Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Rodolfo Caoili seeks a reconsideration of the Court's 18th June 1997 resolution dismissing his petition for review on certiorari. The
petition assails the resolution, dated 14 January 1997, of the Court of Appeals finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in refusing to exclude petitioner from a pending criminal case and to correspondingly amend the information theretofore filed with it.
The instant controversy, as well as the antecedent circumstances leading to the petition, could be said to have started when, in an
Information filed on 15 March 1995 with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")of Manila, Branch 51 (Criminal Case No. 95141750), petitioner,
Rodolfo "Rudy" Caoili, was charged, along with a certain Tony Yip, with violation of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1612. On 24 March 1995,
petitioner sought a review by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution, dated 16 February 1995, of Assistant Prosecutor Antonio R. Rebagay
that had found a prima facie case against petitioner that served as the basis for the information. In his ruling, dated 18 August 1995, the
Secretary of Justice directed the exclusion of petitioner Rodolfo Caoili from the Information. The Secretary opined:
The only issue posed in the petition is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to indict Caoili. To be liable for violation
of P.D. 1612, Section 2 thereof requires that the offender buys or otherwise acquires and then sells or disposes of any
object of value which he knows or should be known to him to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. The allegations of Atule and Azuela do not indicate that respondent Caoili acquired the skiving machines
in question knowing that the same were stolen property. The prima facie presumption of fencing from possession of
stolen property does not apply to Caoili as complainant reacquired the subject skiving machines not from respondent
Caoili but from Yip. It is difficult to give credence to the claim of Atule and Azuela that respondent Caoili told them that he
purchased the stolen skiving machines which he in turn sold to Yip. It is simply contrary to common human behavior that
a person would intimate to another or others an unlawful act, that he purchased stolen items and then dispose of it at a
profit. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.1
In declining to grant the corresponding motion of the prosecutor to exclude petitioner from the information in consonance with the ruling of
the Secretary of Justice, the trial court ratiocinated:
Considering the records of this case and it appearing that the Information was already filed in Court, the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused is now with this Court and the prosecution may no longer interfere with the judge's
disposition of the case.
The accused has to prove his allegations when his turn to present defense evidence comes because this allegations are
matters of defense to be proven in Court.
It is also noted that the Prosecutor has conducted the necessary preliminary investigation in this case; examined the
complaining witnesses; and there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed and
accused are probably guilty thereof. In fact accused Rodolfo Caoili filed his counter-affidavit before
the Investigating Prosecutor during the Preliminary Investigation of this case.2
Petitioner now insists, following the rebuff by the Court of Appeals, that the determination of a prima facie case of an investigating prosecutor
after the examination of declarants and his evaluation of the evidence cannot be considered as attaining finality while still subject to review
by the Secretary of Justice who retains the power and authority to either affirm or reverse the findings of subordinate prosecutors. That
prerogative, petitioner contends, is all up to the Secretary of Justice to take up so long as the accused has not yet been arraigned. Petitioner
concludes that respondent Court of Appeals has erred in affirming the trial court in its questioned order considering that the rule laid down in
Crespo vs. Mogul3 has already been abandoned by the pronouncements in Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals4 and Roberts, Jr., et al. vs. Court
of Appeals,
et al.5
It is too much of an exaggeration to say that Crespo vs. Mogul no longer holds. The Solicitor General correctly points out that Roberts did not
overturn or abandon but simply sustained the authority of the Secretary of Justice, recognized under Rule 112, Section 4, of the Rules of
Court, to review resolutions of provincial or city prosecutors or the Chief State Prosecutor upon petition by a proper party even while the
criminal case is already pending with the courts. It did, understandably, caution the Secretary of Justice from being indiscriminate on this
matter; thus, reiterating Marcelo, the Court has said:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining
a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any
case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed
resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.6
Roberts went on to quote with approval the Crespo rule in explaining the doctrine; thus:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as
[to] its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.7
Evidently then, the appellate court viewed and appreciated correctly the now prevailing Crespo-Marcelo-Roberts rule.
Needless to say, the holding of this Court, or of the appellate court, in this instance is not to be taken as having any bearing on the ultimate
disposition by the trial court of the case on its merits.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision 2 dated 06 January 2006
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of Presidential
Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.
SO ORDERED.4
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC’s finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a
Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount
of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private
complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires
specifically described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in 720
San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker
of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the
warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate
of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On
February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private
complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant
brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking
and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative.
Private complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was
composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza
was appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila.
The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves
across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire
from his display, which Atienza bought for ₱5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck
tires were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on
their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same
tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest
and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00
in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able
to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen
from his warehouse.5
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24)
years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain
Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for ₱3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for
₱45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold
Link).6
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and
came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were
stolen tires.7
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie
evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. 8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of
prision correcional.9
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.10
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in
this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the
warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen – testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to
prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565 11 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory List. 12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise
testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay 13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio. 14 The report led to
the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught
in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight
(38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession. 15
Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980. 16
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of
his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. 17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past
twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and
offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. 19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the
delivery of tires happened in just one day. 20 His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires
considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises the issue of the propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan 1
in Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 both entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina
Morada, Mario Matining and Rommel Luarca" wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders
as defined and penalized under P.D. No. 1829. The grounds for petitioners' Motion to Quash the Informations against them are that only petitioner Prudente
D. Soller occupied a position classified as Grade 27 and higher and because the offenses charged were not committed by him in violation of his office as
Municipal Mayor of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.1âwphi1.nêt
It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was shot and killed along the national highway at Bansud, Oriental
Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with petitioner Soller's son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a medical clinic located in the house
of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health Officer. The incident was reported to
and investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining. An autopsy was conducted on the same night on the cadaver of Jerry by petitioner Dr. Preciosa Soller
with the assistance of petitioner Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the Office of the
Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b) concealing
his brain; (c) falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one; and d) falsely stating in an autopsy report
that there was no blackening around his wound when in truth there was.
Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their
private medical clinic because it was there where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente Soller, who is also a doctor,
was merely requested by his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy considering that the procedure involved
sawing which required male strength, and that Mrs. Macabael's consent was obtained before the autopsy. The two (2) police officers denied having planted
three (3) shells at the place where the shooting took place.
The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an Information for Obstruction of Justice (Violation of P.D. 1829), and two (2) Informations 2
were filed with the Sandiganbayan which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522. The two (2) informations respectively read as follows:
"Criminal Case No. 25521
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA
SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense of
Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829,
committed as follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health
Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of JERRY
MACABAEL with intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence in the investigation of criminal case for
murder against the accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"Criminal Case No. 25522
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer, I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER,
PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense
of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829,
committed as follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal health
Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminal give false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and police
report to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agency, from apprehending the offender by reporting that there are several gunshot
wounds in the body of the victim, JERRY MACABAEL and that there is no tattooing (blackening) around the wound of the said
victim when in truth and in fact, there is only one gunshot wound and there is tattooing (blackening) around the wound which would
indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of the herein respondents spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; this motion was opposed
by respondent People. In its assailed Order dated April 14, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' Motion to Quash on the ground that the accusation
involves the performance of the duties of at least one (1) of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly charged together with that
official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all the co-accused. The Order stated that "the accused is the Mayor of the
municipality where the alleged incident took place and, therefore, any attempt to deviate or to present false evidence in connection with a criminal offense
committed in his municipality for which he is charged would be an offense also in which the accused Mayor would be probably held accountable before
this Court."
Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was filed on the premise that it is not among the functions of the mayor to conduct autopsies so that any
misdeed, if indeed there was any, could not be an offense which would put him under the jurisdiction of the court. Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
the Sandiganbyan ruling that:
"The enumeration of the functions of the mayor indicate very clearly that he is the primary executive and, therefore, necessarily the primary
peace officer of the municipality, for which reason, any action on his part which deviates from that function is an office-related offense. In this
particular instance, the accused is charged for having cooperated or co-participated with another public official of lower rank in the same
municipality in the supposed falsification of the results of an autopsy. Additionally, even if the functions of an autopsy were totally unrelated to
any of the administrative or executive functions over which the mayor may have supervision and, more specially, control, the fact of the matter
is that the jurisdiction of the Court covers not only the offenses committed by the officials of Grade Level 27 or higher as the principal accused
but even where such officials are also accused together with some other public officials who may be at a level below Grade Level 27 in
connection with the performance of their duties.
