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agalog vs Lim Vd de Gonzales Rule 70

Facts: Inocencia Tagalog leased a portion of land of Maria Lim Vd de Gonzales et al (co owner
siblings) and paid rent on a monthly basis. In 2002, de Gonzales notified Tagalog of their intention to
use the land. However, instead of leaving, Tagalog constructed a two storey residential house made of
large steel bars and hollowblocks. Respondents informed the Municipal Engr of the construction w/o a
building permit. It was ordered to stop but to no avail. de Gonzales filed a complaint for recovery of
possession in the RTC.

Issue Won the RTC has Jurisdiction

Held No. The subject of the action is unlawful detainer which falls w/in the jurisdiction of the MTC.
The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by the NATURE OF ACTION pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint. In the present case although denominated as recovery of
possession, the true aubjevt of the complaint is that of unlawful detainer. Hence, RTC does not have
jurisdiction to try and hear the case.

Angeles vs Bucad Rule 45

Facts: Rose and Zenaida Angeles are oweners of Las Marias Grill and Resto, Bucad along with other
employees filed an illegal dismissal and money claims against them alleging mainly that they are
underpaid, maltreated and abused. LA ruled in favor of Bucad et al. However Bucad et al appealed the
case to NLRC questioning the money claims. Nlrc denied. Bucad MR, it was denied then they elevate
the case to CA, which affirmed the decision with slight modifications. Then they appealed the case to
SC wherein Angeles presented evidence that they were not paying the employees beyond the minimum
wage through dovumentary evidence which they alleged were missing during the early stage of the
case.

Issue: won SC may allow resolution of facts

Held No. Pursuant to Rule 45, the SC is not a trier of facts. The findings of facts of the CA is binding
and final in SC. This rule is specially true in regard of administrative bodies in the exercise of their
expertise. Their findings are regarded with finality and is controlling even if the evidence is not
preponderant, particularly in this case where both LA and NLRC had the same findings.

RULE 38 RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS


ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL AND FATIMA A. AFDAL VS. ROMEO CARLOSDGMENTS
ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL AND FATIMA A. AFDAL VS. ROMEO CARLOS

FACTS: Respondents instituted a case of unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners, stating
that the petitioners were occupying the land by mere tolerance. Respondent further claimed that
petitionerAbubakar Afdal sold the property to him but that he allowed petitioners to stay in the
property. The trial proceeded ez parte, for failure of the petitioners to file their corresponding pleadings.
Furthermore the court ruled in favor of the respondents based on the pleadings and the presented pieces
of evidence. Upon the service of the writ of execution, Afdal after 3 days of receiving the writ of
execution filed a petition for relief from judgment. However, it is one of the prohibited pleadings under
the Rules of Court. Realizing such, Afdal withdrew his petition but filed it to the RTC. RTC dismissed
the petition for relief from judgment.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the case.

RULING: NO, the court did not erred in dismissing the case. Pursuant to Sec. 1 Rule 38 A petition for
relief from judgment, if applicable, should be filed in the court where in the case was heard. In the
given case, it is only proper for the RTC to dismiss the case because it is not the one who tried the it
therefore has no jurisdiction over the petition for relief. Moreover, it should be filed to the MTC but in
the given case, it is a prohibited pleading and not a proper remedy. The one that Afdal should have filed
is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Rule 6 Section 11 China Banking Corporation vs Padilla

Facts: On December 22, 1997, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, private respondent
Dolores Padilla had a checking account with CBC Tuguegarao, Cagayan. She filed a complaint for sum
of money with damages against the petitioner on December 1997 in RTC Makati, alleging mainly that
there were erroneous deductions from her account. CBC conducted an inveatigation and concluded that
the erroneous deductions, if true, are imputable to the Branch Manager Emelina Quitan for violating
the Code of Ethics and Operations Procedure and Policy Manual. Due to this, CBC, with leave of court
filed a third party complaint against Quintan. TC denied the motion on the ground that as a corporation
CBC may act only through its employees and was responsible for the acts committed by them in the
discharge of their function. CBC moved for MR but was dismissed. They appealed to SC via certioriari.
It was dismissed for lack of certified true copies of the judgement pursuant to Sec 3 of Rule 46. MR
denied. Elevated to SC.

Issue: won dismissal of CA is correct

Held: Yes. Non compliance of the required form is a sufficient ground for dismissal. Even assuming
that the petition filed in CA is sufficient in form, still the same is dismissible there being no grave abuse
of discretion committed by the trial court in issuing its order of August 17, 1999 which denied the
petitioners motion for leave of court to file third-party complaint against its branch manager. Explicitly,
Section 11, Rule 6, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides: SEC. 11. Third (fourth,
etc.)-party complaint. A third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with
leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.)-party
defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents
claim. A third-party complaint is actually a complaint independent of, and separate and distinct from,
the plaintiffs complaint. Its purpose is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of
lawsuits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters arising from one particular set
of facts. Further, trial courts are not especially enjoined by law to admit a third-party complaint. They
are vested with discretion to allow or disallow a party to an action to implead an additional party. Thus,
a defendant has no vested right to file a third-party complaint.

Rule 35 Philippine Business Bank v. Felipe Chua G.R. No. 178899 Nov. 15, 20

Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the decision of CA
of overturning RTC’s judgment. There was a case pending between Tan and PBB. The former seeks to
declare the unenforceability of promissory notes and mortgages, nullity of Sec.’s Cert., Injunction and
damages with TRO/writ of preliminary injunction against PBB and resp chua. PBB in its Amended
Answer icluded a cross-claim against Chua demanding payment of the promissory notes as he was co-
maker with john chua. PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment after
respondent filed an answer. RTC acting on PBB’s motion, found Chua liable for the promissory notes
plus interests and costs. RTC resolved respondent’s Notice of appeal as well as PBB’s motion to
disallow appeal and issue execution. RTC held that chua cannot appeal and the proper remedy is
certiorari however the time for filing has lapsed thus, the partial summary judgment had become final
and executory and it ordered a writ of execution. CA held that RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it issued writ of execution but ruled that it is correct that chua could not appeal it.

Issue: WON partial summary judgment can be appealed separately from the judgment in the entire
case?

Ruling: No. A Partial Summary Judgment as a rule is not appealable separately from the judgment in
the entire case unless allowed by the court under sec. 1(f), Rule 41. Hence, the failure to appeal
separately from a partial summary judgment or to challenge it by a special civil action for certiorari
does not make the same final and executory.

RULE 39 HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN AND ROMANA BIGO VS. AIR TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE
FACTS: The heirs of Mateo Pidacan inherited a land which part thereof was occupied by the Air
Transportation Office (ATO). In the case that they have filed against the ATO they have won and
awarded to them the just compensation determined by the court with damages. Petitioners then filed a
motion for execution of the judgment. However the same was oppossed by the ATO through the
Solicitor General invoking that under PD 1445, all money claims against the government or any of its
subdivision, agencies, and instrumentalities must be filed with the COA. The RTC denied the Motion
for Execution stating that pursuant to PD 1445 and their circular which states that all judges must
observe utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy
money judgments against governement agencies and local government agencies and local government
units. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the RTC is correct in denying the motion for execution.

