interest over the land passed to her children Hadji Munib Saupi
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144095. April 12, 2005]
SPOUSES HAYMATON S. GARINGAN AND JAYYARI
PAWAKI, petitioners, vs. HADJI MUNIB SAUPI
GARINGAN, HADJA TERO SAUPI GARINGAN, and
HADJA JEHADA SAUPI GARINGAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review[1] to reverse the
Decision[2] dated 19 June 2000 and the Order[3] dated 19 July 2000
of the Sharia District Court, Third Sharia Judicial District, Zamboanga
City in Civil Case No. 13-3. The Sharia District Court cancelled
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2592 in the name of Djayari or
Jayyari Moro. The Sharia District Court also ordered the partition of
the land in dispute, and the issuance of new TCTs in the names of
Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, Hadja Tero Saupi Garingan, Hadja
Jehada Saupi Garingan and Haymaton Garingan Jayyari.
The Antecedent Facts
On 23 February 1993, Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, Hadja Tero
Saupi Garingan and Hadja Jehada Saupi Garingan (Hadji Munib, et
al.) filed an action for Partition and Injunction with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against their sister Haymaton Saupi
Garingan[4] (Haymaton) and her husband Jayyari Pawaki (Pawaki),
also known as Djayari Moro. Hadji Munib, et al. alleged that their
grandfather Saupi Moro owned an agricultural lot, fully planted with
coconut and other fruit bearing trees, containing an area of 11.3365
hectares. The land is situated in Sitio Tinebbasan, Barangay Semut,
Municipality of Lamitan, Basilan Province. Saupi Moro acquired the
land through purchase from Gani Moro. Saupi Moro donated the land
to his daughter Insih Saupi (Insih), mother of Hadji Munib, et al. and
Haymaton. After the donation, Insih predeceased her father and her
Garingan, Hadja Tero Saupi Garingan, Hadja Jehada Saupi
Garingan, and Haymaton Garingan.
After the death of Saupi Moro in 1954,[5] Haymaton and Pawaki
took over the administration of the land. Later, Haymaton and Pawaki
declared the land, then still untitled, in their names for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 1675. Haymaton and Pawaki
refused to share with Hadji Munib, et al. the income from the sale of
fruits from the land.
Haymaton and Pawaki, on the other hand, claimed that on 22
September 1969, Pawaki bought the land from Jikirum M. Adjaluddin
(Jikirum). TCT No. T-2592 was issued in the name of Djayari Moro.
Pawaki took possession of the land in the concept of an owner in the
same year. He declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 1675.
The Decision of the Sharia District Court
The Sharia District Court found that Saupi Moro acquired the
land in dispute from Gani Moro. Insih Saupi, during her lifetime,
accepted the land by way of donation from her father. Upon the
death of Insih and her husband, their children succeeded to the
rights of their parents over the property. The Sharia District Court
ruled:
From the foregoing evidence of the plaintiffs it appears that the
property in question was given by Saupi Moro during his lifetime to
his daughter Insih Saupi, who thereafter, stayed in the land and
introduced improvements consisting of coconut trees with her
husband Garingan until they died, predeceasing Saupi Moro, which
shows that the property given by Saupi Moro to his daughter Insih
Saupi Garingan during the formers lifetime, was accepted by the
latter during her lifetime.
The herein plaintiffs in this case, including their sister and defendant,
Haymaton Garingan Jayyari, being the children of Insih Saupi and
Garingan, steps (sic) into whatever rights or properties left by their
deceased parents.