In this instance, accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who occupies a position at Grade Level 27, is co-accused with his wife, the Municipal
Health Officer who occupies a position at Grade Level 24, so that, necessarily, the offense attributed to the lower ranking officer elevates the
entire case to this Court primarily because somebody over whom this Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is accused together with the lower
ranking officer."3
Hence, this petition alleging that-
"RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED IN SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 25521 and 25522."4
Citing Section 4 of P.D. 1606 as amended, which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners claim that for an offense to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offense must have been committed by the officials enunciated in paragraph (a) "in relation to their office", i.e. it
should be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and should have been perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his official
functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in the information. Petitioners assert that in the subject criminal cases, the Informations do not
contain factual averments showing that they committed the acts charged in relation to their office, i.e., the acts charged are intimately connected with their
respective offices and were perpetrated by them while they were in the performance of their duties and functions.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, posits
that even if the offense charged was not committed by the accused while in the performance of his official functions, the same could still be considered
done in relation to his office if the acts were committed in line of duty. Respondent's position is that an offense may be considered committed in relation to
office if it arose from misuse or abuse of public office or from non-performance of an official duty or function; thus the offense of falsifying autopsy and
police reports is office-related considering that among the duties and functions of the municipal mayor in the exercise of general supervision and control
over all programs, projects, services and activities of the municipal government, is that he shall ensure that all executive officials and employees of the
municipality faithfully discharge their duties and functions. The fact that the informations do not allege that the acts charged were committed by petitioner
Prudente Soller while he was in the performance of his official functions or duties is not a fatal defect, as the conclusion of law that his acts are in violation
of his duties as municipal mayor could necessarily be deduced from the informations.
Petitioners, in their Reply, reiterate that the factual averments in the Information were fatally defective in view of the absence of any specific allegation that
would indicate that the crimes charged were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the performance of their official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into. 5 Furthermore, the jurisdiction
of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal cases, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action.6
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on May 25, 1999 charging the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension
and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829. The applicable statutory provisions are those of
P.D. No. 1606 as last amended by the Republic Act No. 8249. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as amended provides insofar as pertinent:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
xxx xxx xxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as provided by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.
xxx xxx xxx"
In Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,7 this Court held that the Municipal Mayor, who occupies Salary Grade 27 in the hierarchy of positions in the government
under Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services. Position Titles and Salary Grades, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
The bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may be considered as committed "in relation to their office" as this phrase is employed in the
above-quoted Section 4.
As early as Montilla vs. Hilario,8 this Court has interpreted the requirement that an offense be committed in relation to the office to mean that "the offense
cannot exist without the office "or" that the office must be a constituent element of the crime" as defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven
of the Revised Penal Code (referring to the crimes committed by the public officers). People vs. Montejo9 enunciated the principle that the offense must be
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though improper or irregular of his official functions.
The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Concepcion said that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in (the) abstract, the facts
in a particular case may show that -
"xxx the offense therein charged is intimately connected with (the accused's) respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed (the accused) had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown obeyed his instructions
because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City."10
The cited rulings in Montilla vs. Hilario and in People vs. Montejo were reiterated in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,11 Republic vs. Asuncion,12 and Cunanan vs.
Arceo.13 The case of Republic vs. Asuncion categorically pronounced that the fact that offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in
the information:
"That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office, must, however, be alleged in the information for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Section 4 (a) (2). This allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information."14
For this purpose what is controlling is not whether the phrase "committed in violation to public office" appears in the information; what determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific factual allegation in the information that would indicate close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. 15
In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 quoted earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses
charged in relation to their offices. Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/connection between the commission of the
offense charged and the discharge of official functions of the offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders
was committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as
amended. Although the petitioners were described as being "all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO I,
Sanitary Inspector and Midwife", there was no allegation that the offense of altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair
the veracity, authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder (Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and
fabricated information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the offender
(Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the performance of official function. Indeed the offenses defined in P.D. 1829 may be committed by any person
whether a public officer or a private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense. Moreover, the Information in Criminal Case No.
25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police and autopsy report "would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of
herein petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller". Thus there is a categorical indication that the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to
commit the offenses and they would have committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the position of Municipal Mayor or
Municipal Health Officer.
A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as enumerated in Section 444 of the Local Government Code will readily show that
the preparation of police and autopsy reports and the presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of criminal cases are not among such
duties and functions, and the broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis for construing that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner
Mayor fall under his functions as Municipal Mayor. 16 What is obvious is that petitioners spouses probably acted as the parents of the alleged assailant and
if at all, were motivated by personal reasons rather than official duty.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused
Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders are SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No
costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a Petition for Review, 1 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the February 13, 2004 Decision 2 and September
16, 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76019.
The facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner and likewise adopted by the CA, are as follows:
Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her fourteen (14) year-old grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was
entrusted to the care of the former by the girl’s grandmother and petitioner’s sister Leonila Angeles Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the
tender age of four.
Petitioner provided the child with love and care, catered to her needs, sent her to a good school and attended to her general well-being for nine (9)
memorable and happy years. The child also reciprocated the affections of her foster mother and wrote the latter letters.
Petitioner’s love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother respondent Michael Vistan, a former drug-addict, and the latter’s family
who were regular beneficiaries of the undersigned’s generosity. Michael would frequently run to the undersigned for his variety of needs ranging from day
to day subsistence to the medical and hospital expenses of his children.
In the evening of 11 April 1999, Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner for his failure to do a very important errand for which he was severely
reprimanded over the phone. He was told that from then on, no assistance of any kind would be extended to him and that he was no longer welcome at
petitioner’s residence.
Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts (sic), retaliated on 12 April 1999 by inducing his half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to leave petitioner’s
custody. Michael used to have free access to the undersigned’s house and he took the girl away while petitioner was at her office.
In the evening of that day, 12 April 1999, petitioner, accompanied by her friend Ines Francisco, sought Michael Vistan in his residence in Sta. Cruz,
Guiguinto, Bulacan to confront him about the whereabouts of his half-sister. He disclosed that he brought the girl to the residence of her maternal relatives
in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioner then reported the matter and requested for the assistance of the 303rd Criminal Investigation and Detective
Group Field Office in Malolos, Bulacan to locate the girl. Consequently, PO3 Paquito M. Guillermo and Ruben Fred Ramirez accompanied petitioner and
her friend to Hagonoy, Bulacan where they coordinated with police officers from the said place. The group failed to find the girl. Instead, they were given
the run-around as the spouses Ruben and Lourdes Tolentino and spouses Gabriel and Olympia Nazareno misled them with the false information that Maria
Mercedes was already brought by their brother Carmelito Guevarra and the latter’s wife Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon Province.
On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271 of the Revised Penal Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home)
against Michael Vistan, the Tolentino spouses, the Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes Vistan.
Warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against them and to evade the long arm of the law, Michael Vistan went into hiding. He dragged along with
him his half-sister Maria Mercedes.
From 12 April 1999 to 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan, with his little sister in tow, shuttled back and forth from Guiguinto to Hagonoy, Bulacan as well as in
Manila and Quezon City, living the life of a fugitive from justice. He eventually brought the girl to ABS-CBN in Quezon City where he made her recite a
concocted tale of child abuse against herein petitioner hoping that this would compel the latter to withdraw the kidnapping charge which she earlier filed.
In the early morning of 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan brought Maria Mercedes to the DSWD after he felt himself cornered by the police dragnet laid for
him.
Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off the hook from the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had
deliberately, maliciously, selfishly and insensitively caused undue physical, emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of which
were greatly prejudicial to her well-being and development.
Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five
counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD
1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
In a Resolution dated March 3, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig recommended upheld (sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but
recommended that only one Information be filed against Michael Vistan. The charge of Violation of PD 1829 was dismissed. Nonetheless, the Resolution
to uphold the petitioner’s complaint against Maria Cristina Vistan must (sic) remained.
However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for
Violation RA 7610. He also approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829.
On 14 April 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. This was denied in a Resolution dated 28 April 2000.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on 18 May 2000. She also filed a Supplement thereto on 19 May 2000.
In a Resolution dated 5 April 2001, Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, acting for the Secretary of Justice, denied the petition for review. The
undersigned’s Motion for Reconsideration filed on 25 April 2001 was likewise denied by then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a Resolution dated 15
October 2001.