RULING: No. The Court ruled that an effective and efficient administration of justice requires that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. In the
case at bar, it is proved that ATO informed the other party that it has funds to support the fees that will
be determined by the court in its decision. Corollarily, it is able to pay without the need of the
petitioners to raise the matter before the COA. It is almost trite to say that excution is the fruit and the
end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty
victory for the prevailing party. Petitionershave been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of
their propertyfor a considerable length of time. Now that they prevailed before the Court, it would be
highly unjust and in equitable under the particular circumstances that payment of just compensation
would be withheld from them. We, therefore, write finis to this litigation.
RULE 70 Unlawful Detainer/ Ejectment ZACARIAS VS ANACAY
FACTS: Zacarias filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Anacay. Petitioner alleged that said
respondents are occupying the disputed lands situated in Brgy Lalaan, 1st Silang, Cavite and covered
by a tax declaration in the name of the petitioner. The court decided in favor of the respondents and
dismissed the complaint. The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the
essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioners had permitted or
tolerated respondent's occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the
averments of the demand letter sent by the petitioner's counsel that the respondent entered into the
property through stealth and strategy and forcible entry should have been filed instead, but since the
deprivation of the physical possession of the property through illegal means has lapsed from one year
from her discovery thereof, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether unlawful detainer is the proper remedy?

RULING: No. The above complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not
describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which
became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of suchlawful possession. Petitioner’s insistence that
she actually tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of their entry into the
subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered respondents’occupation in May 2007.
Such possession could not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent,
much less was it based on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the possession ofthe
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess.18 In Valdez v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court ruled that where the complaint did
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court
had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus: To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the
plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas: But
even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiencydefendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the
latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule
70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.

RULE 69 PARTITION WILSON GO VS HARRY GO


FACTS: Petitioner and respondent are siblings among the five children of spouses Sio Tiong Go and
Simeona Lim. Wilson alleged that he and Harry are the registered co-owners of the disputed land and
that respondent Harry is renting out the warehouses erected therein without authority from Wilson and
that Harry collected rentals amounting to 1,697,850 without giving Wilson his share despite repeated
demands. Wilson now prays for a partition. In his answer, Harry claims that it was due their parents
investments that the business of warehousing flourished and not through the efforts of Wilson and
Harry. And that the land is only registered in their name as s trust for the rest of the siblings and for
their mother. RTC ruled in favor of Wilson and ordered Harry to deposit to the court the whole amount
of rentals collected. Harry moved for reconsideration but was denied. Aggrieved, he filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. The CA then, overturned and set aside the ruling of the RTC. The CA based
their decision on the fact that the order of the RTC is premature for there is still no established co
ownership and that the petitioner and respondents are only holding the land in trust. Petitioner now
claims that the order of the RTC is only provisional and not final. And the order is only to maintain the
status quo of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is correct
RULING: YES. Even if there is no specific provision in the Rules of Court providing such provisional
order the courts have not only power to maintain their life but they have also the power to make that
existence effective for the purpose for which the judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate
means, do all things necessary to preserve and protect the rights of the parties while the main action is
being litigated.

Rule 33 Oropesa v oropesa G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012


Facts: Nilo Oropesa (petitioner) filed with the RTC od Paranaque City, a petition for him and a certain
Ms. Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and; that due to his age
he cannot manage his property wisely. The respondent then filed an Opposition to the Petition for
Guardianship. Then the Petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his sister and respondent's
former nurse. After that, petitioner filed his manifestation resting his case and he failed to file written
formal offer of evidence. Thus, respondent file an Omnibus Motion to declare the petitioner to have
waived the presentation of his offer of exhibits and presentation of evidence which the court granted.
Then respondent file Demurrer to Evidence which was also granted. Then, the case was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.

Issue: whether or not the court correctly granted the demurrer to Evidence

Ruling: Yes. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned Report of
Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never
identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said report contained findings that
supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent. The SC held that A demurrer
to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. We have also held that a demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of
the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do,
if plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.

Rule 34 Basbas v. Sayson (this case distinguished the difference between judgment on the pleadings
under rule 34 and summary judgment under rule 35) G.R. No. 172660
Facts: 1989 order was not implemented within 5 yr period from the time it became final whis is the
decision in favor of Sayson in a Land registration case between respondent spouses Sayson and his
oppositors, petitioners Eugenio Basbas, Teofilo Aras and Rufino Aras. Sayson filed a complaint for
Revival of Judgment and impleaded, Eugenio Sr., Teofilo, Rufino, Gervacio, Ismael, Eugenio,
Simfronio, Feliciano, Rosita and Eugenio Jr. Upon receipt of summons, set of petitioners filed an
Answer with Counterclaim except Feliciano admitting the allegations in par. 4-12, denying in part par.
Par 2,3 and 14, specifically denying par 13 and stating that they(petitioners) have the right of
possession and par 15 that Sayson cannot suffer losses and damages. After pre-trial conference Saysons
filed an Omnibus Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment. In resolving
Saysons motion, RTC found that petitioner’s answer does not tender an issue since the material
allegations of the complain were admitted. Thus, judgment was rendered in favor of Sayson. CA denied
petitioners appeal, upholding RTC’s decision.
Issue: WON the CA erred in declaring that no reversible error was committed by RTC in granting
motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment.
Ruling: No. The CA’ s decision is correct. Plainly, the issues raised by petitioners could be readily
resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings. A full-blown trial on these issues will only
entail waste of time and resources as they are clearly not genuine issues requiring presentation of
evidence. However, it is summary judgment that is proper in the case. x. The SC held thay what
distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of issues in the
Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the
material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings
by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the
pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material
averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary
judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. A genuine issue means an issue of fact
which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or
contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.
RULE 41
SPOUSES LEBIN V VILMA S. MIRASOL
G.R. No. 164255

FACTS:
the petitioners Lebin relayed their offer to the administrator of the Estate of L.J. Hodges to purchase
Lot 18 who sought judicial approval of the purchase. meanwhile, respondent (Mirasol) learned of the
approval and prayed for relief from the order since she is claimant of lot 18 where her house actually
stands.
the RTC resolved the petition ordering an equal partition of the subject lot herein between the said
offeror-claimant. On March 2 the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the
petitioners so on May 5 petitioners filed a record on appeal. Mirasol filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal, insisting that it has been filed later. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss the appeal hence
this certiorari.
Issues
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners appeal for their failure to timely file a
record on appeal?
RULING:
The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order appealed from except in
special proceedings or cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which event the period of appeal is
30 days and a record on appeal is necessary.
appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right, but merely statutory, and the implication of its
statutory character is that the party who intends to appeal must always comply with the procedures and
rules governing appeals, or else the right of appeal may be lost or squandered
Undoubtedly, they filed the record on appeal 43 days late from the date they received the denial of their
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. They should have filed the record on appeal within 30 days
from their notice of the judgment. Their appeal was not perfected.

RULE 42
DARMA MASLAG vs. ELIZABETH MONZON
G.R. No. 174908

FACTS
petitioner won in an action for reconveyance of real property against respondents Elizabeth Monzon in
the MTC. Respondent appealed to the rtc who declared that MTC is without jurisdiction over
petitioner’s cause of action. It further held that it will take cognizance of the case and reversed the
lower court’s ruling. Hence an appeal was filed by petitioner under rule 41in the CA but it was
dismiseed for being an improper appeal since the subject matter of the appeal Is to set aside an MTC
Judgment; hence, the proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary
appeal. Petitioner argued that the RTC rendered its Resolution in its original jurisdiction citing that the
MTC is without jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC DECIDED THE CASE NOT ON ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION BUT ON ITS
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION?
RULING
It is incumbent upon appellants to utilize the correct mode of appeal of the decisions of trial courts to
the appellate courts. In cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs
to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property. In the case at
bench, Such assessed value of the property is well within the jurisdiction of the MTC thus RtC
rendered its resolution in its appellate jurisdiction. The proper appeal is by petition for review from the
appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court..
RULE 43
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 208976

FACTS:
Respondent Delos Reyes served as the Division Chief in PCSO. The auditors found records of partial
remittance of total sales were made to cover previous unremitted collections. PCSO filed an affidavit-
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Delos Reyes who decided they are guilty of grave
misconduct and gross neglect of duty, and ordering their dismissal from service. He then filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which was granted
hence this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in allowing the petition for certiorari in the interest of
substantial justice?

