G.R. No.

112019 January 4, 1995

1
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It
was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a
number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with
his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor
submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who
does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however,
provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed
out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage
voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
 "That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
2
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain
the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which
describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are
no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there
are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because
one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood
the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage.
Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent
and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and
has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a
vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to
marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right
to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept
of the consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation
should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this
matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5

xxx xxx xxx

 Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the
impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured.3
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in
divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that
the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in
other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that
mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack
of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of
debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with
Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that
marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law.
On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court.
The Committee approved the suggestion.7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow
some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No.
106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
 researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
4
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of
personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due
by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by
normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is
due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person
is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who
opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. 5

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1
of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It
is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved,
even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding,
as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with
her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.

There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity
of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her
separate opinion in this case.

While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough
safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.

In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:

a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.

b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part
of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.

d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.

f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.

A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable
contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts
with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts
eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
6
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications
were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.

It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual
tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus
deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital
obligation.

I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code)
that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses
after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the
effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by
another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as —

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law."

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution
upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church
and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute
divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action
would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil
law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on
grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages
in the present Civil Code, to wit:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34."

"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."

xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on
declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the
Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the
Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
 personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
7
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as
grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for
declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the
Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of
marriage although it be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting
the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an
abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal;
thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom
of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding,
as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with
her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.

There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity
of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her
separate opinion in this case.

While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough
safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.

In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:

a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.

b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part
of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.

d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.

f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.

A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable
contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts
with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.

In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts
eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications
were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.

It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual
tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus
deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital
obligation. 8

I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code)
that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses
after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the
effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by
another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as —

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law."

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution
upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church
and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute
divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action
would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil
law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on
grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages
in the present Civil Code, to wit:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34."

"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."

xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on
declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the
Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the
Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as
grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for
declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the
Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of
marriage although it be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting
the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an
abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal;
thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means. 9

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom
of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works
of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
 After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

10
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing
happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together
with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period,
there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living
room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that,
according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result
thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its
full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

I
 in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.

11
II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings
and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that
he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged
resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual
relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the
reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The
fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex
with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps
physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

 An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of
symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at 12p.
330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This
case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is
hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest
her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity,
and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act
with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can
go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since
the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological
incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the
herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 The Facts

13
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr.
Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence
as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence,
the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on
personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how
he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and
that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
14
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
 The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

15
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appealsand Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No.
112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage.
The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and
to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to
marriage."1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. 16

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest
after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of
the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or
enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into
the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of
three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give
valid consent at the time of the weddingand therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony.

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a
mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts,
but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or 17
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a
distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise
to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.

xxx xxx xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit
into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into.4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia,
the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the
marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on
the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical
disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

We declared:

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the
spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code.
Thus —

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:

(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law —
 Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those) —

18
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage —

that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise,
but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not
applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions
of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect
and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it,
to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the
better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal
command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
(The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional
provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by
disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or
convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appealsand Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No.
112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage.19
The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and
to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to
marriage."1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest
after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of
the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
20
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or
enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into
the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of
three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give
valid consent at the time of the weddingand therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony.

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a
mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts,
but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a
distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise
to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.

xxx xxx xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit
into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia,
the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the
marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting. 21

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on
the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical
disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

We declared:

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the
spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code.
Thus —

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:

(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law —

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those) —

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage —

that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise,
but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not
applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions
of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
 disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
22
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect
and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it,
to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the
better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal
command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
(The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional
provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by
disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or
convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid." 2

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant
to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the
delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the
Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."

23
The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and
(2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their
marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime.
Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the
military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos.
Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when
she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to
look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel
and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake
and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put
up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to
her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After
knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children, x x x."3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the
Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based
only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial
evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological
illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not
physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."4

Hence, this Petition.5

Issues

In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
 II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition." 7

24
The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the
evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should
not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.

In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this Court
as follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

xxx xxx xxx

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."10

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.1âwphi1
25
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. 12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed
them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004

DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations,
culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.2

The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968; 3 Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on
October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to
petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon
abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.

Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as
defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general
circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. 7

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist
who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.

On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and
had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated
acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. 8

After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.

Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.9

26
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that –

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.

The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.10

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to
perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence
submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.

The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does
the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity?"

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons
with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.13

The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s
sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a
valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at
its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.

Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. 15 It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity 16 or sexual promiscuity.

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 17 of the Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not
to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with
the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court.1âwphi1 We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation.
Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.19 While we sympathize with petitioner’s marital
predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be. 20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. 27

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court
of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to
a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA
ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each
other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A
QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 12

Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the
second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14

Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented
was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before
Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing
Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17 and (2) a certification issued by the City
Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and
Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. 28

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly
indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997
would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather,
the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the
self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage,
and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is
significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both
documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration 20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was
subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. 21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to
realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our
mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition
of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which
petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between
the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of
the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this
is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does
not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation29 of
the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There
being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly
affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro
of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.

SEPARATE OPINION>

VITUG, J.:

Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that
since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.

The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage, contracted during the
subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding were it not for its being bigamous.

Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?

I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained),
the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity.2 As early as the case of People vs.
Aragon3 this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage
before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to that effect would or should have been
inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially
annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted
marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.

It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second
marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. 5 I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:

"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage
of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. Although this
pronouncement has been abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of
remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend the
Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. 8

A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those
of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the
essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.

The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid
until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate
similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses’ rights and obligations, property regime and successional rights would continue
unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity
of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages; 10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e.,
relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a mental
state, may not so readily be as evident.11 It would have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt to
make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It
might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the
30by
effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness
the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent.

Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until
judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning
the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial
question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.

In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.12 The Court
has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not
for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has been contracted without the necessary license and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to
enter into the second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting
a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably
arise.

Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to
the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the
relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered
into it.

Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution 2 dated July
8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being 31
previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1,
H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).

On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated
November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on
November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).

On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.

xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is
being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.

Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.3

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with
Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground
of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the
reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of
nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned,
the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy." 5

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.

V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST
TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38
BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.

V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of
the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her
appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for
suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:

x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such
a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x

xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as
a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a 32
prejudicial question. x x x7

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held thus:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of
that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any
difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage." 11

Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
"[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense
has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for
petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own mother told Uy in
1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory
testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay. 13

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party,
the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. 15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of
prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the
court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.16

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The
penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within
the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period,
which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the
penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. 33

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution 2 dated July
8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being
previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.

Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1,
H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).

On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated
November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on
November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).

On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.

xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is
being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001. 3

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with
Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground
of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the
reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of
nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned,
the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy." 5

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.

V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST
TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38
BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

34
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.

V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of
the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her
appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for
suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:

x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such
a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x

xxxx

x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as
a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. x x x7

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held thus:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of
that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.9

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any
difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage." 11

Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
"[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense
has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for
petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own mother told Uy in
1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory
testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay. 13

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party,
the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of
prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the
court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.16

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The
penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within
the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period,
which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
35
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment17
to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the
penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72,
declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.

On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated
to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas
to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.

The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect
service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of
general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated
November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.

On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.

On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the
Court.

SO ORDERED.4

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:

It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained
irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his
wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life. 5

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant
appeal. The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take
steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines
but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail. 36

The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:

But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to
suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as
required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos
while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.

Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondent’s
failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance
with the guidelines set in Molina.

The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.

We rule in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
 Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
37
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 15

We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.

Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several
letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.

We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence
was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We
disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies
of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage
to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is
always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to
fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the
judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration,
we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of
the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child
was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated
and still subsists up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11
38
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth
in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated
from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the
other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was
also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the
foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that
she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband. 25

(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola,
Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold
office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United
States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and
not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance
was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests
conducted by his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses,
which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion
on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld
by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied. 39

Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure
that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of
the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner
sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling
in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was
decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there
was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage
is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such
persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under
the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of
1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a
marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not
among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound
mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of
the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary
consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a
cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because
then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the
auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in
providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at 40
present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but
unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted,
enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic
Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of
influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation
occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological
incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower
courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to
define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of
marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be
taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its
promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

41
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however
was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article
48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the
Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The
question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career.
He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both
courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the
action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner
is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the
trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background,
among others.81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that
seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human
relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s]
their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that
basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the
marriage?

xxx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask
him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say
about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on
to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different
women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Ma’am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is
[a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, 42
Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the
trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by
the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports
the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable
to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are
not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to
adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations
under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to
commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently
deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate
ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the
Tribunal’s consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession
and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct
appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage
Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its
practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no
sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling
the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated
respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the
factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify
to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
43
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof
a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997
and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36
or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference
to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was
incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential
clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in
1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case
from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because
there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be
undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not
have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as
such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an
expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering
doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced
that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment
to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009

DIGNA A. NAJERA, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO J. NAJERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A. Najera and
respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The facts are as follows:

On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.1
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31,
1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan. 2 They are childless.
44
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such
incapacity became manifest only after marriage as shown by the following facts:

(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He
did not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to
land a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.

(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.

(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May 1989, when he came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner
and falsely accused her of having an affair with another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered
"unprintable words" against her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk.

(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening every year, he quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home
drunk and he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with
a bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was
reported at the Bugallon Police Station.

(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his mother at Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.

Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole administrator of their conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be
rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to
Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in

favor of petitioner of respondent’s share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.

On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by publication as provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer3 wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition and averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low
morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award of ₱200,000.00
as moral damages, ₱45,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and ₱1,000.00 as appearance fee for every scheduled hearing.

On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.

On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order4 terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their
conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.

On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that after conducting an investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the
parties.5 The initial hearing of the case was held on November 23, 1998.

Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member
of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan.

Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a government agency in Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced
by their marriage contract.6 At the time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of
Pangasinan with a monthly salary of ₱5,000.00. It was petitioner’s brother who helped respondent find a job as a seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988,
respondent was employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of ₱1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after three
months. Every time respondent was home, he quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man. Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and
every time he went out of the house and returned home, he was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved in drugs.7

In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they constructed a house on the lot.8

On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioner’s sister. Respondent, however, did not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived
home at around midnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but he did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the kitchen.
She asked him again about what happened at the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to
be bloodied. When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able to parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain
injuries on different parts of her body. When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went out. After 10 minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find
her because she had gone out and was hiding from him. When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the
highway, she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her
wounds. After a few hours, she went home.9

When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing about 300 meters away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in
order to open the door. She found that their personal belongings were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card and jewelry.10

Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.11
Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any
allotment from him.12
45
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondent’s parents were separated. Respondent’s brothers were also separated from their respective wives. 13

Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological
incapacity of respondent.14

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:

It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are rooted in the kind of family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and
separated from Respondent’s father. This turn of events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a
double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother.

His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an offshoot of deep-seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to
resolve his childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.

Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his
marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najera’s psychological impairment as traced to his parents’ separation, aggravated by the continued
meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana.

Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior
across time render his impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is recommended that parties’ marriage be annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part of
Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera.15

Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic damage was
minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder
and uncontrollable impulses.16

Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under
the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter. 17

On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;

2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff and respondent/defendant, and to divide the same equally between themselves pursuant to their
Joint Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.18

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 19 dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs. 20
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5, 2004.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.

2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent Eduardo Najera.

3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the same set of facts established by petitioner’s evidence submitted before the trial
court and therefore the same conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.

4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in Psychology. 21

The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.22

Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent which is his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

The Court is not persuaded.

Republic v. Court of Appeals23 laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
 (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
46
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.1avvphi1

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church -- while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."24 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 25 In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified."26 What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.27

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.

As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that respondent was psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on
her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable. 28 Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that
the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates’ testimony:

Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality disorder. [D]id you find any organic cause?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondent’s family] background, there was strong basis that respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.
Q Did you interview the respondent’s family?
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).
xxxx
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
A He is not in the country, sir.
Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is allegedly affected, is this curable?
 A The chances are nil.

47
Q But it is curable?
A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.
Q What is this organic damage?
A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him (respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with borderline personality disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-
image and self-destructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable impulses.
Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?
A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.29
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and
respondent’s abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation 30 only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on
February 11, 2004, twelve days before the decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, thus:

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church – while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other – shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

Petitioner’s argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In the said
Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It
stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:

x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear
before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude
that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was
dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother
with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind:
he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a
policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her;
this led to final separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case
hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983
Code of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia
(petitioner-appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of
July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-
law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latter’s testimonies, this Court is without any clue.1avvphi1

True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a
different set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on
record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.31
48
Santos v. Santos32
cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family
Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which
mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before
the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that
the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case
hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983
Code of Canon Law. x x x

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court,
the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner,
therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,

vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error.

