Korea and Algeria’s History Behind Non-violent
Protests: the Impacts in the Modern World
Jeeweon Moon
Korea International School Jeju, jiwonmoonnn@gmail.com
1. Introduction
On March 10th, 2017, the judges of South Korea’s
Constitutional Court brought their final verdict: the
impeachment of President Park Guen-hye, the 18th president.
President Park, now with the dishonorable title of the first
South Korean president to be impeached, stepped out of the
presidential palace, awaiting future trials for her charges on
bribery, corruption, and extortion.1 The citizens of South
Korea, who had marched out onto the streets for months, had
succeeded in their candlelight vigil.
South Korea’s recent movement, also known as the
Candlelight Protest, was multi-dimensionally novel.
Considering other successful and unsuccessful protests of
the past, South Korea’s demonstration holds particular value
in its non-violent nature. A Harvard Professor, Paul Chang,
replied in his interview with the Harvard Political Review,
that “what stood out most [from South Korea’s movement],
other than the incredible scale of course, was how civil the
protest was…[because] there was not even a hint of possible
violence.”2
A contrasting example to Korea’s non-violence is
another recent protest in Algeria that is considered a part of
the Arab Spring movement. In 2011, Algerian protesters
confronted with the national security in their capital, Algiers,
were inspired by Egypt, a country that successfully removed
their long-serving president.3 Yet in Algeria, the movement
was extinguished as early as January of 2011, and only small
riots that demanded basic infrastructures, wage, and water
continued.4 In one riot, more than 300 protesters were
injured during the clash with the police force, demonstrating
violence.
The juxtaposition of these two different protests
and their contrasting results can be attributed to each
nation’s unique history of protesting, and their history of
political and religious ideologies. This paper will compare
the history of Korea and Algeria, and determine how each
has distinctively impacted the protests of modern day society
in both nations. The reason that Algeria was particularly
chosen to be compared with South Korea was due to the
similarities between the two countries in population, gender
ratio, and age distribution. In 2017, Algeria’s population was
reported to be approximately 40 million;5 South Korea was
close to 50 million.6 The comparable population would
signify that the scale and the scope of the two different
protests would be relatively similar. The social
demographics also resemble each other. In South Korea,
1
about 45.52% of the population are aged 25 to 54 years, 7 and
in Algeria, about 42.93% of the population are,8
demonstrating that the proportion of working population is
almost identical in both nations. The gender ratio for both
countries are, on average, one to one (male to female).9
These analogous social demographics suggest that other
radically different factors between the two countries--such as
religion, politics, and economy--can be given more attention
when comparing the protests.
This paper argues that there are two distinctive
components from each country’s history that led one country
to end its protest in a peaceful manner and the other to erupt
into violence: the practice of pro-democracy movements in
Korean history and their transformation into candlelight
vigils, and the deeply rooted cultural confucianism and
collectivism of the Korean society that contrasts the violent
oppression of demonstrations in Algerian history, and their
fragmented political and religious identity.
2. Defining Non-violent Protests in History
The first important discussion for any social
movement is the distinction between a “revolution” and a
“protest.” Revolution is a “a novel structuring of society,
[and] a new and millennial order,” which means that for an
event to be labeled as a revolution, there must be “a change
in the fundamental laws or conventional norms of a political
system.”10 That is why the Arab Spring, in which several
authoritarian leaders were replaced with free and democratic
elections, is also known as the Arab Revolutions. However,
both the demonstrations in South Korea and Algeria cannot
be called the Candlelight Revolution or the Algerian
Revolution. Even though South Korea successfully
substituted their leader with a more liberal president, it did
not overthrow and introduce a novel government system--
the structure, the administration process, and the constitution
stayed intact.11 The Algerian protests of 2011-12 also did not
incite a major change to their government.12 Both
movements, therefore, are designated the name “protest,”
and need to be distinguished by a different factor: whether
the protests were nonviolent or not.
A nonviolent protest is not simply defined by the
absence of violence. Though violence is the key in
determining a protest’s nature, a non-violent protest has to
fit additional criteria.13 The definition must extend to include
specific behaviors people take in nonviolent protests, such as
“civilian-led action in which unarmed persons confront
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opponents using coordinated, purposive, sequences of
nonviolent methods.”14 Therefore, there is a clear difference
between the practice of pure nonviolence, which often
refuses any form of aggression with its basis in ethical and
religious reasons, and “strategic nonviolence,” in which
nonviolence is consciously chosen as a way to oppose due to
its advantages.15 Examples of nonviolent resistance include
“protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations.” 16
Throughout this paper, strategic nonviolence, nonviolent
resistance, unarmed struggle, and nonviolent protest will all
be referring to the concept above.
In history, “nonviolent” protest was associated with
words that have connotations for being “passive,” “weak,”
and “pacifist.” Violence seemed to require more awareness
and attention due to their scale of trouble and urgency, thus
distracting historians from properly studying minor and
major peaceful struggles.17
Recent studies of history yield a better evaluation
of unarmed struggles. The studies’ first rationale is that
nonviolent protests respect commonly accepted moral
beliefs people tend to adhere to. The demonstration of
political dissatisfaction represents people’s right to speech,
but at the same time, it also upholds the protection of human
life and dignity with its nonviolent methods.18 Often, people
associate nonviolent protests with “an indication of ‘human
development’...and…‘human empowerment.’”19 They are
evaluated as actions that advance human rights.20 The idea
that it does not go against the morals, but is also a sense of
human progressiveness, hugely appeals to the public.