Ruling:
We reiterate our ruling that liberal application of the rules cannot be invoked to justify a flagrant
disregard of the rules of procedure. Appeals of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman
that this court will entertain review of the assailed ruling or order. The rules and jurisprudence require
the dismissal of the petition before the Court of Appeals. Furthermore an appeal does "not stop the
decision from being executory." This is even more so in this case, as respondent availed himself of the
wrong remedy before the Court of Appeals.

RULE 44
RIZAL v NAREDO
G.R. No. 151898
FACTS:
The CFI awarded the ownership of the subject land to the petitioners and ordered the defendants therein
to vacate the said land Although the CFI ordered that the petitioners be placed in possession it did not
evict Marcela and Leoncia from Lot No. 252 since they were not parties to the prior Civil Case. the
petitioners then filed for recovery of ownership of Lot No. 252 the court dismissed the complaint
because of res judicata. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA unfortunately, the CA dismissed
the appeal finding appellants brief neither contained the required page references to the records
ISSUE:
Whether CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE
PETITIONERS' APPEAL BRIEF FAILED TO MAKE PAGE REFERENCES TO THE RECORD.
RULING:
Failure to observe the requirements under Section 13(a), Rule 44 of the Rules of Court and to pay the
correct docket fees is fatal to the appeal.
while this Court may be lenient in some instances on formal defects of pleadings filed with the court, it
could not close its eyes when a litigant continuously ignores technical rules, the court explicitly stated
that the guise of liberal construction should not defeat purpose of the rules. The Court of Appeals noted
in its Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration that despite ample opportunity,
petitioners never attempted to file an amended appellants brief correcting the deficiencies of their brief.
Moreover, the petitioners also failed to pay the correct docket fees; in which case, jurisdiction did not
vest in the appellate court.
Rule 53 YBIERNAS VS. TANCO-GABALDON et al
G.R. No. 178925
June 01, 2011
FACTS:
Estrella Ybiernas owned a parcel of land located She executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
property in favor of her heirs, one of them is Dionisio Ybiernas.
RTC issued an Order in Cadastral Case No. 10, directing the registration and annotation of the
Deed of Absolute Sale on the title. Respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for sum of money
and damages against Estrella and three other individuals. The Pasig RTC resolved the Complaint for
sum of money in favor of respondents, and Estrella, et al. were ordered to pay.
Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The Bacolod RTC initially denied the
motion. Upon petitioners’ MR, the Bacolod RTC granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of
the pertitioners.
Respondents filed a notice of appeal, and it was granted by the RTC. While the appeal was
pending in the CA, respondents filed an MNT, claiming that they have discovered that the Cadastral
Case did not exist and the Deed of Sale was simulated.
The CA granted respondents’ MNT.

ISSUE: WON motion for new trial under Rule 53 is applicable in this case.
RULING:
YES,We find that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is warranted. The Rules allows the
courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly discovered evidence. The
grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking, addressed to the sound discretion of the court
which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.
As previously stated, respondents relied in good faith on the veracity of the Bacolod RTC Order which
petitioners presented in court. It was only practical for them to do so, if only to expedite the
proceedings. Given this circumstance, we hold that respondents exercised reasonable diligence in
obtaining the evidence. The certifications therefore qualify as newly discovered evidence.

Rule 56 CGP vs PCI

FACTS: Petitioner CGP obtained two loans from respondent PCI. Both loans were secured by
real estate mortgages over two parcels of land Petitioner CGP failed to pay its indebtedness to
respondent PCI and the latter filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the real
properties.Respondent PCI was the highest bidder, so the corresponding Certificates of Sale were
issued in his name.
Petitioner failed to redeem the real properties; thus, respondent PCI insisted that actual
possession thereof be turned over to it. Petitioner refused the demand. On 12 April 1999, respondent
PCI[9] filed before the Regional Trial Court, a petition for an ex-parte issuance of a Writ of
Possession. Petitioner CGP opposed the subject petition.
On 15 November 2000, the RTC issued an Order against CGPs.

In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner CGP averred that the scheduled hearing was
violative of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in its favor by the same trial court, albeit in a
different case involving the same parties particularly Civil Case No. 99-234, respecting a complaint for
the annulment of the foreclosure proceedings earlier mentioned. It argued that notwithstanding the fact
that the complaint for annulment of foreclosure proceedings had already been dismissed by the trial
court, such order had not yet become final and executory inasmuch as it was appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The court granted the pertitioner’s motion.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC stood pat on its position. Aggrieved,
respondent PCI filed before this Court, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court

The petition (G.R. No. 150483) was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals by this Court for
appropriate action in aResolution,[14] dated 3 December 2001, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 56 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, factual issues being involved.

Issue: WON the court is correct in referring the case to the CA.

Ruling: The Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals under par. 2, Section 56 of the
same rule. Said section states:

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. x x x

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial
Court submitting issues of fact MAY be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or
appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of
fact are involved shall be final.[Emphasis supplied.]

This Courts discretion to refer the case to the Court of Appeals is by reason of the term may in
both sections. Such term denotes discretion on our part in dismissing an appeal or referring one to the
Court of Appeals.

Besides, it must be borne in mind that procedural rules are intended to ensure proper administration of
law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they
are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice.[26] A deviation from its rigid enforcement
may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core
reason for the existence of the courts.

In the case at bar, substantial ends of justice warranted the referral of the case to the appellate
court for further appropriate proceedings.
RULE 56 SPOUSES VIRGINIA G. GONZAGA G.R. No. 130841
and ALFREDO GONZAGA,
Petitioners, Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS,
BIENVENIDO AGAN, and Promulgated:
ROWENA AGAN,
Respondents. February 26, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Facts: Petitioners are the registered owners of a residential lot located in Davao City. Petitioners
admitted that they do not reside at this property.[4]

Petitioners decided to construct a house on the said parcel of land and engaged the services of a civil
engineer to prepare the corresponding construction plan. Petitioners claimed that there was no occupant
on the land .Sometime in June 1995, petitioners went to inspect the above lot and discovered that a
shanty belonging to private respondents had been built on the land in question.

Petitioners filed a Complaint dated April 18, 1996[6] against private respondents for Forcible Entry,
Damages,. As alleged by petitioners, private respondents put up the structure by stealth and strategy.

Private respondents alleged that their shanty is within the land covered by a Free Patent Application
dated February 9, 1992in the name of Ponciano Sabroso.

MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners.Private respondents appealed, the RTC REVERSED
the decision of the lower court and dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action for forcible
entry.

The RTC predicated its ruling on the premise that petitioners, although claiming to be owners of the
subject property, failed to prove prior actual physical possession, a necessary element in an action for
ejectment. To the RTC, petitioners should have not commenced an action for forcible entry but
an accion publiciana suit.

Petitioners filed petition for review. On April 10, 1997, The CA issued the Resolution, denying due
course to petitioners petition for review.
.
Hence, we have this Petition for Certiorari.

Whether or not the petition for certiorari should be denied

Yes, under Sec. 5(f) of Rule 56,[14]a petition for certiorari interposed when an appeal is proper and
available may be dismissed.
In the instant case, the CA had already finally disposed of the case with the issuance of the Resolution
dated April 10, 1997 denying due course to petitioners petition for review of the RTCs decision, and the
Resolution dated August 29, 1997 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, the remedy of
an appeal under Rule 45 was then already available to petitioners.