On 26 November 2001, the undersigned filed a Petition for Review before the Office of President. The petition was dismissed and the motion for
reconsideration was denied before said forum anchored on Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death. 4
On March 18, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for review 5 before the CA assailing the Order of the Office of President. Petitioner argued that the Office of
the President erred in not addressing the merits of her petition by relying on Memorandum Circular No. 58, series of 1993. Petitioner assailed the
constitutionality of the memorandum circular, specifically arguing that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation because it diminishes the
power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. 6 Moreover, petitioner
contended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) erred in dismissing the complaint against respondent Michael Vistan for violations of Presidential Decree
No. 18297 (PD No. 1829) and for violation of Republic Act No. 76108 (RA No. 7610).9
On February 13, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision, dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.10
The CA affirmed the position of the Solicitor General (OSG) to apply the doctrine of qualified political agency, to wit:
When the President herself did not revoke the order issued by respondent Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs nor saw the necessity to
exempt petitioner’s case from the application of Memorandum Circular No. 58, the act of the latter is deemed to be an act of the President herself. 11
Moreover, the CA ruled that the facts of the case as portrayed by petitioner do not warrant the filing of a separate Information for violation of Section 1(e)
of PD No. 1829.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that the DOJ did not err when it dismissed the complaint for violation for RA No. 7610 as the same was not
attended by grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 16, 2004.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RELIANCE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE
PROVISIONS OF MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 58.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL BY THE DOJ SECRETARY OF THE
COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 1(E). P.D. 1829 (OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT
MICHAEL VISTAN.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF
R.A. 7610 (CHILD ABUSE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN. 14
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner's arguments have no leg to stand on. They are mere suppositions without any basis in law. Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum
Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation, because it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. 15 This argument is absurd. The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of
said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."16 The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance
on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
As early as 1939, in Villena v. Secretary of Interior,17 this Court has recognized and adopted from American jurisprudence this doctrine of qualified
political agency, to wit:
x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the
projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing
with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines."
This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's
bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the
direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of
that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a
department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers
v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160).18
Memorandum Circular No. 58,19 promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by
the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are
reiterated and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases
shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately
preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to
the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion 20 is
purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he
deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary –
his own alter ego.
Nonetheless, the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No less than the Constitution provides for restrictions. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in
his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:
x x x Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain prerogative
acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3,
sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).21
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. 22 The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. 23 The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive
power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.24
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be
considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as
Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose
upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important
duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latter’s expertise in said matter.
In Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,25 this Court discussed the predicament of imposing upon the President duties which ordinarily should be delegated to a
cabinet member, to wit:
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by
the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from
running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the
concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective
expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government.26
Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s position asking this Court to allow her to appeal to the Office of the
President, notwithstanding that the crimes for which she charges respondent are not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
It must be remembered that under the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO No. 292), the Department of Justice, under the leadership of the Secretary of
Justice, is the government’s principal law agency. As such, the Department serves as the government’s prosecution arm and administers the government’s
criminal justice system by investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders and overseeing the correctional system, which are deep within the realm of its
expertise.27 These are known functions of the Department of Justice, which is under the executive branch and, thus, within the Chief Executive's power of
control.
Petitioner’s contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving
the President of his power of control over the executive departments deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was
promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. 28 Memorandum Circular
No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular has the approval of the President.
Anent the second ground raised by petitioner, the same is without merit.
Petitioner argues that the evasion of arrest constitutes a violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829, the same is quoted hereunder as follows:
(e) Delaying the prosecution of criminal case by obstructing the service of processes or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscals' offices in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts. x x x
Specifically, petitioner contends that respondent's act of going underground obstructed the service of a court process, particularly the warrant of arrest. 29
This Court does not agree.
There is no jurisprudence that would support the stance taken by petitioner. Notwithstanding petitioner's vehement objection in the manner the CA had
disposed of the said issue, this Court agrees with the same. The CA ruled that the position taken by petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the law on
"obstruction of justice," in the wise:
x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue that unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re:
"obstruction of justice." Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing another offense of "obstruction of justice" if and when
the warrant of arrest issued for the former offense/ charge is unserved during its life or returned unserved after its life – and that the accused should be
charged therewith re: "obstruction of justice." What if the warrant of arrest for the latter charge ("obstruction of justice") is again unserved during its life or
returned unserved? To follow the line of thinking of petitioner, another or a second charge of "obstruction of justice" should be filed against the accused.
And if the warrant of arrest issued on this second charge is not served, again, a third charge of "obstruction of justice" is warranted or should be filed
against the accused. Thus, petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for "obstruction of justice" is counting and/or countless, unless and
until the accused is either arrested or voluntarily surrendered. We, therefore, find the position taken by petitioner as contrary to the intent and spirit of the
law on "obstruction of justice." x x x30
As correctly observed by the CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do not warrant the filing of a separate information for violation of Section
1(e) of PD No. 1829. This Court agrees with the CA that based on the evidence presented by petitioner, the failure on the part of the arresting officer/s to
arrest the person of the accused makes the latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a commission of another offense of obstruction of justice. 31
Petitioner, however, vehemently argues that the law does not explicitly provide that it is applicable only to another person and not to the offender himself. 32
Petitioner thus contends that where the "law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish."33
Again, this Court does not agree.
Petitioner conveniently forgets that it is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. 34
Courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly
made so by statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within them. 35 Any reasonable doubt must be resolved
in favor of the accused.36
Indeed, if the law is not explicit that it is applicable only to another person and not the offender himself, this Court must resolve the same in favor of the
accused. In any case, this Court agrees with the discussion of the CA, however sarcastic it may be, is nevertheless correct given the circumstances of the
case at bar.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the complaint against respondent for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, of RA
No. 7610. Said Section reads:
Any person who shall commit any other act of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development,
including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period.
On this note, the Provincial Prosecutor in disapproving the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor to file the information for violation of Section
10(a), Article VI, of RA No. 7610, gave the following reasons:
APPROVED for: (1) x x x (2) x x x The recommendation to file an information for viol. of Sec. 10 (a) RA # 7610 vs. M. Vistan is hereby denied. The
affidavit of Ma. Mercedes Vistan, the minor involved, is to the effect that she found happiness and peace of mind away from the complainant and in the
company of her relatives, including her brother, respondent Michael Vistan. How can her joining the brother be prejudicial to her with such statement? 37
Said finding was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
This Court is guided by First Women's Credit Corporation and Shig Katamaya v. Hon. Hernando B. Perez et. al,38 where this Court emphasized the
executive nature of preliminary investigations, to wit:
x x x the determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to
the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. For this reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in
the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of
Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioners will prevail only if
they can show that the CA erred in not holding that public respondent’s resolutions were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 391avvphi1
Were the acts of the Provincial Prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice tainted with grave abuse of discretion?
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
not at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 40
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the provincial prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice did not act with grave abuse of discretion, as their
conclusion of lack of probable cause was based on the affidavit of the alleged victim herself. The reasons for the cause of action were stated clearly and
sufficiently. Was their reliance on the victim's affidavit constitutive of grave abuse of discretion? This Court does not think so.
While petitioner would argue that the victim was "brainwashed" by respondent into executing the affidavit, 41 this Court finds no conclusive proof thereof.
Besides, even if their reliance on the victim’s affidavit may be wrong, it is elementary that not every erroneous conclusion of fact is an abuse of
discretion.42 As such, this Court will not interfere with the said findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice absent a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion. The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the prosecutor and
ultimately on the Secretary of Justice; it is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that this Court will not pass upon
absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 13, 2004 Decision and September 16, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
76019 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber, in violation of Presidential Decree ( P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry
Reform Code of the Philippines. According to the Information, the petitioners took away the truck that carried the lumber to prevent its use as
evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture. The Information specifically states as follows:
That at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning on November 15, 2002, in Caragsacan, Dingalan, Aurora, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforesaid principals, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, unlawfully,
feloniously and willfully have in their possession and control 818 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 10,253 board feet and valued at
P133,289.00 loaded on a ten-wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 and owned by the accused Santiago Castillo y Cruz without any
permit, license or documents from the proper authority and that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the following day,
November 16, 2002, the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not
be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime , [emphasis and
italics supplied]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused Santiago Castillo (Santiago), Frederico Castillo (Frederico), and Roger Mostera (Mostera) remain at large; accused Eddie Gatdula (Gatdula)
pleaded not guilty as principal to the crime; while petitioners Padiernos, Mesina, and Roxas pleaded not guilty as accessories to the crime.
Prosecution's evidence
The presented evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 15, 2002, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Officer (DENRO)
Felimon Balico (Balico) approached a truck loaded with lumber, which was parked at a national highway in Dingalan, Aurora ( Dingalan)3 The truck bore
the name "JEROME" with Plate No. TFZ-747. Balico requested from the truck driver, Frederico, and the truck helper, Mostera, the lumber's supporting
documents but they failed to produce any.
Balico reported the matter to SPO4 Ramil Gamboa (Gamboa) and SPO4 Romulo Derit. Thereafter, he proceeded to the DENR office to report the incident.
Some of the DENROs represented that the transportation of the seized lumber had the required permit but they, too, failed to produce any supporting
document.