On the basis of the evidence of the case, the herein property in
question was acquired by their grandfather Saupi Moro from Gani
Moro before World War II or sometime during the Japanese
occupation. (See Exhibit A-1, p. 297, Record). During their
grandfathers lifetime he donated it to his daughter plaintiffs (sic)
mother Insih Garingan who together with her husband Garingan
occupied and planted said property; After plaintiffs mother Insih
Saupi Garingan died, the property was left to plaintiffs sister now
defendant Haymaton Garingan Jayyari; And, after the latter also
died, her husband and co-defendant Jayyari Pawaki took over the
property. There is therefore, an implied trust relation established
between the heirs of Insih Saupi Garingan plaintiffs herein and their
sister defendant Haymaton Garingan and the latter husband Jayyari
Pawaki over the said property. In a case, it was held, that the
Torrens System was never calculated to forment (sic) betrayal in the
performance of a trust. (Escobar v. Locsin, 74 Phil. 86). Thus,
through the continuous possession of the property beginning from
the plaintiffs grandparent Saupi Moro sometime in 1941, until the
latter died sometime in 1954 up to the time it was held in trust by
plaintiffs co-heir, defendant Haymaton Garingan, and the latter
husband and co-defendant Jayyari Pawaki, who after Haymaton
Garingans death continued to hold the land claiming to have
acquired it by purchase from Adjaluddin Moro, tacking the periods,
more than thirty years had elapsed which gives the herein plaintiffs
the right over the said property, though the donation made in favor of
their mother Insih Garingan by their grandfather Saupi Moro was not
in a public instrument, but merely verbal. In a case the Court held,
That while donation of immovable property not made in a public
instrument, such as verbal one, is not effective as a transfer of title,
yet it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive
character of the possession of the intended donee, and such
possession may ripen into ownership by prescription. (Pensader vs.
Pensader, 47 Phil. 959; Apilado vs. Apilado (C.A.) 34 O.G. p. 144;
Macabasco vs. Macabasco (C.A.) 45 O.G. 2532; Espique vs.
Espique (S.C.) 53 O.G. 4079; Cabacutan vs. Serrano (C.S.) 59 O.G.
292; Cited on p. 523, A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.
II, 1987 ed.).
Plaintiffs herein, namely (1) Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, (2) Hadja
Tero Saupi Garingan, (3) Hadja Jehada Saupi Garingan, together
with their sister, and defendant (4) Haymaton Garingan-Jayyari are
the children of Insih Saupi and Garingan. Upon the death of their
parents Insih Saupi and Garingan, they succeeded to whatever
hereditary rights over the estates of their deceased parents. The
evidence shows that plaintiffs mother Insih Saupi Garingan
predeceased her father Saupi Garingan. x x x.
In Civil Case No. 41 entitled Janjalawi Moro, et. al., plaintiffs vs.
Andaang Moro, et. al., defendants that was filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Basilan City is dated July 16, 1956 on
paragraph 3 of the said Civil complaint states, that Saupi Moro died
intestate in 1954 (sic); Thus, Insih Saupi and Imam Garingan, the
plaintiffs parents, who both predeceased Saupi Moro, their death
occurred sometime before the death of Saupi Moro in 1954. Such
being the case, the law then governing the successional rights of
Filipino Muslims was still the Civil Code of the Philippines, R.A. No.
386 which became effective on August 30, 1950. (Ilejay vs. Ilejay, et.
al., (S.C.) 49 O.G. 4903). And, under Article 90 of the present Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, P.D. 1083, The rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. This provision is an adoption of Article 77 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which provides: The rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent; which has
been interpreted that the succession is opened by the death of the
person from whom the inheritance comes. (A. Tolentino, Civil Code,
p. 13, Vol. III, 1979 ed.; Cited 3 Navarro Amandi 82). Considering the
applicable laws on this regard, since Insih Saupi Garingan and Imam
Garingan who were plaintiffs parents, predeceased Saupi Moro who
died in 1954, the law then applicable to successional rights of Filipino
Muslims was the prevailing law at that time which was still the Civil
Code of the Philippines. This rule is recognized by the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, P.D. 1083, under Article
186, which provides:
Art. 186. Effect of Code on Past Acts. (1) Acts executed prior to the
effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at that
time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to
extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
And, the applicable provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on
this regard are as follows, to quote:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different marriages; And,
Art. 980. The Children of the deceased shall always inherit from him
in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
(1) That the following described real property, viz: A parcel
of agricultural land located in Semut, Lamitan, Basilan
City, Philippines, identified as Bureau of Lands Plan H-
 V-18368 bounded on N., by seashore, 20 m. wide; on
the SE., by property of Turavin Moro; on the S., by
property of Hatib Hiya; and on the W., by property of
Husin Moro, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND
SIXTY FIVE (113,365) SQUARE METERS more or
less is ordered partitioned among the following in
EQUAL SHARES, to wit: Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan,
Hadja Tero Saupi Garingan, Hadja Jehada Saupi
Garingan, and Haymaton Garingan Jayyari, shall get
entitled to ONE FOURTH (1/4) SHARE EACH of the
aforesaid property;
(2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2592 covering said
property in the name of Djayari or Jayyari Moro
married to Haymaton Mora of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Basilan City is hereby ordered
annulled and cancelled, and, in lieu thereof the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Basilan City is ordered to
issue a New Certificate of Title in the names of the
owners mentioned in the preceding paragraph 1, and
in the proportion given therein;
(3) Ordering the defendant and anyone acting for the
defendants to peacefully, and voluntarily surrender the
afore-mentioned parcel of land together with the
improvements existing thereon to the plaintiffs, their
heirs or legal representatives, and restore them in the
occupation and enjoyment thereof.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In an Order dated 19 July 2000, the Sharia District Court denied
the motion for reconsideration of Haymaton and Pawaki.