Rule 56 JULIO B. PURCON, JR. vs. MRM Philippines, Inc. & MIGUEL L.
RIVERA/MARITIME RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008

FACTS:
The stemmed from a complaint filed by Purcon for reimbursement of medical expenses,
sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Purcon was hired
on January 28, 2002 by MRM Phils., Inc, as a seaman on board the vessel M/T Sarabelle 2. He signed a
contract for 3 months and was extended to another 3 months. His worked involved a day-to-day
activity that required exertion of strenuous effort, and that he often worked overtime due to the pressure
of his work. On the 2nd week of June 2002, he felt an excruciating pain in his left testicles. After being
examined by a doctor at the port of France, he was diagnosed with hernia, hence, on June 26, 2002 he
was repatriated due to his ailment.

MRM countered that since Purcon’s ailment, hernia, is not work-related, he is not entitled to
disability benefit and related claims. In fact, he was declared fit to resume to work on July 23, 2002 by
the company doctor. MRM also argued that his ailment is not to be considered permanent disability as
this easily correctible by simple surgery. More importantly, Purcon signed a Quitclaim and Release
which was notarized. On March 31, 2005, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for utter lack of merit.
The Labor Arbiter explained that Purcon was fit to resume to work as a seafarer as of July 23, 2002 as
his “hernia” was already cured or non-existent. In fact, Purcon was ready to resume to work.
Unfortunately he was not accommodated due to the lack of vacancy. The fact that he was not hired by
MRM did not mean that he was suffering from disability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Purcon can avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 28 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Supreme Court Resolution denying his petition for review.
RULING:
No. under section 1 Rule 56 Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme
Court.
A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court. Although Sec. 1 of
Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must
be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the
Supreme Court. A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56, cases
originally cognizable by the Supreme Court. It is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party
who seeks to be relieved form the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due
to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure, otherwise, the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable
negligence or due to the mistaken mode of procedural by counsel.

Sun Insurance v. Asuncion (Rule 1)


FACTS: Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) filed a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the
consignation of fire insurance policy. -
Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) filed a complaint for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims
for damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of
damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50
million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.
The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the
amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
ISSUE: WON did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay
the correct or sufficient docket fees?
RULING: YES. It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings. In herein case, obviously, there was the intent
on the part of PR to defraud the government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original
complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more liberal
interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim
not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Genesis Investment, Inc., Vs. Heirs Of Ceferino Ebarasabal (Rule 2)


FACTS: On November 12, 2003, herein respondents filed against herein petitioners a Complaint3 for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees. The
Complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu.
On August 5, 2004, herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss4 contending, among others, that the
RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case on the ground that, as the case involves title to or possession of
real property or any interest therein and since the assessed value of the subject property does not
exceed P20,000.00 (the same being only P11,990.00), the action falls within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
And while the prayer of the plaintiffs for the annulment of documents qualified the case as one
incapable of pecuniary estimation thus, rendering it cognizable supposedly by the second level courts
but considering that Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides to cover "all civil actions" which phrase
understandably is to include those incapable of pecuniary estimation, like the case at bar, this Court is
of the view that said law really finds application here more so that the same case also "involves title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein." For being so, the assessed value of the real
property involved is determinative of which court has jurisdiction over the case. And the plaintiffs
admitting that the assessed value of the litigated area is less than P20,000.00, the defendants are correct
in arguing that the case is beyond this Court's jurisdiction.7
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,8 arguing that their complaint consists of
several causes of action, including one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, as such, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE: WONthe Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the instant case when the allegations in the
complaint clearly shows that the main cause of action of the respondents is for the Recovery of their
Title, Interest, and Share over a Parcel of Land
HELD: Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of
partition of or recovery of shares or interest over the real property in question but includes an action for
declaration of nullity of contracts and documents which is incapable of pecuniary estimation
Contrary to petitioners contention, the principal relief sought by petitioners is the nullification of the
subject Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale entered into by and between some of their co-heirs and
respondents, insofar as their individual shares in the subject property are concerned. Thus, the recovery
of their undivided shares or interest over the disputed lot, which were included in the sale, simply
becomes a necessary consequence if the above deed is nullified. Hence, since the principal action
sought in respondents Complaint is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus, cognizable by the RTC.20 Well entrenched is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted.21
Moreover, it is provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the causes of
action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be
allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein. Thus, as shown above, respondents complaint clearly falls within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Gonzales v. PAGCOR (Rule 3)


FACTS: Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed on
September 28, 2000 the instant Petition as a class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
seeking to restrain PAGCOR from continuing its operations and prohibit it and its co-respondents from
enforcing: (1) the "Grant of an Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and
Internet Gambling" executed between PAGCOR and SAGE; (2) the "Grant of Authority to Operate
Computerized Bingo Games"4 between PAGCOR and BEST WORLD; and (3) the "Agreement”
among PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME to conduct jai-alai operations.
Petition was given due course. Consequently, the parties were required to submit their respective
Memoranda. Only respondents PAGCOR and SAGE submitted their Memoranda, on December 6,
2001 and January 24, 2002, respectively. Gonzales having failed to file his Memorandum within the
prescribed period, this Court which, in the meantime, was informed of the alleged demise of Gonzales,
required by Resolution 1) respondents to confirm the death of Gonzales, and 2) the parties to manifest
whether they were still interested in prosecuting the petition, or whether supervening events had
rendered it moot and academic.
On September 10, 2002, Attys. Manuel B. Imbong and Jo Aurea M. Imbong filed a Motion for
Substitution stating, among other things, that (1) Gonzales died on January 17, 2002; (2) his heirs are
not interested to pursue and prosecute the present special civil action or be substituted as petitioners
herein; and (3) the petition was instituted by Gonzales as class suit in behalf of "all Filipino citizens,
taxpayers and members of the Philippine Bar" and, as such, survives his death. They thus pray that as
they are among the "Filipino citizens, taxpayers and members of the Philippine Bar" for whom the
herein class suit was instituted and are both capable of prosecuting the instant case, they be substituted
as petitioners in lieu of Gonzales and that they be given thirty days from notice within which to file
their memorandum. -
By Resolution of December 9, 2002, this Court required respondents to file their Comments on the
Motion for Substitution filed by Attys. Imbong and Imbong. -
In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE both argue that, among others things,
movants Attys. Imbong and Imbong may not be substituted for Gonzales as the former are neither legal
representatives nor heirs of the latter within the purview of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. -
Respondents PAGCOR and SAGE further argue that neither Gonzales nor movants have substantiated
the allegation that the instant case is a class suit as defined under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. Hence, so said respondents argue, the petition should be considered a personal action which was
extinguished with the death of Gonzales. -

Movants argue, however, that "unless the herein substitution is allowed, the citizens and taxpayers
represented by Gonzales in this class suit will be denied due process." ISSUE: Duty of counsel upon
death of party. RULING: See Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. *Take note that even if the SC in
this case were to consider the Motion for Substitution as a seasonably filed Motion for Intervention
(Sec. 12, Rule 3), instant petition would have to be dismissed for being moot and academic. [Bonilla v.
Barcena] x x x The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action
and the damage sued for. If the causes of action which survive the wrong complained [of] affects
primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person
the property and rights of property affected being incidental. x x x

United Overseas Bank v. Rosemoore Mining & Dev’t Co. (Rule 4)