Another ground behind such positive evaluation of
strategic nonviolence is due to its relatively successful
results in history. Past incidents have proven that nonviolent
protest is able to, and is highly likely to, bring out change
with the minimum number of casualties. For example, Erica
Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, the authors of the book
Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of
Nonviolent Conflict, gathered “Twenty-Five Largest
Resistance Campaigns, 1900-2006” and found that
nonviolent protests were 70% successful, whereas for
violent protests, only 40% were successful.21 Examples of
these successful protests include “Bolivia (1977, 1982),
Sudan (1985), Haiti (1985), Philippines (1986), South Korea
(1987), Chile (1989), Poland (1989), East Germany (1989),
Czechoslovakia (1989),...Bangladesh (1996), and Indonesia
(1998).”22
There are three reasons why nonviolent protests
often yield superior results to violent protests. First, it
appeals better to the public, thus bringing out greater
participation and mobilization. The lack of safety risks or
costs motivates more people to join, and there are less
physical limitations for women, elderly, or teenagers. There
are less casualties for people, and the prospect of being able
to return to their ordinary lives quickly comforts many
people.23 The social barrier also allows greater participation.
The festive-like atmosphere brings out unity among people,
and with less violence, people are able to turn their political
cause into humor or entertainment through singing, street
2
theater, and art. This helps bring down fear or uncertainty in
people’s minds, thus motivating them to take part.24 This
greater access to protest ultimately results in a larger
membership, which is one of the key factors in bringing out
a successful opposition.
The second reason that attributes to the success is
that nonviolent methods create more backlash for the regime.
Compared to when the regime oppresses a violent,
disorganized crowd, its retaliation against an unarmed group
brings out harsher condemnation from international
community, the nation’s population, and even the regime’s
own supporters. The leadership often has greater risks in
countering nonviolent protests because their actions may
produce dissent and fragmentation of their own supporters,
and an increased “external support for the resistance.”25 This
external support is created by a negative media portrayal of
governments repressing nonviolence, or sanctions from
foreign states. Often, nonviolent protests are much more
effective in provoking sympathy compared to physical
opposition.26 For example, when the footage of Israelis
suppressing unarmed Palestinians was broadcast in the
1980s, it had a significant impact on American society,
arousing sympathy among the American citizens.27
Therefore, it is less likely that a government will brutally
react to repress a peaceful movement for their fear of
extensive backlash.
The final reason that makes nonviolent struggles
more potent is the higher possibility for the protesters to
form a compromise or bargain with the regime. Chenoweth
and Stephan claim that the higher chance of arriving to a
resolution is due to shifting loyalties. In contrast to violent
movements, nonviolent movements “do not physically
threaten members of the security forces or a regime's civil
servants,”28 which means that certain members of the regime
will have less hostility and may actually shift in favor of the
resistance group. These shifting sentiments immediately
undermine the power of regime, thus motivating them to be
more willing to cooperate.29 However, Stephen Zunes, one
of the leading experts of strategic nonviolence in the United
States, argues for a different cause. He argues that the
government is simply less concerned about nonviolent
movements compared to those that require immediate
physical reprisal. Therefore, they are less likely to put
significance in the consequences of their compromises with
the dissenters.30 This general study of protests is later helpful
to understand how certain historical factors either enable or
impede nonviolence. Now, this paper will observe the
history of pro-democracy demonstrations in Korean society
during the 20th century, and how they have contributed to
the recent breakout of the Candlelight Protest.
3. History of Pro-Democracy Movements and Non-
violent Protests in Korea
South Korea’s history of pro-democracy
movements dates back to the days after the devastating
Korean War (1950-53). The first few movements, mostly led
by university students, inevitably broke out into violence;
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yet, the patterns of Korean protests gradually developed into
one of nearly complete nonviolence.
The first major social uprising in South Korea was
in 1960: the April 19th Revolt. It was a large scale pro-
democracy movement that was sparked by university
students against Korea’s first president, Syngman Rhee.
Rhee was determined to maintain his power in the
government. He amended the constitution in 1954, allowing
himself to run for presidency after his second term. After 12
years of his continued presidency, however, the citizens of
South Korea were discontent with the government. The
public’s political opinion was shifting towards Rhee’s rival
political party, Minjudang. It was especially the students,
who looked to the Western democracies as effective and
successful forms of government, that voiced their criticisms
against Rhee’s government.31 In 1960, Rhee’s flagrant
rigging of the vice-presidential election sparked the already
existing sentiments into action, driving students into the
streets to voice for a fair electoral process and democratic
principles. On April 11th of the same year, the movement
developed into a full-blown demonstration when a student’s
body was found in Masan Bay, burnt and badly injured by
police. The “violent hysteria” of the people in Masan
resulted in 15 deaths and more than 170 injuries.32 After
days of organizing, more than 50,000 students from over 30
different colleges gathered to protest in front of the National
Assembly. However, they were soon faced with uncontrolled
open fire by the police, which transitioned the movement
into a violent upheaval. On April 19th, more than 186 people
were killed, marking the day as the “4.19 Revolt.” Due to
international pressure from the United States, on April 27th
the president resigned.33
This first example of social uprising in Korean
history is not an illustration of nonviolence, yet the public’s
reaction to a student’s death in Masan is the first indication
of intolerance towards the government’s violent oppression.
