Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin Saldivar would mean the
loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as
general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with
whom private respondent was allegedly very close.

Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of
dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated
September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had
entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and
manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also
disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without
authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only
after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar. 1

It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company reglations by involving
herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the
articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and
whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.

Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar under preventive
suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side.
But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick
leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she
was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these findings. 2

After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to reinstate private
respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received
were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3

On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution dated December 29,
1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a
period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral damages. 4

Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2)
years' backwages.

On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.

1
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as technical
operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The
suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the
apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper
remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not
signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such
disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged
malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.5

Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process when she was promptly
suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984
"giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department
and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.

But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual separation from
employment was not for cause.

What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not merely lost her job
which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived without due process, but also
the compensation that should have accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:

Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by
existing laws.

Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."7 (Emphasis supplied)

Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone further than the 1973
Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-
poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a
whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor
is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian
and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's
Organizations and Human Rights.9

The opening paragraphs on Labor states

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled
to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be provided by law. 10(Emphasis
supplied)
2
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an Declaration of Principles and
State Policies that provides:

Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. The State shall ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration. 11

To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State is mandated to
protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give primacy to
the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore accorded them,
regardless of the geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.

It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to the present
formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice
and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are
giving now to social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national
development." 12

If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but
to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by
law has assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the
article on Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms,
where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the
employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies
provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even
went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove
any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to
labor "full protection." 13

To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal
of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14

The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the former, to
restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is
"to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from which one had been removed"15 and in the latter, to give her back the
income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."

Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the
hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.

Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of the case
and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years
of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the
company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as
when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing
extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable
estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22

In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay 23 or solely
separation pay. 24

In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor Code is clear a nd
unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full
backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived
from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words

3
employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of
the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of
exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer
and the employee.

In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and
confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be
generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.

A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the employee is a Vice-
President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge
of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the
union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit
organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to
the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32

Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can never be
possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human
nature. 33

Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who
shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his
relationship with his employer had already become strained. 34

Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that may be characterized as
a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and
employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who
has been unlawfully dismissed.

On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that may have created
conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees
from involving themselves with any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private
respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a
supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.

However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create a conflict of interests
situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the procurement of supplies.
Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other
words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.

In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have held countless
times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis which must
be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's
allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that
complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was
probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither
should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.

To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of the
findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support
manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had
direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the
records.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR on May
31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained obviously one-

4
sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his
having had a chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to
ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, justify
her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated December 29,
1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her
backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice, respondent.

Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things
provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and
ordered released.

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two
counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso,
at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land
dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered
immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the appeal of the
other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.

On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed
to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the
companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate
court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to
show conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of
compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal."1 The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was
denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute
and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."

5
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated
March 11, 1993:

It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned" in
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime
he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however,
Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows
that his exculpation is not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.

Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides for review
by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered,
the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant
must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he
contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was
imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim
because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending
was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent stands and,
therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation
for his imprisonment.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given
compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to
petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural
meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read:
"The following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned
but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."

But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is
reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be
acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For
example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which
case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the
quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case
the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended
parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages
and ordered deported.3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial
court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused
would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).

The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence of the accused but only
to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt,"4so is the
presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to
place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing
to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:

Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not
ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure
of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful
conduct do not exist.5

To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than with his
innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust conviction." If his
conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why
it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends
entirely on the innocence of the accused.

6
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the
Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and
the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .

To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence
or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted without malice, he failed
to observe in the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to
exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a
manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only
exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot
be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law
applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner,
in the notorious violation of the legal precept.

Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but,
in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is
unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the
accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is
not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be
erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an
unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an
erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was wrongful or that
it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that
petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was
petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived
together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into it.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he did or say anything on the
occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have committed any act at all.
Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as
having committed anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the
defendants. It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between
actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on
that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming together of the two defendants to an
agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's
contribution to the commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but
part of the dark shadows of that night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and other
circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the fact
that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed
upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these
circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in
disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

7
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA,
JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
AUTHORITY, et al., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.

Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February 23, 1995, created the Zamboanga City
Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law gives the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f), viz:

Section 7.

xxxx

(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities,
including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities;

xxxx

Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent Philippine E-
Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance.

PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as such licensor/regulator to the international
business and gaming community, drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the
present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or
regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.

PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not give power or authority to the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
Citing three (3) statutes, which it claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it likewise created economic zones and
provided for the powers and functions of their respective governing and administrative authorities, PAGCOR posits that the
grant therein of authority to operate games of chance is clearly expressed, but it is not similarly so in Section 7(f) of R.A.
No. 7903.

8
Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their respective pertinent provisions:

Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority Act" enacted on March 13, 1992:

Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. –

xxxx

(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. – The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, otherwise
known as the Subic Authority, shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-related activities subject to priorities and standards set by the Subic
Authority including games and amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which shall continue to
be licensed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the Conversion
Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested areas as a national park;

xxxx

Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone Act of 1995" enacted on February 24, 1995:

Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority – The Cagayan Economic Zone Authority shall
have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities,
including games, amusements, recreational and sports facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing gambling, casinos, golf
courses, and others, under priorities and standards set by the CEZA;

xxxx

And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic Zone Act of 1995," enacted on February 24, 1995 authorizing other
economic zones established under the defunct Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and its successor Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) to establish casinos and other games of chance under the license of PAGCOR by way of
the ipso facto clause, viz:

SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions granted to special economic zones
under Republic Act No. 7227 shall ipso facto be accorded to special economic zones already created or to be created
under this Act. The free port status shall not be vested upon the new special economic zones.

PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the above-quoted provisions of the ecozone-related statutes, Section 7(f) of R.A.
No. 7903 does not categorically empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize entities to
operate games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and "amusement" employed therein do not include "games of
chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes, ZAMBOECOZONE Authority’s grant of license to private respondent PEJI
encroached on its (PAGCOR’s) authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis the above-stated special laws to
centralize and regulate all games of chance.

ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment,1 contends that PAGCOR has no personality to file the present petition as it
failed to cite a superior law which proves its claim of having been granted exclusive right and authority to license and
regulate all games of chance within the Philippines; and that, contrary to PAGCOR’s assertion, the words "games" and
"amusements" in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 include "games of chance" as was the intention of the lawmakers when they
enacted the law.

In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam,2 PAGCOR cites the November 27, 2006 Opinion3 rendered by the Office of the
President through Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the pertinent portions of which read:

9
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related
activitiesincluding games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not
authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing
the same. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license
games of chance/gambling.

Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on its own, either directly or through
a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and
sports facilities."

It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. 4

The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention),
rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will,
and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis
non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.5

The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly different from
"game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a
pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment. 6 On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in
which chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value
against an uncertain event in hope of gaining something of value." 7

A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 with similar provisions in the three cited statutes creating
ECOZONES shows that while the three statutes, particularly R.A. No. 7922 which authorized the Cagayan Economic Zone
Authority to directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos within its jurisdiction, categorically stated that such power
was being vested in their respective administrative bodies, R.A. No. 7903 did not.

The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 8 Not any of these instances is present in the case at bar, however.
Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude "games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to
absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have easily
employed the words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to
operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922 enacted a day after R.A. No.
7903. But they did not.

The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion of the Office of the President which, after differentiating the grant of
powers between the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, states that while the former is
authorized to, among other things, operate gambling casinos and internet gaming, as well as enter into licensing
agreements, the latter is not. The relevant portions of said Opinion read:

The difference in the language and grant of powers to CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE is telling. To the former, the grant of
powers is not only explicit, but amplified, while to the latter the grant of power is merely what the law (RA 7903) states. Not
only are the differences in language telling, it will be noted that both charters of CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE were signed
into law only one (1) day apart from each other, i.e., February 23, 1995 in the case of ZAMBOECOZONE and February 24,
1995 in the case of CEZA. x x x Accordingly, both laws have to be taken in the light of what Congress intended them to be,
and the distinction that the lawmakers made when they enacted the two laws.

Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related activities
including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
10
ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and
gambling casinos.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not
authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing
the same. (Emphasis supplied)

Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the President, the latter’s interpretation of
R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical construction.
In applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases thereof – factors leading the
courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors
include the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness,
experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that
the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the
statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for
discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute. 8

In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to operate and/or license games of
chance/gambling.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is DIRECTED to
CEASE and DESIST from exercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the operation of
any games of chance. And private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated is DIRECTED to CEASE and
DESIST from operating any games of chance pursuant to the license granted to it by public respondent.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the December 10, 2008
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon.
Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage
between petitioner and respondent final and executory.