FACTS: Respondent Rosemoor a Philippine mining corporation with offices at Quezon City, applied
for and was granted by petitioner Westmont Bank (Bank) a credit facility in the total amount of P80
million consisting of P50,000,000.00 as long term loan and P30,000,000.00 as revolving credit line.
To secure the credit facility, a lone real estate mortgage agreement was executed by Rosemoor and Dr.
Lourdes Pascual (Dr. Pascual), Rosemoor’s president, as mortgagors in favor of the Bank as mortgagee
in the City of Manila. The agreement, however, covered six parce;s of land located in San Miguel,
Bulacan, all registered under the name of Rosemoor and two parcels of land situated in Gapan, Nueva
Ecija (Nueva Ecija properties), owned and registered under the name of Dr. Pascual. Rosemoor
subsequently opened with the Bank four irrevocable Letters of Credit (LCs) totaling US$1,943,508.11.
-
Rosemoor defaulted in the payment of its various drawings under the LCs and promissory notes. In
view of the default, the Bank caused the extra- judicial foreclosure of the Nueva Ecija properties and
the Bulacan properties. The Bank was the highest bidder on both occasions. -
Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual filed a Complaint, originally captioned as one for "Damages, Accounting
and Release of Balance of Loan and Machinery and for Injunction" before the Manila RTC. Impleaded
as defendants were the Bank and Notary Public Jose Sineneng, whose office was used to foreclose the
mortgage. The complaint was twice amended, the caption eventually reflecting an action for
"Accounting, Specific Performance and Damages." Through the amendments, Pascual was dropped as
a plaintiff while several officers of the Bank were included as defendant. The Bank moved for the
dismissal of the original and amended complaints on the ground that the venue had been improperly
laid. The motion was denied by the trial court through an Omnibus Resolution.
Plaintiff Rosemoor prayed for the ff: (1) Bank to render an acctg; (2) actual damages for operational
losses; (3) exemplary damages; (4) indemnity and other relief.
The Bank filed another motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the ground of forum-
shopping since, according to it; Rosemoor had filed another petition earlier before the Malolos RTC.
The Bank contended that as between the action before the Manila RTC and the petition before the
Malolos RTC, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same set of facts. The Bank further claimed that any judgment that may be rendered in either
case will amount to res judicata in the other case.
Manila RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It also denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration of the
order of denial. -

ISSUE: (Central issue) W/N Rosemoor committed forum-shopping in filing the Malolos case during
the pendency of the Manila case?
RULING: NO. The rule on venue of real actions is provided in Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which reads in part: Section 1. Venue of Real Actions. Actions affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. The
venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with the Malolos RTC
although two of the properties together with the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. The
venue of real actions affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by the
SINGULARITY or PLURALITY of the transactions involving said parcels of land. Where said parcels
are the object of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein
a parcel of land is situated. Elements of forum-shopping: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other case. (1)
As to the existence of identity of parties, several bank officers and employees impleaded in the
Amended Complaint in the Manila case were not included in the Malolos case. (2)
As regards the identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the main contention of Rosemoor in
the Manila case is that the Bank had failed to deliver the full amount of the loan, as a consequence of
which Rosemoor demanded the remittance of the unreleased portion of the loan and payment of
damages consequent thereto. In contrast, the Malolos case was filed for the purpose of restraining the
Bank from proceeding with the consolidation of the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan properties
because the loan secured by the mortgage had not yet become due and demandable. Moreover, the
Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action affecting the title of
the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the province
where the property or part thereof lies. The Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal action
involving as it does the enforcement of a contract between Rosemoor, whose office is in Quezon City,
and the Bank, whose principal office is in Binondo, Manila. Personal actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendants or any of the
principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Clearly, with the foregoing premises, it
cannot be said that respondents committed forum-shopping.