The DENRO group - composed of Balico, Tarcila Vivero (Vivero) and Rodolfo Tumagan (Tumagan) - and the policemen, Gamboa and Romulo Derit,
guarded the truck loaded with lumber. 4
The DENRO group decided to transfer the truck and the lumber to the police station at Poblacion. They transferred the lumber first from November 15 to
November 16, 2002, and left the truck at the national highway in Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and some police officers. 5
On November 16, 2002, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos arrived at the place where the truck was being held in
custody.6
Santiago, who claimed ownership of the truck, 7 agreed with the DENROs and the police officers to bring the truck to the police station. Santiago gave the
truck key to Mesina who volunteered to drive the truck; while Padiernos asked Balico where the seized lumbers were. 8
Mesina started the engine and Roxas, Santiago, and Padiernos immediately got on board at the front of the truck. The DENRO group also got on board at
the back of the truck. SPO2 Renato Mendoza (Mendoza) and his companion, PO1 John Fajardo (Fajardo) follow on a motorcycle.
Since the truck was then parked opposite the direction to the police station, Balico thought that Mesina would maneuver the truck so that they could
proceed to the police station. To their surprise, Mesina increased the truck's speed and headed towards the direction of Nueva Ecija, leaving behind their
two policemen escorts9 who chased the truck and fired three warning shots. 10
As the truck sped faster, Balico yelled "Saklolo! Saklolo!" but the truck maintained its speed. SPO2 Mendoza corroborated this testimony; he and Fajardo
saw the three DENROs waving but could not hear what they were saying.
When the truck had exited Dingalan, SPO2 Mendoza and Fajardo decided not to pursue the truck anymore and simply reported the incident to the
Philippine Army stationed at Brgy. Tanawan.
The Philippine Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber machine gun and flagged down the truck at Brgy. Bagting, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. 11
As the truck passengers alighted, petitioner Padiernos uttered bad words to them, saying that they had no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber. 12
Police officers Gamboa, Joemar Balmores, Sagudang, Fajardo, and Mendoza 13 immediately proceeded to Brgy. Bagting where they found the DENRO
group, Padiernos, and Roxas. The DENROs and the policemen proceeded back to Dingalan, with police officer Gamboa driving the truck to the police
station compound.
Mesina testified that on November 16, 2002, he was watching television with his wife and children when his former employer, Santiago, arrived and asked
him to bring the latter's truck to Cabanatuan City. He refused Santiago's request because he knew that the truck had been engaged in illegal activities;
particularly, the truck had been previously loaded with lumber that were confiscated. 14
Santiago insisted and assured him that he would take care of everything and that there was really no problem with the truck. Mesina finally agreed and rode
in Santiago's car. Santiago asked him to fetch Roxas to accompany them. 15
Roxas was resting in his house when Santiago and Mesina arrived. Santiago asked Roxas if he could drive his truck to Cabanatuan City. 16 Roxas refused
because he had already heard of the truck's apprehension, 17 but he finally relented after Santiago assured him that there was no problem with the truck.
They proceeded to Caragsacan, Dingalan where the truck was parked. 18 On cross-examination, Roxas testified that he knew very well that the vehicle was
a "hot" truck but he relied on Santiago's claim that the problem already been settled. 19
On their way to Caragsacan, Dingalan, they saw Padiernos at the waiting shed of Aplayang Malaki, Dingalan. 20 According to Padiernos, he had been
waiting for a ride to Cabanatuan City from 12:30 to 1:30 p.m. but only Santiago's group came by. 21 Padiernos hitched a ride with them after learning that
they would bring Santiago's truck to Cabanatuan City. 22
Padiernos testified that he only learned where the truck was parked when they reached Caragsacan. 23
On reaching the place where the truck was parked, they all alighted from the car and walked towards the back of the truck; Padiernos crossed the street.
Mesina saw Santiago talk to DENRO Tumagan and several other persons for about 25 to 30 minutes. 24
Thereafter, Santiago handed the truck keys to Mesina. 25 Padiernos seated himself in the front cab of the truck with Santiago and Roxas, while Mesina took
the driver's seat.26 Mesina drove the car towards Cabanatuan City upon Santiago's instruction. 27
The petitioners unanimously testified that they did not hear people shouting or tapping on the truck to stop them. 28 They also did not notice any motorcycle
following them as the truck's side mirrors were broken. They did not reach Cabanatuan City because the Philippine Army flagged them down. 29
After the incident, Padiernos boarded a jeepney bound for Cabanatuan City while Roxas and Mesina boarded a jeepney bound for Dingalan. 30
The RTC's ruling
The RTC convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705. 31
The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that earlier had been used in violating P.D. No. 705 or the Forestry Reform
Code.32
The RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were categorical, straightforward, and consistent; they had no improper motive to testify
falsely against the petitioners.33 Thus, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' defense that they did not intentionally take away the truck. 34
The RTC also found that the petitioners' testimonies and admissions established their prior knowledge that the truck had been previously confiscated for
illegal transport of forest products. This explains the reluctance of Mesina and Roxas to go with Santiago in getting the truck. 35
The RTC further ruled that Padiernos' defense of denial fails in view of Balico's testimony that Padiernos gave the DENROs a "tongue-lashing" as they
had no right to apprehend the truck and its cargo.36 Padiernos' knowledge of the status of the truck is also undeniable as he admitted his familiarity
with the townsfolk of Dingalan and its rampant problem of illegal transport of forest products. The RTC concluded that the incident and the personalities
involved could not have escaped Padiernos' notice, yet he still went with them to get the truck. 37
Finally, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' claim that they did not hear the policemen's warning shots and the DENROs' shouts because of the noisy
engine and the defective windows of the truck. The RTC had observed during its ocular inspection of the truck that both windows were in order and sounds
outside could be clearly heard even with a running engine.38
The CA's ruling
The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and adopted its factual findings, but modified the penalty imposed on the petitioners. 39
The CA considered the subject truck as an "instrument" in the commission of the offense, within the meaning of Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). While the lumber had already been unloaded and placed in police custody, the truck still served as the essential link to the discovery of
the loaded undocumented lumber. Similarly, its presentation as evidence is material in proving the commission of the offense of violation of P.D. 705, as
amended.40
The CA added that since the petitioners' violation of P.D. 705 is mala prohibita, their intent, motive, or knowledge need not be shown. Nevertheless, their
defense of denial must fail in view of the evidence on record and their own admissions that they were aware of the truck's involvement in an illegal activity
at the time that they drove it towards Nueva Ecija. 41
The prosecution had also clearly established Padiernos's close association with Santiago, Roxas, and Mesina. Padiernos previously facilitated Santiago's
application for mayor's permit as a lumber dealer; Roxas is a family friend of Padiernos and his father is Padiernos's driver, while Mesina and Padiernos'
are long-time acquaintances.42
The Parties' Arguments
The petitioners argue that they could not be held liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705 because the DENROs and the police authorities had already
discovered the crime and had, in fact, control over the truck when the petitioners drove it towards Nueva Ecija. 43 Article 19 of the RPC only punishes
accessories who prevent the discovery of the crime.44
On the other hand, the respondent maintains that the petitioners' acts were aimed at preventing the discovery of the crime. The respondent alleges that
without the truck, the accused in the present case could easily produce the necessary transportation documents to account for the entire volume of the
confiscated lumber.45 The respondent refers to the testimony of James Martinez of CENRO Dingalan who tried to make it appear that the seized lumber
had the proper transportation permit for 8,254 board feet and 261 pieces of lumber. This transportation permit did not tally, however, with the actual
volume of the confiscated lumber of 10,253 board feet, totaling 818 pieces.46
The Court's Ruling
We emphasize at the outset the well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review. An appeal therefore empowers, and even
obligates, the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if these errors have not been raised. It is likewise settled that
when an accused appeals, he opens the whole case for a new trial. 47
The Court is therefore not precluded from determining the correct criminal liability of the appealing accused, and from imposing the corresponding
punishment in accordance with the charges in the Information and the crime proved during trial.
Thus, in People v. Manalili et al.,48 the Court held that since the Information in that case contained a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessarily constituting both the crimes of illegal possession of firearms and of murder, the separate crime of multiple murder may be validly taken into
account49 in the resolution of the appeal before the Court, although the appellants have been acquitted of illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled
that the appellants in that case were fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of multiple murder and granted a fair opportunity to defend themselves.
Even with this premise, we find that insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the facts alleged in the Information and the crime proved in the present case
do not make the petitioners liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations in the Information determine the nature of the offense, and not the technical name that the public prosecutor
assigns in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, the accused is not concerned with the technical name of the
crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. His attention should be directed and his interest should be on the facts
alleged. The real question is not "did he commit a crime given in the law with some technical and specific name," but "did he perform the acts alleged in
the body of the information in the manner therein set forth."50
In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of committing the following acts:
xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and
willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence
and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime.
Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners is not the allegation that they were accessories to the crime, which is merely the
public prosecutor's conclusion of law or the technical name of an accused's criminal participation under Article 19 of the RPC, but the factual
charges against them. In short, their alleged acts control in defining the crime for which they should stand trial.
These material factual allegations pertain to their act of conspiring with each other to take and carry away the subject truck so that it could not be used as
evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime. Notably, the petitioners had been
sufficiently apprised of these factual allegations, against which they should defend themselves.
Reading the facts alleged in the Information and proved at the trial, in relation with the legal definition of "accessories" under Article 19 of the RPC, we
find that the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705.
Article 19, paragraph 251 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the commission of the crime and without having participated therein,
either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or
instruments, in order to prevent its discovery.
Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime.52
In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had already been discovered at the time the petitioners
took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the truck and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the truck on
November 16, 2002, after its confiscation.
In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime charged in the Information as the legal definition of the technical term "accessories"
does not coincide with the factual allegations in the Information that serves as the actual criminal charge against the petitioners.
The factual allegations in the Information constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829
The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense committed by accessories under
Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute instead the criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829
entitled "Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."
P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders.
Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the following acts:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity,
legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in
the investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal cases; xxx" [emphasis supplied]
The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the petitioners' acts actually constituted a violation of Section 1(b)
above.
First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b).
The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying away the truck so that it could not be used as evidence
and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as a tool or instrument of the crime.
In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence that is indispensable in the criminal investigation and
prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the truck is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal possession/transportation of the
seized lumber as the permit for the transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the lumber. According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio
Pajimna,53 the transport of lumber should be covered with supporting documents that should be in the possession of the transporter.
Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. The term "suppress" means to subdue or end by force. 54
Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its availability and prevent its use as evidence in
the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved during trial.
It is undisputed that Santiago owns the truck, which serves as his link to the illegal possession/transport of the seized lumber. Santiago had every reason
and motive to take his truck after its confiscation. Without the truck, Santiago could be exculpated and the forthcoming criminal investigation or
proceedings for violation of P.D. 705 would be frustrated.
The petitioners' intent to take and carry away the truck is established by their knowledge of the status of the truck and their commission of the crime at
Santiago's prompting.
Notably, both the RTC and the CA correctly considered the testimonies of the witnesses and the petitioners' admissions in ruling that the petitioners knew
that the truck had been involved in the illegal transportation/possession of the seized lumber.
Mesina admitted that he knew the truck's involvement in illegal activities as it had been previously loaded with lumber that was confiscated.
According to Mesina, Roxas also initially refused to go with them because he already heard the news of the truck's apprehension. Roxas admitted
that he only agreed to join Santiago and Mesina, after being assured that there was no problem with the truck.
Padiernos' demeanor after the army flagged them down establishes his knowledge of the truck's involvement with the seized lumber. Padiernos uttered bad
words at the DENROs, saying they had no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber. This testimony, together with his close association with the other
petitioners, destroys his flimsy defense of denial.
The RTC's findings during its ocular inspection of the truck also prove that the petitioners deliberately drove the truck to Nueva Ecija despite evident
knowledge of the policemen's warning shots, tapping, and the DENROs shouting for help from the back of the truck.
Clearly, these testimonies, the petitioners' admissions, and the findings of the trial court negate the petitioners' defense of denial of their intent to take the
truck and their knowledge of the truck's involvement in an illegal activity.
The unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA - such as the petitioners' close association with each other, their flimsy defense of denial of their
intent to take away the truck, and the totality of their acts showing their common design to take the truck - lead us to conclude that the petitioners had
indeed mutually conspired with one another to take away the truck to suppress it from being used as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding
for violation of P.D. 705.
Since the crime charged in the Information and the crime proved during trial point to the petitioners' violation of P.D. 1829, we reverse the CA's findings
and find the petitioners guilty of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
Under Section 1 of the same law, the penalty for the crime of obstruction of justice is prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from
P1,000.00 to P6,000.00 pesos, or both.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals' decision dated May 10, 2007, and its resolution dated December 20,
2007. We find petitioners Jackson Padiernos y Quejada, Jackie Roxas y German, and Rolando Mesina y Javate GUILTY for violation of Section 1(b) of
P.D. 1829. They are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision correccional for 4 years, 9 months, and 11 days to 5 years, 4 months, and 20 days.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlib
The Fundador trademark characterized the brandy products manufactured by Pedro Domecq, S.A. of Cadiz, Spain. 3 It was duly registered in the Principal
Register of the Philippines Patent Office on July 12, 1968 under Certificate of Registration No. 15987, 4 for a term of 20 years from November 5, 1970. The
registration was renewed for another 20 years effective November 5, 1990.5
Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc., a Philippine corporation exclusively authorized 6 to distribute Fundador brandy products imported from Spain wholly in
finished form,7 initiated this case against Batistis. Upon its request, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a test-buy in the
premises of Batistis, and thereby confirmed that he was actively engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of counterfeit Fundador brandy
products.8 Upon application of the NBI agents based on the positive results of the test-buy, 9 Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of the Manila RTC issued on
December 20, 2001 Search Warrant No. 01-2576, 10 authorizing the search of the premises of Batistis located at No.1664 Onyx St., San Andres Bukid, Sta.
Ana, Manila. The search yielded 20 empty Carlos I bottles, 10 empty bottles of Black Label whiskey, two empty bottles of Johnny Walker Swing, an empty
bottle of Remy Martin XO, an empty bottle of Chabot, 241 empty Fundador bottles, 163 boxes of Fundador, a half sack of Fundador plastic caps, two filled
bottles of Fundador brandy, and eight cartons of empty Jose Cuervo bottles.11
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila formally charged Batistis in the RTC in Manila with two separate offenses, namely, infringement of trademark
and unfair competition, through the following information, to wit:
That on or about December 20, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then in possession of two hundred forty one (241) empty
Fundador bottles, one hundred sixty three Fundador boxes, one half (1/2) sack of Fundador plastic caps, and two (2) Fundador bottles with intention of
deceiving and defrauding the public in general and Allied Domecq Spirits and Wines and Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Leonardo P.
Salvador, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and engaged in manufacturing of Fundador Brandy
under license of Pedro Domecq, S.A. Cadiz, Spain, and/or copyright owner of the said product, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
reproduce, sell and offer for sale, without prior authority and consent of said manufacturing company, the accused giving their own low quality product the
general appearance and other features of the original Fundador Brandy of the said manufacturing company which would be likely induce the public to
believe that the said fake Fundador Brandy reproduced and/or sold are the real Fundador Brandy produced or distributed by the Allied Domecq Spirits and
Wines Limited, U.K. and Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter and the public.
Contrary to law.12
With Batistis pleading not guilty on June 3, 2003,13 the RTC proceeded to trial. On January 23, 2006, the RTC found Batistis guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of infringement of trademark and unfair competition, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds the accused JUNO BATISTIS Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 155 of the
Intellectual Property Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS.
This Court likewise finds accused JUNO BATISTIS Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 168 (sic) penalty of
imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND (Php50,000.00) PESOS.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the sum of TWENTY-FIVE (Php25,000.00) PESOS as actual damages.
The following items recovered from the premises of the accused and subject of the case are hereby ordered destroyed, pursuant to existing rules and
regulations:
Twenty (20) empty Carlos 1 bottles
Ten (10) Black Label empty bottles
Two (2) empty bottles of Jhonny (sic) Walker Swing
One(1) empty bottle of Remy Martin XO
One (1) empty bottle of Chabot
Two hundred forty-one (241) empty Fundador bottles
One hundred sixty-three (163) Fundador boxes
One half (1/2 sack of Fundador plastic caps, and
Two (2) filled Fundador bottles
Eight (8) boxes of empty Jose Cuervo bottles
WITH COSTS AGAINST ACCUSED
SO ORDERED.14
Batistis appealed to the CA, which, on September 13, 2007, affirmed his conviction for infringement of trademark, but acquitted him of unfair
competition,15 disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal of Appellant JUNO BATISTIS is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The challenged Decision is
AFFIRMED in so far as the charge against him for Violation of Section 155 of the Intellectual Property Code is concerned.
However, for failure of the prosecution to prove to a moral certainty the guilt of the said Appellant, for violation of Section 168 of the same code a
judgment of ACQUITTAL is hereby rendered in his favor.
SO ORDERED.16
After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, Batistis brought this appeal.
Issue
Batistis contends that:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF THE SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVITS AND TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS WHO CONDUCTED THE RAID ON THE HOUSE OF THE
ACCUSED.
He submits that the only direct proofs of his guilt were the self-serving testimonies of the NBI raiding team; that he was not present during the search; that
one of the NBI raiding agents failed to immediately identify him in court; and that aside from the two bottles of Fundador brandy, the rest of the
confiscated items were not found in his house.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
1.
