1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY.
JUDE FERNANDEZ
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent, G.R. No. 115407
August 28, 1995
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari on the CA’s decision denying the motion for
reconsideration on his petition for bail.
Factual Antecedents:
Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information for the
crime of multiple murder as the mastermind.
Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail
before a Warrant of Arrest could be issued by the lower court.
Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment
that needed medical attention. His counsel manifested that they were
submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for
purposes of said hearing, he considered being in the custody of the
law.
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on his right to bail
Statute Involved:
Art. 3, Sec. 12
Sec. 1 of Rule 114
Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the
conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of
corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a)
Position of Respondent/s:
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail
when was not in the custody of the law, thus not eligible for the grant
of the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is proper to admit bail even though petitioner is not
yet in custody of law
HELD/RATIO:
No.
Right to bail is only extended only to those persons who have been
arrested, detained, or otherwise deprived of their freedom
A person is considered to be in the custody of the law:when he is
arrested either by virtue of warrant of arrest or by warrantless
arrestwhen he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. In the foregoing
facts, petitioner can be considered as being constructively and legally
under custody. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person:firstly, by filing the
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
application for bail with the trial courtsecondly, by furnishing true
information of his actual whereabouts;
thirdly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said
court for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to
have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial courtan arrest is made either
by: actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest (house arrest)
Final Ruling
Decision of CA is reversed. Petitioner is granted bail.
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-
conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in the Regional Trial
Court for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in
1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time.
The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest
warrant for petitioner’s apprehension but, before it could be served
on him, petitioner through counsel, a motion for admission to bail
with the trial court which set the same for hearing. As petitioner was
then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital, his
counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the
person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated
Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the law.
The prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application
for bail and that they were submitting the same to the sound
discretion of the trail judge. Upon further inquiries from the trial
court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further
presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution, the trial
court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of bail was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion
Held:
None.
As a paramount requisite, only those persons who have either been
arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever
have occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to
bail.
A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he
is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued or by
warrantless arrest or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper
authorities.In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he
had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was
actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that
point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody.
Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal
control over his person.Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance
which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court,
for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have
voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter
granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual
restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be exemplified
by the so-called “house arrest” or, in case of military offenders, by
being “confined to quarters” or restricted to the military camp area.
The general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court
of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a
matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances
where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper
application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the
accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in
accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other
hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on
the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing,
mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court is required with the participation of both
the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this
time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the
provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is
on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required
quantum.
DOCTRINE:
The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of
hearings on his petition for bail.
When bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be
granted bail even prior to arraignment.
The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or
more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a
hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court
A person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the
opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the
judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter
of right but is discretionary upon the court.
Upon an application for bail by the person charged with a capital
offense, a hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution
must be accorded an opportunity to discharge its burden of proving
that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. The
prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all the
 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
evidence it may deems necessary for this purpose. When it is
satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is
the court’s duty to deny the application for bail. However, when the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right.
Even in cases where the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to an application for bail by an accused charged with a
capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing
on said application
Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443
FACTS:
Serapio, accused together with Pres. Estrada and jinggoy for plunder,
assails the decision of the sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail
and a petition for habeas corpus.Serapio was a member of the board
of trustees and the legal counsel of the erap muslim youth
foundation.Searpio received 200M from Chavit singson, it was a
donation for the foundation.
In 2000, Singson publicly accused Pres. Estrada and Serapio was one
of them who was charged in the sandiganbayan.Serapio filed his
counter-affidavit and the ombudsman conducted a preliminary
investigation and recommended that they (Estrada and serapio) be
charged with plunder. No bail was recommended for the provisional
release.Serapio filed a motion for reconsideration to hold in abeyance
the issuance of warrant of arrest and further proceeds, also to
determine probable cause. However it was denied. Since it was not
with the ombudsman anymore but with the sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbyan issued a resolution finding probable cause to justify
the issuance of warrants of arrest. Serapio voluntarily
surrendered.Sandiganbayan set the arraignment, petitioner filed an
urgent petition for bail – may 24,2001. Sandiganbayn denied the
motion for urgent petition for bail. Also, declared that the petition for
bail can and should be heard before petitioner’s arraignment.
In June 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the
attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused during the
hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-
examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best
conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case,
directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing
considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial.Sandiganbyan
canceled the bail hearing. Also, the motion for reconsideration was
denied.
The sandiganbyan again reset the arraignment and the hearing for the
petition for bail. Serapio filed with the court a petition for habeas
corpuse but it was denied again through the sandiganbyan
resolution. Thus, Serapio filed in this court a petition for certiorari
alleging that the sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
ISSUES: Re: G.R. No. 148769
1. (whether or not) THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO’S MOTION
TO QUASH
2. (whether or not) THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES
MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE.
HELD: Petition dismissed
RATIO:
ISSUE 1
Serapio, asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the
amended Information of a “combination or series of overt or criminal
acts” constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as
amended. Neither does the amended Information allege “a pattern of
criminal acts.”
COURT – we do not agree with SERPIO.
Section 6 rule 110 – sufficiency of complaint or information, the acts
or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the
proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately
the elements of the crime charged.
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the
accused, including petitioner, connived and conspired with former
President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder “through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or
means.” And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information,
petitioner and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting,
directly or indirectly, on several instances money in the aggregate
amount of P545,000,000.00.
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the
same is evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of evidence
need not be alleged in the Information
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner,
are charged of having conspired and confabulated together in
committing plunder. When two or more persons conspire to commit
a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of others.
ISSUE 2
SERAPIO - According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio
the information charges more than one offense, namely, bribery
(Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation of public funds
or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and violations of Sec.
3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
COURT - This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged
in the information are not charged as separate offenses but as
predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of
the amended Information that petitioner and his co-accused are
charged only with one crime of plunder and not with the predicate
acts or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate acts
merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and
independent of the crime of plunder.
ISSUES: Re: G.R. No. 149116
Whether or not, THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIO’S URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY 2001),
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY
DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED
GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY
PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF PETITIONER
SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT
AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER
SERAPIO.”
HELD: Court does not agree with petitioner
RATIO:
SERAPIO - Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion to hold in
abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct a determination
of probable cause; and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a
reinvestigation of the charges him.
Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded
exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse of discretion in
charging him with plunder. He further argues that there exists no
probable cause to support an indictment for plunder as against him.
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the
P200 million he received does not constitute “ill-gotten wealth” as
defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080; (2) there is no evidence
linking him to the collection and receipt of jueteng money; (3) there
was no showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of criminal
acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving the
P200 million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.