Hence, the present petition.
The Issues
In their memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
Whether the Sharia District Court erred in ordering the partition of the
subject property and annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
2592 on the basis alone of respondents claim that Saupi Moro, their
predecessor-in-interest, was the one who owned the said parcel of
land during his lifetime, thereby disregarding the protection accorded
to persons dealing with property registered under the Torrens
system.
Whether the Third Sharia District Court erred in not ruling that
respondents right to seek a reconveyance of the subject property
had already prescribed or is barred by laches.
Whether the Third Sharia District Court erred in not ruling that
respondents have no cause of action against the petitioners in an
action for partition as they are not co-owners of the subject property,
petitioners being the sole owners of the property.[7]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in an
action for partition, and the action will not lie if the claimant has no
rightful interest in the property in dispute.[8] In this case, Hadji Munib,
et al. failed to prove their right to the land in dispute.
The Derivative Title of Jayyari Pawaki
The land in dispute was originally registered in the name of
Andaang Gani (Andaang) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. P-793[9] issued on 6 December 1955. OCT No. P-793 was
issued upon the approval of Andaangs homestead application and
the issuance on 17 February 1955 of Letters of Patent No. V-41831.
Andaang died intestate on 29 August 1959. On 13 April 1960,
Andaangs widow and sole heir, Cristeta Santiago vda. de Gani
(Cristeta), executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and
Sale[10] adjudicating to herself the land in dispute and at the same
time selling it to Jikirum. On 31 August 1967 or seven years after the
sale, Cristeta caused the cancellation of OCT No. P-793 and the
issuance in her name of TCT No. T-1940.[11] On the same date, TCT
No. T-1940 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1941[12] was issued in the
name of Jikirum.
On 22 September 1969, Jikirum executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale[13] in favor of Djayari Moro. On 10 June 1971, TCT No. T-1941
was cancelled and TCT No. T-2592[14] was issued in the name of
Djayari Moro also known as Jayyari Pawaki.
The Claim of Hadji Munib, et al.
 Hadji Munib, et al. claim that before or during the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines, Saupi Moro acquired the land in
dispute through sale from Gani Moro. After Gani Moros death, his
heirs, which included Andaang, offered to repurchase the land from
Saupi Moro. Saupi Moro refused. The heirs of Gani Moro[15] instituted
Civil Case No. 31 for Illegal Detainer[16]against Saupi
Moro.[17] Although the Municipal Trial Court of Basilan
City[18] declared Saupi Moro in default for non-appearance, it
dismissed the complaint in a Decision dated 24 September 1951, as
follows:
Does an action lie against the defendant for Illegal Detainer: Rule 72,
pp. 247-248, Morans Rules of Court, provides, that there are two (2)
kinds of Detainer: (1) that by a tenant, and (2) that by a vendee or
vendor, or other person unlawfully withholding possession of any
land of building (sic). In the present case, the cause of action is
based only on a verbal contract that took place year ago, one of the
principal parties is now dead. The court believes that the right of the
plaintiffs to recover possession has not been clearly established. In
their complaint, they stated that the alleged contract took place
before World War II, while in open court they stated that it took place
during the Japanese occupation. The plaintiffs likewise failed to
explain in Court, why Gani Moro during his lifetime failed to redeem
the property, although the amount involved is a pittant (sic). Gani
Moro has all the time in the world and the means to repay said
amount of seventy (P70.00), before his death on May, 1949, and if
said contract really existed, he would not have hesitated to redeem
said property knowing that his children stands (sic) to be deprived of
their inheritance of a substantial parcel of land with improvements.