On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision 1 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial
court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order 2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage. 4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony
failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that
she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting
and complying with the essential marital obligations.5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for
failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.

Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment 8but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to
file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

49
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, 12 which are unavailing in the instant case.

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all
people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.

As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological
condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.

Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of
some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about
a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own
reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started
fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not
understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.

xxxx

At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant
type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm
of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She
stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came
from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove
that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her
devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.16

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void
based on psychological incapacity.

While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. 19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that
would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. 26 Article 36 should not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. 27 Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007

ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
 DECISION

50
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Court’s ruling that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano Molina 1 "do not require that a physician
should examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition."2

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the (a) Decision 3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4 dated April 5,
2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras, Defendant-Appellee."

On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.

Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following
circumstances:

(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;

(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;

(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and

(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.

To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.

This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. 5 He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964,
convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.7

After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their honeymoon. 8 Upon returning to Bindoy, they resided at her parents’ house. It was their residence for three (3) years until
they were able to build a house of their own.9 For the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children because he shouldered his sister’s
schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one who spent for all their family needs, using the income from her "Botica" and store. 11

Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend time with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during
lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide for their children’s well-being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication.
Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the
habit of climbing the rooftop.15

To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. Her sisters supported them throughout their two-year stay there. However, after three months, Justo
abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a
profligate. At one time, he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land.16 At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge.

She endured all of Justo’s shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after
leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased
daughter Cindy Rose Paras.17

As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.

He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila.18 He frequently spent time in her store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they became
sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married. However, it was postponed because her family demanded a dowry. Their marriage took place in 1964 upon his mother’s signing a deed of
conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut land in favor of Rosa.20

He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of sugar and not to his alleged profligacy. 21 Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-
room family house, expand their store, establish their gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he
did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee.22

As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosa’s attitude after her return from the United States. She became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the family’s
businesses.23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her "new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended that their relationship was blissful.24

He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had tourist visas. When they were there, their children’s tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting
them to stay longer. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines.25

He spent for his children’s education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for
their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. 26

What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted
that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. 27 This was further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area.28

As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee
Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after
Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house;29 (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary;30 and (c) the
charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The RTC observed that the relationship between the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time 51of
the celebration of their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage.33

Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosa’s signature in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was suspended
from the practice of law, thus:

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHSon the charge of falsifying his wife’s signature in bank documents and other
related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously.
Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondent’s record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the
evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by
the evidence," thus:

Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record – first, the income which supported their children came from the earnings of their conjugal properties and not singularly
from Rosa’s industry; second, Justo gave his share of the support to his children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that derived from the conjugal property; third, he was
booted out from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election and as such did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law
and morality, Justo’s alleged infidelity came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.

The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosa’s inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her case, being in violation of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina.34 Thus, she
failed to substantiate her allegation that Justo is psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.35

Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual
findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Court’s pronouncement in Molina relied upon by the Court of Appeals. She states that she
could have presented an expert to prove the root cause of Justo’s psychological incapacity had she been required to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be annulled on the
bases of the Court’s conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand this case to the court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest of due process.

In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a "new matter completely foreign and removed" from A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not
conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings and documents.

The parties’ opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:

first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case;

second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of Justo’s alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and

third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Whether the factual findings of this Court in

A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.

Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that
her charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:

Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we assume Justo’s alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such
traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable
psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married
person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they
do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.36

The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosa’s motion for reconsideration, thus:

Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the disbarment case appellant filed against her husband, namely, appellee’s falsification of documents to
obtain loans and his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do not conclusively establish appellee’s psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In
fact, we already went as far as to presume the existence of such seeming depravities in appellee’s character in our earlier judgment. However, as we emphasized in our Decision, the
existence of such eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the part of appellee to discern and perform the rudiments of marital obligations as required
under Article 36.37
Clearly, Rosa’s insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered "conclusive" on the present case is unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the
existence" of Justo’s depravities, however, even doing so could not bring about her (Rosa’s) desired result. As Rosa’s prayer for relief suggests, what she wants is for this Court to annul her
52
marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No. 5333.38 Obviously, she is of the impression that since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from
the practice of law, the same charges are also sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Her premise is of course non-sequitur.

Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.39 The Court’s
exposition in In re Almacen40 is instructive, thus:

x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice versa.41 The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in
a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa’s charges sufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish
that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders
him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justo’s acts are
not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.

II

Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.

The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina. 42 One of the Guidelines set forth therein states:

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require that the respondent should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine
qua non for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition."

Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court backtracked a bit when it held in Republic v. Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on the alleged
psychological incapacity of one party.

Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared towards the
relaxation of the requirement of expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states:

(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.

In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert
opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of said incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being
procedural in nature, apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.

Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in April
1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s Decision, applying the Guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter was brought to this Court, the wife argued
that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper application
of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to the trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined to remand Pesca51 on the premise that
the Santosand Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:
 The ‘doctrine of stare decisis,’ ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim – ‘legis interpretado legis vim obtinet’ that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus 53
constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of
‘lex prospicit, non replicit.’

The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of her husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence
to establish the psychological condition of Justo.

III

Whether the totality of evidence in the case

shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.

The last issue left for this Court’s consideration is whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the
dissolution of the marriage in question.

At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the State’s policy on marriage. Article XV of the Constitution mandates that:

SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which states that:

ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has held fast to the position that any doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its
validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.

Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature
and renders a person incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.
54
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to reiterate: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability.

A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosa’s main grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity,
profligacy which includes the falsification of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the children, and abandonment of the family. Both the courts below found the charges
unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the evidence sufficient to support Rosa’s charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and
abandonment of family, thus:

ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT’S SIGNATURE

The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the questioned
signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following results:

CONCLUSION:

1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person.

2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and the same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)

The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that
the questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent.

To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais
Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did
he have to falsify his wife’s signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the principal
using his own name.

ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and three other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts
indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was
named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to
live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.

While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true,
nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting in the birth of their four (4) children. The early days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious.
Justo was deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading his mother to give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to
be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care of their children when they were young. Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have taken its toll on their relationship.
The acts committed by Justo appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable differences between them caused by the death of their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure
to win the mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice. Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego and
lowered his self-esteem.

There is no evidence that Justo’s "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he
lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only
after almost 30 years of their marriage.

Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’s "defects" are incurable or grave.

The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage between Justo and Rosa should not be annulled.

In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife who left her family to live with one of her many paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment
do not constitute psychological incapacity absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the marriage, thus:

x x x. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What
is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.

Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could
her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wife’s inability to conceive led her husband to other women so he could fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled
that this is not a manifestation of psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her husband, married an American and had a family by him, which she55
flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that these acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or mental defect of an
incurable nature present at the time of marriage; and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36.

What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a conflicting relationship with his wife and her family and repeated life’s setbacks. While these
do not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.59 As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code.60

Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.61

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. While this Court commiserates with Rosa’s plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex
sed lex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CORONA,
- v e r s u s - VELASCO, JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
PERALTA,* JJ.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
June 9, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court).
The petition sought to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
56
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship.
However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank
calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake.

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert
witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.[3]

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological
incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.

The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.

Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological
incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he
was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We grant the motion for reconsideration.

In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,[4] this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.

Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.[5]

In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioners expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent personality disorder. Thus:

Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings [and] conclusions?

A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed personality disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to [dependent] personality
disorder and this is brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage with Chona. There
were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.

Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological incapacity to handle the essential obligations of marriage?

A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a very impulsive decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to really be
married and after the marriage, there was no consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three months he refused to
see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death, and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.

xx xx xx

Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent suffered from a grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this?

A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It was] just a spur of the moment decision that they should get married xx xx I dont
think they truly considered themselves married.

Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?

A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never consummated the marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there were
frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment.

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder[7] as

[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle
their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without
advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe
they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.

In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much
attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. [9] Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what
action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.[10]
 Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-
defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him. [11] This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father
who treated his family like robots[12] and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father.[13] When petitioner could no longer take respondents domineering ways, he preferred 57to
hide from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage.[14]

Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit:[15]
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?

A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The father was very abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the
children never had affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given financial support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact family. x x x
The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly understand[ing]
what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it] meant to have a real family life.

Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent.[16]

It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case,
recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[17] Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing,
inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or
adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others.[18]

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats
this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated—free in form and devoid of any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution 2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then
initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore
student and respondent, a freshman.3

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after
their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and
sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. 4

However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to
go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. 6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was
treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. 7 At one point, Edward was able to call
home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his 58
inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go
home.8

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted
ways.10

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the
parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings.13

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14

The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in
the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves
to read the Bible and hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments
with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent
that he is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent
had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would
somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu.
Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner
was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioner’s
parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner
stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at
their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home
again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against
petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage.
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondent’s uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was
made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to
go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses.
Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort.
Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioner’s parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that
she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he
would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent
refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he
also does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed
petitioner that they should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
 TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

59
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He
is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he
finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid
type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She
is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used
force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they
are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative
and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake
for them to take.15

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision 19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification
of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG’s reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. 23 The CA later denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the
likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.25

In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial
court orders and notices.27

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply
with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in
Molina29 were not satisfied.30

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.31
I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 33

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked
by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de
facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually,
such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed
and formulated the definition of marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law.’ 60

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom
the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging
problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate
the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the
present Civil Code, to wit:

‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’

‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.’

xxxxxxxxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well
as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34

In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the session was over:

"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration."

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and
to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage."

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest
after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

61
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of
the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo—freed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or
enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into
the Family Code—and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of
three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to
give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he
or she made during the wedding ceremony."

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. 36

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so
designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.38

Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 6840 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in
Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary
judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house
to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a
different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the
canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both
know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks
its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete
summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but
he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing
trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies.
Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain
anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the
activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted
continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person
can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage
issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable62
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible
impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem
entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what
marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal
way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot
deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent
and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and
the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and
understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the
moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal
obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to
distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact,
to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad
impossibile tenetur.

xxxx

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases
where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony.
Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A
spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be
the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are
general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party
to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the
incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his
apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to
recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve one’s ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several,
or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include
affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating
because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as
incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so
afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but
also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to
account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full
sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by
itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the
matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the
psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged
incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply
engrained in one’s consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as given one’s psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of
some degree of freedom.42

Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the
lower court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts. 44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
63
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,46 thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 47

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three—including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized
that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court." 48

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."50 The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. 51 64

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. 52 The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving
marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity
under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the
judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a
personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder recurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s,
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.57

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the
advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a
mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts,
but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a
distinct person; that the spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time
of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of 65
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into." 581avvphi1

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. 61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an
independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat,
dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders
as follows—

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a person’s recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated
episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than
one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors.
Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with
personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and
dissatisfaction with life.

Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain
wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead
to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net However, later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality patterns.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of
other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye
movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of
borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are
categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as
any of the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and
are easily hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may
allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things
on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows—

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a façade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for
the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.lawphil.net
66
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic"
personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules
that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations.
This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,

vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. 4

The facts follow.

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July
26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.

At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their second child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu City.7 In
September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years.
By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field 9 and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family, as member of its active staff,10 while
Carmen worked as the hospital’s Treasurer.11

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986;
Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.14 But after they were married,
petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent,
physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job
as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped
calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge
the same.16

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of
providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his
obligation to his children.19
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He would gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he
had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife’s own jewelry to finance his gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of
the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused67
trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments. 23

In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his
debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.24

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and
athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to
support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly
spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends
twice a week.28

During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses’
children from 1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children. 30

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of
stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a
personality disorder.32

To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his
expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s) interview with Benjamin’s brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing
wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist. 35

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court
found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits find
root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x
x

xxxx

SO ORDERED.37

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision 38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on
established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13,
1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle
of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance
with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this
Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it
issued an Amended Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision.47

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48

Hence, this petition.

For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;

II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code
has been liberalized; and

III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.

68
I. On the issue of stare decisis.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,50necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.51

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s
discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the
beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the
"actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary
discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted
that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict
between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two
centuries."

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been
isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second,
known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of
the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional
litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon
to consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have
said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this
Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This
stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability.
Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and
political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges
that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown,
the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans
from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling
and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its
merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a
remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53

To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no
longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a
law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."

II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not.

In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to
fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all
fours" with another.57
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are
not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the69
merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.59The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but
also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available.
Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.60

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and the
appellate court’s rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 621avvphi1.zw+

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew
that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband.
Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder, 63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality.
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into
consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with
Benjamin’s brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior.
Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondent’s testimony, as well as
the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted
and must, perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009

MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. 70

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,1 and its
Resolution dated November 20, 2007.2

Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after their first meeting, they got married on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City.
At the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They have no children.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.

Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon him. Because of this, the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation
whether there was collusion between the parties. In a report dated August 16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no collusion between the parties.