COURT - The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s omnibus motion.
They assert that since the Ombudsman found probable cause to
charge petitioner with the crime of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is
bound to assume jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try the
same.
COURT - They further argue that “a finding of probable cause is
merely preliminary and prefatory of the eventual determination of
guilt or innocence of the accused,” and that petitioner still has the
chance to interpose his defenses in a full blown trial where his guilt or
innocence may finally be determined.Sandiganbayan did not commit
 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
any GADLEJ. Serapio failed to prove that the Ombudsman
committed such act of abuse.
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to
establish that the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated
in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the
facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.Certiorari will not lie
to invalidate the Sandiganbayan’s resolution denying petitioner’s
motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to substantiate
petitioner’s claim that it gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
ISSUES: Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of
the parties, the issues for resolution are:
(1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings
of his petition for bail may be conducted;
(2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended
Information during the pendency of his petition for bail;
(3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and
those of the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory;
(4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce
strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and
(5) Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in
Criminal Case No. 26558 and should thus be released from detention
via a writ of habeas corpus.
HELD:
RATIO:
1st issue
Serapio contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned
him on said date and entered a plea of not guilty for him when he
refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned first
prior to the conduct of bail hearings since the latter can stand alone
and must, of necessity, be heard immediately
Also, Serapio admitted that he cannot repudiate the evidence or
proceedings taken during the bail hearings because Rule 114, Section
8 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that evidence
present during bail hearings are automatically reproduced during the
trial.
Court – petitioner’s contention is well taken. The arraignment of an
accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition
for bail. Thus, an accused need not wait for his arraignment before
filing a petition for bail.
Court - We held therein that “in cases where it is authorized, bail
should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash.”
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean
that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty
by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as
soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or
information is filed against himto condition the grant of bail to an
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus
delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be
resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail.THUS - It is therefore not necessary that
an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused
may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment.
2nd issue
whether petitioner may file a motion to quash during the pendency of
his petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to quash and a
petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently
of each other.
COURT - finds that no such inconsistency exists between an
application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash.
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of
the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions set
forth under the Rules of Court.Its purpose is to obtain the provisional
liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while
at the same time securing his appearance at the trial.
As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the moment that
he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.The right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty
when charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense
punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his
guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the
validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It must be
conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or
Information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense
is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered
released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and
academic.
3rd & 4th issue
Whether or not it is mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for
bail of petitioner and accused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada in Criminal
Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said case as against former
President Joseph E. Estrada be heard jointly.
SERAPIO - the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his right
to have his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since
said hearings might be converted into a full blown trial on the merits
by the prosecution
COURT - There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing
the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different
accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard
simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused.
The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or
more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a
hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is
shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the
Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will
of course avoid duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution
and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially
so if both movants for bail are charged of having conspired in the
commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces
essentially the same evident against them.
However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition
for bail of petitioner with the trial of the case against former President
Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the
participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioner’s
petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a completely different
dimension.
The proceedings will no longer be summary. As against former
President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-blown trial
which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing.
COURT - the Court finds (sandiganbayan) that it gravely abused its
discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and the
trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly.
A person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the
opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the
judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter
of right but is discretionary upon the court
“Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an
application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the
commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but,
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.”
There must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person
charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him
bail. Thus, upon an application for bail by the person charged with a
capital offense, a hearing thereon must be conducted, where the
prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to discharge its burden
of proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. The
prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all the
evidence it may deems necessary for this purpose.
 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is
strong, it is the court’s duty to deny the application for bail.
However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a
matter of right.IN THE CASE , SERAPIO is not entitled to bail as a
matter of right at this stage of the proceedings.The delay in the
conduct of hearings on petitioner’s application for bail is therefore not
imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution.
Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the
following list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution:Serapio,
cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts
a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor.
Even then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against
petitioner is not strong before he may be granted bail.
5th ISSUE
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus for petitioner, SERAPIO contends that he is entitled to the
issuance of said writ because the State, through the prosecution’s
refusal to present evidence and by the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to
grant a bail hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that
as against him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is
strong.
COURT - the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even
when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or
his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as “the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action” due to “its ability to cut through
barriers of form and procedural mazes.”
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in
favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had
jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan
on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended
information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his
arrest had been issued.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified
but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan’s resolution of the
pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner
is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.
SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT
1. In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are
DISMISSED. The resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan subject of
said petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2. In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex “L” of the petition,
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
ordering a joint hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail and the trial of
Criminal Case No. 26558 as against former President Joseph E.
Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001
is also SET ASIDE.
SERAPIO v. SANDIGANBAYANGR Numbers 148468, 148769, and
149116January 28, 2003
FACTS:
The case is a consolidation of 3 petitions filed by Edward Serapio
which assailed resolutions of the 3rd Division of the Sandiganbayan
in denying his petition for bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion
to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus in relation to a plunder
case against him.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of
the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He received a Php200 million
donation from Chavit Singson. He received the donation and turned
it over to the treasurer of the Foundation and it was deposited to the
account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In 2000, Singson publicly accused Estrada and his cohorts of engaging
in several illegal activities triggering the filing with the Ombudsman
several criminal complaints against Estrada. Petitioner was among
the persons included in the criminal charges.
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations
against Estrada and other persons and no bail was recommended for
the provisional released of the accused. Ombudsman found probable
cause for plunder and petitioner filed an MR. It was denied because
the information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause to justify
the issuance of warrants of arrests for the accused, including
petitioner. Petitioner was detained at Camp Crame for the said
charge. Arraignment was set and petitioner filed a petition for Bail.
Several other bail meetings did not push through.
Even before the Sandiganbayan can resolve the issues, petitioner filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari
praying that the issued Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be declared
void because he was denied due process.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner of his right to due
process of the law.
HELD:
No. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional
right, but it is a right conferred by a statute. Petitioner was afforded
the opportunity to answer the charges against him during the
preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence dictates that the Court do
not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in its conduct of
preliminary investigations. It was enunciated in Raro v.
Sandiganbayan that in the performance of the task to determine
probable cause, the Ombudsman’s discretion is paramount. The lack
of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
information filed before the court.
The denial of his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus does not deny
him of his right to due process because there is no basis for the
issuance of the writ in favor of the petitioner. Petitioner has
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. Habeas corpus
does not lie because there was no deprivation of liberty. Also, the
delay in the hearing of the bail cannot be solely pinned upon the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is also to be blamed. Habeas corpus is not
the appropriate remedy for asserting one’s right to bail.
