Mel Tappan’s Personal Survival Letter # 15

Issue No. 15

Communications and Monitoring for the Survivalist

by Mel Tappan

I got started listening to shortwave in my teens almost by accident. My voice changed early and I got a part-time
job as a radio announcer on the local network station in my Texas hometown. Not satisfied with my
high-school-kid-trying-to-sound-suave approach to the microphone, I wanted to listen to the best metropolitan
announcers across the country. The only thing that would pull in such stations in those days was a professional
communications receiver and a rather elaborate backyard antenna farm.

I saved my salary and bought one, noticing only casually that it also came with a selector switch that allowed tuning
on long-wave and several shortwave bands. It was months before the excitement of being able to hear Chicago,
Kansas City, and St. Louis wore off enough for my curiosity to impel me to explore SW1, SW2, and SW3, but
when I did, I was hooked. The idea of being able to tune in the world instantly, 24 hours a day, fascinated me- and
it still does.

While I was still in high school, I became head of the news department at the radio station because I had fast
breaking stories, often before they broke on the syndicated news wires, and I always had a wealth of detail that the
wires never carried. Later, when I was a portfolio manager in an investment counsel firm and then for mutual funds,
I usually had an edge on my competitors because of the short-wave receiver in the cabinet behind my desk.

Even now, I marvel at the sheer nerve of traders -especially commodities and currency traders- who presume to risk
large sums of their own and client’s funds without even being aware of the enormous advantage that superior
intelligence through shortwave listening could give them

When the trouble comes, monitoring the shortwave frequencies may be your only source of intelligence about the
state of the world, while at your retreat. Not only could the information you receive have barter value in your
community, it could save your life as well. Further, I am convinced that shortwave listening is the best single source
of information and the best early warning device available to the survivalist as we await the countdown for the
holocaust.

After you have a safe place to live with a good water supply, arms and ammunition, storable food, medical
equipment, and supplies, cut whatever budgetary corners you must to provide yourself with the basic radio
equipment you need.

Surely it takes little imagination to see the value of such gear in a post-holocaust world, but perhaps you feel that I
am overstating the case for its importance now. If that is true, let me invite you to conduct two simple experiments
and judge the matter for yourself.

First, spend an afternoon in the library browsing through the New York Times and other leading newspapers for the
three months or so preceding the crash of 1929.
That alone should convince you that the popular press is hardly a sufficient early warning vehicle for impending
crises. You may even find the headlines disturbingly similar to those in your current morning paper: no dire
warnings, business as usual, some areas of the economy in trouble, but government economists and officials are in
agreement that things are under control and strong measures are being taken by Congress and the Administration to
bring about a full recovery.

The specialty newsletters are of some help but I have noticed recently that some are becoming preoccupied with
peripheral matters such as nuclear power and, since they are really little more than specialized clipping services,
their material is no more reliable than their published sources.

If you remain unconvinced, then I would invite you to conduct experiment number two: rent a shortwave receiver
for a month and listen daily to the English language news broadcasts of at least four foreign radio services such as
the BBC from London, Radio Australia, RSA from South Africa, Radio Nederland from Holland, Deutsche Welle
from Germany, Radio Japan, the Vatican, Radio Exterior de Espana from Madrid, and the Arab Republic of Egypt
Broadcasting Corporation.

And don’t overlook the propaganda broadcasts from Radio Moscow, Peking, and Havana. Currently, Radio Iran
and Radio Angola are also worth monitoring. As news develops, tune in the country where it is happening, as well
as friendly and unfriendly neighbors.

Then make a list of the dozen or so items which you consider most significant and see how many of them you can
find covered meaningfully by your favorite domestic news source. I predict that you will never again be willingly
without a shortwave receiver and you will probably gain a new sense of urgency in making your survival
preparations.

The equipment you need for this kind of shortwave listening does not have to be very expensive because most
countries’ external service transmitters are quite powerful, and the time required is minimal. An hour or two a day
is enough once you have learned where to listen and what to listen for, but be prepared to become intrigued by a
new hobby. International shortwave listening, not to mention DX-ing is one of the most interesting pursuits you are
likely to encounter.

If you want to learn a foreign language, most countries offer courses on the air and supply textbooks at little or no
charge. You can collect live exotic ethnic musical performances on tape; hear excellent drama, travelogues,
political commentary, and a potpourri of other features interesting to the inquiring mind. You could even spend a
full day just analyzing the subtle changes in the Soviet attitude toward the US as reflected in Joe Adamov’s
vocabulary when he refers to this country on Radio Moscow broadcasts. At least one intelligence agency does just
that.

If you are interested in hearing hams around the world talking to each other, as well as the international or domestic
broadcasts from many of the smaller nations -as you probably will after the collapse- then you will need quite a
sensitive receiver and a good antenna, but even that quality need not cost more that $500.

As in any other field, it is easy to waste your money on junk or totally unsuitable (at least for the survivalist) radio
gear if you don’t know what to look for. With apologies where they are due, may I suggest that you be wary of
shopping for a shortwave receiver in a ham shop and of being advised regarding what to buy by a ham.
It isn’t that these people aren’t knowledgeable, it’s just that their game is very highly specialized and they are not
looking for the same things that we are.

I have had three subscribers who are hams recommend the same totally inadequate portable to me and it is not just
bad for a survivalist’s SWL, it is ​terrible​. Ham shops cater to hams and they make their money selling ham gear.
They may have a few shortwave monitors or communications receivers in stock, but their attitude seems to be “If
you are not into amateur radio, it doesn’t really matter what you buy just for listening to the international bands.”
Almost certainly, such shops are not qualified to make the modifications which are necessary on even the better
receivers to make them suitable for our purposes.

During the six months or so that I have been intensively researching this article I have investigated about a dozen
firms that specialize in selling shortwave listening and DX-ing equipment together with related books and
accessories- there aren’t many. The two that I feel entirely comfortable about recommending to you are:

Radio West Gilfer Associates, Inc.

3417 Purer Road P.O. Box 239
Escondido, CA 92025 52 Park Avenue
(714-741-2891) Park Ridge, NJ 07656
(201-391-7887)

Both are substantial and carry good lines and both have very knowledgeable people available to help you by phone.
Each has extensive technical capabilities and they can modify, align, and tune your radio for maximum
performance before shipping to you. I strongly suggest that you write for both of their catalogs as a first step, before
buying anything. If you decide on a Sony or a Panasonic and you will be satisfied with whatever comes out of the
box (if it doesn’t work, you deal with factory warranty), then the cheapest prices I have seen are from 47th St.
Photo, Mail Order Division, 36 E. 19th St., New York, NY 10003, (212-260-4410).

If you want to call and discuss your specific radio needs, modifications, and accessories, both Grant Manning of
Radio West and Perry Farrell of Gilfer’s have told me that they will give virtually unlimited advice to PSL
subscribers who identify themselves. Remember, however, to filter their excellent technical information through
your own specialized knowledge of survival requirements. The best shortwave receiver in the world may prove
unsuitable in survival use if it cannot be easily modified to operate from the DC current of a battery pack, for
example.

Before discussing specific recommendations, it may prove useful to pause for familiarization with some of the
terms that you will be hearing when you shop for your receiver. Sensitivity is the ability of a receiver to respond to
a radio signal when it is present. Generally speaking, you will want as much sensitivity as you can get, especially if
you have the means of controlling its intensity through an RF Attenuator or RF gain control (all of the really good
sets have them).

Sensitivity is one of the things you pay for in the better receivers, so determine how much you need or want and
how much you are willing to spend to get it (P.S. Make sure you do get it if you are paying for it Some of the higher
priced units are lacking in this regard).

Almost any brand name set that purports to be a short-wave receiver has enough sensitivity to pull in most of the
international broadcasts, but if you want to listen to the hams, the domestic service of the People’s Republic of
China, or an intelligence agent operating a 50-watt transmitter from Kuwait, you will need sensitivity of a much
higher order.
Selectivity or the ability to separate stations whose signals are close together on the dial is at least as important as
sensitivity and, perhaps, harder to find.