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following
disposition:
11
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and
respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal
consequences provided by law.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.2

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11,
2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required
motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting the
Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as
they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September
19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to
reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision
as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital
obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate
court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the
Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli 3 to the effect that the
"coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988."

Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The
CA, however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.

Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following

ISSUES

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10,
2008 CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT

APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE
NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE

TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD
"PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."
12
 C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO
MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.

D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION FOR

APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11,
2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.

III

THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE
PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5

From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to
the case at bench.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family
Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case,
which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.

She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision on its merits, still
the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In
the said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was
filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage
was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and decided
after the effectivity of both.

Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was
solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from
the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing
the mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as
required under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the
Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. 8

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."

13
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. 9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning
rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore,
there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."10

There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance of the
issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has
stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency
of claiming substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge
judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. 12

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration
considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced
in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this
clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered
thereto.1avvphil

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is
justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained
finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond the review
jurisdiction of this Court.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to respondent’s
appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court.
The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal. 14 In the recent case
of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural
right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal
considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional policy is
echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens
our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. 17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

14
___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.

Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond.1

The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:

In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:

Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award.

The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered
by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment
because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of
P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:

Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash
bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration
and duly accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal
claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation
and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the
Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the Rules of the
Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may
impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety
and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction
shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity
period of license. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in
compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited
workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."

15
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited by the
NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he
says, are governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:

Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as
provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and
the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof;
the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision and/or
award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running
of the period for perfecting an appeal.

Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis
supplied)

The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by
the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA
to the NLRC?

It was.

The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow
money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of
the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the
employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.

It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment of all
valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees whose
contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of
the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA)
and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.

As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a
last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged
against the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may
eventually be exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.

As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed employee,
the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were
to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the
satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may incur.

Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum
of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is a
simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of the special
risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or
effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are
intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our overseas
workers are to be sent.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken
that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-
podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond
16
required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow
money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such
redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction
that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II,
Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the
appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a
decision of the POEA.

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate of the
Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee, this
Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J, is on leave.

_______________________________________________________________________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991

RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA
GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING
CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR
CORPORATION, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP
No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition
for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:

On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga and Angeles City.

On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the said petition and stating inter
alia that:

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 . . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property owing and belonging to
said respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any other persons for the use and benefit of the same
respondents-debtors and/or the transfer of any property by and for the said respondents-debtors to
another, upon petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified and reputable sureties. (Annex 1,
Comment).

Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on
March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising the latter that
"the personal and real property which have been levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final
determination of the petition aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).

On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of insolvency order and resolution of the
case, alleging among other things, that in November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order; on
December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from disposing the personal and real
properties of the insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they (sic) appealed in
the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already shut down its
factory, sometime in March 1983, through their representative, they caused to be investigated the real properties in the
names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid
properties were already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of such development, it is their
submission that without an insolvency order and a resolution of the case which was ripe for resolution as early as March 3,
1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would be injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C").

On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the insolvency order (which has
not been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the transfer certificates of title already issued in its name (Annex "D").

On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and
Teresita Gatmaytan.

On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second urgent motion and motion to direct
respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor
(Annex "E").

On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of certain real properties of the insolvents
had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed within the period of redemption,
respondent court issued an order disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of all the registered
claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof, the said assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the
amount of P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so as to be able to perform his duties and discharge his
functions, as such.

The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the attendance, of course, of the assignee, on March
9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals, which the respective representatives of the parties-claimants
desire to clear with their principals, shall have already been reported.

The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which are now in the actual or constructive custody
and management of the receiver previously appointed by the Court on petitioners' and claimants' proposals be
placed under this actual or constructive custody and management, such as he is able to do so, as the Court
hereby dissolves the receivership previously authorized, it having become a superfluity. (Annex "F").

On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an order
directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from notice
thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430
in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").

In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the proceeds of television sets and other
appliances, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary attachment
on February 15, 1980 upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of P350,000.00. On March 4,
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1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names of
spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry of Deeds of
Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").

On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondents and their co-defendant
Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of
14% per annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs of suit (Annex
"5", Comment). After the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final and executory, a writ of
execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981, respondent sheriff of Angeles City
sold at auction sale the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and
the certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.

On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said properties; but respondent
sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.