Comendador vs. De Villa
Facts:
The case involves 4 consolidated cases of the officers of the AFP who
are facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed
coup d’ etat on December 1-9, 1989: G.R. No. 93177-petition for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus- questioning the conduct of the
pre-trial panel and the creation of General Court Martial (GMC No.
14) G.R. No. 96948-certiorari against the ruling denying them the
right to pre-emptory challenge (or that the Members of general or
special courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial
judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine
the relevancy and validity thereof.) G.R. No. 95020-certiorari- against
the respondent judge on the ground that he has no jurisdiction of
GCM No. 14 and no authority to set aside its ruling of denying bail to
private respondents G.R. No. 97454-certiorari- against the decision of
RTC in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private
respondents. Jurisdictional objection are also raised.
Charges against them include mutiny, conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman, and various crimes in relation to murder. The pre-
trail investigation (PTI) panel issued several letters of notice to the
petitioners for counter-affidavit and of the affidavits of their
witnesses. All were moved to delay and the petitioners contend that
there was no pre-trail investigation done.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail and it was denied
by GMC No. 14. The RTC granted him provisional liberty but he was
not released immediately, “pending the final resolution of the appeal
to be taken.” Then the RTC ruled that the right to bail covers military
men facing court-martial proceedings
Issues:
1. Whether there was violation of due process
2. Whether or not the military personnel are entitled to bail, thus,
WON there was a violation of the right to bail
Held:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several
opportunities to be heard when they were asked to submit their
counter-affidavits to the PTI. They cannot claim that they were denied
due process. “Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits
on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right
to submit controverting evidence." Even a failure to conduct a pre-
 5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of
jurisdiction."
“We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in
G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied
in the Bill of Rights.” However, a right to speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military, where the right to bail does not exist.
•Solicitor General’s explanation of the exception:
“The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to
exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to
bail.” “…soldiers operate within the framework of democratic
system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government
for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out
of revenues collected from the people.” “…the truly disquieting
thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which
could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted
authorities,”
Neither does it violate equal protection because the military is not
similarly situated with others. Dispositive part of the case: As in that
case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted
with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction
to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts
complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however,
in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory
challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered
released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the
respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the
right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War.
In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and
the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.”
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR
PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I.
CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL.
LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the
“Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the
Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official
functions of the Senate, Alleging mainly that his case is distinct from
that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in
the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos
exists
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of
Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos
(Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending
appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus
Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He
asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the
presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes
involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six
counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat
which is regarded as a "political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble
causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and
institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
xxx
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into
custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the
Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Underscoring
supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases,
both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within
the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable
penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion
of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application
for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The
determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a
trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such
cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such
justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public
self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or
convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
xxx
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to
evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to
the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times
he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders
augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past
security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to
a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this
time as the "Manila Pen Incident," proves that petitioner's argument
bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither
remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find
relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and
in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-
bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail
shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.
A.M. No. RTJ- 03-1767 March 28, 2003
ROSALIA DOCENA-CASPE, complainant, vs. JUDGE
ARNULFO O. BUGTAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan,
Eastern Samar, respondent.
FACTS:
The instant administrative case for gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence against respondent judge stemmed from a murder case
filed against accused Celso Docil and Juan Docil for the death of
Lucio Docena. In her sworn complaint, complainant alleged that on
September 3, 1993, Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez of the Municipal Trial
Court of Taft, Eastern Samar, conducted a preliminary investigation
on the said murder case, and thereafter issued the corresponding
warrants of arrest. No bail was recommended for the two (2) accused
who were at large since the
commission of the offense on August 29, 1993.
Complainant further stated that the information for murder was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II,
then presided by Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. The latter allegedly
granted a P60,000.00 bailbond each to both accused without
conducting a hearing, and while the two were at large. Meanwhile,
accused Celso Docil was apprehended on June 4, 2000.
Subsequently, Provincial Prosecutor Vicente Catudio filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, now
 6 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
presided by respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, a motion praying
that an alias warrant of arrest be issued for the other accused, Juan
Docil; and that both accused be denied bail. Said motion was granted
by the respondent Judge. Thereafter, accused Celso Docil filed a
motion for reconsideration praying that he be allowed to post bail on
the grounds that – (1) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right because
he is charged with murder allegedly committed at the time when the
imposition of the death penalty was suspended by the Constitution;
and that (2) both the investigating Judge and the First Assistant
Prosecutor recommended P60,000.00 bail for his temporary liberty.
On August 11, 2000, the respondent Judge denied said motion. He
explained that notwithstanding the suspension of the imposition of
the death penalty at the time the accused committed the offense, bail
for the crime of murder remains to be a matter of discretion. He cited
Section 13, Article III, of the Constitution which explicitly provides
that “(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.”
Accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating his
previouscontentions. Then, he filed a manifestationpointing out that
on page 49 of the records is an order granting him and his co-accused
the recommended bail of P60,000.00. The court gave the prosecution
five (5) days within which to file a comment to the accused’s motion
for reconsideration but the former failed to do so.
On January 15, 2001, the respondent Judge issued a Resolution
granting the said motion for reconsideration on the basis of a
previous order granting bail to the accused.
On August 16, 2001, the complainant filed the instant administrative
case against the respondent Judge for granting bail to accused Celso
Docil without conducting a bail hearing.
In his Comment, He added that despite the five- day period given to
the prosecution, it failed to file a comment to the motion for
reconsideration of the accused, warranting the presumption that it
has no objection to the accused’s petition for bail.
Issue:
WON bail should be immediately granted absence of any opposition
by the prosecution to that effect.
Ruling:
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of
a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail
especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion.
Under the present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail
whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that
the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of
discretion hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the
guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not
the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains
with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong.
In Santos v. Ofilada, it was held that the failure to raise or the absence
of an objection on the part of the prosecution in an application for bail
does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus – Even
the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the
granting of bail to the accused will not justify such grant without
hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer
the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused.
Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution
such questions as would ascertain the strength of the State’s evidence
or judge the adequacy of the amount of the bail. Irrespective of
respondent judge’s opinion that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that
a hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary
release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection
to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge therein
should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and
diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not in
fact contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was also
necessary for the court to take into consideration theguidelines set
forth in the then Section 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail. Only after
respondent judge had satisfied himself that these requirements have
been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant
bail. Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on
the alleged belated objection of the prosecution to the order dated
July 22, 1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez; nor
on the prosecution’s failure to file a comment to the accused’s motion
for reconsideration of the August 11, 2000 order denying the
application for bail.
