090 Verdun

VOLUNTARY GUIDES BACKGROUNDER
Number 90 Issue # 1 November 2006
"Ils ne passeront pas"

PJH
VERDUN
They shall not pass

{Wikipedia}
"They shall not pass" (French: "Ils ne passeront pas", Spanish: "¡No pasarán!") is a propaganda
slogan used to express determination to defend a position against an enemy. It was most famously
used during the Battle of Verdun in World War I by French General Robert Nivelle (although some
have attributed it to his commander, Philippe Pétain). It appears on propaganda posters, such as that
by Maurice Neumont after the Second Battle of the Marne, as On ne passe pas !, which was later
adopted on uniform badges by units manning the Maginot Line.
It was again used in the defense of Madrid during the Spanish Civil War by Dolores Ibárruri Gómez
("La Pasionaria"), Communist orator and one of the founders of the Communist Party of Spain.
"¡No pasarán!" became an international anti-fascist slogan, and is still used in this context in left
wing political circles. It was often accompanied by the word pasaremos (we will pass). The right
wing riposte to this slogan was "Han pasado" ("They have passed") said by general Francisco
Franco when his forces conquered Madrid.
ISSUE #1 (November 2006)

FOREWORD
Why a BACKGROUNDER on Verdun ?
In July 1916 the Australian Imperial Force was an integral component of the British Expeditionary
Forces at the Battle of the Somme, an offensive planned to divert the German resources from
Verdun and relieve the pressure on the French. The Brusilov Offensive by the Russians in the
Ukraine on the Eastern Front in early June was in part designed to the same end.
The ongoing Battle of Verdun, that had commenced on 21 February 1916, resulted in the planned
date of the Somme Offensive being brought forward from I August to 1 July 1916. Verdun also had
the impact of considerably reducing the French resources available for the Somme offensive that
had originally been intended to be a predominantly French affair. Perhaps the Somme outcome
might have been quite different if the German General Falkenhayn had not attempted to “bleed
France white” at Verdun.
Verdun was the longest battle of World War I, and the third bloodiest after the Battle of the Somme
and the Brusilov Offensive.
In France the Battle of Verdun is regarded as far more significant than the Battle of the Somme,
whereas the British remember the Battle of the Somme as the most famous battle in France in
WWI.
Why Verdun ?
In the Great War no one German success could affect France as would the taking of Verdun. It was
the last of the great fortresses between the frontier and Paris that was only 135 miles distant.
Verdun was one of the most historic of French cities and was considered by many to be the “ Heart
of France “ , for here in 843 Charles the Bold, Louis the German and Lothaire, the sons of Louis I
the “Debonaire” or Pious, took over and divided the heritage of the Empire of the great
Charlemagne , their grandfather. Verdun at that date passed into the hands of Louis the German and
remained German territory until 1552 when it was taken by France; and later by the Treaty of Peace
of Westphalia in 1648 was formally annexed to France.
In the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 Verdun was put to siege by the Prussians in August and did not
surrender until the capitulation of Metz on 27 October. Verdun was the last French town to be
liberated and following the Treaty of Frankfurt on 10 May 1871 and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the
town found itself on the poorly protected border and at the mercy of a new German offensive.
Peter Hugonnet
Voluntary Guide
November 2006

BACKGROUNDER # 90
90e ANNIVERSAIRE de la BATAILLE de VERDUN
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
SECTION 1- BATTLE OF VERDUN
SECTION 2- MEMORIALS IN AND AROUND VERDUN

2.1 CITADELLE SOUTERRAINE (CITADEL)
2.2 VOIE SACRÉE (THE SACRED WAY)
2.3 FORT DOUAMONT
2.4 DOUAMONT OSSUARY AND NATIONAL CEMETERY
2.5 VERDUN NATIONAL MEMORIAL
2.6 THE TRENCH OF BAYONETS
2.7 VERDUN VICTORY MEMORIAL
2.8 THE MEMORIAL TO THE CHILDREN OF VERDUN
ENCLOSURE #1: 1914-1918 BATTLE FIELDS OF VERDUN
ANNEXES: A. THE HISTORY OF THE BATTLE OF VAUQUOIS

B. “VERDUN” ARTEFACTS IN THE AWM COLLECTION

SECTION 1
BATTLE OF VERDUN
[Reference: Wikipedia]
Date: 21 February – 19 December 1916
Location: Verdun-sur-Meuse, France
Result: French victory
Combatants
France Germany
Commanders
Philippe Pétain
Robert Nivelle Erich von Falkenhayn
Strength
About 30,000 on 21 February 1916 About 150,000 on 21 February 1916
Casualties
378,000; of whom 120,000 dead 337,000; of whom 100,000 dead
The Battle of Verdun, fought from 21 February to 19 December 1916 around the city of Verdun-
sur-Meuse in northeast France, was one of the most important battles in World War I on the
Western Front. The battle was fought between the German and French armies.
It resulted in more than a quarter of a million deaths and about half a million wounded. It was the
longest battle and one of the bloodiest in World War I. In both France and Germany it has come to
represent the horrors of war, similar to the Somme in Britain.
The battle popularized the phrase "Ils ne passeront pas" ("They shall not pass"), uttered by Robert
Nivelle, but often incorrectly attributed to Pétain.
Symbolic value of Verdun