On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and submitted a written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case
on the State’s behalf under the supervision and control of the Solicitor General.

In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to
petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband.

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who found
them a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.

Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment. She even bought him a newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most
jobs have an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave him money. Sometime later, her
husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his
parents when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didn’t actually get a job and the money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from his
mother. When she confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have a job so that petitioner would stop nagging him about applying
for a job. He also told her that his parents can support their needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in
conformity with those of his mother.

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only
had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not
even want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner requested that they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his
parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.

During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfo’s first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece of Rodolfo’s father, was living with Rodolfo’s family. She
corroborated petitioner’s testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully employed when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his mother. This witness also
confirmed that it was respondent’s mother who was paying the rentals for the room where the couple lived. She also testified that at one time, she saw respondent going to his mother’s house
in business attire. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated that respondent was still residing at the house of his mother and not
living together with petitioner.

Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature,
independent, very responsible, focused and has direction and ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based on the information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy related to masculine strivings.

She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence,
constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem was a cross-identification with the mother
who was the dominant figure in the family considering that respondent’s father was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his life
but manifested only after the celebration of his marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities
expected of a married person. It was incurable because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his personality.

Based on petitioner’s evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage between petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having
sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to
live together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and incurable psychological incapacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata is hereby declared null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.
The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General. 71
SO ORDERED.3
On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision4 to correct the first name of Rodolfo which was erroneously typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of the original Decision.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was based solely on the information provided by petitioner and was not based on an
examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the alleged psychological defects were present at the inception of marriage or that such defects were grave, permanent and
incurable.
Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder
existed prior to the marriage and was grave and incurable. In setting aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:
The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondent’s alleged irresponsibility and over-dependence on his mother is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained.

xxx xxx xxx

Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellee’s failure to prove that respondent’s supposed psychological malady existed even before the marriage. Records however show that the parties were
living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage and were living on their own in a rented apartment. That respondent often times asks his mother for financial support may be brought
about by his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to the family coffers, considering that it was his wife who is working for the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that
respondent does not like to have a child on the pretense that respondent is not yet ready to have one. However this is not at all a manifestation of irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent
has shown that he has a full grasp of reality and completely understands the implication of having a child especially that he is unemployed. The only problem besetting the union is respondent’s
alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which was not proven in this case to be psychological-rooted.

The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and emotional immaturity which by themselves, do not constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of Appeals, 421
SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356
SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme Court:

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007).

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-appellee Marietta C. Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains VALID. 5 (emphasis ours)

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court correctly ruled that the "totality of evidence presented by petitioner" failed to prove her spouse’s
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and settled jurisprudence.

We grant the petition.

Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.6 Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.7

Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
 (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision. 72

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x.9 (Emphasis supplied)

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.11 It should refer to "no less
than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."12 The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.13

However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern
the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.14 Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.15 With the advent of Te v. Te,16 the Court
encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.

First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband.

The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report, highlights the lack of personal examination of Rodolfo by said doctor and the doctor’s reliance on petitioner’s version of
events. In Marcos v. Marcos,17 it was held that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine
qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.

It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under
oath before the lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony.18 Significantly, petitioner’s narration of facts was corroborated in material points
by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to elaborate on her report and fully explain the link between the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 19 Since the
trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witness.20

Second, the root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the
trial court’s decision.

The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find
employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the couple’s daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couple’s inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfo’s refusal to
have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his mother.1avvphi1

These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical causes by an expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field
of psychology in general and psychological incapacity, in particular. In a portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and Rodolfo,
thus:

Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited education. Being the eldest, she is expected to be the role model of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and
physically punished, in order to tow the line. But on the other hand, she developed growing resentments towards her father and promised herself that with the first opportunity, she’ll get out of
the family. When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 ½ months after they met, without really knowing anything about him. Her obsession to leave her family was her primary reason at
that time and she did not exercise good judgment in her decision making in marriage. During their 4 years marital relationship, she came to realize that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his
duties and responsibilities, in terms of loving, caring, protection, financial support and sex.

On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to be weak, and his two elder brothers were all working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his
mother’s needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed into her system. The relationship became symbiotic, that led to a prolonged and abnormal dependence to his mother. The mother, being
the stronger and dominant parent, is a convenient role model, but the reversal of roles became confusing that led to ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency. Apparently, all the boys
were hooked up to his complexities, producing so much doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting. Specifically, Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is
referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of defying the mother’s love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother, so that his continuous relationship with his
wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and crippled him psychologically.

Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their marriage, it is the opinion of the examiner, that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible
and is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous personal problems she has difficulty in handling her considerable anxiety, at present.
There are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated
to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence with a parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation
crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due
to marital stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality
structure. It is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustment.21
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of which we quote below:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your psychological evaluation?
A: I’ve found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured, independent, very responsible, focused, she has direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what
she wanted, ma’am, and therefore, I concluded that she is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the marriage, ma’am.
Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological evaluation with regards to the respondent?
 A: Based on my interview, I’ve found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering from a
psychiatric classification as Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings, ma’am.
73
Q: In layman’s language, Madame Witness, can you please explain to us what do you mean by Dependent Personality Disorder?
A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their response to ordinary way of life are ineffectual and inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in
doubt with himself and inability to make his own decision, quite dependent on other people, and in this case, on his mother, ma’am.
Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological problem of respondent, Rodolfo Azcueta?
A: Very much, ma’am.
Q: Why?
A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his duties and responsibilities as a husband and as a father, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root cause of this psychological problem?
A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the mother who is the dominant figure in the family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the
family while the father was a seaman and always out of the house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very submissive and passive to the authority of the wife,
ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this kind of psychological problem manifested?
A: This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his early stages in life, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the respondent in this case, before the celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with the…that the manifestation came too late?
A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no stresses, no demand on his life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already
finished college degree of Computer Science, there is no demand on himself at least to establish his own, and the mother always would make the decision for him, ma’am.
Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?
A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is expected of a married person, ma’am.
Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?
A: It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became so deeply ingrained into his personality, and therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage,
ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?
A: It is permanent in nature, sir.
Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological problem as far as the marriage relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?

A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because standard expectation is, the husband has to work, to feed, to protect, to love, and of course, to function
on (sic) the sexual duties of a husband to the wife, but in this case, early in their marriage, they had only according to the wife, experienced once sexual relationship every month and
this is due to the fact that because husband was so closely attached to the mother, it is a result of the unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in defying the mother’s love when
they will be having heterosexual relationship and therefore, at that point, he will not be able to distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore, sex relationship will not
be satisfactory according to expectation, ma’am.22

In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties." 23

Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its decision, which we reproduce here for emphasis:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having
sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to
live together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

Third, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CA’s finding that the parties lived
harmoniously and independently in the first few years of marriage, witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his
mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of Rodolfo’s dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being
rooted in his early development and a by product of his upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The Court is wary of the CA’s bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this point. The CA’s reasoning that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might have
been due to his embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was his "responsible" realization that he should not have a child since he
is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on record to support these views. Again, we must point out that appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of
the trial court or the expert witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by evidence.

We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the
time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior.
In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent personality disorder and how one afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with
marital obligations, to wit:
74
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. 24

Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We
realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their symptoms or manifestations
and in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same before
declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s
dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live together,
observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most
basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.

Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo’s condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.

At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in
time and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in science and
medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and
material support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal that the family should be an "autonomous" social institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and
are equally responsible for the support and well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on mutual love,
respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.

This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under
Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.26 (emphasis ours)

In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
75
Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence
refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it
was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with
their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been
done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that
respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in
order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove
that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of
them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their
father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second
elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these
allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological
incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There
may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as
supported by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective
essential marital obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the
marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not
defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the
Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided
to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its application." 4 Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been the
omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of
ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.5

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed
independently of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." 7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
 devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
76
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — whatis decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to
enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its
own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."10

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed,
the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. 12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts
and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court
and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution 14 only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab
initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our
society is thereby made all the more strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying.16 The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance
and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were
solely based on the petitioner’s version of the events.
77
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value
as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent
within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and
should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises. 17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings
would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in
the records, including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight
to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
"despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties."18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the
petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the
experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is
important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." 20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting
such other evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the
absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so,
considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had
been based on the parties’ upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates’ expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own
witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the
respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways. Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too,
values her relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for
rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a
dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on having significant others would
depend on most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his
life. She became relationship-dependent.25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test 26 conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on
dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:

Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be considered as acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as
well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more or less, could you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings
that the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?

A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was
prompted to look for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own
mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an indication
that Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own
mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat
somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own family. I did interview the son
because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he could not see, according to the
child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?

78
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend
to another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded. 29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision
Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by experience. 30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological
incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can
you say to that claim of respondent?
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically incapacitated is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun to
inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she
had embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the relationship of the respondent with her husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and toher children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong
and associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else
would be subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism.
When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?
A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?
xxxx
A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these
responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic] upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much
that this became the top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?
A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation
for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along with it and
putting it in top priority.31

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial
determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of
marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard
his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
79
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the
advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a
mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts,
but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a
distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to
fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time
of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the standards set in Molina, 34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized
that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals." 80

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like,
tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under
Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her children
at home. The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this
episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in
second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her
obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have
known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the
disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37– the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing
mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or activity or practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would get there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON:
You, you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself.38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a
culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current
psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly
defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and
rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
 (2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, 81
and
inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent
them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically
incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her
answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAÑA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even
the time that they were together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one
who determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of problems that she had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?

A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to
marry her. And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.

Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that in his younger years he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to
page 18. He also admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to
enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?

A : Sir, it’s difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of husband to Malyn.

Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner
was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her
husband because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner
or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone
or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed
in the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater
injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero
decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today.1âwphi1 It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a
"habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent,
his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and towhich he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus
deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital
obligation. In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the82
Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life,"
thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively
state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that
[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to
define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of
marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be
taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as
the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not
further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 209180

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II and OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209253
OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, Petitioner,
vs.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions1 for review on certiorari assailing the Decision2 dated March 21, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated September 12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 94337, which affirmed the Decision4 dated November 5, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 225 (RTC Branch 225) in Civil Case No. Q-98-34627 declaring
the marriage of Reghis M. Romero II (Reghis) and Olivia Lagman Romero (Olivia) null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 5 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code), as amended.

The Facts

Reghis and Olivia were married6 on May 11, 1972 at the Mary the Queen Parish in San Juan City and were blessed with two (2) children, namely, Michael and Nathaniel, born in 1973 and
1975,7 respectively. The couple first met in Baguio City in 1971 when Reghis helped Olivia and her family who were stranded along Kennon Road. Since then, Reghis developed a closeness with
Olivia’s family, especially with the latter’s parents who tried to play matchmakers for Reghis and Olivia. In the desire to please Olivia’s parents, Reghis courted Olivia and, eventually, they became
sweethearts.8

Reghis was still a student at the time, determined to finish his studies and provide for the financial needs of his siblings and parents. Thus, less than a year into their relationship, Reghis tried to
break-up with Olivia because he felt that her demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals. Olivia, however, refused to end their relationship and insisted
on staying with Reghis at the latter’s dormitory overnight. Reghis declined and, instead, made arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a female dormitory. The next day, Reghis
brought Olivia home and while nothing happened between them the previous night, Olivia’s parents believed that they had eloped and planned for them to get married. Reghis initially objected
to the planned marriage as he was unemployed and still unprepared. However, Olivia’s parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and would support them until they are
financially able. As Olivia’s parents had treated him with nothing but kindness, Reghis agreed.9

The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights and jealous fits. Reghis could not forgive Olivia for dragging him into marriage and resented her
condescending attitude towards him. They became even more estranged when Reghis secured a job as a medical representative and became engrossed in his career and focused on supporting
his parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little time with his family, causing Olivia to complain that Reghis failed to be a real husband to her. In 1986, the couple parted ways.10

On June 16, 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage 11 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94,12 docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-34627, citing his psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.13 In support of his petition, Reghis testified that he married Olivia not out of love but out of the desire to please the latter’s parents
who were kind and accommodating to him. Reghis further maintained that he was not prepared to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time, as his mind was geared towards
finishing his studies and finding employment to support his parents and siblings.14 He also added that Olivia is in a relationship with a certain Eddie Garcia (Mr. Garcia) but he (Reghis) has no ill-
feelings towards Mr. Garcia, as he and Olivia have been separated for a long time. 15 83

Reghis also presented Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio (Dr. Basilio), a clinical psychologist, who submitted a Psychological Evaluation Report 16 dated April 28, 1998 and testified that Reghis suffered
from Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD).17 According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis’ behavioral disorder gave him a strong obsession for whatever endeavour he chooses, such as his work,
to the exclusion of other responsibilities and duties such as those pertaining to his roles as father and husband. Dr. Basilio surmised that Reghis’ OCPD was the root of the couple’s disagreements
and that the same is incurable, explaining too that Reghis was an unwilling groom as marriage was farthest from his mind at the time and, as such, felt cheated into marriage.18