Although, the allegations of the plaintiffs stands unrefuted (defendant
being in default) yet the Court in the interest of justice, has to sift and
analyze the evidence of the plaintiffs in order that justice could be
meted to the parties.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court is of
the opinion and so hold, that the plaintiff has failed to prove its case,
and judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above complaint,
without costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[19]
Despite the decision, Andaang applied for a homestead patent
over the disputed land. Andaangs application was approved and on
17 February 1955, he was issued Letters of Patent No. V-41831. On
6 December 1955, OCT No. P-793 was issued in Andaangs name.
In July 1956, the brothers and sisters of Saupi Moro,[20] claiming
to be his heirs,[21] filed Civil Case No. 41 for Annulment of Certificate
of Title to a Parcel of Land and Damages against Andaang and the
Register of Deeds of Basilan before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Basilan City.[22] However, the case did not prosper. In a
certification dated 18 September 1994, Clerk of Court Selso M.
Manzanaris of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Basilan declared
that the building housing the sala of the CFI of Basilan City was
burned in 1975. The records of Civil Case No. 41 were destroyed.
The plaintiffs did not revive the case which was considered
abandoned.[23]
The Homestead Application of Andaang Gani
Under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141),[24] as amended,
agricultural lands may be acquired by homestead, as follows:
SEC. 12. Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen
years, or the head of a family, who does not own more than twenty-
four hectares of land in the Philippines or has not had the benefit of
any gratuitous allotment of more than twenty-four hectares of land
since the occupation of the Philippines by the United States, may
enter a homestead of not exceeding twenty-four hectares of
agricultural land of the public domain.
SEC. 13. Upon the filing of an application for a homestead, the
Director of Lands, if he finds that the application should be approved,
shall do so and authorize the applicant to take possession of the land
upon the payment of five pesos, Philippine currency, as entry fee.
Within six months from and after the date of the approval of the
application, the applicant shall begin to work the homestead,
otherwise he shall lose his prior right to the land.
SEC. 14. No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land
applied for until at least one-fifth of the land has been improved and
cultivated. The period within which the land shall be cultivated shall
not be less than one nor more than five years, from and after the
date of the approval of the application. The applicant shall, within the
said period, notify the Director of Lands as soon as he is ready to
acquire the title. If at the date of such notice, the applicant shall
prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that he has resided
continuously for at least one year in the municipality in which the land
is located, or in the municipality adjacent to the same and has
cultivated at least one-fifth of the land continuously since the
approval of the application, and shall make affidavit that no part of
said land has been alienated or encumbered, and that he has
complied with all the requirements of this Act, then, upon the
payment of five pesos, as final fee, he shall be entitled to a patent.
CA 141 requires the applicant to enter in possession of, improve
and cultivate the land.
Andaang was one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 31 for illegal
detainer against Saupi Moro.[25] In that case, the plaintiffs prayed that
they be allowed to redeem the land in dispute which Gani
Moro verbally mortgaged to Saupi Moro during the Japanese
occupation. The plaintiffs also prayed that the trial court order Saupi
Moro to vacate the land and to restitute the premises to the
plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
There is no evidence on record that shows that the heirs of Gani
Moro subsequently reacquired the land. Nothing shows that
Andaang Gani was the occupant of the land when he applied for
homestead patent, or that he occupied the land and introduced
improvements thereon in the interim before the approval of his
application. Hence, Hadji Munib, et al. insist that Andaang did not
comply with the requirements of CA 141.
