Chinese Perceptions of The U.S.

Chinese Perceptions of
the U.S.
the U.S.
An Exploration of China’s
Foreign Policy Motivations
Biwu Zhang
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Zhang, Biwu, 1957-
Chinese perceptions of the U.S. : an exploration of China’s foreign policy motivations /
Biwu Zhang.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-7391-7085-4 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7391-7086-1 (electronic)
1. United States—Foreign relations—China. 2. China—Foreign relations—United
States. I. Title. II. Title: Chinese perceptions of the United States.
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To U.S.-China Mutual Understanding and Friendship
Contents
List of Tables ix
Foreword by Richard K. Herrmann xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Chapter 1 What Are China’s Foreign Policy Motivations? 1
Chapter 2 Image Study as an Approach to Explore China’s
Motivations toward the United States 13
Chapter 3 Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 37
Chapter 4 Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity from
the United States 69
Chapter 5 Chinese Perceptions of American Power 101
Chapter 6 Chinese Perceptions of the American Economy 125
Chapter 7 Chinese Perceptions of American Politics 153
Chapter 8 Conclusion 183
Appendix I 207
Appendix II 217
Appendix III 229
Appendix IV 237
Bibliography 243
Index 257
vii
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Schools in the China Threat Debate 3

Table 2.1 Components of National Images 14
Table 2.2 National Images 15
Table 2.3 Perceivers of National Images 16
Table 2.4 Approaches for Studying National Perceptions 18
Table 2.5 Research Institutes Covered in the Three
Comparable Projects 23
Table 2.6 Objects Studied in Major Books on Chinese
Perceptions of the United States 26
Table 2.7 Objects Studied in Major Articles on Chinese
Table 2.8 Dimensions in Image Study 27
Table 2.9 Dimensions Endorsed by Very Few Authors 28
Table 3.1 Rules for Presenting the Dominant Chinese
Table 3.2 Articles in the Sample for Studying Chinese
Perceptions of Threat and Opportunity from the
United States 38
Table 3.3 Number of Articles in the Sample Having Expressed
Perceptions of Threat from the United States 39
ix
x List
Introduction
of Tables
Table 3.4 Nuechterlein’s National Interest Matrix 39

Table 3.5 Major Differences between the United States and
China Regarding World Order (Chinese Conception) 59
Table 4.1 Number of Articles Having Expressed a Perception
of Opportunity from the United States 70
Table 4.2 Balancing Perceptions of Threat and Opportunity
to China from the United States 94
Table 6.1 Number of Articles in Each Journal on the U.S.
Economy 127
Table 6.2 Number of Articles in Each Journal on the Overall
U.S. Economy and on Specific Aspects of the U.S.
Economy 128
Table 6.3 What to Perceive Regarding the American Economy 128
Table 6.4 Inferences from the Chinese Perceptions of the
American Economy 129
Table 6.5 Summary Inferences in Chinese Perceptions of the
American Economy 131
Table 6.6 Chinese Perception of the Performance of the U.S.
Economy (1) 133
Economy (2) 133
Economy (3) 134
Table 7.1 Number of Articles in Each Journal on American Politics 155
Table 7.2 What to Perceive Regarding American Politics 155
Table 7.3 Inferences from the Chinese Perceptions of American
Politics 156
Table 7.4 Summary Inferences in the Chinese Perceptions of
American Politics 158
Table 7.5 Articles Holding Different Positions Concerning the
Determinants of Election Outcome in the United States 160
Table 7.6 Whose Interests Does the American Political System
Serve? 168
List of Tables xi
Table 7.7 Number of Articles in Each Journal Conveying a

