarcating the maritime baseline of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State in
accordance with the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in
1958 (UNCLOS I). In March 2009, Republic
Act 9522 (Baselines Law), an act defining the
archipelagic baselines of the Philippines, was
enacted to comply with the terms of the
UNCLOS III.
Petitioners assailed that RA 9522 is
unconstitutional because it decreased the
national territory of the Philippines; it
abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of
Paris and other ancillary treaties which resulted
to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah; it
opens our waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels (innocent
passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country‘s nuclear-free policy,
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and damaging marine resources, in violation of
relevant constitutional provisions; and lastly,
that the classification of the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal
(bajo de masinloc), as a ―regime of islands‖
pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
Issue: Whether or not the contentions of the
petitioners are meritorious.
Ruling: No. RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is
not a means to acquire, or lose, territory The
law did not decrease the demarcation of our
territory. In fact it increased it. If any, the
baselines law is a notice to the international
community of the scope of the maritime space
and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights. The law did not
abandon the Sabah claim as provided in Sec. 2.,
stating that the definition of the baselines of the
territorial sea is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea
around the territory of Sabah, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty. Our country
exercises sovereignty over these archipelagic
waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that.
However, due to the observance of
international law, we allow the exercise of
others of their right of innocent passage. No
modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty
to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory
measures from the international community.
Lastly, the classification of the KIG as well
as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands
did not diminish our maritime area.
They generate their own maritime zones – in
short, they are not to be enclosed within the
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baselines of the main archipelago (which is the
Philippine Island group). Nevertheless,
Philippines still continue to lay claim over these
regimes of islands.
Nicolas v. Romulo
578 SCRA 438; February 11, 2009
Topic: Act of State
Facts: In November 2005, Daniel Smith, a
member of the US Armed
Forces, committed the crime of rape against
Nicole and was convicted of the said crime.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement, a
treaty between the US and Philippines, and the
Romulo-Kenney Agreement, the US embassy
was granted custody over Smith.
Petitioners assailed the validity of the VFA
contending that it was not ratified by the US
senate in the same way our senate ratified the
VFA.
ISSUE: Whether or not VFA is void and
unconstitutional
HELD: No. The VFA is a self-executing
agreement. It is simply an implementing
agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense
Treaty, the instrument agreed upon to provide
for the joint RP-US military exercises. The VFA
is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch
as it is the very purpose and intent of the US
Congress that executive agreements registered
under this Act within 60 days from their
ratification be immediately implemented. The
SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties
that need implementing legislation such as the
Vienna Convention. Therefore, the fact that the
VFA was not submitted for advice and consent
of the United States Senate does not detract
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from its status as a binding international
agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.
Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals
352 SCRA 334; February 20, 2001
Topic: Government
Facts: The Office of the Solicitor General
received a letter regarding orders and decision
of trial court of a land registration cases which
have not been executed by Register of Deeds
despite receipt of the writ of execution issued
24 years ago. OSG filed for revival of judgment
and cancellation of titles against heirs of Rafael
Galvez, petitioner Shipside Inc. included. The
Solicitor General argues that the action for
cancellation of land title is imprescriptible
because the land is a part of Camp Wallace
which belongs to the government.
Petitioner contended that the Republic is not
the real party-in-interest because the property
was under the administration and ownership of
Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA) and it is therefore barred by
prescription.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the Republic is the
proper party
II. Whether or not BCDA exercises
ministrant or constituent functions of the
government
Ruling:
I. No. With the transfer of Camp Wallace
to the BCDA, the government is therefore not a
real party in interest and it may not institute the
instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of
imprescriptibility, the same being applicable
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only in cases where the government is a party in
interest.
II. Neither. BCDA is an entity invested
with a personality separate and distinct from the
government. While public benefit and public
welfare may be attributable to the operation of
the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions
performed by the BCDA are basically
proprietary in nature and it is not a government-
function corporation invested with
governmental attributes. Having the capacity to
sue or be sued, it should thus be the BCDA
which may file an action to cancel petitioner‘s
title, not the Republic. The rule that
prescription does not run against the State does
not apply to corporations or artificial bodies
created by the State for special purposes
VFP v. Reyes
483 SCRA 526; February 28, 2006
Topic:
Facts: Veterans Federation of the Philippines
(VFP) is a corporate body organized under R.A.
2640. Respondent Department of National
Defense Secretary issued a DND Department
Circular No. 04 regarding the implementation
of provisions of R.A. 2640. A department order
directed the conduct of a Management Audit of
the VFP. Petitioner complained about the
alleged broadness of the scope of the
management audit and requested the suspension
thereof. Furthermore, petitioner argued that the
Department Circular No. 04 expanded the
scope of ―control and supervision‖ beyond
what has been laid down in R.A. 2640.
Petitioner claims that it is not a public nor a
governmental entity but a private organization,
the issuance of DND Department Circular No.
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04 is an invalid exercise of respondent
Secretary‘s control and supervision.
Issue: Whether or not VFP is a private
corporation.
Ruling: No. Petitioner VFP is a public
corporation. As such, it can be placed under the
control and supervision of the Secretary of
National Defense.
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
499 SCRA 375; August 18, 2006
Topic: Government
Facts: The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
carried out an extensive inquiry into the "coup
rumors and the alleged anomalies" in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines-Philippine Retirement
Benefits Systems (AFP-RSBS).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined,
among others, anomalies in the acquisition of
lots in Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba, Laguna and
Iloilo City by the AFP-RSBS. The Ombudsman
found probable cause for the commission of
one hundred forty eight (148) counts of estafa
thru falsification of public document and
another one hundred forty eight (148) counts of
violation of R.A. 3019 against petitioner Gen.
Jose Ramiscal Jr., past AFP-RSBS president,
who signed the unregistered deeds of sale
covering the acquisition of certain parcels of
lands. Criminal cases were filed against the
petitioner and raffled to Divisions of
Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the offenses charged.
Ruling: Yes. AFP-RSBS is a government-
owned and controlled corporation, and that its
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funds are in the nature of public funds. R.A. No.
8249 states that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses committed by
presidents, directors, trustees or managers of
government owned or controlled corporations
and over offenses committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes.
The charge against petitioner is estafa through
falsification of public document in the
performance of his duties and in relation to his
position as president of the AFP-RSBS.
Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan
505 SCRA 848; October 27, 2006
Topic: Government
Facts: Charges were filed against petitioners
Alzaga et. al relative to alleged irregularities
which attended the purchase of four lots by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
They filed motions to dismiss the case
contending that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction because AFP-RSBS is a private
entity created for the benefit of its members and
their positions do not fall within its jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan granted their motions to dismiss,
however, it later reversed its decision stating
that AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or
controlled corporation thus subject to its
jurisdiction. It also found that the positions of
the petitioners are covered and embraced by PD
No. 1606, thus under its jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.
Ruling: Yes. AFP-RSBS was established to
guarantee continuous financial support to the
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AFP military retirement system. It is similar to
GSIS and SSS. The Supreme Court has ruled
that the character and operations of AFP-RSBS
are imbued with public interest and thus the
same is a government entity and its funds are in
the nature of public funds and that it is also a
GOCC. Furthermore, it is the position held and
not the salary grade which determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners
Alzaga et. al‘s ranks were Vice Presidents and
Assistant Vice President, though not specifically
enumerated in the law, are even higher than
―manager‖ and are therefore within the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
Javier v. Sandiganbayan
599 SCRA 324; September 11, 2009
Topic: Government
Facts: Carolina Javier was appointed as private
sector representative to the National Book
Development Board (NBDB) which is under
the administration and supervision of the Office
of the President. She was tasked to attend an
international book fair, with paid traveling
expenses, but failed to do so. She was charged
with Malversation of Public Funds for not
liquidating the cash advance granted to her in
connection with her supposed trip.
Petitioner argued that she is not a public officer,
only a private sector representative, and is
therefore cannot be held liable for crimes
imputed against her and is outside
Sandiganbayan‘s jursidicition
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a public
officer
Ruling: Yes. NBDB is a statutory government
agency created by R.A. No. 8047. Petitioner
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performs public functions in pursuance of the
objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a
public officer who takes part in the
performance of public functions in the
government whether as an employee, agent,
subordinate official, of any rank or classes.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the
private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB,
the law invested her with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, so that
the purpose of the government is achieved.
MIAA v. CA
495 SCRA 591; July 20, 2006
Topic: Government
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) operates Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) under the MIAA Charter. The
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 stating that
the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew
the exemption from real estate tax granted to
MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter.
City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer,
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on
the Airport Lands and Buildings. It then posted
notices of auction sale.
Petitioner averred that Airport Lands and
Buildings are owned by the Republic. Justifying
the exemption, petitioner invoked the principle
that the government cannot tax itself.
Issue: Whether or not properties of MIAA is
subject to real estate taxes under existing laws.
Ruling: No. Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code states that MIAA is a
government instrumentality and not a
government-owned or controlled corporation.
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Under Section 133(o) of the Local Government
Code, MIAA as a government instrumentality is
not a taxable person because it is not subject to
"taxes, fees or charges of any kind" by local
governments. The real properties of MIAA are
owned by the Republic and thus exempt from
real estate taxes.
Phil. Society v. COA
534 SCRA 112; September 25, 2007
Topic: Government
Facts: Philippine Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animal was incorporated as a
juridical entity by virtue of an act over a
hundred years ago. An audit team from
respondent Commission on Audit (COA)
visited the office of the petitioner to conduct an
audit survey. Petitioner demurred on the ground
that it was a private entity and is not under the
jurisdiction of COA
Issue: Whether or not petitioner qualifies as a
government agency, subject to COA‘s auditing
authority.
Ruling: No. A reading of petitioner‘s charter
shows that it is not subject to control or
supervision by any agency of the State, unlike
government-owned and -controlled
corporations. Furthermore, the fact that a
certain juridical entity is impressed with public
interest does not necessarily make them a public
corporation. CA is therefore enjoined from
investigating, examining, and auditing the
petitioner‘s fiscal and financial affairs.
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Serana v. Sandiganbayan
542 SCRA 224; January 22, 2008
Topic: Government
Facts: Petitioner Hannah Eunice Serana was
appointed as a student regent of the University
of the Philippines-Cebu. Petitioner, with her
siblings and relatives, registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI). One of its projects was the renovation
of the Vinzons Hall Annex, in which President
Joseph Estrada gave Php 50, 000, 000 as
financial assistance. However, the renovation
failed to materialize. The succeeding regent and
secretary general of the university‘s system-wide
alliance of student councils filed complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with
the Office of the Ombudsman which was later
on filed to Sandiganbayan as a crime of estafa.
Petitioner argued that as a student regent, she
was not a public officer and Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over her case.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner UP student
regent is a public officer
Ruling: Yes. Delegation of sovereign functions
is essential in the public office. An investment
in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public
makes one a public officer. The administration
of the UP is a sovereign function in line with
Article XIV of the Constitution.
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Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 104768; July 21, 2003
Topic: Government
Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino issued
E.O. No. creating the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) which is
primarily tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth
of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates. AFP Anti-Graft Board was
created to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel.
Respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Rama was
found having ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.
The Solicitor General filed an Amended
Complaint which prayed for, among others, the
forfeiture of respondents‘ properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State. Sandiganbayan
dismissed the Amended Complaint.
Issue: Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction
to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture
petition against private respondents.
Ruling: No. There are two categories of AFP
personnel under Sec. 2 of E.O. 1 which the
PCGG can investigate: (1) AFP personnel who
have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by
being the latter‘s immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence or (2) AFP personnel
involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the
PCGG. Since it was not claimed that the
President assigned Ramas case to PCGG, his
case falls under the first category. However,
Ramas was not a ―subordinate‖ of former
President Marcos under E.O. 1. Mere position
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held by a military officer does not automatically
make him a ―subordinate‖.
C. STATE IMMUNITY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND
DIVISION) and ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO
G.R. No. 129406; March 6, 2006
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity
Facts: The PCGG issued writs placing under
sequestration all business enterprises, entities
and other properties, real and personal, owned
or registered in the name of private respondent
Benedicto, or of corporations in which he
appeared to have controlling or majority interest.
Among the properties thus sequestered and
taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227
shares in NOGCCI owned by him and
registered in his name. Following the
sequestration process, the Board of Directors of
NOGCCI passed a resolution increasing the
monthly membership due of P150.00 to
P250.00 for each NOGCCI share. The PCGG
failed to pay the corresponding monthly
membership due. On account thereof, the 227
sequestered shares were declared delinquent to
be disposed of in an auction sale. In a
Compromise Agreement entered into by the
petitioner Republic and the private respondent,
they agreed to lift the sequestration on the 227
NOGCCI shares and recognition by petitioner
Republic that the subject shares of stock could
not have been ill-gotten. Private respondent
Benedicto filed a "Motion for Release from
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Sequestration and Return of Sequestered
Shares/Dividends", praying that his shares of
stock be released from sequestration and
returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the
parties‘ Compromise Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government
can invoke state immunity.
RULING: No. When the government enters
into a contract, for the State is then deemed to
have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign
immunity and descended to the level of the
ordinary individual. Having done so, it becomes
a subject to judicial action and processes.
In fact, by entering into a Compromise
Agreement with private respondent Benedicto,
petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its
immunity from suit and placed itself in the same
level of its adversary. When the State enters into
contract, through its officers or agents, in
furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and
pursuant to constitutional legislative authority,
whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue
and rights and obligations arise there from, the
State may be sued even without its express
consent, precisely because by entering into a
contract the sovereign descends to the level of
the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied
from the very act of entering into such
contract,26 breach of which on its part gives the
corresponding right to the other party to the
agreement.
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET. AL v.
PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH INC.
G.R. No. 169304; March 13, 2007
TOPIC: Doctrine of State Immunity
FACTS: DOH Secretary Romualdez, Jr. issued
A.O No. 27, as amended by A.O. No.10,
providing for additional guidelines for
accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at
ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact
business with petitioner DOH. Respondent
submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion
of additional items in its list of accredited drug
products, including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G
Benzathine. An invitation for Bids for the
procurement of Penicillin G Benzathine was
issued. Despite the lack of response from DOH
regarding Pharmawealth‗s request, the latter
submitted its bid for the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid
thereof. . In view, however, of the non-
accreditation of respondent‗s Penicillin G
Benzathine product, the contract was awarded
to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘
(YSS). Respondent filed a complaint for
injunction, mandamus and damages, praying the
nullification of award of the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc.
and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare
Pharmawealth as the lowest complying
responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract,
and that they accordingly award the same to
plaintiff company. Petitioners DOH et al.
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying
for the dismissal of the complaint based on the
doctrine of state immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are clothed
with immunity from suit.
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RULING: No. The defense of immunity from
suit will not avail despite its being an
unincorporated agency of the government, for
the only causes of action directed against it are
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
preliminary injunction may be directed against a
party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover,
the defense of state immunity from suit does
not apply in causes of action which do not seek
to impose a charge or financial liability against
the State.
In the present case, suing individual petitioners
in their personal capacities for damages in
connection with their alleged act of ―illegally
abusing their official positions to make sure that
plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded
the Benzathine contract done in bad faith and
with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of
their powers given by law is permissible, in
consonance with the foregoing principles. For
an officer who exceeds the power conferred on
him by law cannot hide behind the plea of
sovereign immunity and must bear the liability
personally.
EPG CONSTRUCTION CO., ET. AL v.
DPWH, SEC. VIGILAR
G.R. No. 131544; March 16, 2001
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity
Facts: The Ministry of Human Settlement,
through the BLISS Development Corporation,
initiated a housing project on a government
property. For this purpose, it entered into a
MOA with the Ministry of Public Works and
Highways. By virtue of the MOA, MPWH
forged individual contracts with herein
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petitioners EPG Construction Co.,et. al. By
reason of the verbal request and assurance of
DPWH Usec. Canlas that additional funds
would be available and forthcoming, petitioners
agreed to undertake and perform ―additional
constructions‖ for the completion of the
housing units, despite the absence of
appropriations and written contracts to cover
subsequent expenses for the ―additional
constructions.‖ But it was not issued by the
DPWH. Petitioners sent a demand letter to the
DPWH Secretary. The DPWH Auditor did not
object to the payment subject to whatever
action COA may adopt. Through the request of
then DPWH Sec. De Jesus, the DBM released
the amount for payment but Sec. Vigilar denied
the money claims prompting petitioners to file a
petition for mandamus. Among others,
respondent-secretary argues that the state may
not be sued invoking the doctrine of non-
suability of the State also known as Royal
Prerogative of Dishonesty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent may
invoke the doctrine of non-suability or Royal
Prerogative of Dishonesty.
RULING: No. It may not validly invoke
the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and
conveniently hide under the State‘s cloak of
invincibility against suit, considering that this
principle yields to certain settled
exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case,
is not absolute for it does not say that the state
may not be sued under any circumstance. ―The
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice on a citizen.‖
As the staunch guardian of the citizens‘ rights
and welfare – cannot sanction an injustice so
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patent on its face, and allow itself to be an
instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice
and equity sternly demand that the State‘s cloak
of invincibility against suit be shred in this
particular instance, and that petitioners–
contractors be duly compensated – on the basis
of quantum meruit– for construction done on
the public works housing project.
REPUBLIC v. HIDALGO
A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1959; DECEMBER 9, 2005
TOPIC: Doctrine of State Immunity
FACTS: Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed
an action for the annulment or
declaration of nullity of the title and deed of
sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of
ownership and possession of a 4,924.60 sq. m.
property against the Republic of the Philippines
in the RTC Manila. The property in question is
located at 1440 Arlegui Street, San Miguel,
Manila. It is also known as the Arlegui
Residence which housed two (2) Philippine
presidents and which now holds the Office of
the Press Secretary and the News Information
Bureau. The case was intially dismissed by the
presiding Judge of the RTC Manila on the
ground of state immunity. But the case was re-
raffled to the Manila RTC with respondent
Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo as presiding Judge. In
an order, he declared that the Republic in
default for failure of the Solicitor general, to file
the required answer within the period prayed
for in his motion for extension. It is contended
that the respondent Judge violated the
fundamental rule that the government funds are
exempt from execution of garnishment against
the issuance of the writ of execution against the
Republic.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the
Philippines can invoke immunity from suit.
RULING: It is settled that when the State gives
its consent to be sued, it does not thereby
necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution
against it. When the State waives its immunity,
all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an
opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has
a liability.
The functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law.
LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND
WATCHMAN AGENCY, INC., v.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHIILIPPINES
G.R. No. 161657; October 4, 2007
TOPIC: Doctrine of State of Immunity
FACTS: Petitioner Lockheed Detective and
Watchman Agency, Inc. entered into a contract
for security services with respondent University
of the Philippines. In 1998, several security
guards assigned to UP filed separate complaints
against Lockheed and UP for payment of
underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium
pay for rest days and special holidays, holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay, night
shift differentials, 13th month pay, refund of
cash bond, refund of deductions for the Mutual
Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid wages
from December 16-31, 1998, and attorney‘s fees.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring
that UP is solidarily liable with Lockheed in the
payment of the rests of the claims covering their
service contract. UP filed a Motion to Quash
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Garnishment, contending that the funds being
subjected to garnishment at PNB are
government/public funds. UP further argued
that as public funds, cannot be disbursed except
pursuant to an appropriation required by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not University of the
Philippines can invoke immunity from suit.
RULING: UP is a juridical personality separate
and distinct from the government and has the
capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like
NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds
may be subject to garnishment or levy. However,
before execution may be had, a claim for
payment of the judgment award must first be
filed with the COA. Under Commonwealth
Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of P.D.
No. 144, it is the COA which has primary
jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle ―all
debts and claims of any sort‖ due from or
owing the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With
respect to money claims arising from the
implementation of Republic Act No. 6758, their
allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide,
subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition
for certiorari to this Court.
MINUCHER v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003
TOPICS: Doctrine of State Immunity
FACTS: Petitioner Khosrow Minucher, Iranian
national and one Abbas Torabian was charged
for violation of Section 4, RA No. 6425
―Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” This was followed
by a ―buy-bust operation‖ conducted by the
Philippine Police Narcotic agents in the house
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of Minucher, where a quantity of heroin, was
said to have been seized. The narcotic agents
were accompanied by private respondent
Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution. Presiding Judge
Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting
the two accused. Minucher filed a case against
the private respondent Scalzo on account of
what he claimed to have been trumped-up
charges of drug trafficking. Private respondent
Scalzo asserted his diplomatic immunity.
According to him, being a special agent of the
US Drug Enforcement Administration, he is
entitled to diplomatic immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is
entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULING: Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency
allowed by the Philippine government to
conduct activities in the country to help contain
the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to
the defense of state immunity from suit.
Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of
the Vienna Convention, are vested with blanket
diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal
suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining
whether a person is a diplomat entitled to
immunity is the determination of whether or
not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.
Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a
prerogative of the executive branch of the
government. The government of the United
States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for,
has formulated its standards for recognition of a
diplomatic agent. The State Department policy
is to only concede diplomatic status to a person
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who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title
and ―performs duties of diplomatic nature.‖
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY &
EQUIPMENT CORP. (Group) v.
SANTAMARIA
G.R. No. 185572; February 7, 2012
TOPIC: Doctrine of State Immunity
FACTS: The petitioner, China National
Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) ,
designated by the Republic of China as its prime
contractor for the Northrail Project of the
Republic of the Philippines, as certified by its
Chinese Ambassador, claimed sovereign
immunity in connection with a suit against it
based on its Memorandum of Understanding
with the North Luzon Railways Corporation. It
contends that it performs governmental
functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not CNMECG can invoke
immunity from suit.
RULING: Even assuming arguendo that
CNMEG performs governmental functions,
such claim does not automatically vest it with
immunity. Its designation as the Primary
Contractor does not automatically grant it
immunity, just as the term ―implementing agency‖
has no precise definition for purposes of
ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from
suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a
government-owned corporation, it failed to
adduce evidence that it has not consented to be
sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this
Court‘s ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is
to be presumed to be a government-owned and -
controlled corporation without an original
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and
be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation
Code.
By the terms of the Contract Agreement,
Northrail is a government-owned or -controlled
corporation, while CNMEG is a corporation
duly organized and created under the laws of the
People‘s Republic of China. Thus, both Northrail
and CNMEG entered into the Contract
Agreement as entities with personalities distinct
and separate from the Philippine and Chinese
governments, respectively.
Neither can it be said that CNMEG acted as
agent of the Chinese government. Amb. Wang
described CNMEG as a ―state corporation‖. It
did not mean it was to perform sovereign
functions on behalf of China. That label was only
descriptive of its nature as a state-owned
corporation, and did not preclude it from
engaging in purely commercial or proprietary
ventures.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNANCE v.
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 124772; August 14, 2007
TOPICS: Act of State Doctrine
FACTS: The case at bar emanates from a letter
of the Office of the Solicitor General to the
Federal Office for Police Matters in Bene,
Switzerland regarding the sequestration and
restitution of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. The Office of the District Attorney
in Zurich respond to such request and as an
effect, the Banker‘s Trust A.G. (BTAG) of
Zurich froze the accounts of Officeco Holdings,
N.V. Officeco appealed but such was dismissed
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by the Zurich court. It made then
representation before the Office of the Solicitor
General and Presidential Commission on Good
Governance for them to officially advise the
Swiss Federal Office to unfreeze their assets.
The PCGG required Officeco to present
evidence to support their petition. Instead of
complying with the requirement, Officeco
instituted a civil case before public respondent
Sandiganbayan with a prayer that Officeco‘s
account be unfreezed and excluded from
sequestration. The PCGG and OSG appealed
before the Sandiganbayan but such was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act of State Doctrine
may be invoked by PCGG.
RULING: The parameters of the use of the act
of state doctrine were clarified in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino. There, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that international law does not
require the application of this doctrine nor does
it forbid the application of the rule even if it is
claimed that the act of state in question violated
international law. Moreover, due to the
doctrine‘s peculiar nation-to-nation character, in
practice the usual method for an individual to
seek relief is to exhaust local remedies and then
repair to the executive authorities of his own
state to persuade them to champion his claim in
diplomacy or before an international tribunal.
Even assuming that international law requires
the application of the act of state doctrine, it
bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan will not
examine and review the freeze orders of the
concerned Swiss officials in Civil Case No. 0164.
The Sandiganbayan will not require the Swiss
officials to submit to its adjudication nor will it
settle a dispute involving said officials. In fact,
as prayed for in the complaint, the
Sandiganbayan will only review and examine the
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
propriety of maintaining PCGG‘s position with
respect to Office‘s accounts with BTAG for the
purpose of further determining the propriety of
issuing a writ against the PCGG and the OSG.
Everything considered, the act of state doctrine
finds no application in this case and petitioners‘
resort to it is utterly mislaid.
LIANG v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000
353 SCRA 125 (2001) SEPARATE OPINION
TOPICS: Doctrine of State Immunity
FACTS: The petitioner is an economist in the
Asian Development Bank who was charged by
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City for allegedly uttering defamatory words
against her fellow worker with two accounts of
grave oral defamation. The Judge then received
an office protocol from the Department of
Foreign Affairs, stating that the petitioner is
covered by immunity from legal process under
Section 45 of the agreement between ADB and
the government. The judge, without notice,
dismissed the two criminal cases. Prosecution
filed a writ of mandamus and certiorari and
ordered the MeTC judge to enforce the warrant
of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Liang, as an official
of an international organization, is entitled to
diplomatic immunity.
RULING: Courts cannot blindly adhere and
take on its face the communication from the
DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity.
The DFA‘s determination that a certain person
is covered by immunity is only preliminary
which has no binding effect in courts. In
receiving ex-parte the DFA‘s advice and in motu
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proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without
notice to the prosecution, the latter‘s right to
due process was violated. It should be noted
that due process is a right of the accused as
much as it is of the prosecution. The needed
inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at
the time of the alleged utterances requires for its
resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has
been ruled that the mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
dropping of the charges.
Slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra
vires and cannot be part of official functions. It
is well-settled principle of law that a public
official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice or in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. It appears that even the
government‘s chief legal counsel, the Solicitor
General, does not support the stand taken by
petitioner and that of the DFA.