Review of Certificate of Title on Ground of Fraud
Section 122 of Act No. 496 (Act 496),[26] provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging
to the Government of the (United States or to the Government of the)
Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or
to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It
shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation,
grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such
instrument before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the
register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there
registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a
certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and
an owners duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed,
grant, or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the
grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but
shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the
grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds
to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act
to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act
registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the
province where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid
by the grantee. After due registration and issue of the certificate and
owners duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposes
under this Act.
Upon its registration, the land in dispute falls under the
operation of Act 496 and becomes registered land. A homestead
patent, once registered, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens
title.[27]
A person deprived of the land, estate, or interest therein by
virtue of a decree of registration may avail of the remedy provided
under Section 38 of Act 496. Thus:
Sec. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and
proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall
be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet
title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following
section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including
the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included
in the general description To whom it may concern. Such decree
shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding
in any court for reversing judgments or decrees: subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of the land or of
any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a
petition for review within one year after entry of the decree
provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every
decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this
section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser,
the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full
force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal
hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no decree or
certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be
cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in
any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the
applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree.
Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent
phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (Emphasis
supplied)
The fraud contemplated in Section 38 of Act 496 refers to
extrinsic or collateral fraud. In Libudan v. Gil,[28] the Court explained
the scope of extrinsic or collateral fraud as follows:
x x x (T)he action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud,
would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the
facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved
in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented
from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. But intrinsic fraud
takes the form of acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as
the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not
affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.
Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where
the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are
not contested when in fact they are; or in applying for and obtaining
adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which
he knows had not been allotted to him in the partition; or in
intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the land inspector
to include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream; or in
willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in
deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing
him not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about the
identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the
former to withdraw his application. In all these examples the
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or
from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and
goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
xxx
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be
granted where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is
intrinsic and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided.
Thus we have underscored the denial of relief where it appears that
the fraud consisted in the presentation at the trial of a supposed
forged document, or a false and perjured testimony, or in basing the
judgment on a fraudulent compromise agreement, or in the alleged
fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel which prevented the
petitioner from properly presenting the case.
The fraud being attributed to Andaang is not extrinsic and
collateral. In Libudan, the Court ruled that the allegation that neither
the applicant nor his alleged successor-in-interest has ever been in
actual possession of the property in question since time immemorial
does not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Granting that Andaang committed extrinsic and collateral fraud,
Hadji Munib, et al. failed to avail of the remedy provided under
Section 38 of Act 496 within the prescribed period.
In Nelayan, et al. v. Nelayan, et al.,[29] this Court ruled that in
the case of public land grants (patents), the one-year period under
Section 38 is counted from the issuance of the patent by the
government.
The Letters of Patent was issued on 17 February 1955. The
brothers and sisters of Saupi Moro filed Civil Case No. 41 for
annulment of title only in July 1956, more than a year after the
issuance of the Letters of Patent. There is no evidence that Saupi
Moros children, who are his compulsory heirs, intervened in the
case. Insihs children who claim to have succeeded to the rights of
their mother also failed to intervene in the case. Hadji Munib, et al.
did not do anything to protect their interest, not even after the records
of Civil Case No. 41 were burned. Instead of availing of the remedy
under Section 38 of Act 496, Hadji Munib, et al. filed an action for
partition on 23 February 1993, which must fail because a Torrens
title is not susceptible to collateral attack. Thus:
It is a rule in this jurisdiction that once a public land has been brought
under the Land Registration Act, the Torrens title issued thereto is
indefeasible. It is entitled to the same regard as one issued in a
judicial proceeding. The Torrens title is not susceptible to collateral
attack. The decree (or order of the Director of Lands for the issuance
of the patent in the case of a homestead) may be reviewed under
Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act by filing the appropriate petition
within one year from the issuance of the said decree or from the
issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Or an appeal
may be taken to the appellate court within the reglementary period
from the decision of the Court; and in the case of the homestead, the
administrative remedies may be pursued. These are the methods of
direct attack.[30]
The Proper Party to Bring the Action
In any event, Hadji Munib, et al. are not the proper parties to file
an action for reconveyance of the land in dispute.
