US v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1
In the absence of the proclamation
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and
Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary
circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of
such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued
Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a
ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The
said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the Executive
Order. He was charged in violation of the said Executive Order and
was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence
countering that there was an undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.
Issues: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to
the Governor General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional
limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively
in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of
the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority
of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice
and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic
law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that
it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of
all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in
respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion
that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not
possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government
and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other
appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be
left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of
any prescribed fact or event.
Rulings:
Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime.
Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In
other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the
Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause” for
enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under certain undefined
conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard
to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced,
how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be
suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any
cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay
or corn,” Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the
proclamation should be issued.
no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at
all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act
or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or
qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one
ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price
greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
43 Phil. 1 – Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative
Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session)
passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the
Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG)
to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919,
the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on
August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be
sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of
rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said
amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale
was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was
charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged
and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine.
He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor
General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because
he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he
cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the
law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable
standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to
provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain,
so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the
place of all others without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which
the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in
all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of
the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which
may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Hirabayashi v. US, 320 US 99
Facts of the case
In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President
Roosevelt acted to prevent incidents of subversion and espionage
from individuals of Japanese descent living in the United States. He
issued two executive orders which were quickly enacted into law.
One gave the Secretary of War the power to designate certain parts
of the country "military areas" and exclude certain persons from
them. The second established the War Relocation Authority which
had the power to remove, maintain, and supervise persons who were
excluded from the military areas. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a
student at the University of Washington, was convicted of violating a
curfew and relocation order.
Question
Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the
military authorities discriminate against Americans and resident
aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the
curfew to be constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the
unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of military
installations and weapons production that occurred on the West
Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt
with their motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese
actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the
thorny relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the
Court viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued
that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents
having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater
source of danger than those of a different ancestry."
Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General
15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and
Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders
creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of
any… municipality… and may change the seat of government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a
special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing
funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims
that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the
RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which
provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues:
“If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio,
how can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only
barrios were barred from being created by the President.
Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be
created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through
Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create
municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create
barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may
delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec.
68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine,
with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the
public welfare may require” – which would mean that the President
may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is
present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper
delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public
welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes
hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as
the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be
changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT
the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities
is essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative
(not executive).