RULE 45
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents. [G.R. No. 129846. January 18, 2000]
FACTS:
On two occasions in January 1986, the Office of the President issued four type "B" Treasury
Warrants drawn against the Bureau of Treasury in the aggregate amount of P151,645,000.00. The
treasury warrants were deposited in private respondent Traders Royal Bank for collection.
Private respondent presented the warrants to the Bureau of Treasury for clearing. The warrants
were cleared and private respondent credited the amounts to the designated payees accounts. Petitioner
subsequently discovered that the payees indorsements on the warrants had been forged. It demanded
reimbursement from private respondent of the amounts paid on the warrants but the latter refused to
pay.
Petitioner, through the Bureau of Treasury, filed Civil Case for collection against private
respondent before the Regional Trial Court. Trial then ensued. After petitioner had rested its case,
private respondent, with prior leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence.
The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence. However, on motion of private respondent, the
trial court, reconsidered its order and dismissed petitioners complaint. Petitioner, two days before the
last day to file an appeal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal which
interrupted the running of the period of appeal.
The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. However, petitioner filed its notice
of appeal after 12 days beyond the 15-day reglementary period. As a consequence, the dismissal
became final.
For some reason, this fact was not immediately noticed, so that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals and petitioner was required to file its appellants brief. When it came to
its turn to file its brief as an appellee, private respondent asked for an extension of time.
Its motion was granted, but instead of filing its brief, private respondent asked the appellate
court to dismiss petitioners appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. Its motion was granted
and petitioners appeal was dismissed.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was denied. Petitioner received the
appellate courts resolution denying its motion it had until June 20, 1997 within which to appeal to this
Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, petitioner filed on August 4,
1997, 45 days after the last day to file an appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing its appeal from
the order of the RTC which dismissed its complaint against private respondent.
HELD:
This petition should be dismissed.
First. Petitioners remedy was to appeal to this Court from the resolutions, dated March 17, 1997
and May 20, 1997, of the appellate court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Instead, it filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 only on August 4, 1997. Apparently, petitioner
resorted to this special civil action because it had failed to take an appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period which expired on June 20, 1997. This, of course, cannot be done.
The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which
petitioner has lost. Nor can it be contended that the only question raised in this case is a jurisdictional
question. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. There is no reason why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether
the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitions, could not have been
raised by it on appeal.
In Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, we dismissed a Rule 65 petition on the ground that the proper
remedy for petitioner therein should have been an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule
45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. In this case,
however, we find no reason to justify a liberal application of the rules. The petition was filed well
beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review without any reason therefor.
Second. Even on the grounds invoked by petitioner, we think the present petition should be
dismissed. Time and again, we have emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner and within
the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an
appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executor. This rule is founded upon the principle
that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. In this case, we find no reason to
depart from this rule
The fact is that petitioner did not only fail to appeal from the main order of the trial court
dismissing its complaint. It did not only fail to appeal on time from the order denying reconsideration.
Petitioner likewise failed to make a timely appeal to this Court from the resolution of the appellate
court dismissing its appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
RULE 46
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, petitioner, vs. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT,
INC., respondent. [G. R. No. 142572. February 20, 2002]
FACTS:
On March 17, 1998, Carmel Development, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City a Complaint for recovery of possession with preliminary injunction against the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and the Caloocan City School Board. Carmel sought to recover
possession of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (64007)15807, allegedly
occupied by the Pangarap Elementary School and the Pangarap High School which were established by
the Department of Education.
The Department of Education filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer dated April
16, 1998 as well as a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated April 24, 1998.
On April 27, 1998, Carmel filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default alleging that the
period to answer had already lapsed since the subpoenas were served upon the Department of
Education and the School Board on April 2, 1998 and March 2, 1998, respectively. On the same day,
April 27, 1998, the trial court granted the motion declaring the Department of Education and the School
Board in default and allowing Carmel to present its evidence ex parte.
In an Order dated April 29, 1998, the trial court declared the Motion for Extension of Time to
File Answer filed on April 28, 1998 by the Department of Education and the School Board as moot and
academic. Thereafter, in an Order dated April 30, 1998, the trial court declared that no action shall be
taken on the Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss filed on April 30, 1998 by the Department of
Education and the School Board considering that the defendants have already been declared in default
and have lost their standing in court.
On May 14, 1998, the Department of Education filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Orders dated April 27, 29 and 30, 1998 and to Lift Order of Default. It contended that it seasonably
filed its motion for extension of time to file its answer on April 16, 1998. It also claimed that it filed its
motion to dismiss within the reglementary period. It explained that the summons issued on March 23,
1998 was received by the School Board on March 27, 1998 and not on March 2, 1998 as erroneously
found by the trial court. The Department of Education further claimed that Carmel failed to notify and
furnish it with a copy of the motion to declare it in default. Aside from praying for the lifting of the
order of default, the Department of Education likewise sought the dismissal of the case for violation of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping. Carmel filed an Opposition on
June 8, 1998.
The trial court set aside its orders dated April 27, 29 and 30, 1998 and lifted the order of default.
The trial court, however, denied the dismissal of the case.
The Department of Education filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order. It contended that the trial courts finding of substantial compliance with the Supreme Court
Circular had no factual or legal bases to stand on. It also maintained that Carmel is engaged in forum
shopping. Carmel filed its Opposition dated July 31, 1998 claiming that the issues in the other pending
cases are different. On August 17, 1998, the trial court issued an Order denying the Department of
Educations motion for reconsideration.
Dissatisfied, the Department of Education filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the trial courts
orders dated June 15, 1998 and August 17, 1998. Carmel filed a Comment as well as a Supplemental
Comment while the Department of Education filed its Reply.
On August 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Department of Educations petition for
certiorari and denied on March 17, 2000 the motion to reconsider the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that it was
not accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed decision and resolution but only duplicate
orginals.
HELD:
The Petition is meritorious.
The filing of original actions for certiorari in the Court of Appeals is governed by Section 3,
Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the petition for certiorari be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution, or ruling subject thereof. The same Section provides that the failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition. (Emphasis supplied)
This is the clear import of Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 46 (Original Cases) of the 1997 Rules
which read in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. Title of cases. In all cases originally filed in the Court of Appeals, the party
instituting the action shall be called the petitioner and the opposing party the respondent.
SEC. 2. To what actions applicable. This Rule shall apply to original actions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto.
Except as otherwise provided, the actions for annulment of judgment shall be governed by
Rule 47, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus by Rule 65, and for quo warranto by Rule 66.
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - x x.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the
respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the Petitioner, and shall be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and
other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that a legal provision or rule must not be so construed as to make it a useless
surplusage, and hence meaningless in the sense of having no effect whatsoever.
The phrase except as otherwise provided means exactly what it says, that is, except as otherwise
provided in Rule 46, original actions for certiorari shall be governed by Rule 65. Contrary to Carmels
contention, Rule 46 applies to original actions for certiorari because Section 2 thereof expressly states
that [t]his Rule shall apply to original actions for certiorari. That Rule 46 applies to actions for
certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals can hardly be disputed.
Rule 46 should be construed in relation to Rule 65 without rendering any of its provisions
useless. This is evident in Section 6 of Rule 65 which provides that [i]n petitions for certiorari before
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provision of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed.
Section 2 of Rule 56 which governs the procedure in the Supreme Court, specifically original cases
filed therein, provides in turn:
Sec. 2. Rules applicable. The procedure in original cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the
Constitution, laws, and Rule 46, 48, 49, 51 and 52 and this Rule, subject to the following provisions:
a) All references in said Rules to the Court of Appeals shall be understood to also apply to the
Supreme Court;
b) The portions of said Rule dealing strictly with and specifically intended for appealed cases in
the Court of Appeals shall not be applicable; and
This simply means that the following rules which are of primary governance in the Court of
Appeals, viz.: Rule 46 (Original Actions in the Court of Appeals), Rule 48 (Preliminary Conference),
Rule 49 (Hearings on Oral Argument), Rule 51 (Judgment), and Rule 52 (Motion for Reconsideration)
have been expressly made applicable to original actions in the Supreme Court save for those portions
which deal strictly with and are specifically intended for appealed cases in the Court of Appeals.
(Emphasis supplied)
In fine, Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals
but Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 co-exist with each other and
should be construed so as to give effect to every provision of both rules.
Clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for certiorari filed by the
Department of Education on the ground that it was accompanied by mere duplicate originals instead of
certified true copies of the assailed orders.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96 defines duplicate originals in this wise:
1. The duplicate original copy shall be understood to be that copy of the decision,
judgment, resolution or order which is intended for and furnished to a party in the case or proceeding in
the court or adjudicative body which rendered and issued the same.
2. The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialed by the authorities or the
corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal thereof or
any other official indication of the authenticity and completeness of such copy.
Indeed, the copies of the orders attached to the petition were the copies furnished to the Office
of the Solicitor General by the trial court as counsel of the Department of Education. We note that the
Order dated June 15, 1998 was duly signed by the presiding judge of the trial court. However, the
Order dated August 17, 1998 falls short of the requirements found in Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 3-96 considering that it was not duly signed or initialed by the judge or other appropriate
officer of the court nor does it bear the dry seal thereof. Instead, it contains the stamp mark
`ORIGINAL SIGNED atop the name of the presiding judge. Still, there is substantial compliance with
the requirement that the petition be accompanied by duplicate originals of the orders being assailed
since the Order dated June 15, 1998 is what is being primarily assailed in the petition, while the Order
dated August 17, 1998 was merely the denial of the motion to reconsider the same. A liberal
construction of the Rules may be invoked in this instance to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously
as possible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 16, 1999 and Resolution dated March 17, 2000 dismissing the Department of Educations
petition are SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondent Carmel Development, Inc. against the
Department of Education with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 125) in Civil Case
No. C-18264 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

RULE 47
JESSIE MACALALAG, petitioner, vs. OMBUDSMAN, PABLO ALORO and COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 147995, March 4, 2004
FACTS:
Private respondent Pablo Aloro lodged with the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas a
complaint for dishonesty against the petitioner Jessie Macalalag, an employee of the Philippine Postal
Corporation, Bacolod City. The petitioner was directed to file his answer but he did not bother to file
any. Instead, when the case was called for preliminary conference, he sent a telegram requesting for
postponement and praying that he be allowed to submit his position paper after which the case shall be
deemed submitted for resolution. Again, no position paper was ever submitted by him. Accordingly, the
investigator was constrained to resolve the case on the basis solely of the evidence furnished by the
private respondent.
Private respondent, a resident of Bacolod City, is a retired employee receiving a monthly
pension from the Social Security System. As of September 15, 1996, however, he failed to receive his
pension checks corresponding to the months of April, May and July, 1996. When he went to Bacolod
City Post Office to verify about the matter, he learned that his missing checks were taken by the
petitioner, an employee of the Philippine Postal Corporation in Bacolod City, who endorsed and
encashed them for his personal benefit. When confronted by the private respondent, the petitioner
issued to the former his personal check in the amount of P7,320.00 in payment of the checks. However,
when the private complainant presented the check for payment, it was dishonored by the drawee bank
for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
The private-respondent executed an affidavit of desistance for the purpose of seeking the
dismissal of the case against the petitioner. But said affidavit was rejected and, instead, the petitioner
was declared administratively liable and ordered dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and disqualification from government service. The petitioner sought a consideration but the
same was denied.
Petitioner next appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari.
However, the appeal was dismissed.
In the interim, the adverse Ombudsman decision attained finality.
Petitioner filed an action for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals on the ground
that "the gross ignorance, negligence and incompetence of petitioner's former lawyer deprived
petitioner of his day in court which (would) justify the annulment of the assailed Resolution and
Order." The appellate court, however, dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 47 of the Rules of Court on annulment of judgments, refers to "Regional
Trial Courts" in its generic sense that should thus include quasi-judicial bodies whose functions or rank
are co-equal with those of the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
Rule 47, entitled "Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions," is a new
provision under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure albeit the remedy has long been given imprimatur
by the courts. The rule covers "annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault
of the petitioner." An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case
where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. The concern that the remedy could so easily be
resorted to as an instrument to delay a final and executory judgment, has prompted safeguards to be put
in place in order to avoid an abuse of the rule. Thus, the annulment of judgment may be based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and the remedy may not be invoked (1) where
the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedy and lost therefrom, or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his
own fault or negligence.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6770, also known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are appealable
to the Supreme Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In Fabian v. Desierto, the Court has declared
Section 27 of the Act to be unconstitutional since it expands the Supreme Court's jurisdiction without
its advice and consent required under Article VI, Section 30, of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, all
appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are instead to be taken
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule is reiterated in
Administrative Circular No. 99-2-01-SC.
Parenthetically, R.A. 6770 is silent on the remedy of annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario, the Court has held
that since The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders,
directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, the right to appeal
is not to be considered granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in
criminal or non-administrative cases. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. There must
then be a law expressly granting such right. This legal axiom is also applicable and even more true in
actions for annulment of judgments which is an exception to the rule on finality of judgments.
Moreover, petitioner may no longer resort to the remedy of annulment of judgment after having
filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. Neither can he claim that he is not bound by his lawyer's
actions; it is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of counsel when the courts can step in and
accord relief to a client who would have suffered thereby. If every perceived mistake, failure of
diligence, lack of experience or insufficient legal knowledge of the lawyer would be admitted as a
reason for the reopening of a case, there would be no end to controversy. Fundamental to our judicial
system is the principle that every litigation must come to an end. It would be a clear mockery if it were
otherwise. Access to the courts is guaranteed, but there must be a limit to it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision, dated 24 January 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59361 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Rule 34 Basbas v. Sayson