Appeal confined only to Questions of Law
Pursuant to Section 3,17 Rule 122, and Section 9,18 Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA
imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court, explicitly so provides, viz:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies
and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in
the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Accordingly, we reject the appeal for the following reasons:
Firstly: The petition for review replicates Batistis’ appellant's brief filed in the CA, 19 a true indication that the errors he submits for our review and reversal
are those he had attributed to the RTC. He thereby rests his appeal on his rehashed arguments that the CA already discarded. His appeal is, therefore,
improper, considering that his petition for review on certiorari should raise only the errors committed by the CA as the appellate court, not the errors of the
RTC.
Secondly: Batistis’ assigned errors stated in the petition for review on certiorari require a re-appreciation and re-examination of the trial evidence. As such,
they raise issues evidentiary and factual in nature. The appeal is dismissible on that basis, because, one, the petition for review thereby violates the
limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they
were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin. 20
We rule that the penalty thus fixed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,26 as amended by Act No. 4225. We modify the penalty.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense;
and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, whose Section 1 requires that the penalty of imprisonment should be
an indeterminate sentence. According to Spouses Bacar v. Judge de Guzman,Jr., 27 the imposition of an indeterminate sentence with maximum and
minimum periods in criminal cases not excepted from the coverage of the Indeterminate Sentence Law pursuant to its Section 2 28 is mandatory, viz:
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior
and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the
Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty
specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.
Indeed, the imposition of an indeterminate sentence is mandatory. For instance, in Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, 29 three persons were prosecuted for and
found guilty of illegal fishing (with the use of explosives) as defined in Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1058, for which the prescribed penalty was imprisonment from 20 years to life imprisonment. The trial court imposed on each of the accused a straight
penalty of 20 years imprisonment, and the CA affirmed the trial court. On appeal, however, this Court declared the straight penalty to be erroneous, and
modified it by imposing imprisonment ranging from 20 years, as minimum, to 25 years, as maximum.
We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay,30 a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms punished by a special law (that is,
Section 2692, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act 56 and Republic Act No. 4) with imprisonment of not less than five years
nor more than ten years. There, the Court sustained the straight penalty of five years and one day imposed by the trial court (Court of First Instance of
Rizal) because the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law would be unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison sentence. Yet, we cannot
apply the Nang Kay exception herein, even if this case was a prosecution under a special law like that in Nang Kay. Firstly, the trial court in Nang Kay
could well and lawfully have given the accused the lowest prison sentence of five years because of the mitigating circumstance of his voluntary plea of
guilty, but, herein, both the trial court and the CA did not have a similar circumstance to justify the lenity towards the accused. Secondly, the large number
of Fundador articles confiscated from his house (namely, 241 empty bottles of Fundador, 163 Fundador boxes, a half sack full of Fundador plastic caps,
and two filled bottles of Fundador Brandy) clearly demonstrated that Batistis had been committing a grave economic offense over a period of time, thereby
deserving for him the indeterminate, rather than the straight and lower, penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the decision dated September 13, 2007 rendered in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 30392 entitled People of the Philippines v. Juno
Batistis, but modify the penalty to imprisonment ranging from two years, as minimum, to three years, as maximum, and a fine of ₱50,000.00.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
AQUINO, J.:p
This is an appeal of defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
which convicted them of robbery with homicide, sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay solidarily the sum of
six thousand pesos to the heirs of Ramonito Jabatan and the sum of five hundred pesos to Valentin Baylon as the value of fighting cocks
(Criminal Case No. 11082).
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around eleven o'clock in the evening of January 9, 1966, Gorriceta, who had just come from
Fort San Pedro in Iloilo City, was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister, Remia G. Valencia. While he was in front of the Elizalde
Building on J. M. Basa Street, he saw Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck.
Jaranilla requested to bring them to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred. He told Jaranilla that he (Gorriceta)
was on his way home.
Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's place. So,
Jaranilla, Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup truck which Gorriceta drove to Mandurriao.
Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta parked the truck at a distance of about fifty to seventy meters from the provincial hospital. Jaranilla,
Suyo and Brillantes alighted from the vehicle. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the direction of the plaza. After
an interval of about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared. Each of them was carrying two fighting cocks. They ran to the truck.
Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove the truck to Jaro (another district of the city)
on the same route that they had taken in going to Mandurriao.
It is important to note the positions of Gorriceta and his three companions on the front seat of the track. Gorriceta the driver, was on the
extreme left. Next to him on his right was Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes. On the extreme right was Jaranilla.
While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road
Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman Jabatan had
fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan
approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go down. They did not heed the injunction
of the policeman.
Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it. Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened
Gorriceta. He immediately started the motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the city. Jaranilla kept on firing
towards Jabatan.
Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta's house. Gorriceta parked the truck inside the garage. Jaranilla warned Gorriceta
not to tell anybody about the incident. Gorriceta went up to his room. After a while, he heard policemen shouting his name and asking him to
come down. Instead of doing so, he hid in the ceiling. It was only at about eight o'clock in the morning of the following day that he decided to
come down. His uncle had counselled him to surrender to the police. The policemen took Gorriceta to their headquarters. He recounted the
incident to a police investigator.
Victorino Trespeces, whose house was located opposite the house of Valentin Baylon on Taft Street in Mandurriao, testified that before
midnight of January 9, 1966, he conducted a friend in his car to the housing project in the vicinity of the provincial hospital at Mandurriao. As
he neared his residence, he saw three men emerging from the canal on Taft Street in front of Baylon's house. He noticed a red Ford pickup
truck parked about fifty yards from the place where he saw the three men. Shortly thereafter, he espied the three men carrying roosters. He
immediately repaired to the police station at Mandurriao. He reported to Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro what he had just witnessed. The two
policemen requested him to take them in his car to the place where he saw the three suspicious-looking men. Upon arrival thereat, the men
and the truck were not there anymore.
Trespeces and the policemen followed the truck speeding towards Jaro. On reaching the detour road leading to the airport, the policemen
left the car and crossed the runway which was a shortcut. Their objective was to intercept the truck. Trespeces turned his car around in order
to return to Mandurriao. At that moment he heard gunshots. He stopped and again turned his car in the direction where shots had emanated.
A few moments later, Patrolman Castro came into view. He was running. He asked Trespeces for help because Jabatan, his comrade, was
wounded. Patrolman Castro and Trespeces lifted Jabatan into the car and brought him to the hospital. Trespeces learned later that Jabatan
was dead.
Doctor Raymundo L. Torres, the chief medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City police department, conducted an autopsy on the remains of
Patrolman Jabatan. He found:
(1) Contusion on left eyebrow.
(2) Bullet wound one centimeter in diameter, penetrating left anterior axilla, directed diagonally downward to the right,
perforating the left upper lobe of the lungs through and through, bitting the left pulmonary artery and was recovered at
the right thoracic cavity; both thoracic cavity was full of blood.
Cause of death: Shock, hemorrhage, secondary to bullet wound.
Valentin Baylon, the owner of the fighting cocks, returned home at about six o'clock in the morning of January 10, 1966. He discovered that
the door of one of his cock pens or chicken coops (Exhs. A and A-1) was broken. The feeding vessels were scattered on the ground. Upon
investigation he found that six of his fighting cocks were missing. Each coop contained six cocks. The coop was made of bamboo and wood
with nipa roofing. Each coop had a door which was locked by means of nails. The coops were located at the side of his house, about two
meters therefrom.
Baylon reported the loss to the police at Mandurriao. At about ten o'clock, a group of detectives came to his house together with the police
photographer who took pictures of the chicken coops. The six roosters were valued at one hundred pesos each. Two days later, he was
summoned to the police station at Mandurriao to identify a rooster which was recovered somewhere at the airport. He readily identified it as
one of the six roosters which was stolen from his chicken coop (Exh. B).
Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con homicidio with the aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle,
nocturnity, band, contempt of or with insult to the public authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta as a state witness. Hence, the
case was dismissed as to him.
On February 2, 1967, after the prosecution had rested its case and before the defense had commenced the presentation of its evidence,
Jaranilla escaped from the provincial jail. The record does not show that he has been apprehended.
The judgment of conviction was promulgated as to defendants Suyo and Brillantes on October 19, 1967 when it was read to them in court.
They signed at the bottom of the last page of the decision.
There was no promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla, who, as already stated, escaped from jail (See Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court).
However, the notice of appeal filed by defendants' counsel de oficio erroneously included Jaranilla. Inasmuch as the judgment has not been
promulgated as to Jaranilla, he could not have appealed. His appeal through counsel cannot be entertained. Only the appeals of defendants
Suyo and Brillantes will be considered.