It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of
Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. As a responsible judge, he should have
looked into the real and hard facts of the case before him and
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. To
make things worse, respondent Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994
order despite the fact that the same appears to have been issued by
his predecessor Judge also without a hearing and while the accused
was at large.
In addition to the requirement of a mandatory bail hearing,
respondent judge should have known the basic rule that the right to
bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to
say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom
has yet to be curtailed.
In Basco v. Rapatalo, the Court laid down the following rules which
outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether
or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bail bond.
Otherwise, petition should be denied.
In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially
granted the prosecution’s motion praying that the accused be denied
bail, no hearing was conducted. Irrespective of his opinion on the
strength or weakness of evidence of the accused’s guilt, he should
have conducted a
hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of
evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has
always been ardently and indefatigably stressed by the Court. The
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles
and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive
for
excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he
be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.
In Dericto v. Bautista, the Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the
respondent Judge for granting bail without conducting a bail hearing.
We explained therein that although the Rules of Court authorize the
investigating judge to determine the amount of bail, such authority
does not include the outright granting of bail without a preliminary
hearing on the matter, more so in cases where the crime charged is
punishable with death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. And
while it may be true that
the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, this discretion lies not in the
determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecution’s
evidence of guilt against the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. IRENEO
GAKO, JR. (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 7th
Judicial Region, Branch 5, Cebu City) and VICENTE GO,
respondents.
 7 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
Facts:
On July 3, 1991, de la Peña executed an Extra-judicial Confession
implicating therein Herodias and Go in the conspiracy to kill and
murder the victim. On July 9, 1991, an Information was filed against
the three accused namely, de la Peña, Herodias and Go, charging
them with the murder of Galan, Sr. and the case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-22474. Judge Godardo Jacinto, then the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a
Warrant of Arrest against the accused. On July 22, 1991 an Urgent
Motion to Confine private respondent Go in a hospital was filed. On
August 2, 1991, the hearing on said motion was conducted with the
prosecution reserving its right to cross-examine Dr. Gonzales. On
August 6, 1991 an Order was issued to confine private respondent Go
in a hospital without the prosecution having cross-examined Dr.
Gonzales on his medical report. On July 15, 1992, a hearing was
conducted where de la Peña was presented as a witness for the
prosecution. Presiding Judge Agana sustained the objections of the
defense counsels each time that the prosecution attempted to
establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a
motion to inhibit Judge Agana, which motion was denied.On
November 20, 1992, the Information against Go and Herodias was
dismissed with prejudice on the ground that their right to a speedy
trial had been violated, leaving de la Peña to face trial.
The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice before the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 32954. In its
Decision dated April 18, 1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set
aside the Order of Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana,
and ordered the raffle of the case to another branch. With the
dismissal of the appeal of private respondent Go and co-accused
Herodias by this Court in a Minute Resolution dated June 26, 1995,
the criminal case was set anew for trial.The case was re-raffled to
RTC-17 and on October 28, 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was
issued against private respondent Go and co-accused Herodias. On
February 2, 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of Go, filed a Clinical
Summary on the illness of Go and on February 13, 1997 Go filed a
Petition for Bail. On March 7, 1997 and March 10, 1997, the
prosecution presented de la Peña who was acquitted in 1993. De la
Peña testified on matters which he was not allowed by then presiding
Judge Agana to testify on. On March 21, 1997, a Manifestation on the
Confinement of private respondent Vicente Go was filed urging his
arrest because he was out of the intensive care unit. The motion of the
prosecution to transfer the criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes
Court was denied by then presiding Judge Jesus de la Peña (Judge de
la Peña). The case was finally assigned to Branch 5 with public
respondent Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge. On September 16 and
17, 1997, the hearing was resumed, now presided by public
respondent Judge Gako, Jr. On September 26, 1997, an Urgent Motion
to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest was filed praying for the arrest
of private respondent Go first before his Clinical Summary Report
could be heard. On November 10, 1997, public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of private
respondent Go. On November 11, 1997, the prosecution filed a
Vehement Motion to Inhibit public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. due to
his alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with the
arrest of private respondent Go. On November 12, 1992, the
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the Order of the court
dated November 10, 1997, the order which granted bail to private
respondent Go. On November 14, 1997, a Supplemental Motion to
Inhibit public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. was filed by the counsel of
the offended party because Judge Gako, Jr. allegedly pre-judged the
evidence of the prosecution without carefully evaluating why it is
short of the requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment. On
November 15, 1997, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was
filed from the Order dated November 10, 1997 because the transcripts
were allegedly not read. On December 1, 1997, a Motion for the
Issuance of Subpoena DucesTecum to produce the records of Dr.
Matig-a was filed to determine if the medical findings on private
respondent Go were not exaggerated to prevent his arrest. On
December 11, 1997, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. issued an
Order in which he denied the prosecution’s Manifestation dated
March 21, 1997 on the confinement of private respondent Go, and the
Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest dated
September 26, 1997 against private respondent Go. On January 20,
1998, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the:
(1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 10,
1997; (2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental Motion to Inhibit the
Presiding Judge. The prosecution received this order on February 10,
1998.
On 20 March 1998, Guadalupe Galan, the widow of the victim, filed a
petition for certiorari (CA-GR SP 471460) before the Court of Appeals.
The petition sought to annul or set aside the orders of Judge Gako, Jr.
and then acting Presiding Judge de la Peña. The petition was signed
by the counsel of private complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with
the conformity of Vidal Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu City. On 26 March 1998, the Court of Appeals
(Special Third Division) issued a Resolution dismissing the said
petition on these grounds: (1) that the petition was not filed by the
Solicitor General in behalf of the People of the Philippines; and (2)
that the certification on non-forum shopping was signed by counsel
for Galan, not by Galan herself. On 14 April 1998, Galan, through
counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution
indicating that the OSG was going to adopt her petition. On the same
date, the OSG manifested before the Court of Appeals that it was
joining Galan in her petition and was adopting her petition as its
own. On 18 June 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution that
denied said motion for reconsideration of Galan on the ground that
the certification on non-forum shopping was not signed by Galan.
The Court of Appeals also reasoned that “the fact that the OSG joined
Galan in her petition did not cure the above deficiency”. The OSG
received copy of the resolution on 29 June 1998. On 3 August 1998,
the OSG filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-
GR SP 47142). On 12 August 1998, said petition of the OSG was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the petition
was practically a reproduction of the petition earlier filed by
Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on 26 March 1998. Hence, the
appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
Whether the appreciation of the strength or weakness of the evidence
of guilt may be based on the “voluminous records” of the case,
without necessarily hearing the prosecution.