On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among other things, that subject motion is
improper and premature because it treats of matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the reason
that the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought to the jurisdiction of the insolvency
court for the determination of the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the approved credits/liabilities of the
insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant the motion referring to
matters involved in a case pending before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex "l").

Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with its assailed extended order with the
following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order issued in pursuance of a similar motion of
the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby denied the motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and
directs the latter to participate in the supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by the duly elected
assignee. (Annex "J").

On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid
petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated July
1, 1986.

Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues —

1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF

JURISDICTION ONLY; and

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING FROM A
LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency
proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.

On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:

Sec. 32 — As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of the court shall, by an
instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real and personal
property, estate, and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such
assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the
acts upon the adjudication was founded, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and
effects in the assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne process, as the property of the debtor. Such
assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from
execution. It shall dissolve any attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the
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 insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty
days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered
by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed that the levy on attachment against
the subject properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35946, was
on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding
No. 1548, was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the issuance of the said attachment.
Under the circumstances, petitioner contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and
was not dissolved thereby.

Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which reads:

Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit
was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and
disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.

and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that the
subsequent Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject properties, was issued in
bad faith, in violation of the law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above
quoted Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject properties in its name.

Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit.1âwphi1 The provision of the above-quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency
Law is very clear — that attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the commencement
of the insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any action, including
judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30) days immediately prior to
the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off period — one (1) month in attachment cases
and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the
other hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved
before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the
claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no
conflict between the two provisions.

But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction
that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam
pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute — its every word. Hence, where a
statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction
as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA
1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).

Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be considered as a fraudulent transfer or
preference by the insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the case of Velayo vs.
Shell Co. of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and
transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all
other acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of their operation.

Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the jurisdiction of respondent
insolvency court so as to be made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the insolvency
proceedings.

Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and execution of Civil Case No.
35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former which were not within
its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET ASIDE.
The attachment and execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due course and petitioner's
ownership of subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.

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SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

________________________________________________________________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division, denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state
university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999
as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. 4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. 5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and
Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the
state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade
Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:

21
 That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-
ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City,
while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently
representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University
of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for
which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said
false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently
encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and
benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said
accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over
crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. 10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a
public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the
Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money
is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she
hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a
public office, petitioner’s stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is
not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this
definition, petitioner was compensated.14

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. 15 It ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution,
Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by
22
 public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court
has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.

Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a public
officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in
view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the
primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents,
to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate
powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be
provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the
government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with
the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University,
professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service,
and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of absence
under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to
remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of
trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body
of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a
member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this
Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position
classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former
President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly
ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 17 The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution
dated February 4, 2004.18

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION
23
AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED
IN THE INFORMATION."19

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged
was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the
government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when
a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial,
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. 20 Remedial measures as regards
interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. 21 The evident reason for this rule is
to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions,
thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal
until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case
is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.
The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is
entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash,
acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The
reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial
of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following
are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and
directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the
offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in
the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this
Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case
except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this
Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds,
this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

24
 In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on
double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case
except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside
on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law
yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. 25She repeats the
reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner
repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan. 28

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It
was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. 29

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;

"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

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" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding
the rank of senior superintended or higher;

" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;

" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and

" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued
in 1986.

" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.

" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action

26
 had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts
of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 31 Pursuant
to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. 32

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals. We quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from
any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which
such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity
in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and
fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such
public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses
defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust
or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where
there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law
and every part of the act is to be taken into view. 35 In other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to the
rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute
itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa
kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We
see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense
is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.

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In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held
then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14,
1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It
was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69).
On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD
No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709,
dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the
Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC
(Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent
parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason
that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the
Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees separately charged
for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by
penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by
government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be
possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student
regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office
of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer. 39 The 1987 Constitution does
not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices
and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it
(Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute
right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer."42

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
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Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held
that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as she is placed there by express provision of law.44

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer
as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. 46 At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. 48

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training. 49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is
not a corporation created for profit.50

The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no
Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not
ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation
to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent. 53

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P.,
"while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of
her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information
based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada’s private funds and not from the government coffers.
Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant,
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing
on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."

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Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that
should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as
a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro
D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name
different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may
warrant suspension or disbarment.56

We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the court
should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act
with complete candor and honesty before the courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona*, Nachura, JJ., concur.

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