(this case distinguished the difference between judgment on the pleadings under rule 34 and
summary judgment under rule 35)

Facts: 1989 order was not implemented within 5 yr period from the time it became final whis
is the decision in favor of Sayson in a Land registration case between respondent spouses
Sayson and his oppositors, petitioners Eugenio Basbas, Teofilo Aras and Rufino Aras. Sayson
filed a complaint for Revival of Judgment and impleaded, Eugenio Sr., Teofilo, Rufino,
Gervacio, Ismael, Eugenio, Simfronio, Feliciano, Rosita and Eugenio Jr. Upon receipt of
summons, set of petitioners filed an Answer with Counterclaim except Feliciano admitting the
allegations in par. 4-12, denying in part par. Par 2,3 and 14, specifically denying par 13 and
stating that they(petitioners) have the right of possession and par 15 that Sayson cannot
suffer losses and damages. After pre-trial conference Saysons filed an Omnibus Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment. In resolving Saysons motion, RTC
found that petitioner’s answer does not tender an issue since the material allegations of the
complain were admitted. Thus, judgment was rendered in favor of Sayson. CA denied
petitioners appeal, upholding RTC’s decision.

Issue: WON the CA erred in declaring that no reversible error was committed by RTC in
granting motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment.

Ruling: No. The CA’ s decision is correct. Plainly, the issues raised by petitioners could be
readily resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings. A full-blown trial on these
issues will only entail waste of time and resources as they are clearly not genuine issues
requiring presentation of evidence. However, it is summary judgment that is proper in the
case. x. The SC held thay what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary
judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to
tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits
said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof
and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the
other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or
asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper
provided that the issue raised is not genuine. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which
calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or
contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.

Rule 35 Philippine Business Bank v. Felipe Chua

Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
decision of CA of overturning RTC’s judgment. There was a case pending between Tan and
PBB. The former seeks to declare the unenforceability of promissory notes and mortgages,
nullity of Sec.’s Cert., Injunction and damages with TRO/writ of preliminary injunction against
PBB and resp chua. PBB in its Amended Answer icluded a cross-claim against Chua
demanding payment of the promissory notes as he was co-maker with john chua. PBB
subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment after respondent filed an answer.
RTC acting on PBB’s motion, found Chua liable for the promissory notes plus interests and
costs. RTC resolved respondent’s Notice of appeal as well as PBB’s motion to disallow
appeal and issue execution. RTC held that chua cannot appeal and the proper remedy is
certiorari however the time for filing has lapsed thus, the partial summary judgment had
become final and executory and it ordered a writ of execution. CA held that RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it issued writ of execution but ruled that it is correct that chua
could not appeal it.

Issue: WON partial summary judgment can be appealed separately from the judgment in the
entire case?

Ruling: No. A Partial Summary Judgment as a rule is not appealable separately from the
judgment in the entire case unless allowed by the court under sec. 1(f), Rule 41. Hence, the
failure to appeal separately from a partial summary judgment or to challenge it by a special
civil action for certiorari does not make the same final and executory.

RULE 37/43 JUSTINA MANIEBO VS. COURT OF APPEALS and CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION

FACTS: Justina Maniebo was an employee in the local government unit who was dismissed
from the service for dishonesty. Allegedly, she presented herself as a person who is civil
service eligible. However, it was discovered that the petitioner had actually failed in the
examination with only 60% as her rating. Subsequently, CSCRO held a preliminary
investigation that resulted in the finding that a prima facie case of falsification existed against
maniebo. Accordingly, she was formally charged with possession of spurious report of rating,
falsification, grave misconduct and dishonesty. Maniebo asserts that she has no kknowledge
of such falsification and she did not on any occasion approach any personnel of the CSC, or
any body else connected with the CSC in order to procure the passing grade of 74.01%.
CSCRO rendered its decision dismissing Maniebo from service. She appealed to the CSC but
the CSCRO's decision was affirmed by the CSC. She then seek for reconsideration from the
CSC but was also denied. Then to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for review due to
the petitioner's failure to accompany it with the requisite certified true copies of the material
portions of the record. She applied for a motion for Reconsideration but was again denied
because of her failure to include the necessary documents or the certified true copies of the
material portions of the record referred to therein and another motion for reconsideration
(constituted the second motion) but was further denied stating the same reasons.

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in dismissing the motion for reconsideration.


RULING: YES. The court ruled that failure to file the required certified true copies of the
material portions of the record referred to in the petition was sufficient ground for its dismissal;
and that the subsequent motions for reconsideration were also rightly denied because
Maniebo exerted no effort to furnish the required certified copies within the requested period
of ten days. The CA did not commit any error, least of all a reversible one. Its dismissal was
founded on the correct application of rules that such documents must be accompanied by
certified true copies of the material parts thereof.

RULE 38 RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS - ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL AND FATIMA A. AFDAL


VS. ROMEO CARLOS

FACTS: Respondents instituted a case of unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners,
stating that the petitioners were occupying the land by mere tolerance. Respondent further
claimed that petitionerAbubakar Afdal sold the property to him but that he allowed petitioners
to stay in the property. The trial proceeded ez parte, for failure of the petitioners to file their
corresponding pleadings. Furthermore the court ruled in favor of the respondents based on
the pleadings and the presented pieces of evidence. Upon the service of the writ of execution,
Afdal after 3 days of receiving the writ of execution filed a petition for relief from judgment.
However, it is one of the prohibited pleadings under the Rules of Court. Realizing such, Afdal
withdrew his petition but filed it to the RTC. RTC dismissed the petition for relief from
judgment.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the case.

RULING: NO, the court did not erred in dismissing the case. Pursuant to Sec. 1 Rule 38 A
petition for relief from judgment, if applicable, should be filed in the court where in the case
was heard. In the given case, it is only proper for the RTC to dismiss the case because it is
not the one who tried the it therefore has no jurisdiction over the petition for relief. Moreover, it
should be filed to the MTC but in the given case, it is a prohibited pleading and not a proper
remedy. The one that Afdal should have filed is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

RULE 39 HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN AND ROMANA BIGO VS. AIR TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE

FACTS: The heirs of Mateo Pidacan inherited a land which part thereof was occupied by the
Air Transportation Office (ATO). In the case that they have filed against the ATO they have
won and awarded to them the just compensation determined by the court with damages.
Petitioners then filed a motion for execution of the judgment. However the same was
oppossed by the ATO through the Solicitor General invoking that under PD 1445, all money
claims against the government or any of its subdivision, agencies, and instrumentalities must
be filed with the COA. The RTC denied the Motion for Execution stating that pursuant to PD
1445 and their circular which states that all judges must observe utmost caution, prudence,
and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against
governement agencies and local government agencies and local government units. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE: WON the RTC is correct in denying the motion for execution.