Even in Civil Case No. 41, the plaintiffs there did not claim that
the land was privately owned and thus not proper subject for
homestead application. They only alleged continuous
possession of the land. Even in their Memorandum filed before this
Court, Hadji Munib, et al. only alleged that Andaang Gani violated
the provisions of CA 141 and that he was never in actual possession
and occupation of the land in dispute. Hadji Munib, et al. also
acknowledged that Civil Case No. 31 only confirmed Saupi
Moros physical possession of the land. Indeed, Civil Case No. 31,
being a case for illegal detainer, did not settle the issue of ownership
of the land. The trial court dismissed the complaint in that case only
because the plaintiffs failed to establish their right to recover
possession of the land. Any determination of ownership made in the
illegal detainer case is not conclusive.
Evidently, the land was not privately owned by Gani Moro from
whom Saupi Moro acquired it. The land in dispute was part of the
public domain before the issuance of OCT No. P-793. If it were
otherwise, there would be no need for Gani Moros son, Andaang, to
file a homestead application.
The rule on this matter is clear:
A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes
of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding, as long
as the land disposed of is really a part of the disposable land of the
public domain and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after
one year from issuance. x x x. The only instance when a certificate of
title covering a tract of land, formerly a part of the patrimonial
property of the State, could be cancelled, is for failure on the part of
the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law, and in
such case the proper party to bring the action would be the
Government to which the property would revert.[33]
Considering the foregoing, Hadji Munib, et al. have no
personality to file an action to recover possession of the land in
dispute. Further, they failed to timely avail of whatever remedy
available to them to protect whatever interest they had over the land.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sharia District Court, Third
Sharia Judicial District, Zamboanga City in Civil Case No. 13-3, is
SET ASIDE, and another one is entered DISMISSING the complaint
in Civil Case No. 13-3.
SO ORDERED.

All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to
the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession
of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest.[31]

Hadji Munib, et al.s action for partition effectively seeks to

cancel the homestead patent and the corresponding certificate of
title. However, even if the homestead patent and the certificate of title
are cancelled, Hadji Munib, et al. will not acquire the land in the
concept of an owner. The land will revert to the government and will
again form part of the public domain.
Section 101 of CA 141 provides that actions for reversion of
public lands fraudulently awarded must be instituted by the Solicitor
General and in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.[32] Thus:
Garingan vs. Garingan Case Digest (455
SCRA 480)
FACTS:
Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, et al., herein respondents, alleged that
their grandfather Sauri Moro owned an agricultural lot, fully panted
with coconut and other fruit bearing trees, containing an area of
11.3365 hectares. Saupi Moro acquired the land through purchase
from Gani Moro. Saupi Moro then donated the land to his daughter
Insih Saupi, mother of Hadji Munib, et al. and petitioner Haymaton S.
Garingan.
After the death of Saupi Moro in 1954, Haymaton and and husband
Pawaki, who was also known as Djayari Moro, herein petitioners,
took over the administration of the land. Later, petitioners declared
the land, then still untitled, in their names for taxation purposes.
Petitioners refused to share with the respondents the income from
the sale of fruits from the land. Petitioners claimed that on 22
September 1969, Pawaki alleged that he bought the land from
Jikirum M. Adjaluddin (Jikirum) and a TCT was issued in the name of
Djayari Moro. Pawaki took possession of the land in the concept of
an owner in the same year. He declared the land for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 1675.