Rejection of images, spurious signals, and impulse noise must also be considered, especially if you plan to spend an
appreciable amount of time listening to short-wave.

Most hams and at least a few international broadcasters are now using SSB or single sideband transmissions in
preference to the older, more common AM (amplitude modulation). If you want to hear them or CW (continuous
wave- Morse code) intelligibly, your set must have a BFO (beat frequency oscillator) or a product detector.

Almost all of the better receivers have such controls, but how well they work is another matter. Try tuning in a ham
transmission to find out- CW is not sufficiently demanding.

Tuning accuracy and repeatability is a matter of consequence on any shortwave receiver, but it could be crucial
under survival conditions. There may not be many stations broadcasting after the collapse and they may do so only
intermittently, so if you find one, you must know exactly where it was if you want to find it again

Also, if you are monitoring for a coded signal from a hunting or security party, you must be able to wait exactly on
frequency since such signals -if they are to be of any value- must be of extremely short duration and precisely
timed. Only digital frequency readout will give you such repeatable accuracy and at least one of your receivers
should have that feature.

An S-meter for measuring incoming signal strength, together with an external antenna jack, a headphone jack, and
the provision for battery operation completes the list of major features you should look for. During normal times,
when the airwaves are full of signals, you will also need a bandwidth attenuator or narrow band selector to isolate
the signal you want to listen to.

In the next issue we will present a review of receivers ranging in price from $150 to $500, which we have found
suitable for survival applications- and we will warn you about some of the well-known brands and a few more
expensive models that are decidedly unsatisfactory for our purposes.

If you simply can’t wait to get started, consider one of these alternatives. For the very best practical coverage a
survivalist could want, get the Kenwood R-l000, but ​only as modified extensively by Radio West. As it comes from
the box it is not even mediocre. That will be your primary monitor.

Then consider the inexpensive, extremely compact but superbly performing Sony 5900-W for portable and backup
use. If you can only afford a single receiver, buy the Panasonic RF-2900 portable modified for better sensitivity,
selectivity, and increased narrow band attenuation.

There is a good deal more to be said about all three of these radios and there are a number of others that might meet
your particular needs better, but if you feel that you must act before the next issue reaches you. I do not think you
will be poorly served by these recommendations.
 Books, Records, and Tapes for the Shortwave Listener
by Mel Tappan

Tuning in a broadcast on a shortwave receiver is quite different from dialing the local top 40 station on the car
radio. It must be done slowly and precisely. Further, since there are literally thousands of signals available to you,
you need to have some idea of the times and frequencies on which the stations you want to hear broadcast.

The standard reference in this regard is the ​World Radio TV Handbook,​ published annually, and available for about
$15 from either Radio West or Gilfer’s. If you plan to do any systematic listening at all, this item is indispensable.
It will tell you the hours (in GMT) when each station is broadcasting, the languages used, when or whether special
beaming toward your location is practiced and it will give you some idea of program content.

Schedules and frequencies often change, however, between issues of ​WRTVH and for that reason, serious listeners
will want further information. You may find it interesting to write to all of the international stations that appeal to
you for their latest program schedules (be sure to specify the language you want to receive) and other promotional
literature. Some of the mailings -such as those from the People’s Republic of China- are spectacular. Almost all
are free and addresses, together with any special ordering information, will be found in the ​WRTVH​.

Another source -especially for exotic stations, pirate broadcasters, and clandestine radio- which I find indispensable
are the monthly guides published by various SWL and DX short-wave clubs. Three of the best are:

Speedx
P.O. Box E
Lake Elsinore, CA 92330 ($12 per year)

Review of International Broadcasting

Glenn Hauser
University Radio WUOT
Knoxville, TN 37916 ($12 per year)

Newsletter of the American Shortwave Listener’s Club

16182 Ballad Lane
Huntington Beach, CA 92649 ($13 per year)

Any of these organizations will send a sample issue for one dollar. If you write to Glenn Hauser, you may find
Issue #41 (July 1980) particularly useful as it contains a 24-hour, 7-day schedule of some of the best material
available on shortwave. The list is an especially good introduction to the variety of programming to which only the
SWL has access.

To avoid confusion, all shortwave schedules list universal time (GMT or Greenwich Mean Time). In order to
determine the relation of your local time to GMT you may dial in the National Bureau of Standards 24 hours a day
for a precision time signal -given every minute- and based on an atomic clock.
The frequencies are 2.5, 5, 10, 15, and 20 MHz. At various times of day and from various parts of the world, one or
more frequencies will be more easily received than the others. You may also want to write WWV for their free
literature on the background and uses of their broadcast facility. The address is: Radio Station WWV, 200 E.
County Rd 58, Boulder, CO 80524.

You will hear some strange sounds on the short-wave bands between recognizable programming, ranging from
radio signals emanating from nearby planets to Soviet jamming operations. Two very instructive recordings will
help you to better understand what you hear.

Robert B. Grove has a cassette available called, “Sounds of Shortwave” for $5.95 from Grove Enterprises, Inc. Rte.
1. Box 156, Brasstown, NC 28902 and Gilfer’s offers an LP, very professionally recorded by BBC personnel,
entitled “Long Live Shortwave”. There is some overlapping information on these two recordings, but I think you
will find them both helpful and well worth the cost.

The basic book on shortwave listening remains to be written and most of the small paperbacks that you will find in
the radio stores are hopelessly outdated and, frankly, imbecilic. Two that are worth looking into are Robert Grove’s
Communications Monitoring ($5.45 from the Grove Enterprises address given above) and ​The World in My Ears by
Arthur T. Cushen from Radio West or Gilfer’s.

Memo from Mel

Beginning with this issue, you may fairly focus any and all PSL complaints squarely on me. Bill Pier, already
overworked by the growth of his flourishing business, Survival, Inc., has agreed to sell his interest in PSL to me and
we are in the process of consolidating all of the operations -including production and mailing- in Oregon.

Finding a new typesetter, printer, etc., gathering stocks of paper, and the like are hectic and time consuming so I
hope that you will bear with us if you are inconvenienced in any way as the next couple of issues are produced.
After that, have at us. We intend to continue publishing the most practically useful survival newsletter available. If
we fall short, I want to know about it- personally.

As his time permits, Bill will continue to write for PSL and his firm still handles our monthly specials.

New Column
J.B. Wood, a long-time colleague and distinguished gunsmith-author, will be joining us with a regular “Survival
Gunsmithing” column beginning in our next issue. Jay will cover the basics of repair and maintenance of arms
specifically in the survival context. He will give you detailed information about the tools you will need and he will
spotlight chronic problems with specific guns.
All of my basic recommendations from ​Survival Guns will be covered in detail and each article will contain a
recommended spare parts list gleaned from Jay’s long experience and modified with the long-term survivalist in
mind.

In keeping with our policy of not reprinting information readily available elsewhere, I suggest that you purchase
Jay’s excellent firearms assembly/disassembly series available through Digest Books (Attention: Bob Anderson,
DBI, 540 Frontage Road, Northfield, IL 60093).

Together, they will give you complete instructions and illustrations for taking down virtually every popular modern
firearm. Jay will be referring to the text of these books in his series and you may find it hard to follow his
recommendations without them. Best, Mel

Survival Wheels
By Rick Fine

Continued From PSL No. 14

One machine which has managed to get through the maze, that you may want to take a look at, is the Mercedes
Benz Unimog. While it looks and drives like a 4x4 truck, and to anyone brighter than a very slow ten-year old it
obviously is one, our government types have decided that it is a farm implement. For once, the government has
screwed up in our favor. Somehow, Case Tractor Company has managed to import and sell the Unimog as the basis
for certain farm applications and snow removal equipment.

The Unimog has been in production for many years and is sold all over the world- except here. It’s an excellent 4x4
truck in the 1 ½-ton class, with unusually large wheels and good flotation. I must give it a cautious endorsement,
considering the obvious parts situation However, the Unimog is such an interesting vehicle that you may want to
visit your local Case dealer to see how good machines are put together.