The next democratic transition was in 1980: the May 18th
Gwangju Democratic Movement. Despite the relatively
successful 4.19 Revolt, in 1961 the South Korean
government fell under the control of Park Chung Hee. Park
remained in his office for 18 years, creating a “virtual
dictatorship” by strengthening presidential powers and
repressing any political oppression. He was also the father of
President Park Guen-hye, the recent president that was
impeached after the Candlelight Protest. However, Park was
assassinated in 1979. This sudden void of dictatorship
created anticipation for a truly democratic government that
swept over the citizens.
The excitement was soon shattered when an
internal coup succeeded in December, creating the next
dictatorship by Chun Doo Hwan. As the anguished political
sentiments culminated among social activists, students,
laborers, and ordinary citizens, Chun’s government declared
martial law.34 On May 18th, the students in Gwangju rose to
actively resist the imposition of Martial Law. The
government responded to this by brutal military oppression,
killing 165 citizens and injuring many more. 35 Though this
3
movement failed to bring an immediate transformation of
the government, it acted as a catalyst to Korea’s democratic
movements and those in surrounding Asian nations.
Dandeniya Gamage Jayanthi, a political activist in Sri Lanka,
described the May 18th movement as “a great source of
inspiration in the human rights struggle… [that helped]
demolish conventional impunity omnipresent in East
Asia.”36
The protesters of the May 18th Movement could
also not avoid violent interactions with the government.
However, the movement was yet another indisputable
exemplification of the pro-democratic values persistent in
Korean society. The fact that such values were reiterated
after the April 19th Movement was enough to transform the
political atmosphere in South Korea. In the 2000s, the
fervent spirit of resistance began manifesting itself in a
nonviolent form--most prominently, in candlelight vigils.
The history of South Korea’s candlelight protests
dates back to 2002, when thousands of Korean citizens held
up candles in vigil for two teenage girls killed by American
soldiers. When the court trial concluded the soldiers to be
innocent, the vigil turned into a protest for a fair verdict37
and an amendment of U.S. and South Korea’s Status of
Force Agreement.38 Ever since this incident, mass civil
movements in Korea have taken the form of candlelight
protest that signifies the opposition to injustice. Another
major candlelight protest occurred in 2004 when citizens
protested against the impeachment of President No Mu
Hyun. More than 200,000 people came out to the streets,
consisting of both groups who agreed and disagreed about
the impeachment, but the protest ended in peace with no
casualties.39 In 2008, another public outcry was measured
against the government’s agreement to U.S. beef imports. As
the public concern for food safety -- and the dangers of
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, also known as Mad
Cow Disease -- intensified,40 more than 500,000 citizens
gathered in downtown Seoul (the capital city of South
Korea), returning again to the method of candlelight vigils. 41
Candlelight was engraved in the citizens’ minds as
the symbol of justice. The frequent recurrence of vigils and
protests that use candles provided citizens with practice and
training for any political uprising. It was implicitly agreed
within people’s minds that holding candles was the key to
representing public opposition. This historical practice of
pro-democratic movements and their gradual development
into a solid practice of nonviolence became an irreplaceable
basis for the recent Candlelight Protest against President
Park, which will be further elaborated in the latter parts of
this paper.
4. History of Anti-government Movements and Non-
violent Protests in Algeria
Algeria’s anti-government movement can be dated
back to the late 1980s (this paper does not include the
Algerian War of Independence in 1962, as decolonization
wars hold completely different social traits than internal
uprisings against a national government). In 1978, Chadli
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Bendjedid, the new president of Algeria, took office. 42
However, throughout the late 1970s to mid 1980s, Algeria
met national challenges of growing unemployment and a
drop in oil price (1985), resulting in economic instability. 43
In October 1988, the crisis overwhelmed the youth of
Algeria, and they took to the streets against the Front de
Libération Nationale (FNL), the single party ruling the
country.
The FNL reacted with brutality and heavy violence:
the protesters were arrested, the media was systematically
censored, and there was even outright torture to keep the
public at bay.44 Yet the young population continued to
protest against “the absence of presidential term limits; a
mismanaged socialist economy; and a tyrannical secret
service.”45 The demonstrations soon turned to riots. The
rioters attacked “public buildings, airline headquarters, and a
nightclub”46 until the actual army was positioned around the
city, and a state of siege was decreed by the government.
The riot ended with approximately 500 deaths. 47
Despite the violent progression of the protest, the
results seemed successful. It had ended the single-party
system that was persistent in the nation for more than a
decade, and introduced political pluralism.48 Yet, this
political transition did not last long. In 1992, only four years
after the violent uprising, a democratic election in which the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party had significant
advantage was nullified. The dramatic economic and
political reforms after 1988 were immediately undermined in
an explosion of civil war. The military that had temporarily
fallen into the back of Algerian politics reasserted its control
again. The Algerian security forces brutally reacted against
the equally aggressive Islamist parties, and the violent
upheaval continued for nearly a decade. Approximately
150,000 to 200,000 Algerians were killed, and more than
10,000 “disappeared,” who were believed to be abducted by
either sides forces.49 This era was also called the “Black
Decade.”50
Compared to the history in South Korea, Algeria’s
experience with political transition was more radical and
violent. The series of protests did not simply result in a
transformed government; the new form of pluralism, created
by people’s demonstrating, ended up with the outbreak of a
civil war. This contemporary history, still vividly evident in
different parts of the country, “left Algerians with a deep
fear of instability.”51 As will be mentioned further in this
paper, the nation’s history ultimately stifled the recent
Algerian protests in 2011, as both the government and the
citizens’ fear for another war was greater than their hope for
change.52
5. The History of Collectivist Ideologies and Culture in
Korea
When trying to find a cause for a modern day
phenomenon, though it is beneficial to look at sequential
events and how one has led to the other, it is equally
important to observe the history of ideologies and culture.