Verdun had great symbolic significance for the French. Into the mists of history, it had played an
important role in the defence of the area to its rear due to its strategic location on the Meuse River.
Atilla the Hun never succeeded in seizing the town. In the division of the empire of Charlemagne,
the Treaty of Verdun of 843 made the town part of the Holy Roman Empire. The Peace of Munster
in 1648 awarded Verdun to France. Verdun played a very important role in the defensive line that
was built after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. As protection against German threats along the
eastern border, a strong line of fortifications was constructed between Verdun and Toul and
between Epinal and Belfort. Verdun guarded the northern entrance to the plains of Champagne and
thus the approach to Paris.
In 1914, Verdun held fast against German attacks, and the fortifications withstood even Big
Bertha's artillery attacks. The garrison was housed in the citadel built by Vauban in the 17th
century. By the end of the 19th century, an underground complex had been built which served as a
workshop, munitions dump, hospital, and quarters for the French troops.
1
Background
After the Germans failed to achieve a quick victory in 1914, the war of movement soon bogged
down into a stalemate on the Western Front. Trench warfare developed and neither side could
achieve a breakthrough.
In 1915 all attempts to force a breakthrough—by the Germans at Ypres, by the British at Neuve
Chapelle and by the French at Champagne—had failed, with terrible casualties being the only
result.
The German Chief of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, believed that although a breakthrough might no
longer be possible, the French could still be defeated if they suffered enough casualties. He planned
to attack a position from which the French could not retreat, for both strategic reasons and reasons
of national pride, and so impose a ruinous battle of attrition on the French armies. The town of
Verdun-sur-Meuse was chosen to "bleed white" the French: the town, surrounded by a ring of forts,
was an important stronghold that projected into the German lines and guarded the direct route to
Paris.
In choosing the battlefield, Falkenhayn was looking for a place where the material circumstances
favored the Germans. Verdun was isolated on three sides. Communications to the French rear were
poor. A German railhead was only twelve miles away while France would resupply by a single
road, the Voie Sacrée. In a war where materiel trumped elan, Falkenhayn expected a favorable loss
exchange ratio as the French would cling fanatically to a death trap.
Rather than a traditional military victory, Verdun was planned as a vehicle for destroying the
French army. Falkenhayn wrote to the Kaiser:
"The string in France has reached breaking point. A mass breakthrough—which in any case is
beyond our means—is unnecessary. Within our reach there are objectives for the retention of which
the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the
forces of France will bleed to death."
Recent scholarship by Holger Afflerbach and others, however, has questioned the veracity of the
Christmas memo. No copy has ever surfaced and the only account of it appeared in Falkenhayn's
post-war memoir. His army commanders at Verdun, including the German Crown Prince, denied
any knowledge of an attrition. It seems likely that Falkenhayn did not specifically design the battle
to bleed the French Army but justified ex-post-facto the motive of the Verdun offensive, despite its
failure.
2
3
Battle
Verdun burning during bombardment with incendiary shells
Verdun was poorly defended because artillery guns had been removed from the local fortifications,
but good intelligence and a delay in the German attack due to bad weather gave the French time to
rush two divisions of 30th Corps, the 72nd and 51st, to the area.
The battle began on 21 February 1916 with a nine-hour artillery bombardment firing 1,000,000
shells by 1,200 guns on a front of 40 km, followed by an attack by three army corps (the 3rd, 7th,
and 18th). The Germans used flamethrowers for the first time to clear the French trenches. By 23
February the Germans had advanced three miles capturing the Bois des Caures after two French
battalions led by Colonel Émile Driant had held them up for two days, and pushed the French
defenders back to Samogneux, Beaumont, and Ornes. Poor communications meant that only now
did the French command realize the seriousness of the attack.
On 24 February the French defenders of 30th Corps fell back again from their second line of
defence, but were saved from disaster by the appearance of the 20th Corps under General
Balfourier. Intended as relief, the new arrivals were thrown into combat immediately. That evening
French Army chief of staff, General de Castelnau, advised his commander-in-chief, Joseph Joffre,
that the French Second Army under General Phillipe Petain, ought to be sent to man the Verdun
sector. On 25 February the German 24th (Brandenburg) Infantry Regiment captured a centre-piece
of France's fortifications, Fort Douaumont.
Castelnau appointed General Philippe Pétain commander of the Verdun area and ordered the French
Second Army to the battle sector. The German attack was slowed down at the village of Douaumont
by the tenacious defense of the French 33rd Infantry Regiment and heavy snowfall. This gave the
French time to bring up 90,000 men and 23,000 tonnes of ammunition from the railhead at Bar-le-
Duc to Verdun.
4
As in so many other offensives on the Western Front, by advancing, the German troops had lost
effective artillery cover. With the battlefield turned into a sea of mud through continual shelling it
was very hard to move guns forward. The advance also brought the Germans into range of French
artillery on the west bank of the Meuse. Each new advance thus became costlier than the previous
one as the attacking German Fifth Army units, often attacking in massed crowds southward down
the east bank, were cut down ruthlessly from their flank by Petain's guns on the opposite, or west,
side of the Meuse valley. When the village of Douaumont was finally captured on 2 March 1916
four German regiments had been virtually destroyed.
Le Mort Homme and Hill 287, May 1916
Unable to make any further progress against Verdun frontally, the Germans turned to the flanks,
attacking the hill of Le Mort Homme on 6 March and Fort Vaux on 8 March. In three months of
savage fighting the Germans captured the villages of Cumières and Chattancourt to the west of
Verdun, and Fort Vaux to the east surrendered on 7 June. The losses were terrible on both sides.
Pétain attempted to spare his troops by remaining on the defensive, but he was relieved on 1 May
and replaced with the more attack-minded General Robert Nivelle.
The Germans' next objective was Fort Souville. On 22 June 1916 they shelled the French defences
with the poison gas diphosgene, and attacked the next day with 60,000 men, taking the battery of
Thiaumont and the village of Fleury. But they were unable to capture Souville, though the fighting
around it continued until 6 September.
The opening of the Battle of the Somme on 1 July 1916 forced the Germans to withdraw some of
their artillery from Verdun to counter the combined Anglo-French offensive to the north.
By the autumn, the German soldiers were exhausted and Falkenhayn had been replaced as chief of
staff by Paul von Hindenburg (Prussian Army) and his co-commander General Erich Ludendorff
(Bavarian Army).
The French launched a counter-offensive on 21 October 1916. Fort Douaumont was bombarded
with new 400 mm guns (brought up on rails and directed by spotter planes), and captured on 24
October. On 2 November the Germans lost Fort Vaux and retreated. A final French offensive
beginning on 11 December drove the Germans back to their starting positions.
5
German dead at Verdun
Casualties
It was crucial that the less populous Central Powers inflict many more casualties on their
adversaries than they themselves suffered. At Verdun, Germany did inflict more casualties on the
French than they incurred—but not in the 2:1 ratio that they had hoped for, despite the fact that the
German army grossly outnumbered the French.
France's losses were appalling, however. It was the perceived humanity of Field Marshal Philippe
Pétain who insisted that troops be regularly rotated in the face of such horror that helped seal his
reputation. The rotation of forces meant that 70% of France's army went through "the wringer of
Verdun", as opposed to the 25% of the German forces who saw action there.
Significance
The Battle of Verdun, also known as the 'Mincing Machine of Verdun' or 'Meuse Mill' became a
symbol of French determination, inspired by the sacrifice of the defenders.
The successes of the fixed fortification system led to the adoption of the Maginot Line as the
preferred method of defence along the Franco-German border during the inter-war years.
Verdun Memorial
References
0. Clayton, Anthony. Paths of Glory - The French Army 1914-18., ISBN 0-304-36652-8
0. Foley, Robert. German Strategy and the Path to Verdun., ISBN 0-521-84193-3
0. Horne, Alistair. The Price of Glory., ISBN 0-14-017041-3
0. Keegan, John. The First World War., ISBN 0-375-70045-5
0. Martin, William. Verdun 1916. London: Osprey Publishing, 2001. ISBN 1-85532-993-X
0. Mosier, John. The Myth of the Great War., ISBN 0-06-008433-2
6
SECTION 2
MEMORIALS IN AND AROUND VERDUN
1
2.1 CITADELLE SOUTERRAINE
The Citadel of Verdun was constructed from 1200. Between 1890 and 1893 more than 7 kilometers
of gallery were constructed under the citadel. In the World War I the citadel was the logistic center
for the battle of Verdun.
During the war more than 10.000 soldiers lived and worked in the galleries.
Entrance to the Citadel
France’s Unknown Soldier
On November 10, 1920 at the Citadel of Verdun, Auguste Thien reviewed eight identical coffins,
each bearing the remains of an unknown French soldier who had been killed during the Great War.
Thien selected the sixth of the eight coffins, as his Regimental number (1+2+3) added up to six as
well as it being the number of his Division. The coffin was transported to Paris to rest in the chapel
on the first floor of the Arc de Triomphe. There the coffin remained until January 28, 1921 at
which time the Unknown French soldier was laid in his permanent place of honor at the base of the
Arc de Triomphe.
Soldat Thien was a native of Normandy and had joined up in January 1918 at the age of 19. For the
ceremony Maginot had demanded a young soldier, a simple private who had been one of the
valiant. It was harder than expected to find such a soldier still serving and as things turned out the
chosen soldier fell ill and a replacement had to be found that morning. Ordered to find a Number 1
Uniform with only a few hours notice the name of Auguste Thien has entered into history. Three
months later he finished his service and was discharged.
2
The display in the Citadel depicting the selection of France’s Unknown
The remains of the seven other “Unknowns” were interned at the Verdun Faubourg Pavé National
Cemetery at the same time that the chosen Unknown was laid to rest in Paris.
The Verdun Faubourg Pavé National Cemetery. Square of the Unknowns below the National Flag
of France
3
2.2 Voie Sacrée ( The Sacred Way)
Milestone along the Voie Sacrée
Voie Sacrée ("Sacred Way") is the name given to the road between Bar-le-Duc and Verdun, because of
the vital role that it played in the battle.
Along its 72km (45 miles), day and night, there were normally 3,500 trucks on the move, ferrying men,
ammunition and supplies to the beleaguered city. During the initial crisis of February 21 to 6 March it
delivered 23,000 tons of ammunition, 2,500 tons of other material and 190,000 men. One truck passed
every 14 seconds, submitting the road to considerable wear and tear. Over the course of ten months,
8,500 men from 16 labour battalions worked to keep the road in good shape and order.
The special unit responsible for controlling traffic and servicing the vehicles numbered 300 officers and
8,500 men. There were 30 breakdown trucks always on the road and repair crews stationed beside it. A
broken down vehicle was immediately moved to the roadside so as not to interrupt the flow of supplies.
Automobile repair shops at Bar-le-Duc and Troyes worked ceaselessly as did hydraulic presses turning
out solid rubber tyres. Alongside the road ran a narrow-gauge single track railway, Le Meusin. This was
able to move about 1,800 tons of supplies a day. it carried the bulk of the food for the army at Verdun -
some 16,600 officers and 420,000 men, not to mention 136,000 horses - and brought back many
wounded from the front.
It still exists today.{Wikipedia}
4
2.3 FORT DOUAMONT
Ft. Douaumont, set on Hill 388, was originally part
of the , defence system built by General Sere de
Rivieres to protect France from a new German
invasion following the Treaty of Frankfurt. The
building work began in 1882 and it was
modernised seven times in the run up to 1914. Its
initial stonework, which was reinforced after the
“high-explosive shell crisis", was protected by a
thick layer of sand to muffle the blasts and a layer
of concrete measuring 1.5 metres by , 2.5 metres.
It was surrounded by ditches featuring metal
fences and armed with breach guns, a 155mm gun
cupola, a “casemate de Bourge" -type bunker for
two 75mm guns and ; three armour-plated cupolas
with two Hotchkiss machine I guns and six
armour-plated observation posts. In August 1915,
it was partially disarmed and its garrison, closed.
By 25 February 1916, all that remained was the
fixed 155mm and 75mm gun cupolas and a small
team of forty territorial artillerymen. German
shelling took its toll on the building - the damaged
drawbridge lay open, the observation towers were
demolished, the concrete shell was weakened and
the scarp and counterscarp were in ruins. The 24th
Brandenburg Infantry Regiment captured the fort
without resistance. I Following an initial failed
attempt, the fort was recaptured on 24 October
1916.
The German Tomb inside Fort Douamont
Designated as a listed building in 1970, Ft. Douaumont is now open to visitors. Guided tours take
you through the first casemate followed by several hundred metres of corridors on two levels
featuring bedrooms, dormitories and kitchens.
5
2.4 DOUAMONT OSSUARY AND NATIONAL CEMETERY
The Ossuary
Work on the Ossuary began on 22 August 1920. Financed by contributions and private funds and
built according to plans by the architects Azema, Hardy and Edrei, the Ossuary stands on a peak in
the middle of the former battlefield and features a tower, cloister and chapel.
The 46-metre high tower, shaped in the form of a shell, holds the Victory Bell, which weighs 2,300
kilos and is rung three times a day. It also contains a panoramic table and a light - the lantern of the
dead - that shines out over the battlefield. The arched cloister measures 137 metres in length and its
outside walls display the coats of arms of all the towns that were involved in its construction (113
French towns and 26 foreign ones). Its inside walls feature inscriptions from societies and clubs of
the soldiers killed in Verdun and within these walls lie eighteen alcoves holding forty-six tombs.
These tombs stand above 14m3 of graves containing bones and each one corresponds to a sector of
Verdun (Douaumont, Bois des Caures, etc.). 130,000 soldiers therefore share this burial ground.
There is a tomb containing more remains from the most deadly sectors at each end and the mosaic-
paved floor displays the military medal at the sides, the Legion of Honour in the centre and French
War Crosses in between the two.
The chapel has a nave and its stained glass windows (the work of the French painter Desvallieres)
illustrate two themes - sacrifice, and glory and immortality. The pietá on the high altar was carved
by Vezier.
It was His Lordship Bishop Ginisty who came up with the idea of an ossuary and the building work
lasted over a decade. The tower and light were unveiled in September 1927 and the Ossuary itself in
August 1932 by the French President Albert Lebrun.
6
Douamount National Cemetery
In 1923, it was decided that a cemetery should be built to complete the Ossuary. Several hectares of
land were levelled out in front of the Ossuary and graves and paths were marked out before the
bodies began to be transferred in 1925.
This 144,380 sq m cemetery contains 16,142 bodies and was opened 23 June 1929.
7
2.5 VERDUN NATIONAL MEMORIAL
This memorial was built on the site of the former station in Fleury devant-Douaumont and was
designed by Charles Legrand, himself a Great War veteran. It keeps the memory of the battle alive
for both France and Germany, and above all serves as a museum of reconciliation.
The first floor of the museum, which is dominated by two fighter planes (a French “baby" Nieuport
and a German Fokker Dill), retraces the history of the Great War and the Battle of Verdun through
documents, photos, maps, models, uniforms, light weapons and slide shows. The ground floor
features a real-life reconstitution of the battlefield, with trenches, shell holes and barbed wire, and
an exhibition of heavy equipment (field kitchen, pieces of artillery and a Berliet lorry which carried
troops along the "Sacred Way").
8
2.6 THE TRENCH OF BAYONETS
History intermingles with legend concerning the Tranchée des Baionnettes. On the 12th of June
1916, this entrenched position was a part of the terrain forming a salient west of Fort Douaumont
which the Germans wanted to take before launching their main offensive on the 23rd.
Two battalions of the 137th Infantry Regiment, deployed at the front since the 10th of June, were
the object of appalling shelling and very soon found themselves cut off. The regiment's third
company had lost 94 of its 164 men by the night of the 11th. The remainder had been placed in row
of exposed trenches directly observable by German artillery spotters. The artillery fire on the
position increased in the early morning hours and the remainder of 137th Regiment was annihilated
almost to a man. . Author Alistair Horne tells what subsequently transpired.
It was not until after the war that French teams exploring the battlefield provided a clue as to the
fate of 3 Company. The trench it had occupied was discovered completely filled in, but from a part
of it at regular intervals protruded rifles, with bayonets still fixed to their twisted and rusty muzzles,
On excavation, a corpse was found beneath each rifle.
From that plus the testimony of survivors from nearby units, it was deduced that 3 Company had
placed its rifles on the parapet ready to repel any attack and — rather than abandon their trench —
had been buried alive to a man there by the German bombardment. When the story of the Tranchée
des Baionnettes was told it caught the world's imagination."
9
The Colonel of the 137th had a small wooden
monument erected there in January 1919. A
generous American patron, Mr. Rand, funded the
present-day trench covering with a paved path
ending at the nearest road. This monument was
opened by Alexandre Millerand, President of the
Republic, in the presence of the ambassador of the
United States, on the 8th of December 1920. Other
theories have evolved over the years about the fate
of the last men of the 3rd Company. Gas or
concussion from exploding shells are alternative
explanations of the mass deaths of the men. This
may have been followed by Germans overrunning
the position and hurriedly filling in the mass grave
which would explain their unique internment. But
the exact details are besides the point. As Mr.
Horne points out, the legend persists because
whatever happened was an epic display of
gallantry and sacrifice by the Poilus and vivid
documentation of the intensity of the fighting at
Verdun. The Bayonet Trench symbolizes what
makes Verdun a singular event in military history.
{Reference: The Great War Society website 15