We still have inquiries about the suitability of motorhomes of one sort or another for survival use. While some
construction standards have gotten a bit better over the past year or so, they are all still bad bets as survival
machines. If, for reasons unique to you, a behemoth-sized machine is necessary to suit your purposes, there is still a
way out.

You may buy a new short-wheelbase school bus, based on a Ford or Chevrolet chassis and equip the interior exactly
as you wish. The all-steel body and rugged construction will not literally torque to pieces off the road, as will most
of the motor homes on the market today. (Except Blue Bird, which is simply a school bus, factory converted to a
motorhome).

For those who wish to zero-time a machine, the old school bus can represent an excellent buy. While you will make
few points with your neighbors in the status race, the old bus can be bought for little money. Adding the cost of a
factory new engine of your choice, combined with exactly the sort of transmission and tires you require, still adds
up to a package price of less than the tariff on a cheap motorhome.
 Conclusion

As you may have gathered, the outlook for new equipment is bleak, and is not likely to get much better. I think you
can look forward to a few more things happening in the next few years:

1. Most full-size pickups will go out of production.

2. Most of the current engines in production today, which have been around for a while, will be replaced by small,
turbocharged units. The turbos are interesting in day to day street applications, but have no place in survival
planning.

3. Most of the full-size 4x4 equipment will go off the market. Since most of what we have available now is
incredibly dated compared to what’s available elsewhere in the world, the replacement items may be interesting.
I’m afraid, however, that there will either be no replacements or they will be as absurd as the Subaru or as
ill-designed as the new AMC Eagle.

4. Good used machines are becoming more expensive. The VW Thing for which I paid $1,500 nearly three years
ago is now worth nearly twice that. I recently saw a ‘61 Beetle advertised and sold for $1,995. Neat, considering
that the machine was only worth $1,500 new.

5. As the bureaucrats become more and more powerful, there will be less and less choice in the American
marketplace. Whatever you decide to do, do it now. Even if it involves buying an older machine to restore and
sticking it away until some time in the future, do it now.

Diesel Update

The new, small automotive Diesels have been getting a good bit of press of late. Some of it has been objective, but
a good bit of the balance has been a combination of pseudo-technical information mixed with sociopolitical
commentary concerning the oil industry.

I just completed about 1,800 miles of travel on the Oregon and California coast in my Diesel 10-wheeler military
truck, and made a few observations of interest. The first is that there is no longer the ten-cent margin between diesel
fuel and gasoline. Both averaged about a dollar per gallon. The most disturbing observation involved signs posted
at truck stops. One read “No Credit Cards for Cars”, and the other said, “No Cars on Weekends”.

The point of bringing this up is to illustrate a tremendous fallacy put forth by a number of Diesel-uber-Alles types,
who insist that Diesel fuel will always be available because the “big trucks” run on it. These people are right to a
point, but they conveniently fail to realize how very easy it would be to deny Diesel fuel to the operators of
passenger cars in the event of a real fuel crisis.

Obviously, the government would have no trouble at all imposing the same fuel restrictions on Diesel cars as on
gasoline cars in any situation. The truck stop operators may beat them to it, in that they really do not want to be
bothered -or to have their pumps tied up and their high-ticket customers delayed- by people who want $4.12 worth
of Diesel fuel.

The realities of the matter are as follows:

1. Diesel now is no cheaper than gasoline.

2. Diesel sources may be shut off to the consumer more readily than gasoline sources, since there are so few of
them.

3. Diesel engines cost considerably more to buy and far more to repair. The cost of maintaining a small automotive
Diesel is about the same as maintaining a comparable gasoline engine- the money is just in different areas.

Even though it leaves my seat empty on a currently very fashionable bandwagon, I must stick to suggesting that
unless you own a truck with an empty weight of over 12,000 lbs., you are best served in a survival context by a
gasoline engine. If it pleases you to own a Diesel-powered camper, luxury car, or pogo stick, go to it

Editing Error:

Errat. What can I tell you? The introduction obviously didn’t belong with the article on plague in Issue Number 14.
Bill was given the introduction from another article by the typesetter and I didn’t see his final past-up. It’s the sort
of thing that happens when your editorial facility is 900 miles from your production facility and it is also the sort of
thing that should cease when our consolidation in Oregon is completed.

Editor’s Note: We have reason to believe that a wave of terrorist activities is imminent within the borders of the
United States. The following article is the first in an irregular series that will be presented in PSL. Each will be
written by men who have extensive first hand experience in the field and recognized expertise. MT.

Bodyguards?
by Jeff Cooper

It may be that the phenomenon of terrorism is evidence of the breakdown of social order. The Western democracies
are in a state of moral uncertainty and incapable of taking official action against an attack of this sort. We may note
that terrorism is not a problem in dictatorships, nor has it been a problem in free societies which were on the rise
and successfully solving their social problems. It is clearly the decline of will which makes the acts we call
“terrorism” possible, since terrorists by definition never have a decisive degree of physical force at their disposal.

Any authority -state or private- which determines to wipe out terrorism can do so by taking Draconian offensive
action against the source of the problem. An example of this is that of Saladin who, when confronted with the “Old
Man of the Mountain”, simply mobilized his military forces and erased the terrorist base.

Today we do not seem prepared to handle this problem. Terrorism will succeed and will continue to increase in our
society. It is quite obvious at this time that the governments of the free world are essentially ineffective in
combating this thing. It becomes therefore clear that the people who are the objects of these acts must take their
own measures to save themselves.

As a professional teacher of weaponry, it is my belief that the only satisfactory protector any man can have is
himself.
This is not, however, a majority view and many people throughout the world are seeking to employ guards of
various sorts to interpose between themselves and their attackers. I teach weaponry, but weaponry alone is only a
part of the capacity that a guard force must have. In a majority of terrorist confrontations the act of violence can be
forestalled without gunfire, providing the people concerned are properly prepared.

Careful study of such films as are available on acts of assassination and violent attack illustrate that it is the surprise
with which the attacker strikes that makes his act successful. If the defender, either in person or through the agency
of his guards, ​expects​ an attack, it very rarely succeeds.

The problem is that it is very difficult for anyone to maintain a condition of combat alert at all times -even when he
is paid to do so- and even (more remarkably) when it is his life that is at stake. It is necessary for a bodyguard to be
adept in the use of his weapons, but it is more important that he be properly alert whenever he is on duty. This may
seem obvious but evidently it is not, because the disasters we see are almost always the result of a lack of alertness.

The shooting skills necessary for efficient bodyguard work are not extremely demanding. Any man with ordinarily
good balance, eyesight, reaction time, and coordination can be taught to use a handgun quite well with about
twenty-four hours of training time and 500 rounds of ammunition. Whether he will acquire the proper mental
conditioning and tactical attitudes is another matter.

In my opinion the greatest value that a security guard will receive from intense and highly sophisticated weaponry
training will be in the building of his personal confidence in his ability to confront violent situations. This is apart
from his actual shooting skills.

I have studied these matters now for nearly ten years and I am convinced that in most of the confrontations which
my clients and contacts report the success of the action was due more to self-confidence than to skill-at-arms. The
difference may not be vital, because one learns both at the same time.

More important than weaponry in the selection of guard personnel is personality type. The obvious difficulty is that
bodyguarding is not a profession which attracts a particularly high sort of person. Standing outside a door armed
and ready is not a career that most men would choose as a life work. We must face the fact that when we set out to
train hired bodyguards we are not going to be dealing with West Point graduates.

Much as we may regret to say it, the security business is one in which the public sector may have a built-in
advantage over the private.

For example, the men of the US Secret Service who guard our public dignitaries have a tradition of service ​and
esprit de corps,​ which cannot be matched by any private agency. These men are inspired by a sense of duty similar
to that of a trained soldier, whereas private guards are generally in the business for the money.

Right here we have a problem, because anything that can be paid to a guard as wages may be multiplied tenfold by
one who wishes to subvert him. No matter what salary you pay your guard, your enemy can offer him the sky to
avoid his duty.