HELD:
The assailed Order dated 10 November 1997 granting bail is legally
infirm for failing to conform with the requirement that in cases when
the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose
mustfirst be conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
provides the instances when bail is a matter of right or discretionary,
Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates
that "no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.” Based on the foregoing, bail is not
a matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime the
penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
when the evidence of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the criminal case,
was charged with murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the
law that re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused Go’s right to bail is
merely discretionary. When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be
conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it,
against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. It is
inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt of the accused when he
did not even bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge
Gako, Jr. on the “voluminous records” of the case simply does not
suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a hearing on the
petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the crime charged is
one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing,
the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth stressing
that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Another
compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is
to determine the amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in
Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Without the required
hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00 is
undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis.
Further, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely
made a conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a substantive
and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule
that after the hearing, whether the bail is granted or denied, the
presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution. The irregularity in the grant of bail, however, is
not attenuated since the judge’s findings were based on the summary
clinical report of Dr. Matiga dated 4 February 1997 while the order
granting bail was issued on 10 November 1997. It could not therefore
be reasonably assumed that the actual state of health of Go could still
be accurately reflected by the said medical report when 9 had already
passed from the time that said medical report was prepared. It was
therefore clear error for Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated
medical report in granting bail when the defense failed to present a
more recent one that would convincingly raise strong grounds to
apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused would endanger his
life.
 8 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
Leviste vs. CA, 615 SCRA 619
Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail
pending appeal on the grounds of his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight
on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied his application for bail and found that
petitioner failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity
that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair
his health or put his life in danger and the physical condition of
petitioner does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his
personal physician. The Court of Appeals also considered the fact of
petitioner’s conviction and that there was no substantial reason
enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his
application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying
denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an
appellant pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not in an application for bail pending appeal by an
appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment
for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of
bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present then bail shall be denied.
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. maximum.
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the
risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal,
caution and only for strong reasons. he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal,
citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It
discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal,
appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”
appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
discretion.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Issue:
Whether or not the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail
appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of
pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages:
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
(1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court
114 of the Rules of Court.
must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether
Ruling:
or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
No. Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2)
procedural and substantive rules.
the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case
falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of
that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the
Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on
absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third
the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. We disagree.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
scenario, the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the
imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be
proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial
discretionary.
to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of
those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority
Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present
in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will
simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
approach.
when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion
Leviste vs. Alameda, 626 SCRA 575
perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Facts:
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
present then bail shall be denied. (
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
 9 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This
means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the
discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail
pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail
pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages:
(1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court
must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether
or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2)
the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case
falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on
the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. A finding that
none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result
in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to
use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Choice
occurs where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite
number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome, with
the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker.” On the other
hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end
of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s
discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in
applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty
imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory
the provision that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.”
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6,
Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as
follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody,
shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right,
except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future
as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
lays down the following policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail
of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out
on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense
than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set
forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No.
12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes
in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit
the accused to bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.”
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the
risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
Bongcac vs. Sandiganbayan, 588 SCRA 537
Facts:
Petitioner Panfilo Bongcac (Bongcac) was designated by the Mayor of
Tagbilaran City Consultant and Coordinator on market matters.
Respondents Engr. Fortunato Lim (Lim) and Toribio Bon (Bon)
applied for stalls or tiendas in the Cogon Public Market in Tagbilaran
City and were referred to by Bongcac.
Bongcac informed Lim and Bon the government cannot afford to
construct a new market and if the two were interested, they should
give Bongcac money for the construction. Lim and Bon thereafter
gave Bongcac a check amounting to 62, 000 and 40, 000 respectively.
Thereafter, Lim and Bon learned from a newspaper that Bongcac was
“sacked” as market body consultant and was terminated as secretary
to the Mayor. They looked for him and demanded that he either make
an accounting of the money he received or deliver the stalls or tiendas
already constructed. Bongcac failed to do so. Thus, he was charged
with Estafa by respondents before Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan found Bongcac as guilty of Estafa. Bongcac filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied by Sandiganbayan. He
then filed a certiorari before SC seeking reversal but was likewise
denied through resolution. No motion for reconsideration was filed
and the resolution became final and executory. Sandiganbayan issued
notice to Bongcac directing him to be present for the execution of
judgement. An extraordinary relief was sought by him in SC.
Meanwhile, he filed a motion to suspend the execution in the
Sandiganbayan but was denied and the cash bond posted by
petitioner for his temporary liberty was ordered cancelled. Hence,
this case.
Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order praying that the Resolution issued by the
Sandiganbayan be set aside and that the warrant of arrest and the
order cancelling the bail bond pending resolution of the Very Urgent
Petition for Extraordinary Relief be recalled. Respondent on the other
hand in their comment asserts Petitioner’s bail bond was deemed
automatically cancelled upon execution of the judgment of
conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in cancelling Bongcac’s cash
bail bond.
Ruling:
No. the cancellation of the bail bond was due to the execution of the
final judgment of conviction. Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides:
SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen,
with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon
surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of
the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of
conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice
to any liability on the bail.
From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic
upon execution of the judgment of conviction. The Sandiganbayan
did not err in cancelling petitioner’s cash bail bond after the judgment
of conviction became final and executory and its execution became
ministerial.
Young v. Batuegas
Facts:
Young filed a complaint for disbarment against respondents for
committing deliberate falsehood in court
& violating the lawyer’s oath. Young is the private prosecutor in the
murder case, P vs. Arana. Batuegas& Llantino were counsels for
accused.
 10 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
Counsels for accused filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail
alleging that their client voluntarily surrendered to a person in
authority on Dec 13,2000 but when in fact accused was only in
custody onDec 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of Detention
executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the Security
Management Division of the NBI.
Clerk of court, Susa, also a respondent on this case filed the motion on
Dec 15, 2000 despite theirregularities of the case of (lack of notice of
hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day notice
rule, and failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which was
referred to in the Motion as Annex).
ISSUE
WON the counsel is guilty of deliberate falsehood in declaring
custody of the accused.
WON the prosecutor must be given a reasonable notice of hearing.
WON the clerk of court would be held liable for wrong entry.
HELD
YES, To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading
is a contemptuous conduct that the court strongly condemn. They
violated their oath when they resorted to deception.
