Aquino, Ninoy v Enrile

59 SCRA 183
Ponente: Makalintal, CJ.
Topic: Commander-in-Chief

Introduction of Justice Makalintal (short summary)

These cases are 9 Petitions for habeas corpus. All petitioners having been arrested and
detained by the military because of Marcos’ Presidential Proclamation No. 1081 (Martial Law)
dated September 21, 1972.

Before this case was decided, Jose Diokno filed to withdraw his petition. Marcos released him
before his petition was granted and thus, renders the decision of the Court moot and academic.
In other cases EXCEPT NINOY AQUINO, they have been released and were subject to certain
restrictions.

Ninoy Aquino had to face formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of firearms
with a Military Commission.

Facts
• Petitioners1 were arrested pursuant to General Order No. 2 “for being participants in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the
Government by force…”
• Because Marcos had declared Martial Law, he now had the power to order the arrest of
people at his pleasure. He had suspended the writ of habeas corpus.
• Looking at the proclamation, the 1935 Constitution states that the “President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of the all armed forces and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection
or rebellion. He may also suspend the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines under
Martial Law.”

Issues/ Held/ Rationale

• Is the Proclamation No. 1081 valid and maybe subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question
political or justiciable in character?
o The Justices of the Supreme Court have varied answers to this question.
 Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino hold that the
question is political and therefore its determination is beyond the jurisdiction
of this Court.
 Justice Barredo believes that political questions are not per se beyond the
Court's jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being
plenary and all-embracing, but that as a matter of policy implicit in the
Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interfering with the
Executive's Proclamation, dealing as it does with national security, for which
the responsibility is vested by the charter in him alone.
 Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the President on the existence
of the grounds for the declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon
the Courts.
 Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino concur,
finds that there is no dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the
country, and on that premise emphasizes the factor of necessity for the
exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare
martial law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is such

1
Ninoy Aquino, Ramon Mitra, Francisco Rodrigo, Napoleon Rama, Joaquin Roces, Teodoro Locsin, Sr, Jose
Diokno, Carmen Diokno, etc.
 necessity is wholly confided to him and therefore is not subject to judicial
inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people.
 Justice Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Palma hold that the doctrine laid
down in Landang v Garcia should be applied. “The recognition of justiciability
accorded to the question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is there
expressly distinguished from the power of judicial review in ordinary civil or
criminal cases, and is limited to ascertaining "merely whether he (the
President) has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." The
test is not whether the President's decision is correct but whether, in
suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily. Applying this test, the
finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the
President's proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution;
and I concur with them in that finding.”
 Justice Makalintal states that he is convinced that the proclamation of
Marcos of Martial Law was valid because “a state of rebellion
existed in the country when Proclamation 1081 was issued.” He also
thinks that the state of rebellion still continues up to the present
(1974).
 Moreover, Justice Makalintal states that the “question of validity of
Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the
1973 Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain
valid, legal, binding and effective even after ... the ratification of this
Constitution ..."
 On the issue of political and justiciable question, Makalintal said that “the
political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this Court
in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for
the proclamation of martial law — has become moot and purposeless as a
consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973.”
• Must the Court dismiss the petitions of those who have been released but have not
withdrawn their petitions because they are still subject to restrictions?
o Yes, the Court should dismiss.
 The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to the
situation which justifies the proclamation of martial law, such as the
existence of a state of rebellion, necessarily implies the power (subject, in the
opinion of the Justices who consider Lansang applicable, to the same test of
arbitrariness laid down therein), to impose upon the released detainees
conditions or restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out
the purposes of the proclamation.
 Justice Fernando, however, "is for easing the restrictions on the right to travel
of petitioner Rodrigo" and others similarly situated and so to this extent
dissents from the ruling of the majority; while Justice Teehankee believes that
those restrictions do not constitute deprivation of physical liberty within the
meaning of the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
 Justice Makalintal states that it is only RIGHT that those who were detained
were arrested because it was pursuant to the objective in declaring Martial
Law which is to suppress invasion, insurrection, rebellion and safeguard the
public from imminent danger. The preservation of society and national
survival take precedence. The Court UNANIMOUSLY AGREED on this
point that those who were detained should have their privilege of
habeas corpus suspended!!!!!!!!!!
SUPREME COURT DISMISSED THE PETITIONS FOR HABEAS CORPUS.

Summary of the Whole Case (if you’re in a hurry)

Decided during Martial Law, it involved the petition of habeas corpus of Marcos’ critics,
notably Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Jose W. Diokno. The Supreme Court decided unanimously
to dismiss the petitions, but as Chief Justice Querube Makalintal put it, “there was no
agreement as to the manner the issues would be treated and developed. The same
destination would be reached, so to speak, but through different routes and by means of
different vehicles of approach.” He said that the reason why the Court did not produce a
single, collegial opinion, among others, was that the members of the Supreme Court are
conscious of "the future verdict of history" upon their stand.

Even before the cases were decided, Jose W. Diokno, to the chagrin of the Supreme Court,
opted to withdraw his petition on the ground that no fair decision can be made of the court
to render him justice. What made it worse was the fact that before the Supreme Court
could respond to Diokmo’s challenge, Marcos issued an order releasing him and the other
petitioners, leaving Aquino behind.

Justice Fred Ruiz Castro opined that the declaration of Martial Law automatically suspends
the application of the said writ, thus Aquino cannot be released. He said that Martial Law
“is founded upon the principle that the state has a right to protect itself against those who
would destroy it, and has therefore been likened to the right of an individual to self-
defense.”