October 2006}
Extract from A Historical Tour of VERDUN. Jean –Pascal Soudagne. 2005 ISBN 2.7373.3741.0
“…Excavation and exhumation work revealed that the bodies were in fact lying down and so the
most likely explanation is that , during the battle, the Germans turned this site – which was not a
trench but rather a communication trench into a communal grave. They covered the bodies with
earth and used the rifles to mark the graves (as was so often done by combatants during this
war)…”
10
2.7 VERDUN VICTORY MEMORIAL
The "Á la Victoire et aux soldats de Verdun" victory memorial was unveiled on 25 June 1929 and it
stands on the town's oldest rampart, which dates from the Roman era and was damaged by shelling
in 1916 and 1917. This memorial was built by the French architect Chesnay in 1929 and it looks out
over rue Maze] - one of Verdun’s shopping streets. Visitors can climb its sevemy three steps to
reach the crypt, which holds the Verdun combatants' visitors book containing the names of all the
soldiers who fought in the battle. The crypt itself forms the base of a 30-metre high tower that is
topped with a Victory statue in the form of a knight, who faces east and watches over Verdun. Both
Romanesque and Neo-Babylonian in style, the memorial was unveiled by the French President
Gaston Doumergue in the presence of the French Prime Minister Raymond Poincare and Marshal
Petain.
11
2.8 THE MEMORIALTO THE CHILDREN OF VERDUN
Five soldiers, each holding a different weapon, stand against Verdun's rampart and symbolise the
resistance of the town. They form a human wall and represent Verdun's 1916 motto, "Nobody will
pass us!" The base of the memorial. which is the work of the architect Forest and sculptor Grange,
bears the names of all the Verdunois who died for France.
12
ENCLOSURE # 1 TO BACKGROUNDER # 90
1
AGL (1) 7-63-5M-95111
FORWARD
This brochure has been prepared by the Information Division, United States Army Garrison,
Verdun, as a supplementary text in conjunction with the Verdun Battlefield briefing and tour given
by this headquarters.
Our aim is to provide a comprehensive, readable text with accompanying maps for the visitor to
become familiar with the events surrounding the Battle of Verdun. Historians and students of
military history will likely find technical omissions, however, none have been omitted that would
have a material effect on the account.
This headquarters is indebted to the exploratory research of Majors George S. Long and John F.
Hunt, who began this project in 1959. This brochure was printed through the courtesy of the United
States Army, Europe, Publications and Training Aids Center.
September 1962
WALLACE A. McDANIEL Colonel, Infantry Commanding
NOTE: Layout of the original document was altered by to facilitate its use over the Internet.
(Al Nieder, 23 September, 2000.)
www.vahs.org/wwi
2
INTRODUCTION
On 4 August 1914, Germany initiated World War I by moving its forces through Belgium to
implement a large, planned offensive against France. Seven of the eight German Armies were
concentrated toward this end; the Eighth German Army was directed against the Russians in the
Eastern Front. The German plan, which embodied many of the ideas and characteristics of the Von
Schlieffen Plan, was a gigantic double envelopment. Von Moltke, Chief of the German General
Staff, hoped to conquer France within six weeks, after which he would throw a strong portion of the
forces against the Russians. The plan called for the German Fifth Army to serve as the hub at the
Metz-Thionville area with the First to the Fourth Armies to the north moving west and south, in a
gigantic pincers movement. The Sixth and Seventh Armies, located between Belfort and Toul
would, if possible, move forward to form the second arm of the pincers, in which the French
Armies would be caught. If not possible to accomplish this envelopment, the German armies would
fall back to the Sarrebourg-Strasbourg area.
To oppose the Germans, the French had five armies deployed from Belfort through Epinal, Toul,
Verdun and Maubeuge, with the British and the Belgians completing the line to the sea and
guarding the French left flank. General Joffre, Chief of the French General Staff had indications
that the Germans would violate Belgian territory, but he, not wishing to do the same, and not having
a visible German commitment, organized the French Armies along the French-German and French-
Belgian borders.
3
The German plan did not progress as scheduled. The initial movement through Belgium was slowed
down. First, the German First Army had to defile through Aachen to get into position in Belgium
without violating Dutch territory. Second, the Germans met with stiff opposition at Liege and were
delayed here capturing the city. Third, General Von Kluck, the First German Army Commander
changed course to the south and southeast too soon, a move which exposed the German right flank
to the British and Belgian forces. A later drive to the sea was unsuccessful; the damage had been
done.
4
After the first few months of battle, the war developed into trench warfare with small gains or
losses along the entire front. December 1915, just prior to the Battle of Verdun found the front line
extending from Belfort, Epinal, St-Mihiel, Verdun, Reims, Soissons, Tassigny, Perrones, Arras and
Ypres.
----- FOOTNOTE by Al Nieder - 1963-1965 student at Verdun & Toul American HS: During
World War One, over one TON of high explosives fell on every square yard of the Verdun
battlefield - an area roughly 10 miles by 10 miles - poisoning the earth so nothing grew in many
areas even in the late 1950's.
One of every four deaths and injuries in World War I were at Verdun: over 600,000 died and over
two million more were wounded, injured, or poison-gassed on the Verdun battlefields. Years later,
thousands still were dying slow, agonizing years later from the poison gas. Even in the mid-1960's,
one could see green chlorine gas gather in the bottom of shell craters after a rain.
The hopes, ambitions, and dreams of an entire generation of the human race died at Verdun. The
bones of some 300,000 Unknowns, Allies and Axis alike, now reside under the Ossuary overlooking
the Verdun cemetery. Among those survivors inured to poison gas and deadly hand-to-hand combat
in trenches were many of the future leaders of World War Two.
Copyright Has Been Applied For On Behalf Of The US Army
5
6
CHAPTER I
EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ASSAULT
Late in December 1915, the possibility of an attack on Verdun was brought to the attention of
General Gallieni, French Prime Minister of War. On 16 December 1915, he queried Marshal Joffre,
Group Commander of the French First and Second Armies, as to whether a two line defensive
system, to include all necessary construction, had been planned and completed. Joffre replied that
on 22 October he had ordered the improvement along the entire front of the existing double line
defense system and the organization of the fortified areas in the rear of the lines. These defensive
measures were nearing completion and at a number of points were completed.
At this time, Joffre was centering his thoughts much more on the plans for the coordinated Allied
offensive along the Somme slated for July 1916, than on the defense of the Verdun. In fact, since
August 1915, when he assumed control of the fortress of Verdun, Joffre had been draining it of its
men and guns without taking any measures to compensate for the losses with more adequate trench
defenses. Privately, he felt the "apprehensions of an attack on Verdun were baseless," despite
reports from his Intelligence Branch of German activities near Verdun. Such rumors, he thought,
were "calculated to disturb profoundly the spirit of discipline in the Army". Similarly, his
Operations Staff was too concerned with the offensive schedules for the July offensive to pay heed.
As late as 18 February in a letter to General Haig, British Commander-In-Chief, Joffre stated that if
the Germans took the offensive at all, it would be against the Russians.
On 10 February 1916, the garrison under General Herr consisted of seven divisions and two
territorial brigades in the line, with one division in reserve. These forces were deployed for the
defense of the area between the Second Army in the Argonne and the First Army in Woevre. They
occupied a series of four defensive parallel lines of which only one was fully manned. Reports of
German activities in front of the Verdun area led General Herr to request additional troops for a
speedy concentration of forces in the Verdun defense. As a result of this request, six divisions were
diverted from the Somme and arrived at the Verdun Forts on 20 February, one day before the
German attack.
At this time, the logistical problems to support the Verdun forces were critical. Of the two standard
gauge railroads serving Verdun, one to the south was cut off above St-Mihiel and other to the west
was within easy range of the German artillery. All that remained was the Meusian Railroad Line
with a carrying capacity of 800 tons per day and the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun to transport
men and material for the gigantic struggle. Marshal Petain, who shortly after the attack assumed
command of the Verdun defense, initiated the day and night motor convoys that hauled
ammunition, food supplies, guns and personnel to the front. By March 1916, 3,500 vehicles were
streaming back and forth over this seven yard wide route, at times reaching a rate of one vehicle
every five seconds, to serve the defensive troops. This roadway between Bar-le-Duc and Verdun is
now known as the "Voie Sacree" (Sacred Way) and is lined with special Voie Sacree "milestones".
In planning the offensive, Falkenhayn scheduled his attack for 13 February. Heavy rains and haze
over the battlefield made him postpone the attack to the 21st of February. This delay permitted the
French to move up the reserves to almost double General Herr's forces and prevent what might have
been a severe defeat and breakthrough by the German forces.
For the offensive, Crown Prince Rupprecht, Commander of the German forces, had twenty six
divisions, of which a third was held in general reserves. The plan proposed using nine divisions in a
penetration of the stronghold in the plain of Woevre, which were ready to assault the French flank
7
as soon as the front was breached. Four more divisions, deployed on the west bank of the Meuse
north of Verdun, had orders to attack the French to bar any French retreat when the breach on the
eastern side was accomplished.
"Voie Sacree" (Sacred Way)
8
CHAPTER II
FEBRUARY OPERATIONS
Early on 21 February in the midst of severe, cold weather, the German Army opened up its
offensive on Verdun by concentrating the heaviest artillery bombardment known in history up to
that time. On a twenty mile front from Bois d'Avocourt to Etain, German artillery poured heavy
shells incessantly for nine hours, which, to all indications, should have wiped out the French
fortifications and trench system.
About 1615 hours, after lifting the artillery fire, the German Army launched amid snow flurries, the
first infantry attack. Not being sure of the effect of the artillery barrage, the Crown Prince sent in
the first attack, strong reconnoitering parties to test the effectiveness and results of the German
artillery preparations and to seize whatever trenches had been destroyed or evacuated. By grasping
these forward trenches, the Crown Prince sought to put the German Infantry in a favorable position
for launching the big offensive on the following day.
The Prince employed the following tactics: "Each German troop was given a specific limited
objective. Before the attack, the German Artillery fired barrages that were concentrated to weaken
the defenses. Upon lifting the artillery fire, a wave of scouts went forward to test the results of the
artillery fire and to report its effectiveness. After the scouts, the pioneers and soldiers armed with
grenades moved forward. Then came the main body in single file. Finally, the reserves brought up
the rear, carrying with them ammunition, tools, sandbags and serviced the main body. The second
offensive line was composed as the first and was used in support of or as a replacement for the first
to exploit its gains. The scheme of attack employed was to proceed by small enveloping
movements, utilizing cover and ravines, forcing the small centers of resistance to fall one by one. In
each instance, artillery fire supported the advance continually and was responsible for the
breakdown of the resistance of the strong points before the units attempted the assault and moved
on their objectives."
9
The French front line of defense met the fierce German onslaught along the line of the village
Brabant, Bois des Caures, Bois de Ville and Herbebois. While defending this line, the French
hurried to strengthen the redoubts at Bois de la Wavrille and the Village of Beaumont to the south.
On 21 February, the resistance at Herbebois, the first to fall to the German forces, slowed the
German advances. Part of Herbebois was retaken by the French forces in a counterattack during the
night. Later in the day, Bois d'Haumont was captured by a French counterattack at 1600, 22
February, failed to retake it.
At the end of the second day, the French command relieved with fresh troops the two divisions in
the line which bore the brunt of the attacks by the five German divisions. The new French division
troops, thrown at night into doubtful positions in the open country, were quickly annihilated. On the
third day, the French lost the last two positions in the first defense line.
The situation was grave. General Langle de Cary, commanding the center group of armies, ordered
II Corps, closely engaged in the Woevre area, to fall back on the heights of the Meuse. This
movement was carried out during the night.
The same evening, Marshal Joffre, alarmed for the first time about the actions at Verdun, assigned
General Petain to the Second Army and the defense of Verdun. He also ordered the withdrawal of
the French Army and to concentrate the forces in the west sector to be effective 25 February. At
midnight of 24 February, he gave full power to General Castelnau, Chief of the French General
Staff who set out for Verdun, to act on his behalf. When Castelnau reached General Langle de
Cary's headquarters at Avize (near Epernay) at 0545, he countermanded Joffre's order, and
telephoned General Herr to hold the line at all costs east of the Meuse River facing north between
the Meuse and Douaumont, and on the heights of the Meuse facing east. At midnight of 25
February, Petain arrived to assume command replacing General Herr.
During the same day, German forces advanced south of Samogneux to the hill of Cotelettes on the
west, and captured Bezonvaux and Bois de la Vauche on the east. These advances by the Germans
10
made General de Bonneval, commanding the 37th Division on Talou and Poivre Hills, order a
withdrawal to the Belleville Hill since he feared the envelopment of his troops. Fortunately, the
order was only partially carried out, since the Zouave troops, west of Poivre Hill, defended and held
their position, and the 39th Division of II Corps, going up the line, passed the 37th and organized a
defense along the Bras-Hardaumont line.
In the center, Fort Douaumont fell into the hands of the Germans. The German's desire to capture
Douaumont is apparent when one realizes how the fort occupies the dominant position overlooking
the northern terrain and substantial barricades defended it.
The advancing German units in the assault toward Douaumont were ordered to halt about 800
meters from the barbed wire entanglements of the fort. A German lieutenant, who ventured to take
his company under cover of a patrol, made a break in the entanglements. Discovering the side
casemates and seeing no one, he had his unit slide down into the moats and then climbed the wall of
the fort to gain entry. The German unit caught the few turret artillerymen and engineers completely
by surprise and rendered the French helpless.
According to reports, the French commander of the fort had, during the snow storm, mistaken the
invaders for Frenchmen who were falling back, and consequently, made no effort to stop them. The
small number of troops available to defend the fort resulted from a high command decision to limit
the numbers in garrisons and merge the excess with field troops.
On 25 February 1916, Verdun came under constant and continuous bombardments which required
the last of the residents to be evacuated by the Army.
On 26 February, at his Souilly Headquarters, 18 kilometers southwest of Verdun on the Sacred