The cultural basis of a society is fundamental, meaning that
4
its impact cannot and should not be underestimated. The
most prominent culture in Korea is perhaps its Confucian
tradition and collectivist ideologies -- both of them leaving
permanent marks in the country’s progress towards
democracy.
The first aspect of culture is the Confucian tradition
in South Korea. Confucianism first originated in China, but
is unclear when it was brought into the dynasties in Korea --
the rough approximation is that it originated from the import
of Chinese classics in 108 BCE. Confucianism is considered
a branch of philosophy, a political system, or a religion.
Though interpretations may vary, Confucian traditions
nonetheless left a profound impact on Korean history. 53
Confucianism was developed from the teachings of
Confucius (551-479 BCE). The core of its doctrine is “to be
human,” focusing on the ethical and social roles people have.
It emphasizes human virtues like Ren (benevolence and
love), or Ye/Li (propriety). Another key aspect of the
ideology is people’s social relationship and respect to the
family, especially parents (filial piety).54 The Five
Relationship (Oryun) between parent and child, husband and
wife, sibling and sibling, friend and friend, and finally, ruler
and subject, was emphasized as the basis for a stable and
harmonious country.55 To Koreans in history, such harmony
and stability was necessary for them to persist through
hardships. Korea had frequently suffered through invasions
as a country surrounded by prominent empires in history
such as Mongol, China, and Japan. Withstanding national
insecurities, a certain mentality called ‘han’ was developed.
It was formed in accordance with Confucianism traditions,
transforming that permanent repression and inability felt
within an inferior country into desires for discipline and
group unity.56 This national mentality that developed is
demonstrated in various traditions and artifacts of Korea, the
most prominent one being the Tripitaka Koreana. Also
called the Janggyeong Panjeon, it is a collection of Buddhist
text engraved on 80,000 wooden blocks by hand. The
purpose of its construction was to defend the Koryu Dynasty
from Mongol invasions between 1237 and 1248 through
national unity. Worked on by countless monks and protected
by the people, Tripitaka Koreana is one demonstration of the
nation’s collectivist values.57 With more than centuries
cultivated in such Confucian traditions, even the modern
Koreans see “reciprocity in human relationships as an
indispensable daily value,”58 and it has created a majorly
‘collectivist’ society.
Collective culture refers to the prioritization of
group and the interdependence of members in society.59
Even before and after the rise and fall of the Joseon Dynasty
(1392-1897), the last dynasty of Korea, the value of
collective social harmony in Korea “has been highly
promoted by central governing institutions,” like educational
facilities.60 In both family and workplace structures, efforts
to achieve ‘we-ness’ and arrive at a consensus of opinion
thrive.61 The two most prominent examples of collectivism
is the country’s national education system and its
compulsory military system, as mentioned by Dr.Tan Soo
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Kee in the International Journal of East Asian Studies.62
National education systems like Membership Training (MT)
gather college freshman students on a mandatory trip, doing
teamwork-building activities and games to “promote
friendship and community spirit.”63 The compulsory military
conscription also creates this sense of communal identity, as
all male members of society are forced to build relationships
with new people, following discipline -- though often
perceived as being harsh -- directed towards a common goal.
Referring back to the definition of nonviolent
protests as using “coordinated, purposive, sequences of
nonviolent methods,”64 the success of nonviolent protests
relies on the strategic nature of the protests. Working in a
group is not an unfamiliar concept in Korea -- in fact, it is
most commonly exposed to all generations, especially the
youth, with education and military. Considering that the
Korean public was more accustomed and experienced in
strategic group behaviors, it is a factor that cannot be
overlooked when examining the causes of such a mass scale
social movement.
6. The History of Fragmentation in Algerian Political
and Religious Ideologies
In contrast to the collectivist norms of South Korea,
the historical culture and ideologies in Algeria are not
homogenous. The main justification behind this is the power
struggle between multiple Algerian groups after their
independence from France in 1962. In the summer of 1962,
nationalist leaders gathered in the Soummam Congress to
distinguish different roles during the process of gaining
independence. The main distinction was made between two
factions: the political branch and the military branch.
Toward the end of the Algerian war, the struggle between
the Gouvernement Provisioire de la République Algérienne
(GPRA) and Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) grew. It
ultimately ended with another conflict, and the army who
took control “marginaliz[ed] the political authority that had
negotiated independence with France.”65 Because of such
antagonism between the two factions, the experience of
struggle was a collective one, but the sense of ownership
during the postcolonial period was disjointed.66 The country
had lost a pivotal moment in history to provide a foundation
for a nationally united sense of identity.