The magnitude of such bribes is no problem because the attacker does not intend that they be paid. A bodyguard
who is bribed to betray his employer is quite sensibly killed with his employer, so that he will not have any stories
to tell and cannot demand his money.
A good friend and client of mine in Latin America was in the habit of maintaining a guard of four men at all times
when he was abroad. I asked him what he thought bound those men to him that was more powerful than what the
enemy could offer them. He felt that it was fear. He told me that these men could not betray him because they
would die if they did so. He was not aware of the corollary of that observation, which is that certainly they would
die but they would not be told- and that is exactly what happened.

My friend was aware of the need for irregularity in movement and he always traveled to and from his affairs by
different routes. The only way he could have been set up on the day that he was killed was for one of his
bodyguards to telephone the necessary information to his attackers.

All four bodyguards were killed in the assault without firing a return shot. My friend was able to defend himself to
the degree that he killed two of his attackers, but he was fatally wounded in the encounter and found dead later at
their hideout.

The MO of the Bolshevik bombers of the early part of the century was always to arm a fanatic with a bomb with a
fuse shorter than he was told, which would result in the accomplishment of two objectives: The death of the victim
and the death of the assassin at the same time.

I must confess that bodyguards make me nervous. I have been offered this type of protection several times, and
after the first experience I have declined it. I don’t like a man standing across the lobby of the hotel, obviously
armed and watching me. I simply don’t know what side he is on from day to day.

When I finished the job in training the personal guard of a Central American president, I told him that the degree of
skill in his people was quite high, probably higher than that of the men who protect the president of the United
States, but that I didn’t know who they were. I told the President that I hoped that he did. He knew what I meant,
since one of his predecessors in office had been murdered by one of his own guards.

Probably the best service that an armed guard can provide is that of a scout. He can go through doors first. He can
start cars first. He can move around buildings and relay information to his principle. In these functions he need not
be armed, though he probably expects to be. One solution which is practical in some parts of the world -though not
in others- is to arm security personnel with a single-barrel shotgun and one cartridge.

Such a man is quite efficient in a disarmed society, but he is not quite as much of a problem if he is subverted as if
he were more dangerously equipped. It should be noted that when an armed guard is subverted, he rarely is asked to
kill his employer- usually just to set him up. Thus, the use of his official equipment against his principal is unlikely.

Obviously, the most dependable personnel that can be acquired are members of the family or extended family of the
subject. This is the system used by the Mafia, but is not generally available to the private citizen.

The easiest way to meet the problem of reliability in security personnel is by the unpleasant tactic of entrapment.
Clandestine attempts to subvert all bodyguard personnel should be made at irregular intervals, and very
convincingly.

Guards should be approached by persons presumably wishing to attack the employer -but actually in the employ of
the employer- in order to see just how much money or other reward is necessary to buy their treachery. If this is
kept up, the guard himself will never know who is trying to bribe him and thus be kept in the line of fidelity.
If all this sounds cynical, it is because of the facts of life and not because anyone desires it to be so. It has been said
that a cynic is one who believes that no man is worthy. A realist, on the other hand, knows that some men are
worthy and some are not. Since only one defection on the part of a bodyguard is necessary to work a disaster, the
realist assumes that ​some of the people he trusts are unworthy of that trust, and that he must therefore never be
surprised by the defection of any one individual.

The foregoing should not be construed as the council of despair, but only as an indication that the problems
involved in obtaining proper guard personnel are not as easy as sometimes believed. Difficult as it may be to
accept, the principle himself will always remain his best and cheapest protection. His hired guards should be trained
mainly in the matters of alertness and mental conditioning, rather than in weaponry and marksmanship.

The principle himself should be the prime marksman and his guards should act essentially as scouts, keeping him
informed of the nature of hazards which he cannot always assess for himself. Primarily, a bodyguard should watch
and ask questions.

In the notable television coverage of the attempt on the life of Imelda Marcos, it was quite obvious that the aspiring
assassin could have been stopped easily had anyone thought to confront him and ask his intentions. He stood out
clearly in the crowd since he was of a totally foreign stamp, yet no one thought to give him pause. In this case the
assassin was shot on the spot ​after he had inflicted serious damage on his intended victim, but the entire episode
could have been forestalled by proper vigilance without the necessity of violent response.

Alertness is the first principle of personal defense. No man can be fully alert at all times throughout his life, so here
is the primary reason for personal guards. Bear in mind that all an armed guard need do in order to set up his
employer is to relax his vigilance. He need not shoot or take overt action of any kind. All he must do is ​fail to take
action.

The terrorist will always have the initiative. He chooses the time and place for his action. His target must grant him
that and still maintain a condition of readiness- around the clock, throughout the year. This is clearly not easy. It is
not that people cannot be hired to stand watches the year round, but that they cannot be inspired to treat every
moment as if it were the initial instant of a confrontation.

When we consider such “Chinese-fire-drills” as the takeover of the US Embassy in Teheran, it is quite clear that the
force and technique employed by the attackers was not nearly appropriate to the task and could have been stopped
in its tracks by people who were equipped to do so and aware of the need to do it.

In all counter-terrorist operations there must be a full measure of bitterness on those carrying out operations.
Terrorism is an obscene act in that it menaces the lives of the innocent in order to achieve the acquiescence of a
third party. People who fear to attack their proper enemy choose to attack the defenseless and the unwary in order
to work upon the humanity of the person they are seeking to influence.

They forswear any such things as humanity on their own part and therefore place themselves outside of any
considerations of humanity on the part of those who would suppress them. Once this point is fully grasped and
broadcast, we may have made a start toward the limitation of this nastiness.

This is not to say that terrorists necessarily fear death -for some do not- but that if they are fully convinced that they
not only will die ​but that they also will fail​, their motivation can be severely hampered.
The essence of the counter-terror operation must be the will to carry it out. Once ​that is established, speed,
efficiency, and ruthlessness take precedence. It goes without saying that the sympathies and sensibilities of those
related to innocent victims must not be considered, only the elimination of the criminal. For this reason, no person
who is related or otherwise attached to any innocent victim should be involved in any counter-terrorist operation.

If this happens coincidentally, the person should relieve himself from his duties. ​No ransom must ever be paid​. One
good start in this direction would be to make the paying of a ransom to any kidnapper or terrorist a felony in all
parts of the world. This may appear to be unfeeling but it is sometimes necessary to endure one pain in order to
suppress a greater one.

The entire terrorist movement in Central and South America has been financed by ransoms paid by the suffering
kinsmen of persons kidnapped. Much as we sympathize with the helplessness of the payers of ransom, we must
impress upon all that in paying such a ransom they are feeding the very horror that has been inflicted upon them.

All persons involved in the counter-terrorist movement, especially security guards employed in these operations,
should be aware of these principles and realize that when confronted with an act of insupportable barbarism, a
certain amount of ferocity is a proper response.

It is unfortunate that we hear primarily of those terrorist acts which succeed (from the standpoint of the terrorist).
We rarely hear of those forestalled, because they are not so newsworthy. One should not conclude from this that the
terrorist will always win- often he fails. Everyone knows of the Schleyer murder in Germany.

Hardly anyone knows of the client of mine in a somewhat similar circumstance who, when approached at the point
of a submachine gun in a kidnapping attempt, tore the weapon from the assailant’s hands and drove off the entire
band, killing three. A terrorist does not ​have to succeed, but in order to stop him we must resolve ourselves to take
such steps as are necessary and to agree upon what those steps are.

The Myths of Nuclear Doomsday

by Bruce D. Clayton Ph.D.

The subject of nuclear war is badly obscured by a thick screen of misinformation, lurid lies, and popular myths.
American citizens are badly misinformed about this vital subject, and their lack of understanding is the one thing
which may actually doom them to die in such a war.

The American public has been led to believe that a nuclear war would be so devastating that no one would survive
it. If anyone did survive, most people feel, they would regret their good fortune in not being killed at once. We have
built and reinforced this idea into a popular mythology which includes such specters as doomsday bombs, lands
radioactively poisoned for centuries, long-term fallout which kills people months or years after the war, people who
glow in the dark, mass death due to cancer, and most hideous of all, permanent damage to the genetics of the human
species itself. Such tall tales have convinced many otherwise sensible people that a nuclear attack is something they
would not be able to survive, and in fact ​they would rather not survive it​.