SEPARATE OPINION of JUSTICE
PUNO:
The nature and degree of immunities vary
depending on who the recipient is. Under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts,
whether private or official, and hence he cannot
be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any
offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic
immunity is waived. On the other
hand, officials of international organizations
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enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only
those necessary for the exercise of the functions
of the organization and the fulfillment of its
purposes.
- Officials and employees of the ADB are subject
to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their
private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a
waiver of immunity.
- If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing
to certify by the DFA.
D. STATE PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES
METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY et.al. v.
CONCERNEDRESIDENTS OF MANILA
BAY
G.R. Nos. 171947-48; December 18, 2008
TOPIC: State Principles and Policies
FACTS: The 12 government agencies did not
take notice of the present danger to public
health and the depletion and contamination of
the marine life of Manila Bay. According to the
concerned residents of Manila Bay, the
condition of Manila Bay did not match to
intended SB level standard of water quality in
such a way that recreational activities were
already not allowed. Thus, RTC Manila ordered
the government agencies to participate in the
cleaning the Bay. It was said that the
government agencies violated the PD 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code. The
petitioners argued that PD 1152‘s provisions
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only pertain to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
ISSUE: Whether or not cleaning Manila Bay is
the ministerial act of the petitioners that can be
induced by mandamus.
Whether or not Section 17 and 20 of the PD
1152 only pertain to the specific cleaning of
pollution and not general cleaning.
RULING: The cleaning and rehabilitation of
Manila Bay can be compelled
by mandamus. Petitioners claimed that it is not
their ministerial duty to clean up the bay
because for them it is a discretionary duty which
cannot be compelled by mandamus. According to the
Supreme Court, the obligations to perform the
duties (as defined by law) of the petitioners and
on how they carry out such duties are two
distinct concepts. The former pertains to the
discretionary duties of the petitioners while the
latter is their ministerial duty. As for this case, it
is the discretion of the petitioners to choose not
to perform or to perform their duties as defined
by law. And when they have chosen to perform
their duties, the way they carry out those duties
are called ministerial acts.
It is very clear in their charters that aside from
performing their main function as an agency,
they are also mandated to perform certain
functions relating directly or indirectly to the
clean-up, rehabilitation, protection,
and preservation of the Manila Bay.
Section 17 and 20 of P.D. 1152 include cleaning
in general. Section 17 provides that in case the
water quality has deteriorated, the government
agencies concerned shall act on it to bring back
the standard quality of water. On the other hand,
Section 20 also mandates the government
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
agencies concerned to take action in cleaning-up
in case the polluters failed to do their part. In
the succeeding section 62(g) and (h) of the same
Code, provide that oil spilling is the cause of
pollution that should be done in clean-up
operations.
PAMATONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872; April 13, 2004
TOPIC: State Principles and Policies
FACTS: Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his
CoC where the COMELEC had not given its
due course. From the parties involved in the
approval of the certificate, only two
commissioners had voted in favor of the
petitioner for the reason that he has his party to
back him up.
A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by
Pamatong which the COMELEC had process.
The respondent declared that Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate who does not have the
means to campaign for the national scale.
A Writ For Certiorari was filed by the petitioner,
praying for a reversal of the previous
declaration of the respondent. The petitioner
contended that his right secured by Section 26
of Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution was
violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC violated
Section 26 of Article 2 of the Constitution.
RULING: No, there is no law that would grant
such right and that what he only has is a
privilege to run for public office.
The provisions of the Article 2 of the 1987
Constitution are not self-executory and that
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they are only guidelines for legislative or
executive actions.
The State has the right to have an order and
objective election. It is the reason why the
COMELEC has the power of their own will to
declare a candidate as a nuisance. The
qualifications for being a candidate were not
created to discriminate any person. The
impediments to run for office were initiated to
all aspiring candidate and so the ―equal access to
public service‖ was not to be violated.
Bayan Muna v. Romulo
GR No. 159618; February 1, 2011
Topic: On Executive Agreement
Facts: In 2003, then President Arroyo,
represented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
concluded the RP-US Non-Surrender
Agreement via Exchange of Notes with then
Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardione of the US
Embassy. Petitioner parlays the notion that
the Agreement is of dubious validity, partaking as
it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must
be duly concurred in by the Senate.
Issue: Whether or not the agreement needs the
concurrence of the Senate to be binding and
effective.
Held: No. The Constitution vests in the
President the power to enter into international
agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the
required concurrence votes of the Senate. But
executive agreements may be validly entered
into without such concurrence. As the
President wields vast powers and influence, her
conduct in the external affairs of the nation is,
as Bayan would put it, ―executive
altogether.‖ The right of the President to enter
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into or ratify binding executive agreements has
been confirmed by long practice.
Lim v. Executive Secretary
GR No. 151445; April 11, 2002
Topic: Executive Agreement
Facts: In the year 2002, personnel from the
armed forces of the United States of America
started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in
conjunction with the Philippine military, in
―Balikatan 02-1.‖ These so-called ―Balikatan‖
exercises are the largest combined training
operations involving Filipino and American
troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement
entered into by the Philippines and the United
States in 1951. The entry of American troops
into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the
international anti-terrorism campaign declared
by President George W. Bush in reaction to the
tragic events that occurred on September 11,
2001. Petitioners attack the constitutionality of
the Balikatan on the ground that the Mutual
Defense Treaty only provides for mutual
military assistance in accordance with the
constitutional processes of each country only in
the case of an armed attack by an external
aggressor, meaning a third country against one
of them and by no stretch of the imagination
can it be said that the Abu Sayyaf bandits in
Basilan constitute an external armed force that
has subject the Philippines to an armed external
attack to warrant US Military assistance under
the MDT of 1951.
Issue: Whether or not the Balikatan
Exercise is within the activities authorized
by the MDT of 1951.
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Held: Yes. The holding of the Balikatan 02-1
must be studied in the framework of the treaty
antecedents to which the Philippines bound
itself, the Mutual Defense Treaty to which the
Visiting Forces Agreement seeks to
reaffirm. the VFA gives legitimacy to the
current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to
assume that ―Balikatan 02-1,‖ a ―mutual anti-
terrorism advising, assisting and training
exercise,‖ falls under the umbrella of sanctioned
or allowable activities in the context of the
agreement. Both the history and intent of the
Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support
the conclusion that combat-relatedactivities — as
opposed to combat itself — such as the one
subject of the instant petition, are indeed
authorized.
Shangri-La International Hotel
Management Ltd. V. Development Group
of Companies
GR No. 159938; March 31, 2006
Topic: On Conflict Between Municipal Law
and International Law
Facts: At the core of the controversy are the
Shangri-La mark and S logo. Respondent DGCI
claims ownership of said mark and logo in the
Philippines on the strength of its prior use
thereof within the country pursuant to RA 166.
The petitioners accused DGCI of appropriating
and illegally using the "Shangri-La" mark and
"S" logo, adding that the legal and beneficial
ownership thereof pertained to SLIHM and that
the Kuok Group and its related companies had
been using this mark and logo since March 1962
for all their corporate names and affairs. In this
regard, they point to the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property as
affording security and protection to SLIHM's
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
exclusive right to said mark and logo. They
further claimed having used, since late 1975, the
internationally-known and specially-designed
"Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo for all the
hotels in their hotel chain.
Issue: Whether or not municipal law in the
Philippines is subordinate to an international
agreement.
Held: No. Following universal acquiescence
and comity, our municipal law on trademarks
regarding the requirement of actual use in
the Philippines must subordinate an
international agreement inasmuch as the
apparent clash is being decided by a municipal
tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law
has been made part of the law of the land does
not by any means imply the primacy of
international law over national law in the
municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of
incorporation as applied in most countries, rules
of international law are given a standing equal,
not superior, to national legislative enactments.
Trademark is a creation of use and,
therefore, actual use is a pre-requisite to
exclusive ownership; registration is only an
administrative confirmation of the existence of
the right of ownership of the mark, but does
not perfect such right; actual use thereof is the
perfecting ingredient. As between actual use of
a mark without registration, and registration of
the mark without actual use thereof, the former
prevails over the latter. For a rule widely
accepted and firmly entrenched, because it has
come down through the years, is that actual use
in commerce or business is a pre-requisite to the
acquisition of the right of ownership.
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Philip Morris, Inc. v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation
GR No. 158589; June 27, 2006
Topic: On Conflict Between Municipal Law
and International Law
Facts: Petitioner Philip Morris, Inc., a
corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Virginia, United States of America, is,
per Certificate of Registration No. 18723 issued
on April 26, 1973 by the Philippine Patents
Office (PPO), the registered owner of the
trademark "MARK VII" for cigarettes. On the
other hand, respondent Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, a company organized in the
Philippines, manufactures and sells cigarettes
using the trademark "MARK."
The legal dispute between the parties
started when the herein petitioners, on the claim
that an infringement of their respective
trademarks had been committed, filed a
Complaint for Infringement of Trademark and
Damages against respondent Fortune Tobacco
Corporation.
Issue: Whether or not municipal law in the
Philippines is subordinate to an international
agreement.
Held: No. Admittedly, the registration of a
trademark gives the registrant, such as
petitioners, advantages denied non-registrants
or ordinary users, like respondent. But while
petitioners enjoy the statutory presumptions
arising from such registration ,i.e., as to the
validity of the registration, ownership and the
exclusive right to use the registered marks, they
may not successfully sue on the basis alone of
their respective certificates of registration of
trademarks. For, petitioners are still foreign
corporations. As such, they ought, as a
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
condition to availment of the rights and
privileges vis-à-vis their trademarks in this
country, to show proof that, on top of
Philippine registration, their country grants
substantially similar rights and privileges to
Filipino citizens pursuant to Section 21-A of
R.A. No. 166.
True, the Philippines‘ adherence to the
Paris Convention effectively obligates the
country to honor and enforce its provisions as
regards the protection of industrial property of
foreign nationals in this country. However, any
protection accorded has to be made subject to
the limitations of Philippine laws. Hence,
despite Article 2 of the Paris Convention which
substantially provides that (1) nationals of
member-countries shall have in this country
rights specially provided by the Convention as
are consistent with Philippine laws, and enjoy
the privileges that Philippine laws now grant or
may hereafter grant to its nationals, and (2)
while no domicile requirement in the country
where protection is claimed shall be required of
persons entitled to the benefits of the Union for
the enjoyment of any industrial property
rights, foreign nationals must still observe and
comply with the conditions imposed by
Philippine law on its nationals.
Mijares v. Rañada
GR No. 139325; April 12, 2005
Topic: On Enforcement of Foreign
Judgment
Facts: Petitioners sought the enforcement of a
final judgment with the RTC Makati. This is a
Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the
plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine
Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety
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Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final
Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a
decision rendered on 17 December 1996.On 5
February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion
to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-
payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged
that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred
Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees,
notwithstanding the fact that they sought to
enforce a monetary amount of damages in the
amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US
Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate
cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining
to the proper computation and payment of
docket fees. In response, the petitioners
claimed that an action for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary
estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four
Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper,
pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Philippines is obliged
to recognize foreign judgments.
2. Whether or not the amount paid by
petitioners is the proper filing fee for the
action.
Held:
1. There is no obligatory rule derived from
treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or
allow a procedure for the enforcement
thereof. However, generally accepted principles
of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those
19
 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
customary rules accepted as binding result from
the combination two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part
of States; and a psychological element known as
the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law
or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a
belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.
2. Yes. Notably, the amount paid as docket
fees by the petitioners on the premise that it
was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation
corresponds to the same amount required for
―other actions not involving property.‖
Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association
of the Philippines v. Duque III
GR No. 173034; October 9, 2007
Topic: State Principle: The
Philippines…adopts the generally accepted
principles of international as part of the law
of the land…
Facts: Petitioners seek to nullify Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known
as The “Milk Code,” Relevant International
Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof,
and for Other Purposes (RIRR) for allegedly
going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code,
thereby amending and expanding the coverage
of said law. The defense of the DOH is that
the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code
but also various international instruments
regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is
respondents' position that said international
instruments are deemed part of the law of the
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land and therefore the DOH may implement
them through the RIRR.
Issue: Whether or not the pertinent
international instruments adverted to by
respondents are part of the law of the land.
Held: Under the 1987 Constitution,
international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic
law. ―Generally accepted principles of
international law‖ refers to norms of general or
customary international law which are binding
on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy, the principle of
sovereign immunity, a person's right to life,
liberty and due
process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others.
For an international rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such
rule is being followed by
states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules
(opinio juris). Respondents have not presented
any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the
member states, were in fact enforced or
practiced by at least a majority of the member
states; neither have respondents proven that any
compliance by member states with said WHA
Resolutions was obligatory in
nature. Consequently, legislation is necessary to
transform the provisions of the WHA
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions
of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that
can be implemented by executive agencies
without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature.
Kulayan v. Tan
GR No. 187298; July 3, 2012
Topic: On Calling Out Powers of the
President
Facts: Governor Tan issued Proclamation No.
1, Series of 2009 declaring a state of emergency
in the province of Sulu citing the kidnapping
incident as a ground for the said declaration. In
the same proclamation, respondent Tan called
upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency
Force to set-up checkpoints and chokepoints,
conduct general search and seizures including
arrests and other actions necessary to ensure
public safety. Governor Tan invoked Section
465 of the Local Government Code of 1991
which bestows on the provincial governor the
power to carry out emergency measures during
man-made and natural disasters and calamities
and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and
lawless violence. Petitioners contend that such
declaration is ultra vires and void on the ground
that it is the sole authority of the President to
exercise emergency powers and calling-out
powers as the chief executive of the Republic
and commander in chief of the armed forces.
Issue: Whether or not a provincial governor
may validly exercise the calling out powers.
Held: No. Respondent provincial governor is
not
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endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his
authority when he declared a state of emergency
and called upon the Armed Forces, the police,
and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the
local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of
the Local Government Code.
United Church of Christ in the Philippines
Inc. v. Bradford United Church of Christ
GR No. 171905; June 20, 2012
Topic: The State and Ecclesiastical Affairs
Facts: UCCP has three (3) governing bodies
namely: the General Assembly, the Conference
and the Local Church, each having distinct and
separate duties and powers. As a UCCP local
church located in Cebu, BUCCI belonged to the
Cebu Conference Inc. (CCI) with whom it
enjoyed peaceful co-existence until late 1989
when BUCCI started construction of a fence
that encroached upon the right-of way allocated
by UCCP for CCI and Visayas jurisdiction.
BUCCI then disaffiliated itself form UCCP and
the SEC approved the same. UCCP filed a
protest alleging that such separate incorporation
and registration is not allowed under the
Constitution and Bylaws of the UCCP. SEC
defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate
itself from UCCP in recognition of its
constitutional freedom to associate and
disassociate. In its motion for reconsideration,
UCCP maintains that the issue on whether the
disaffiliation of respondents is valid is purely an
ecclesiastical affair. It asserts that it has the sole
21
 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
power and authority to declare and/or decide
whether BUCCI or any of its local churches
could disaffiliate from it.
Issue: Whether or not the issue on validity of
BUCCI‘s disaffiliation is purely an ecclesiastical
affair.
Held: No. The issue is not purely an
ecclesiastical affair. An ecclesiastical affair is one
that concerns doctrine, creed or form of
worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of
needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power
of excluding from such associations those
deemed unworthy of membership. Based on
this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves
the relationship between the church and its
members and relate to matters of faith, religious
doctrines, worship and governance of the
congregation. To be concrete, examples of this
so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State
cannot meddle are proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and
other activities attached with religious
significance.
UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate
entities and grantees of primary franchises, are
subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3
of Presidential Decree No. 902-A provides that
SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all
corporations. Even with their religious nature,
SEC may exercise jurisdiction over them in
matters that are legal and corporate.
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Orceo v. COMELEC
GR No. 190779; March 26, 2010
Topic: On Implementing Rules and
Regulations germane to the Statute
Facts: Pursuant to Section 35 of R.A. No.
7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National
and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other
Purposes), the COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 8714 entitled Rules
and Regulations on the: (1) Bearing, Carrying or
Transporting of Firearms or other Deadly Weapons;
and (2) Employment, Availment or Engagement of the
Services of Security Personnel or Bodyguards,
During the Election Period for the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections, which contains the
implementing rules and regulations of Sections
32 and 33 of R.A. No. 7166. Petitioner
contends that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in including ―airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations‖ in the definition of ―firearm‖
in Resolution No. 8714, since there is nothing
in R.A. No. 7166 that mentions ―airsoft guns
and their replicas/imitations.‖ He asserts that
the intendment of R.A. No. 7166 is that the
term ―firearm‖ refers to real firearm in its
common and ordinary usage.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 8714 is
invalid on the ground that it is not germane to
the statute or RA 7166.
Held: No. Where a rule or regulation has a
provision not expressly stated or contained in
the statute being implemented, that provision
does not necessarily contradict the statute. A
legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details
22
 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
thereof. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law; that the regulation
be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by the law.
Evidently, the COMELEC had the
authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714
pursuant to Section 35 of R.A. No. 7166. It was
granted the power to issue the implementing
rules and regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of
R.A. No. 7166. Under this broad power, the
COMELEC was mandated to provide the
details of who may bear, carry or transport
firearms or other deadly weapons, as well as the
definition of ―firearms,‖ among others. These
details are left to the discretion of the
COMELEC, which is a constitutional body that
possesses special knowledge and expertise on
election matters, with the objective of ensuring
the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v.
Commission on Audit
GR No. 177131; June 7, 2011
Topic: On Government Instrumentalities
Facts: COA issued Resolution 99-011 with the
subject ―Defining the Commission’s policy with respect
to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines” to
conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards. The
BSP contends that it is not a government entity
administering special funds. It is not even
included in the DECS National Budget. BSP
maintains that it is not an ―agency‖ of the
Government. The 1987 Administrative Code,
merely referred the BSP as an ―attached agency‖
of the DECS as distinguished from an actual
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line agency of departments that are included in
the National Budget. The BSP believes that an
―attached agency‖ is different from an ―agency.‖
Agency, as defined in Section 2(4) of the
Administrative Code, is defined as any of the
various units of the Government including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality,
government-owned or controlled corporation
or local government or distinct unit therein.
Issue: Whether or not the BSP is a government
instrumentality for it to fall under the
jurisdiction of the COA.
Held: The BSP is a public corporation or a
government agency or instrumentality with
juridical personality, which does not fall within
the constitutional prohibition in Article XII,
Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to
its charter. The BSP still remains
an instrumentality of the national
government. It is a public corporation created
by law for a public purpose, attached to the
DECS pursuant to its Charter and the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private
corporation which is required to be owned or
controlled by the government and be
economically viable to justify its existence under
a special law. Not all corporations, which
are not government owned or controlled,
are ipso facto to be considered private
corporations as there exists another distinct
class of corporations or chartered institutions
which are otherwise known as ―public
corporations.‖ These corporations are treated
by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the
government which are not subject to the tests
of ownership or control and economic viability
but to different criteria relating to their public
purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relationship
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
to the government or any of its Departments or
Offices.
Boracay Foundation Inc. v. Province of
Aklan
GR No. 196870; June 26, 2012
Topic: Writ of Continuing Mandamus
Facts: Respondent Province included the
proposed expansion of the port facilities at
Barangay Caticlan in its 2009 Annual
Investment Plan, envisioned as its project site
the area adjacent to the existing jetty port, and
identified additional areas along the coastline of
Barangay Caticlan as the site for future project
expansion. Site 1 is in Brgy. Caticlan with a
total area of 36.82 hectares and Site 2 in
Brgy. Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island with a
total area of 3.18 hectares. Sites 1 and 2 are on
the opposite sides of Tabon Strait, about 1,200
meters apart. Petitioner prays for the issuance of
an Environmental Protection Order in the
nature of a continuing mandamus under A.M. No.
09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases,
promulgated on April 29, 2010. The petition is
premised on the ground that the respondent
province, being the proponent of the
reclamation project, failed to comply with the
relevant rules and regulations in the acquisition
of Environmental Compliance Certificate.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Province
complied with all the requirements under the
pertinent laws and regulations.
Held: No. Respondent province failed to
comply with the requirement of prior
consultation and prior approval that should
have been conducted by the respondent
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province applying for ECC.
Prior consultations and prior approval are
required by law to have been conducted and
secured by the respondent
Province. Accordingly, the information
dissemination conducted months after the ECC
had already been issued was insufficient to
comply with this requirement under the Local
Government Code. Had they been conducted
properly, the prior public consultation should
have considered the ecological or environmental
concerns of the stakeholders and studied
measures alternative to the project, to avoid or
minimize adverse environmental impact or
damage. In fact, respondent Province once
tried to obtain the favorable endorsement of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was
denied by the latter.
Writ of Continuing Mandamus
The writ of
continuing mandamus ―permits the court to
retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the
reliefs mandated under the court‘s decision‖ and,
in order to do this, ―the court may compel the
submission of compliance reports from the
respondent government agencies as well as avail
of other means to monitor compliance with its
decision.‖
It is a special civil action that may be
availed of ―to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law‖[140] and which
provides for the issuance of a TEPO ―as an
auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the
writ itself.‖
Petition for continuing mandamus.—When
any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the
24
 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental
law rule or regulation or a right therein, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching
thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the
petition concerns an environmental law, rule or
regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an
act or series of acts until the judgment is fully
satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to
perform the duties of the respondent, under the
law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also
contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.
Philippine National Bank v. Dan Padao
GR No. 180849 and 187143
November 16, 2011
Topic: On the Protection of Labor
Facts: On January 10, 1997, after due
investigation, PNB found Padao guilty of gross
and habitual neglect of duty and ordered him
dismissed from the bank. Padao appealed to the
bank‘s Board of Directors but after almost three
(3) years of inaction on the part of the Board,
Padao instituted a complaint against with the
Labor Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
Regional Arbitration
for Reinstatement; Backwages; Illegal Dismissal;
and Treachery/Bad Faith and Palpable
Discrimination in the Treatment of Employees
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with administrative cases. Executive Labor
Arbiter (ELA) found Padao‘s dismissal valid.
Padao appealed to the NLRC, which, in
its Resolution reversed and set aside the ELA
Decision and declared Padao‘s dismissal to be
illegal. He was thereby ordered reinstated to his
previous position without loss of seniority rights
and PNB was ordered to pay him full
backwages and attorney‘s fees equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
PNB‘s Motion for Reconsideration was denied
by the NLRC in its Resolution dated December
27, 2002.
Issue: Whether or not Padao‘s dismissal is valid
on the ground that his position is one imbued
with trust and confidence.
Held: Yes, the dismissal is valid. While the 1987
Constitution provisions on social justice and the
protection of labor underscore the importance
and economic significance of labor, Article II,
Section 18 characterizes labor as a ―primary
social economic force,‖ and as such, the State is
bound to ―protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare,‖ the case at bar involves
dismissal by PNB for gross and habitual neglect
of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor
Code. The role that a credit investigator plays in
the conduct of a bank‘s business cannot be
overestimated. Padao‘s repeated failure to
discharge his duties as a credit investigator of
the bank amounted to gross and habitual
neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the
Labor Code. He not only failed to perform what
he was employed to do, but also did so
repetitively and habitually, causing millions of
pesos in damage to PNB. Thus, PNB acted
within the bounds of the law by meting out the
penalty of dismissal, which it deemed
appropriate given the circumstances.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Gamboa v. Teves
GR No. 176579; June 28, 2011
Topic: State Principle: State shall develop a
self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Facts: On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the
instant petition for prohibition, injunction,
declaratory relief, and declaration of nullity of
sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Petitioner
claims, among others, that the sale of the
111,415 PTIC shares would result in an increase
in First Pacific‘s common shareholdings in
PLDT from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, and this,
combined with Japanese
NTT DoCoMo‘s common shareholdings in
PLDT, would result to a total foreign common
shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which
is over the 40 percent constitutional limit.
Issue: Whether the term ―capital‖ in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers to the
total common shares only or to the total
outstanding capital stock (combined total of
common and non-voting preferred shares) of
PLDT, a public utility.
Held: Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the
60 percent Filipino-owned ―capital‖ required in
the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of
60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is
required. The legal and beneficial ownership of
60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must
rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in
accordance with the constitutional mandate.
Otherwise, the corporation is ―considered as
non-Philippine national[s].‖
To construe broadly the term ―capital‖
as the total outstanding capital stock, including
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both common and non-voting preferred shares,
grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the
Constitution that the ―State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.‖
A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who
owns the all-important voting stock, which
necessarily equates to control of the public
utility.
Liban v. Gordon
639 SCRA 709; January 18, 2011
Topic: The Incorporation Clause
Facts: The Philippine National Red Cross is a
non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary,
humanitarian organization. The PNRC provides
six major services: Blood Services, Disaster
Management, Safety Services, Community
Health and Nursing, Social Services and
Voluntary Service.
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the
Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as
a voluntary organization for the purpose
contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27
July 1929.
Issue: Whether or not the Court must
recognize too the country‘s adherence to the
Geneva Convention and respect the unique
status of the PNRC in consonance with its
treaty obligations.
Ruling: Yes. The Geneva Convention has the
force and effect of law. Under the Constitution,
the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law
of the land. This constitutional provision must
be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII,
Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using
the latter to negate the former.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA
651 SCRA 146; June 7, 2011
Topic: Rearing of Youth
Facts: Commission on Audit issued a
resolution that it will conduct an annual
financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines. BSP contended that it is not subject
to the Commission‘s jurisdiction. COA argued
that BSP is a public corporation whose
functions relate to the fostering of public virtues
of citizenship and patriotism and that the
manner of creation and the purpose of which
the BSP was created proved that it is a
government agency.
Issue: Whether or not BSP is a public
corporation and falls under the jurisdiction of
COA
Ruling: Yes. The purpose of the BSP as stated
in its amended charter shows that it was created
in order to implement a State policy declared in
Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution stating
that ―The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.‖ BSP, which was
created by a special law to serve a public
purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate,
comes within the class of ―public corporations‖
defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil
Code and governed by the law which creates it,
pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code.