In convicting Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes of robo con homicidio, the trial court assumed that the taking of the six fighting cocks was robbery
and that Patrolman Jabatan was killed "by reason or on the occasion of the robbery" within the purview of article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In this appeal the appellants contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Gorriceta was the one who shot the policeman and that
Jaranilla was driving the Ford truck because Gorriceta was allegedly drunk. Through their counsel de oficio, they further contend that the
taking of roosters was theft and, alternatively, that, if it was robbery, the crime could not be robbery with homicide because the robbery was
already consummated when Jabatan was killed.
After evaluating the testimonies of Gorriceta and Brillantes as to who was driving the truck and who shot policeman, this Court finds that the
trial court did not err in giving credence to Gorriceta's declaration that he was driving the truck at the time that Jaranilla shot Jabatan.
The improbability of appellants' theory is manifest. The truck belonged to Gorriceta's sister. He was responsible for its preservation. He had
the obligation to return it to his sister in the same condition when he borrowed it. He was driving it when he saw Brillantes, Jaranilla and Suyo
and when he allegedly invited them for a paseo. There is no indubitable proof that Jaranilla knows how to drive a truck.
The theory of the defense may be viewed from another angle. If, according to the appellants, Gorriceta asked Jaranilla to drive the truck
because he (Gorriceta) was drunk then that circumstance would be inconsistent with their theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan. Being
supposedly intoxicated, Gorriceta would have been dozing when Jabatan signalled the driver to stop the truck and he could not have thought
of killing Jabatan in his inebriated state. He would not have been able to shoot accurately at Jabatan. But the fact is that the first shot hit
Jabatan. So, the one who shot him must have been a sober person like Jaranilla.
Moreover, as Jaranilla and his two comrades were interested in concealing the fighting cocks, it was Jaranilla, not Gorriceta, who would have
the motive for shooting Jabatan. Consequently, the theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan and that Jaranilla was driving the truck appears to be
plausible.
Was the taking of the roosters robbery or theft? There is no evidence that in taking the six roosters from their coop or cages in the yard of
Baylon's house violence against or intimidation of persons was employed. Hence, article 294 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be invoked.
Neither could such taking fall under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes robbery in an inhabited house ( casa habitada),
public building or edifice devoted to worship. The coop was not inside Baylon's house. Nor was it a dependency thereof within the meaning
of article 301 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having shown the inapplicability of Articles 294 and 299, the next inquiry is whether the taking of the six roosters is covered by article 302 of
the Revised Penal Code which reads:
ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building.—Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than
those mentioned in the first paragraph of article 299, if the value of the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods provided that any of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or egress.
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other similar tools.
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been broken.
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be
broken open elsewhere.
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, it is relevant to note that there is an inaccuracy in the English translation of article 302. The controlling Spanish original
reads:
ART. 302. Robo en lugar no habitado o edificio particular.—El robo cometido en un lugar no habitado o en un edificio
que no sea de los comprendidos en el parrafo primero del articulo 299, ... . (Tomo 26, Leyes Publicas 479).
The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated. as "uninhabited place", a term which may be confounded with the expression
"uninhabited place" in articles 295 and 300 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the translation of despoblado and which is different from the
term lugar no habitado in article 302. The term lugar no habitado is the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited house) in article 299.
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is that the malefactor should enter the building or
dependency, where the object to be taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should enter the building
(casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things. (See
Albert, Revised Penal Code, 1932 edition, p. 688).
Thus, where the accused broke the show-window of the Bombay Palace Bazar at Rizal Avenue, Manila and removed forty watches
therefrom, the crime was theft and not robbery because he did not enter the building. The show-window was outside the store. (People vs.
Adorno, CA 40 O. G. 567, per Montemayor, J., who later became a member of this Court). *
In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be considered a building within the meaning of article 302.
Not being a building, it cannot be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five
circumstances enumerated in article 302.
The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was construed as embracing any structure not mentioned in article 299
(meaning not an "inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof) used for storage and
safekeeping of personal property. As thus construed, a freight car used for the shipment of sugar was considered a private building. The
unnailing of a strip of cloth nailed over the door, the customary manner of sealing a freight car, was held to constitute breaking by force within
the meaning of article 512, now article 302. (U.S. vs. Magsino, 2 Phil. 710).
The ruling in the Magsino case is in conflict with the rulings of the Supreme Court of Spain that a railroad employee who, by force, opens a
sealed or locked receptacle deposited in a freight car, does not commit robbery. He is guilty of theft because a railroad car is neither a house
nor a building within the meaning of article 302 which corresponds to article 525 of the 1870 Spanish Penal Code. Article 302 refers to
houses or buildings which, while not actually inhabited, are habitable. Thus, a pig sty is not a building within the meaning of article 302. The
stealing of hogs from a pig sty is theft and not robbery, although the culprit breaks into it. Article 302 refers to habitable buildings. (Guevara,
Revised Penal Code, 1939 Edition, pages 555-6, citing II Hidalgo Codigo Penal 636-7, 642, which in turn cites the decisions of the Spanish
Supreme Court dated March 2, 1886 and April 25, 1887). **
As may be seen from the photographs (Exhs. A and A-1) Baylon's coop, which is known in the dialect as tangkal or kulungan, is about five
yards long, one yard wide and one yard high. It has wooden stilts and bamboo strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the shoulder of a
person of average height like Baylon. It is divided into six compartments or cages. A compartment has an area of less than one cubic yard. A
person cannot be accommodated inside the cage or compartment. It was not intended that a person should go inside that compartment. The
taking was effected by forcibly opening the cage and putting the hands inside it to get the roosters.
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused
were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is
punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes of theft (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, citing decision of Supreme Court of Spain dated July 13, 1894 and 36 C. J.
799; People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320; People vs. Villanueva, 49 O.G. 5448, L-10239, August 7, 1953).
Nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle are aggravating. Those circumstances facilitated the commission of the theft. The accused intentionally
sought the cover of night and used a motor vehicle so as to insure the success of their nefarious enterprise (People vs. Tan, 89 Phil. 647,
660; People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372).
Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating circumstance of recidivism which was alleged in the
information. They admitted their previous convictions for theft (130, 132 tsn; Exhs. I and J; Art. 14[9], Revised Penal Code).
The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 309[3],
Revised Penal Code). That penalty should be imposed in its maximum period because only aggravating circumstances are present (Art.
64[3], Revised Penal Code).
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act
No. 4103).
With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been noted that the evidence for the prosecution points to Jaranilla as the
malefactor who shot that unfortunate peace officer. The killing was homicide because it was made on the spur of the moment. The
treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately adopted by the offender (U.S. vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926; People vs. Tumaob, 83
Phil. 738; People vs. Abalos, 84 Phil. 771).
The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of authority on night duty at the time of the shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The killing
should be characterized as a direct assault (atentado) upon an agent of authority (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code) complexed with homicide.
The two offenses resulted from a single act. (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People vs. Lojo, Jr., 52 Phil.
390).
The evidence for the prosecution does not prove any conspiracy on the part of appellants Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes to kill Jabatan. They
conspired to steal the fighting cocks. The conspiracy is shown by the manner in which they perpetrated the theft. They went to the scene of
the crime together. They left the yard of Baylon's residence, each carrying two roosters. They all boarded the getaway truck driven by
Gorriceta.
The theft was consummated when the culprits were able to take possession of the roosters. It is not an indispenable element of theft that the
thief carry, more or less far away, the thing taken by him from its owner (People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; Duran vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 476; U.S
vs. Adiao, 38 Phil. 754).
It is not reasonable to assume that the killing of any peace officer, who would forestall the theft or frustrate appellants' desire to enjoy the
fruits of the crime, was part of their plan. There is no evidence to link appellants Suyo and Brillantes to the killing of Jabatan, except the
circumstance that they were with Jaranilla in the truck when the latter shot the policeman. Gorriceta testified that Suyo did not do anything
when Jabatan approached the right side of the truck and came in close proximity to Jaranilla who was on the extreme right. Brillantes pulled
his revolver which he did not fire (47, 53-55 tsn). Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make a person a co-principal
thereof.
Jaranilla heard Gorriceta's testimony that he (Jaranilla) shot Jabatan. Instead of taking the witness stand to refute the testimony of Gorriceta,
Jaranilla escaped from jail. That circumstance is an admission of guilt.
The instant case is different from People vs. Mabassa, 65 Phil. 568 where the victim was killed on the occasion when the accused took his
chickens under the house. It is distinguishable from the People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372 and People vs. Salamudin No. 1, 52 Phil. 670 (both
cited by the Solicitor General) where the robbery was clearly proven and the homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery. As
already noted, theft, not robbery, was committed in this case.
The situation in this case bears some analogy to that found in the People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 where the homicide committed by a
member of the band was not a part of the common plan to commit robbery. Hence, only the person who perpetrated the killing was liable for
robbery with homicide. The others were convicted of robbery only.