For her part,19 Olivia maintained that she and Reghis were capacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations before, at the time, and after the celebration of their marriage. She also
averred that the petition is barred by res judicata inasmuch as Reghis had previously filed petitions for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage on the ground the she is allegedly
psychologically incapacitated, but said petitions were dismissed.20 Olivia, however, was unable to present evidence due to the absence of her counsel which was considered by the RTC as waiver
of her right to present evidence.21

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the petition. 22

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision23 dated November 5, 2008, the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between Reghis and Olivia null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.24 It
relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Basilio, holding that Reghis suffered from a disorder that rendered him unable to perform the obligations of love, respect and fidelity towards Olivia as
it gave him a strong obsession to succeed in his career, to the exclusion of his responsibilities as a father and husband. It also concurred with Dr. Basilio’s observation that Reghis is still deeply
attached to his parents and siblings such that he pursues his business ventures for their benefit. Likewise, it agreed that Reghis’ behavioral disorder existed even before his marriage or even his
adolescent years and that the same is incurable.25

Anent the issue of res judicata, the RTC remarked that there is no identity of causes of action between the petitions previously filed, which ascribed psychological incapacity on Olivia’s part, and
the present case which is brought on the ground of Reghis’ own psychological incapacity.26

The Republic and Olivia moved for reconsideration,27 which was, however, denied by the RTC in a Resolution 28dated July 3, 2009. Undaunted, both appealed29 to the CA.30

The CA Ruling

In a Decision31 dated March 21, 2013, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC, holding that the OCPD from which Reghis suffered made him yearn for professional advancement and rendered
him obligated to support his parents and siblings, at the expense of his marital and filial duties. It ruled that Reghis’ condition amounts to psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
Article 36 of the Family Code as it is permanent in nature and incurable. It observed that Reghis’ OCPD started early in his psychological development and is now so deeply ingrained in his
structure and, thus, incurable because people who suffer from it are of the belief that nothing is wrong with them. It further concluded that Reghis’ condition is severe considering that it
interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning and rendered him unable to assume the essential marital obligations.

The Republic’s and Olivia’s respective motions for reconsideration 32 were denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated September 12, 2013.

The Proceedings Before the Court

On November 19, 2013, the Republic filed a petition for review on certiorari34 before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 209180, where it maintained that Reghis has not established that his
alleged psychological incapacity is grave, has juridical antecedence, and is incurable. It averred that the psychological report prepared and submitted by Dr. Basilio has no factual basis to support
the conclusions found therein as she failed to describe in detail the "pattern of behavior" showing that Reghis indeed suffered from OCPD. The Republic also claimed that the methodology
employed in evaluating Reghis’ condition is not comprehensive enough 35 and that based on Reghis’ own testimony, he was able to perform his marital obligations as he lived together with Olivia
for years and attended to his duties to their children.36 It pointed out that Reghis’ condition was not shown to have existed before their marriage and that the same is incurable. 37

On November 13, 2013, a separate petition for review on certiorari,38 docketed as G.R. No. 209253 was filed by Olivia. Like the Republic, she pointed out that Reghis himself admitted knowing
his marital obligations as husband to Olivia and father to their children. 39 Olivia added that if Reghis indeed felt that he was being forced into the marriage, he could have simply abandoned her
then or refused to take his vows on their wedding day.40

In a Resolution41 dated February 17, 2014, the Court consolidated the present petitions.

The Issue Before the Court

The lone issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petitions.

The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees
marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. 42 Thus, it has consistently been held that psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.43 It must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.44

Verily, all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality disorders and there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases.45 Thus, to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.46
In Republic v. CA,47 the Court laid down definitive guidelines on the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Among others, it clarified that the illness must be grave
enough to bring about the incapacity or inability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage such that "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
84
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.48

After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not concur.1âwphi1As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis’ testimony shows that
he was able to comply with his marital obligations which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived
together as husband and wife under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both of them contributed in purchasing their own house in Parañaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and
take care of his family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them. 49 That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the
latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code. In Republic v. Albios,50 the Court held that:

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would
go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they
see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the
only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the OCPD which Reghis allegedly suffered from was not shown to have juridical antecedence. Other than Dr. Basilio’s conclusion that Reghis’ "behavioral disorder x x x existed even
prior to the marriage or even during his adolescent years,"52 no specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years were shown which would explain his behavior during his marriage with
Olivia. Simply put, Dr. Basilio’s medical report did not establish that Reghis’ incapacity existed long before he entered into marriage.

In like manner, Dr. Basilio simply concluded that Reghis’ disorder is incurable but failed to explain how she came to such conclusion. Based on the appreciation of the RTC, Dr. Basilio did not
discuss the concept of OCPD, its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary
inference that Reghis’ condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. To the Court’s mind, this is a glaring deficiency that should have prompted the RTC and the CA to be more circumspect
and critical in the assessment and appreciation of Dr. Basilio’s testimony.

Indeed, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital tie.53 After all, marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State. Accordingly, it cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the pieces of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the
party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties. 54

The Court is not unaware of the rule that factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court. However, this principle does not apply when such findings go beyond
the issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts,55 such as in the case at bar.

The Court can only commiserate with the parties’ plight as their marriage may have failed. It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.56Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves;57 rather, it must be limited to cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 58 Thus, absent sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court is compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie. 59

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated March 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94337 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, as amended, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 203284

NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARILYN** B. MATUDAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1seeks to set aside the January 31, 2012 Decision2 and August 23, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition in CA·G.R. CV No. 95392
and the Motion for Reconsideration,4 thus affirming the December 18, 2009 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan (Marilyn) were married in Laoang, Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children.

In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with her; she had not been seen nor heard from again.

Twenty-three years later, or on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, 6docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94.
Petitioner alleged that before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother; that she consistently neglected
and failed to provide petitioner and her children with the necessary emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance, and even so after leaving for work abroad; that based on expert
evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable; that petitioner's consent to the marriage was
obtained by Marilyn through misrepresentation as she concealed her condition from him; and that Marilyn is "not ready for a lasting and pennanent commitment like marriage"7 as she "never
(gave) him and their children financial and emotional support x x x and for being selfish through their six (6) years of cohabitation;" 8 that Marilyn became "so despicably irresponsible as she has
not shown love and care upon her husband, x x x and that she cannot properly and morally take on the responsibility of a loving and caring wife x x x."9
85
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the Petition.
The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having determined that there is no collusion between the parties, proceedings were conducted in due course. However, trial proceeded in
Marilyn's absence.
Apart from the testimonies of the petitioner, his daughter Maricel B. Matudan (Maricel), and Dr. Tayag, the following documents were submitted in evidence:
1. Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit10 (Exhibit "A") which was adopted as his testimony on direct examination;
2. The Judicial Aftidavit11 of Maricel (Exhibit "D"), which was adopted as part of her testimony on direct examination;
3. The Sworn Affidavit12 of Dr. Tayag (Exhibit "B"), which was considered part of her testimony on direct examination;
4. Dr. Tayag's evaluation report entitled "A Report on the Psychological Condition of NICOLAS T. MATUDAN, the petitioner for Nullity of Marriage against respondent MARILYN BORJA-
MATUDAN''13(Exhibit "C"); and

5. Other relevant evidence, such as petitioner's marriage contract/certificate and respective birth certificates of his children, and a Letter/Notice, with Registry Return Receipt, sent by Dr. Tayag
to Marilyn requesting evaluation/interview relative to petitioner's desire to file a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage (Exhibits "E" to "G").

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 18, 2009, the RTC issued its Decision14 dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed
psychological incapacity. It held, thus:

Petitioner, his daughter Maricel Matudan and psychologist Nedy L. Tayag testified. Petitioner offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to ''G" which were admitted by the Court.

The State and the respondent did not present any evidence.

From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the petitioner, the Court gathered the following:

Petitioner and respondent were roamed on October 26, 1976 x x x. They begot four (4) children x x x. Petitioner and respondent lived together with their children. On June 25, 1985, petitioner
asked respondent [sic] for permission to work and left the conjugal dwelling. Since then she was never heard of [sic]. Respondent never communicated with the petitioner and her children.
Petitioner inquired from the relatives of the respondent but they did not tell him her whereabouts.

In his Affidavit which was considered as his direct testimony, petitioner claimed that respondent failed to perform her duties as a wife to him. Respondent never gave petitioner and their
children financial and emotional support, love and care during their cohabitation. She was irresponsible, immature and exhibited irrational behavior towards petitioner and their children. She
was self-centered, had no remorse and involved herself in activities defying social and moral ethics.

On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he and the respondent had a happy married life and they never had a fight. The only reason why he filed this case was because respondent
abandoned him and their children.

Maricel Matudan was only two (2) years old when respondent left them. She corroborated the testimony of the petitioner that since respondent left the conjugal dwelling she never provided
financial support to the family and never communicated with them.

Nedy L. Tayag, Psychologist, testified on the 'Report on the Psychological Condition of Nicolas Matudan' which she prepared (Exhibit "C''). She subjected petitioner to psychological test and
interview. She likewise interviewed Maricel Matudan. She came up with the findings that petitioner is suffering from Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder and respondent has Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits. The features of petitioner's disorder are the following: negativistic attitude, passive resistance, lacks the ability to assert his opinions and has great
difficulty expressing his feelings.

The root cause of his personality condition can be attributed to his being an abandoned child. At a young age, his parents separated and he was left in the custody of his paternal grandmother.
He lacked a support system and felt rejected. He developed a strong need for nurturance, love and attention and that he would do anything to attain such.

As for respondent, the manifestation of her disorder are as follows: Preoccupation with pursuing matters that would make her happy; has a high sense of self-importance; wants to have her way
and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a good life.

Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial environment. She came from an impoverished family. Her parents were more pre-occupied with finding ways to make ends meet to
such extent that they failed to give adequate attention and emotional support to their children.

Ms. Tayag further testified that the psychological condition of the parties are grave and characterized by juridical antecedence as the same already existed before they got married, their
disorders having been in existence since their childhood years are permanent and severe.

The sole issue to be resolved is whether x x x respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Article 36 of the Family Code as amended, states:

'A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapicity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.'

Article 68 of the same Code provides:

'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.'

In the case of Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, January 4, 1995, G.R. No. 112019, the Honorable Supreme Court held:
'Justice Alicia Sempio Dy, in her commentaries on the Family Code cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila x x x, who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage although the overt86
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the same must be serious, grave and 'so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.' x x x.

In the case of Santos, it was also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.'

It must be emphasized that the cause of action of petitioner is the alleged psychological incapacity of the respondent. During the pre-trial, the sole issue raised is whether or not respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The alleged personality disorder of the petitioner is clearly not an issue in this case.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds that the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner has not established the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Again,
it must be emphasized that this petition was filed on the ground of the psychological incapacity of respondent and not the petitioner.

Respondent is said to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits. The salient features of her disorder were enumerated by Nedy Tayag in her report as follows: pre-
occupation with pursuing matters that would make her happy; has a high sense of self-importance; wants to have her way and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a
good life. Her personality disorder is considered permanent, grave and incurable. It has its root cause in her unhealthy familial environment during her early developmental years.

In petitions for declaration of marriage (sic), the testimony of the petitioner as to the physical manifestation of the psychological incapacity is of utmost importance. Unfortunately, petitioner's
testimony particularly his affidavit which was considered as his direct examination contained only general statements on the supposed manifestations of respondent's incapacity. Respondent
was described therein as irresponsible, immature, self -centered, lacks remorse, got involved with activities defying social and moral ethics. Petitioner however miserably failed to expound on
these allegations. In fact during his cross-examination, he even contradicted the allegations in his petition and affidavit. He clearly stated that he had a happy marital relationship with the
respondent and never had a fight with her (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 8).

Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He even admitted that this the [sic] only reason why he wants their marriage dissolved (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 9). Abandonment of
spouse however is not psychological incapacity. It is only a ground for legal separation.

Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage are sui generis, the allegations therein must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that would warrant the dissolution of the marriage
bond. Absent such proof, the Court will uphold the validity of the marriage for 'the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility
of the marriage bond.' (Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006).

In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioner moved to reconsider, 16 but in a May 12, 2010 Order,17 the RTC held its ground reiterating its pronouncement that petitioner failed to demonstrate Marilyn's psychological incapacity,
and that the petition is anchored merely on Marilyn's abandonment of the marriage and family, which by itself is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R CV No. 95392. However, in its assailed January 31, 2012 Decision, the CA instead affirmed the RTC judgment, declaring thus:

Petitioner-appellant asserts that the ETC should not have denied the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Marilyn x x x. He maintains that, contrary to the conclusion reached by
the trial court, he was able to establish by the quantum of evidence required, the claimed psychological incapacity of his wife.

The argument of Nicolas R. Matudan fails to persuade Us.