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Board of Medicine v. Ota
588 SCRA 234; July 14, 2008
Topic: State Policies
Facts: Yasuyuki Ota is a Japanese national,
married to a Filipina, and a graduate of Doctor
of Medicine. He filed an application to take the
medical board examinations to obtain a medical
license. The Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) required him to submit
proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and
the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the
practice of medicine. He was able to comply
with this requirement but the PRC Board of
Medicine still rejected his application on the
ground that there is no genuine reciprocity as
there is no Filipino who can possibly practice in
Japan.
Issue: Whether or not the Board and the PRC
acted arbitrarily.
Ruling: Yes. The power to regulate the exercise
of a profession or pursuit of an occupation
cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in
an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A
political body which regulates the exercise of a
particular privilege has the authority to both
forbid and grant such privilege in accordance
with certain conditions. R.A. No. 2382, which
provides who may be candidates for the medical
board examinations, merely requires a foreign
citizen to submit competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing
that his country‘s existing laws permit citizens
of the Philippines to practice medicine under
the same rules and regulations governing
citizens thereof. Requiring respondent to prove
first that a Filipino has already been granted
license and is actually practicing therein unduly
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
expands the requirements provided for under
R.A. No. 2382.
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of
Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay
540 SCRA 424; December 17, 2007
Topic:
Facts: Atty. Benjamin Dacanay was admitted to
the Philippine bar in 1960 until he migrated to
Canada in 1998 to seek medical help. In order
to avail of Canada‘s free medical aid program he
became a Canadian citizen in 2004. R.A. 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003) was enacted. Pursuant to R.A. 9225,
Atty. Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship and took oath of allegiance as a
Filipino Citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Canada. In the same year, he
returned to the Philippines and he now intends
to resume his practice of law.
Issue: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may
still resume his practice of law.
Ruling: Yes. Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege
to engage in the practice of law. In other words,
the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. Exception is when Filipino
citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as
a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225, as the case of Atty.
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Dacanay. Although he is also deemed never to
have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law
practice accrues.
E. SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND CHECKS AND
BALANCES
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General
NEDA
487 SCRA 623; April 19, 2006
Topic: Separation of Powers
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued E.O. 420 which requires all government
agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations to adopt a uniform data collection
and format for their existing identification
systems. E.O 420 seeks to have a unified
identification system, from multiple
identification systems from different
government agencies into one multi-purpose
I.D., thereby reducing inconvenience to their
transactions with the government.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. 420 is a usurpation
of legislative powers by the President
Ruling: No. E.O. 420 is an exercise of the
Executive power as the President‘s power of
control of the Executive department. Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution provides that the
―President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices.‖
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Senate v. Ermita
488 SCRA 1; April 20, 2006
Topic: Separation of Powers
Facts: In the exercise of its legislative power,
the Senate of the Philippines conducts inquiries
in aid of legislation which calls for the
attendance of various officials and employees of
the executive department. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo enacted E.O. 464 requiring
that all department heads of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress to ensure the
observance of the principle of separation of
powers.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. 464 is
unconstitutional in contravening the power of
inquiry vested in the Congress
Ruling: Yes. E.O. 464 bars the appearance of
executive officials before the Congress,
depriving the Congress of the information in
the possession of these officials. The power of
inquiry, a power vested in the Congress, is
expressly recognized in Sec. 21 of Article VI of
the Constitution. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the
legislation intended to affect or change. The
power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power
to legislate.
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Silverio v. Republic
537 SCRA 373; October 22, 2007
Topic: Separation of Powers
Facts: Rommel Silverio was registered as ―male‖
but he alleged that he is a male transsexual.
Consequently, he underwent sex reassignment
surgery. He then sought for the change of his
first name from ―Rommel‖ to ―Mely‖ and his
sex from ―male‖ to ―female‖ in his birth
certificate which was granted by the trial court.
Republic of the Philippines alleged that there is
no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
Issue: Whether or not the Court can engage in
judicial legislation.
Ruling: No. The duty of the Court is to apply
or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. It
is for the legislature to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The Court cannot
enact a law where no law exists.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Reyes
621 SCRA 511; June 23, 2010
Topic: Separation of Powers
Facts: Rene De Guzman is a clerk at the RTC
Branch 31, Guimba, Nueva Ecija. He was
allegedly using illegal drugs which manifested in
his irrational and queer behaviour at work. The
Office of the Court Administrator conducted a
drug test on De Guzman in which he tested
positive. OCA recommended his dismissal from
service immediately which was adopted by the
Supreme Court.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drug
Act) states that sustainable programs of
rehabilitation and treatment must be
considered in light of this Court‘s constitutional
power of administrative supervision over courts
and court personnel.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9165 limits the
Courts exercise of disciplinary actions over the
members of the judiciary department
Ruling: Yes. The Constitution provides that
the Supreme Court shall have the administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof. The legislative power imposing policies
through laws is not unlimited and is subject to
the substantive and constitutional limitations
that set parameters both in the exercise of the
power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation. As such, it cannot limit the Court‘s
power to impose disciplinary actions against
erring justices, judges and court personnel or be
used to restrict the Court‘s power to preserve
and maintain the Judiciary‘s honor, dignity and
integrity and public confidence that can only be
achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards
of decency and propriety governing the conduct
of justices, judges and court employees.
Maria Araullo v. Benigno Simeon Aquino
G.R. No. 209287; July 1, 2014
Topic: Separation of Powers
Facts: Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered a privilege
speech revealing that he, including other
senators, received P50M as cash ―incentive‖ for
voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief
Justice C. Corona. Responding to Senator
Estrada‘s revelation, Sec. Florencio Abad of
Department of Budget and Management issued
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a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to
Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program,
explaining the funds had been released to
senators had been part of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program, a program designed by
the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic expansion. He further explained that
the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased
appropriations under Personnel Services; (2)
unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over
appropriations unreleased from the previous
year; and budgets for slow-moving items or
projects that had been realigned to support
faster-disbursing projects.
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of
DAP and issuances relating to DAP were filed.
Issue: Whether or not the DAP violates the
doctrine of separation of powers
Ruling: Yes. Though the President is allowed
by the Constitution to make realignment of
funds, such transfer or realignment should only
be made ―within their respective offices‖. Thus,
no cross-border transfers/augmentations may
be allowed. But under the DAP, this was
violated because funds appropriated by the
General Appropriations Act for the Executive
were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
F. DELEGATION OF POWERS
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CO. v.
CEMENT MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 158540; August 3, 2005
TOPIC: Permissible Delegation
FACTS: Philcemcor filed with the DTI a
petition seeking for the imposition of safeguard
measures on Gray Portland cement, in
accordance with the SMA. After the DTI issued
a provisional safeguard measure, the application
was referred to the Tariff Commission for a
formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of
the SMA and its IRR, in order to determine
whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard
measure on imports of gray Portland cement.
After public hearings and conducting its own
investigation, the Tariff Commission came out
with a negative finding. The DTI sought the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it
could still impose a definitive safeguard measure.
DOJ Secretary opined that the DTI could not
do so under the SMA, and so the DTI Secretary
then promulgated a Decision wherein he
expressed the DTI‘s disagreement with the
conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at
the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcor‘s
application for safeguard measures on the
ground that the he was bound to do so in light
of the Tariff Commission‘s negative findings.
Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary is not
bound to adopt the recommendations of the
Tariff Commission; and, that the Report is void,
as it is predicated on a flawed framework,
inconsistent inferences and erroneous
methodology. Southern Cross filed the present
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petition, arguing that the factual findings of the
Tariff Commission on the existence or non-
existence of conditions warranting the
imposition of general safeguard measures are
binding upon the DTI Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the factual findings of
the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-
existence of conditions warranting the
imposition of general safeguard measures are
binding upon the DTI Secretary.
RULING: The DTI Secretary is barred from
imposing a general safeguard measure in the
absent of a positive final determination
rendered by the Tariff Commission. The
required positive final determination of the
Tariff Commission exists as a properly enacted
constitutional limitation imposed on the
delegation of the legislative power to impose
tariffs and imposts to the President under
Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
YAZAKI TORRES MANUFACTURING
INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 130584; June 27, 2006
TOPIC: Permissible Delegation
FACTS: The Home Development Mutual
Fund is the government agency tasked with the
administration of the PAG-IBIG Fund created
under P.D. No. 1530, intended for housing
purposes to be sourced from voluntary
contributions from its members. But it was
amended by P.D. No. 1752 providing that
membership in the Fund is mandatory for all
gainfully-employed Filipinos. RA No. 7742 was
passed and amended the former, which
provides that the coverage of the Fund extends
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
to all members of the SSS and GSIS, as well as
their employers. However, membership is
voluntary for employees earning less
than P4,000.00 a month. Yazaki Torres
Manufacturing, Inc. applied and was granted by
the HDMF a waiver from the Fund coverage
for the period from January 1 to December 31,
1995. The HDMF found that petitioner‘s
retirement plan for its employees is superior to
that offered by the Fund. HDMF Chief
Executive Officer disapproved petitioner‘s
application on the ground that its retirement
plan is not superior to that provided by the
Fund. Petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying its application for renewal of waiver of
the Fund membership coverage; and in
confirming the authority of the HDMF to
amend the implementing Rules of the Fund. It
claims that Section 5 of R.A. No. 7742 does not
grant HDMF the power to amend the
implementing Rules and Regulations,
contending that ―the power to make laws does
not necessarily include the power to alter or
repeal the same.‖ .
ISSUE: Whether or not the HDMF has the
power to amend the Implementing Rules and
Regulations, of RA No. 7742.
RULING: Yes. The legislative power is granted
pursuant to Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution.
The law delegated to the HDMF the rule-
making power since this is necessary for the
proper exercise of its authority to administer the
Fund. Following the doctrine of necessary
implication, this grant of express power to
formulate implementing rules and regulations
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must necessarily include the power to amend,
revise, alter, or repeal the same.
SEMA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 178628 July 16, 2008
TOPIC: Permissible Delegation
FACTS: RA 9054 was passed amending
ARMM‘s Organic Act and vesting it with power
to create provinces, municipalities, cities and
barangays. Pursuant to this law, Shariff
Kabunsuan was created, comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao
with the exception of Cotabato City. For the
purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC
initially stated that the 1st district is now only
made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201).
But it later amended this stating that status quo
should be retained however just for the
purposes of the elections, the first district
should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City. Sema was a congressional
candidate for the legislative district of S.
Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later,
she was contending that Cotabato City should
be a separate legislative district and that votes
therefrom should be excluded in the voting.
Moreover, upon creation of a province (S.
Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains
legislative representation and since S.
Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in
effect Cotabato is being deprived of a
representative in the HOR. COMELEC
maintained that the legislative district is still
there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being
created, the legislative district is not affected
and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not ARMM can create
validly LGUs.
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RULING: No. The power to create a province
or city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the
creation of legislative districts, a power only
Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The
ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because
the Constitution mandates that every province
shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the
ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law
creating a national office like the office of a
district representative of Congress because the
legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X
of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA
Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, is void.
MAGO v. PEÑALOSA-FERMO
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1715; March 19, 2009
TOPIC: Permissible Delegation
FACTS: Mago filed before the MTC Labo,
Camarines Norte a complaint for grave
coercion against Sheriff Alex Rodolfo Angeles
of the DAR Adjudication Board. Sheriff
Angeles filed a counter-charge for grave threats
against complainant and his sons. Alleging that
Presiding Judge of the MTC Labo, Camarines
Sur Judge Aurea G. Peñalosa-Fermo committed
gross ignorance of the law and bias in the
disposition of his complaint and of the counter-
charge against him, complainant filed the
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administrative complaint. Contending that he
and his witnesses attended the Preliminary
Investigation, without the assistance of counsel,
they were examined through a prepared set of
questions handed to them by the stenographer.
The respondent judge was not present then.
The complainant also states that right after the
preliminary investigation, he was immediately
arrested and was imprisoned for three days.
Respondent explained that the Court
Stenographer has a prepared sheet of questions
during the preliminary examination because the
undersigned prepares her questions for
preliminary examination based on the affidavits
of the complaining witnesses and the counter
affidavits of the accused. Furthermore, it will be
easier for the Stenographers to take/print the
transcript of the proceedings. Also, this is
convenient when more than one preliminary
examination is scheduled for the day. After the
witnesses are briefed, the stenographers take
over since the prepared sheets are given to them
so they could propound the questions and the
answers are typed directly.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Fermo can
delegate to the Court Stenographer the power
to conduct of Preliminary Investigation.
RULING: No. An officer to whom discretion
is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the
presumption being that he was chosen because
he was deemed fit and competent to exercise
that judgment and discretion, and unless the
power to substitute another in his place has
been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties
to another.
A personal examination of the complainant in a
criminal case and his witnesses was
required. Thus, under Section 4, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Court before its
amendment, the ―investigating fiscal‖ was
33
 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
required to ―certify under oath that he, or as
shown by the record, an authorized officer,
has personally examined the complainant and
his witnesses . . . ‖
By respondent‘s delegation of the examination
of the sheriff-complainant in the grave threats
case to the stenographer, and worse, by allowing
the witnesses to ―read/study the written
questions‖ to be propounded to them and
to ―write their answers thereto‖ upon
respondent‘s justification that the scheme was
for the convenience of the stenographers,
respondent betrayed her lack of knowledge of
procedure, thereby contributing to the erosion
of public confidence in the judicial system.
SEC v. INTERPORT RESOURCES CO.
G.R. No. 1 35808; October 6, 2008
TOPIC: Permissible Delegation
FACTS: The Board of Directors of IRC
approved a Memorandum of Agreement with
Ganda Holdings Berhad, saying that a press
release announcing the approval of the
agreement was sent through facsimile
transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange
and the SEC, but SEC averred that it received
reports that IRC failed to make timely public
disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and
that some of its directors, respondents herein,
heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material
insider information. For this reason, SEC
required all principal officers of IRC to appear
before the SEC to explain its failure to
immediately disclose the information as
required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material
Facts. Unsatisfied with the explanation, SEC
issued an order finding that the IRC violated the
Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts and that
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some of the officers and directors of IRC
entered into transactions involving IRC shares
in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section
36, of the Revised Securities Act. IRC alleged
that the SEC had no authority to investigate the
subject matter, since under Section 8 of PD No.
902-A, as amended by PD No. 1758,
jurisdiction was conferred upon the Prosecution
and Enforcement Department of the SEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not PED of the SEC is
authorized to file a suit against IRC for
violations of the Revised Security Act.
RULING: The law creating PED empowers it
to investigate violations of the rules and
regulations promulgated by the SEC and to file
and prosecute such cases. It fails to mention
any adjudicatory functions insofar as the PED is
concerned. Thus, the PED Rules of Practice
and Procedure need not comply with the
provisions of the Administrative Code on
adjudication. Even assuming that these are
adjudicative functions, the PED, in the instant
case, exercised its investigative powers; thus,
respondents do not have the requisite standing
to assail the validity of the rules on adjudication.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
570 SCRA 354 (2008)
TOPIC: Permisible Delegation
FACTS: Before the Court are 3 consolidated
petitions assailing the constitutionality of
Section 36 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as
it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor‘s office with certain
offenses. According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a
senator of the RP and a candidate for re-
election in May 2004 elections, said mandatory
drug testing imposes an additional qualification
for Senators beyond that which are provided by
the Constitution. No provision in the
Constitution authorizes the Congress or the
COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution
authorizes the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
RULING: Section 36(g) of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and
has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law
to which all laws must conform; no act shall be
valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but
to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed. The substantive constitutional
limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights
and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution prescribing the qualifications
of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the
guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator
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to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Beltran v. Secretary of Health
G.R. No. 133640; November 25, 2005
Topic: Delegation to Administrative Bodies
Facts: Republic Act No. 7719 or the National
Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into
law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and by regulating
blood banks in the country. Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law
was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the
Department of Health (DOH). Section 23 of
Administrative Order No. 9 provides: ―Section
23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The
Department shall effect the phasing-out of all
commercial blood banks over a period of two
(2) years, extendible for a maximum period of
two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719.
The decision to extend shall be based on the
result of a careful study and review of the blood
supply and demand and public safety.‖
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the
questioned legal provisions, namely, Section 7
of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on
the following ground that the questioned
provisions of the National Blood Services Act and
its Implementing Rules represent undue delegation
if not outright abdication of the police power of
the state.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Issue: Whether or not RA 7719 is
unconstitutional on the ground that it is an
improper and unwarranted delegation of
legislative power.
Held: No. The Court UPHELD THE
VALIDITY of the Act. In testing whether a
statute constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms
and provisions when it left the hands of the
Legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of the administrative body or any
other appointee or delegate of the
Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that
may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by
executive officers and administrative boards, an
act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay
down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated
to it. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National
Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself.
It is clear from the provisions of the Act that
the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard
the health of the people and has mandated
several measures to attain this objective. One of
these is the phase out of commercial blood
banks in the country. The law has sufficiently
provided a definite standard for the guidance of
the Secretary of Health in carrying out its
provisions, that is, the promotion of public
health by providing a safe and adequate supply
of blood through voluntary blood donation. By
its provisions, it has conferred the power and
authority to the Secretary of Health as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.
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Tondo Medical v. CA
G.R. No. 1 67324; July 17, 2007
Topic: Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency
Facts: Then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
―Redirecting the Functions and Operations of
the Department of Health,‖ which provided for
the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. In view
of the functional and operational redirection in
the DOH, and to effect efficiency and
effectiveness in its activities, the Department
shall prepare a Rationalization and Streamlining
Plan (RSP) which shall be the basis of the
intended changes. Petitioners contend that the
Office of the President should have issued an
administrative order to carry out the
streamlining, but that it failed to do so.
Issue: Whether or not an administrative order
issued by the President is needed to carry out
the RSP.
Held: No. Such objection cannot be given any
weight considering that the acts of the DOH
Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are
presumed to be the acts of the President. The
members of the Cabinet are subject at all times
to the disposition of the President since they are
merely his alter egos. Thus, their acts,
performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved by
the President, presumptively acts of the
President. Significantly, the acts of the DOH
Secretary were clearly authorized by the
President, who, thru the PCEG, issued the
aforementioned Memorandum Circular No. 62,
sanctioning the implementation of the RSP.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency,
department secretaries are alter egos or assistants of
the President and their acts are presumed to be those of
the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him.
Anak v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 166052; August 29, 2007
Topic: On Reorganizatioon of
Administrative Bodies
Facts: Then President Arroyo issued EO 364
transforming of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) into the Department of Land
Reform (DLR).
Section 2 of EO 364 provide: the PCUP
(Presidential Commission [for] the Urban
Poor) is hereby placed under the supervision
and control of the Department of Land
Reform. The Chairman of the PCUP shall be
ex-officio Undersecretary of the Department of
Land Reform for Urban Land Reform.
A month later, EO 379 amended EO 364.
Section 3 of EO 379 provide: the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
shall be an attached agency of the Department
of Land Reform.
AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and
NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be
transformed, merged or attached by statutes,
not by mere executive orders.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the transformation of the
DAR into DLR is valid.
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2. Whether or not the placing the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under
the supervision and control of the DAR, and
the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) under the DAR as an attached
agency are valid.
Held:
1. The issue on the transformation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) into
the Department of Land Reform (DLR) became
moot and academic, however, the department
having reverted to its former name by virtue of
E.O. No. 456 which was issued on August 23,
2005.
2. Yes. It is not disputed that PCUP and NCIP
were formed as agencies under the Office of the
President. As thus provided by law, the
President may transfer any agency under the
Office of the President to any other department
or agency, subject to the policy in the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency. Gauged against these
guidelines, the challenged executive orders may
not be said to have been issued with grave
abuse of discretion or in violation of the rule of
law.
The characterization of the NCIP as
an independent agency under the Office of the
President does not remove said body from the
President‘s control and supervision with respect
to its performance of administrative functions.
Agencies under the Office of the President
The “Agencies under the Office of the President” refer to
those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control of the
President, those under the administrative supervision of
the Office of the President, those attached to the Office
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
for policy and program coordination, and those that are
not placed by law or order creating them under any
special department.
Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association
of the Philippines v. Duque III
GR No. 173034; October 9, 2007
Topic: On Implementing Agencies
Facts: Petitioners seek to nullify Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known
as The “Milk Code,” Relevant International
Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof,
and for Other Purposes (RIRR) for allegedly
going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code,
thereby amending and expanding the coverage
of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the
RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but
also various international instruments regarding
infant and young child nutrition.
Petitioners contend that
respondent officers of the DOH acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions
of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR.
Issue: Whether or not the DOH acted with
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the
RIRR.
Held: Since legislation is necessary to transform
the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into
domestic law. The provisions of the WHA
Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the
law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law
enacted by the legislature. Thus, only the
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provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of
subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly
implemented by the DOH through the subject
RIRR.
Jose Jesus Disini v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 203335; February 11, 2014
Topic: On Delegation of Legislative Power
Facts: Petitioners seek to declare several
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The
CICC shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan
and extend immediate assistance of real time
commission of cybercrime offenses through a
computer emergency response team (CERT); x
x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that
Congress invalidly delegated its power when it
gave the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to
formulate a national cybersecurity plan without
any sufficient standards or parameters for it to
follow.
Issue: Whether or not the Congress invalidly
delegated its power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC) the power to formulate a
national cybersecurity plan without any
sufficient standards or parameters for it to
follow.
Held: No. The cybercrime law is complete in
itself when it directed the CICC to formulate
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
and implement a national cybersecurity plan.
Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners,
the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC
to follow when it provided a definition of
cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools,
policies, risk management approaches, actions,
training, best practices, assurance and
technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and user‘s assets.
This definition serves as the parameters within
which CICC should work in formulating the
cybersecurity plan.
James Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa
GR No. 204819; April 8, 2014
Topic: On Delegation of Legislative Power
Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on
December 21, 2012.
The petitioners question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether or not a supply or product is
to be included in the Essential Drugs List
(EDL).
Issue: Whether or not the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether or not a supply or product is
to be included in the Essential Drugs List
(EDL) is valid.
Held: Yes. The delegation is valid. The Court
finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The
FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover
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health services and methods. It is the only
government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should
be understood that health services and methods
fall under the gamut of terms that are associated
with what is ordinarily understood as "health
products." the functions, powers and duties of
the FDA are specific to enable the agency to
carry out the mandates of the law. Being the
country's premiere and sole agency that ensures
the safety of food and medicines available to the
public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it
effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the
FDA to ensure public health and safety by
permitting only food and medicines that are safe
includes "service" and "methods." From the
declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that
Congress intended that the public be given only
those medicines that are proven medically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards.
TESTS OF DELEGATION
Gerochi v. DOE
GR No. 159796; July 17, 2007
Topic: Tests of Delegation
Facts: Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong
Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist
Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners),
come before this Court in this original action
praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA)
9136, otherwise known as the ―Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001‖ (EPIRA),
imposing the Universal Charge, and Rule 18 of
the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks to
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER

implement the said imposition, be declared adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
unconstitutional. determine the boundaries of the delegate's
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of authority and prevent the delegation from
a provision of the law and its IRR which sought running riot.
to implement the same on the ground that the The Court finds that the EPIRA, read
universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec.
the EPIRA and sought to be implemented 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms
under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
is a tax which is to be collected from all electric standards.
end-users and self-generating entities. The Moreover, contrary to the petitioners‘
power to tax is strictly a legislative function and contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide
as such, the delegation of said power to any latitude of discretion in the determination of the
executive or administrative agency like the ERC Universal Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the
is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited EPIRA clearly provides:
authority. The assailed provision clearly
provides that the Universal Charge is to be SECTION 51. Powers. — The
determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, PSALM Corp. shall, in the
hence leaving to the latter complete performance of its functions and
discretionary legislative authority. for the attainment of its
objective, have the following
Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation powers:
of legislative power to tax on the part of the xxxx
ERC. (d) To calculate the amount of
the stranded debts and stranded
Held: No. There is no undue delegation in the contract costs of NPC
case. which shall form the basis for
ERC in the determination of
All that is required for the valid exercise the universal charge;
of this power of subordinate legislation is that (e) To liquidate the NPC
the regulation be germane to the objects and stranded contract costs,
purposes of the law and that the regulation be utilizing the proceeds from
not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, sales and other property
the standards prescribed by the law. These contributed to it, including
requirements are denominated as the the proceeds from the
completeness test and the sufficient standard universal charge.
test. Thus, the law is complete and passes the
Under the first test, the law must be first test for valid delegation of legislative power.
complete in all its terms and conditions when it As to the second test, this Court had, in
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate
to enforce it. The second test mandates and efficient instruction;" "public interest;"

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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
"justice and equity;" "public convenience and
welfare;" "simplicity, economy and
efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of
medical education;" and "fair and equitable
employment practices." Provisions of the
EPIRA such as, among others, ―to ensure the
total electrification of the country and the
quality, reliability, security and affordability of
the supply of electric power‖ and ―watershed
rehabilitation and management‖ meet the
requirements for valid delegation, as they
provide the limitations on the ERC‘s power to
formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards.
Abakada v. Ermita
GR No. 168056; September 1, 2005
Topic: Tests of Delegation
Facts: Mounting budget deficit, revenue
generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for
education, increased emoluments for health
workers, and wider coverage for full value-
added tax benefits … these are the reasons why
Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was
enacted.
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party
List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et
al. contend in common that Sections 4, 5 and 6
of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107
and 108, respectively, of the NIRC giving the
President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT
rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition
is met, constitutes undue delegation of the
legislative power to tax.
Issue: Whether or not the stand by authority
given to the president to raise the VAT rate
from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is
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met, constitutes undue delegation of the
legislative power to tax.
Held: No. The case before the Court is not a
delegation of legislative power. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increase
rate under the law is contingent. The legislature
has made the operation of the 12% rate
effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire
operation or non-operation of the 12% rate
upon factual matters outside of the control of
the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the
President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion is the fact that the word shall is used
in the common proviso. The use of the
word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use
in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and
is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it
must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and
courts have no choice but to see to it that the
mandate is obeyed.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President
to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by
Congress. This is a duty which cannot be
evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law
specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of
discretion by the President does not come into
play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12%
VAT rate when the specified conditions are
present. The time of taking into effect of the
12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a
certain specified contingency, or upon the
ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a
person or body other than the legislature itself.