Respondents filed an action for Partition and Injunction with prayer
for Preliminary Injunction against petitioners with the Shari'a District
Court, Third Shari'a Judicial District, Zamboanga City. The Shari'a
District Court then ordered to partition the land in equal shares
among the respondents and their sister petitioner. Each of them was
entitled to one-fourth share of the aforesaid property. The TCT in the
name of Djayari Moro was ordered annulled and cancelled, and, in
lieu thereof the Office of the Register of Deeds of Basilan City was
ordered to issue a new TCT in the names of the respondents and
their sister petitioner. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied in an order dated 19 July 2000.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Shari'a District Court erred in ordering the
partition of the subject property and annulment of the Transfer
Certificate of Title on the basis alone of respondents' claim that
Saupi Moro, their predecessor-in-interest, was the one who owned
the said parcel of land during his lifetime, thereby disregarding the
protection accorded to the persons dealing with property registered
under the Torrens system.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. The first stage in an action for partition is
the settlement of the issue of ownership, and the action will not lie if
the claimant has no rightful interest in the property in dispute. In the
case at bar, Hadji Munib, et al., herein respondents, failed to prove
their right to the land in dispute.
The subject property originally belonged to Gani Moro and was
acquired through sale by Saupi Moro. After Gani Moro's death, his
heirs, including Andaang, offered to repurchase the land, but Saupi
Moro refused. The heirs instituted a civil case for Unlawful Detainer
but was dismissed by the court. Despite the dismissal, Andaang filed
for a homestead patent over the said property. It was approved on 17
February 1955 and he was issued Letters of patent. On 6 December
1955, an Original Certificate of Title was issued in Andaang's name.
In July 1956, the brothers and sisters of Saupi Moro filed a civil case
for the annulment of the OCT and damages against Andaang. Again,
the case did not prosper. The plaintiffs did not revive the case and it
was considered abandoned.
Andaang died intestate in 1959. On 13 April 1960, Andaang's widow
and sole heir, Cristeta Santiago vda. de Gani, executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale adjudicating to herself the land in
dispute and at the same time selling it to Jikirum. Consequently, a
TCT was issued in the name of Jikirum.
CA 141 requires the applicant for a homestead patent, to enter in
possession of, improve and cultivate the land. Petitioners, insist that
Andaang did not comply with these requirements. A person deprived
of the land, estate, or interest therein by virtue of a decree of
registration may avail of the remedy provided under Section 38 of Act
496. Section 38, however, contemplates of an external fraud. In the
case of Libudan vs. Gil, the Court explained the scope of external or
collateral fraud as any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing
litigant "outside the trial of the case against the defeated party, or his
agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case". The
fraud being attributed to Andaang is not extrinsic and collateral.
Granting that Andaang committed extrinsic and collateral fraud,
respondents failed to avail of the remedy provided under Section 38
of Act 496 within the prescribed period. In Nelayan, et al. vs.
Nelayan, et al., this Court ruled that in the case of public land grants
(patents), the one-year period under Section 38 counted from the
issuance of the patent by the government.

Upon registration, the land in dispute falls under the operation of Act
496 and becomes a registered land. A homestead patent, once
registered, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title. Instead of
availing the remedy of Section 38 of Act 496, respondents filed an
action for partition, which must fail because a Torrens title is not
susceptible to collateral attack.

In any event, the respondents are not the proper parties to file the
action for reconveyance of the land in dispute. In the civil cases,
respondents did not claim that the land was privately owned and thus
not proper for homestead application. They only alleged continuous
possession of the land. The respondents acknowledged that the
Illegal Detainer case filed by the heirs of Gani Moro, only confirmed
Saupi Moro's physical possession of the land. This, however, did not
settle the issue of ownership of the land.

Evidently, the land was not privately owned by Gani Moro from whom
Saupi Moro acquired it. The land in dispute was part of public domain
before the issuance of OCT in the name of Andaang. If it were
otherwise, there would be no need for Andaang to file a homestead
application.

Respondents' action for partition effectively seeks to cancel the

homestead patent and the corresponding certificate of title. However,
even if the homestead patent and the certificate of title were
cancelled, respondents will not acquire the land in the concept of an
owner. The land will revert to the government and will again form part
of the public domain. The proper party to bring such action of patent
cancellation is the Government. This is provided for in Section 101 of
CA 141.

Considering the foregoing, the respondents is not the proper party to

file an action to recover possession of the land in dispute. Further,
they failed to timely avail of whatever remedy available to them to
protect whatever interest they had over the land.

The decision of the Shari'a District Court is set aside and another
one is entered dismissing the said complaint.