Way, General Petain decided to revise his plans. He divided the defensive area into four sectors,
giving the first to General Duschene at Woevre; the second to General Balfourier from Woevre to
Douaumont; the third to General Guillaumat astride the Meuse and the fourth to General Bazelaire
on the extreme left of the defensive positions. He ordered the 59th Division to establish two
defensive positions that he selected on 27 February, and two additional lines on 2 March. At his
request, territorials repaired and widened the "Sacred Way". Within four days after his arrival and
assumption of Command, he had received the following reinforcements: I, III, XIII, XIV and XXI
Corps.
The fresh French forces under disposition of the new plans slowed the German forward movement
and finally halted the German assault at Hardaumont and Bois de la Caillette on 29 February.
The German assault and drive from Verdun was stopped due to their exhausted forces and the
nonavailability of adequate reserves. The German High Command had failed to gain its objective,
Verdun, and a speedy victory. The Kaiser, who had been on hand and prepared to march through
Verdun in a victory parade, departed for Germany never to return.
11
A German 38cm gun fires the first shot at Fort Douaumont in the battle of Verdun
12
CHAPTER III
BATTLE OF THE FLANKS
The German High Command realized the imminence of a British attack on the Somme. As a means
of diverting troops and disorganizing the preparations being made by the Allies in Picardy, the
German forces continued their attacks with furious tenacity. However, the scene of all ensuing large
scale attacks shifted to the flanks of the Verdun front when the Crown Prince seemingly realized the
serious errors in concentrating his initial frontal attack on such a small and difficult area. Verdun
was still considered to be the objective, but he planned to attack the flanks of the defensive line in
front of Verdun. He started his campaign, known as the Battle of the Flanks on 6 March.
From the French point of view, the French General Staff realized that the problem was to hold
Verdun without ceasing to prepare for their big offensive along the Somme scheduled for July.
With regards to the defense of Verdun, Joffre announced to the troops of Verdun: "For three weeks
you have withstood the most formidable attack which the enemy has yet made. Germany counted
on the success of this effort, which she believed to be irresistible and used for this purpose her best
troops and heaviest artillery. With the capture of Verdun, she had hoped to strengthen the courage
of her allies and convince neutrals of her superiority." Joffre then directed French defensive forces
to make necessary preparations and cautioned them to be ready at all times for prompt action to
repel the enemy.
On 6 March, two German Corps on the west flank attacked Hill de L'Oie and on 10 March, Bois de
Cumieres, capturing them both. Slightly west of Cumieres is Mort Homme consisting of Hill 256
and Hill 295. Positions on these hills formed excellent observation posts on activities behind enemy
lines. After capturing Bois de Cumieres, the German artillery opened fire and continued a five?hour
bombardment using all types of shells, which included timefuse, percussion, poisonous gas, and tear
gas. As the artillery lifted its fire, German infantry advanced on Mort Homme. Meanwhile, the
French Command ordered its defenders to hold. In the defense, among those who fell, were four
colonels and a brigadier commander, all with their weapons in hand. Later, the French counter
attacked to drive off the enemy and retook Hill 265. They were not so fortunate on Hill 295, where
13
they were unable to dislodge the Germans. Nevertheless, Mort Homme did not benefit the Germans,
since it became a veritable "no man's land" with attacks and counter?attacks continuing until 20
August 1917, when Mort Homme was finally recaptured by the French 31st Infantry Division.
The German 11th Bavarian Division then moved on the second strong point, Hill 304, west of Mort
Homme, on 20 March. On this objective, the division was unable to make any headway, but going
around it to the southwest, the Germans captured Malancourt and Bois d'Avocourt.
On 28 March, the Germans again attacked Hill 304 with fresh troops but without success. By 8
April, German attacks almost eliminated the French front line. A new French defensive line was
then established along the Avocourt Redoubt, the slopes of Hill 304 on the north side, the southern
approach of Mort Homme and just north of Cumieres.
The German forces west of Hill 304, then took the offensive and captured Bois de Camard on 8
May. From here the action shifted to Cumieres where, after three attempts with reinforcements of
six divisions, German forces captured Cumieres on 18 May. In this effort the Germans were unable
to exploit the fruit of their victory because they had expended all their reserves in the main effort. In
fact, the Germans lost some of their gains because they lacked the reserves to hold what they had
won.
On the eastern flank early in March, the Germans attacked Vaux and continued the attack until they
captured it on 31 March. Two days later they captured the lake behind Vaux. Then the Crown
Prince ordered an all out attack on the flanks on 9 April, hoping to breach the French defensive
wall. Again, his gains were insignificant for the troops and efforts he put into the assault which was
on a scale similar to that of the first day.
General Petain lauded the French soldier for his great effort. Nevertheless, he cautioned them to be
watchful and courageous and not be complacent. His remarks of 10 April are significant: "9 April
1916, was a glorious day for our armies ... the furious attacks of the soldiers of the Crown Prince
broke down everywhere. The artillery, infantry, engineers and aviators of the Second Army vied
with one another in valor. Honor to all!! No doubt, the Germans will attack again. Let us all work
and watch, that yesterday's success be continued. Courage! We shall take them".
14
CHAPTER IV
THE FINAL GERMAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST VERDUN
As of 30 May 1916, the French Army occupied a defensive position generally from Bois de
Malancourt, Hill 304, Mort Homme, Cumieres, Charny, Thiaucourt, north of Fort de Vaux,
Damloup, extending to les Eparges. General Joffre had made a number of changes in command
during the period of April, May and June. The most significant was that he appointed General
Nivelle overall commander of the Armies in the center and assigned him the defense of the east
sector.
Similarly, the Crown Prince (See Below) made changes. He divided the Verdun battlefield into two
similar sectors with General Von Luchow in command of the western sector replacing Von Mudra
in April and General Francois replacing General Von Gallwitz as commander in the eastern sector.
With increasing evidence of preparations for the forthcoming Allied offensive on the Somme, the
German High Command became concerned on how to divert French troops from participating in
that offensive. It decided that the solution to the problem was to concentrate its offensive on Verdun
and to gain a quick, decisive victory. The Crown Prince, therefore, ordered a renewal of the
offensive on 1 June, striking the French defensive line in the eastern sector from the crest of
Thiaumont through Froideterre Hill, Fleury, Fort Souville, to Fort de Vaux.
15
On 1 June, the Germans took Thiaumont Farm, lost it on the second and regained it on the 9th.
Situated near Thiaumont Farm lies the spot know as the Trench of Bayonets. Here, in this hastily
built line, two companies of the 137th Infantry Regiment were ordered to defend it at all costs. In
anticipation of the German charge, the troops fixed bayonets for close-in combat. While they
crouched in the trench, heavy German artillery opened a terrific bombardment on the trench, which,
weakened by the past week's artillery battering, collapsed on the defenders burying them alive, just
leaving their bayonets protruding.
On 1 June, the Germans attacked Fort de Vaux. However, they were not successful in capturing it
until 9 June, when the Germans, after concentrating a massive artillery and infantry attack, managed
to take the fort with flame throwers and grenades. Partial French resistance under Major Raynal
continued in one of the passages for eight days and nights, the last days without food or water.
While the fort was falling other German units attacked Thiaumont Redoubt, but without success.
They did succeed, however, in entrenching themselves in the Ravine de la Dame, west of
Thiaumont Farm.
The German High Command felt pressed for time and desired a quick victory. "Now the time is ripe
for victory", the Kaiser announced, "Thiaumont Redoubt, Froideterre Hill, Fleury and Fort Souville
are the last powerful barriers between German forces and Verdun". He anticipated capture of
Verdun within four days.
Beginning on 21 June, German artillery directed an unprecedented barrage in the sectors