That is the tragedy of the nuclear war myths.

The fact is that most of the commonly believed nuclear war legends are simply not true, and the remainder have
been exaggerated out of all proportion to the real threat.

The origin of these myths is not at all mysterious. There are many people who benefit from making a nuclear war
sound as terrible as possible, and almost no one who benefits from describing the truth to the public. Politicians, for
instance, are well known for their colorful rhetoric, and they surpass themselves when they speak out for (or
against) the arms race.

The Soviets have a vested interest in supporting the no-survivors myth, since it puts pressure on the US to disarm.
This increases their strategic lead and insures that the 1980’s will be a period of Russian-dominated international
developments. Civil defense officials tell tall tales in attempts to get increased funding and so do the representatives
of the Pentagon when they wage their annual appropriations campaign with Congress.

Disarmament speakers tell outrageous lies about nuclear weapons effects in order to frighten people into supporting
their programs. The speakers know that their audiences are largely composed of non-technical people who won’t
notice or question incongruities in the facts.

Finally, the writers of novels, movies, and TV shows regularly present the wildest fantasies cloaked in the guise of
“the truth about nuclear weapons”. No one benefits by telling the truth about nuclear weapons. No one except a
survivalist.

The purpose of this article is to dispel a few of the numbing doomsday myths which may be preventing you from
seriously preparing to survive a nuclear attack. ​There is no effect of a nuclear war which would defeat a
well-prepared survivalist​. That is, not unless he has been deceived by the doomsday myths.

Let’s look at some of these widely believed tall tales.

“A nuclear war would kill everybody and everything.” Far from it. The classic version of this argument is embodied
in the novel ​On the Beach by Nevil Shute. In the story, the long-term fallout from a US-Soviet-Chinese war settled
in Australia and New Zealand a year later, and promptly killed everybody within a few days.

This kind of nightmare is just not within the realm of reality. In ​Life After Doomsday I calculated that to achieve the
“On the Beach” scenario we would need a world arsenal half a million times the size of the one we have now.
That’s a pretty safe margin.

The casualty estimates I have seen predict that an exchange of nuclear attacks would cause the deaths of 2% to 30%
of the citizens in the embattled countries within the first few days. The rest of the world population would not be
noticeably disrupted. Be assured that the world will be well-populated in spite of the worst we can do.

“Even if some people did survive, they would envy the dead.” I doubt it. The one lesson which comes through from
nearly every kind of disaster is that the survivors are glad to be alive. Sometimes people suffer from survivor's guilt
for living when so many others have died, but you rarely hear of someone killing himself out of envy for the
victims!

Usually the people who recite this myth are referring to the disruption of civilization which would follow an attack
with its resulting famines, epidemics, riots, and lack of medical, police, and fire services. PS Letter readers should
not find these problems to be especially novel and should not be intimidated by them.
In fact, being prepared for the emergency is a strong psychological defense against the feelings of fear and guilt
experienced by other victims. People who are prepared do not have to deal with the overpowering fear of the
unknown, and should not suffer the shock of losing any loved ones in the disaster.

“The Hiroshima bomb destroyed houses two miles from ground zero. Today we have bombs that are a thousand
times bigger that that!” Well, actually we do have some 10 to 20 megaton warheads but they are not common. Most
of the Minuteman missiles, for instance, are armed with warheads rated at 173 kilotons, or about 10 times the size
of the Hiroshima bomb.

Not only that, but most people don’t realize that the “size” of the bomb has little to do with its destructiveness. The
“one thousand times bigger” statement gives many people the idea that modern bombs can destroy houses 2000
miles away! The truth is very different. In general, if you increase the size of a bomb by a factor of ten, you
increase the radius of damage by a factor of ​two.​ If you are interested in the distance at which a bomb can crush
wood-frame houses, the figures go like this:

Size of Bomb Range of Damage

(Tactical size) 1 kiloton 1.0 mile
(Hiroshima size) 10 kilotons 2.1 mile
(Minuteman size) 100 kilotons 4.6 miles

(Typical Soviet warhead size) 1 megaton 10 miles

(Titan missile warhead size) 10 megatons 21 miles

Twenty-one miles is a far cry from 2000!

I didn’t list any 100-megaton bombs because, as far as I can discover, there aren’t any. Years ago Nikita
Khrushchev claimed he had one, but he never followed through with a demonstration. Apparently someone told
him that Western scientists were laughing at him. Bombs that size are a waste of scarce radioactive resources. Little
bombs work better. Don’t be alarmed by comments about the size of modern weapons. They aren’t as big as they
sound.

“There is no place you can go to escape the deadly fallout.” Most of the targets in the United States are not likely to
produce any fallout ​at all.​ The contention that the fallout will be everywhere is flatly untrue.

Warheads detonated near the ground (to dig up silos) generate lots of fallout because of the dirt they lift up into the
air. Most of this descends to the ground within 24 hours of the explosion. In a real-life nuclear war, however, this
kind of fallout is only likely in the vicinity of missile silos. Warheads used to attack cities and airfields work best if
detonated a mile or more up in the air. These explosions do not produce fallout because they do not dig up any dirt.

As for long-term fallout, my advice is not to worry about it. Fallout that remains in the upper atmosphere for
months has lost nearly all of its radioactivity before it returns to the ground. Thirty years after the war we will all
have received a total dose of about 10 Rem of radiation from this source... just enough to produce a very faint
increase in the cancer rate. Considering the other dangers posed by a nuclear war, this one is not very alarming.
“The fallout radiation will kill little babies and make human reproduction impossible.” This is one of the more
insidious stories, because it involves a “scientific” study which linked Nevada weapons-testing fallout with sudden
infant death syndrome (SIDS) in the states of the Deep South. The contention was that the low levels of radiation
from the spent fallout somehow caused a very slight increase in the number of unexplained deaths among young
babies in these states. I read this paper, and in my opinion as a scientist, it was very poor.

To start with, there was no attempt to determine where the Nevada fallout had actually gone. Also, it was not very
convincing to find that the SIDS effect was not apparent in the southern Rocky Mountain states where the test had
been made, but showed up only in the states of the Gulf Coast, which have the lowest average standard of living in
the nation. If they lose a few more babies, it is not very surprising. I regard this story as insubstantial at best.

“Even if the babies don’t die, they will still be horribly deformed by the radiation.” It is true that the radiation will
damage the genes of some survivors and will cause some additional birth defects. In fact, the official projection is
that it will take a thousand years for this genetic damage to finally disappear from the human gene pool.

Disarmament spokesmen like to dwell on that thousand-year figure, and invariably mention that the post-war peak
of abnormal births is expected to be 61 deformed babies out of every thousand. They don’t mention that in the
United States the ​normal birth defect rate is ​60 out of every thousand.​ Most people will not be able to detect the
difference.

“Some of the radioactive poisons from the bombs have half-lives measured in millions of years!” That’s true, but
most people miss the point. If it takes a million years for a particle to release half of it’s radioactivity, that means
that it isn’t really very radioactive. Non-radioactive elements have infinitely long half-lives. The really dangerous
radioisotopes are the ones which decay quickly, not the ones which persist forever.

“A one-megaton bomb can produce enough fallout to kill everyone within 150 square miles.” This statement is an
example of a numbers game. It sounds very impressive, but notice that we’re talking about ​square miles. An area of
150 square miles can be contained within a circle only seven miles in radius. If you initially thought this statement
said “everyone within 150 miles”, you were mentally crediting the bomb with the ability to drop lethal fallout on
70,000 square miles of territory!

When doomsayers throw numbers at you, always check them. The “square mile” trick makes the bombs sound 500
more times dangerous than they really are. I picked this example from a disarmament article where I am sure the
author wanted to give the impression that the bomb’s lethal radius was 150 miles. Not true.