There is a hiatus in the evidence of the prosecution as to the participation of Suyo and Brillantes in the killing of Jabatan by Jaranilla. As
already stated, no robbery with homicide was committed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that those two appellants have any responsibility
for Jabatan's death. Their complicity in the homicide committed by Jaranilla has not been established.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellants Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes of robbery with homicide is reversed.
They are acquitted of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
As co-principals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks, they are (a) each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum and (b) ordered to indemnify
solidarily the complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum of five hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the costs.
As to the liability of Elias Jaranilla for theft and homicide, with direct assault upon an agent of authority, trial court should render a new
judgment consistent with this opinion (See Sec. 19, Art. IV, Constitution).
So ordered.
12.
G.R. No. 92020 October 19, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELISEO MARTINADO y AGUILLON, HERMOGENES MARTINADO y AGUILLON and JOHN DOE, alias "ROLLY", accused-appellants.
Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of Collections (MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued
RORs, date of collection, name of taxpayer,the amount collectedand the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the MRC with the attached
triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit (COA).
The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing
Registration (CAR) relating to the real property transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the issued ROR, its date,
name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax paid.
On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers Helen D. Rosario, Maria Lourdes G.Morada, Marina B. Magluyan and
Norma Duran, all from the central office of the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities of the appellant.
Among the documents reviewed by the audit team were the CARs furnished by the Assessment Division ofthe BIR; triplicate copies of
the RORs attached to the MRCs submitted by appellant to COA; and appellant’s MRCs provided by the Finance Division of the BIR. The
audit team likewise requested and was given copies of the RORs issued to the San Fernando, La Union branch of the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). A comparison of the entries in said documents revealed that the data pertaining to 18 RORs with the same serial number,
i.e., (a) 1513716, (b) 1513717, (c) 1513718, (d) 1513719, (e) 1529758, (f) 2016733, (g) 2018017, (h) 2018310, (i) 2023438, (j) 2023837,
(k) 2617653, (l) 2617821, (m) 2627973, (n) 3095194, (o) 3096955, (p) 3097386, (q) 3503336, (r) 4534412, vary with respect to the name
of the taxpayer, the kind of tax paid, the amount of tax and the date of payment. Of particular concern to the audit team were the lesser
amounts of taxes reported in appellant’s MRCs and the attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the CARs and PNB’s RORs.
The CARs showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax for ROR Nos. 1513716, 1513717, 1513718, 1513719, 2018017, and
2023438 totalled Php114,887.78, while the MRCs and COA’s copies of the RORs submitted by appellant, the sum of the taxes collected
was only Php227.00, or a difference of Php114,660.78. ROR Nos. 2018017 and 2023438, mentioned in CAR as duly issued to taxpayers
and for which taxes were paid, were reported in the MRC as cancelled receipts.
Likewise, PNB’s RORs bearing Serial Nos. 1529758, 2016733, 2018310, 2023837, 2617653. 2617821, 2627973, 3095194, 3096955,
3097386, 3503336, and 4534412, show that it paid the total sum of Php500,606.15, as documentary stamp tax. Yet, appellant’s MRCs
yielded only the total sum of Php1,115.00, for the same RORs, or a difference of Php499,491.15.
The subject 18 RORs were the accountability of appellant as shown in his Monthly Reports of Accountability (MRA) or BIR Form 16
(A). The MRA contains, among others, the serial numbers of blank RORs received by the collection agent from the BOR as well as those
issued by him for a certain month.
In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount reflected in the CARs and PNB’s 12 copies of RORs is
Ph₱615,493.93, while only Php1,342.00 was reported as tax collections in the RORs’ triplicate copies submittedby appellant to COA and
in his MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93, Thus, the audit team sent to appellant a demand letter requiring him to restitute the total
amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the 18 cases for malversation of public funds
through falsification of public document against him."4
More than ₱200 Prision 6 years and 6 years and 7 years, 8 years,
pesos but not mayorin its 1 day to 10 1 day to 4 months 8 months
exceeding minimum years 7 years and and 1 day and 1 day
₱6,000.00 and medium 4 months to 8 years to 10 years
periods and 8
Months
18 years,
2 months<
and 21 days
to 20 years/td>
Reclusion temporal in Not applicable in the present case since the proper imposable penalty to be imposed upon the accused in
its maximum period to already reclusion
reclusion perpetua perpetua
1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;
2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00;
3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱13,260.90;
4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱17,419.00;
5) Criminal Case No. 4638and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penaltyfrom 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20;
6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86;
7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱39,050.00;
8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱38,878.55;
9) Criminal Case No. 4642 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as m inimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱20,286.88;
10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱42,573.97;
11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱40,598.40;
12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱42,140.45;
13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱47 ,902.60;
14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱52, 7 40.66;
15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱75,489. 76;
16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱54,948.47;
17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱45,330.18;
18) Criminal Case No. 4651 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱37,842.05;
In addition, the accused shall pay to the Government the total amount of ₱614,268.73, plus interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment, by way of his civil liability.
SO ORDERED.
For this Court's consideration is the Decision 1 dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the
Omnibus Judgment2 dated September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No.
10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba,
who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized,
composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of ₱100 marked bills to be used in the
purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan
City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo
saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter
gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police
officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the
appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of ₱100 bill, thrown by the
appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant
which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and
(3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso ( ₱50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B.
Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as
well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia
Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The
laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline
substance contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the
following:
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point zero four one two
(0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.
In its Omnibus Judgment 5 dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive
portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling
shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the
offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos ( ₱500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu,
a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
SO ORDERED.6
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant
Allen Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He also argues that the chain of custody of the seized
shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took place. However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo,
there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation was successfully conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct your buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that Allen Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling
shabu. And after we evaluated this Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this accused for possible apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be
used for the operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxxx
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to
the police officer.
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys, approached the guy who was selling shabu at that
time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because in the pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel.
(sic) In the case, of this suspect, there was no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the shabu and the marked moneys to the
suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The poseur-buyer immediately proceeded to us and
informed us that the shabu was already given by the suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the
suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional rights and we immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the
attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
xxxx
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100 peso bills as marked moneys. 8
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the
offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.9 From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met.
The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also
satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic
chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic containing white crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and
that the petitioner was in possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets of suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated specimen, the result was positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
xxxx
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as well as the marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba is positive to the test for the presence of bright orange
ultra-violet flourescent powder. x x x10
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and
proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. 11 It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and
capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. 12 In People v. Roa,13 this Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and
importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is
true that Section 8614 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for
every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 15 of the Rules of the Court, which
police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. 16 A buy-bust operation is not
invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes17 is quite instructive:
In People v. Ganguso,18 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-
bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer.
Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca,19 that there is no rigid or textbook
method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense
with the need for prior surveillance.20
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing
the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.21
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the appellant is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA
9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation of the buy-bust operation, the
arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In the said search, the appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of
shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from him. However, based on his cross-examination, such denial
was not convincing enough to merit reasonable doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they recovered from your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they also found another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that no money was taken from you because you have
none at that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the ₱250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This ₱250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not ₱200 of the ₱250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were arrested by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested for ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested
positively for the presence of the said powder?
A: Yes, sir.23
Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common
and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be
proved with strong and convincing evidence.24
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of custody of the recovered dangerous drug. According to
him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon were present in
the buy-bust operation.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. 25 Its non-compliance will not render an
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 26 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 27 In this particular case, it
is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members of the buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who
signed the letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any way affect the integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper
chain of custody had been observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the consummation of the buy-bust operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the
suspect.
xxxx
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this [constitutional] rights and immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the
attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
xxxx
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the barangay officials. Now, when these barangay officials were present,
what did you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of ₱100.00 peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where were the marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces of sachets of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other
one during the search, what did you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of Inventory. 28
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking 29 of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking
after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence.30
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The
appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the
time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said
appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code 31
and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 32 the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its
retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as
provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia33 that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even
if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same
law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge
the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his
suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was
under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence,
when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of
minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.34
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows:35
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction
and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as
mandated in Section 9836 of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it
is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the
Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court in People v. Simon,37 thus:
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however,
reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and
which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned
did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances
whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given
supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by
Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where
there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually
taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of
penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
xxxx
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61
of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused.
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty
shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty
by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty
under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the
legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs
thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in
their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule
were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction
by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the
scale.1avvphi1
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce
the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this
reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the
lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis
valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be
forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress. 38
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority 39 can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the
proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having
been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower
in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.40 The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible
penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment
dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant
Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.