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TESTS OF DELEGATION
COMPLETENESS TEST- the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is
to enforce it.
SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST-
mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.
Purely legislative power, which can
never be delegated, has been described as
the authority to make a complete law –
complete as to the time when it shall take
effect and as to whom it shall be applicable
– and to determine the expediency of its
enactment.
The general rule barring delegation of
legislative powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations or exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the
President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of
the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the
President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of
the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Abakada v. Purisima
GR No. 166715; August 14, 2008
Topic: Tests of Delegation
Facts: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
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Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board).
Petitioners assert that the law unduly
delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that
matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may be
dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least
7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the
revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the
fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to
the President without sufficient standards. It
will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to
dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Issue: Whether or not the fixing of revenue
targets has been delegated to the President
without sufficient standards.
Held: No. The law provides for sufficient
standards in its delegation to the President.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy
and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies
in carrying out the provisions of the law.
Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the
policy of the State to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a
system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and
a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
the above agencies for the purpose of
encouraging their officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets.
Revenue targets are based on the
original estimated revenue collection expected
respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given
fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated
in the BESF submitted by the President to
Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue
targets does not rest solely on the President as it
also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies
the limits of the Board‘s authority and identifies
the conditions under which officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short
of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed
from the service.
At any rate, this Court has recognized
the following as sufficient standards: ―public
interest,‖ ―justice and equity,‖ ―public
convenience and welfare‖ and ―simplicity,
economy and welfare.‖ In this case, the declared
policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC is infused with public interest.
G. LEGISLATIVE
Aquilino Pimentel vs. Commission on
Elections
G.R. No. 161658 (November 3, 2008)
TOPIC: Composition, Qualification, Term
FACTS: On December 23, 2003, Terafe
Commission on Elections issued Resolution
No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations
on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
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public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local
elections. Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel a senator
of the Republic and a candidate for re-election
in the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 6486 is
unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. COMELEC cannot, in the guise
of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator
to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
ALDABA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R No. 188078 (January 25, 2010)
Topic: Legislative District
FACTS: Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.)
9591, to amend Section 57 of R.A. 8754, the
charter of the City of Malolos, making the city a
separate district from the existing first
legislative district of Bulacan. Petitioners filed
the present action, assailing the constitutionality
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
of R.A. 9591 pointing out that the law failed to
comply with the requirement of Section 5(4),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that a city
must have a population of at least 250,000; (2)
that the creation of a separate district amounts
to a conversion and requires the conduct of
a plebiscite; and (3) that the law violates Section
5(3), Article VI which provides that each district
shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.
ISSUE: RA 9591 unconstitutional for
being violative of Section5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987Constitution.
RULING: Yes RA 9591 is unconstitutional for
being violative of Section5 (3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda,
which is based on demographic projections, is
without legal effect because Regional Director
Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue
the Certification. The Certification is also void
on its face because based on its own growth rate
assumption; the population of Malolos will be
less than 250,000 in the year 2010.
BAGABUYO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176970 (December 8, 2008)
TOPIC: Plebiscite
FACTS: Cagayan de Oro Congressman
Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative
districts in Cagayan deOro since CdO had only
one legislative districts. The law was passed (RA
9371) hence two legislative districts were
created. Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the
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said law and he went immediately to the
Supreme Court. He was contending that the
2nd district was created without a plebiscite
which was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required
in order to create a legislative district.
RULING: No. A plebiscite is not required in the
case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the
House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established
under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this
case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371
did not bring about any change in Cagayan de
Oro‘s territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190852 (April 8, 2010)
TOPIC: Party-list Organization
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari with
an application for preliminary injunction against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Election‘s refusal
to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization
under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act. Ang Ladlad is
an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs) that are
marginalized and under-represented sector that is
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity. Incorporated in
2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with
the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership base.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner should be
accredited as a party-list organization under RA
7941.
RULING: Yes. The enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with
the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated
its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. 1987 Constitution provides in
Article III, Section 5 that ―no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.‖ At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls
for is ―government neutrality in religious
matters. Clearly, ―governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.‖Laws of general application
should apply with equal force to LGBTs and
they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized
and under-represented sectors. The principle of
non-discrimination requires the laws of general
application relating to elections be applied to all
persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
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Trillanes vs. Pimentel, Sr.
G.R. No. 179817 (June 27, 2008)
Topic: Privilege to Attend Official Functions
FACTS: Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for
coup d‘etat in relation to the ―Oakwood
Incident.‖ when he won a seat in the Senate
with a six-year term commencing at noon on
June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court
that he be allowed to attend all official functions
of the Senate.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner be allowed
to attend all official functions of the Senate
RULING: No, Emergency or compelling
temporary leaves from imprisonment is allowed
to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders. That this
discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed
to establish. In fact, the trial court previously
allowed petitioner to register as a voter in
December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy
in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007,
be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath
of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming
attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial
court lest it be accused of taking a complete
turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these
prior grants to him and insists on unending
concessions and blanket authorizations.
Limkaichong v. COMELEC
583 SCRA 1; April 1, 2009
Topic: Electoral Tribunal
Facts: Jocelyn Limkaichong filed a Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of Representative
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
of First Distict of Negros Occidental. Petitions
for her disqualification were instituted alleging
that she lacked the citizenship requirement.
Limkaichong, however, emerged as the winner
pending the disqualification case. A Very Urgent
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Suspend
the Proclamation of Limkaichong was filed.
COMELEC 2nd Division granted the petitions
in the disqualification cases and disqualified
Limkaichong and directed Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend her
proclamation. However, COMELEC en banc
issued a resolution adopting the policy-
guidelines of not suspending the proclamation
of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases. PBOC, in compliance
with the resolution, proclaimed Limkaichong.
COMELEC later on issued a resolution
declaring Limkaichong as a disqualified
congressional candidate.
Louis Biraogo, as a citizen, contended that
COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion
for still acting upon Limkaichong‘s
manifestation and motion.
Issue: Whether or not upon Limkaichong's
proclamation, the HRET, instead of the
COMELEC, should assume jurisdiction over
the disqualification cases.
Ruling: Yes. Once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then
that the proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his
qualification should now present his case in a
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proper proceeding before the HRET. This is
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution which states that ―The Senate and
the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members‖
Señeres v. COMELEC
585 SCRA 557; April 16, 2009
Topic: Electoral Tribunal
Facts: Hans Christian Señeres, holding himself
up as acting president and secretary-general of
Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY) filed a
Certificate of Nomination with the COMELEC.
This is prior private respondent and elected
President Melquiades Robles‘ filing of the same
certificate. Señeres filed a petition to deny
Robles‘ certificates of nomination alleging that
the latter has no authority because he was the
acting president and secretary-general of
BUHAY. National Council of BUHAY expelled
Señeres. BUHAY was proclaimed winner in the
May 2007 election and COMELEC issued a
resolution (E.M. 07-043) recognizing and
declaring Robles as the president of BUHAY.
Señeres then filed the petition for certiorari
alleging that COMELEC acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing E.M. 07-043.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for certiorari is
a proper remedy for Señeres
Ruling: No. A special civil action for certiorari
may be availed of when the tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of
46
 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the purpose of annulling the
proceeding. Since at the time Señeres filed this
petition, nominees had taken their oath and
already assumed their officed in the House of
Representatives, the proper recourse would
have been to file a petition for quo warranto
before the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
Amores v. HRET
622 SCRA 593; June 29, 2010
Topic: Electoral Tribunal
Facts: Milagros Amores seeks for the ouster of
Emmanuel Villanueva as representative of
Citizen‘s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in
the House of Representatives alleging that the
latter assumed office without formal
proclamation issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), was disqualified to be a
nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC for
being beyond the age limit, and his change of
affiliation from CIBAC‘s youth sector to its
OFW and their families sector was not in
conformity with Section 15 of R.A. 7941. The
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) dismissed petitioner‘s claims. It also
found the petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period of 10 days from private
respondent‘s proclamation issued in NBC
Resolution No. 07-60.
Issue: Whether or not HRET committed grave
abuse for dismissing petitioner‘s petition for
being filed out of time.
Ruling: Yes. HRET erroneously counted the
10-day reglementary period provided in its
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Rules from the issuance of NBC Resolution No.
07-60. The NBC Resolution partially
proclaimed CIBAC as a winner but was not a
proclamation of the private respondent
himself. Alternatively, since petitioner‘s
challenge goes into private respondent‘s
qualifications, it may be filed at any time during
his term.
Lokin Jr. v. COMELEC
621 SCRA 385; June 22, 2010
Topic: Electoral Tribunal
Facts: The Citizens‘ Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), a registered party-list organization
during 2007 elections, submitted their list of
five nominees. However, the list was amended
and some nominees, including petitioner Luis
Lokin Jr., were substituted. In E.M. No. 07-54,
COMELEC en banc approved the withdrawal of
the substituted nominees. Lokin argued that Sec.
13 of Resolution No. 7804 issued by
COMELEC expanded the grounds for
substitution of nominees. COMELEC in its
comment said that Lokin‘s protest must be filed
in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Court therefore has
no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by
him
Issue: Whether or not HRET has jurisdiction
over the case.
Ruling: No. Lokin‘s case is neither an election
protest nor an action for quo warranto for it to be
covered by HRET‘s jurisdiction. The special
civil action for certiorari against COMELEC to
review the latter‘s resolution was the proper
action for Lokin‘s peculiar situation. Rule 64 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
47
 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
the mode of review of the judgments, final
orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and
the Commission on Audit is by a petition for
certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed
in the Supreme Court within a limited period of
30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin‘s petitions
for certiorari and for mandamus against the
COMELEC.
Abayon v. HRET
612 SCRA 275; February 11, 2010
Topic: Electoral Tribunal
Facts: Daryl Grace Abayon is the first nominee
of the Aangat Tayo party-list that won a seat in
the House of Representatives during the 2007
elections. Respondents, as registered voters,
argued that Aangat Tayo was not an eligible
party-list because it did not represent the
marginalized and the underrepresented sectors
and that Abayon herself was not qualified
because she did not belong to the said sector
and she lost her bid as a party-list representative
in the immediately preceding election.
Abayon countered that COMELEC already
confirmed the status of Aangat tayo as an
eligible party-list organization. Furthermore, she
pointed out that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has no jurisdiction
over the issue of Aangat Tayo‘s qualification as
well as her eligibility. These matters should be
within the jurisdiction of COMELEC.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET has the
authority to pass upon the eligibilities of the
nominees of the party-list groups that won seats
in the lower house of Congress.
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Ruling: Yes. Sec. 5, Art. VI of the Constitution
and the Party-list System Act both recognize
party-list nominees as ―members of the House
of Representatives‖. It is the party-list
representatives who are ―elected‖ into office,
not their parties or organization.
Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides
that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the qualifications of the
members of the HR. Since party-list nominees
are members of the HR, the HRET has the
jurisdiction to pass upon their qualifications.
ABC Party List v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193256; March 22, 2011
Topic: Electoral Tribunal
Facts: A petition was filed for the cancellation
of registration and accreditation of ABC
(Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party-List as it
was allegedly a front for a religious organization,
a violation of R.A. 7941 (Party-list System Act).
COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed this petition.
However, COMELEC en banc partially granted
the motion for reconsideration and directed the
Commission Secretary to schedule a hearing.
Petitioner contended that COMELEC en banc
has no more jurisdiction to entertain the
petition for cancellation of registration and
accreditation since ABC was already proclaimed
as winner. Invoking Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution which provides that the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
shall be the sole judge of all electoral contests,
the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction to
pass upon its qualification.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET should have
the jurisdiction of the case.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Ruling: No. The jurisdiction of the
COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of
registration of any political party, organization
or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA v.
COMELEC
523 SCRA 1; May 4, 2007
Topic: Electoral Tribunal
Facts: Commission on Elections issued
Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the filing of manifestation
of intent to participate and submission of names
of nominees under the party-list system of
representation in connection with the May 14,
2007 elections. A number of organized groups
filed their manifestations and were subsequently
accredited by COMELEC.
Petitioners argued that COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
accreditation without simultaneously
determining the qualifications of their nominees.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion
Ruling: No. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7804 is there
a requirement that the qualification of the party-
list nominees be determined simultaneously
with the accreditation of the organization.
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Dueñas v. HRET
593 SCRA 316; July 21, 2009
Topic: Electoral Tribunal
Facts: Henry Dueñas and Angelito Reyes were
rival candidates for the position of congressman
in Taguig City in which the former won. Reyes
prayed for a recount alleging that there where
anomalies which resulted in the reduction of his
votes. Petitioner Dueñas also counter-protested
that there is miscounting in some precincts
resulting in the reduction of his votes. HRET
thereafer directed the revision of ballots in
100% of the protested precincts and 25% pilot
of the counter-protested precincts. HRET
directed the continuation of the revision and
appreciation of the remaining 75% of the
counter-protested precincts pursuant to Rule 88
of the HRET Rules. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but HRET denied his motion,
invoking Rule 88 of the HRET rules which
states that it had the discretion either to dismiss
the protest/ counter-protest or continue with
the revision if necessary. Furthermore, it could
not determine the true will of the electorate on
the basis alone of the initial revision of the
100% protested precincts and the 25% counter-
protested precincts, it had no other recourse but
to continue the revision and appreciation of all
the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
Petitioner argued that HRET committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the continuation
of the revision of ballots in the remaining
unrevised precincts as its acts amounted to
giving private respondent the undeserved
chance to prevail by assisting him in his search
for evidence to support his case.
49

Issue: Whether or not the HRET committed
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction
Ruling: No. Rule 88 of the HRET Rules states
HRET could continue or discontinue the
revision proceedings ex propio motu, that is, of its
own accord. The only requisite is its own
determination that the evidence presented could
affect the officially proclaimed results.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY-LIST
PURISIMA
562 SCRA 251 (2008)
TOPIC: Legislative Power
FACTS: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC. This is to encourage its
officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives FUND and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board, sourced from the collection
of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
revenue targets for the year.
Invoking their rights as taxpayers, petitioners
challenged the constitutionality of RA 9335,
contending that the system invites corruption
and undermines the constitutionally mandated
duty of these officials and employees to serve
the people with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency since they will do their
best only in consideration of such rewards.
Also, the creation of a congressional oversight
committee was assailed on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers
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POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
because it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
Respondent countered that the creation of the
congressional oversight committee enhances
separation of powers. It ensures the fulfilment
of the legislative policy and serves as a check to
any over-accumulation of power on the part of
the executive and the implementing agencies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the congressional
oversight violates the separation of powers.
v.
RULING: No. The power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by Congress
to enhance its understanding of and influence
over the implementation of legislation it has
enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
enactment measures undertaken by Congress:
(a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity
with the congressional perception of public
interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be
intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself
and integral to the checks and balances inherent
in a democratic system of government.
JAMES IMBONG v. HON. OCHOA
Gr No. 204819; April 8, 2014
TOPIC: Approval of the Bill
FACTS: RA No. 10354, ―Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012‖ was enacted by Congress. Shortly after
50
 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
the President approved the bill, challengers
from various sectors of society came knocking
on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield
the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience.
Petitioners contend that RH Law violates the
one subject/one bill rule provision under
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution on
the ground that being one for reproductive
health with responsible parenthood, the
legislation violates the constitutional standards
of due process by concealing its true intent - to
act as a population control measure.
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist
that the RH Law is not a birth or population
control measure, and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive
health" are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.
ISSUE: Whether or not RH Law violates the
one subject/one bill rule provision under
Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
RULING: The RH Law does not violate the
one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep.
Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one
subject" rule does not require the Congress
to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope
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and consequences of the proposed law and
its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule "so as not
to cripple or impede legislation."
In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population
growth.
Considering the close intimacy between
"reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" which bears to the attainment of
the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to
the contents of the assailed legislation.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v.
ERMITA
469 SCRA 1 (2005)
TOPIC: Approval of the Bill
FACTS: RA 9337 ―VAT Reform Act‖ was
signed into law by the President. But before the
law took effect, ABAKADA GURO Party List,
et al., filed a petition for prohibition, questioning
the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
R.A. No. 9337 having common proviso
authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%, subject to
conditions:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a
percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds 2 4/5%;
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(ii) National government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds 1½%‖
Petitioners allege the grant of stand-
by authority to the President on the ground that
it is an undue delegation of legislative power,
that the increase in the VAT rate to 12%
contingent on any of the two conditions being
satisfied violates the due process clause
embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and
additional tax burden on the people.
Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of
a stand-by authority granted to the President by
the Bicameral Conference Committee is a
violation of the ―no-amendment rule‖ laid
down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 9337
violates the following provisions of the
Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
RULING: No. Under the provisions of both
the Rules of the House of Representatives and
Senate Rules, the Bicameral Conference
Committee is mandated to settle the differences
between the disagreeing provisions in the
House bill and the Senate bill. The term ―settle‖
is synonymous to ―reconcile‖ and ―harmonize.‖
In the present case, the changes introduced by
the Bicameral Conference Committee on
disagreeing provisions were meant only to
reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing
provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent
that is wholly foreign to the subject embraced
by the original provisions.
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No. The Court reiterates here that the ―no-
amendment rule‖ refers only to the procedure
to be followed by each house of Congress with
regard to bills initiated in each of said respective
houses, before said bill is transmitted to the
other house for its concurrence or
amendment. Verily, to construe said provision
in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a
bill after one house has voted on it would lead
to absurdity as this would mean that the other
house of Congress would be deprived of its
constitutional power to amend or introduce
changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2)
of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean
that the introduction by the Bicameral
Conference Committee of amendments and
modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills
that have been acted upon by both houses of
Congress is prohibited.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ERMITA
495 SCRA 170 (2006)
TOPIC: Legislative Inquiries
FACTS: Scandals concerning anomalous
transactions of the North Rail Project and the
Garci tapes arose in 2005. The Senate was then
prompted to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the
alleged overpricing in the NRP.
The Senate Committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials
to speak before the committee as resource
persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of
the department heads cannot attend the
said hearing due to pressing matters that need
immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga
likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate
president, accepted the said requests for they
52
 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
were sent belatedly and arrangements were
already made and scheduled. Subsequently,
GMA issued EO 464, which prohibits officials
and such other officers as may be determined
by the President, who are covered by the
executive privilege, from appearing in such
hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president‘s approval.
The department heads and the military officers
who were invited by the Committee then
invoked EO 464. The
scheduled hearing proceeded even if only 2
military personnel attended. For defying
President Arroyo‘s order barring military
personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from
their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings.
EO 464‘s constitutionality was questioned on
the ground that it infringes on the rights and
duties of Congress to conduct investigation in
aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the
power of inquiry vested in Congress.
RULING: E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars
the appearance of executive officials before
Congress, deprives Congress of the information
in the possession of these officials. To resolve
the question of whether such withholding of
information violates the Constitution,
consideration of the general power of Congress
to obtain information, otherwise known as the
power of inquiry, is in order.
―Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly INVESTING either
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House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end
that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry –
with process to enforce it – is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and
where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to
others who do possess it. Experience has
shown that mere requests for such information
are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed.‖
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigations
GR No. 180643; March 25, 2008
Topic: Legislative Inquiries
Facts: Petitioner testified before respondent
Committees in an investigation on the NBN
Project. He disclosed that then Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin
Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what
they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking
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―executive privilege‖. In particular, he refused
to answer the questions on
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed
up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued
a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner,
requiring him to appear and testify. However,
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
requested respondent Committees to dispense
with petitioner‘s testimony on the ground
of executive privilege. Petitioner did not
appear before respondent Committees, thus the
latter issued the show cause Letter requiring
him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt. Petitioner replied to respondent
Committees, manifesting that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that
he thought the only remaining questions were
those he claimed to be covered by executive
privilege. Respondent Committees found
petitioner‘s explanations unsatisfactory, hence
they issued the Order citing him in contempt of
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest
and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony. Petitioner
contends that respondent Committees‘ show
cause Letter and
contempt Order were issued with grave abus
e of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Executive Privilege was
properly invoked.
2. Whether or not Senate Committees gravely
abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of
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petitioner for non-compliance with the
subpoena?
Held:
1. Yes. The three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications relate to
a ―quintessential and non-delegable power‖ of
the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are ―received‖ by a close
advisor of the President. Under the ―operational
proximity‖ test, petitioner can be considered a
close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyo‘s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
2. Yes. Respondent Committees did not comply
with the requirement laid down in Senate v.
Ermita that the invitations should contain the
―possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry,‖ along with ―the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and
the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof.‖ Compliance with this requirement is
imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of
Article VI of the Constitution. This must be so
to ensure that the rights of both
persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiry are respected as mandated by said
Section 21 and by virtue of the express language
of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite
petitioner‘s repeated demands, respondent
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Committees did not send him an advance list of
questions.
The phrase ‗duly published rules of
procedure‘ requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation because
every Senate is distinct from the one before it or
after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every
three (3) years for one-half of the Senate‘s
membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate
may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published its Rules of
Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm.
Garcillano v. House of Representatives
Committee on Accountability of Public
Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information
and Communications Technology and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
GR No. 170338; December 28, 2003
Topic: Legislative Inquiries
Facts: The tapes, notoriously referred to as the
―Hello Garci‖ tapes, allegedly contained the
President‘s instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate
in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the
subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of
Congress. After prolonged and impassioned
debate by the committee members on the
admissibility and authenticity of the recordings,
the tapes were eventually played in the
chambers of the House. Petitioner Virgilio O.
Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a
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Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction that the
respondent House Committees be restrained
from using these tape recordings of the ―illegally
obtained‖ wiretapped conversations in their
committee reports and for any other purpose.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents should
be prohibited from playing the tape recordings
on the ground that it is in violation of R.A. No.
4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.
Held: The Court dismissed the petition for
being moot and academic because the
recordings were already played and there is also
the widely publicized fact that the committee
reports on the ―Hello Garci‖ inquiry were
completed and submitted to the House in
plenary by the respondent committees. Having
been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano
petition has to be dismissed for being moot and
academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive
remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to
be done, and not intended to provide a remedy
for an act already accomplished.
_____________________________________
Philcomsat Holdings Corp. v. Senate
GR No. 180308; June 19, 2012
Topic: Legislative Inquiry
Facts: Committee Report No. 312
recommended, inter alia, the privatization and
transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of
the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT
to the Privatization Management Office (PMO)
under the Department of Finance (DOF) and
the replacement of government nominees as
directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT in view
of the losses that the government continued to
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incur and in order to protect its interests in
POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. Petitioner
seeks to enjoin the implementation of and
nullify Committee Report No. 312 for allegedly
having been approved by respondent Senate of
the Republic of the Philippines (respondent
Senate) with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,
questioning, in particular, the haste with which
the respondent Senate approved the challenged
Committee Report No. 312.
Issue: Whether or not Committee Report No.
312 should be nullified, having proposed no
piece of legislation and having been hastily
approved by the respondent Senate.
Held: No. ―The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.‖ The Court explained that such
conferral of the legislative power of inquiry
upon any committee of Congress, in this case
the respondents Senate Committees, must carry
with it all powers necessary and proper for its
effective discharge.
On this score, the respondents Senate
Committees cannot be said to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted
Committee Resolution No. 312, given its
constitutional mandate to conduct legislative
inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be
faulted for doing so on the very same day that
the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide
latitude given to Congress with respect to these
legislative inquiries has long been settled,
otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be
rendered pointless.
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______________________________
De La Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations
GR No. 184849; February 13, 2009
Topic: Legislative Inquiry
Facts: Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the
local authorities at the Moscow airport
departure area for failure to declare in written
form the 105,000 euros
[approximately P6,930,000.00] found in his
luggage. In addition, he was also found to have
in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly
equivalent to P2,970,000.00). Petitioners were
detained in Moscow for questioning. After a
few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the PNP
delegation were allowed to return to
the Philippines, but the Russian government
confiscated the euros. Gen. Dela Paz arrived
in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz.
Awaiting them were subpoenae earlier issued by
respondent Committee for the investigation it
was to conduct on the Moscow incident.
Respondent Committee held its first
hearing. Instead of attending the hearing,
petitioners filed with respondent Committee a
pleading denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with
Motion to Quash Subpoena. Petitioners argue that
respondent Committee is devoid of any
jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident
as the matter does not involve state to state
relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section
13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
(Senate Rules). They further claim that
respondent Committee violated the same Senate
Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest
without the required signatures of the majority
of the members of respondent
Committee. They likewise assail the very same
Senate Rules because the same were not
published as required by the Constitution, and
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
thus, cannot be used as the basis of any
investigation involving them relative to
the Moscow incident.
Issue: Whether or not the Committee has
jurisdiction over the incident.
Held: Yes. Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution states:“Each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision
has been traditionally construed as a grant of
full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. As such, the
exercise of this power is generally exempt from
judicial supervision and interference, except on
a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute
a denial of due process. The challenge to the
jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee partakes of the nature of a political
question that, in Tañada v. Cuenco, was
characterized as a question which, under the
Constitution, is to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. Further, pursuant to this
constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted
authority to determine its own rules, the Senate
is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any
time it may see fit, subject only to the
imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.
Sabio v. Gordon
GR No. 174340; October 17, 2006
Topic: Legislative Inquiry
Facts: Former President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, creating
the Presidential Commission on Good
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Government (PCGG). Section 4 (b) of E.O. No.
1 provides that: ―No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.‖
Apparently, the purpose is to
ensure PCGG‘s unhampered performance of its
task.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 4 (b) EO No. 1 is
constitutional.
Held: No. Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits
such power of legislative inquiry by exempting
all PCGG members or staff from testifying in
any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding.
The Congress‘ power of inquiry has been
recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it
reached our shores through McGrain v.