Another major cause of the country’s fragmentation
can be found in the 1980s. Despite the draconian
government, Algeria was seemingly stable with its economy
during the 1960s and 1970s, mainly due to its heavy reliance
on oil revenues. In the late 1980s, however, the government
faced a steep decline of oil revenues, and was forced to take
on new ways of liberalizing the country.67 In 1989, the new
revision of the country’s constitution began allowing the
participation of multi-political parties other than the already
existing single political party, the National Liberation Front
(FLN). This led to the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS), which also acted as not only a political catalyst but a
religious one in the midst of an Islamist social movement.68
5
Islam was constantly associated with conflict in
Algeria -- during the French occupation, Islam provided a
common ground for anti colonial resistance.69 In the
postcolonial era, it opposed the secular militaristic regime of
FLN. It stepped in again in the late 1980s when the
country’s hidden issues were unveiled, including soaring
inflation, an unsettled youth population, and the growing
wealth gap between the people and the corrupted officials. 70
As this religious activism attempted to confront the
authoritarian government, it created three partisan
movements: The Movement for Society of Peace (MSP), the
Al-Nahda Tendency, and the FIS. The most important out of
all three was the FIS, gaining electoral success in both local
and regional areas, and criticizing the FLN party of its
secular governing. Threatened by their growing success, the
military dismissed the results of the election, creating
powerful religious unrest and ultimately causing the ‘Black
Decade’ mentioned above in this paper.71
This incident rattled the numerous radical religious
activists and political parties to their core, and these factions
still remain today as the basis of Algeria’s society. The
“mutual distrust” among those who have similar intentions
of opposing the government creates a weak anti-government
front,72 which is one of the primary factors that would have
hindered the development of a non-violent protest, in which
unity is the key. Comparing this progression of history to
South Korea, in which the overwhelming majority of the
people both intentionally and unintentionally adhered to the
Confucian traditions that motivated “unity and harmony,”
Algeria’s political and religious unrest provided a weak
foundation for a non-violent protest.
7. The Effect of History in Two Recent Protests
Until now, the paper has compared the parallel
history of two nations. Various factors were considered,
including how the anti-government movements progressed,
the nature of such movements, and the existence of violence
in them. The discussion was then extended to the
development of traditional unity, in the case of South Korea,
and the process of political and religious fragmentation in
the case of Algeria. The purpose of such comparisons was to
determine how the practice of anti-government movements
and the history of unity and fragmentation each contribute to
the development of non-violent protests in contemporary
society.
South Korea’s Candlelight Protest mainly began
with President Park’s scandal with Choi Soon- sil. In the
summer of 2016, Choi was pointed out by several news
outlets to have connections with the government, especially
after her wealth and her daughter’s preferential admission to
a university was revealed. The tension that was gradually
building finally erupted into a mass protest in October, when
a news organization, JTBC, found the abandoned computer
of Choi, with all of the country’s private national
documents.73 The documents, the so-called “Choi Files,”
contained various government legal documents, from
presidential speeches and personal schedules to human
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resources and diplomatic records, revealing how the
president had give Choi illegal access to the national
government.74
In October 2016, the first candlelight protest
against President Park broke out. At first, the protesters
called for President Park’s resignation. When she refused,
the citizens began to advocate for the impeachment of
President Park. On December 19th, the National Assembly
of Korea passed a bill to move on to the voting procedure for
Park’s impeachment, and thousands of citizens celebrated
this progress. For 134 days, people continued to light up
their candles in large public squares, like the Gwanghwamun
Square, until finally, on March 10th, the president was
impeached.75 The protest had lasted for ten weeks, recording
1.5 million people on the fifth protest, and ending with an
accumulated number of 10 million protestors,76 a large feat
for a country with a population of 50 million.
The protest included an extremely diversified group
of people ranging from the elderly, adults, and students, to
children, families, and celebrities. There was no political
party that dominated or led the protest, and the high
participation rate of ordinary citizens was noted by the
foreign media. Most notably, however, the protest was
completely nonviolent. The atmosphere of the protest was
described as one like a festival. On various protests, famous
Korean celebrities and singers performed. Large stages,
lights, and sound facilities were set up in the streets. People
created satirical shows, posters, and art by mockingly
dressing up as Choi, or using sarcastic humor to criticize the
president.77
Considering the gradual development of South
Korea’s anti-government protests and its trend, this
Candlelight Protest was a predictable extension of the
already existing history of candlelight vigils. To the people
of South Korea, the act of protesting against the government,
like the dictatorship and military regime of the 1980s, was
familiar. The majority of the participants in this protest, from
youth to the elderly, were also accustomed to the style of
candlelight vigils. The older generation had observed the
development of the candlelight vigil tradition, and the
younger generation was also frequently exposed to them
after the 2000s. The most recent candlelight protest before
this was only three years ago in 2014, as people came out
into the streets to mourn the sinking of a ferry with more
than 300 students.78 ‘Candlelight’ itself has become a
symbol of struggle and opposition in the country, and
therefore it was natural for the nation’s citizens to seek this
nonviolent method instead of breaking off into violent
protests. After the scandal, people immediately created
organizations like Bisang 2016 that were responsible for
informing specific venues and dates to citizens, showing
how experienced they were in dealing with a national
crisis.79
South Korea’s homogeneous traditions and
ideologies that stemmed from Confucian traditions,
continuing into the modern military and college culture, also
effectively created a sense of ‘collective determinism’ in the
6
protests. By November, the support rate of President Park
plummeted to 5%, which meant that almost 95% of the
citizens, an extreme majority, was opposed to Park’s
presidency.80The political front was largely unified for the
same cause, which was the president’s impeachment, and
even the left and right parties unanimously agreed upon the
necessity of such a decision. This collective goal can be
assumed as a major catalyst behind a quick spread of the
movement across the whole country, which ultimately led to
adding substantial weight behind the citizens’ demands even
in the absence of violence.