Euroideterre, Fleury, Souville and Tavannes. The bombardment was so severe from the enormous
"beer barrel" 38 and 42 centimeter shells that the ridges appeared to be on fire, smoking like
volcanoes, and the ravines were shrouded with rising clouds of rising black and yellow smoke.
On the evening of 22 June, in final preparation for the big attack, the German artillery poured
almost 200,000 poison gas shells into the Souville area. With this heavy bombardment, little or no
resistance was expected, so very sure was the German command of having destroyed French
artillery, food and supply convoys, and supporting troops. Nevertheless, while shells continued to
whistle down all sides, French reinforcements continued to move into the "FURNACE", wearing
gas masks and stopped under the weight of their packs stumbled into shell holes.
In the book, "La Bataille devant Souville", Colonel Bordeaux, Brigadier Commander at Souville,
wrote, "All night long the troops climbed this CALVARY. In the morning, tired out, they would
have to withstand the shock of attacking German infantry. Masked, blinded, half-suffocated and
half-buried in the earth thrown up by the incessant shell fire, the troops in the line ... knew perfectly
that the moment the tornado lifted would be the signal for the German attack. They waited on
ground churned up by a fire, listening to the pityful cries of the wounded, and with the dead to keep
them company ... controlling their nerves, yet keeping them on edge, concentrating on the motive,
one idea; never to give ground, but to fight and hold.
At 0700, on 23 June, 70,000 Bavarian light infantrymen, troops inured to hardship, moved forward
on a three-mile front extending from approximately Froideterre Hill, Thiaumont Redoubt, and Fort
de Vaux. An extended line of the advance party armed with grenades and leaping from hole to hole
preceded the storm battalions, which moved forward in mass formation. To the rear in the ravines
were assembled the reserves and service troops.
To meet this advance, French "75mm" artillery batteries continued firing an unceasing barrage,
harassing and disrupting the reserve and service troops in the ravines, which became charnel houses
16
of blood, poisoned with gas fumes. Near Froideterre Hill, the French lost Thiaumont Redoubt.
Attacked from flank and front, the men of the French 121st Battalion, outnumbered ten-to-one,
struggled in hand-to-hand fighting as the Germans closed in on them from all sides. Only sixty
Frenchmen survived this encounter. Taking advantage of this breach, four Bavarian companies
burst through it as far as Froideterre Redoubt. The struggle at Thiaumont Redoubt gained time for
the French command to send the 114th Battalion into battle. As the battalion moved up it deployed
"as though on parade" and by use of bayonets and grenades, encountered and drove out the tired
Bavarians who momentarily had held their objective.
In the center of the offensive line, a German battalion, succeeding to cross Bazil Ravine before the
French lifted the barrage, hurled themselves against the flank of Fleury and gained a footing in the
western outskirts.
A little to the east, the French 407th Regiment defended the line along the wooded slope of Vaux-
Chapitre. During a critical moment of the battle, the Germans breached the line and managed to
gain a position from which they could attack the Regiment from the rear. Fortunately, the French
Regimental Commander, by ideally emplacing a number of machine guns near his headquarters in
the way of advance, slowed down the enemy offensive. This enabled him to improvise reserve
forces from among the communications men, stretcher bearers pioneers, orderlies and cooks. With
these forces, he counter-attacked and forced the surprised attackers to fall back.
On 23 June, the overall prospects on the front for the French were so grim that General Petain
suggested to General Joffre the withdrawal of the forces to the west flank if the enemy reached the
countercarps of Souville. Joffre gave a peremptory order to hold the east sector. Meanwhile, the
French and the British along the Somme began their preliminary attacks and on 1 July, they opened
their offensive in full force.
Still pressing to breach the line as soon as possible, the Germans launched another heavy attack on
Souville on 11 July. They planned a flanking movement from the west on Fort Souville while
holding frontally from the north. The Germans penetrated Poudriere and Ravine de la Vigne and
captured Chapelle Sainte-Fine, just below the fort. The Germans, determined in capturing it,
charged up the slope under direct fire. One hundred-fifty reached the summit of the fort, and "Like
the edge of foam from a packet steamer which dissolves into spray", where they were all quickly
captured and killed. The German forces failed to take Souville.
At Chapelle Sainte-Fine (now marked by an impressive fallen-lion monument memorial to the

130th Division), the Germans reached the limit of their march towards Verdun on 12 July 1916.
Although fighting continued for several months more in this area, the defense of Verdun virtually
ceased. It was only a matter of time when the French would go on the offensive.
17
Crown Prince Rupprecht, heir to the throne of Bavaria, was
born in 1869.On the outbreak of the First World War was
commander of the German Sixth Army in the Lorraine.
On 14th August, 1914, the French Army, led by Ferdinand

Foch, Auguste Dubail and Michel Maunoury attempted to
capture Lorraine. Rupprecht and the Sixth Army successfully
withstood the attack and persuaded Hermuth von Moltke,
Chief of General Staff, to allow him to launch a major
counter-offensive at the end of August. Rupprecht failed to
breakthrough French defences and remained on the Western
Front for the rest of the war. In July 1916, Rupprecht was
promoted to field marshal. Considered to be the most
competent of the royal commanders, he clashed several times
with the Chief of General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, who
replaced Hermuth von Moltke. Revolutionary activity after the
war deprived Rupprecht of his Bavarian throne.
Prince Rupprecht lived in quiet

retirement until his death in 1955
18
CHAPTER V
FRENCH LIBERATION OF VERDUN
The French now desired to eliminate the German threat to Verdun completely, Monsieur Poincare,
President of the French Republic, on 13 September 1916, awarded the Legion of Honor to the City
of Verdun. With this award began the new phase of dislodging the German threat and pushing them
back.
General Mangin, called from the battlefield in June to take command of Group "D" which manned
the front between the Meuse River and Fleury, planned the counter-attacks which proved
successful. On 17 September, he sent General Nivelle a report which outlined a plan to free the
German threat from the Verdun area.
The plan outlined advances on a series of limited objectives. The first objective was 300 meters
north of Thiaumont Farm (Hardaumont Quarry) with the operation scheduled for 21 September.
The second, scheduled for 24 September, included the advance to Fort Douaumont. And the third,
to be carried out 9 October, included the capture of Fort Douaumont and Fort de Vaux.
The plan was approved on 21 September. This late date precluded the implementation of the plans
on the first objective as scheduled. Exactly one month after the approval of the plan, French
artillery began the counter-attack with a three day continuous shelling. On the 24th , the first waves
of the 38th, 133rd and 74th Divisions moved forward under a creeping barrage following a precise
time table and with artillery lending maximum protection. An account of Douaumont's recapture
runs as follows: "On 24 October, a dense fog overhung the entire plateau. Nevertheless, General
Mangin decided to attack. At 1140 hours, marching by compass, without hurrying, in good order,
and with assurance, his troops proceeded over muddy terrain. Observation points were useless.
Only several planes, flying very low, followed the progress of the battle and kept the French
commanders informed.
The 38th Division sharpshooters captured Thiaumont Redoubt in the first assault. While the 38th
was consolidating their positions, Zouave Infantrymen went through them, and attacked the village
of Douaumont. Simultaneously, the 133rd Division, after crossing Bazil Ravine without meeting
opposition, moved towards Hardaumont Hill, capturing Bois de Caillette on the way.
The Zouave Regiment then received orders to take Fort Douaumont. There was some confusion
caused by heavy fog to get to their new positions in the line of departure. Commander Nicolay, in
command of the battalion assigned to charge the fort, to drive out the Germans, and the established
position there, wrote in his report: "With the French planes cruising just over the fort, the battalion
approached the moats in single file, rifles slung, their leaders in the front. They climbed the steep
slopes of the rampart from where they saw the gaping ends of the casement of the fort behind the
incredibly torn-up court. The heads of the columns stood and gazed at the great chaos which the
fort, symbol of determination and power, had become. The commander of the battalion (Nicolay
himself) after checking on the movements in the moat, rejoined those in the lead, and while
rendering homage to this consecrated and unforgettable sight gave the order to take the machine
guns which began firing from the bottom of the casemates. The third resistance was overcome, and
everyone reached his objective (the operation having been fully rehearsed before the attack). Each
turret was taken, one after the other.
19
Commander Nicolay conquered the superstructure of 'the fort. By morning of the 25th the entire
fort, including about 6,000 German prisoners, fell into his hands.
An interesting sidelight on the German defense of the fort is pointed out by the present guardian and
guide. He states, with a certain superiority, that because of the acoustics in the interior of the fort,
the "Boches" had a serious incidence of nervous hysteria and insanity due to the echoing and re-
echoing in the corridors and tunnels from the explosions of the shells on the outside.
The French forces did not succeed in taking Fort de Vaux that same day. Therefore, General
Mangin made new plans to assault it with an additional division on 3 November. When the French
moved on the fort as planned, they found that the Germans had evacuated it the day before. The
front line had now been restored to the approximate position it held on 25 February.
General Mangin next planned an attack along a ten mile front on 5 December, thus hoping to regain
at once the entire French second line lost on 24 February.
In preparation for this attack, he ordered the construction of thirty kilometers of road, including one
of logs for artillery, ten kilometers of narrow gauge railway, numerous delivery and return trenches
(some of which may still be seen near Douaumont) and depots for ammunitions, bombs, and
supplies. The army of Verdun accomplished this construction, much under heavy shell-fire.
With four divisions in place (37th , 38th , 126th and 1334th), four more in reserve and two lines of
artillery, against five German divisions in the line and four in reserves on a six mile front between
Vacherauville and Bezonvaux, General Mangin's artillery opened fire with 750 guns in preparation
of a new attack on 29 November. Bad weather intervened, forcing him to halt the firing. On 9
December, the weather having improved, the artillery resumed its preparatory fire. At 1000 hours
on 15 December, while the Germans were inviting the French to sue for peace, the French attacked
Louvemont. There, the French succeeded in capturing more than 11,000 prisoners and 115
cannons.
One of the captured officers is reported to have complained to General Mangin about the scantiness
of the accomodations allotted him. The General replied, "You must forgive me, sir, but I was not
expecting you to turn up in such large numbers".
By the 18th of December 1916, the French line had progressed to a position in front of Talou Hill,
north of Poivre Hill, Louvemont and Chambrettes, then south across the Bois d'Hardaumont and La
Vaucheup to the outskirts of Bezonvaux.
General Mangin congratulated his troops on their recent victory and also on having been "Good
Ambassadors of the Republic" in view of the recent German overture for peace.
The battlefields at Verdun remained relatively quiet for the next eight months, while the focal point
of the war moved to the field of Flandres. However, both German and French were fortifying their
positions in preparation for the final battles to come. The Germans retained three excellent
observation Points-Talou Hill in the east sector west of Poivre Hill; Mort Homme and Hill 304 in
the west sector. These they heavily fortified at their leisure. Observing the French preparations, they
increased their strength in the front line 'to nine divisions with five in reserves and with additional
gun batteries.
In the summer of 1917, Petain planned a series of limited offensives to raise the spirit of the Army.
He planned to take Mort Homme, Samogneux and Beaumont, with artillery playing the leading
20
role. On 18 August 1917, 2,500 artillery pieces in line manned by 40,000 artillerymen opened a
systematic and methodical shelling on the German defenses. A week later, with US Army officers
as observers, eight French divisions carried out a dawn attack on these objectives. Four days later,
the French were in possession of Mort Homme and Hills de L'Oie, Talou and 304 to bring the new
front line in the west sector to Forges Creek. On the east side of the Meuse, the French recaptured
Samogneux. German counterattacks failed to repel the French and the new front line remained as it
had been on the second day of the initial battle until the end of hostilities. During these offensives,
more than 10,000 prisoners were taken with 39 cannons, 100 mortars and 242 machine guns.
Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain
Henri Pétain was a military and political leader and France´s greatest
hero in World War I (1914-1918). He was later condemned as a traitor
for having headed the pro-German Vichy regime after France's defeat
in World War II (1939-1945).
Born in Cauchy-ó-la-Tour in 1856, Pétain was educated at the Saint-