Verily, instead or substantiating the alleged psychological incapacity his wife, petitioner-appellant revealed during his cross examination that it was actually his wife's act of abandoning the family
that led him to seek the nullification of their marriage. In fact, during his cross-examination, he readily admitted that they were happily married and that they never engaged in bickering with
each other.
xxxx
Q: But how would you describe your marital relations [sic]? Were there moments that you were happy with your wife?
A: Yes, ma' am, that is why we begot four children.
COURT
And so, you so you [sic] had a happy married life then?
FISCAL
I would presume that you had a happy married life, how come your wife just left you like that? Do you have any idea why your wife just left you like that?
A: She did not communicate with us to tell her whereabouts.
Q: Did you ever have a fight with your wife?
A: None, ma'am.
xxxx
COURT
All right, you stated in this Affidavit that you are filing this case for the declaration of nullity of marriage because of the psychological incapacity of your wife, what do you mean by that?
WITNESS
'Pinabayaan lang kmning pamilya niya, hindi naman niya sinasabi kung saan siya hahanapin.' She did not inform us of her whereabouts.
COURT
Is that the only reason why you want your marriage with her dissolved? 87
WITNESS
Yes, your honor.
As correctly observed by the RTC, abandonment by a spouse, by itself, however, does not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be
shown that such abandonment is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes the spouse concerned completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Indeed, the term 'psychological incapacity' to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano Molina, the following definitive guidelines were laid down in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of
the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff: Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage,
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements established in Santos v. Court of Appeals that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and
(c) incurability. These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nu1lity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Using the above standards, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent-appellee is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected
of her as a wife.

Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the clinical psychologist cannot be relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological
incapacity of his wife.

It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the information
supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at the time the
respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between her parents until long after her birth. On the other hand; as the petitioning
spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly be considered as credible. The ruling
in Jocelyn Suazo v.Angelita Suazo, et al., is illuminating on this score:

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on
her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn
whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of
the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

xxxx

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could
not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelita's psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological
condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.

In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'

At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the psychological condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives as manifestations of the same. The report neither explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that
the respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.

xxxx

Dr. Tayag's testimony during her cross-examination as well as her statements in the Sworn Affidavit are no different.

When asked to explain the personality disorder of Marilyn, Dr. Tayag simply replied:

Q: On her case you assessed her as, likewise, suffering from a personality disorder characterized by Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Anti-Social Trait. Will you please tell to the Court what
do you mean by that personality disorder?
A: In layman's term, once you are being labeled as a narcissistic [sic], this is a person whose preoccupation are all toward his own self satisfaction both materially or emotionally at the expense of
somebody. They have what you called [sic] strong sense of entitlement thinking that she can get away whatever [sic] she wants to in pursuit of her own satisfaction at the expense of somebody.
And this is what happened to the respondent. She gave more consideration to her own satisfaction material wise at the expense of social embarrassment of the children because of what 88
happened to her.

On the other hand, in her Sworn Affidavit, Dr. Tayag stated:

7. Without a doubt, Marilyn is suffering from a form of personality disorder that rooted [sic] the downfall of their marriage. As based on the DSM-IV, respondent's behavioral disposition fits with
individuals with NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti-social traits, as characterized by her disregard for and violation of the rights of others as well as her failure to conform to social
norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are clearly immoral and socially despised. Such is also depicted through his [sic] deceitfulness, as indicated
by repeated lying and conning methods she used upon others in order to achieve personal profit or pleasure. In addition, her consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by her repeated failure to
sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations and her lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another. x x x.
And such condition is considered to [sic] grave, severe, long lasting and incurable by any treatment available.

Accordingly, even if We assume that Marilyn is really afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits, in the absence of any showing that the same actually incapacitated her
from fulfilling her essential marital obligations, such disorder cannot be a valid basis for declaring Nicolas' marriage to Marilyn as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. To be sure,
jurisprudence has declared that not every psychological illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the marriage a nullity under Article 36. '[T]he meaning of 'psychological incapacity' [is
confined] to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.'

All told, We find that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in rendering its assailed Decision:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.18 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 23, 2012 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.

In a November 19, 2014 Resolution,19 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.

Issue

Petitioner mainly questions the CA's appreciation of the case, insisting that he was able to prove Marilyn's psychological incapacity.1âwphi1

Petitioner's Arguments

In his Petition and Reply,20 petitioner argues that contrary to the CA's findings, he was able to prove Marilyn's psychological incapacity which is rooted in Dr. Tayag's diagnosis that she was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which existed even before their marriage, and continued to subsist thereafter; that her illness is grave, serious, incurable, and permanent as to
render her incapable of assuming her marriage obligations; that the nullification of his marriage to Marilyn is not an affront to the institutions of marriage and family, but will actually protect the
sanctity thereof because in effect, it will discourage individuals with psychological disorders that prevent them from assuming marital obligations from remaining in the sacred bond; 21 that the
issue of whether psychological incapacity exists as a ground to nullify one's marriage is a legal question; and that the totality of his evidence and Marilyn's failure to refute the same despite due
notice demonstrate that he is entitled to a declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Respondent's Arguments

In its Comment22 praying for denial, the Republic argues that the Petition calls for an evaluation of facts, thus violating the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should be confined to legal
questions. Citing Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,23which decrees as follows-

Tue issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case. (Citations omitted)

the State argues that the instant case should be dismissed instead.

The public respondent adds that allegations and proof of irresponsibility, immaturity, selfishness, indifference, and abandonment of the family do not automatically justify a conclusion of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders -
existing at the time of the marriage - clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and depriving the spouse of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the marital bond he/she is about to assume; that petitioner failed to show how each of Marilyn's claimed negative traits affected her ability to perform her essential
marital obligations; that the supposed psychological evaluation of Marilyn was in fact based on the one-sided, self-serving, and biased information supplied by petitioner and Maricel - which
renders the same unreliable and without credibility; that petitioner's real reason for seeking nullification is Marilyn's abandonment of the family; and that all in all, petitioner failed to prove the
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals24taught us that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. Thus, the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved."25 In this connection, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant to Republic v. Court of Appeals,26or the Molina case.
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has
declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity
should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. 27 89

Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground that the totality of petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that Marilyn was
psychologically unfit to enter marriage - in short, while petitioner professed psychological incapacity, he could not establish its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

The Court agrees.

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation
report on the psychological condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed evaluation of Marilyn's psychological condition was based solely on petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not
participate in the proceedings.

Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition." 28 "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage." 29 Petitioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during trial, however, fail to show gravity and
juridical antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and was involved in "activities defying social and moral ethics,"30 and that she was, among others, irrational,
irresponsible, immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly the degree of Marilyn's claimed irresponsibility,
immaturity, or selfishness. This is compounded by the fact that petitioner contradicted his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married and never had a fight, which is why
they begot four children; and the only reason for his filing Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 was Marilyn's complete abandonment of the marriage and family when she left to work abroad.

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. 31

If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very least. At most, they fail to sufficiently establish the degree of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.

On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only two years old when Marilyn left the family. Growing up, she may have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment - such as the
lack of emotional and financial support; but she could not have any idea of her mother's claimed psychological incapacity, as well as the nature, history, and gravity thereof.

Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's psychological condition were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are based on the
personal accounts of petitioner. This fact gave more significance and importance to petitioner's other pieces of evidence, which could have compensated for the deficiency in the expert opinion
which resulted from its being based solely on petitioner's one-sided account. But since these other pieces of evidence could not be relied upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well.
In one decided case with a similar factual backdrop and involving the very same expert witness, this Court held:

It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under
one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace's departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with
her husband.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability of the former's condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn's testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn's
statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to MaryGrace's traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the
antecedence of Mary Grace's alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-]
educated person" in Mary Grace.

Anent Dr. Tayag's assessment of Mary Grace's condition, the Court finds the same as unfounded. Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of
psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz.:

We' cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in
favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a
more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not
actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who 'believes
that the world revolves around him'; and who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.' x x x

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the respondent suffered 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces
of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable' -is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent.
While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. 32

Finally, the identical rulings of the trial and appellate courts should be given due respect and finality. This Court is not a trier of facts.

The issue of whether or not psychological inq1pacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons x x x.33

With the foregoing disquisition, there is no need to resolve the other issues raised. They have become irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2012 Decision and August 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95392 are AFFIRMED.

90
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 214064

MIRASOL CASTILLO, Petitioner

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE IMPAS, Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Mirasol Castillo (Mirasol) challenging the Decision1and Resolution,2 dated March 10, 2014 and August 28, 2014, respectively, of
the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled against the dissolution and nullity of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The facts of the case follow:

As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe
sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got married in Bani,
Pangasinan on April 22, 1984 and were blessed with two (2) children born in 1992 and in 2001.3

On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint4 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90.

Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting her to believe that the same was made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed
philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with different women. One time, she has just arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise her family. But to her consternation, she caught
him in a compromising act with another woman. He did not bother to explain or apologize. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with
him.5Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their children for a period of not less than ten (10) years without any
reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.6

In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological Evaluation Report,7 concluded that Felipe is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations. A portion of the report reads:

x x xx

The personality disorder speaks of antecedence as it has an early onset, with an enduring pattern and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. His poor
parental and family molding (particularly lack of parental parenting) caused him to have a defective superego and he proved to be selfish, immature and negligent person and followed a pattern
of gross irresponsibility and gross disregard of the feelings of his partner/wife disregarding the marriage contract and the commitment he agreed on during the wedding. In other words, the root
cause of respondent's flawed personality pattern can be in childhood milieu. Respondent's familial constellation, unreliable parenting style from significant figures around him, and unfavorable
childhood experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his environment in general. The respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope with his obligations and
responsibilities as married man and father.

It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the normative and ordinary duties of marriage and family, shouldered by any married man, existing in ordinary circumstances. He just
cannot perform his duties and obligations as a husband, as he entered into marriage for his own self-satisfaction and gratification, manipulate and denigrate the petitioner for his own pleasures
and satisfaction. In the process, respondent was unable to assume his marital duties and responsibilities to his wife. He failed to render mutual help and support (Article 68, FC).

Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has no psychological insight that he has a character problem. He would not acknowledge the pain he caused to people around
him. People suffering from this personality disorder are unmotivated to treatment and impervious to recovery. There are no medications and laboratory examinations to be taken for
maladaptive behavior such as the NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder).

Otherwise stated, his personality disorder is chronic and pervasive affecting many aspects of his life, such as social functioning and close relationships.1âwphi1 Apparently, he has failed to
develop appropriate adjustment methods. He lacks the intrapersonal and interpersonal integration that caused him the failure to understand the very nature of that sharing of life that is
directed toward the solidarity and formation of family.

x x x x8

In a Decision9 dated January 20, 2012, the RTC in Civil Case No. 4853-11 declared the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Court hereby declares the marriage contract by the petitioner MIRASOL CASTILLO to the respondent FELIPE IMPAS on April 22, 1984 in Bani, Pangasinan to be
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Clerk of Court is directed to enter this judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue the
corresponding Entry of Judgment. Thereupon, the Office of the Civil Registrars in Bani, Pangasinan and Imus, Cavite, are also mandated to cause the registration of the said ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
in their respective Book of Marriages.
Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the counsel of the petitioner, the respondent, the Solicitor General, 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos and the Civil Registrar General with
copies hereof.
91
Upon compliance, the Court shall forthwith issue the DECREE OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

SO ORDERED.10

On February 22, 2012, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order11 dated April 3,
2012.

On appeal, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from
psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of performing marital obligations due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.12 A pertinent portion of the
decision reads:

x x xx

Based on the records, it appears more likely that Felipe became unfaithful as a result of unknown factors that happened during the marriage and not because of his family background. His
tendency to womanize was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that are grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, it was only after thirteen (13) years of marriage that he
started to engage in extra-marital affairs. In the complaint filed by Mirasol, she said that after they got married, their relationship as husband and wife went smoothly and that she was of the
belief that she had a marriage made in heaven.

In short, Felipe's marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. Sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. Since that situation does not obtain in the case, Mirasol's claim of psychological incapacity must fail. Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Felipe, We cannot but rule in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 20, 2012 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.13

Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol elevated the case before this Court raising the issue, thus:

[Petitioner] was able to establish that respondent is suffering from grave psychological condition that rendered him incognitive of his marital covenants under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and
Felipe on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

This Court rules in the negative.

Mirasol alleges that she has sufficiently established that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The conclusions of the trial court regarding
the credibility of the witnesses are entitled to great respect because of its opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Since the court a quo accepted the veracity of the petitioner's
premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity drawn from the expert witness. She claims that Montefalcon was correct in interviewing her for it was
submitted that it was only her who knew best whether her husband was complying with his marital obligations. Moreover, the OSG admits that personal examination of the respondent by the
clinical psychologist is not an indispensable requisite for a finding of psychological incapacity.

On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to establish from the totality of evidence the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of Felipe's alleged Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. The conclusions of the clinical psychologist that he was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was present at the inception of the marriage were not supported by
evidence. At most, the psychologist merely proved his refusal to perform his marital obligations.14 Moreover, she has no personal knowledge of the facts from which she based her findings and
was working on pure assumptions and secondhand information related to her by one side. 15

Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.16 Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 17

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,18 this Court laid down the more definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases, viz.:
x x xx
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. x x x
92
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x
xx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x
xxx19
The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.20
As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a
given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.22

The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have automatically ensured the granting of
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.23

Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal of the records, this Court rules that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's psychological incapacity.

Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that respondent is encumbered with a personality disorder classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his personality structure
that rendered him incapacitated to perform his marital duties and obligations. In her direct testimony, she stated:

ATTY. BAYAUA:
Question: Were you able to interview and conduct examination on the respondent?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: [W]here did you base your conclusion that supported your findings that the husband of Mirasol is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage?
Answer: From the interviews I had with the petitioner and also from my interview of the couple's common friend who validated all information given to me by the petitioner.
Question: You mean to say you were not able to interview the respondent?
Answer: No sir. But I sent him an invitation to undergo the same psychological evaluation I administered with the petitioner but he did not respond to my invitation.
Question: [W]hat relevant information were you able to gather from your interview of the friend of the couple?
Answer: She validated every piece of information relayed to me by the petitioner during the interview.

x x xx

Question: Madam witness, were you able to determine at what point in time in the life of the respondent did he acquire this disorder that you mentioned?

Answer: The disorder of the respondent already existed even at the time of celebration of their marriage, although the incapacity became manifest only after their marriage. His disorder seemed
to have started during the early years of his life.

Question: In your expert opinion, what would be the likely source of the disorder of the respondent?

Answer: The disorder of the respondent seemed to have developed during the early years of his life due to his poor parental and family [molding] particularly lack of parental guidance. [His] parents
separated when he was still young and when [his] mother had another affair and lived with her common-law husband. Respondent's familial constellation and [unfavorable] childhood
experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his environment. Respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope with his obligations and responsibilities as a married man
and father.

x x x24

The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal of the RTC's decision would reveal that there was no assessment of the veracity of such
allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the pieces of evidence presented. Also, there were no factual findings which can serve as bases for its conclusion of Felipe's
psychological incapacity.

The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 25 The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of
her conclusion is founded.26

Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that she evaluated
respondent's psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which brought about his personality disorder
as painted in the evaluation was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner. There was no independent witness knowledgeable of respondent's upbringing interviewed by the
psychologist or presented before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's common friend, agreed with petitioner's claims in the interview with the psychologist, confirmed the
information given by petitioner, and alleged that she knew Felipe as "chick boy" or ''playboy."27 She did not testify before the court a quo.

As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to establish Felipe's psychological condition and its associations in his early life. Montefalcon's testimony and psychological evaluation
report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Mirasol's one-sided assertion. The said report falls short of the required proof for the Court to rely on the same as basis
to declare petitioner's marriage to respondent as void.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must still be "medically or clinically identified," and
adequately established by evidence.28 We cannot take the conclusion that Felipe harbors a personality disorder existing prior to his marriage which purportedly incapacitated him with the
essential marital obligations as credible proof of juridical antecedence. The manner by which such conclusion was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of 93
evidence required in determining psychological incapacity. The lack of corroborative witness and evidence regarding Felipe's upbringing and family history renders Montefalcon's opinion on the
root cause of his psychological incapacity conjectural or speculative.

Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at issue are considered since the judge had found them to be credible enough, this Court cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with
regard to information on Felipe's pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case because we only have petitioner's words to rely on. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence
as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.29

Anent Felipe's sexual infidelity, Mirasol alleged in her judicial affidavit, to wit:
x x xx
Question: You said Madam Witness that after several months you and respondent became sweethearts, what happened next Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, while we were already sweethearts, I got dismayed when respondent was also maintaining another woman who was his former girlfriend.
Question: What was the reaction of the respondent when you told him about his relation with his former girlfriend?
Answer: Respondent was shocked and became moody Sir. This turned our relationship sour and it led to being stormy.
Question: You said Madam Witness that you and respondent's relationship became sour and stormy, what happened next, if any?
Answer: Sir, my relationship with respondent should have been ended had it not been with the timely intervention of our parents. Respondent and I reconciled.
x x xx
Question: Madam Witness as you said you finally got married with the respondent as evidenced in fact by a Marriage Certificate. What happened next after the marriage?
Answer: After our wedding, our relationship as husband and wife went on smoothly. I was of the belief that my marriage was made in heaven and that respondent had already reformed his ways
and had completely deviated from his relationship with his ex-girlfriend;
x x x30
Question: After giving birth to your first child did respondent change or become responsible considering that he is already a father?
Answer: No, Sir. I thought that having our first child would already change the ways of respondent. The birth of our first child did not actually help improve respondent's ways because
respondent is really a man who is not contented with one woman even before we got married;
xxx31
Question: After you gave birth to you[r] second child what happened next Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, respondent is back to his old habit where he has been seen having relationship with a different woman. This was also seen by our relatives and
friends of respondent.
x xx32

Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.33 In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity,
the respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital
state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.34 It is indispensable that the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.35

As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the subject himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's allegations, no
other reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable. We are not
persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or clinically established.

Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.36 Based on the records, this Court finds that there exists
insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Felipe's sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated with psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. We reiterate that there was
no other evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed
that their relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA against the dissolution and nullity of the parties' marriage due to insufficiency of the evidence presented. The policy of
the State is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the
marriage.37

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari filed by herein petitioner Mirasol Castillo. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the assailed Decision and Resolution, dated March 10, 2014 and
August 28, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 222541

94
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner
vs.
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
102745, which reversed the Decision4 dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891 declaring the marriage of Jose O. Del Rosario
(Jose) and Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the Family Code, as amended.6

The Facts

Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17) years old, sometime in December 1983 at a party in Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.7 Very soon, they became romantically
involved.8

Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose
eventually decided to get married on December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On
February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony held in the Philippine Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.9

In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic helper/caregiver and has been working there ever since, only returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation. Through her
efforts, she was able to acquire a house and lot in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.10

In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
his essential marital obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and father. According
to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few days before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation
expenses of his parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to leave Jose's parents' house where they were then staying; and he even
locked her out of their house in the middle of the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal, which he refused to perform. Rachel added that Jose
would represent himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly),
stating: "love, kung ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang dito."12 Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa
'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse any
chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart.13

Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its early years, and it was only later in their marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions.14

Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley15 and her sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora,16 which corroborated her allegations, as well as the testimony 17 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag),
who prepared the Psychological Report18 (Report) on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on her interview with Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose
suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) characterized by: (a) his lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to
his own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it comes to his marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings.19

For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully performed all of his marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; (b) he had
provided for his family's financial and emotional needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed that although they occasionally had
misunderstandings, they nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that their first major argument was when Rachel decided to go to Hongkong to work; that they continued to
communicate through mail during her stay overseas; and that he remained supportive of Rachel and would advise her to give her family the financial aid that they need so long as she would not
sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-marital affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their son.20 Jose presented as well the testimony of Faustino Rigos to support his
allegations.21

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag,
declaring that Jose's APD interferes with his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties, as he in fact even refused to take responsibility for his actions, notwithstanding the
overwhelming evidence against him.23

Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to seek employment, squandering of their money on vices, violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious, grave, and permanent
psychological condition that incapacitates him to perform his marital obligations required by Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. At most, they are personality defects, i.e., immaturity,
irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, which may be considered as grounds for legal separation under Article 5525 of the same code.26

The CA Ruling

In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC,28 holding that the totality of the evidence Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.29 Particularly, the CA declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek employment, his act of
squandering their money on his vices, and his temper and alleged propensity for violence were not so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond sufficient to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code; at best, they showed that Jose was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature which
nonetheless do not amount to the downright incapacity that the law requires. Additionally, the CA pointed out that the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating
nature, and the incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's Report failed to show the relation between Jose's "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition," on one hand,
and grave and permanent psychological malady, on the other. Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only offered a general evaluation on the supposed root cause
of Jose's personality disorder.30

Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution 32 dated December 1, 2015; hence, this petition.
 The Issue Before the Court

95
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of psychological incapacity.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, 33 and marriage as the foundation of the family.34 Because of this, the Constitution decrees
marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 35 of the Family
Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.36 It
should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under Article 68 37 of the Family Code, among others,38 include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity, and render help and support.39 In other words, it must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.40

In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 42 The Court laid
down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 in Republic v. Molina43 (Molina) whose salient points are footnoted below,44 that incorporated the basic
requirements the Court established in Santos.

Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.45 The evidence need not necessarily come from
the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately related to the spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's
condition at or about the time of the marriage.46 In other words, the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its application calls for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.47 To be clear, however, the totality of the evidence must still establish the characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity,
incurability, and juridical antecedence.

Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or
sexual promiscuity.49 In Taring v. Taring,50 the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some
psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses."51 The Court equally did not consider as tantamount to psychological incapacity the emotional immaturity, irresponsibility,
sexual promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders invoked by the petitioning spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,52 Republic v. Encelan,53 Republic v. De Gracia,54 and Republic v. Romero,55 to name a few,
and thus dismissed their petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.

The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the petition. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.

Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking sprees; (2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging
his duties as a father to Wesley and as a husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself as single; and (4) engaged in an extra-marital affair with a
bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions. Significantly, Rachel admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other hand,
simply summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become
deeply embedded within his adaptive systems since early childhood years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent component of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair
despite any form of intervention."56

It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential
parameters for establishing psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and
cure, or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's
condition has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons why and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and how
it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his marital obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition" that
automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological incapacity without, however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or
habits during his adolescent years that could explain his behavior during the marriage.

Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is
rooted in his childhood or was already existing at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established parameters do not require that the expert witness personally examine the party alleged
to be suffering from psychological incapacity provided corroborating evidence are presented sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters.57 Considering that her Report was based
solely on Rachel's side whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony deserved the application of a more rigid and stringent standards which the RTC failed to apply.

In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. 58 There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.59

A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; 60 a
marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36, the Court is
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 96
G.R. No. 188400

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner

vs
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital obligations.

This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Maria Teresa B. Tani- De La Fuente (Maria Teresa) assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 2 and Resolution3 dated August 29, 2008 and May 25,
2009, respectively, in CA- G.R. CV. No. 76243, which reversed the Decision4 dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q- 99-37829.

Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they were students at the University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts.5

After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the University of Sto. Tomas Treasurer's Office. 6Meanwhile, Rodolfo, who was unable to finish his college degree, found continued
employment at his family's printing press business.7

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy.8 She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life
and felt insecure of his siblings, who excelled in their studies and careers.9

On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City. They had two children: Maria Katharyn, who was born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born on
April 6, 1986.10

Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's printing press to stalk
her.11 Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who was staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover. 12

In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or five (5) times a day.13 At times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch
break, just so they could have sex.14During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the bed or poke her with things.15 Rodolfo also suggested that they invite a third person with them
while having sex, or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's presence. 16 Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria Teresa feel molested and maltreated.17 Whenever Maria Teresa
refused Rodolfo's advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they would quarrel. 18

Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest, as well as any person she thought could help her and Rodolfo.19 Maria Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo
marriage counselling, but Rodolfo refused and deemed it as mere "kalokohan".20

Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. 21 In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria
Teresa, with their two (2) daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking incident. Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children
by herself.22

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage23 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was initially archived because Rodolfo failed to file a
responsive pleading.24 Maria Teresa moved for the revival of the Petition.25 The trial court granted the motion and referred the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for collusion
investigation.26 Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and recommended the trial of the case on the merits. 27

Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference.28 The pre-trial conference was declared closed and terminated, and Maria Teresa was allowed to present her
evidence.29

Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was presented as an expert witness.30 Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria
Teresa to gather information on her family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of psychological tests.31 Dr. Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best
friend.32

After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez concluded that Maria Teresa was not suffering from any severe mental disorder and had no indication of any organic or
functional impairment.33 Although Dr. Lopez found that Maria Teresa had an emotionally disturbed personality, he opined that this was not severe enough to constitute psychological
incapacity.34

Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation through registered mail. 35 After two (2) months, Rodolfo contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor, ano ba ang pakialam niyo sa amin,
hindi niyo naman ako kilala." Dr. Lopez explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's side of the story, but Rodolfo replied with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala kayong pakialam sa akin."36

Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his
severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe
immaturity."37

Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of personality disorder, even more severe than the other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality
disorders.38 Dr. Lopez explained that Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by a pathogenic parental model.39 Rodolfo's family background showed that his father was a
psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic contamination called double insanity, a symptom similar to his father's.40 Dr. Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's disorder was
serious and incurable because of his severe paranoia.41

Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's incapacity to perform his marital obligations.42
Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file any responsive leading.43 He likewise did not appear during the pre-trial conference.44 He was given a specific date to present evidence but
he still failed to appear.45 he trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence.46
97
On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence.47 The Office of the Solicitor General was also
directed to submit its certification.48 The Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification
and comment from the Office of the Solicitor General.49