Daugherty, cited in Arnault v.Nazareno. In those
earlier days, American courts considered the
power of inquiry as inherent in the power to
legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs
v. MacKellar explains the breath and basis of the
power, thus:
Where no constitutional limitation or restriction
exists, it is competent for either of the two
bodies composing the legislature to do, in their
separate capacity, whatever may be
essential to enable them to legislate….It is
well-established principle of this parliamentary
law, that either house may institute any
investigation having reference to its own
organization, the conduct or qualification of its
members, its proceedings, rights, or privileges
or any matter affecting the public interest
upon which it may be important that it
should have exact information, and in
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
respect to which it would be competent for
it to legislate. The right to pass laws,
necessarily implies the right to obtain
information upon any matter which may
become the subject of a law. It is essential
to the full and intelligent exercise of the
legislative function….In American
legislatures the investigation of public
matters before committees, preliminary to
legislation, or with the view of advising the
house appointing the committee is, as a
parliamentary usage, well established as it is
in England, and the right of either house to
compel witnesses to appear and testify before
its committee, and to punish for disobedience
has been frequently enforced….The right of
inquiry, I think, extends to other matters, in
respect to which it may be necessary, or
may be deemed advisable to apply for
legislative aid.
POWER OF TAXATION
GSIS v. City Treasurer of the City of Manila
GR No. 186242; December 23, 2009
Topic: Power of Taxation
Facts: Petitioner GSIS owns or used to own
two (2) parcels of land, one located at Katigbak
25th St., Bonifacio Drive, Manila (Katigbak
property), and the other, at Concepcion cor.
Arroceros Sts., also in Manila (Concepcion-
Arroceros property). Title to the Concepcion-
Arroceros property was transferred to this
Court in 2005 pursuant to Proclamation No.
835 dated April 27, 2005. Both the GSIS and
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Manila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros
property, while the Katigbak property was
under lease.
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The controversy started when the City
Treasurer of Manila addressed a letter to GSIS
President and General Manager Winston F.
Garcia informing him of the unpaid real
property taxes due on the
aforementioned properties for years 1992 to
2002. GSIS argued that both its old and new
charter Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1146, and
present charter, RA 8291 or the GSIS Act of
1997, exempt the agency and its properties from
all forms of taxes and assessments, inclusive of
realty tax.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is exempt
from the payment of real property taxes on the
property it leased to a taxable entity.
Held: No. GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax
exemption. Moreover, as an instrumentality of
the national government, it is itself not liable to
pay real estate taxes assessed by the City
of Manila against its Katigbak and Concepcion-
Arroceros properties. Following the ―beneficial
use‖ rule, however, accrued real property taxes
are due from the Katigbak property, leased as it
is to a taxable entity. But the corresponding
liability for the payment thereof devolves on the
taxable beneficial user. The Katigbak property
cannot in any event be subject of a public
auction sale, notwithstanding its realty tax
delinquency. This means that the City
of Manila has to satisfy its tax claim by serving
the accrued realty tax assessment on MHC, as
the taxable beneficial user of the Katigbak
property and, in case of nonpayment, through
means other than the sale at public auction of
the leased property.
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POWER OF CONCURRENCE
Akbayan Citizen Action Party v. Aquino
GR No. 170516; July 16, 2008
Topic: Limitations on Legislative Inquiry
Facts: While the final text of the JPEPA has
now been made accessible to the public
since September 11, 2006, respondents do not
dispute that, at the time the petition was filed up
to the filing of petitioners‘ Reply – when the
JPEPA was still being negotiated – the initial
drafts thereof were kept from public
view. Petitioners assert that the refusal of the
government to disclose the documents bearing
on the JPEPA negotiations violates their right
to information on matters of public concern
and contravenes other constitutional provisions
on transparency, such as that on the policy of
full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest.
Issue: Whether or not diplomatic negotiations
are covered by the Executive Privilege during
legislative inquiries.
Held: Yes. While the final text of the JPEPA
may not be kept perpetually confidential – since
there should be ―ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved‖ –
the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after
the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to
conclude that the Japanese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding
that ―historic confidentiality‖ would govern
the same. Disclosing these offers could impair
the ability of the Philippines to deal not only
with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
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A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty
negotiations should now be open to public
scrutiny would discourage future Philippine
representatives from frankly expressing their
views during negotiations. While, on first
impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine
representatives from entering into compromises,
it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any
negotiation for that matter, normally involve a
process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes
negotiators have to be willing to grant
concessions in an area of lesser importance
in order to obtain more favorable terms in
an area of greater national interest.
H. PRESIDENCY
MACALINTAL VS PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618 (November 23, 2010)
Topic: Constitutionality of Presidential
Electoral Tribunal
FACTS: Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal filed an
undesignated petition that questions the
constitution of the Presidential Electoral
tribunal, as an illegal and unauthorized progeny
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
wherein PET created a ―separate tribunal
complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a
set of personnel and confidential employees, to
effect the constitutional mandate,
notwithstanding the silence of constitutional
provision.
ISSUE: Whether or not PET is constitutional.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
RULING: Yes. PET is not a separate and
distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it
has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. The
PET was constituted in implementation of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it
faithfully complies not faithfully defies the
constitutional directive. The adoption of a
separate seal, as well as the change in the
nomenclature if the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices into Chairman and Members
of the tribunal was designed simply to highlight
the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal‘s
function as a special electoral court.
MACALINTAL VS PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618 (June 7, 2011)
TOPIC: Constitutionality of Presidential
Electoral Tribunal
FACTS: Petitioner Macalintal in a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision in G.R. No.
19168 declaring PET as constitutional reiterates
that PET is an illegal and unauthorized progeny
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
invoking the constitutionality of Philippine
Truth Commission (PTC). Petitioner cites the
concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public
office which cannot be created by the President
the power to do so being lodged exclusively
with Congress. Thus, the petitioner submits that
if the President as the head of the Executive
Department cannot create the PTC, the
Supreme Court, likewise cannot create the PET
in the absence of legislature.
ISSUE: Whether or not PET is constitutional.
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RULING: Yes. The court reiterated that the
PET is authorized by the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as
supported by the discussions of the Members of
the Constitutional Commission which drafted
the present Constitution. The basis of PET was
mentioned in the deliberations of the members
of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission during the present Constitution.
RODRIGO VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 191805 (Novembr 15, 2011)
TOPIC: Presidential Immunity
FACTS: Former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo being the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed forces of the Philippines allegedly
having command responsibility was made a
respondent in the abduction of Noriel H.
Rodriguez who filed a petition for Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data.
ISSUE: Whether or not former President
Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on
the basis of presidential immunity from suit.
RULING: In Estrada vs. Desierto case, the
court clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting
President does not enjoy immunity from suit,
even for acts committed during the latter‘s
tenure. The Court emphasized the ruling therein
that courts should look with disfavor upon the
presidential privilege of immunity, especially
when it impedes the search for truth and
impairs the vindication of a right.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
FUNA VS. ACTING S ECRETARY OF JUSTICE
ALBERTO AGRA
G.R. No. 191644 (February 19,2013)
TOPIC: Concurrent Capacities
FACTS: President Gloria Arroyo appointed
Agra as the Acting as the Acting Secretary of
Justice following the resignation of Secretary
Agnes VST Devanadera on March 1, 2010.
President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting
Secretary General in a concurrent capacity on
March 5, 2010.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Agra
as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
violate the constitutional prohibition against
dual or multiple offices fot the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistant.
RULING: The designation of Agra as Acting
Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General was
unconstitutional and void in violation of the
constitutional prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in order to
prevent the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice President, the members of
the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
Matibag v. Benipayo
380 SCRA 49; April 2, 2002
Topic: Powers of the President- Appointing
Powers
Facts: On March 22, 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim,
respondents Benipayo et al as members of the
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Commission on Elections, each for a term of
seven years and all expiring on February 2,
2008. The Office of the President submitted to
the Commission on Appointments the ad
interim appointments for confirmation, however,
the CA did not act on said appointments. On
June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad
interim appointments of respondents to the same
positions and for the same term of seven years.
They took their oaths of office for a second
time. The Office of the President transmitted
their appointments to the CA but the Congress
adjourned before the CA could act on their
appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President
Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad
interim appointments. Petitioner Ma. Angelina
Matibag is the Director IV of COMELEC‘s
Education and Information Department (EID).
Benipayo, as the COMELEC Chairman
reassigned Matibag to the Law Department.
Matibag requested for reconsideration but was
denied by Benipayo. Petitioner questioned the
appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo et al. claiming that their ad interim
appointments were unconstitutional
Issue: Whether or not the ad interim
appointments amounted to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Sec. 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.
Ruling: No. An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment. Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution states that the ad interim
appointment remains effective until such
disapproval by the CA or the next adjournment
of Congress, meaning, it can no longer be
withdrawn or revoked by the President.
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Pimentel Jr. v. Ermita
472 SCRA 587; October 13, 2005
Topic: Powers of the President- Appointing
Powers
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
appointed herein respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments after
the Congress commenced their regular session.
When Congress adjourned, President Arroyo
issued ad interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments to which they
were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Petitioners want to declare the appointments as
unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or not President Arroyo‘s
appointment of respondents as acting
secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments while Congress
is in session is unconstitutional.
Ruling: No. The President can issue
appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of
the Commission on Appointments even while
Congress is in session under Sec. 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution. The essence of an
appointment in an acting capacity is its
temporary nature and the President‘s power to
issue temporary appointments is strengthened
by E.O. 292. Furthermore, department
secretaries are the alter egos of the President. The
acting appointee to the office must, therefore,
necessarily have the President‘s confidence.
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Rufino v. Endriga
496 SCRA 13; July 21, 2006
Topic: Powers of the President- Appointing
Powers
Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
E.O. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the
Philippines. He also appointed the seven
members of the Board of Trustees. Soon after
the declaration of Martial Law, President
Marcos issued P.D. 15, converting CCP into a
non-municipal public corporation and increased
the Board‘s members from seven to nine.
During President Joseph Estrada‘s term, he
appointed seven new trustees to replace the
respondent‘s group who were previously
appointed by President Fidel Ramos. The
Endriga group questioned President Estrada‘s
appointments, claiming that only when the CCP
Board is entirely vacant may the President fill
such vacancies as stated in Sec. 6(b) of P.D. 15.
The Court of Appeals held the Endriga
group lawfully entitled to the office, ousting
Rufino‘s group.
Petitioners averred that Section 6(b) of PD 15
authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their
fellow trustees should be declared
unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing
the appointment only of "officers lower in
rank" than the appointing power.
Issue: Whether or not Section 6(b) of PD 15 is
unconstitutional for being an invalid delegation
of the President's appointing power under the
Constitution
Ruling: Yes. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
states that only those officers lower in rank may
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be appointed by heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The assailed provision
empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP
Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board,
allowing them to elect their fellow trustees.
De Castro v. JBC
614 SCRA 666; March 17, 2010
Topic: Powers of the President- Appointing
Powers
Facts: The compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, seven days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that ―vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof‖ from
a ―list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.‖
The Judicial and Bar Council opened the
position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation. Although it has already begun
the process for the filling of the position of
Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules,
the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to
the President its list due to the unresolved issue
in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the incumbent President
has the power and authority to appoint during
the election ban the successor of Chief Justice
Puno.
Ruling: Yes. Prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII does not apply to appointments to
fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary and is confined
only to appointments made in the Executive
Department. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of
Article VIII are the provisions governing the
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appointment of Supreme Court Justices. Had
the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court,
they would have easily and surely written the
prohibition as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court.
Since there was no such specification, the
prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the President‘s or Acting
President‘s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court. The President may
appoint the next Chief Justice.
Paguia v. Office of the President
621 SCRA 600; June 25, 2010
Topic: Powers of the President- Appointing
Powers
Facts: Petitioner Alan Paguia, as citizen and
taxpayer, filed this original action to invalidate
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo‘s
nomination of respondent former Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. as Permanent Representative
to the United Nations (UN) for violating
Section 23 of RA 7157 or the Philippine
Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues
that respondent Davide‘s age at that time of his
nomination, 70, disqualifies him from holding
his post. Respondents questioned petitioner‘s
standing to bring this suit. On the eligibility of
respondent Davide, respondents counter that
Section 23‘s mandated retirement age applies
only to career diplomats, excluding from its
ambit non-career appointees such as respondent
Davide.
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Issue: Whether or not the Congress may limit
the President‘s prerogative to nominate
ambassadors by legislating age qualifications
Ruling: The petition was dismissed without
reaching the merits for lack of a case or
controversy grounded on petitioner‘s lack of
capacity to sue and mootness.
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita
469 SCRA 1; September 1, 2005
Topic: Powers of the President- Control Power
Facts: R.A. No. 9337 was enacted for mounting
budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate
fiscal allocation for education, increased
emoluments for health workers, and wider
coverage for full value-added tax benefits,
among others. Petitioners ABAKADA
GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question
the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
R.A. No. 9337 for abandoning Congress‘
exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes.
These questioned provisions contain a
uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1,
2006, after any of the following conditions have
been satisfied. They also argue that the law also
effectively nullified the President‘s power of
control, which includes the authority to set aside
and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the
Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of
the tax rate by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
Issue: Whether or not the law violates the
power of control of the President
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Ruling: No. In making his recommendation to
the President on the existence of either of the
two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not
acting as the alter ego of the President or even
her subordinate. In such instance, he is not
subject to the power of control and direction of
the President. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare
the event upon which its expressed will is to
take effect. Thus, being the agent of Congress
and not of the President, the President cannot
alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the
findings of the Secretary of Finance and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter.
Gudani v. Senga
498 SCRA 671; August 15, 2006
Topic: Powers of the President- Control Power
Facts: The petitioners are high-ranking officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
Both petitioners, Brigadier General Francisco
Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander
Balutan, belonged to the Philippine Marines.
Both petitioners and respondent AFP Chief of
Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga were
invited by the Senate to appear at a public
hearing before the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security. However,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered
that no AFP personnel shall appear before any
congressional or senate hearing without her
approval. Defying President Arroyo‘s order,
petitioners appeared and testified at the hearing.
They were then directed to appear before the
Office of the Provost Marshal General
(OPMG), who recommended that petitioners
be charged with violation of Article of War 65,
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on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in
relation to Article of War 97, on conduct
prejudicial to the good order and military
discipline.
Petitioners seek to declare President Arroyo‘s
order unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or not President Arroyo has the
basis and authority such order
Ruling: Yes. The Constitution reposes final
authority, control and supervision of the AFP to
the President. Section 18, Article VII declares
that ―the President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines‖.
Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief
clause vests on the President, absolute authority
over the persons and actions of the members of
the armed forces including the ability of the
President to restrict the travel, movement and
speech of military officers, activities which may
otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
Maria Araullo v. Benigno Aquino
G.R. No. 209287; July 1, 2014
Topic: Powers of the President- Control Power
Facts: : Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered a
privilege speech revealing that he, including
other senators, received P50M as cash
―incentive‖ for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice C. Corona.
Responding to Senator Estrada‘s revelation, Sec.
Florencio Abad of Department of Budget and
Management issued a public statement entitled
Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending
Acceleration Program, explaining the funds had
been released to senators had been part of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program, a program
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designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to
accelerate economic expansion. He further
explained that the DAP were usually taken from
(1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel
Services; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-
over appropriations unreleased from the
previous year; and budgets for slow-moving
items or projects that had been realigned to
support faster-disbursing projects.
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of
DAP and issuances relating to DAP were filed.
Issue: Whether or not the DAP realignments
can be considered as impoundments by the
executive
Ruling: No. There is no impoundment in DAP
but transfer of funds. Impoundment of funds
refers to the President‘s power to refuse to
spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the
General Appropriations Act unless there will be
an unmanageable national government budget
deficit in the future.
Jose Disini v. Sec. of Justice
G.R. No. 203335; February 18, 2014
Topic: Powers of the President- Take Care
Clause
Facts: Cybercrime Prevention Act was enacted
to protect the users of the cyberspace against
those who use it for mischiefs and crimes.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of
some provisions of the cybercrime law that
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regard certain acts as crimes and impose
penalties for their commission as well as
provisions that would enable the government to
track down and penalize violators.
Issue: Whether or not the cybercrime law is
unconstitutional.
Ruling: No. Only the following provisions of
the cybercrime law are unconstitutional: Section
4(c)(3); Section 12; Section 19; Section 4(c)(4)
that penalizes online libel with respect to those
who simply receive the post and react to it;
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting,
Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery,
Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity
Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex with
respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on
online Libel. The law is only partially
unconstitutional.
Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v.
Zamora
GR No. 138570. October 10, 2000
Topic: Diplomatic Power
Facts: With the expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military
exercises conducted between the two countries
were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the
defense and security relationship between the
Philippines and the United States of America
continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense
Treaty. On July 18, 1997, the United States
panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant
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Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met
with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign
Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to
exchange notes on ―the complementing
strategic interests of the United States and the
Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.‖ Both
sides discussed, among other things, the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA for brevity). On October 5,
1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through
respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified
the VFA. On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate
Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate,
by a two-thirds (2/3) vote[9] of its members.
Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-
numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.
Petitioners - as legislators, non-
governmental organizations, citizens and
taxpayers - assail the constitutionality of the
VFA and impute to herein respondents grave
abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in ratifying
the agreement.
Held: No. As regards the power to enter into
treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two-
thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In
this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the
subsequent ratification of the agreement are
exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast
executive and diplomatic powers granted him
no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into
the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently,
the acts or judgment calls of the President
involving the VFA-specifically the acts of
ratification and entering into a treaty and those
66

necessary or incidental to the exercise of such
principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere of
his constitutional powers and thus, may not be
validly struck down, much less calibrated by this
Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave
abuse of power or discretion.
It is the Court‘s considered view that the
President, in ratifying the VFA and in
submitting the same to the Senate for
concurrence, acted within the confines and
limits of the powers vested in him by the
Constitution.
Vinuya v. Romulo
GR No. 162230; April 28, 2010
Topic: Diplomatic Power
Facts: Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have
approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing
a claim against the Japanese officials and military
officers who ordered the establishment of the
―comfort women‖ stations
the Philippines. However, officials of the
Executive Department declined to assist the
petitioners, and took the position that the individual
claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japan‘s compliance
with the Peace Treaty between
the Philippines andJapan.
Issue: Whether or not respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their
claims for the crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed against them.
Held: No. From a Domestic Law Perspective,
the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse
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POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
petitioners’ claims against Japan. It is well-
established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the
political'--departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision." In this case, the Executive Department
has already decided that it is to the best interest of
the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of
1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the
courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein
assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
I. JUDICIARY
Lozano v. Nograles
G.R. No. 187883; June 16, 2009
in
Judicial Power Defined
Judicial Power is defined as ―the bounden duty
of the Court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.
Dumlao v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52245; January 22, 1980
Topic: Requisites for Judicial Inquiry
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
2. The question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party;
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3. The constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself.
Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 131719; May 25, 2004
Topic: Locus Standi
Facts: Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on July 15,
1995. Respondents questioned the provisions of
RA 8042, by way of a restraining order
otherwise, the member recruitment agencies of
the petitioner will suffer grave or irreparable
damage or injury. Indeed, this has far reaching
effects not only to survival of the overseas
manpower supply industry and the active
participating recruitment agencies, the country‘s
economy which has survived mainly due to the
dollar remittances of the overseas workers but
more importantly, to the poor and the needy
who are in dire need of income-generating jobs
which can only be obtained from abroad.
The petitioners contend that the
respondent has no locus standi.It is a non-stock,
non-profit organization; hence, not the real
party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. The
respondent, for its part, asserts that it has duly
established its locus standi and its right to
injunctive relief as gleaned from its pleadings
and the appendages thereto.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent has the
legal standing in the case.
Held: Yes. The modern view is that an
association has standing to complain of injuries
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to its members. This view fuses the legal
identity of an association with that of its
members.16An association has standing to file
suit for its workers despite its lack of direct
interest if its members are affected by the action.
An organization has standing to assert the
concerns of its constituents.
The respondent is, thus, the appropriate
party to assert the rights of its members,
because it and its members are in every practical
sense identical. The respondent asserts that the
assailed provisions violate the constitutional
rights of its members and the officers and
employees thereof. The respondent is but the
medium through which its individual members
seek to make more effective the expression of
their voices and the redress of their grievances.
However, the respondent has no locus
standi to file the petition for and in behalf of
unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to
implead any unskilled workers in its petition.
In Re: Appointment of Mateo A. Valenzuela
and Placido B. Vallarta
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998
Topic: Power of Appointment
Facts: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta were appointed as Judges of
the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago
City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively on March 30, 1998, two months
before the next presidential elections. The
referral was made in view of the serious
constitutional issue concerning said
appointments arising from the pertinent
antecedents. Attention was drawn to Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution reading as
follows:
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"SEC 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public
safety."
On the other hand, appointments to fill
vacancies in the Supreme court during the
period mentioned in the provision just quoted
could seemingly be justified by another
provision of the same Constitution. Section 4(1)
of Article VIII which states:
"SEC 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. ***. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof."
Issue: Whether or not the President can make
appointments to the judiciary during the period
of the ban in the interest of public service.
Held: During the period stated in Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution - "(t)wo months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term" - the
President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do
so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII
simply mean that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided
therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII.
It is noteworthy that the prohibition on
appointments comes into effect only once every
six years.
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De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
GR No. 191002; March 17, 2010
Topic: Power of Appointment
Facts: The compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections
on May 10, 2010. In its January 18,
2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC passed
a resolution stating that they have unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May
17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent
Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno. As a
result, the JBC opened the position of Chief
Justice for application or recommendation, and
published for that purpose
its announcement dated January 20, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for
the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno
in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet
decided on when to submit to the President its
list of nominees for the position due to the
present controversy being yet unresolved.
Issue: Whether or not the incumbent President
have the power to appoint the next Chief
Justice during the election ban as prohibited by
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.
Held: Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition
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made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President
or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President‘s or
Acting President‘s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the
Philippines
GR No. 196271; February 28, 2012
Topic: Finality of a Decision
Facts: Petitioners assail the Supreme Court‘s
Decision dated October 18, 2011, where the
Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic
Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA
No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on
the second Monday of August 2011) to the
second Monday of May 2013 and recognized
the President‘s power to appoint officers-in-
charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of
the elected officials.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their
Manifestation and Motion dated December 21,
2011, question the propriety of the appointment
by the President of Mujiv Hataman as acting
Governor and Bainon Karon as acting Vice
Governor of the ARMM. They argue that since
the Court‘s previous decision was based on a
close vote of 8-7, and given the numerous
motions for reconsideration filed by the parties,
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the President, in recognition of the principle of
judicial courtesy, should have refrained from
implementing our decision until The Court have
ruled with finality on this case.
Issue: Whether or not a Court‘s decision based
on close vote affects the finality of a case.
Held: No. ―…a slim vote of 8-7 does not, and
cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any
less effective or binding. Regardless of how
close the voting is, so long as there is
concurrence of the majority of the members of
the en banc who actually took part in the
deliberations of the case, a decision garnering
only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a
decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must
be respected as such. The petitioners are,
therefore, not in any position to speculate that,
based on the voting, ―the probability exists that
their motion for reconsideration may be
granted.‖
Bengzon v. Drilon
G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
Topic: Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary
Facts: The petitioners are retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are
currently receiving monthly pensions under
Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic
Act No. 1797. They filed the instant petition on
their own behalf and in representation of all
other retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals similarly situated.
This petition assails the constitutionality of the
veto by the President of certain provisions in
the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal
Year 1992 relating to the payment of the
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adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the questioned veto is
repugnant to the fiscal autonomy granted to the
Judiciary.
Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the veto of these
specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating
to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized,
which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
The freedom of the Chief Justice to make
adjustments in the utilization of the funds
appropriated for the expenditures of the
judiciary, including the use of any savings from
any particular item to cover deficits or shortages
in other items of the Judiciary is withheld.
Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the
Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition
of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations
law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of
the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be
given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.
Bengzon v. Drilon
G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
Topic: Fiscal Autonomy Defined
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside
control.
―Fiscal autonomy…contemplates a guarantee
on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that
their needs require. It recognizes the power and
authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest
rates authorized by law for compensation and
pay plans of the government and allocate and
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disburse such sums as may be provided by law
or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions.‖
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of
the Appraised Value of the Properties
Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court
A.M. No. 11-7-100-SC; July 31, 2012
Topic: Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy
Facts: The Commission on Audit requested the
Court to determine the proper formula to be
used in computing the appraisal value that a
retired Chief Justice and several Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to
acquire the government properties they used
during their tenure. This issue has its roots in
the June 8, 2010 Opinion1 issued by the Legal
Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel
of the Commission on Audit (COA), which
found that an underpayment amounting to
P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired
Supreme Court justices purchased from the
Supreme Court the personal properties assigned
to them during their incumbency in the Court .
Issue: Whether or not the COA can conduct
post-audit examination on constitutional bodies
granted fiscal autonomy under Sec. 2 (1) of
Article IX-D of the Constitution.
Held: No. Any kind of interference on how
these retirement privileges and benefits are
exercised and availed of, not only violates the
fiscal autonomy and independence of the
Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the
constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief
Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to
manage the Judiciary‘s own affairs.
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Fortich v. Corona
G.R. No. 131457; August 19, 1999
Topic: On Finality of Decisions by Supreme
Court Division Denying Motion for
Reconsideration by a 2-2 Vote
Facts: The petitioners filed motions for
reconsideration of a 3-2 decision of the Special
Second Division that were denied by a 2-2 vote.
As the denial was not supported by a majority
of the division, respondents and intervenors
pray that this case be referred to this Court en
banc. They contend that inasmuch as their
earlier motions for reconsideration (of the
Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by
a vote of two-two, the required number to carry
a decision, i.e., three, was not
met. Consequently, the case should be referred
to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying
on the following constitutional provision:
―Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of
law laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.‖
Issue: Whether or not a motion for
reconsideration decided by a 2-2 vote can be
elevated to the court en banc.