Cyr military academy and the École Supérieure de Guerre (army war
college) in Paris. As a general during World War I, he won fame for his
successful defense of Verdun against the Germans in 1916. Later, as
commander in chief, he did much to restore morale in the French army
after a series of mutinies in 1917. He was made a marshal of France the
following year.
21
22
CHAPTER VI
COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE OF VERDUN
When the Germans failed in the Battle of Verdun, they failed to achieve their objective, to defeat
the French and break the spirit of the French. In fact, it had a contrary effect. For this battle, the
Germans exhausted a great percentage of their best troops and much of their supplies which could
have been diverted to other areas more profitably.
The German Staff would perhaps have preferred to cut off the conflict much earlier. It realized that
its sacrifices were crippling their war-machine, but the prestige of Prussian militarism was at stake
before its own people, and relinquishing the attack would have been a confession of defeat to the
whole world. In the hopes of carrying out General Von Falkenhayn's plan, they poured in the
equivalent of 82 1/2 divisions during the first year-more than a million and a half men. Two
hundred eighty-two thousand men, 18% of German losses in World War I, died here in what
became one of history's greatest slaughters. What had been planned as a major victory and turning
point of the war had developed into a battle of attrition through which they lost the initiative, and
ultimately, the war.
On the other hand, the Battle of Verdun crowned the French with victory and prestige. The French
spirit, although strained at times, rebounded in strength as expressed in their rallying cry "On ne
passe pas" (They shall not pass).
The French, not well prepared, pressed back to a point less than three kilometers from the city of
Verdun by an incredible leviathan, a war-machine unprecedented in history either in size or
organization, must be envied for their fantastic will to resist under the most terrifying and
enervating conditions. They poured sixty-six divisions into the battle. Three hundred-seventeen
thousand were killed or died there-23% of the total French losses for the entire war. They fired
twelve million artillery shells during the eighteen months of fighting, an average of more than
twenty-two thousand each day.
This holocaust had been a battle of annihilation, mutual annihilation. One of every twelve men lost
by all sixteen countries engaged in all four years of the struggle reached his destiny in this ten
square mile area. The method of fighting had been to concentrate the fire of all guns, not over a line
but on a zone, and not only on the position to be captured, but also as far as possible in the rear on
everything that could support the position. Old territorials, working far behind the lines, ran almost
as great a risk as men in the attacking waves had run in other battles. During the shelling, no supply
party ever went far without losses-a jug of water often meant the difference between life and death
to a man, the wounded in deep-dug aid post went mad from lack of air. The fringes around the
shelled zones were usually spared by the opposing artilleries because the infantry were fighting
there hand-to-hand with knives, bayonets, grenades, guns and flame throwers, until every square
yard of earth became hotly disputed.
Hindenburg wrote later, "The Battle of Verdun exhausted our forces like a wound that never heals".
Mr Gillet, Historian of the Battle of Verdun, wrote, "At Verdun, France learned to know herself.
The Marne was not enough to show France what she really was. A day of inspiration, a few hours
of frenzy, a burst of enthusiasm, a sudden glow of rage and passion with the Marseillaise sounding
on all sides, the world knew us to be capable of flashes like these. But the world did not know-nor
did we ourselves-our own sterling values.
23
"We were the country of improvisation, the country of laughing nonchalance, varied with attacks of
fever; we had forgotten our strength of continuity. Thanks to the length of the battle, France was
able to measure her reserves of endurance in this continuous struggle which brought, one after
another, men of every village to the same tragic scene, inspired with the determination to do at least
as well as those who had preceded him. Then, when their turn had come to be relieved, after
unheard of ordeals, they read again and again, in the communiques, the names of the same hills and
woods where they had held the line, and learned others in their turn kept holding on. Instead of a
succession of isolated deeds of valor, Verdun was for the whole French Army a heroic exploit in
which all shared alike. France bled something solemn, sacred and unanimous, like the spirit of a
religious crusade".
24
CHAPTER VII
FRANCO-AMERICAN OFFENSIVE
In three days of brilliant offensive action, 12-14 September 1918, the American First Army attacked
the salient at St-Mihiel which the Germans had held since September 1914. The salient covered the
most sensitive section of the enemy's position on the western front (Mezieres-Sedan-Metz railroad
and the Briey Iron Basin). It threatened the entire region between Verdun and Nancy and
interrupted the main railroad line from Paris to the east. Its primary strength lay in the natural
defensive features of the terrain itself. The western face of the salient extended along the rugged,
heavily wooded heights of the Meuse; the southern face followed the height of the Meuse for five
miles to the east and then crossed the plain of the Woevre, including with the German lines the
detached heights of Loupmont and Mont Sec which dominated the plain and afforded the enemy
unusual facilities for observation. The enemy had reinforced the positions by every artificial means
during a period of four years.
Having concentrated by night movements over 600,000 men on the battlefield, the American troops
were deployed in attack positions on the night of September 11th. On the south face of the salient
was I Corps with four divisions in line extending from the Moselle westward. On its left was IV
Corps with three divisions in line facing Mont Sec. These two corps delivered the main attack, the
advance pivoting on the center of I Corps with the VI Corps (3 divisions) on the west. In spite of the
determined resistance of the Germans who repeatedly launched strong counter-attacks, the
Americans continued to progress along the whole line. The swiftness with which the operation was
carried out enabled the First Army to smother the opposition to such an extent that 16,000
prisoners; 443 field guns, and large stores of material and supplies were captured.
The weight of American arms was now shifted to the Meuse-Argonne offensive which began on 26
September and ended on 11 November 1918. The transfer of American units to this area was begun
even before the completion of the St-Mihiel area. The First Army under command of Lieutenant
General Bullard was to hold in the St-Mihiel area, while the First Army under command of
Lieutenant General Liggett took the offensive in the Meuse-Argonne.
25
The Meuse Heights and the broken hills of the Argonne Forest had been organized into almost
impregnable positions by the addition of machine guns, artillery, trenches and obstacles of all kinds.
Between these two natural bulwarks, lay the dominating hill of Montfaucon which afforded the
Germans perfect observation, and whose inherent strength had been greatly increased by the
elaborate use of field fortifications of all kinds.
The movement of men and material was made entirely under the cover of darkness, all activity
suspended and the men kept in concealment during daylight hours. French soldiers remained in
outpost positions until the last minute to prevent the Germans from seeing or otherwise securing
information of the presence of large numbers of American soldiers in the region and thus receiving
advance warning of the impending offensive.
Finally, on the night 25-26 September, the First Army stood on its new battle front ready for the
momentous battle that was to begin the next day. I Corps was on the left, V Corps in the center and
III Corps on the right. The artillery preparation for the attack began in full force at 2030 hours with
2700 guns. At 0530, the infantry began the assault, protected by a rolling barrage. The dense fog
during the morning coupled with the difficult terrain impeded the attack, but except in front of
Montfaucon, the progress on the first day was considered entirely satisfactory. III Corps drove
forward vigorously to the east of Montfaucon and by early afternoon, its left flank was a mile
beyond that hill. During the advance, its right flank wheeled toward the Meuse and took up a
defensive position along the bluffs of the river. I Corps on the left, made a deep penetration along
the Aire River while its left flank fought its way forward about one mile in the Argonne forest. On
the evening of the 26th, the strong German first position was in the hands of the Americans, and
Montfaucon, in the second position, had held out, but the deep salients driven into the German lines
on both sides of that hill made its capture a question of merely a few hours.
From this point on, the American Army bolstered by one French Corps, had its feet firmly planted
on the ground and maintained the initiative of attack. Incessant Allied offensives in process all
along the western front had completely shaken the enemy defenses everywhere, and the signing of
the Armistice on 11 November 1918, found the Allied Armies in hot pursuit of the retiring Germans
along the whole front.
26
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Volume 25 Encyclopedia Britannica -1960 Publication
Verdun, Illustrated Historical Guide (ca. 1933) - H. Fremont and Sons
Verdun, Guide Historique Illustre (ca. 1933) - H. Fremont and Sons
Verdun and Its Battle Fields - H. Fremont and Sons
Foch, Man of Orleans - B. H. Liddel Hart
Strategy - B. H. Liddel Hart
Outlines of the World's Military History - W. A. Mitchell
A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe - C. J. H. Hayes
Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries (1789-1939) - A. J. Grant & H. W. V. Temperley
A Short History of WWI - Brig. Gen. Sir James E. Edmonds
27
28
ANNEX A TO BACKGROUNDER #90
THE BATTLE OF VAUQUOIS
Map showing the French and German tunnels under Vauquois during WWI
The lost village of Vauquois in the Argonne (Le village disparu) is a testament to the enormity and
ferocity of a unique underground struggle of the 1914-1918 war. There are other lost villages in
France: Hurlus, Ripont and Tahure on the Champagne battlefields, and the villages of Verdun that
were destroyed and left little evidence of where they once stood. Other areas were mined - the
Somme, Vimy and the Argonne Forest - but it is only at Vauquois that you find surviving evidence of
extreme mine warfare that continued below ground well after the village was obliterated, and when
there was little hope of a breakthrough on the surface from the infantry of either side. The Butte de
Vauquois, where this tiny village once stood, is now just a mass of craters and tunnel entrances. But
in 1914 this small hill 290 metres above sea level, with the Argonne massif to the west and Mort
Homme to the east, was hotly contested by the Germans and French. It provided a superb observation
point for road and rail traffic from the Islettes pass, and therefore, eventually, all movement to and
from Verdun.
Along the Frontline
The Germans took the hill on 24th September 1914 and heavily fortified it. Between October of the
same year and March 1915 the French 10th Division, under General Vaidant, mounted several
counter-attacks. At first they were unsupported by artillery, using only bayonets in heroic charges.
They also used, for the first and last time at Vauquois, a flame-thrower but a north wind blew it back
upon their own infantry. Eventually they overcame German resistance and established themselves on
1
ISSUE #1(November 2006)
the south side of the hill, with the Germans occupying the north side supported by artillery in the
woods of Cheppy and Montfaucon on a 6 km front. This is where both sides stayed for the next three
years, mining towards each other with increasing ferocity.
The first German miners, 30th Pioneer Battalion, arrived on 7th January 1915 and the French, who
were also beginning to mine, blew their first charge on 3rd February. Initially the French had to dig
vertically as their position was on a gentler slope than the Germans. They climbed up and down these
first tunnels by rope and with some humour, akin to their Tommy allies, named their tunnels after