“A 100-megaton bomb would make a crater 19 miles across.” This is another example of numbers on the rampage,
borrowed from the ​Guinness Book of World Records​. First of all, I have already mentioned that there aren’t any
100-megaton bombs. Second, the theoretical size of the crater from a bomb this size is 0.8 miles across, not 19
miles.
The 19-mile figure was apparently obtained by taking the size of a one-megaton crater (0.19 miles) and multiplying
it by 100! If you really wanted to make a crater 19 miles across, you would need a ​five million-megaton bomb!​
Good luck finding one.

“People will glow in the dark.” Fireflies glow in the dark. People never do, under any circumstances. A nuclear
attack will not make anything glow in the dark, not even the craters where the silos used to be.

“Who wants to live like a savage in a radioactive wasteland?” As they say, when you consider the alternatives...
There will be people who will insist on being unprepared for the war, and who will then be cast on their own
resources to live (or die) like savages, but I can’t envision a survivalist caught in this predicament.

In fact, the reason behind this series of articles is to insure that the people who will be best prepared for survival
will not be taken by surprise by the somewhat unusual challenges of the nuclear war environment.

“The wall of fire from the bomb will incinerate the countryside for hundreds of miles around.” ​There is no “wall of
fire”. I’m not sure where that myth got started, but it persists even in the pages of serious survivalist literature.
Nuclear explosions consist of a bright flash of light (not enough to start fires in some cases) and a separate shock
wave which behaves like a very, very powerful sonic boom and wind.

The fireball itself might be called a wall of fire, but it is a local effect extending less than half a mile from the center
of the explosion... and in most cases, the fireball forms high in the air and doesn’t touch the ground at all.

The myth of the all-consuming wall of flame which washes over the countryside and leaves nothing in its wake but
flakes of charred bone is totally fictional. (See, for instance, ​Malevil by Robert Merle, where one bomb detonated
over Paris utterly destroys all of France!)

“I don’t have to worry. Where I live, I’ll be vaporized before I know what hits me!” Many people take refuge in the
idea that they would die instantly, and painlessly, in a nuclear attack. It is an easy way to justify not thinking about
the subject. I have some very bad news for these people. ​Nobody gets vaporized.​

Nuclear weapons fatalities result from flash burns, flame burns, and crushing or impact injuries like those found in
automobile wrecks. A person who clings to the “vaporization” myth is dooming his family to very unpleasant
deaths... and they may not all die before he does. This is the worst myth of all. Don’t be taken in by it.

These are just a few of the many paralyzing myths which prevent people from preparing to survive a nuclear war. It
is essential for a survivalist to break these mental bonds and realize that you ​can survive a nuclear attack. All you
have to do is give it a determined try and prepare properly.
In subsequent articles I will explore the detailed information which you will need in order to adapt your current
survival planning to encompass the additional problems posed by nuclear weapons effects. Some of these, I
guarantee, you will not have seen described before.

Intrusion Detection Alarm Systems, Part II

By Alexander Jason

The Local System

There are alternatives to the externally-connected intrusion detection system for those who can’t afford the expense,
live in an area where such service is not available, or who feel that they have neighbors who can be relied upon.
You can either install an internal system yourself or have it done professionally.

In the Yellow Pages you will find many firms advertising burglar alarm installation. Most of them are likely to be
competent and reputable, but I strongly suggest that you select one which has been recommended to you by a friend
or associate, and a firm which can give you some references. You must be aware that whoever installs your
intrusion detection system will also know how to defeat it. And while the installer is in your home doing the
installation, he has a good opportunity to see what you’ve got inside.

I’m not trying to make you paranoid about these people... I shouldn’t have to. In this day and age you should
naturally feel that way about any such stranger you allow into your home. One protective tactic I recommend you
use with alarm installers is to tell them to leave you a connection point (a wire pair) because you plan to add one or
two sensors of your own into the system. The installer (honest ones, too) will probably object or be somewhat
annoyed, but it doesn’t mean much extra work or time for them so just insist and they’ll do it

Now, remember this because they will certainly ask you what type of sensor you will be connecting into the system
and they will also be aware that you really don’t know enough to make any intelligent additions to the system; you
simply state that you’re not sure because your uncle (brother-in law, cousin, ex-husband, etc.) is an electronic
engineer who’s going to be bringing the equipment out in a few weeks when he comes for a visit.

All he told you, you say, was that it needed a ​normally open connection. That’s all the installer needs to know; just
a normally open connection. The installer will likely warn you that it’s not a good idea and that it might interfere
with effective functioning of his system and so on, but you just insist and tell him that you’re sure your “uncle” will
make things right.

By going through this act, the installer will never know what type of sensor you added to your system. All you have
to do when he leaves is to make sure that the bare ends of those wires don’t touch each other. The installer will have
left them taped so just get the wire out of harm’s way and forget about it- or if you do know enough about it, go
ahead and install another sensor.
If you have a professional installer do the job, he will guide you in your choice of sensors, as he will certainly favor
the particular type of mix of sensors with which he has had good experience. I will not recommend specific sensor
types because a complete discussion of the enormous variety of sensors is beyond the scope of this article.

You will have to rely on the installer’s advice, which will probably be good as he is motivated to give you a system
which works the way it is supposed to and one which is reliably false alarm free, so he won’t have to come back
again and again to make adjustments and repairs.

One specific recommendation I will make is that you do not have an outside switch to turn the system off or on.
While these are popular (especially the “round-key” type lock switch), they become a seriously vulnerable point in
your security system. When an experienced burglar sees one of these switches on or near the front door, he knows
that if he can pick or otherwise defeat the lock (like forcibly pulling it out of the door or wall and shorting the wires
together), he can turn the whole system off and not have to worry. (You also may be interested to know that, with a
special tool, those round locks can be picked open in less than a minute, much easier than standard locks.)

So instead of mounting the key switch outside, have the installer mount it somewhere inside the house, near the
front door (inside hall closet is a good spot). This means that the system will have to allow a short (10 second or so)
delay which will give you sufficient time to leave the house before the system turns on and then enough time to
allow you to get into the house and to the keyswitch before the alarm is activated.

It is very unlikely that a burglar could locate and pick the key switch during that short delay. Be sure to use a switch
that requires a key (or combination) to be used as it is probable that there will be times when you’ll have to use the
switch while you’re being observed by casual visitors or tradesmen. If the switch controlling your entire system
only requires the flick of a finger to operate, your home can become a very tempting target to someone who has
learned the secret.

A professionally installed intrusion detection alarm system will usually cost from $200 to $2,000, depending upon
the size of your home and the amount of gadgetry you desire. If you want one of those systems which activates
lights on a large electronic map showing an intruder’s exact location, and which switches automatic closed-circuit
TV cameras to the appropriate sector, and soon you can easily spend $25,000. But you really don’t need to spend
anywhere near that: good security for the average home shouldn’t have to cost more than about $500.

Doing It Yourself

There is no reason why you can’t install your own intrusion detection system. One system is particularly easy to set
up- even for those who know nothing about these things. But before I present my recommendations, there are some
fundamental things you should first understand about intrusion detection systems in general.

In the ever-expanding marketplace of intrusion detection, there is a dizzying variety of types of sensors. There are
sensors which detect a person’s footsteps; infrared sensors which detect the heat emitted by the human body;
ultrasonic and microwave sensors which detect movement; acoustic sensors which only detect the sounds of
breaking glass, metal scraping, and wood splintering; vibration sensors sensitive only to the movement caused by a
person climbing or cutting a fence; invisible infrared light beams which detect interruptions in the beam path;
capacitance sensors which detect anyone coming close to an object, and more.
These are just some of the choices which will be available to you when you begin to plan your own system. As each
sensor type has both weak and strong points, there is no one type which is best for all situations. The best
professionally designed systems ​never rely on one type of sensor; a variety are used to provide the utmost in
reliability and invulnerability.

But I want to warn you against getting carried away by all the exotic, technologically advanced sensors you will
come across once you start looking into the available equipment. While much of it is excellent, it really takes
someone with specific knowledge and experience to understand when and where to use which type of sensor. There
are certain locations where a particular sensor will continually trigger false alarms in spite of its space-age
technology.