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of
hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least,
he must be asked for his recommendation. In the case at bar, the
prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail
two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be
heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to
justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as
lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for
including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering
that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is
reminded that his administrative functions, although not involving
the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to theprompt and
sound administration of justice. Thus, he should not hesitate to
inform the judge if heshould find any act or conduct on the part of
lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of procedure.
RULING
Batuegas, Nazareno and LLantino suspended for 6 months.
Complaint against Susa, dismissed for lack of merit.
Sps. Agbada v. Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. and RTC
FACTS
Sps. Agbada borrowed P1, 500,000 from Inter-Urban Developers, Inc
through its President Simeon Ong Tiam. To secure the loan, parties
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land and
improvements situated in Quezon City which was payable within 6
months at 3% interest per month otherwise, failure to discharge loan
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
within stipulated period entitles Inter-Urban Developers to foreclose
mortgage judicially or extra-judicially.
Spouses failed to pay the loan within 6-month period despite several
out-of-court demands. Because of this, Inter-Urban Developers, Inc.
filed with RTC a complaint for foreclosure of real estate mortgage
which the Spuses answered admitting that they borrowed the amount
of P1, 500, 000 and executed a real estate mortgage to secure the loan
but denied that it was payable within 6 months and at 3% interest per
month.
When the pre-trial was set, it was postponed several times but later
Guillermo Agbada submitted a 1-page handwritten letter addressed
to the trial judge admitting liability for the due and demandable loan
because of this Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. moved for summary
judgment. The spouses opposed the motion.
RTC promulgated its Summary Judgment in favor of Inter-Urban
Developers, Inc and held that Simeon Ong Tiam, could not have
obligated his principal by contemporaneous agreement amending
maturity of loan from 6 months to 5 years and interest rate from 3%
per month to default or statutory rate, much less interest-free, since
the undertaking was contrary to express provisions of duly executed
loan and mortgage contract. The spouses did not appeal the summary
judgment nor did they pay the judgment debt hence, Inter-Urban
Developers Inc. moved for decree of foreclosure which the spouses
did not oppose nor did they attend the hearing on motion. Trial Court
granted the motion and issued a decree of foreclosure which once
again, Spouses did not oppose the motion nor did they attend the
hearing.
Upon motion of Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. and despite Spouses
opposition on the ground that the purchase price of mortgaged
property was below its appraised value according to an appraisal
report, RTC confirmed the sale in favor Inter-Urban Developers, Inc.
Spouses moved for reconsideration of confirmation order insisting on
the inadequacy of purchase price but RTC denied the motion.
Spouses then filed with CA a motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review of a subject matter did not identify which CA
granted however, Spouses moved for a second extension of period to
file but this time denied with finality and recorded entry of judgment
of denial. Inter-Urban Developers, Inc. therefore moved for issuance
of writ of possession over foreclosed real estate.
However, the Spouses filed a Motion to tender full obligation alleging
that they had paid their obligation worth P6, 307, 532.66 in the form
of cashier’s check. Trial court denied the motion. Hence, Spouses filed
with CA a petition for annulment of judgment for alleged violation of
their right to due process arising from absence of full-blown trial on
genuine issue of fact that loan and mortgage would mature only on
fifth year. Petition however did not question compliance with legal
requirements of foreclosure proceedings or any part thereof.
CA dismissed the petition and held that the subject matter was
already barred by res judicata wherein Court denied with finality
Spouses second motion for extension of time to file Petition for
Review. CA also ruled that Spouses were in no position to ask for
annulment of Summary Judgment since their negligence denied them
the right to avail of other remedies otherwise open to them, such as
appeal, and that spouses were estopped from assailing jurisdiction of
trial court after filing several motions to re-evaluate assessed value of
mortgaged property.
Hence present petition.
ISSUE: WON Spouses were deprived of due process
HELD:
No, the spouses were not deprived of due process.
As explained quite frequently, a party may be barred from raising
questions of jurisdiction where estoppel by laches has set in. In a
general sense, estoppel by laches is failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do what, by
exercising due diligence, ought to have been done earlier, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned
to defend it or has acquiesced to the correctness and fairness of its
resolution. The doctrine is based on grounds of public policy which
for peace of society requires the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally an issue of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or espoused. Verily, after voluntarily submitting
a cause, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power
of the court just so he could escape an adverse decision on the merits.
In the instant case, the allegation of deprivation of due process took
more than four (4) years of hibernation, so to speak, from 13 January
1995 when the trial court promulgated its Summary Judgment only to
resurrect after failed attempts to thwart the transfer of title over the
foreclosed real estate in favor of respondent Inter-Urban Developers,
Inc. Evidently, petitioner-spouses are barred by laches from assailing
the regularity of the Summary Judgment as shown not only by their
silence when they should have defended their alleged right to
establish their understanding of the interest rate and maturity of the
loan and mortgage contract, but also by their full and knowing
participation in the proceedings, with the assistance of counsel,
leading to the confirmation of the foreclosure sale in favor of
respondent Inter-Urban Developers, Inc.
During the period of their obtrusive reticence, instead of pushing for
a full-blown trial where they could have ventilated their affirmative
defense, petitioner-spouses merely disagreed with the finding of the
trial court regarding the appraised value of the foreclosed property,
thus strongly implying their acquiescence to the due and demandable
loan.
The foregoing circumstances also show that the due process routine
vigorously pursued only now by petitioner-spouses is a clear-cut
afterthought meant to delay the settlement of an otherwise
uncomplicated property dispute. Aside from clogging court dockets,
the strategy is deplorably a common curse resorted to by losing
litigants in the hope of evading manifest obligations.
It bears stressing that the proper remedy to seek reversal of judgment
in an action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage is not a petition for
 11 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
annulment of judgment but an appeal from the judgment itself or
from the order confirming the sale of the foreclosed real estate. Since
petitioner-spouses failed to avail of appeal without sufficient
justification, they cannot conveniently resort to the action for
annulment for otherwise they would benefit from their own inaction
and negligence.
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia
Facts:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court.
Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the
validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the
private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no
Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject
to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused
hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in
these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to
orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment.
If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion
of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court
even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors
handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time
and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this
Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused
flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted
therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by
the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting
private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail,
the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to
bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of
United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same
being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took
cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under
our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the
other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where
emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of
human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and
held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
JOCELYN GRAGEDA VERSUS JUDGE TRESVALLES
(421 SCRA 500)
Facts
An administrative case was filed by wife of Gil Grageda against
Judge Tresvalles for gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority
relative to the criminal case of murder where her husband was the
victim. A complaint was filed for preliminary investigation with
Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. in the sala of Judge Tresvalles.