stations on the Paris Metro. During this early stage small mines were used as an adjunct to infantry
attacks but by March 1915 the mines increased in size to 50-1,500 kg of explosive, in tunnels at a
depth of 5-15 metres.
Neither side was to be outdone or moved from this vantage point. They tenaciously dug deeper and
increased the size of the mines. March 1916 heralded the advent of mines 1,500-15,000 kg in size at a
depth of 25-40 metres. The Germans exploded the biggest of all at Vauquois, 60,000 kg, on 14th May
of that year. It blew apart the west portion of the hill taking 108 French lives. The crater of 80 metres
width would hold within the diameter of its upper margin the length and wingspan of a Jumbo Jet.
The depth of 20 metres would comfortably accommodate the height from the wheels to the top of the
tail.
Tunnel Entrances French [Odeon after Paris Metro Station] · German
The sappers of both sides shifted tons of Argonne rock, a loamy sandstone the French called 'gaize',
to create an underground system of tunnels, on three levels, that eventually totalled 17 km (12 km
German/5 km French), and between them exploded 519 mines (199 German/320 French). The
explosive used by the Germans for both mines and camouflets was Westfalit. The French used a
mixture of Ammonium Nitrate and TNT.
From April 1917 to the beginning of 1918 the French dropped the use of mines and changed to large
camouflets (smaller explosive devices to destroy tunnels and not large enough to create craters) of
2,000-8,000 kg at a depth of 35-50 metres. Mid December 1917 saw a lull in hostilities as both sides
fraternised underground. They agreed to detonate only between the hours of 4pm and 7pm. This
amicable agreement came to an end when the Germans exploded 7 camouflets in February 1918. The
2
Germans had also undertaken the herculean task of digging 3 deep shafts Mittel, Rader and Treppen
Stollen intended to blow up the entire hill so that it would be of no use to anyone. Only Mittel and
Rader were completed to a depth of 94 metres and 95 metres respectively, but were never used. The
last French explosion was in March 1918 and the Germans exploded their final camouflet on 9th of
April. From 14th to 19th April the German Pioneers withdrew from Vauquois to the Pioneer camp at
Varennes. No advantage had been won for either side and when the US 35th Division arrived on 26th
September, the first day of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, they found nothing but a devastated
landscape as evidence of the fighting that had occurred there.
What had been a small hill-top village with a population of 168 was a series of mine craters 10-20
metres deep separating the French and German front lines. The ground had become the grave to
8,000 missing French and German dead. There was no sign of the church or school that had crowned
the crest of the hill: all had been swallowed up by the ground beneath. What remains is an
underground labyrinth of tunnels containing barracks, storage depots, command posts and everything
needed to support the men (up to 1,200 Germans and 800 French) and the operations of that
troglodyte world.
The Troglodyte World
Today the ground that dips and folds around you has been softened by time. Trees and vegetation
have reclaimed the shattered landscape. A new village has been built below the summit and a French
preservation society, "Les Amis de Vauquois", are proudly restoring this subterranean world. At the
top of the Butte stands the "Memorial to the Combatants and Dead of Vauquois". A Poilu, constantly
vigilant, looks east towards Verdun, a rifle in one hand, a grenade in the other. Behind him is a
representation of the blasted tree that served the French as a range marker for artillery. Tucked into
the rock lies a sleeping tunneller, forever at rest above the hell that once was his, and what is now for
us an enduring reminder of a hidden conflict.
{Reference : Great War Society website November 2006}
3
Extract from the Amis de Vaquois Society website
The Butte de Vauquois
Dominating the whole area east of the Argonne, Vauquois is considered, by the general staff of both
sides, to be an exceptional observation post and a strategic bolt. As it has long-range views in every
direction, the Vauquois hill allows its owner to follow and therefore to command the traffic axe
(road and rail) emerging from the Islettes pass, leading to Verdun. This explains the stubbornness of
both sides to obtain or to maintain their power there. This mound justifies, from then onwards, the
sacrifices that were agreed to... The Germans, at the time of their violent surge against the 3rd
French Army to surround Verdun, occupied this hillock on 24th September 1914, when it had been
evacuated by the 82th Infantry Regiment. Whilst there, the Germans turned the mound into a real
fortress, supported and flanked by artillery in the woods of Cheppy and Montfaucon. From October
1914 to February 1915, the first counter-attacks using bayonets, with no artillery preparation,
allowed our troops to approach the southern edges of the mound, after intensive charges and
extraordinary human sacrifice. From 17 February until 4 March the successive waves of French
attacks eventually ended the fierce German resistance. Losses are heavy : 3,000 killed or missing
for the attack lasting from 28th February to 4th March. In the middle of March, the front line of
General Vaidant's 10th Division is finally stabilised in the southern half of the village. With better
protected positions the front resists a counter-attack uniting classical weapons with a fearsome
contraption : the flame-thrower. The position war began in the area. Pioneers and sappers buried
themselves and hollowed out kilometres of galleries, sheltered chambers from where battle
ramifications will leave, which, infiltrating the enemy network, allow them to inflict the heaviest
losses possible, using tons of explosives. The Vauquois mound is a huge termite nest : the
installations on various levels, from the far east up to the " V of Vauquois " (1,500 metres long, 50
to 250 metres wide, 10 to 50 metres deep) made up more than '.7 kilometres of shafts, galleries and
ramifications. Thousands of tons of Argonne rock were extracted. Vauquois is also the
extraordinary underground struggle acted out "below" : the mine war. 519 explosions (199 German,
320 French) were counted. Mines were placed deeper and deeper, the explosive charges are
therefore more and more significant. That's how, on 14th May 1916, a German mine estimated at 60
tons of explosives made 108 victims, shattering the entire far west of the mound. A lunar
landscape, a mound cut in two by huge craters that form a ditch 10 to 20 metres deep separating the
first German lines from the first French lines, is the apocalyptical sight that the American soldiers
will remember when they finally freed it from its nightmare on Thursday, 26th September 1918
Where a Small Meusian village of 168 inhabitants once stood, only a terrifying network of giant
funnels remains. Other important areas of 1914-1918 had mine wars : les Eparges, the Argonne
forest, les Hauts de Champagne, the 108 mound at Berry-au-Bac, the Vimy crest, etc., but only the
Vauquois mound conjugates several factors :
A village crushed and the battle continued under the hill below it.
The integration of an immense underground city with its various quarters : barracks, sanitary
blocks, storage depots, electric and compressed air exchanges, commanding and communication
posts..
The use of various types of position and mine wars, leading each side to successive developments in
the destruction of the enemy's installations, forestalling or thwarting their plans, without thinking of
the slightest prospect of a breakthrough by the attacking infantry. The Vauquois mound is a First
World War site still intact, graded by French Heritage, where the effects of war are forever
engraved in the ground of the .Argonne and the Meuse.
4
An agreement has been signed between the State owner and the "Friends of the Vauquois and its
Area Association" to protect, to pass on the memory and to promote the heritage.
Entrée de galerie allemande : "Westfalen Stollen"
5
6
ISSUE #1 ( November 2006)
ANNEX B TO BACKGROUNDER # 90
“ VERDUN” ARTEFACTS IN THE AWM COLLECTION
La borne (The milestone)
Maker: Forain, Jean-Louis Date made: 1916 Physical description: photoengraving on Japan paper;
edition:144/300
Summary: Depicts a dead German soldier, lying face down, on the ground, next to a mile post on
which is inscribed 'Verdun 11 kil'. Behind this German soldier are piles of bodies of other dead
soldiers. The Germans commenced the year 1916 by launching a massive offensive, attacking the
French salient around Verdun, 200 kilometres east of Paris. After a period of six months the French
and German casualties exceeded half a million. Jean-Louis Forain (1852-1931) was a painter,
illustrator and caricaturist. He began his career as a caricaturist for several Paris journals. His style
was a cross between Manet's realism and Daumier's sarcasm. Between 1879 and 1886, Forain
exhibited at four Impressionist exhibitions and devoted himself to painting after 1900.He took up
lithography in 1892 and caricature ans social comment inform much of his work. He was
considered one of the most important artists in France during the first few decades of the twentieth
century. He contributed satirical drawings to a wide range of journals, taking his subjects mainly
from the legal and theatrical worlds. In 1915, at the age of 62, Forain joined the Army and became a
member of the Camouflage Corps. He later worked as a roving correspondent, covering the various
fronts. From 1914 he made a series of illustrations for 'Le Figaro' and many of his drawings showed
the effect of war on soldiers and civilians, in some instances with iconic wit. This work was
published in 'Le Figaro' on 22 March 1916. French research undertaken on this work noted;
'Milestone. A mass of dead bodies of German soldiers near a stone milestone with the inscription
'Verdun...Km'. (drawing framed by a line). For one month the battle raged at Verdun. In spite of the
1
numerous attacks that they launched territory gains made (10 March: recapturing the Bois de
Corbeaux, which is a veritable German carnage scene; 14 March: trenches between Bethincourt and
le Mort-Homme; 17 March: village and fort of Vaux; 18 March: Bois d'Haudromont; 20 March:
Cote du Poivres and Bois de Malancourt), the Germans have scarcely advanced in the direction of
Verdun, but have left many dead on the field of battle'.
Bataille de Verdun: Le Bois des Corbeaux et le Morthomme
Maker: Mansard, Paul Object type: Print Date made: 1916 Physical description: hand-coloured
etching, aquatint on paper
Summary: View of a badly war-damaged hilly landscape after the battle of Verdun in 1916, with
smashed and burnt trees and a pathway in the foreground. The Germans commenced the year 1916
by launching a massive offensive, attacking the French salient around Verdun, 200 kilometres east
of Paris. After a period of six months the French and German casualties exceeded half a million.
Paul Mansard was a French artist. This etching was presented to the War Memorial by Sister
Constance Adelaide Stone MBE RRC a nurse, who enlisted in November 1914 and initially served
with the No.2 Australian General Hospital and spent time in Egypt and Great Britain, before
returning to Australia in July 1919. The work was one of a number of aquatints that she gave to the
War Memorial in March 1935 as 'war mementoes of an Australian Army nurse'.
2
To Verdun
Maker: Shepperson, Claude Object type: Drawing Date made: 1916 Physical description: lithograph
on paper
Summary: Depicts an image of the figure of Death, a skeleton, wearing a cloak, riding a dark
horse. The figure of Death bears a German standard (flag with Imperial eagle on it) and rides up an
embankment before a tide of German soldiers led by their officers. The German soldiers and the
figure of Death move across the landscape, under a stormy sky. The work comments on the carnage
of German soldiers at the battle of Verdun, during the First World War. The Germans commenced
the year 1916 by launching a massive offensive, attacking the French salient around Verdun, 200
kilometres east of Paris. After a period of six months the French and German casualties exceeded
half a million. Claude Allin Shepperson (1867-1921) was an illustrator, printmaker, painter and
lithographer. Initially a law student, he studied art in London and Paris during the 1890s. He was a
regular contributor to 'Punch' magazine (1905-21), illustrated books and often depicted landscapes
and figure subjects. He also served as a war artist, near the age of 50, during the First World War.
Summary: Verdun, France.