Held: No. With the aforesaid rule of
construction in mind, it is clear that only cases
are referred to the Court en banc for decision
whenever the required number of votes is not
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obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply
where, as in this case, the required three votes is
not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of
the aforequoted provision speaks only of ―case‖
and not ―matter‖. The reason is simple. The
above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains
to the disposition of cases by a division. If
there is a tie in the voting, there is no
decision. The only way to dispose of the case
then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the
other hand, if a case has already been decided
by the division and the losing party files a
motion for reconsideration, the failure of the
division to resolve the motion because of a tie
in the voting does not leave the case
undecided. There is still the decision which
must stand in view of the failure of the
members of the division to muster the
necessary vote for its reconsideration.
A careful reading of the above constitutional
provision, however, reveals the intention of the
framers to draw a distinction between cases, on
the one hand, and matters, on the other hand,
such that cases are ―decided‖ while matters,
which include motions, are
―resolved‖. Otherwise put, the word ―decided‖
must refer to ―cases‖; while the word ―resolved‖
must refer to ―matters‖, applying the rule
of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only
in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article
VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other
provisions of the Constitution where these
words appear.
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Republic v. Sagun
GR. No. 187567; February 15, 2012
Topic: Citizenship and Rules of Court
Facts: Nora Fe Sagun who did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority but executed an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, was denied of
having a Philippine passport due to the
citizenship of his father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has
elected Philippine citizenship. A judicial
declaration of her election of the Philippine
citizenship was sought.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent‘s petition
for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship is authorized by the Rules of Court
and jurisprudence.
Held: Yes. But it should be stressed that there
is no specific statutory or procedural rule which
authorizes the direct filing of a petition for
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship
before the courts. Respondent cannot now be
allowed to seek the intervention of the court to
confer upon her Philippine citizenship when
clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship.
Galicto v. Aquino III
G.R. No. 193978; February 28, 2012
Topic: Locus Standi
Facts: Pres. Aquino issued EO 7 ordering (1) a
moratorium on the increases in the salaries and
other forms of compensation of all GOCC and
GFI employees for an indefinite period to be
set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all
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allowances, bonuses and incentives of members
of the Board of Directors/Trustees until
December 31, 2010. The petitioner claims that
as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the
implementation of EO 7, which was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a locus
standi in bringing the petition before the Court.
Held: The Supreme Court was not convinced
that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has
a personal stake or material interest in the
outcome of the case because his interest, if any,
is speculative and based on a mere
expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of
future increases in his salaries and other benefits
cannot but be characterized as contingent
events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no
vested rights to salary increases and, therefore,
the absence of such right deprives the petitioner
of legal standing to assail EO 7.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by
the petitioner‘s claim that he is instituting the
present petition as a member of the bar in good
standing who has an interest in ensuring that
laws and orders of the Philippine government
are legally and validly issued.
Moldex Realty, Inc. v. Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board
G.R. No. 149719; June 21, 2007
Topic: Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court
Facts: Petitioner decided to stop paying the
electric bills for the streetlights and advised
respondent association to assume this obligation.
Respondent association objected to petitioner‘s
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resolution and refused to pay the electric bills.
HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994
was issued, mandating subdivision
owners/developers shall continue to maintain
street lights facilities and pay the bills for
electric consumption of the subdivision street
lights until the facilities in the project are turned
over to the local government. A writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was also
issued ordering the petitioner to assume the
obligation of paying the cost of electricity of the
streetlights.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals by filing a Petition for Prohibition and
Certiorari, praying not only for the reversal of
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, as
well as the two issuances, but also for the
nullification of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562,
series of 1994, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
a jurisdiction to take cognizance of this original
action for certiorari and prohibition.
Held: The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of this original action for
certiorari and prohibition, notwithstanding
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
general rule is that this Court shall exercise only
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation,
except in circumstances where the Court
believes that resolving the issue of
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the
first instance is of paramount importance and
immediately affects the social, economic and
moral well-being of the people.
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Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation
GR No. 166066; March 14, 2008
Topic: RTC Jurisdiction on
Constitutionality Issue
Facts: Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection
and damages against FPA and PPI with the
RTC in Makati. It questioned the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being
unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an
unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial
of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the
LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned
corporation, which used the proceeds to
maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction
to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree or an executive order. This
is clear from Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: SECTION
5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay
Katarungan Foundation v. Executive
Secretary Ermita
G.R. No. 177721; July 3, 2007
Topic: Locus Standi
Facts: Executive Secretary, in representation of
the Office of the President, announced an
appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S.
Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement
of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a
Chinese citizen and that his own birth certificate
indicates his Chinese citizenship. They invoke
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. Respondent Executive Secretary
stated in his Comment that the appointment of
Ong as Associate Justice of this Court was made
by the President pursuant to the powers vested
in him by Article VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has the
standing to file this suit.
Held: Petitioners have standing to file the suit
simply as people‘s organizations and taxpayers
since the matter involves an issue of utmost and
far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely,
the qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a
person to be appointed a member of this Court.
Standing has been accorded and recognized in
similar instances.
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Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 202242; July 17, 2012
Topic: Locus Standi
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only 7
members, an 8th member was added to JBC as
two representatives from the Congress began
sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with
each having one full vote, as decided by the JBC
in a separate meeting. Petitioner claims that the
action of the JBC allowing more than one
representative of congress to represent JBC is
unconstitutional invoking Section 8 of Article
VIII of the Constitution. Without his name in
the official list of applicants for the post, the
respondents claim that there is no personal
stake on the part of petitioner that would justify
his outcry of unconstitutionality.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the
legal standing to sue.
Held: Yes. While it is true that a ―personal
stake‖ on the case is imperative to have locus
standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come
to the Court and question the JBC composition
for being unconstitutional. JBC‘s duty is not at
all limited to the nominations for the highest
magistrate in the land. The legality of the very
process of nominations to the positions in the
Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy.
Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this
question to the Court, clothed with legal
standing and at the same time, armed with
issues of transcendental importance to society.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council
676 SCRA 579; July 17, 2012
Topic: Appointments- JBC
Facts: The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) was
created as an independent body, in-charge of
the process of appointments in the Judiciary. It
is composed seven members; one of them is a
representative from the Congress as an ex officio
member. However, an 8th member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC-one from House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, each
having one-half of a vote.
Petitioner contended that the Constitution
clearly states that JBC shall have only one
representative from the Congress.
Issue: Whether or not Section 8, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution allow more than one
member of Congress to sit in the JBC with one
vote each.
Ruling: No. The Constitution mandates that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only. Sec. 8 of Article VIII provides Congress
with equal voice with other members of the JBC.
Additionally, the seven-member composition of
the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to
provide solution in case of a tie or stalemate in
voting.
Cabuay Jr v. Malvar
389 SCRA 492; September 24, 2002
Topic: Division Cases
Facts: The heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, the
heirs of Elino Adia, Ambrosio Aguilar and
Eduardo V. Santos were engaged in a legal tug-
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of-war over the ownership of a parcel of land
located in Barrio De la Paz, Antipolo City. After
a series of court trials, Supreme Court First
Division ruled that Ambrosio Aguilar,
successor-in-interest of Hermogenes Lopez, is
the lawful owner of the property. However,
Land Management Bureau dismissed the claim
of Lopez and ordered the reconstitution of the
homestead application of Elino Adia. The
Lopez heir filed a motion for consideration of
the LMB decision which was denied by LMB.
They later filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court which was
denied by its Third Division. The Third
Division in its decision clarified that its
Resolution ―prevails over‖ the Decision
rendered by the First Division, thus the Aida
hers‘ titles are valid.
Issue: Whether or not the Third Division may
reverse the ruling of First Division.
Ruling: No. Section 4 (3), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution provides that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Supreme
Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified
or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. A
Decision rendered by a Division of Supreme
Court in violation of the above constitutional
provision would be in excess of jurisdiction and
is therefore invalid.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Re: Petition for Recognition of the
Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System for Payment of Legal
Fees
612 SCRA 193; February 11, 2010
Topic: Rule-Making Power
Facts: Government Service Insurance System
seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees
imposed on government-owned or controlled
corporations under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal
Fees) of the rules of court. GSIS anchors its
petition on Sec. 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The
GSIS Act of 1997). GSIS argues that its
exemption from the payment of legal fees
would not mean that RA 8291 is superior to the
Rules of Court. It only shows ―deference‖ by
the Court to the legislature as a co-equal branch.
Issue: Whether or not the Legislature may
exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by
the Court on GOCCs.
Ruling: No. The Congress may not exempt the
GSIS from the payment of legal fees. The
payment of legal fees is an integral part of the
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its rule-making power under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. As one of
the safeguards of the Supreme Court‘s
institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now the Court‘s exclusive domain.
The power is no longer shared by the Court
with Congress, much less with the Executive.
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Disini v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 2033335; February 11, 2014
Topic: Partial Unconstitutionality
Facts: Cybercrime Prevention Act was enacted
to protect the users of the cyberspace against
those who use it for mischiefs and crimes.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of
some provisions of the cybercrime law that
regard certain acts as crimes and impose
penalties for their commission as well as
provisions that would enable the government to
track down and penalize violators.
Issue: Whether or not the cybercrime law is
unconstitutional.
Ruling: No. Only the following provisions of
the cybercrime law are unconstitutional: Section
4(c)(3); Section 12; Section 19; Section 4(c)(4)
that penalizes online libel with respect to those
who simply receive the post and react to it;
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting,
Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery,
Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity
Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex with
respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on
online Libel. The law is only partially
unconstitutional.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Imbong v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 204819; April 8, 2014
Topic: Judicial Review
Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on
December 21, 2012. Petitioners
The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that
the Court should leave it to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress in reviewing the
RH Law.
Issue: Whether or not the Court may exercise
its power of judicial review.
Ruling: Yes. While the Court may not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where
an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse
of discretion results. Furthermore, Sec. 1, Art.
VIII of the Constitution expressly provides that
―Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.‖ The petition for
certiorari/prohibition filed by petitioners
seeking to nullify R.A. 10354 raises a justiciable
controversy as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision, in
which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide.
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IN RE: TRANSFER OF HEARING OF
CRIMINAL CASE NOS 13308 AND 13337
FROM RTC-BRANCH 4 BATANGAS CITY TO
THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
MUNTINLUPA CITY
A.M. No. 07-11-592-RTC; March 14,2008
TOPIC: Transfer of Hearing Cases
FACTS: : Judge Kalalo sought the guidance of
the OCA on what course of action should be
taken on the subject cases taking into
consideration the risks involved and the
expenses incurred by the government whenever
the accused are brought to court for hearings.
The OCA recommended that the records of the
subject cases be forwarded to the RTC
Muntinlupa City for raffle and the judge whom
the cases are assigned be directed to conduct
the entirety of the trial, thereafter the records
shall be returned to RTC Batangas for the
preparation of the decisions and be returned to
RTC Muntinlupa for the promulgation of the
decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary that the
judge who prepares and signs the decision be
the judge who heard the case.
RULING: No. A successor may decide the
case only if the judge who heard the trial is no
longer available by reason of death, retirement
or resignation to render the decision. In the case
at bar, it does not involve the abovementioned
circumstances thereby the Court ordered Judge
Kalalo to go to Muntinlupa City to conduct the
trial of the subject cases within the premises of
the Bureau of Corrections.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
PEDREGOZA VS. COMELEC AND
S UMULONG, JR.
G.R. No. 169885 (July 25, 2006)
Topic: NON-COMPLIANCE with RULES
FACTS: Respondent Sumulong filed an
election protest for irregularities wherein
petitioner was proclaimed as the winner. MTC
dismissed the protest but COMELEC reversed
the decision and declared respondent as duly
elected Punong Bayan. Petitioner sought for
reconsideration but COMELEC En Banc
affirmed the decision of the division with the
five signatures of the commissioners in the
resolution although Commissioner Tuazon and
Sadain took no part without indicating the
reasons of inhibition.
Petitioner prays for the invalidation of the
resolution for having been promulgated without
a quorum because of the failure of the two
commissioners to indicate the reason for taking
no part in the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the
Commissioners to indicate their reasons for
taking no part in the case annuls the Resolution.
RULING: No. The omission of not indicating
the reason of inhibition does not invalidate the
ruling. The non-compliance with the rule does
not annul the ruling in which a judge takes no
part but may be basis for holding him
responsible for the omission.
IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS
BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO VS.
NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG
A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC (February 24, 2009)
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Topic: Unpromulgated Decision
FACTS: The promulgation of Gilbert Copy
was being withheld. Louis Biraogo, held a press
conference and circulated to the media an
undated letter signed by him together with a
Xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia.
Biragao, in his letter, insinuated that the Court,
at the instance of the Chief Justice and with
implied consent of other Justices, unlawfully
and with improper motives withheld the
promulgation of the ponencia. The
unauthorized release of a copy of the
unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the
confidential internal deliberations of the Court
and Constituted contempt of the court.
ISSUE: WON the unpromulgated decision is
binding.
RULING: It was noted that if a majority
concurred only―in the result,‖
the ponencia would have no doctrinal value.
More importantly, any decision ousting a sitting
member of the House of Representatives
should spell out clearly the legal basis relied
upon by the majority for such extreme measure.
SC ruled that, a decision becomes binding only
after it is validly promulgated. Until such
operative acts occur, there is no really decision
to speak of, even if some or all the Justices have
already affixed their signature thereto.
AGOY VS. ARANETA CENTER
G.R. No. 196358 (March 21, 2012)
Topic: Minute Resolution
FACTS: Petitioner Agoy filed Motion to
Rescind the June 15, 2011 Resolution doubting
the authenticity of the Minute Resolution and
79
 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
the September 11, 2011 resolution affirming the
authenticity of the former resolution. The
petitioner sought the Court En Banc to decide
reiterating that his case cannot be decided by a
minute resolution.
ISSUES: Whether or not it was proper for the
Court to deny his petition through a minute
resolution.
RULING: The court itself has defined the
instances when cases are to be adjudicated by
decision, signed resolution, unsigned resolution
or minute resolution.
Minute resolutions constitute actual
adjudications on the merits. They are the result
of thorough deliberation among the members
of the court. When the court does not find any
reversible error in the decision of the CA and
denies the petition, there is no need for the
Court to fully explain its denial, since it already
means that it agrees with and adopts the
findings of the CA.
FIRESTONE CERAMICS INC. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 127022 (January 15, 2002)
G.R. No. 127245 (January 15, 2002)
Topic: EN BANC Cases
FACTS: Petitioners filed Motion to Refer to the
Court En Banc these consolidated cases
involving a vast tract of land with an area of
around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
which land has been adjudicated by private
individuals by a court alleged to be without
jurisdiction, are pending at the Third Division.
The Third Division voted 4-1 to deny
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petitioner‘s motion to transfer cases to the Banc
but the Court deliberated on the consultation
and voted 9-5 to accept cases for the En Banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not these consolidated cases
can be considered and treated as en banc cases.
RULING: Yes, Supreme Court voted 9-5 to
accept the cases for the En Banc to pass upon
in view of the finding that the cases above
entitled are of sufficient importance to merit its
attention. The action of the court is a legitimate
and valid exercise of its residual power within
the contemplation of Paragraph 9 of the
Resolution En Banc Nov. 18, 1998 ―All other
cases as the court en banc by a majority of its
actual membership may deem of sufficient
importance to merit its attention‖.
Taking into account the importance of these
cases and the issues raised, let alone the
enormous value of the area in litigation, which
is claimed as government property, there is
merit in the prayer of the petitioners that their
pending motions for reconsideration should be
resolved by the Court En Banc.
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF
PLAGIARISM AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
DEL CASTILLO
A.M. 10-7-17-SC (October 12, 2010)
Topic: PLAGIARISM
FACTS: In the landmark decision of Vinuya vs.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230,
petitioners alleged that Justice del Castillo
plagiarized and twisted passages from three
foreign legal articles to support the Court‘s
position in the Vinuya decision. The
Court then referred the charges against Justice
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Del Castillo to its Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards, chaired by Chief Justice
Renato Corona, for investigation and
recommendation. After the proceedings before
it, the Committee submitted its findings and
recommendations to the Court en banc, which
then treated and decided the controversy as an
administrative matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not Justice de Castillo, in
writing the opinion for the Court in
the Vinuya case plagiarized and twisted public
works.
RULING: No. By a 10-2 vote, with three
Justices including Justice del Castillo taking no
part, the Court dismissed the charges for lack of
merit and held that Justice del Castillo was not
guilty of plagiarizing and twisting the cited
materials and hence did not commit gross
negligence. The court reiterated that on
occasion judges and justices have mistakenly
cited the wrong sources, failed to use quotation
marks, inadvertently omitted necessary
information from footnotes or endnotes. But
these do not, in every case, amount to
misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with
fraud, corruption, or malice are subject of
disciplinary action. Justice Del Castillo‘s acts or
omissions were not shown to have been
impelled by any of such disreputable
motives. If the rule were otherwise, no judge or
justice, however competent, honest, or
dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire
from the judiciary with an unblemished record.
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J. CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS
Gaminde v. COA
347 SCRA 655; December 13, 2000
Topic: Staggering of Terms
Facts: On June 11, 1993, the President of the
Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P.
Gaminde ad interim Commissioner of the Civil
Service Commission. She assumed office on
June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of
office. On September 07, 1993, the
Commission on Appointment confirmed the
appointment.
Issue: Whether the term of office of Atty.
Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission expired on February 02, 1999, as
stated in the appointment paper, or on February
02, 2000, as claimed by her.
Ruling: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P.
Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, under an appointment extended
to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11,
1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However,
she served as de facto officer in good faith until
February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive
her salary and other emoluments for actual
service rendered. Consequently, the
Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in
audit such salary and other emoluments,
including that of her co-terminous staff.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Funa v. Villar
405 SCRA 614; April 24, 2012
Topic: Staggering Terms
Facts: On Feb. 15, 2001, Pres. Arroyo
appointed Guillermo N. Carague as Chairman
of the COA for a seven-year term. On Feb. 7,
2004, Pres. Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A.
Villar as the third member of the COA also for
a seven-year term, until Feb. 2, 2004. Villar was
designated as Acting Chairman of the COA
from Feb. 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008 (nominated
and appointed Chairman on April 18, 2008;
appointment was confirmed on June 11, 2008 –
to serve as Chairman until the expiration of his
original term on Feb. 2, 2011
Villar maintained that his appointment as
Chairman gave him a fresh term of seven years.
Evelyn R. San Buenaventura was appointed
COA Commissioner to serve the unexpired
term of Villar (up to Feb. 2, 2011). Villar
resigned and vacated his position, and was
replaced by Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan
Issue: Whether or not Villar‘s appointment as
COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and
after having served for four (4) years of his
seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is
valid in light of the term limitations imposed
under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked
in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
Ruling: No. Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987
Constitution and similar provisions do not
peremptorily prohibit the promotional
appointment of a commissioner to chairman,
provided the new appointee‘s tenure in both
capacities does not exceed seven (7) years in all
and it is due to death, disability, resignation or
impeachment of the predecessor. However,
Villar‘s appointment as chairman is
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unconstitutional as it will destroy the rationale
and policy behind the rotational system or the
staggering of appointments (Villar and San
Buenaventura‘s terms would both expire on Feb.
2, 2011).
Macalintal v. COMELEC
405 SCRA 614; July 10, 2003
Topic: Proceedings
Facts: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a
taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He
questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others: That the
provision that a Filipino already considered an
immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate
in absentee voting provided he executes an
affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of
the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he intends to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed provision is
unconstitutional
Ruling: No. It could not be the intention of
Congress to allow COMELEC to include
the proclamation of the winners in the vice-
presidential and presidential race. To interpret it
that way would mean that Congress allowed
COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing
and proclamation of the presidential and vice
presidential elections is still lodged in Congress
and was in no way transferred to the
COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Civil Service Commission v. Department of
Budget and Management
464 SCRA 115; July 22, 2005
Facts: Petitioner via the present petition for
mandamus seeks to compel the Department of
Budget and Management to release the balance
of its budget for fiscal year 2002. It also seeks a
determination by this Court of the extent of the
constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. By
petitioner‘s claim, the amount
of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its
Central Office by the General Appropriations
Act of 2002, while the total allocations for the
same Office, if all sources of funds are
considered, amount to P285,660,790.44. It
complains, however, that the total fund releases
by respondent to its Central Office during the
fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14,
thereby leaving an unreleased balance of
P5,807,392.30.
Issue: Whether or not the policy of DBM ― No
Report, No Release Policy ― is constitutional.
Ruling: Yes. Respondent‘s act of withholding
the subject funds from petitioner due to
revenue shortfall is unconstitutional.
Accordingly, respondent is directed to release to
petitioner the amount P5,807,392.30
representing the unreleased balance of
petitioner‘s appropriation for its Central Office
by the General Appropriations Act for FY 2002.
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J. 1. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
GRINO v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
194 SCRA 485, (2008)
TOPIC: Civil Service Commission
FACTS: Governor Simplicion Griño
terminated respondents Arandela as Provincial
Attorney and all the legal officers at the PAO.
He made mention of an article pertaining to the
Iloilo office of the Provincial Attorney which
―undermined that trust and confidence‖ that he
reposed on them. He then arranged the
replacements of the said officers.
The terminated officers appealed to the CSC
which later declared their termination as illegal
and ordered that they be immediately restored
to their positions.
Petitioners seek the reversal of CSC resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of a
provincial attorney is confidential so that the
holder thereof may be terminated upon loss of
confidence.
RULING: The positions of city legal officer
and provincial attorney were created under
Republic Act No. 5185 which categorized them
together as positions of "trust―. The attorney-
client relationship is strictly personal because it
involves mutual trust and confidence of the
highest degree.
The fact that the position of respondent
Arandela as provincial attorney has already been
classified as one under the career service and
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
certified as permanent by the CSC cannot
conceal or alter its highly confidential nature.
This Court holds that the position of
respondent Arandela as the provincial attorney
of Iloilo is a primarily confidential position.
Following the principle that the tenure of an
official holding a primarily confidential position
ends upon loss of confidence, Arandela‘s
termination is valid.
However, with respect to the legal assistants or
subordinates of the provincial attorney, their
positions are not confidential but are highly
technical in character. They are permanent
employees and they enjoy security of tenure.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v.
JAVIER
546 SCRA 485, (2008)
TOPIC: Civil Service Commission
FACTS: Nita Javier was first employed as
Private Secretary in the GSIS on a ―confidential‖
status. A month before her 64th birthday, she
opted for early retirement. Barely a year after,
GSIS reappointed her as Corporate Secretary
and classified her appointment as ―confidential
in nature and the tenure of office is at the
pleasure of the Board.‖.
CSC alleged that the respondent‘s
reappointment on confidential status was meant
to illegally extend her service since under the
civil service regulations, those who are in
primarily confidential positions may serve even
beyond the compulsory retirement age of 65.
Petitioner invalidated respondent‘s
reappointment on the ground that the position
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is a permanent, career position and not
primarily confidential.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the courts may
determine the proper classification of a position
in government.
(2) Whether or not the position of Corporate
Secretary in a GOCC is primarily confidential in
nature.
RULING: The Court is expected to make its
own determination as to the nature of a
particular position, such as whether it is a
primarily confidential position or not, without
being bound by prior classifications made by
other bodies. The findings of the other
branches of government are merely considered
initial and not conclusive to the Court. However,
in case of conflict, the Court must exercise its
constitutional role as final arbiter of all
justiciable controversies and disputes.
The position of corporate secretary in a GOCC
is primarily confidential in nature.
A position is considered to be primarily
confidential when there is a primarily close
intimacy between the appointing authority and
the appointee (―proximity rule‖).
The secretary reports directly to the board of
directors, without an intervening officer in
between them. The nature of the duties and
functions attached to the position points to its
highly confidential character.
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ROMAGOS v. METRO WATER CEBU
DISTRICT
533 SCRA 188, (2000)
TOPIC: Civil Service Commission
FACTS: Vilma Ramagos is an employee of
MWCD. Two incidents where she suddenly and
without provocation began rambling loudly and
incoherently causing alarm and anxiety among
office employees. She was diagnosed as
suffering from major depression but declared as
physically and mentally fit to go back to work.
However MCWD informed her that she was
being dropped from the rolls for mental
incapacity.
Ramagos assailed the decision of CA that
MCWD correctly declared her as mentally unfit.
ISSUE: Whether or not MCWD sufficiently
proved that Ramagos‘ mental incapacity has
rendered her incapacitated to work, justifying
her being dropped from the rolls.
RULING: MCWD sufficiently established that
Ramagos suffers from a mental disorder.
However, a declaration of mental disorder does
not automatically translate to a judgment of
mental incapacity to perform work.
When Ramagos was suffering from a protracted
mental disorder, the same did not render her
incapable of performing her work. There was
therefore an incomplete cause or justification to
drop her from the rolls.
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DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000
TOPIC: Civil Service Commission
FACTS: Petitioners, pursuant to Section 44 of
R.A. No. 8189 (Voter‘s Registration Act of
1996), were reassigned to different stations.
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 8189,
contending that Sec. 44 violated the
constitutional guarantee on security of tenure of
civil servants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law violated the
petitioners‘ security of tenure.
RULING: The guarantee of security of tenure
under the Constitution is not a guarantee of
perpetual employment. It only means that an
employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred)
from the service for causes other than those
provided by law and after due process is
accorded the employee.
What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise
of the power to dismiss. However, no such
capriciousness can be raised for so long as the
remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is
germane to the purposes of the law.
CANONIZADO v. AGUIRRE
323 SCRA 312 (2000)
TOPIC: Civil Service Commission
FACTS: Petitioners are members of the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).
When RA 8551, (Philippine National Police
Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998) took
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effect, it declared that their terms were deemed
expired and separated from office.
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of
Section 8 of RA 8551, arguing that their
removal from office violates their security of
tenure. Respondents pointed out that RA 8551
reorganized the NAPOLCOM resulting in the
abolition of petitioners‘ offices.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a bona fide
reorganization of NAPOLCOM in RA 8551.
RULING: Reorganization takes place when
there is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including
the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. It involves a reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions.Naturally, it may result in the loss of
one‘s position through removal or abolition of
an office. However, for a reorganization to be
valid, it must also pass the test of good faith.