On the contrary, the way Algeria’s protests
progressed reflected their own history. The Arab Spring was
first ignited in Tunisia, with the self immolation of a grocer
named Mohamed Bouaziizi, who was harassed by local
officials.81 The movement of pro-democracy in Tunisia
spread rapidly to other Arab nations like Egypt, Yemen,
Bahrain, Syria, Libya, and Algeria. The spontaneous surge
of revolts were attributed with the word ‘revolution,’ all the
while maintaining its own distinctive meaning and value
from other historically upheld Western revolutions.82 On
February 12th, 2011, protesters gathered in the country’s
capital, Algiers, chanting for their president, Abdelaziz
Bouteflika, to leave. However, the protests soon turned to
riots and violence; video footage was released of the police
dragging and beating civilians.83The opposition was weak,
as only about 2000 gathered in Algiers, and it simply ended
up in a local, small scale expression of resentment rather
than a political act.84
Algerian society was too politically unstable and
fragmented for a joint action. Even 30 years after the ‘Black
Decade,’ or the Algerian Civil War, the public was not ready
to face another mass scale movement. The civil war had left
too many casualties for a political opposition to be
successful, which contrasted how past protests left clues for
Koreans to follow in its path for nonviolence. The vivid
history of violence and opposition actually hindered the
movement in Algeria from gaining momentum, as the fear
and distrust was still evident among the nation. Unlike
Korea, in which the people were reassured of the power to
create change via non-violent methods, in Algeria, “[the]
continuing failures of political dialogue….and heavy-handed
repressive tactics ensured an atmosphere of mutual distrust
in the country.”85Another major difference Algeria had with
its parallel example, Korea, was the society's fragmented
history, as thoroughly explained above in this paper. The
regime exploited this deeply rooted division of the Islamists
against the Democrats, and the military against the public.
For example, Bouaziizi’s regime bribed more than 30,000
policemen to ensure they oppose the civilians and remain
loyal.86 The protest also had its limits in the division
between the capital and other provincial areas; unlike Korea,
in which the protest spread simultaneously to ‘provincial
urban centers’ all around the country, 87 Algeria’s major
protest simply ended in Algiers. The fact that the political
and ideological divisions existed made it harder for it to gain
a regional support. Therefore, when the government
May 15, 2018, Moon
announced several compromises like price reduction for actually influenced a particular protest, and if so, how and to
food imports, the movement faded away, not reignited in what level it did.
other areas of the country.88 Despite its limitations, however, the implications of
However, even with the limits, the 2011 protests of this paper cannot be undermined. The fact that history can be
Algeria have more implications than just a hasty held accountable for a modern day phenomenon once again
condemnation of the nation’s history. Most importantly, this proves that a nation’s past behaviors and events must be
protest showed a sign of the younger generation’s growing recognized for their significance. It also leaves an
participation in marching, something that has not been implication that when studying these characteristics, if a
witnessed until recent.89 This could signify a potentially particular historical trend is to be found in a positive
positive outcome for future uprisings, as the youth could correlation with a progression of nonviolent protests, it could
gradually replace the older generations still entrenched in the signify the capacity to apply it to different social and cultural
memories of the nation’s civil war, bringing out a more contexts. Thus, different outcomes of social movements can
active and pressing political dialogue. An illustration of this be predicted, or at least be anticipated, to a certain degree. In
is the Barakat! (Enough) Movement of 2014, an opposition this rapidly growing politically conscious atmosphere, this
against Bouteflika’s running for the fourth term in could become a vital change to bring out nonviolent protests,
presidency. The movement was mostly led by youth activists, the power stemming from not only the absence of violence,
gaining support in social networking sites and public but the continuing symbol of justice and morality.
demonstrations in universities. The National Youth Council
was also formed, that aimed for “the political and economic
engagement of youth.”90 These recent trends that continued
from 2011 to 2014, and the rising involvement of the youth Endnotes
in an attempt to change the country’s political atmosphere,
1. Sang-Hun Choe, “South Korea Removes
imply how Algeria might be in the course of overcoming the
President Park Geun-Hye,” The New York Times, March 9,
historically derived obstacles it previously faced.
2017, accessed March 28, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/asia/park-geun-
hye-impeached-south-korea.html.
8. Conclusion
2. Andrew, Kim, “Protest: The South Korean
Though seemingly unrelated in their history, South
Weapon of Choice,” Harvard Political Review, Harvard
Korea and Algeria have created distinct patterns in history
University, April 8, 2017, accessed March 28, 2018,
that are comparable. When analyzing the two recent protests
http://harvardpolitics.com/world/south-korean-protest/.
of South Korea and Algeria, one successful and nonviolent
3. “Algeria Protesters Push for Change,” Aljazeera,
in its nature, and the other dismantled and oppressed, the
February 13, 2011, accessed March 28, 2018,
history of the two countries’ anti-government movements,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011212351
and their development of national unity and ideology
30627461.html.
juxtaposed one another.
4. Kamel Daoud, “The Algerian Exception,” The
South Korea’s pro-democracy movements starting
New York Times, May 29, 2015, accessed March 28, 2018,
with the April 19th Revolution in 1960, and the gradual
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/the-algerian-
development of the ‘candlelight vigil,’ unique to the
exception.html.
country’s unified and collectivist culture, greatly contributed
5. “Algeria,” The World Factbook, Central
in bringing out a successful protest to impeach the country’s
Intelligence Agency, 2018, accessed March 28, 2018,
18th president, President Park. Algeria’s anti-government
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
movements after the country’s independence, on the other
factbook/geos/ag.html.
hand, was series of violence. The politically and religiously
6. “Korea,” The World Factbook, Central
fragmented aggression reached its climax with the ‘Black
Intelligence Agency, 2018, accessed March 28, 2018,
Decade,’ resulting in a tragic massacre. There is a clear
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
correlation shown in the impacts a country’s political history
factbook/geos/ks.html.
and unification could have on recent, modern day
7. Ibid.
demonstrations.