1918-09-28. The remains of
an observatory in the ruins
of the Church Mont
Faucon. The German Army
had used this position to
overlook Verdun. (Donor
French Army)
3
Verdun and God in the war machine
Maker: Dyson, Will Object type: Drawing Place made: United Kingdom: England, London Date
made: c 1915-16; c 1916
Summary: Depicts a thousand small German soldiers marching in the foreground, while above
them rises the giant figure of a German officer. He shovels the soldiers into the barrel of gun, which
is already gorged with the bodies of soldiers. Perched on the German officer's helmet is a vulture.
This caricature comments on the extraordinarily high casualty rate of French defenders during the
Battle of Verdun (as well as among attacking German troops) in February 1916. After six months
the casualties from both sides exceeded half a million men. Will Dyson was the first Australian
artist to visit the front during the first World War, travelling to France in December 1916, remaining
there until May 1917, making records of the Australian involvement in the war. Dyson was
appointed an Official War Artist, attached to the AIF , in May 1917, working in France and London
throughout the war. His commission was terminated in March 1920.
Bataille de Verdun (Battle of Verdun)

Maker: Mansard, Paul Object type: Print Date made: 1917-1918
Summary: A landscape with a hill, a duckboard, burnt trees and barbed wire in the foregrouond.
4
Devant Verdun: leur consolation (In front of Verdun: their consolation)
Maker: Forain, Jean-Louis Object type: Print Date made: 1916

Summary: Innumerable graves mark those of German soldiers killed at Verdun. The Crown Prince
stands and places his hand on the shoulder of Bethmann-Hollweg who kneels in prayer, and
consoles him with the remark: 'Der Verlust an Menschenmaterial ist ein normaler (La perte en
materiel humain est normale) (The loss of human life is normal)'. Coutin 1987 (105D). This work
was published in 'Le Figaro', 22 November 1916, p. 3 (105A). There is a drawing in a private
collection (105B). It was included in 'De la Marne au Rhin' II, p. 5 (105E).
Route du Tillat, Verdun

Maker: Berne-Bellecour, Jean-Jacques Object type: Painting Date made: 1916 Physical description:
oil on canvas
Summary: Depicts a French soldier on a horse on the Tillat Road, near Verdun. He stands beside
another soldier who observes an overturned cart and dead horse. Behind them are two wounded
soldiers, one with a bandage on his head, the other with a sling over his arm. In teh background is
an ambulance vehicle. The landcape in which they appear is badly damaged, with smashed trees.
Jean- Jacques Berne-Bellecour (1874-1939) was born at St. Germain-en-Laye and studied under his
father, Etienne Berne-Bellecour. Jean-Jacques was known as a realist painter and his first works
were military paintings, but he also painted landscapes, especially snow scenes. His art was
exhibited at the National des Beaux-Artes and the salon des Independants from 1926-1939.
5
Devant les ramparts de Verdun (In front of the ramparts at Verdun)
Maker: Jonas, Lucien-Hector Object type: Print Place made: France: Paris Date made: c 1916
Physical description: lithograph chine colle on paper
Summary: Dead German soldiers lying in front of the French ramparts at Verdun in France during
the First World War. A French soldier with his rifle is looking over the parapet from where he has
been shooting the Germans. Lucien-Hector Jonas was born at Anzin in France on 8 April 1880. He
studied first at Valenciennes with Layraud then went to Paris to study with A Maignan and Bonnat.
He joined the Societaire des Artistes Francais in 1904 and was awarded third class medal in 1905,
second class medal and a scholarship to travel in 1907, the Prix du Salon in 1911, and the second
Prix de Rome and the chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur. During the First World War he produced
several posters for the French government. He died in Paris in 1947. (biog. translation from Benezit,
vol. 6, p. 93).
6
VERDUN, FRANCE, 1918. SKELETAL REMAINS OF DEAD GERMAN SOLDIERS
VERDUN , FRANCE 1918 PETIT POST E BOIS LE CHUME
7
Dead mans hill
Maker: Unknown French Official Photographer Place made: Western Front: Western Front
(France), Meuse, Verdun Date made: c 1916 Physical description: Black & white
Verdun, France. 1916-07-23. French Army entanglement defences in front of the Citadel
8
Verdun, France. 1916-11-15. A section of the war damaged city as seen from across the Meuse
River
Verdun, France. 1916-01. French Army members carrying out trench mortar manoeuvres at
Belleville
9
Die schlafenden von Fort Vaux (Verdun): gastote (The sleepers of Fort Vaux: gas deaths)
Maker:Dix, Otto Object type: Print Place made: Germany Date made: 1924 Physical
description:etching, aquatint on paper
Summary: This image is plate 46 from the portfolio of 50 etchings comprising the series 'Der
Krieg (The War)' published by Otto Dix in 1961. The series consists of fifty images assembled in
five consecutive portfolios of ten plates each (generally inscribed in the margin in pencil, I to X). It
constitutes, along with his 1920-23 painting 'Der Schutzengraben (Trenches destroyed)', the first
summation of his military experiences in the war. Dix did not determine the full size of the cycle
until he was in the midst of its execution and produced the portfolio in three working periods while
in the Black Forest and in St Goar am Rhein between 1923 ands Many soldiers sit and lie on the
slope of a hill. One soldier is caught with his mouth open, seeming to be in conversation with
another. It is as if the figures have turned to stone, or like volcano victims have been stilled in the
moment.The blind stamp and the inscription indicate that this print comes from the second edition,
published by Otto Dix in 1961. Dix wrote: "The war was a horrible thing, but there was something
tremendous about it, too. I didn't want to miss it at any price. You have to see human beings in this
unleashed state to know what human nature is." Dix achieved a superb mastery of the techniques of
etching, his works equalling those of such great masters as Rembrandt and Goya. Strongly
influenced by Goya's war etchings, Dix's 'Der Krieg' was published in five portfolios, each
containing ten prints. The series was widely exhibited, and Dix received considerable critical
acclaim.
10
Commemorative medallion : Heroes of Verdun
Maker: Pillet, Charles Philippe Germain AristideObject type:Medallion Place made: France
(Country of origin) Date made: c 1916
...il faut maintenant souscrire a l'Emprunt (...we must subscribe to the loan now)
Maker: Avenir - Publicite; Joseph - Charles; Scott, Georges Bertin Object type: Poster Place made:
France: Paris (Place printed); France: Paris (Place published) Date made: 1919 (Date printed); 1919
(Date published) Physical description: auto-lithograph
Summary: patriotism; poster depicts French colours, worn and tattered, with list of battle honours
(la, l'Yser, Champagne, l'Artois, Argonne, l', la, l', les Flandres), and asks for subscribers to a loan
for postwar reconstruction
11
French troops resting during their move from Fort Vaux to Niseville.
Maker: Unknown French Official Photographer Place made: Western Front: Western Front
(France), Meuse, Verdun Date made: 8 April 1916 Physical description: Black & white
12
Portrait of Yvon Calmus
Place made: Australia: New South Wales, Sydney Date made: 1919; c June 1919
Summary: Portrait of Yvon Calmus, the young French war refugee 'souvenired' by members of the
2nd Field Artillery Brigade (2nd FAB) and brought back to Australia to live. He is wearing the AIF
uniform given to him in France when he was unofficially adopted by the brigade. The son of a
French soldier killed at Verdun, Yvon was separated from his mother and sister when his village,
Franvillers, was evacuated during the German advance in March 1918. He was discovered in the
ruins of his home by Australians gunners of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, who took him to their
wagon lines behind the front lines. Once they learned of Yvon's desolate situation, the brigade
adopted the boy and gave him an AIF uniform. With the permission of the commanding officer,
Yvon was unofficially put on the strength of the brigade and spent the remainder of their time in
France helping at the wagon lines and working as an artillery digger. Following the armistice, the
brigade was demobilised and travelled back to England; Yvon was smuggled aboard the Channel
boat wrapped in a bundle of army blankets. He was still with the brigade at Salisbury Plain in mid
1919 when he was again smuggled aboard a troopship to Australia with the assistance of YMCA
representative Lieutenant (Lt) Frank Grose and 33931 Sergeant (Sgt) John Thomas 'Jack' Conn,
who later referred to the kidnapping of their willing victim as 'souveniring'. After reaching Sydney
Yvon went to live with the families of Lt Grose and Sgt Conn, and later with Captain Roy Pattie in
Victoria. Whilst boarding at Ivanhoe Grammar School in Melbourne, the French Consul learned of
his story. Yvon was sent back to France to commence his compulsory military service with the
French Army of Occupation on the Rhine. After completing his service Yvon joined the Thomas
Cook travel company as a guide and interpreter, where he frequently met Australians touring the
Continent. Although he remained in France, Yvon kept in contact with the friends and families he
had known in Australia. In his retirement, Yvon ran a cafe at Notre Dame de Bondeville, near
Rouen, where he received several visits from old battery mates and the daughters of Sgt Conn
during the 1960's.
13

090 Verdun

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VOLUNTARY GUIDES BACKGROUNDER

Number 90 Issue # 1 November 2006

"Ils ne passeront pas"

They shall not pass

ISSUE #1 (November 2006)

Why a BACKGROUNDER on Verdun ?

ISSUE #1 (November 2006)

90e ANNIVERSAIRE de la BATAILLE de VERDUN

SECTION 1- BATTLE OF VERDUN

SECTION 2- MEMORIALS IN AND AROUND VERDUN

2.2 VOIE SACRÉE (THE SACRED WAY)

2.3 FORT DOUAMONT

2.4 DOUAMONT OSSUARY AND NATIONAL CEMETERY

2.5 VERDUN NATIONAL MEMORIAL

2.6 THE TRENCH OF BAYONETS

2.7 VERDUN VICTORY MEMORIAL

2.8 THE MEMORIAL TO THE CHILDREN OF VERDUN

ENCLOSURE #1: 1914-1918 BATTLE FIELDS OF VERDUN

ANNEXES: A. THE HISTORY OF THE BATTLE OF VAUQUOIS

ISSUE #1 (November 2006)

Symbolic value of Verdun

Verdun burning during bombardment with incendiary shells

Le Mort Homme and Hill 287, May 1916

MEMORIALS IN AND AROUND VERDUN

Entrance to the Citadel

France’s Unknown Soldier

Milestone along the Voie Sacrée

It still exists today.{Wikipedia}

The German Tomb inside Fort Douamont

{Reference: The Great War Society website 15

WALLACE A. McDANIEL Colonel, Infantry Commanding

Copyright Has Been Applied For On Behalf Of The US Army

EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ASSAULT

"Voie Sacree" (Sacred Way)

On 26 February, at his Souilly Headquarters, 18 kilometers southwest of Verdun on the Sacred

BATTLE OF THE FLANKS

THE FINAL GERMAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST VERDUN

Beginning on 21 June, German artillery directed an unprecedented barrage in the sectors

At Chapelle Sainte-Fine (now marked by an impressive fallen-lion monument memorial to the

On 14th August, 1914, the French Army, led by Ferdinand

Prince Rupprecht lived in quiet

FRENCH LIBERATION OF VERDUN

Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain

Born in Cauchy-ó-la-Tour in 1856, Pétain was educated at the Saint-

COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE OF VERDUN

THE BATTLE OF VAUQUOIS

Along the Frontline

Tunnel Entrances French [Odeon after Paris Metro Station] · German

The Troglodyte World

The Butte de Vauquois

Entrée de galerie allemande : "Westfalen Stollen"

“ VERDUN” ARTEFACTS IN THE AWM COLLECTION

La borne (The milestone)

Bataille de Verdun: Le Bois des Corbeaux et le Morthomme

Summary: Verdun, France.

Bataille de Verdun (Battle of Verdun)

Maker: Forain, Jean-Louis Object type: Print Date made: 1916

Route du Tillat, Verdun

VERDUN , FRANCE 1918 PETIT POST E BOIS LE CHUME

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