Dario v. Mison...As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in "good
faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist. And in
that case, security of tenure would not
be a Chinese wall…There is an invalid
"abolition" as where there is merely a
change of nomenclature of positions,
or where claims of economy are belied
by the existence of ample funds
The basic structure of the NAPOLCOM has
been preserved. There has been no revision in
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its lines of control, authority and responsibility,
neither has there been a reduction in its
membership, nor a consolidation or abolition of
the offices constituting the same.
Therefore, no bona fide reorganization of the
NAPOLCOM having been mandated by
Congress in RA 8551, insofar as it declares the
terms of office of the petitioners as expired and
resulting in their removal from office. It
removes civil service employees from office
without legal cause and must therefore be struck
down for being constitutionally infirm.
GLORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS
338 SCRA 5 (2000)
TOPIC: Civil Service Commission
FACTS: Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido
Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of
the Marikina Institute of Science and
Technology upon the recommendation of
DECS Sec. Ricardo Gloria.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary
mandatory injuction against Sec. Gloria on the
ground that it violates his security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of
the case is improper because the same attacks
an act of the President, in violation of the
doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the private
respondent‘s reassignment violates his security
of tenure.
(2) Whether or not the filing of the case violates
the presidential immunity from suit.
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RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the
reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to
be indefinite". The same can be inferred from
the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for
President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the
reassignment of private respondent will "best fit
his qualifications and experience" being "an
expert in vocational and technical education." It
can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is
more than temporary as the private respondent
has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job,
being an expert in the field. Besides, there is
nothing in the said Memorandum to show that
the reassignment of private respondent is
temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified
or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the
part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration.
Such feature of the reassignment in question is
definitely violative of the security of tenure of
the private respondent.
Petitioners‘ contention is untenable because the
petition is directed against petitioners and not
against the President. The questioned acts are
those of petitioners and not of the President.
Furthermore, presidential decisions may be
questioned before the courts where there is
grave abuse of discretion or that the President
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION-NCR v.
ALBAO
472 SCRA 548 (2005)
TOPIC: Civil Service Commission
FACTS: Respondent Albao was a contractual
employee in the Office of the Vice President
before his appointment to a permanent position,
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which appointment was, however, requested to
be retrieved by the Office of the Vice President
and at the same time disapproved by the Civil
Service Commission. Moreover, it was found
out that there exists a prima facie case against
Albao for Dishonesty and Falsification of
Official Documents. A case was then initiated
against him by CSC-NCR. Respondent filed a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals
alleging that the CSC has no original jurisdiction
to institute administrative case and so, it cannot
delegate the same to CSC-NCR.
CA ruled that the CSC-NCR does not have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide the case of
respondent. Consequently, the CSC-NCR
exceeded its authority in initiating the
administrative case against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power conferred
upon the CSC-NCR to hear and decide
administrative cases does not include the power
to initiate and prosecute said cases.
RULING: No. When the Commission, in the
course of the performance of its official and
other duties, comes to know of any
transgression committed by a government
employee, it can initiate the necessary
proceedings. In this case, it initiated the
administrative proceedings against respondent
after the discovery of the latter‘s spurious
eligibility.
This is an integral part of its duty, authority and
power to administer the civil service system and
protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B,
Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its
list of eligibles those who falsified their
qualifications. This is to be distinguished from
ordinary proceedings intended
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to discipline a bona fide member of the system,
for acts or omissions that constitute violations
of the law or the rules of the service.
De Rama v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 131136. February 28, 2001
Topic: On Recall of Appointment
Facts: Petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a
letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service
Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14) municipal
employees justifying his recall request on the
allegation that the appointments of the said
employees were ―midnight‖ appointments of
the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in
violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution.
The CSC denied petitioner‘s request for the
recall of the appointments of the fourteen
employees, for lack of merit. The CSC also cited
Rule V, Sections 9 and 10 of the Omnibus
Rules, and declared that the appointments of
the said employees were issued in accordance
with pertinent laws. Thus, the same were
effective immediately, and cannot be withdrawn
or revoked by the appointing authority until
disapproved by the CSC. The CSC also
dismissed petitioner‘s allegation that these were
―midnight‖ appointments, pointing out that the
Constitutional provision relied upon by
petitioner prohibits only those appointments
made by an outgoing President and cannot be
made to apply to local elective officials. Thus,
the CSC opined, ―the appointing authority can
validly issue appointments until his term has
expired, as long as the appointee meets the
qualification standards for the position.‖
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Issue: Whether or not the employees should be
recalled on the sole ground that their
appointment is a midnight appointment.
Held: Initial approval of an appointment may
be recalled on any of the following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the
procedures/criteria provided in the agency‘s
Merit Promotion Plan;
(b) Failure to pass through the agency‘s
Selection/Promotion Board;
(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement
between management and employees relative to
promotion; or
(d) Violation of other existing civil service law,
rules and regulations.
Accordingly, the appointments of the
private respondents may only be recalled on the
above-cited grounds. And yet, the only reason
advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall
was that these were ―midnight appointments.‖
The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the
constitutional prohibition on so-called
―midnight appointments,‖ specifically those
made within two (2) months immediately prior
to the next presidential elections, applies only to
the President or Acting President.
People v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 164185; July 23, 2008
Topic: On Legal Disqualifications on
Appointment
Facts: Private respondent Alejandro A.
Villapando won as Municipal Mayor of San
Vicente, Palawan. He was charged for violation
of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon for taking advantage of his official
functions when he designated ORLANDO M.
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TIAPE as a Municipal Administrator of San
Vicente, Palawan, knowing fully well that
Orlando Tiape, a relative of Villapando‘s wife
and that lacks the qualification as he is a losing
mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of
Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte during the May
1998 elections, hence is ineligible for
appointment to a public office within one year
(1) from the date of the elections.
Issue: Whether or not Villapando violated the
provisions of Article 244 of the RPC which
punishes any public officer who shall knowingly
nominate or appoint to any public office any
person lacking legal disqualifications.
Held: Yes. Such appointment is in violation of
Art. 244 of the RPC. Legal disqualification in
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code simply
means disqualification under the law. Clearly,
Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 94(b) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within
one year after such election to be appointed to
any office in the government or any
government-owned or controlled corporations
or in any of their subsidiaries.
J. 2. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
Sarangani v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 135927. June 26, 2000
Topic: On Judicial Review of COMELEC’s
Findings
Facts: An ocular inspection was conducted on
the alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in the
Municipality of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur. Task
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Force Investigation Team from the COMELEC
arrived in the area supposedly Barangay Padian
Torogan. It came out that the name Padian-
Torogan means a cemetery not a residential
place. So this contradicts the records being
brought by the COMELEC Team from the
Census saying that the area has 45 households
with a total population of 285. COMELEC
issued Order finding Padian Torogan as ghost
precinct and shall be excluded from the special election to
be conducted in Madalum. Petitioners seek to
nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC, for
having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent
COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost
precinct.
Held: No. The findings of the administrative
agency cannot be reversed on appeal
or certiorari particularly when no significant facts
and circumstances are shown to have been
overlooked or disregarded which when
considered would have substantially affected the
outcome of the case. The COMELEC has
broad powers to ascertain the true results of an
election by means available to it. The assailed
order having been issued pursuant to
COMELEC‘s administrative powers and in the
absence of any finding of grave abuse of
discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent,
said order shall stand. Judicial interference is
unnecessary and uncalled for. No voter is
disenfranchised because no such voter exist.
The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the
Constitution is not tampered when a list of
fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral
exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the
Constitution only on citizens who are qualified
to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent
voters all the more protects the validity and
credibility of the electoral process as well as the
right of suffrage because the "electoral will"
would not be rendered nugatory by the
inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws
should give effect to, rather than frustrate the
will of the people.
Nevertheless, the determination of
whether a certain election precinct actually
exists or not and whether the voters registered
in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter.
On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that
factual findings of the COMELEC based on its
own assessments and duly supported by
evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more
so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on
the validity of the same.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 161265. February 24, 2004
Topic: COMELEC and Political Party
Dispute
Facts: Preceding the May 2004 Elections, a
dispute arose within the LDP Party as to who
among the [LDP] officers [are] authorized to
authenticate before the Commission that the
person filing the certificate of candidacy as party
nominee for a certain position is the official
candidate of the party chosen in accordance
with its Constitution. The COMELEC
decided the dispute with LEGAL EQUITY
recognizing candidates for President down to
the last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad nominated
and endorsed by LDP Chairman Edgardo J.
Angara as official candidates of LDP ―Angara
Wing‖ and those nominated and endorsed by
LDP Secretary General Agapito ―Butz‖ Aquino
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are recognized as official candidates of LDP
―Aquino Wing‖
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing the two wings of LDP
Held: Yes. From the foregoing, it is plain that
the COMELEC misapplied equity in the
present case. For all its conceded merits, equity
is available only in the absence of law and not as
its replacement. Equity is described as justice
without legality, which simply means that it
cannot supplant, although it may, as often
happens, supplement the law.[40] The
COMELEC should have decided the case on
the basis of the party constitution and election
laws.
By creating the two wings, the
COMELEC effectively diffused the LDP‘s
strength and undeniably emasculated its chance
of obtaining the Commission‘s nod as the
dominant minority party.
By allowing each wing to nominate
different candidates, the COMELEC planted
the seeds of confusion among the electorate,
who are apt to be confounded by two
candidates from a single political
party. In Recabo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, this
Court declared that the electoral process
envisions one candidate from a political party
for each position, and disunity and discord
amongst members of a political party should
not be allowed to create a mockery
thereof. The admonition against mocking the
electoral process not only applies to political
parties but with greater force to the COMELEC.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Sandoval v. COMELEC
G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000
Topic: On COMELEC’s Jurisdiction Over
Pre-Proclamation Contests
Facts: Petitioner Sandoval was proclaimed the
duly elected congressman of the legislative
district of Malabon-Navotas pending the
petition private respondent filed with the
COMELEC an Urgent Manifestation/Motion
in connection with SPC No.98-143. Private
respondent filed with the COMELEC in
connection with SPC No.98-143 an "Urgent
Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative
District Board of Canvassers for Malabon and
Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of the
Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as
Congressman." It alleged that there was a verbal
order from the COMELEC Chairman to
suspend the canvass and proclamation of the
winning candidate for congressman of the
Malabon-Navotas legislative district; that the
district board of canvassers proceeded with the
canvass and proclamation despite the verbal
order; and that the non-inclusion of the 19
election returns in the canvass would result in
an incomplete canvass of the election returns. It
prayed that the decision of the district board of
canvassers be reversed and that the municipal
board of canvassers of Malabon be reconvened
to complete its canvass. It also prayed that the
proclamation of petitioner as congressman be
annulled.
The COMELEC en banc issued an order
setting aside the proclamation of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has
jurisdiction pre-proclamation controversy
alleging the existence 'of manifest error in the
certificate of canvass.
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Held: Yes. As a general rule, the COMELEC
has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-
proclamation controversies. As an exception,
however, to the general rule, Section 15 of
Republic Act (RA) 7166, prohibits candidates in
the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and
congressional elections from filing pre-
proclamation cases. The prohibition aims to
avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in
the election, which delay might result in a
vacuum in these sensitive posts.
COMELEC v. Tagle
G. R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60. February 17,
2003
Topic: Immunity from Criminal Liability of
Witnesses in an Election Case
Facts: During the 11 May 1998 elections,
Florentino A. Bautista ran for the position of
mayor in the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. On
8 July 1998, he filed with the COMELEC a
complaint against then incumbent mayor Atty.
Federico Poblete et. al., for violation of Section
261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code.
The complaint was supported by the separate
affidavits of forty-four (44) witnesses attesting
to the vote-buying activities of the respondents.
Before the trial, a complaint was filed for
violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus
Election Code against the witnesses in the
criminal case for vote-buying. The
COMELEC en banc issued a minute resolution
holding that the respondents therein are exempt
from criminal prosecution pursuant to the
fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No.
6646, otherwise known as ―The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987,‖ which grants immunity
from criminal prosecution persons who
voluntarily give information and willingly testify
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
against those liable for vote-buying or vote-
selling. Pursuant to Minute Resolution No. 00-
2453, the Law Department filed a motion to
dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-
00 and 7980-00 before Branch 20 of the RTC of
Imus, Cavite, presided by herein respondent
judge. The latter, however, denied the said
motion and the motion for
reconsideration. According to respondent judge,
before one can be exempt from prosecution
under the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of
R.A. No. 6646, it is necessary that such person
has already performed the overt act of
voluntarily giving information or testifying in
any official investigation or proceeding for the
offense to which such information or testimony
was given. It was thus premature to exempt the
respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 from criminal
prosecution, since they have not yet testified.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in peremptorily denying
the prosecution‘s motion to dismiss Criminal
Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00.
Held: Yes. Respondents in who are the accused
in Criminal Case for vote selling are exempt
from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by
virtue of the proviso in the last paragraph of
Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Respondent judge
lost sight of the fact that at the time the
complaint for vote-selling was filed with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the had
already executed sworn statements attesting to
the corrupt practice of vote-buying in the case
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. It
cannot then be denied that they had
already voluntarily given information in the vote-
buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in
Criminal Case No. 7034-99 per petitioner‘s
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Memorandum filed with this Court. Clearly then,
respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when he denied the motion to
dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-
00 and 7980-00 despite COMELEC‘s
determination that the accused therein are
exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-
selling pursuant to the proviso in the fourth
paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646.
K. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan
Telecommunications Inc.
GR No. 162015; March 6, 2006
Topic: On LGUs’ Taxing Power
Facts: The government of Quezon City,
pursuant to the taxing power vested on the
Local Government Units by Sec. 5, Art. X of
the Constitution in relation to Sec. 232 of the
LGC, enacted the Quezon City Revenue Code
imposing a real property tax on all real
properties in Quezon City and reiterating under
Sec. 6 thereof, the withdrawal of exemption
from real property tax under section 234 of the
LGC. With the QC‘s Revenue Code, new tax
declarations for Bayantel‘s real properties in
Quezon City were issued. Bayantel, on the other
hand, sought the exclusion of its real properties
in the city from the roll of taxable real
properties on the ground that under RA 7633
(enacted months after the effectivity of the
LGC), amending Bayantel‘s original franchise,
states that ‗the grantee, its successors or assigns
shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real
estate, buildings and personal property,
exclusive of this franchise, as other persons
or corporations are now or hereinafter may be
required by law to pay.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Issue: Whether or not the city government of
Quezon City, pursuant to its delegated power to
tax under the LGC, can impose real property
tax on Bayantel which was granted exemption
by Congress.
Ruling: No. Reiterating the Court‘s ruling in
PLDT v. City of Davao, the grant of taxing
powers to LGUs under the Constitution and the
LGC does not affect the power of Congress to
grant exemptions to certain persons pursuant to
a declared national policy.
In the case at bar, Rep. Act No. 7633 was
enacted subsequent to the LGC. Perfectly aware
that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel‘s
former exemption from realty taxes, Congress
opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under
Section 11 thereof, exactly the same defining
phrase ‖exclusive of this franchise‖ which was
the basis for Bayantel‘s exemption from realty
taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language,
Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 states that ―the
grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable
to pay the same taxes on their real estate,
buildings and personal property, exclusive of
this franchise, as other persons or corporations
are now or hereafter may be required by law to
pay.‖
Alternative Center for Organizational
Reforms and Development Inc. v. Zamora
GR No. 144256; June 8, 2005
Topic: On Automatic Release of the IRA
Facts: President Estrada submitted the
National Expenditures Program for Fiscal Year
2000 with an IRA allotment of P121, 778, 000,
000. The Legislature then passed RA 8760 or
the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal
Year 2000 which allotted for the IRA for LGUs
in the amount of P111, 778, 000, 000 and in
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another part of the GAA under the heading
‗UNPROGRAMMED FUNDS‘ provided for
an allotment of 10 Billion which shall be released
only when the revenue targets can be realized.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this
constitutional mandate when it made the
release of IRA contingent on whether revenue
collections could meet the revenue targets
originally submitted by the President, rather
than making the release automatic as mandated
under Article X Section 6.
Issue: Whether or not the Legislature can
impose conditional requirement in the release of
IRA.
Held: No. The automatic release of IRA is
mandatory in nature. To rule that the term
‗automatic release‘ contemplates such
conditional release would be to strip the term
automatic of all meaning, and the only
exception to the rule is when the national
internal revenue collections for the current fiscal
year is less than 40 percent of the collections of
the preceding third fiscal year, in which case
what should be automatically released shall be a
proportionate amount of the collections for the
current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be
made on a quarterly basis depending on the
actual collections of national internal revenue
taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year.
Batangas CATV v. CA
GR No. 138810; September 29, 2004
Topic: On LGUs’ Power of Regulation
Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City
of Batangas enacted Resolution No. granting
petitioner a permit to construct, install, and
operate a CATV system in Batangas City.
Section 8 of the Resolution provides that
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petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers
the maximum rates specified therein, ―provided,
however, that any increase of rates shall be
subject to the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod.‖ Sometime in November 1993,
petitioner increased its subscriber rates from
P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result,
respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter
threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures
the approval of respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
alleged that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod
has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators because under
Executive Order No. 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has
the sole authority to regulate the CATV
operation in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has the power to regulate
subscriber charges by CATV Operators.
Held: No. Since E.O. No. 205, a general law,
mandates that the regulation of CATV
operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an
LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a
resolution in
violation of the said law. It is a fundamental
principle that municipal ordinances are inferior
in status and subordinate to the laws of the state.
An ordinance in conflict with a state law of
general character and statewide application is
universally held to be invalid. The principle is
frequently expressed in the declaration that
municipal authorities, under a general grant of
power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe
the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the
general policy of the state. In every power to
pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is
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an implied restriction that the ordinances shall
be consistent with the general law.
Rodolfo Navarro et. al. v. Executive
Secretary Ermita
GR No. 180050; February 10, 2010
Topic: On Creation of Provinces
Facts: Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands. Petitioners question
the constitutionality of the law pointing that
when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land
area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a
population of only 106,951, failing to comply
with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
and of Section 461 of the LGC. Respondents
on the other hand argued that they conducted
special census in 2003 which yielded a
population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the
proposed province. The NSO, however, did not
certify the result of the special census. They
further argued that the land requirement need
not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a chartered city
or cities that do not contribute to the income of
the province as stated in the LGC-IRR.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9355 complied with
the Constitution and Statutory Requirements
under Section 461 of the LGC.
Held: No. RA 9355 was rendered
Unconstitutional. It is a requirement in the LGC
that the population requirement be certified by
the NSO, in the case at bar, even though the
special census was conducted with the
assistance of NSO representative, still the result
was not certified by the said government agency
since NSO conducts census of population every
10 years and special census every 5 years, in this
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case, the special census was conducted 2003.
Likewise, the pertinent provision in the IRR did
not fill in any detail in accordance with a known
standard provided for by the law. Instead, the
IRR added an exemption to the standard or
criteria prescribed by the Local Government
Code in the creation of a province as regards
the land area requirement, which exemption is
not found in the Code. As such, the provision
in the IRR that the land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one or more islands is not in
conformity with the standard or criteria
prescribed by the Local Government Code;
hence, it is null and void.
Rodolfo Navarro et. al. v. Executive
Secretary Ermita
GR No. 180050; April 12. 2011
Topic: On Creation of Provinces
Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration of
the February 10, 2010 Decision. The Decision
declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for
failure to comply with the requirements on
population and land area in the creation of a
province under the LGC. Consequently, it
declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the
election of its officials as null and void. The
Decision likewise declared as null and void the
provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR),
stating that, ―[t]he land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands‖ for being
beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC,
inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly
provided in the law.
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Issue: Whether or not the LGC-IRR is
unconstitutional on the ground that it provided
an exemption not expressly stated in the LGC
with respect to the creation of provinces.
Held: No. The LGC-IRR pertaining to
exemptions in the creation of provinces is
constutional. The Philippines, as an
archipelagic country, accounts for the
exemption from the land area requirement of
local government units composed of one or
more islands, as expressly stated under Sections
442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the
creation of municipalities and cities, but
inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with
respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the
void or missing detail was filled in by the
Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR. When
the
exemption was expressly provided in Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was
intended to correct the congressional oversight
in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the
true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order
for the Court to uphold the validity of Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR. Consistent with the
declared policy to provide local government
units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements
for prospective local government units should
be liberally construed in order to achieve the
desired results. The strict interpretation adopted
by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove
to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd,
awkward, and impractical.
_____________________________________
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Pablico v. Villapando
GR No. 147870; July 31, 2002
Topic: On Penalty or Dismissal from
Service on Erring Elective Officials
Facts: Alejandro Villapando and Ramir Pablico
were then the Mayor and Vice-Mayor
respectively of San Vicente, Palawan. The
Mayor entered into a consultancy agreement
with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty
candidate in the May 1998 elections. The
petitioners argued that the consultancy
agreement amounted to an appointment to a
government position within the prohibited one-
year period under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the
1987 Constitution. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan found respondent
Villapando guilty and imposed the penalty of
dismissal from service. Respondent Mayor then
appealed to the Office of the President but only
affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Issue: Whether or not local legislative bodies
and/or the Office of the President, on appeal,
can validly impose the penalty of dismissal from
service on erring elective officials.
Held: No. Sec. 60 of the LGC provides that an
elective official may be removed from office on
the grounds enumerated above by proper court
order. It is clear from the last paragraph of the
aforecited provision that the penalty of
dismissal from service upon an erring elective
local official may be decreed only by a court of
law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., the
Court held that ―[t]he Office of the President is
without any power to remove elected officials,
since such power is exclusively vested in the
proper courts as expressly provided for in the
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last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.‖
The law on suspension or removal of elective
public officials must be strictly construed and
applied, and the authority in whom such power
of suspension or removal is vested must
exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is
involved is not just an ordinary public official
but one chosen by the people through the
exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage.
Their will must not be put to naught by the
caprice or partisanship of the disciplining
authority. Where the disciplining authority is
given only the power to suspend and not the
power to remove, it should not be permitted to
manipulate the law by usurping the power to
remove.
Atienza v. Villarosa
GR No. 161081; May 10, 2005
Topic: On Power of the Vice-Governor
Facts: Petitioner Atienza and respondent
Villarosa were the Vice-Governor and
Governor respectively of the Province of
Occidental Mindoro. Petitioner Vice-Governor
received a memorandum issued by the
Governor concerning the authority to sign
Purchase Orders of Supplies, Materials,
Equipment, Including Fuel Repairs and
Maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
shall be approved by the Governor himself in
his capacity as the local chief executive of the
province. In his reply, the Vice-Governor that
the concern in the memorandum is under his
authority and that the Governor‘s apporoval is
no longer necessary pursuant to Sec. 466 and
468 of RA 7160. Unimpressed in the reply of
the Vice-Governor, the Governor issued
another memorandum terminating contract of
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services of casual/job order employees and
reappointment of the respective recommendees
entered into by the Vice-Governor and only
retained 4 casual job orders to be assigned to
the Office of the Vice-Governor and 1
casual/job order employee for each member of
the Sanggunian Panlalawigan.
Issues: 1. Who between the Governor or Vice-
Governor is authorized to approve purchase
orders issued in connection with the
procurement of supplies, materials, equipment,
including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the
Sanggunian Panalalawigan?
2. Does the Governor have the authority to
terminate or cancel the appointments of casual
job/ order employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members and the Office of the
Vice-Governor?
Held: 1. It is the Vice-Governor who has the
authority pursuant to RA 7160, local legislative
power of the province is exercised by the
Sanggunian Panlalawigan and the Vice-
Governor is its presiding officer. The same
statute vests upon the Vice-Governor the
power to ‗Be the presiding officer of the
Sanggunian Panlalawigan and sign all warrants
drawn on the provincial treasury for all
expenditures appropriated for the operation of
the sangguniang panlalawigan.
2. The Governor, with respect to the
appointment of the officials and employees of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has no such
authority. Thus, while the Governor has the
authority to appoint officials and employees
whose salaries are paid out of the provincial
funds, this does not extend to the officials and
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
because such authority is lodged with the Vice-
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Governor. In the same manner, the authority to
appoint casual and job order employees of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan belongs to the Vice-
Governor. The authority of the Vice-Governor
to appoint the officials and employees of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan is anchored on the fact
that the salaries of these employees are derived
from the appropriation specifically for the said
local legislative body. Indeed, the budget source
of their salaries is what sets the employees and
officials of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan apart from the other employees and
officials of the province. Accordingly, the
appointing power of the Vice-Governor is
limited to those employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, as well as those of the Office of
the Vice-Governor, whose salaries are paid out of the
funds appropriated for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Latasa v. COMELEC
GR No. 154829
Topic: Three Term Limit Rule
Facts: Petitioner Latasa was elected mayor of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao Del Sur in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. During the
Petitioner‘s third term, the Municipality of
Digos was declared a component city to be
known as City of Digos. This event also marked
the end of petitioner‘s tenure as mayor of the
Municipality fo Digos; however, under Section
53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was
mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as
mayor of the new City of Digos, hence, he took
his ath as the city mayor. In the 2001 elections,
petitioner filed his COC for ‗city mayor‘. He
stated therein that he is eligible therefor and
likewise disclosed that he had already served for
three consecutive terms as mayor of the
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Municipality of Digos and is now running for
the first time for the position as the City Mayor.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Latasa is
eligible to run as candidate for the position of
mayor of the newly created City of Digos
immediately after he served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality
of Digos.
Held: No. He is not eligible to run for the
position of City Mayor. While it is true that the
new city acquired a new corporate existence
separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that
for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a
different local government post as that of the
office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the
same as that of the municipality. Consequently,
the inhabitants of the municipality are the same
as those in the city. These inhabitants are the
same group of voters who elected petitioner
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years.
Laceda Sr. v. Limena and COMELEC
GR No. 182867; November 25, 2008
Topic: Three Term Limit Rule
Facts: Laceda served as Punong Barangay of
Panlayaan, West District, Sorsogon City for
three consecutive terms. Latasa argued that that
when he was elected for his first two terms,
Sorsogon was still a municipality and that when
he served his third term, the Municipality of
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Sorsogon had already been merged with the
Municipality of Bacon to form a new political
unit, the City of Sorsogon pursuant to RA 8806.
Thus he argued that his third term was actually
just his first term in the new political unit and
that he was accordingly entitled to run for two
more terms.