RULING: No. The Court ruled that an effective and efficient administration of justice requires
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. In the case at bar, it is proved that ATO informed the other party that it has funds to
support the fees that will be determined by the court in its decision. Corollarily, it is able to pay
without the need of the petitioners to raise the matter before the COA. It is almost trite to say
that excution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left
unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Petitionershave
been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their propertyfor a considerable length
of time. Now that they prevailed before the Court, it would be highly unjust and in equitable
under the particular circumstances that payment of just compensation would be withheld from
them. We, therefore, write finis to this litigation.

Rule 45 - Angeles vs Bucad

Facts: Rose and Zenaida Angeles are oweners of Las Marias Grill and Resto, Bucad along
with other employees filed an illegal dismissal and money claims against them alleging mainly
that they are underpaid, maltreated and abused. LA ruled in favor of Bucad et al. However
Bucad et al appealed the case to NLRC questioning the money claims. Nlrc denied. Bucad
MR, it was denied then they elevate the case to CA, which affirmed the decision with slight
modifications. Then they appealed the case to SC wherein Angeles presented evidence that
they were not paying the employees beyond the minimum wage through dovumentary
evidence which they alleged were missing during the early stage of the case.

Issue: won SC may allow resolution of facts

Held: No. Pursuant to Rule 45, the SC is not a trier of facts. The findings of facts of the CA is
binding and final in SC. This rule is specially true in regard of administrative bodies in the
exercise of their expertise. Their findings are regarded with finality and is controlling even if
the evidence is not preponderant, particularly in this case where both LA and NLRC had the
same findings.

Rule 50
G.R. No. L-51278 May 9, 1988
HEIRS OF RAMON PIZARRO, SR., vs. HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION,
Facts: Luis Tan filed a verified petition with the CFI of Davao for the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of a certain Alfonso Atilano. The petition alleged, among others that private
respondent is the only surviving son of the deceased Dominga Garcia who died intestate sometime in
1930 in Canton, China; that the deceased left a parcel of land. Luis Tan filed a verified petition with the
CFI of Davao for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of a certain Alfonso Atilano. The
petition alleged, among others that private respondent is the only surviving son of the deceased
Dominga Garcia who died intestate sometime in 1930 in Canton, China
Petitioners filed an opposition to the said petition claiming that they are the heirs of Ramon Pizarro
who died intestate; and that the deceased was the vendee of one-half (1/2) of the aforementioned lot
by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of estate and deed of absolute sale executed by Vicente Tan.
Private respondent filed a motion to drop and exclude the petitioners on the ground that they do not
even claim to be the heirs of the deceased Dominga Garcia and that the extrajudicial deed of partition
and deed of absolute sale allegedly executed in Hongkong in favor of the petitioners' deceased father
is spurious and simulated.
They likewise filed a claim against the estate of the deceased Garcia in the amount of P350,000.00
representing services allegedly rendered by their deceased father in favor of Vicente Tan. Private
respondent filed a reply to petitioners' opposition and a motion to strike out or dismiss the claim on the
ground that it is spurious and barred for having been filed beyond the six (6) month period set in the
notice for the filing of creditors' claim. Petitioners filed another claim against the estate for
P200,000.00 allegedly advanced by their deceased father for the payment of realty and income taxes
of the said lot sometime in 1936, to which claim private respondent filed an opposition on the ground
that it is barred for having been filed beyond the six (6) month period and that it was merely intended
to delay the proceedings.
Respondent court dismissed both claims of the petitioners on the ground that they are barred for
having been filed out of time. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal and respondent court issued an order
dismissing petitioners' appeal and directed petitioners to file instead a petition for review on certiorari
before this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court has the authority to determine whether the appeal involves a
question of law or both questions of law and facts.
Held: It is within the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court to determine whether the appeal
interposed was based on pure questions of law or involves both questions of law and facts in
considering the appeal. The provision of Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court applies only when
the appeal is already brought to the Court of Appeals at which time it may, instead of dismissing the
appeal, upon determination that it involves a pure question of law, order that the case be certified to
this Court.
It must be noted that in the notice of appeal it is not even required that the appellant indicate the court
to which its appeal is being interposed. The requirement is merely directory and failure to comply with
it or error in the court indicated is not fatal to the appeal.

Rule 51
G.R. No. 145420 September 19, 2006
A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

Facts: Before this Court is a Petition for New Trial and, in the alternative, for the Reopening of
the Case on the ground of newly discovered evidence filed by A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. who
was found guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing
Checks Law, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case No.
21238.
Respondent claims that under the Revised Rules of Court, the Motion for New Trial should be
filed at any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the
judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final. The judgment of this
Court has become final and executory on 14 October 1999 as evidenced by the Entry of
Judgment. The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, on their part,
submitted that the instant petition should be dismissed because it was filed out of time
and Dinglasans evidence sought to be admitted is neither material nor newly discovered so
as to warrant new trial or reopening of the case. The alleged evidence if introduced
and admitted, would not in any way alter the judgment.
Issue: Whether or not the instant petition was filed on time.
Held: To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or
order denying the second motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation
whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying what is a prohibited
motion in the first place, in order that the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby,
prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to forestall
the running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such
a situation is not only illogical but also unjust to the winning party.
It bears stressing further that the Resolution of this Court became final and executory as
evidenced by the Entry of Judgment according to the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules
of Court, which reads:

Rule 51. - Judgment.


Sec. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new
trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the
judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of
entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution
becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall
contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be
signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has
become final and executory.
After the judgment or final resolution is entered in the entries of judgment, the case
shall be laid to rest. A decision that acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it
or by the highest court of the land

Rule52
G.R. No. 138295. August 28, 2003
PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, vs NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION

Facts: On 20 March 1995, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued


PILTEL a Provisional Authority (PA) to install, operate and maintain telephone exchanges and
public calling offices. The areas covered by PILTELs PA included Sulu, Zamboanga del Norte,
Zamboanga del Sur, Tawi-Tawi, Misamis Occidental, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato,
Saranggani and Davao City.
On 21 June 1996, while PILTELs PA was still valid and subsisting, the International
Communications Corporation (ICC) applied with the NTC for a PA to construct, operate and maintain
local exchange services in some of the areas covered by PILTELs PA. Among the areas included in
ICCs application were Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato and
Saranggani.
On 11 November 1996, PILTEL filed its Opposition to ICCs PA application.
On 9 March 1998, the NTC issued an Order (NTC Order) granting ICC a PA to establish local
exchange services in areas that included Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga del Sur, Davao del Sur,
South Cotabato and Saranggani.
PILTEL filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals on 5 June 1998 to nullify the NTC Order. On 28
July 1998, ICC filed its Comment to PILTELs Petition, while PILTEL filed its Reply on 28 August 1998.
On 21 September 1998, PILTEL filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve its application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order. PILTEL alleged, among others, that it had yet to receive ICCs
Comment despite the lapse of a considerable time from the Court of Appeals Resolution requiring ICC
to file its Comment.
Issue: Whether or not PILTEL properly availed of the remedy of certiorari.
Held: The settled rule is a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the filing of a petition
for certiorari. A petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to certiorari. An
exception to this rule arises if the petitioner raises purely legal issues. However, contrary to PILTELs
view, the issues raised in its petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals were mainly factual in
nature. Since PILTEL disputes NTCs factual findings and seeks a re-evaluation of the facts and
evidence on record, the issues PILTEL raised are not proper subjects for certiorari. Evidentiary matters
or matters of fact raised in the NTC are not proper grounds in the proceedings for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction and does
not include a review of the NTCs evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.