8. Ibid.
This comparison and observation, however, is not
9. Ibid.
complete. It did not consider the more recent factors that
10. Isaac Kraminick, “Reflections on Revolution:
cannot be attributed to the nation's history, like the
Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship,” History
widespread usage of media as a communication and public
and Theory 11, no. 1 (1972): 26–63,
reporting method in South Korea.91 Additional research on
https://doi.org/10.2307/2504623.
more identical case studies of other Asian and Arab nations
11. Alexis Dudden, “Revolution by Candlelight:
would have confirmed whether certain characteristics unique
How South Koreans Toppled a Government,” Dissent
to these cultural spheres, like Confucian traditions in East
Magazine, 2017, accessed March 28, 2018,
Asian society, or Islamist Social Movements in Arab nations,

May 15, 2018, Moon

7
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/revolution-by-
candlelight-how-south-koreans-toppled-a-government.
12. Kamel Daoud, “The Algerian Exception.”
13. Kraminick, 30.
14. Joel Day, Jonathan Pickney, and Erica
Chenoweth, “Collecting Data on Nonviolent Actions:
Lessons Learned and Ways Forward,” Journal of Peace
Research 52, no.1 (June 2014): 129-133, doi:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314533985.
15. Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, “Why
Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
Conflict,” International Security 33, no. 1 (2008): 7–44.
16. Erica Chenoweth and Kathleen Gallagher
Cunningham, “Understanding Nonviolent Resistance: An
Introduction,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013):
271–76.
17. Kurt Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil
Resistance,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no.3 (May
2013): 277-290, doi:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313476530.
18. Russell J. Dalton and Christian Welzel, The
Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive
Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 318.
19. Ibid., 40.
20. Stephen Zunes, “Nonviolent Action and Human
Rights,” PS: Political Science and Politics 33, no. 2 (2000):
181–87, https://doi.org/10.2307/420888.
21. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why
Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
Conflict (Columbia University Press, 2012): 33.
22. Zunes, 182.
23. Chenoweth and Stephan, 38.
24. Ibid., 36.
25. Ibid., 225.
26. Ibid., 37.
27. Zunes, 184.
28. Stephan and Chenoweth, 13.
29. Ibid., 11.
30. Zunes, 184.
31. Quee-Young Kim, “From Protest to Change of
Regime: The 4-19 Revolt and the Fall of the Rhee Regime in
South Korea,” Social Forces 74, no. 4 (1996): 1179–1208,
https://doi.org/10.2307/2580348.
32. Ibid., 1185-87.
33. Ibid.,1189.
34. Chong-suk Han, “Kwangju Uprising,”
Encyclopaedia Britannica, May 11, 2018, accessed March
28, 2018, https://www.britannica.com/event/Kwangju-
Uprising.
35. “Human Rights Documentary Heritage 1980
Archives for the May 18th Democratic Uprising Against
Military Regime, in Gwangju,” UNESCO & Heritage, Korea
National Commission for UNESCO, 2011, accessed March
28, 2018, http://heritage.unesco.or.kr/mows/human-rights-
documentary-heritage-1980-archives-for-the-may-18th-
democratic-uprising-against-military-regime-in-gwangju/.
36. Ibid.
8
37. Sun-Chul Kim, “South Korea’s Candlelight
Protests a Peaceful Force,” The Asia Times, accessed May
14, 2018, accessed March 28, 2018,
http://www.atimes.com/article/south-koreas-candlelight-
protests-peaceful-force/.
38. Hyekyu Jung, “Exploded Anger of the Citizens
after the Death of Misun and Hyosun,” Voice of Public, June
11, 2012, accessed March 28, 2018,
http://www.vop.co.kr/A00000510804.html.
39. “From the 1987… Candlelight as the Sign of
Peace,” Chosun.com, Chosunilbo, December 6, 2016,
accessed March 28, 2018,
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/11/29/20161
12901790.html.
40. Jennifer S. Oh, “Strong State and Strong Civil
Society in Contemporary South Korea: Challenges to
Democratic Governance,” Asian Survey 52, no. 3 (2012):
528–49, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2012.52.3.528.
41. Jiyeon Kang, “Corporeal Memory and the
Making of a Post-Ideological Social Movement:
Remembering the 2002 South Korean Candlelight Vigils,”
The Journal of Korean Studies 17, no. 2 (2012): 329–50.
42. “Algeria Profile,” BBC News, January 8, 2018,
accessed March 28, 2018, sec. Africa,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118856.
43. Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short
History (Cornell University Press, 2004).
44. James D. Le Sueur, Algeria since 1989:
Between Terror and Democracy (Zed Books Ltd., 2013).
45. Kamel Daoud, “The Algerian Exception.”
46. Stora, Algeria, 196.
47. Ibid., 196-209.
48. Rabah Ghezali, “Why Has the Arab Spring Not
Spread to Algeria?” Huffington Post (blog), April 3, 2011,
accessed March 28, 2018,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabah-ghezali/why-has-the-
arab-spring-n_b_844182.html.