One general rule is that the fancier and more exotic a sensor is, the more knowledge required to properly install it.
And with the low-cost systems sold directly to the public, the more fancy and exotic they claim to be, the more
likely they are to produce false alarms. The point is to avoid the fancy stuff- unless you can afford the very high
price gear and the necessary expertise to install it.

This means that you should generally avoid the lowest priced microwave, ultrasonic, and infrared systems you see
advertised. In this business you generally get what you pay for. The cheap systems may work well during a
demonstration but they are likely to drive you (and your neighbors) nuts with false alarms.

The fact is that it is easy and inexpensive to design and produce a sensor system which will set off an alarm each
time it is supposed to but it is a very difficult task to design and produce a sensor system which knows both when
and when ​not​ to activate.

The most common problem with alarm systems is not that they fail to work during an intrusion, it is the ​false
alarms​. Once you have a system which constantly produces false alarms, you will tend not to use it- to keep the
damn thing turned off. And that’s as bad as not having any system at all.

There is an almost foolproof and false alarm-free system which is quite cheap and very easy to install yourself. It is
really the ultimate in simplicity and virtually impossible for the average burglar to beat. The system’s sensors are
simply pressure mats which you place under rugs throughout your house- especially near the points of entry like
doors and windows.

These thin mats come in all sorts of sizes and they are undetectable when slipped under a rug or carpet. The
effectiveness of a mat system comes from the fact that an intruder has to walk through the house and he has no way
of knowing that there are mats or where they might be.

The mats are actually large, flat switches which are closed when stepped on. The simplicity of the system makes
false alarms just about impossible. If pressure is not applied to the mats, they will not set the alarm off- very
fundamental. One advantage of a pressure mat system is that you don’t have to attach sensors on all your doors and
windows; you just slip a mat under a rug at critical entry or travel points throughout the house.

If you plan to install a mat (or any other) intrusion detection system, you will have to have some form of ​control
unit. This is the “brain” of your system, as the control is the mechanism which receives the signal from the sensor
and then activates the proper warning device (bell, siren, telephone dialer, etc.) The control also has a timer to
provide you with the necessary delay period you need to get in and out of your house before the system is activated.
A good control will provide your system with auxiliary power, in case your outside electricity is cut off. A control
unit can cost anywhere from $100 to $200 for a good basic unit; to $650 for a really fancy unit. But the low-cost
ones are generally quite adequate for the typical home.

Before we go any further, I want to point out that there are two methods of installing a mat system: Hard wiring and
wireless. Hard wiring means that each mat (or other sensor) is physically connected to the control unit by a thin pair
of wires. This is the most reliable and inexpensive way to go but it does mean that you will have to run wire either
under the carpet or behind the wall molding If you have a house with a basement under wooden floors, you can
hardwire your system easily. But there are homes and especially apartments in which this would be either very
difficult or impossible to do without having the wires exposed throughout the house.

If you are going to hardwire your system, then I suggest you spend some time examining the control units available
at electronic supply, hardware, and retail security equipment stores. A few features I think you should have are: (1)
An automatic delay timer (so you won’t need an outside key switch to turn the system off and on). (2) An “instant”
alarm mode so you can eliminate the delay period when you are at home. (3) A “panic” button capability. (4) A test
switch to allow you to insure that your warning device is working. (5) An internal battery to provide power when
the outside power is off.

There are many good controls on the market. Among them I recommend: Airtech Model 724 (about $145.00) and
Fire/Burglary Instruments Model 642 which is also sold by Mountain West Co. as its Model F9-001 (about
$180.00). But don’t limit your choice to the above two. All controls have different features. You will have to decide
first what you will want your system to do, and then choose the appropriate model.

If you are unable to hard wire your home or if you prefer not to spend the time and energy, you can use a wireless
intrusion detection alarm system which, although it will cost a bit more, is very effective and very easy to install.
This system works by means of a little radio frequency (RF) transmitter which you attach to the mat wires. When
someone steps on the mat, the signal goes through the wires and activates the transmitter. The transmitter then
sends a low-powered signal to a special combination receiver and control unit which sets off the proper alarm. The
transmitters are powered by a small 9V battery and are about two- thirds the size of a thin paperback book.

The advantage of this wireless system is that you can place a mat and a transmitter anywhere in or ​near your home
(within about 150 feet of the receiver). You can connect any number of mats to one transmitter or use one with each
mat. A transmitter retails for about $28.00 and you can use as many transmitters in as many spots as you want.

The beauty of a wireless system is in its inherent flexibility. It is a very simple thing to move a mat and transmitter
from one room to another or to the garage, the basement, or the tool shed- wherever you need some protection. The
wireless system, as you may have already imagined, can be readily utilized to “catch” the kid who’s been creeping
around your garage, or even a peeping tom.

With most systems, you can purchase a low-cost personal transmitter (a portable panic button) which can be carried
in a pocket or purse (it looks like an automatic garage door control). You can use as many of these as needed and
they are particularly valuable to have in your hand when you investigate that late night noise or for a woman alone
as she walks from her car to her door. One simple push of the button will have the same effect as someone stepping
on a mat- the alarm goes off and it cannot be stopped by someone smashing the transmitter.

When you are going to leave your house unoccupied for some time, you can drop the control unit with a neighbor.
And if you move, you just pick up your mats and transmitters and take them with you to your new home.
There are several wireless intrusion detection systems currently being sold in hardware and building supply stores.
As there are new ones coming out frequently, I am unable to give you specific information on these. I can, however,
recommend very highly the Linear Corporation’s series of transmitters and control unit.

The Linear transmitters can be set to your own digital code which you establish by setting identical positions on
each transmitter’s code switch; The receiver and control unit’s code switch is also set to match these and this
establishes your own system. These digitally coded units are extremely resistant to interference by other
transmitters operating on different codes and by the millions of various RF signals in the atmosphere.

Linear offers an excellent selection of transmitters and among them are: the basic transmitter for use with pressure
mats (Model D-21, about $28), and the personal pocket transmitter (Model D-22, about $25). For use with the
transmitters, Linear has a well-designed control unit (Model Q-1001, about $240.00) which provides an entry and
exit delay, an automatic reset after the internal alarm siren has been activated for several minutes, an internal
standby power source, a 110-volt outlet which will turn a lamp on, along with its blistering electronic siren, and a
speaker outlet so you can have the siren sound both in and outside the house. The Q-1001 is a superb control unit,
and if you decide to use a wireless system, you’ll do well to have one of these.

I must point out the one fundamental weakness of a wireless system. Each transmitter requires a standard 9-volt
battery and this means that the battery can run down. The Linear transmitters have a small light which will tell you
that the battery is functioning whenever you push the test button. Although a transmitter battery will last for a long,
long time (especially if you use the alkaline type), you must periodically check each one. While I still believe the
wireless system is a good one, the battery requirement is a factor you must consider.

The “Space” or “Local-Zone” Units

I’m often asked for my opinion of the small portable local-zone devices which have the sensor-detector and alarm
built into a single unit, usually disguised to appear as a book or a hi-fi speaker. Most operate on ultrasonic wave
detection of movement and are limited to 20 feet or so in range. The idea is to install one pointed towards your front
door or down a hallway to detect the movement of an intruder.

There are several reasons why I’m unenthusiastic about these units as your one-and-only security system: (1) They
are only able to detect intrusions in a small, localized area, which is not too good if you have it aimed at your front
door and the intruder comes in through a window. (2) The ultrasonic sensing circuitry is inherently prone to
producing false alarms. (3) Most units can only sound an alarm inside the house, which may not be heard by anyone
but the burglar. (4) Most of the small units can be silenced by a good kick or just picked up and thrown into a
closet. (Very few burglars, however, will hang around at all once any alarm goes off.)

In spite of the above, I am not at all against the use of a local-zone unit as it is indeed better than no security at all.
While it is by no means the equal of a full system protecting all points of entry and a few passage points, a
local-zone system can be an effective device to protect such locations as a high-rise apartment with only one door
and especially those areas where there are neighbors who will hear and respond to the alarm.