On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision 50 granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial court gave credence to his findings as they were based on information gathered from credible informants. The trial court
held that the marriage between Maria Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void because "[Rodolfo's] psychological incapacity [was] grave, serious and incurable."51 The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE LA FUENTE to respondent, RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR. null and void on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Their conjugal partnership (sic) property relations is hereby dissolved. There being no mention of properties acquired by the parties, no
pronouncement as to its liquidation and partition is hereby made;
(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both surnamed De la Fuente shall remain legitimate. They shall remain in the custody of the petitioner.
(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no evidence presented as to the capability of the respondent to give support, no pronouncement is hereby made in the meantime;
(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden name, TANI.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and Mandaluyong City where the marriage was celebrated upon the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. 53 The Office of the Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification
because it had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes.54 It was also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was handling.55
On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, with the dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby deemed moot and academic.
This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the Solicitor General that this case was filed on June 3, 1999 and there should be no more delay in the disposition of the case. 56

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.57 It argued that the trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the
Solicitor General,58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not follow
the standards set forth in the Molina case.59

The Court of Appeals granted60 the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay, thus, the trial court should not have given it weight.61 The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Dr.
Lopez's finding that Rodolfo's behavior descended from psychological illness contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.62

In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria Teresa's admission that she married Rodolfo with the belief that he would change, and that they were in a relationship for five (5) years
before getting married, showed that they were in good terms during the early part of their marriage. It also negated her claim that Rodolfo's psychological defect existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, and that it deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage. 63 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is REVERSED and the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.64 (Emphasis in the original)

Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration65 but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution 66 dated May 25, 2009.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.67

Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a wider discretion on whether expert opinion was needed to prove psychological incapacity.68 Petitioner further argued
that for as long as the trial court had basis in concluding that psychological incapacity existed, such conclusion should be upheld.69

Rodolfo filed a Comment70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married."71

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment,72 agreed that a physician was not required to declare a person psychologically incapacitated but emphasized that the evidence presented
must be able to adequately prove the presence of a psychological condition. The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that Maria Teresa was unable to sufficiently prove Rodolfo's alleged
psychological incapacity.73

The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Lopez's psychological report stated that his assessment was based on interviews he made with petitioner and two (2) of the parties'
common friends. However, Dr. Lopez did not name the two (2) common friends in the report. 74 Furthermore, during trial Dr. Lopez testified that he only interviewed petitioner and Rodolfo's
best friend, not two (2) friends as indicated in his report.75 The Office of the Solicitor General insisted that the finding of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity should be dismissed as hearsay as it
was based solely on information given by petitioner to Dr. Lopez.76

The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because petitioner's evidence was
insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.

The Petition is granted.

The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals77 was the first case that attempted to lay down the standards for determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Santos declared that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."78 Furthermore, the incapacity "should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the 98
marriage[.]"79

Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,80 provided the guidelines to be followed when interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.81 (Emphasis in the original)

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to
discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.

The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's
mental and psychological condition. The Court of Appeals cited Republic v. Dagdag,82 where this Court held that "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by experts."83 The Court of Appeals then ruled that "[o]bviously, this requirement is not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testifies
on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party."84

The Court of Appeals is mistaken.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes85 states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist,
since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed
mainly by the other."86

Marcos v. Marcos87 emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of
evidence presented establishes the party's psychological condition.88

Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful
and prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial court found:
Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent' [s] personality by taking into consideration the psychological impression and conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the
different behaviors he manifested during the time that he and petitioner were living together. According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, he found the respondent to be suffering
from a paranoid personality disorder manifested by the respondent's damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and99
distrust of friends and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity. He also testified that
this kind of disorder is actually one of the severe forms of personality disorder even more severe than the other personality disorders like the borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.

As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused by a pathogenic parental model. As he investigated the family background of the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that his
father was a psychiatric patient such that the respondent developed a similar symptom or psychic contamination which is called double insanity. This, according to Dr. Lopez is usually developed
among close family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and even couples who are close to one another; that people close to one another get psychically contaminated; that surprisingly, the
symptom that the father manifested is the same as those of the respondent. The said disorder started during respondent's late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years.

He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable because of the severe paranoia of the patient; that patients with this kind of personality disorder could never accept
that there is something wrong with them and if ever forced to seek treatment, they would rather engage in an intellectual battle with the therapist rather than cooperate with them.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner.1âwphi1 He
recommends that the marriage be annulled.89 (Emphasis supplied)

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, must give due regard to expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. 90

The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological
disorder probably started during his late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological incapacity to perform his marital
obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model.

The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before their marriage,
and that he would often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him. 91 She believed that he would change after they got married; 92 however, this did not happen.
Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head. 93

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit
that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner
consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also
refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and
respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even
apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which show his need to intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive control. At first, respondent
only inflicted nonphysical forms of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon
escalated into physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a gun at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.

Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats,
emotional insults, and economic deprivation.94 Although not specifically named, coercive control as a form of psychological abuse or harm has been recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in
or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage
to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of
his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to
respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that
respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.

In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court reiterates the pronouncement we made in an opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin:95

Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law,
this refers to responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of society.1âwphi1 The state's interest should not
amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.

Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of psychological incapacity should not only be based on a medical or psychological disorder, but should consist of the
inability to comply with essential marital obligations such that public interest is imperiled.96

Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that a straitjacket application of the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions."97 Ironically, the ultimate effect
of such stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the perversion of the family unit, the very institution that our laws are meant to protect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-De La Fuente and Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared NULL and VOID. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 76243 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829 is REINSTATED. 10
0
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 217993

MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III,, Petitioner,

vs.
NORA REYES BAKUNAWA,, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, JR, J.:

For resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Manuel R. Bakunawa III (Manuel) challenging the Decision2 dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution3 dated April 22, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579, which upheld the validity of his marriage to Nora Reyes Bakunawa (Nora).

The Facts

Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where they were students and became sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel got married on July 26,
1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.4

Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time, they lived with Manuel's parents. While Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to stop his studies to help his father in
the family's construction business. Manuel was assigned to provincial projects and came home only during weekends. This setup continued even as Nora gave birth to their eldest child, Moncho
Manuel (Moncho). However, whenever Manuel came back from his provincial assignments, he chose to spend his limited time with friends and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora resented
this and they started quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel depended on his father and on Nora for their family's needs.5

In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was during this period th.at Manuel first observed Nora's passiveness and laziness; she was moody and mercurial. Their
house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus, Manuel became more irritated with Nora and their verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.6

On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing changed in their relationship. Manuel spent most of his time with friends and engaged in drinking sprees. In 1979, he
had an extramarital affair and seldom came home. He eventually left Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered themselves separated.7

In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their children. After Manuel spent a few nights with them in the new house, Nora became pregnant again and thereafter gave
birth to their third child.8

On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,9 on the ground that he and Nora are psychologica11y
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified that Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not
proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with
Manuel. Her findings were based on her interview with Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho, because Nora did not participate in the psychological assessment.10

Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with his common-law wife and has a son with her, whereas, Nora lives alone in her unit in Cubao, Quezon City. Their house and lot was
already foreclosed following Nora's failure to pay a loan secured by a mortgage on the said property. 11

Ruling of the RTC

The R TC granted the petition in its Decision12 dated March 28, 2011. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between MANUEL R. BAKUNAWAIII and NORAREYESBAKUNAWA null and void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code.

The Office of the City Civil Registrar of Quezon City is hereby ordered to make entries into the records of the respective parties pursuant to the judgment of the Court.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished upon the Office of Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, the Office of the Civil Registrars of Quezon City, and the National
Statistics Office, as well as the parties and counsel.

SO ORDERED.13

Nora appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing inter alia that the RTC erred in finding that the testimony of the psychiatrist is sufficient to prove the parties' psychological incapacity.

Ruling of the CA

The CA, in its Decision14 dated March 27, 2014, granted Nora's appeal and reversed the RTC decision. The decretal portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal filed by [Nora] is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 28, 2011 of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region in Civil Case No. Q-08-62822
is REVERSED and SETASIDE.
10
SO ORDERED.15 1

The CA denied Manuel's motion for reconsideration16 through a Resolution17 dated April 22, 2015.

Manuel filed the present petition raising the following grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF °THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES DESPITE MORE THAN CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO DECLARE ITS NULLITY DUE TO
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES TO PERFORM THEIR MARITAL OBLIGATIONS; and

II. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION DATED MARCH 27, 2014 DESPITE MORE THAN COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE REVERSAL THEREOF.18

Ruling of the Court

As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to
prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder and that Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them psychologically incapacitated
under Article 36 of the Family Code,19 is solely based on her interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did not err in not according probative value to
her psychological evaluation report and testimony.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang,20 the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to
support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologist's examination and report."21 In Toring v. Toring, et al.,22 the Court stated that:

Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the
allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.23

In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable witness to establish
the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.

The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on Manuel despite having had the opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared that there is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician, 24 much less be subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds
application only if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have been
established by means of psychometric and neurological tests which are objective means designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.25

With regard to the Confirmatory Decree26 of the National Tribunal of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila in favor of
nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel and Nora, the Court accords the same with great respect but does not consider the same as controlling and decisive, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.27

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 210766

MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON, Petitioner

vs.
BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the August 29, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its January 6, 2014 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662, which reversed and
set aside the November 12, 2010 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Civil Case No. 07-0070.

Factual Antecedents

On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner) filed a Petition 5 for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines6 (Family Code). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.

It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that
said marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at
the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually,"7 and a compulsive gambler; that respondent was immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that
respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to
her; and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner.

Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro Psych Facility, 8 a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's attending
psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent:
Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is diagnosed to be suffering from Pathological Gambling as manifested by:
a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances[;] 10
b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired effect[;]
2
c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent of [his] involvement with gambling[;]
d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of his wife, issuing bouncing checks in order to finance his gambling[;]
e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the respect of his children, lost a good career in banking because of gambling[;]
f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide money to relieve a desperate fmancial situation caused by gambling[;]
While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes as a young boy, it would be difficult to say that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are]
etiologically related to the general medical condition that occurred in his childhood.
Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of our culture as manifested in the following areas:
a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self, other people, and events[;]
b. his emotional response[;]
c. his poor impulse control[;]

Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant impairment in social, occupational and interpersonal relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has persisted for several years, and
can be traced back [to] his adolescence since he started gambling while in high school. He is therefore diagnosed to be suffering from Personality Disorder.

All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital obligations.9

Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught" family and had a "dysfunctional" childhood;10that respondent had all the love, care, and protection of his parents as the
youngest child for some time; but that these parental love, care and protection were, however, transferred to his youngest brother who was born when respondent was almost five years old;
and that these factors caused respondent emotional devastation from which he never recovered.

Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school student, was already betting on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to adjust to respondent's personality disorders,
but that she did not attain her goal.

Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to govern their prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no conjugal assets or
debts.

On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer.11

Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not present in the
instant case because petitioner's allegations are not supported by facts.

Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render any help, support or assistance to petitioner and their family; that the family home where petitioner and their children
are living was in fact his own capital property; that his shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do not pertain to the most grave or serious cases of personality disorders that would satisfy the
standards required to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage; that petitioner's complaint is nothing more than a complaint of a woman with an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to get out of it;
that contrary to petitioner's claim that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college degree in business administration, and is a bank employee, and, that it was money problem, and not his
alleged personality disorder, that is the wall that divided him and petitioner.

Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the conclusions of the psychiatrist to the effect that he is suffering from pathological gambling and personality disorder; that
petitioner's allegation that he came from a distraught family and that he suffered emotional devastation is vague, and bereft of particular details, and even slanderous; and that assuming that he
had not acted the way petitioner expected him to conduct himself, his actions and behavior are not psychological illnesses or personality disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body, akin
to hypertension and allied sicknesses, and that these physical illnesses are not at all incurable psychiatric disorders that were present at the time of his marriage with petitioner.

Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that the land where their family home is built came from his earnings, hence the family home is their
conjugal property; that he and petitioner also have a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts that are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also have investments in
shares of stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they came from petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance
money.

Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present Petition, petitioner had caused him to be admitted into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment; that on account of his
confinement and treatment in this psychiatric facility, he has incurred medical expenses and professional medical fees; and that since it is petitioner who manages all their finances and conjugal
assets it stands to reason that he should be awarded '"spousal support."

On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order.12

Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson (Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.

On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which included a photocopy of the marriage contract; the birth certificates of their four children; her son Jose’s Judicial
Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008; Clinical Summary of respondent issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio dated February 11, 2007
(Clinical Summary); her (petitioner's) own Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 179751 registered in the names of the parties' four children:,
and a notarized document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds for tJ1e period November 1999 to March 31, 2008" executed by petitioner and described as a detailed summary of
expenses paid for with the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of the latter's house in Magallanes Village.13

Respondent filed his Comment thereon.14

On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits.15

On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss16 "on the ground that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner did not establish [his] psychological incapacity x x x to comply with
the essential martial obligations x x x".17 Petitioner filed her Opposition18 thereto, and respondent tendered his Comment thereon.19
On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and stood pat on its March 29, 2010 Order. 20

10
During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s counsel manifested that his client was waiving the right to present countervailing evidence. Respondent’s counsel also moved that the
Petition at bar be submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on the record. The RTC thus declared the case submitted for decision.21 3

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The RTC disposed thus-

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered[:]

1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage between MARIA CONCEPCION v. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON and BENJAMIN L SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in
Mandaluyong City or any other marriage between them on the ground of psychological' incapacity of the respondent.

2. ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the National Statistics Office to cancel the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in the Registry of
Marriage.

There are no other issues in this case.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars ofMandaluyong City and Parañaque City, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General (National
Statistics Office) and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Parañaque City.

SO ORDERED.22

The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the family Code are present in the instant case because the totality of evidence showed that
respondent is suffering from a psychological condition that is grave, incurable, and has juridical antecedence.

The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio convincingly showed that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations; that respondent's inability to perform his marital obligations as set out in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code, was essentially due to a psychological abnormality arising from a
pathological and utterly irresistible urge to gamble.

The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal that respondent is suffering from Personality Disorder known as Pathological Gambling."23 It ruled that it has been shown that this
personality disorder was present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only later; that because of this personality disorder respondent had already jeopardized his
relationship with his family; and that respondent's psychological disorder hinders the performance of his obligations as a husband and as a father.

Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by spouses was donated in favor of the parties' children as evidenced by TCT No.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.

But in its older dated January 6, 2011,24 the RTC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. It reiterated that the expert witness had adequately established that respondent is suffering from
"Pathological Gambling Personality Disorder'' which is grave, permanent, and has juridical antecedence. On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal25 which was given due course by
the RTC in its order26 dated February 28, 2011.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 November 2010 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0070, declaring the marriage
between Maria Concepcion N. Singson and Benjamin L. Singson null and void ab initio, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.27

The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish respondent's alleged psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations, which in this case,
was not at all proven to be grave or serious, much less incurable, and furthermore was not existing at the time of the marriage. What is more, the CA declared that any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage, and against its dissolution and nullity, in obedience to the mandate of the Constitution and statutory laws; and that in this case,
petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that respondent is suffering from a serious or grave psychological disorder that completely disables or incapacitates him from understanding
and discharging the essential obligations of the marital union.

According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The CA did not go along with the
RTC, which placed heavy reliance on Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations due to a personality disorder
known as pathological gambling. The CA held that, contrary to petitioner's claim that respondent's pathological gambling was grave or serious, the evidence in fact showed that the latter was
truly capable of carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because he had a job, had provided money for the family from the sale of his own property, and he likewise provided the land
on which the family home was built, and he also lives in the family home with petitioner and their children.

On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of a spouse, is different from incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; that the evidence at bar showed that respondent's alleged pathological gambling arose after the marriage; that in fact petitioner
admitted that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got married; that petitioner moreover acknowledged that respondent was a kind and a caring person when he was
courting her; that petitioner likewise admitted that respondent also brought petitioner to the hospital during all four instances when she gave birth to their four children.
In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported pathological gambling was not proven to be incurable or permanent since respondent has been undergoing treatment since 2003 and
has been responding to the treatment.
10
Petitioner moved for reconsideration28 of the CA's Decision. But her motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution of January 6, 2014. 29 4

Issue

Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question –

[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE [RTC].30

Petitioner's Arguments

In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and in asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, petitioner argues in her Petition,31 Reply,32 and
Memorandum33 that respondent's psychological incapacity had been duly proved in court, including its juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity.

First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital duties of mutual love, respect, and support; that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert findings are corroborated by the testimonies
of petitioner end her son Jose both of whom demonstrated that respondent’s psychological incapacity is grave or serious rendering him incapable to perform the essential marital obligations;
that for his pan, respondent had adduced no proof that he (respondent) is capable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage for the reason that everything that the family had
saved and built had been squandered by respondent; and that respondent's confinement at the rehabilitation facility is itself proof of the gravity or seriousness of his psychological incapacity.

Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, as shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s Clinical Summary, which pointed out that such psychological
incapacity, which included pathological gambling, can be traced back when respondents was already betting on jai alai even in high school, and this was not known to his family; that the Clinical
Summary was based on information provided not only by petitioner, but by respondent’s sister, and by respondent himself; that such juridical antecedence was neither questioned nor
overthrown by countervailing evidence; and that the root cause could be traced back to respondent’s flawed relationship with his parents which developed into a psychological disorder that
existed before the marriage.

Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders are generally incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically; that in
this case the Clinical Summary; had pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem is only at the surface level; and that in point of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that
personality disorders are incurable.

Respondent’s Arguments

In his Comment34 and Memorandum,35 respondent counters that the assailed CA Decision should be affirmed. He argues that the grounds cited by petitioner are the self-same grounds raised by
petitioner before the RTC and the CA; that petitioner's evidence indeed failed to prove convincingly that he (respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, hence there is no basis to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio.

Our Ruling

The Petition will not succeed.

It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of
the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner.36 "The policy of the Constitution is to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties."37

Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life" and as "the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution."

In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution by suing out pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case law rulings interpreting and construing the quoted Article, to wit:

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). The
Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the Molina guidelines]. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.38

In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner failed to prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations because
she failed to establish that such incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed at the time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.

At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the conflicting findings between the trial court and the appellate court.39 We thus did peruse and review the records,
and we are satisfied that the CA correctly found that respondent has the capability and ability to perform his duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather general statement that
respondent's psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic obligations as a husband and a father.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since
"[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-
appellee and their children."40 10
5
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was working at a certain point."41 This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical
Summary and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence, respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the bank where
petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit investigator prior to their courtship and their marriage.42

It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of
respondent's share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this amount was insufficient to
cover the family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the items for their family budget, such as their children's education, the payments for association dues,
and for electric bills came from this money.
And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon which the family home was built, thus -
[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property?
A: No.
Q: He does not [own] any real property?
A: No.
Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal which has been transferred with the Register of Deeds of Paranaque and is now re-numbered as S-
25470, which is in the name of [respondent], Filipino, of legal age, single.
xxxx
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Who owned this property?
A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson.
Q: Where is this property located?
A: It is located in United Paranaque.
Q: Where in United Paranaque?
A: No. 2822 Daang Hari.
Q: Are you staying in that property?
A: We are staying in that property.
xxxx
[Respondent's counsel to the Witiress, petitioner]
Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property], who owns it?
A: It was donated to the children.
xxxx
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner?
A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor.
Q: Who owns it now?
A: The children because it was donated [to them].43

What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and wife since their marriage on July 6,1974 (and in the company of their four children, too). In fact, shunting aside
the time that respondent was under treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege any instance when respondent failed to live with them.

To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted, that respondent likewise brought her to the hospital during all four instances that she gave birth to their children. 44

By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere confinement at the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is irresponsible, and is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It is settled that "[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will."45 "[I]t is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical,
illness."46

Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary be taken for gospel truth in regard to the charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to appreciate his
marital obligations. That much is clear from the following testimony –

[Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]

Q: Madam Witness, do you know the respondent in this case, Benjamin Singson?
A: Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during his first admission and again [in] 2006, [S]ir.
Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?
A: Yes, [S]ir.
Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?
A: He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and subsequently because of [behavioral] problem, [S]ir.
xxxx
Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam [W]itness?
A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in] September of 2006, he knocked on the doors of the maids in the middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got his car in the
garage and drove out bumping the car parked right across the garage and he [also kept] takfr1g things out from his cabinet. And if the maids would clean [these], he [would] immediately take
them out again. So, he was brought to the facility in October because of his uncontrolled behavior, [S]ir. 10
6
xxxx

Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the respondent, Benjamin Singson, Madam witness?

A: Based on history, mental status examination and observations during his stay, I found that [respondent] is suffering from pathological gambling. Also, with his history of typhoid fever when he
was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006. Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is suffering from a personality disorder, [S]ir.

Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder with [regard] to [respondent's dealings] with other people, with his wife and his family, [M]adam witness?

A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory.

COURT: Go ahead.

A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his problems which [makes] his personal[,] family[,] and social life[,] and even his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was pre-
occupied with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to amble with increasing amounts of money
in order achieve his desired effects into gambling, [S]ir.

COURT: Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

[Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s counsel]

Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam witness?

A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the psychological testing, [S]ir.

Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness, which we would like to request [from] this Honorable Court, later on, that you present your credentials as expert witness, you
concluded that the respondent is suffering from personality disorder?

A: Yes,[S]ir.

Q: What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam witness?

A: Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that has distracted his ability to perform his functions as a married man to his wife as a father to his children and as a person who is
supposed to be employed productively, [S]ir.47

Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly negative traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence of
[incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness."48

We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the contrasting findings of the trial court and appellate court,49 we take recourse to the records to assist us in evaluating the perspective
postures taken by the parties.

Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic
marital obligations x x x."50 "A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity." 51

Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the bases or premises for this particular finding relative to respondent's psychological incapacity, thus:

Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent's inabilities to perform his marital obligations was a result of not mere intentional refusal on his part but are caused by
psychological abnormality. Such psychological incapacity of the respondent has been shown as already present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only after the
solemnization. x x x.52

As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio did not point to a definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and
2006."53 Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but another psychologist who conducted the tests. 54 And this psychologist was not presented by petitioner. More than
that, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he was allegedly betting on jai alai when he was still in high school is essentially hearsay as no witness having
personal knowledge of that fact was called to the witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister in connection therewith, the latter did testify
in court. And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the Court assesses the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in our Constitution that
marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State."55

Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity could be attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties'
marriage; no evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught" and that respondent's
conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious charges which must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not
at all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's alleged inability to appreciate marital obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been held that the
parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening
between his parents until long after his birth."56 10
7
To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing, competent and trustworthy evidence to establish the cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity and
that the same antedated their marriage.57 If anything, petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA's finding that she was not aware of any gan1b1ing by respondent before they got married
and that respondent was a kind and caring person when he was courting her. 58

Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that petitioner failed to prove that respondents alleged psychological incapacity is serious or grave and that it is incurable or
permanent.

To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial
notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.59

"'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was
celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the
marital tie."60 This is the situation here.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and January 6, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 218630

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision2 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of
Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.

Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual friends. After a brief courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked as both their
parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was worried how it would affect his image and how his parents would take the situation.3 Nevertheless,
they got married on July 22, 2000.4

Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering and quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were fighting so much that they went their separate ways most of the
time and Katrina found herself wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone.5

Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30, 2000.6 Lawrence was distant and did not
help in rearing their child, saying he knew nothing about children and how to run a family. 7 Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees.8 Katrina noticed
that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of immaturity. 9 Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him and they lost all intimacy
between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the needs of Lanz.10

Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's decisions-from the manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the way she treated the household help. Most fights ended up
in full blown arguments, often in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and missed her youngest brother who was then committed in a substance rehabilitation center, Lawrence
told her to stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center if she will not stop.11

In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents' home and never to come back. They have been separated in fact since then.12

Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina,
diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way.13

Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent, incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche; 14 and that it was present but repressed at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and the onset was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and support to his
wife.15

The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence as void ab initio. It disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of her husband having lost the right over the same and so as to avoid the misconception that she is still the legal wifo of respondent.
Custody over the couple's· minor child is awarded to petitioner, with reasonable visitation rights accorded to respondent, preferably Saturday and Sunday, or as the parties may agree among10
themselves. 8
Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General, the National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in turn, shall endorse a copy of the same to the
Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City, ·Metro Manila, so that the appropriate amendment and/or cancellation of the parties' marriage can be effected in its registry. Furnish, likewise, the
parties and counsel.

SO ORDERED.16

The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. 4903-11dated8 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.17

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the information coming from either party in a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the information coming from either party in a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.

Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances of each and every case for the nullity is different from the other and must be appreciated for its distinctiveness. She points
out that the psychological report of Dr. Arellano clearly outlined well-accepted scientific and reliable tests18 to come up with his findings. In any case, the decision must be based not solely on
the expert opinions but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings, which the RTC and the CA have found to have been sufficient in proving Lawrence's psychological
incapacity.

The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence presented by Katrina supports the findings of both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to perform his
essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.

Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in the negative.

Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 19

The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals20has set out the guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of
psychological incapacity cases that We have decided:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. xxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. xxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. xxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. xxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. xxx

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. xxx 21

Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a husband.

Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.22 Here, We find the totality of evidence clearly wanting.

First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were based solely on Katrina's statements.1âwphi1 It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate
in the proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B. Matudan23is instructive on the matter:

10
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological
incapacity of his wife. 9

It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the information
supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at the time the
respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between her parents until long after her birth. On the other hand, as the petitioning
spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly be considered as credible. The ruling
in Jocelyn Suazo v. Angelita Suazo, el al., is illuminating on this score:

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on
her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn
whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of
the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

xxxx

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could
not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological
condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.

In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'

At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the psychological condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from. Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives as manifestations of the same. The report neither explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that
the respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. (Emphasis Ours)

The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said to be
indicative of the psychological condition of Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential
marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, as
in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. 24

Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and
frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.25 It is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness
that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.26

Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal conclusion
that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.27 Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other
witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.28

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012
Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring
the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case
No. 4903-11 is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.