49. Dalia Dassa Kaye et al., eds., “Algeria,” in
More Freedom, Less Terror?, 1st ed., Liberalization and
Political Violence in the Arab World (RAND Corporation,
2008), 123–42,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg772rc.14.
50. Vish Sakthivel, “Political Islam in Post-
Conflict Algeria,” Hudson Institute, November 2, 2017,
accessed March 28, 2018,
https://www.hudson.org/research/13934-political-islam-in-
post-conflict-algeria.
51. Kamel Daoud, “The Algerian Exception.”
52. Ibid.
53. Edward Y.J. Chung, Korean Confucianism:
Tradition and Modernity (Seongnam: The
Academy of Korean Study Press, 2015), 19-143.
54. Ibid., 26.
55. Ibid., 77.
56. Jong Park, “The Experience of Elderly
Koreans’ Han and Its Implication for Spiritual Care: In the
May 15, 2018, Moon
Canadian Context” (Ph.D diss., Wilfrid Laurier University,
2013).
57. “Haeinsa Temple Janggyeong Panjeon, the
Depositories for the Tripitaka Koreana Woodblocks,”
UNESCO World Heritage Center, 1995, accessed March 28,
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58. Chung, Korean Confucianism, 79.
59. Diana D. Ahn, “Individualism and
Collectivism in a Korean Population” (senior thesis, Scripps
College, 2011), 6-7.
60. Tomasz Sleziak, The Role of Confucianism in
Contemporary South Korean Society, vol. LXVI (Committee
on Oriental Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 2013).
61. Ahn, 7.
62. Tan Soo Kee, “The Role of Korean
Collectivism in South Korea’s Industrialization Process.,”
International Journal of East Asian Studies 4, no. 1
(December 1, 2015), http://repository.um.edu.my/108381/.
63. Sin Sup Kim, “Where Should MT Culture
Head Towards To?,” Daily UNN, May 1, 2016, accessed
March 28, 2018,
http://news.unn.net/news/articleView.html?idxno=158644.
64. Day, Pickney, and Chenoweth, Collecting Data
on Nonviolent Action, 129.
65. Edward McAllister, “Immunity to the Arab
Spring? Fear, Fatigue and Fragmentation in Algeria,”
Journal of New Middle Eastern Studies 3, (January 2013).
66. Ibid., 7.
67. Ray Takeyh, “Islam in Algeria: A Struggle
Between Hope and Agony,” Journal of Middle East Policy
Council X, no.2 (2013), https://mepc.org/journal/islamism-
algeria-struggle-between-hope-and-agony.
68. Robert Mortimer, “Islam and Multiparty
Politics in Algeria,” Middle East Journal 45, no. 4 (1991):
575–93.
69. Ibid., 575.
70. Takeyh, “Islam in Algeria.”
71. Sakthivel, “Political Islam in Post-Conflict
Algeria.”
72. Ghezali, “Why has the Arab Spring Not
Spread.”
73. Youngyik Han, "Butterfly Effect," News Join,
2016, accessed March 28, 2018,
http://news.joins.com/Digitalspecial/120.
74. Yookyung Chung, "How Did Choi 'Control' the
President," Hankyorae, Hankyorae News, October 25, 2016,
accessed March 28, 2018.
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/bluehouse/767200.html.
75. Jiwoo Sim, "Ever Since 1987... Candle, the
Sign of Peace," Chosun.com, December 6, 2016, accessed
March 28, 2018.
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/11/29/20161
12901790.html.
76. Jihan Yoo, "5th Candlelight Revolution,"
Chosun.com, November 26, 2016, accessed March 28, 2018.
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/11/26/20161
12600797.html?Dep0=twitter&d=2016112600797.
9
77. Dudden, “Revolution by Candlelight.”
78. Sim, “Ever Since 1987.”
79. “2.25 17th Protest Mass Meeting,” Bisang
2016, February 24, 2017, accessed March 28, 2018.
http://www.bisang2016.net/.
80. “South Korea Leader Set to Be Questioned,”
BBC News, November 13, 2016, accessed March 28, 2018,
sec. Asia, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37966494.
81. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica,
“Arab Spring,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, January 14, 2015,
accessed March 28, 2018,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring.
82. William V. Spanos, “Arab Spring, 2011,”
Symplokē 20, no. 1–2 (2012): 83–119,
https://doi.org/10.5250/symploke.20.1-2.0083.
83. “Arab Revolution: Will Algeria’s Regime Be
the Next to Fall?,” Time, February 14, 2011, accessed March
28, 2018,
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84. Ghezali, “Why has the Arab Spring Not
Spread.”
85. Frédéric Volpi, “Algeria versus the Arab
Spring,” Journal of Democracy 24, no.3 (July 2013): 104-
115, https://research-repository.st-
andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/5118/Volpi_2013_Jo
D_Algeria.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
86. “Arab Revolution.”
87. Nan Kim, “Candlelight and the Yellow
Ribbon: Catalyzing ReDemocratization in South Korea,”
The Asia-Pacific Journal 14, no.5 (July 2017).
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88. Volpi, 107.
89. Karima Bennoune, “Algeria’s Long Haul
towards Liberty,” The Guardian, February 19, 2011,
accessed March 28, 2018, sec. Opinion,
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90. Nadine Sika, Youth Activism and Contentious
Politics in Egypt: Dynamics of Continuity and Change
(Cambridge University Press, 2017).
91. Sangwon Lee, “The Role of Social Media in
Protest Participation: The Case of Candlelight Vigils in
South Korea,” International Journal of Communication 12
(2018).
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