Laceda likewise argued that assuming he had
already served three consecutive terms, Rep.
Act No. 9164 which imposes the three-term
limit, cannot be made to apply to him as it
would violate his vested right to office. He
alleged that when he was elected in 1994 the
prohibition did not exist. Had he known that
there will be a law preventing him to run for the
fourth time, he would not have run for office in
1994 as he was looking forward to the election
in 2007.
Issue: Whether or not Laceda is eligible to run
as candidate for Punong Barangay after serving
for three consecutive terms as Punong Barangay
of Panlayaan.
Held: No. He cannot run for again for the
Office of the Punong Barangay after serving
three consecutive terms. while it is true that
under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of
Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and
converted into a city thereby abolishing the
former and creating Sorsogon City as a new
political unit, it cannot be said that for the
purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2
of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of
Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of
Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of
Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is the same
as before the conversion. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They
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are the same group of voters who elected
Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held
power and authority as their Punong Barangay.
Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt
Laceda's term.
Atty. Rivera III & Atty. De Guzman v.
COMELEC & Morales
GR No. 167591; May 9, 2007
Topic: On Three Term Limit Rule
Facts: Petitioners Atty. Rivera III and Atty. De
Guzman filed a petition to cancel respondent
Morales‘ COC for the 2004 elections on the
ground that he was elected and served three
previous consecutive terms as Mayor of
Mabalacat. Respondent Morales argued that he
served as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for
the term 1995-1998 (first term) and 2001-2004
(third term) but during his second term 1998-
2001, he only served as a ‗caretaker of the office‘
or as a ‗de facto officer‘ because he was not
validly elected for the second term since his
proclamation was declared void by the RTC and
the Decision became final and executor on
August 6, 2001 and that he was preventively
suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft
case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999.
Issue: Whether or not Morales‘ assumption of
office as Mayor of Mabalacat from 1998-2001
may be considered as one full term service in
the context of the three-term limit rule.
Held: Yes, such assumption of office for
service of the full term should be counted as
full term in contemplation of the three term
limit rule prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions barring local elective
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officials from being elected and serving for
more than three consecutive terms for the same
office, thereby, Morales is not eligible to run
again. Here, respondent Morales was elected for
the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. There
was actually no interruption or break in the
continuity of Morales‘ service with respect to
the 1998-2001 term. He assumed the position.
He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was
mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the
Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest
case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him
(respondent) as mayor.
Dizon v. COMELEC & MORALES
GR No. 182088; January 30, 2009
Topic: On Three Term Limit Rule
Facts: Petitioner alleges that respondedt was
proclaimed as the Municipal Mayor of
Mabalacat Pampanga during the 1995, 1998,
2001 and 2004 elections and had fully served
the same. Respondent filed his COC on March
28, 2007 again for the same position. Petitioner
argues that respondent is no longer eligible and
qualified to run for the same position for the
May 14, 2007 elections as it is violative of the
three term limit rule. Respondent, on the other
hand, asserts that he is still eligible and qualified
to run because he was not elected for the said
position in the 1998 elections thereby his term
should be reckoned from 2001 and that his
election in 2004 is only his second term.
Issue: Whether or not Morales‘ fourth term
was interrupted when he relinquished the office
for 1 month and 14 days prior to the May 14,
2007 elections.
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Held: Yes, Morales‘ relinquishment of the
office should be considered an interruption
since the ruling in the Rivera case declared
Morales to have served three consecutive terms
for the same office because there was actually
no interruption in his service as a result his
COC was cancelled for the term of 2004 to
2007 and respondent has relinquished the
disputed position on May 16, 2007 and the
Vice-Mayor then took his oath and assumed
office as mayor on May 17, 2007 until the term
ended on June 30, 2007. The assumption by the
vice-mayor of the office of the mayor no matter
how short it may seem, interrupted Morales‘
continuity of service. Thus Morales did not hold
office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June
2007.
Montebon & Ondoy v. COMELEC &
Potencioso Jr.
GR No. 180444; April 8, 2008
Topic: On Voluntary Renunciation of Office
Facts: Petitioners Montebon and Ondoy filed a
petition for disqualification against respondent
Potencioso alleging that respondent had been
elected three consecutive terms as municipal
councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004 and 2004-
2007, thus he is proscribed from running for the
same position in the 2007 elections as it would
be his fourth consecutive term. In his answer,
respondent admitted that he had been elected
for three consecutive terms as municipal
councilor, however, he claimed that the service
of his second term was interrupted on January
12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice-mayor of
Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice-Mayor
Mendoza. In petitioners‘ memorandum, they
maintained that respondent‘s assumption of
office as vicemayor in January 2004 should not
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be considered an interruption in the service of
his second term since it was a voluntary
renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.
They argued that, according to the law,
voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the official concerned was
elected.
Issue: Whether or not Potencioso‘s second
term should be considered as a voluntary
renunciation to disqualify him from running
again in the same position.
Held: No. Such assumption to the office of the
vice-mayor is an involuntary renunciation thus
he is qualified to run again. In this case, a
permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the
vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor
Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest
ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in
accordance with law. It is clear therefore that his
assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no
way be considered a voluntary renunciation of
his office as municipal councilor.
BOLOS JR. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184082; March 17, 2009
TOPIC: Local Government
FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Punong
Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3 terms.
In May 2004, sitting as the incumbent PB, he
ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won.
He served the full term of the Sangguniang
Bayan position until June 30, 2007.
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Thereafter, petitioner filed his CoC for Punong
Barangay in the 2007 Barangay Elections.
Respondent Cinconiegue filed before the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
petitioner on the ground that there was
voluntary renunciation on the latter‘s part.
Petitioner argued that his election and
assumption of office as Municipal Councilor
was by operation of law.
The 1st division of COMELEC ruled that the
relinquishment of office as PB, as a
consequence of his assumption of office as SB
Member, was a voluntary renunciation of office.
Comelec En Banc affirmed the decision of the
division.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was voluntary
renunciation of the Office of Punong
Barangay by petitioner when he assumed office
as Municipal Councilor.
RULING: Yes. The Court agrees with the
COMELEC that there was voluntary
renunciation by petitioner of his position as
Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang
Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the
position of SB member, thus, voluntarily
relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay
which the Court deems as a voluntary
renunciation of said office.
ALDOVINO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836; December 23, 2009
TOPIC: Local Government
FACTS: The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo was
elected as councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms. (1998, 2001 and 2004) In
September 2005, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days because
of a criminal case against him.
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In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his CoC for the
same position. The petitioners sought to deny
due course to Asilo‘s Coc or to cancel it on the
ground that he had been elected and had served
for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term
therefore violated the three-term limit rule
under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELEC‘s Second Division ruled in
favor of Asilo. It reasoned out that the three-
term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to
render complete service for the 2004-2007 term
because of the suspension ordered by the
Sandiganbayan. The COMELEC En banc
refused to reconsider the Second Division‘s
ruling in its October 7, 2008 Resolution.
ISSUE: (1) Whether preventive suspension of
an elected local official is an interruption of the
three-term limit rule.
(2) Whether preventive suspension is
considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
RULING: No. temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term
because it does not involve the loss of title to
office or at least an effective break from holding
office; the office holder, while retaining title, is
simply barred from exercising the functions of
his office for a reason provided by law.
No. Preventive suspension does not involve a
voluntary act on the part of the suspended
official, except in the indirect sense that he may
have voluntarily committed the act that became
the basis of the charge against him.
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ARATEA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 195229; October 09, 2012
TOPIC: Local Government
FACTS: Lonzanida, candidate for Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales, filed his CoC for May
2010 Elections. Dra. Rodolfo filed a petition to
disqualify Lonzanida and to cancel his CoC on
the ground that he made a false material
representation in his CoC when he certified
under oath that he was eligible for the office he
sought election.
The COMELEC 2nd Division rendered a
Resolution cancelling Lonzanida‘s CoC. The
latter‘s motion for reconsideration remained
pending during the May 2010 Elections.
Lonzanida and Aratea were then proclaimed
Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor.
Requesting an opinion from the DILG if he was
legally required to assume the Office of the
Mayor in view of Lonzanida‘s disqualification,
the DILG stated that he should assume said
office in an acting capacity without prejudice to
Lonzanida‘s motion for reconsideration
COMELEC En Banc disqualified Lonzanida
from running for Mayor in the 2010 Elections
on the grounds that he served as a mayor for 3
consecutive terms and that he has been
convicted by final judgment of falsification
under the RPC. Antipolo, opponent of
Lonzanida for Mayorship, filed a Motion for
Leave and to Intervene.
COMELEC En Banc no longer considered
Lonzanida‘s qualification as an issue, and
granted the motion of Antipolo.
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ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Lonzanida can be
considered an eligible candidate in the 2010
Elections.
(2) Whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful
occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales
RULING: No. The conviction of Lonzanida
by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding
any public office, or from being elected to any
public office. This perpetual disqualification
took effect upon the finality of the judgment of
conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate
of candidacy. We hold that Antipolo, the alleged
"second placer" should be proclaimed Mayor
because Lonzanida‘s certificate of candidacy
was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was
never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida
were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only
qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Mayor.
TALAGA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 196804; October 9, 2012
TOPIC: Local Government
FACTS: Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo
respectively filed their CoCs for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in May
2010 Elections. Ramon declared in his CoC that
he was eligible for the office he was seeking to
be elected to. Castillo filed with the COMELEC
a petition for the denial or cancellation of the
CoC of Ramon for having already served 3
consecutive terms as a City Mayor. COMELEC
First Division disqualified Ramon to run for
Mayor of the said city.
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Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of
Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching
thereto the Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the
party that had nominated Ramon.
During the elections, the name of Ramon
remained printed on the ballots but the votes
cast in his favor were counted in favor of
Barbara Ruby, resulting in her victory. Castillo
was seeking for the suspension of Barbara
Ruby‘s proclamation. He alleged that Barbara
Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his
CoC had been cancelled and denied due course;
and she could not be considered a candidate
because the COMELEC En Banc had approved
her substitution three days after the elections;
hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be
considered stray.
Barbara Ruby countered that the COMELEC
En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel
Ramon‘s CoC because there was no finding that
he had committed misrepresentation. Roderick
Alcala sought to intervene, positing that he
should assume the post of Mayor because
Barbara Ruby‘s substitution had been invalid
and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Barbara Ruby can
validly substitute his husband, Ramon, as
candidate for Mayorship of Lucena City.
(2) Whether or not Roderick Alcala, the duly-
elected Vice-Mayor of Lucena City, should be
the one to assume the post of Mayor.
RULING: No. Existence of a valid CoC is a
condition sine qua non for a valid substitution.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give
rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
substitution of the candidate under Section 77
of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be
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clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a
valid CoC may not be validly substituted,
because a person without a valid CoC is not
considered a candidate in much the same way as
any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all
a candidate.
Yes. Elected Vice-Mayor must succeed
and assume the position of Mayor
due to a permanent vacancy in the office. The
law expressly declares that a candidate
disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him
shall not be counted. This is a mandatory
provision of law.
ABUNDO v. COMELEC
TOPIC: Local Government
FACTS: Abelardo Abundo Sr. vied for the
position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes for 4
consecutive elections (2001, 2004, 2007 and
2010). In both 2001 and 2007, he was
proclaimed as the winner and served his term.
However, Jose Torres was proclaimed winner in
the 2004 elections. Abundo unseated Torres
after a successful election protest. He served the
remaining 1 year and 1 month of the term.
In the 2010 elections, Abundo and Torres again
opposed each other. Torres filed a petition to
disqualify Abundo based on the three-term limit
rule. Meanwhile, Ernesto Vega filed a quo
warranto proceeding against Abundo before the
RTC which ruled that the latter was ineligible to
serve as Mayor. On appeal, COMELEC Second
Division and En Banc affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo is deemed to
have served three consecutive terms.
RULING: No. The two-year period during
which Torres, was serving as mayor should be
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considered as an interruption, which effectively
removed Abundo‘s case from the ambit of the
three-term limit rule.
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would
have been Abundo‘s three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken
during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially
deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed
to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after
due proceedings, was eventually declared to
have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
ADORMEO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147927; February 4, 2002
TOPIC: Local Government
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were
the only candidates who filed their CoCs for
mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001 elections.
Private respondent Talaga Jr. was then the
incumbent mayor, elected in 1992, 1995, 1998.
He lost to Tagarao in 1998. However, Talaga Jr.
won in a recall election and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
Petitioner filed a petition, seeking for Talaga‘s
disqualification, on the ground that the he was
elected and had served as city mayor for 3
consecutive. Private respondent claimed that he
served only for 2 consecutive terms and not 3,
pointing his defeat in the election by Tagarao.
COMELEC First Division found Talaga Jr.
disqualified to run for the Mayorship on the
ground that he had already served 3 consecutive
terms, and his Certificate of Candidacy was
ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled.
Talaga Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration
reiterating that ―3 consecutive terms‖ means
continuous service for 9 years. He further
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alleged that the recall election was not a regular
election, but a separate special election
specifically to remove incompetent local
officials. Petitioner opposed private
respondent‘s claim, stating that serving the
unexpired term of office is considered as 1
term.
COMELEC En banc ruled in favor of private
respondent and reversed the First Division‘s
ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent had
served 3 consecutive terms.
RULING: COMELEC‘s ruling that private
respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive
terms should be upheld. For nearly 2 years he
was a private citizen. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
1998 elections. To bolster his case, respondent
adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
stating that in interpreting said provision that ―if
one is elected representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no
matter how short, will be considered one term
for the purpose of computing the number of
successive terms allowed.‖
As pointed out by the COMELEC En banc, Fr.
Bernas‘ comment is pertinent only to members
of the House of Representatives. Unlike local
government officials, there is no recall election
provided for members of Congress
SOCRATES VS COMELEC
GR No. 154512; November 12, 2002
TOPIC: Local Government
FACTS: The members of the incumbent
barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa passed
Resolution No. 01-02 which declared its loss of
confidence in Victorino Dennis M. Socrates and
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called for his recall. COMELEC gave due
course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor
Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and
scheduled the recall election on September 7,
2002.
Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall
election. Several petitions were consolidated,
seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run
and the cancellation of his COC on the ground
that the latter is disqualified from running for a
4th consecutive term, having been elected and
having served as mayor of the city for 3
consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998
immediately prior to the instant recall election
for the same post.
COMELEC‘s First Division dismissed in a
resolution the petitioner for lack of merit and
declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall
election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hagedorn who has
been elected and served for 3 consecutive full
terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election.
HELD: The candidacy of Hagedorn in the
recall election is not an immediate re-election
after his third consecutive term which ended on
June 30, 2001. He ceased to be mayor after his
term and became a private citizen until the recall
election of September 24, 2002 when he won by
3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
MMDA v. GARIN
G.R. No. 130230; April 15, 2005
TOPIC: Local Government
FACTS: Garin was issued a traffic violation
receipt and his driver‘s license was confiscated
for parking illegally. He then wrote addressed to
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MMDA Chairman Oreta requesting the return
of his license and expressed his preference for
case to be filed in Court. Receiving no
immediate reply, Garin assailed the validity of
Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 on the
ground that it violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and
impose unspecified and unlimited fines and
penalties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5(f) of
Republic Act No. 7924 which authorizes
MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke
driver‘s license in the enforcement of traffic
constitutional.
RULING: The MMDA is not vested with
police power. It is not a local government unit
or a public corporation endowed with legislative
power and it has no power to enact ordinances
for the welfare of the community.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, is the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
for the subjects of the same.
MMDA v. VIRON TRANSPORTATION
CO., INC.
G.R. No. 170656; August 15, 2007
TOPIC: Local Government
FACTS: GMA issued EO No. 179, which
provided for the establishment of a Mass
Transport System for Greater Manila (the
Project). The Metro Manila Council, governing
board and policy making body of MMDA,
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
issued a Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003
expressing full support of the Project. MMDA
then recommended a plan to decongest traffic
by eliminating the bus terminals located along
major Metro Manila thoroughfares and
providing more and convenient access to the
mass transport system to the commuting public
through the provision of mass transport
terminal facilities. Respondents, provincial bus
operators who had bus terminals that were
threatened to be removed, alleged that the EO
No. 179 should be declared unconstitutional
and illegal for transgressing the possessory
rights of owners and operators of public land
transportation units over their respective
terminals.
ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA can validly
exercise police power by ordering the
elimination of the respondents‘ terminals.
RULING: MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project as envisioned by the EO
No. 179. Police power rests primarily with the
legislature, such power may be delegated by
virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be
exercised by the President and administrative
boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local governments
under an express delegation by the Local
Government Code of 1991.
It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus,
the President, although authorized to establish
or cause the implementation of the Project,
must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is
the primary implementing and administrative
entity in the promotion, development and
regulation of networks of transportation, and
the one so authorized to establish and
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implement a project such as the Project in
question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing
agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority
conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra
vires.
Disomangcop v. Datumanong
444 SCRA 203;
Topic: Local Government Units- Autonomous
Regions
Facts: The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074,
as implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the
functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which
includes Lanao del Sur to the Regional
Government. R.A. 8999 was passed to establish
an engineering district in the first district of the
Province of Lanao Del Sur. DPWH D.O. 119
was issued creating the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over
infrastructure projects within Marawi City and
Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality and
validity R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119
violate the provisions of E.O. 426
Ruling: Yes. The challenged law creates an
office with functions and powers which have
been previously devolved to the DPWH-
ARMM. The department order runs counter to
the provision of E.O. 426 identifying only four
district engineering offices in each of the four
provinces. The First Engineering District of the
DPWH-ARMM in Lanao Del Sur has
jurisdiction over projects within Marawi City.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Sema v. COMELEC
558 SCRA 700; July 16, 2008
Topic: Local Government Units-Autonomous
Regions
Facts: RA 9054 was passed amending
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao‘s
Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays.
ARMM Regional Assembly then created Shariff
Kabunsuan which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao
with the exception of Cotabato City. For the
purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC
treated Cotabato City as part of the legislative
district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Petitioner Sema was a congressional candidate
for the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City. She contended that
Cotabato City should be a separate legislative
district and that the votes therefrom should be
excluded in the voting.
Issue: Whether or not ARMM Regional
Assembly can validly create LGUs.
Ruling: No. The ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot create a province without legislative
district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district.
Kida v. Senate of the Philippines
659 SCRA 270; October 18, 2011
667 SCRA 200; February 28, 2012
Topic: Local Government Units- Autonomous
Regions
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Facts: In 1989, Congress enacted R.A. No.
6734 providing for an organic act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. R.A
9054, R.A. 9140, and R.A. No. 9333 were
passed by Congress to reset ARMM regional
elections. However, R.A. No. 9333 was not
ratified in a plebiscite unlike the other two. R.A.
No. 10153 was later enacted to stop the
preparations for the ARMM elections in
accordance with R.A. 9333.
Petitioners assailed the validity of the laws
enacted subsequent to repeal R.A. 9054 for not
complying with the supermajority vote and
plebiscite requirements.
Issue: Whether or not the passage of RA No.
10153 requires a supermajority vote and
plebiscite.
Ruling: No. Subsequent laws R.A. 9333 and
R.A. No. 10153 cannot be considered
amendments to R.A. No. 9054 as they did not
change or revise any provision of the latter law.
They don‘t need to comply with the
supermajority requirement under Sec. 1, Article
XVII of R.A. 9054. Consequently, this voting
requirement must be struck down for giving
R.A.9054 the character of an irrepealable law by
requiring more than what the Constitution
demands. Furthermore, the plebiscite
requirement is also a constitutional violation.
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L. ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Abakada Group Partylist v. Purisima
562 SCRA 251; August 14, 2008
Topic: Accountability of Public Officers
Facts: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board).
Petitioners contend that, by establishing a
system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transforms the officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the
petitioner is meritorious
Ruling: No. Petitioner‘s claim is not only
without any factual and legal basis; it is also
purely speculative. Public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties. R.A. 9335 operates on the basis
thereof and reinforces it by providing a system
of rewards and sanctions with the purpose of
encouraging the officials and employees of BIR
and BOC to exceed their revenue targets and
optimize their revenue-generating capability and
collection.
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Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives
415 SCRA 44; November 10, 2003
Topic: Impeachment- Procedure
Facts: The House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution which directed the Committee on
Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF). Then, former Pres. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against CJ Hilario
Davide Jr. and 7 Associate Justices. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
―sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient
in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second
impeachment complaint was filed against CJ
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the second impeachment
complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution
Ruling: Yes. The initiation takes place by the
act of the filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice.
Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, no
impeachment may be filed against the same
official within one year pursuant to Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives
415 SCRA 44; February 15, 2011
Topic: Impeachment- Procedure
Facts: On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an
impeachment complaint against Ombudsman
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez based on betrayal
of public trust and culpable violation of the
Constitution. A Second Complaint was filed by
Reyes against the same respondent also based
on the same grounds. The two complaints were
referred by the House Plenary to the Committee
on Justice at the same time and found that the
two complaints were sufficient in form and
substance.
Petitioner maintains the ―one offense, one
complaint‖ rule stating that a complaint or
information must charge only one offense.
Issue: Whether or not an impeachment
complaint need to allege only one impeachable
offense.
Ruling: No. An impeachment complaint need
not allege only one impeachable offense. The
Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
impeachment offenses, with each charge
representing an article of impeachment,
assembled in one set known as the ―Articles of
Impeachment.‖ Multiple complaints may be
considered so long as they would all be
simultaneously referred/endorsed to the proper
committee of the HR, and would lead to only
one impeachment proceeding.
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Office of the Ombudsman v. CA
452 SCRA 714; March 4, 2005
Topic: Impeachment- Impeachable Officers
Facts: Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
(OMB) filed a formal complaint against then
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas,
respondent Arturo Mojica.
Issue: Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman
is an impeachable officer
Ruling: No. The impeachable officers
enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution is exclusive. Only the Ombudsman,
not his deputies, is impeachable.
People v. Sandiganbayan
451 SCRA 413; February 16, 2005
Topic: Sandiganbayan
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two
separate informations for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) with the Sandiganbayan against
Efren Alas, in his capacity as President and
Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal
Savings Bank (PPSB). Alas argued that
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction which the
latter confirmed because PPSB was a private
corporation because it was not created by a
special law.
Petitioner contended that PPSB is a GOCC and
that there must be no distinction as to the
manner of its creation. Hence, Alas came under
the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether or not PPSB is within the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
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 POLITICAL LAW I JUSTICE AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
Ruling: Yes. Sec. 2 (13) of E.O. 292 defines
GOCCs and PPSB fits the bill as the subsidiary
of the Philippine Postal Corporation
(PHILPOST). Furthermore, Congress enacted
R.A. 8249 which maintains the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan over presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations without any distinction
whatsoever.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service
Commission
451 SCRA 714; February 16, 2005
Topic: Ombudsman
Facts: The Civil Service Commission issued
qualification standards for the Graft
Investigation Officer III under the Office of the
Ombudsman. It further classified it as a Career
Executive Service (CES) position, thus requiring
CES eligibility.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has
the appointing authority, who is specifically
tasked by the Constitution to choose his own
qualified personnel. CSC has no authority to
review the appointments made except only to
ascertain if they met the required qualifications.
Issue: Whether or no CSC can impose such
qualifications to personnel of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Ruling: No. The CSC may not classify a
position created by the Ombudsman as
belonging to the Career Executive Service and
require and appointee thereto to acquire Career
Executive Service eligibility because they are
appointed by the President. This derogates the
appointing power of the Ombudsman
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Gonzales III v. Office of the President
679 SCRA 614; September 4, 2012
Topic: Ombudsman
Facts: Petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, Deputy
Ombudsman, was dismissed by the Office of
the President. Petitioner seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989),
which gives the President the power to dismiss
a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the
Ombudsman because it is the Office of the
Ombudsman that has the constitutional
authority to discipline Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutors.
Issue: Whether or not the President has
constitutional or valid statutory authority to
order petitioner‘s removal as Deputy
Ombudsman
Ruling: Yes. The Ombudsman‘s administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman
is not exclusive. Under Sec. 21 of R.A. 6770, the
President has concurrent authority with respect
to the removal from office of the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor.
QUIMBO VS GERVACIO
G.R. No. 155620 (August 9, 2005)
TOPIC: Difference of Preventive Suspension
and Suspension as Penalty
FACTS: Petitioner, Provincial Engineer of
Samar, was administratively charged for
harassment and oppression by a general
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foreman. During the pendency, petitioner
served his preventive suspension of two months
and seventeen days without pay. The Office of
the Ombudsman found him guilty of
oppression and recommended that he be
―suspended from office for a period of eight (8)
months without pay. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration/Consideration to take into
account the two months and seventeen days of
his preventive suspension without pay as part of
his penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not preventive suspension
can be taken into account in suspension as
penalty.
RULING: No, the distinction, by considering
the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily
cognizable as they have different ends sought to
be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a
preventive measure, a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The purpose of the
suspension order is to prevent the accused from
using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesss or tamper records which may be vital
in the prosecution of the case against him. If
under such investigation, the charge established
and the person investigated is found guilty of
acts warranting his suspension or removal, then
he is suspended removed or dismissed. That is
the penalty.
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CRUZ VS GANGAN
G.R. No. 143403 (January 22, 2003)
TOPIC: Accountability on Government
Property
FACTS: Petitioner coming from the Regional
Office of the Technological Education and
Skills Development Authority (TESDA)
boarded in the Light Railway Transit (LRT)
from Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue to Monumento in
returning to her official station in Caloocan City
where she was then Camanava district director
of the TESDA when her handbag was slashed
and its contents stolen by an unidentified
person including the government-issued cellular
phone. Petitioner then requested relief from
accountability of the subject property but
Commission on Audit found no sufficient
justification to grant the request for relief for
accountability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is
accountable of the subject property for
negligence.
RULING: No. negligence on the part of the
petitioner had no factual or legal basis and was
therefore invalid. The records do not show that
any specific act of negligence on her part. It is a
settled rule that negligence cannot be presumed;
it has been proven. In the absence of any shred
of evidence thereof, respondents gravely abused
their discretion in finding petitioner negligent.
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