On the same day, Judge Tresvalles issued an order stating that
accused was probably guilty of the charged and grants the warrant of
arrest and stated the amount of bail bond. Six days after the order,
Accused surrendered and filed a motion to strike out the testimony of
petitioner and to grant him of bail. The following day, Jude Tresvalles
granted the release of accused after he posted bail bond of P30,000.00.
The record was hereafter transferred to Provincial Prosecutor which
contained the denial of motion to strike out of testimony of petitioner.
However, upon preliminary investigation conducted by the
Prosecutor by, he found that the accused was guilty of murder, with
aggravating circumstance and no bail was recommended. Thereafter,
and administrative case was filed by the petitioner against Judge
Tresvalles.
According to the complaint, the respondent judge granted bail to the
accused without the requisite bail hearing, despite the fact that there
was an eyewitness to the murder who made a positive identification
of the accused. In his comment, the respondent admitted that no bail
hearing was conducted, but reasoned that the evidence of the guilt of
the accused was not strong. According to the respondent judge, no
matter of granting bail is an exercise of judgment, and that the
accused should not be denied his Constitutional right to bail.
Issue
WON, bail hearing is required to be conducted by the
judge and which he shall be held guilty
Ruling
Yes! we agree that the respondent judge is
administratively liable for granting bail to an accused charged with
murder without conducting the requisite bail hearing. The
importance of a hearing in applications for bail should once more be
emphasized. Section 8,Rule 114 proved as follows:
Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application – At the hearing of an
application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the
commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpertua,
or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden showing that
the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but,
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, or otherwise, unable
to testify.
The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on the result of the
bail hearing depends the right of an accused to provisional liberty vis-
à-vis the duty of the State to protect the people against dangerous
elements. The resolution of the issue affects important norms in our
society: liberty on the one hand, and order on the other. To minimize,
if not eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a Judge’s decision, the
Rules require the judge to hear the parties and then make an
intelligent assessment of their evidence.
The respondent’s argument that a hearing is “only necessary if there
is an application for admission to bail” is erroneous. As found by the
executive judge, the fact that the accused has not even filed yet any
application for bail at the time bail was fixed on December 5, 2000
aggravate matters. To state the obvious, there was no occasion for the
respondent judge to exercise any discretion on the matter of bail at
that point in time as the accused was not asking to be release on
temporary liberty.
The respondent Judge, should have followed the straight and trodden
path, well-traveled by members of the bench that bail should not be
allowed in case of murder. It might also be worth mentioning, in
passing, that the right to bail may be waived considering its personal
nature. It arises from the time on is placed in the custody of the law.
The fact that the respondent judge already granted bail when the
accused has not been arrested yet compounds the aggravation.
Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance
with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The
 12 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present
evidence because by the very nature of deciding application for bail,
it in on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed
against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In
other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and
within the confines of due process, that is, after the evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution.
In the case at bar, the respondent Judge motu proprio granted bail to
the accused. The prosecution was not even afforded an opportunity to
present its evidence, in accordance with the Rules.
Ergo, Respondent judge is administratively liable.
ROMULO TOLENTINO VERSUS JUDGE CAMANO, JR
(322 SCRA 559)
Facts:
Respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of discretion, grave abuse of authority, violation of
Canons 1,2 and 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and incompetence
in connection with granting bail to the accused in a criminal case for
child abuse.
The complaint alleges that respondent Judge granted bail while
pending the holding of preliminary investigation. The defense moved
to quash the information against the accused on the alleged absence
of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, respondent Judge
ordered that a preliminary investigation be had by state prosecutor.
During the pendency of this, the respondent Judge granted bail in
favor of the defendant after several notices of hearing to the state
prosecutor to which the latter failed to appear. After such grant,
complainant herein now accuses respondent of denying to
prosecution the chance to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of
the accused was strong and the bail should not have been granted in
his favor.
Issue
WON, the granting bail to the accused in a criminal case for child
abuse while the preliminary investigation is still pending is valid.
Ruling
Yes, the granting of bail is valid. There was no denial of due process.
It was not necessary to hold hearing so that the prosecution could
show that evidence of guilt of the accused was strong since a
preliminary investigation had been ordered by the court. At that
point, bail was still a matter of right.
Respondent Judge, knowing that bail was indeed a matter of right at
that state, nevertheless set the hearing for the petition for bail four
times. However, complainant failed to appear and present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused was strong. It thus appears that
complainant is actually the one who was remiss in the performance of
his duties. Considering that the case was referred to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, the accused could
be considered as entitled to bail as a matter of right.
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
Therefore, respondent judge’s decision granting bail to the accused
was proper and in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
BARBERO VERSUS JUDGE DUMLAO
(555 SCRA 193)
Facts:
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law filed by Ester F.
Barbero against Judge Dumlao, Presiding Judge of the MTC, San
Mateo City Isabela. Barbero filed a criminal case for estafa against
certain Herman Medina. The case was raffled to Judge Anghad,
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 36, Santiago City, Isabela. On
February 19, 2003, Judge Anghad issued a warrant of arrest
commanding the proper office to arrest Medina.
Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest. However,
Judge Dumlao approved Medina’s bail and on May 9, 2003 the latter
issued and order commanding the bJMP Penology and the PNP to
release Medina.
Barbero alleged that Judge Dumalo’s approval of Medina’s bail and
his order to release Medina were unlawful.
Issue
WON, Judge Dumlao is guilty of serious and grave abuse of
discretion
Ruling
Yes! Under Rule 144, section 3 of the Ruled of Court proved that no
person under detention by legal process shall be release except when
he is admitted to bail. Section 19 provides that the accused must be
discharged upon approval of the bail by the Judge with whom it was
filed in accordance with Section 17.
Section 17 proved that the bail may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, unless:
(1) The judge in that court is absent or unavailable; or
(2) The accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality
other than where the case is pending.
If the judge is absent or unavailable, the bail should be filed with
another brance of the same court. If the accused is arrested in a
province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending,
the bail should be filed with any RTC of the place.
IT is not disputed that the criminal case filed by complaint against
Medina were pending before RTC of Isabela, Branch 35. In fact, the
warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding
judge of the said court. The order of release therefor on account of the
posting of bail, should have been issued by that court, or in the
absence or unavailability of Judge Madrid, by another branch of an
RTC. In this case, there is no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or
unavailable at the time of the posting of the bail bond. In fact,
complainant Lim avers that on the day Judge Dumlao ordered the
release of Medina, all the Judges of the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela
were their respective post.