I have recommended the use of such a unit to people who, although they may have a good security system installed,
want an independent, “fail-safe” and last-line-of-defense alarm in their bedroom at night. These local-zone units
can indeed be useful if their limitations are fully understood.
If you are interested in a local-zone unit, I recommend the Master Lock Co.’s “Ultrason II” (about $170) as it is
very well designed to provide several valuable features, among which is the ability to add a remote alarm horn
which can be located up to 500 feet from the unit- either outside or at a neighbor’s house. This unit also has a
built-in emergency power supply.

If you purchase one of the many “Brand X” models, do so only at a store which will allow you to return it. Then
install the unit where you think it will give the best protection and play with it for an hour or so. Try to sneak
around it, see what range it has, test it with the dishwasher on, see if your doorbell will activate it, etc. Make every
effort to determine realistically the unit’s reliability before you put your trust in it.

Warning Signs and Decals

Part of the effectiveness of a security system is its deterrent effect. The number of times the mere presence of a
security system has prevented a burglary or robbery cannot be known for sure but it has certainly happened many
times.

An excellent tactic is to affix warning signs and decals announcing the fact that an intrusion detection/alarm system
has been installed. Do not, however, use decals or signs which specify a particular type or brand of system as this
may give an experienced burglar a clue towards defeating your system. Particularly good are the decals which state
that a ​silent​ alarm system has been installed.

Of course, it is also a good idea to use these warning signs even you ​do not h​ ave a security system.

Automatic Telephone Dialers

For those unable to connect their intrusion detection system into an external central monitoring station, the
automatic telephone dialer is the next best thing. The dialer is a machine which can be connected into, and used
with, most security systems. When activated by the control unit, the dialer will automatically call from three to ten
different telephone numbers and play a recorded message. While a dialer can be a valuable element within your
security system, you should understand its capabilities and limitations.

When most security-minded citizens first hear about automatic telephone dialers, they regard them as a wondrously
simple device, which makes a central station hook-up unnecessary. Just have the dialer call the police department
and that’s that. But it is not that easy.

Most police departments have developed an intense dislike for automatic dialers. Some departments will not even
respond to taped calls for help. One reason for this attitude is the extremely high rate of false alarms associated with
automatic dialers. Another reason is that, because there are many low-quality dialers around, it often happens that
the taped call comes in garbled and unintelligible.

The high false alarm rate exists because automatic dialers are very often used in do-it-yourself residential security
systems. These systems, installed by an inexperienced homeowner, are most prone to producing false alarms. The
other more common cause is accidental activation of a system by some family member.
You must realize how many times this could occur in a large city during just one day. So, before you buy a dialer,
you should call your local police (and fire) department and find out their policy on responding to taped calls.

If your police department discourages you from using a dialer, you can still consider including one in your system
by having it call several friends or neighbors in your area who are likely to be at home and who would then either
call the police directly or call your house to verify the alarm (no answer or a prearranged code word means it’s real)
and then call the police.

Having to depend on friends being available to answer their phones at the right time is a shaky thing but most
modern dialers will call five to ten different numbers and play the taped message for each one. With that many
numbers, you have a good probability of finding someone who will be there to hear the message.

The message on the dialer has to be recorded on a special machine which a dealer will have. He will likely tape the
message for you, but you can insist on using your own voice, as recognition of your voice by your friends or
relatives may be helpful if the taped message is not clear for some reason.

I strongly suggest that you use the phrase, “IN PROGRESS” on your message tape as it is immediately recognized
by police officers as an urgent and immediate call.

A typical message would state:

“This is a taped emergency message. There is a burglary in progress at 1234 Willow Street, the William Johnson
residence. Please send help now.”

There are several very important features to look for in a dialer: (1) A ​“kill” or ​“abort” switch​, which can be
hidden in a closet or behind a curtain and will let you stop the dialer if you’ve only accidentally set off your system;
(2) a telephone ​line-cut sensor which will set off your audible alarm if a criminal cuts the phone line; (3) an
internal, ​stand-by power source if the outside power should fail; (4) an ​audible test ability to allow you actually to
hear the taped message; (5) a ​two-channel capability to allow you to have a separate message and calling sequence
for a burglary and one for a fire; (6) a ​fire-channel override on the two channel unit, which means that even if the
intrusion alarm is activated first, the dialer will immediately drop the burglary message and switch to the tape with
the fire message and calling sequence if the fire sensor is activated after the burglary sensor.

This feature is necessary because a fire may set off the burglar alarm by damaging an intrusion sensor (or its
connecting wire) before the fire is sensed by the smoke and heat sensors. A recommended dialer is the
Fire/Burglary Instrument Co.’s Model 310 ​with​ the line-cut detector option (about $220).

False Alarms

Having an intrusion detection system installed in your home is a giant step towards having a safe and secure home
but, although this may sound silly, it will do you no good if you don’t use it!
The reason I’m telling you this is because there are a number of people, who, after paying a good amount of money
to have a super security system installed, will not bother to turn it on. While this is often caused by sheer laziness,
the most common reason is the result of bad experiences with false alarms.

False alarms are always embarrassing and often nerve shattering (like at night when you forget the system is on and
you go downstairs for a magazine). If you are directly connected to a central station or the police, you will find that
false alarms will not win you any friends and in some areas you may be charged a punitive fee if they occur
frequently.

But keeping your system turned off ​is ​not the solution to false alarms. Each false alarm must be carefully and
thoughtfully evaluated as to its cause and future prevention. Most are caused by the homeowner’s (or his family’s)
bad procedures, which usually result from simply forgetting to turn the system off after entering.

This is to be expected at first, but if it continues, you must get tough with yourself or with those careless members
of your household, because those false alarms are undermining your security.

If false alarms are caused by unknown electrical or mechanical factors, then keep calling the installer back until he
fixes the system. No matter what he might tell you, there is no system which ​naturally has repeated false alarms. If
yours does, then you have a poorly designed and/or installed system which must be repaired or replaced.

If the system is one you have installed yourself, you must troubleshoot it or call in someone who can. If you’ve got
one of those cheap, “miracle” systems which produces false alarms no matter what you do, then you must realize
that you really don’t have a security system. Get rid of it and install a good one.

A security system which is in any way unreliable is a potential danger to you and your family. With the superb
selection and availability of excellent security equipment on the market today, there is no reason why you can’t
have an intrusion detection system which works as it should. Don’t settle for anything less.

Shut Your Mouth

Another very important factor in establishing and maintaining the effectiveness of an intrusion detection/alarm
system is to fight the urge to give everyone you know a “guided tour” of your new system. Remember that virtually
any intrusion detection system can be thwarted by someone who knows how the system works. Letting people
know that you have installed a security system is a good deterrent, but only if they don’t know the operational
details.

While you will likely be closed-mouth about your system with repairmen, delivery people, and other strangers, you
must be particularly careful about revealing your system’s workings to your children’s teenage friends. I realize that
you may be close to their parents, and that you may get along well with them, and that you may think very highly of
these kids, but you should be aware of the fact that a very significant number of suburban burglaries are committed
by teenagers whom you know or their friends, who have been to your home to visit your kids or to attend a party.

A teenager who knows you, knows your house, your schedule, and who knows his way around your security system
may regard your home as a low-risk target for some excitement, adventure, and some quick money.
Think about it. If you had no real moral opposition to stealing, wouldn’t you prefer to burglarize the home of
someone you knew, whom you knew would be away, whose house (and security system) you knew your way
around, and who, because he’s a “friend” might not press charges against you?

The best policy is to follow a fundamental rule of all intelligence and security agencies: Do not give anyone
information unless they have a legitimate NEED TO KNOW!

Where to Buy Alarm Equipment

In most metropolitan areas there are now retail stores which specialize in selling security equipment directly to
consumers. Look in your Yellow Pages under “Burglar Alarms”.

A good mail-order source for security gear is the Mountain West Co., P.O. Box 10780, Phoenix, AR, 85064, Tel.
800-528-6169. Their catalog is filled with an extremely wide and interesting selection of alarm equipment

As a courtesy to PS Letter subscribers: If there is a ​particular​ item you want and you are having a difficult time
trying to locate it, you can write my firm (The Anite Company, P.O. Box 375, Pinole, CA 94564).