It is elementary that a MTC judge has no authority to grant bail to an
accused arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The
requirements of Section 17(a) Rule 114 must be complied with before
a judge may grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial
error speaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith,
does not warrant administrative sanction but only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where the laws is
straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if
one does not know it constitute gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Dumlao undeniable erred in approving the bail and Gross
ignorance of the law is a serious punishable offense by (1) dismissal
form the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits except accrued
leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including GOCC’s; (2) suspension form office
without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not
exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
Basco vs. Rapatalo
Facts:
Petitioner filed a case for murder against Roger Morente. The accused
filed a petition for bail. The hearing for bail was repeatedly
rescheduled and it was discovered later on that the accused was
already granted to post bail. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint
against the respondent judge Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful
disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in
a murder case without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
Respondent judge, in his comment, alleged that he granted the
petition based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as
well as the latter's recommendation setting the bailbond in the
amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose
not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to
approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the
petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he
was doing since he was more familiar with the case, having
conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private
prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor
recommended bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by
accused was cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on
account of complainant's motion for reconsideration. The Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the
motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
WON respondent judge gravely abused his discretion granting bail to
an accused in a murder case.
Held:
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent
Judge granted bail to the accused without first conducting a hearing
to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his knowledge
 13 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ
that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the
procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on
the prosecution's declaration not to oppose the petition. Respondent's
assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that the prosecutor
knows what he is doing on account of the latter's familiarity with the
case due to his having conducted the preliminary investigation is
faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the
duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of
the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge
before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The
mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon
the prosecutor.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for
granting bail to the accused. It is the court's determination after a
hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the basis
for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on
the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After
all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation.
Moreover, there will be a violation of due process if the respondent
Judge grants the application for bail without hearing since Section 8
of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against
the accused's provisional release will be determined at the hearing.
Wherefore, respondent judge was reprimanded by the SC with the
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
People vs. Ejandra, 429 SCRA 364
This is a review on automatic appeal of the Decision of the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, , convicting appellants Elvie Ejandra,
Magdalena Calunod, Edwin Tampos and Roel Revilla of kidnapping
for ransom, and sentencing them to suffer the death penalty.
Facts:
Ed Henderson Tan is the nine-year old son of the spouses Eddie and
Marileen Tan. When Ed was on his way back to the house of his tutor
to wait for his father, suddenly, Ed Tampos, armed with a revolver,
chased and overtook Ed Henderson near the school. Tampos ordered
the boy to proceed to a motorcyle parked nearby and warned the
latter that if he refused, he would be shot. Ejandra covered Ed
Henderson’s mouth with his hand, pointed his gun at the boy and
warned the latter not to shout. Revilla boarded the motorcycle and
took the driver’s seat. Ejandra sat behind him, and Tampos sat behind
Ejandra. Tampos ordered Ed Henderson to board the motorcyle, or
else, he would be shot. The boy was then ordered to sit behind
Tampos. Ed was brought to a one-storey house. Once inside, he saw
a man who was drinking, who turned out to be Antonio Huera, and a
female, who turned out to be Magdalena Calunod. Eddie received a
call from the kidnappers and demanded ransom.
By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus
The accused were charged of kidnapping for ransom. The accused,
assisted by counsel, were arraigned for the crime charged on
November 11, 1997, and entered their respective pleas of not guilty.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused waives any irregularities relating to his
warrantless arrest if he fails to file a motion to quash the Information
on that ground, or to object to any irregularity in his arrest before he
is arraigned.
Held:
Yes. We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the
appellants Ejandra and Calunod waived any irregularities relating to
their warrantless arrest when they failed to file a motion to quash the
Information on that ground, or to object to any irregularity in their
arrest before they were arraigned. They are now estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest.
YUSOP v SANDIGANDYAN G.R. No. 138859-60 - February 22,
2001
Doctrine: The right of a person to preliminary investigation is
recognized by the law and is governed by the Rules of Court.
However, the failure to accord this right does not ipso facto result in
the dismissal of the information; the case is merely suspended, and
the prosecutor directed to conduct the proper investigation
Facts:
In a Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao, the prosecution of Benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters,
Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden
of Pagadian City as respondents was recommended for violating
Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code (unlawful arrest) and Section 3-
a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended.
Petitioner Alvarez Yusop was included as one of the persons to be
prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents
mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto approved the recommendation. Subsequently, an Order
of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
24524 but the petitioner posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolos City on May 20 of the same year. On the same day, a
"Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For
Preliminary Investigation was filed but the Sandiganbayan denied the
same for failure to submit the petitioner himself to the jurisdiction of
the anti-graft court. With this, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss.
The respondent Sandiganbayan, however resolved not to take action
on the motion. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner contended that he had not been accorded preliminary
investigation, thereby, requested for the dismissal of those charges.
Meanwhile, respondent Sandiganbayan argued that “the claim of
accused Yusop that he was not notified with respect to one of the
cases on an identical set of facts herein is not [of] particular
significance since this would be indulging in a superfluity.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of the
lack of preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner,
committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with his
arraignment.
Held:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of disretion. The
Court held that there is no basis for the Sandiganbayan's ruling that
petitioner "had not given timely notice nor any statement of the
alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the
Information.” First, there was no showing that petitioner was notified
of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. Second, petitioner immediately
informed the Sandiganbayan that no preliminary investigation had
been conducted in regard to him. In fact, moments before his
arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the preliminary
investigation be conducted. Third, petitioner cannot be expected to
know of the investigator's subsequent act of charging him. Lastly,
neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner's
right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[a]n application for or
admission to bai; shall not bar the accused from challenging the
validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or
from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he
raises them before entering his plea. xxx.” The right to preliminary
investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it
to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due
process.17Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must
be conducted.
The Court, on the other hand, ruled that petitioner’s claim for the
dismissal of cases due to lack of preliminary investigation is
untenable. Nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or
even the old Rules, is there any mention that this lack is a ground for
a motion to quash.21 Furthermore, it has been held that responsibility
for the "absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the
jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings."22 We reiterate the following ruling of the Court in
People v. Gomez: "If there were no preliminary investigations and the
defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court
of their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information,
should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or
remand the case to the inferior court so the preliminary investigation
may be conducted."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed
Orders are REVERSED, and the Office of the Ombudsman is hereby
ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the
charge of violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019 against Petitioner
Alvarez Aro Yusop. The trial on the merits of Criminal Case No.
24524 shall be SUSPENDED in regard to petitioner until the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED.
 14 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | RULE 114 (BAIL) Case Digest | ATTY. JUDE FERNANDEZ

By Berezo, Esgana, Mayordo, Morado, Saguran, Tampus