Positive, Neutral, or Negative Image of American
Politics 173
Table 8.1 Conflicting Interests between the United States and
China 197
Table 8.2 Claims and Accommodation between the United States
and China 199
Table 8.3 Relative Tolerance of Threat 200
Foreword
The rise of China may well be the most important trend today redefining
the geopolitics of Asia and the world beyond. Beijing’s relationship with
Washington will be central to the future of both countries and faces numer-
ous challenges. Although Sino-American economic interdependence has
grown exponentially over the past few decades, our understanding of the
worldviews from which decisions are made on each side has advanced more
slowly. Fundamental debates about Chinese perceptions and motives continue
to fuel arguments over policy on the U.S. side. It seems likely that parallel
arguments over America will continue in China. Biwu Zhang’s study takes
a look inside China to shed light on some of the most important of these
debates and arguments.
Although there have been numerous studies that summarize the competing
American perspectives on China, there are far fewer that explore in depth the
discussions about America that are going on in China. In the United States
experts disagree over whether Chinese leaders are (1) emboldened by the
P.R.C.’s increasing power and see great opportunities to reshape the system,
(2) are mostly interested in prestige and status and see the United States as a
necessary source of legitimacy, or (3) are worried about China’s continued
economic well-being and see America as a possible threat to this. In all these
analyses, the assumptions about Chinese perceptions of America sit at the
center of the strategic advice given for U.S. policy. What the Chinese percep-
tions are, whose perceptions should be taken as most reflective of Chinese
thinking, and how to determine the degree of threat and opportunity they
involve continue to be open questions.
Zhang makes several important contributions to the study of Chinese per-
ceptions of the United States. First, he moves beyond traditional inclinations
xiii
xiv Foreword
to generalize about a single Chinese worldview. Instead, he looks at a range

of journals and leaders and discovers a range of perspectives. Second, Zhang
employs a systematic strategy for assessing perceptions of both threat and
opportunity that takes advantage of his ability to analyze a large number of
Chinese texts. This method allows Zhang to report what the text says in literal
terms but also to look behind it and explain its likely meaning in strategic
terms. Finally, Zhang looks carefully at what Chinese analysts are saying
about both American motives and U.S. power, exploring in some depth how
the two sets of assessments are connected to one another.
The analysis of such a large body of Chinese writing about the United
States is useful in a descriptive sense as we work to understand Chinese
politics. More important, however, Zhang reminds us that Chinese views
are not monolithic and that they not only vary across people but also can be
complicated within a single mindset. He finds that perceptions of threat and
opportunity are evident in different places, as we might expect in a country
that is simultaneously booming on the economic front and rethinking its geo-
political role. While some leaders and institutions stress the possible threats,
others see great opportunities. Especially interesting is Zhang’s exploration
of where Chinese leaders feel they should learn from the United States and
where, in return, they feel America might learn from them.
As Sino-American relations evolve, studies like Zhang’s provide an
important foundation for better understanding and wise policy. He com-
bines a native familiarity with China with a set of analytic tools used more
often in international relations and political psychology to produce a picture
of Chinese perceptions that is original and interesting. He undoubtedly is
watching a moving target that is likely to continue to change over time but
provides a benchmark of what worldviews were like as China’s rise took off
and began to accelerate. As we seek to understand change and how countries
learn, knowing where they started from is an indispensable first step. Zhang
provides a good basis on which future explorations can build, watching how
the set of perceptions he uncovered interpret unfolding history and evolve in
response to it.
Richard K. Herrmann
Director, The Mershon Center
The Ohio State University
Acknowledgments
This project was essentially completed when I was pursuing my Ph.D. at the
Ohio State University. As I look back at my years of study and research at
this university, my heart is filled with gratitude for all of those who helped
me one way or another throughout this journey. I will be able to mention only
some of them here. My most profound gratitude goes to Prof. Richard K. Her-
rmann, the chair of my dissertation committee, whose theoretical framework,
intellectual insights, and frequent advice were invaluable to my research
project. I am equally grateful to Prof. Kevin J. O’Brien, a former member
of my dissertation committee, who, together with Prof. Herrmann, helped
me solve some of the most difficult problems. Profs. Mughan and Hopf gave
me indispensable assistance in the process. I wish also to convey my sincere
appreciation of their help to the following individuals: Andrew J. Nathan,
Edwin A. Winckler, David Shambaugh, and Alastair Iain Johnston.
During my days as a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science,
I learned important lessons and/or received significant help from the follow-
ing respectable professors: Paul A. Beck, Donald A. Sylvan, David M. Rowe,
Chadwick Alger, Judith Kullberg, Margaret Hermann, Brian M. Pollins, and
Randall L. Schweller. Years of financial assistance from OSU, the depart-
ment, and research funding from the Mershon Center contributed greatly
toward the completion of this project.
A special word of thanks is owed to Lianjiang Li, who has done for me
much more than one would normally expect from a friend.
It would have been impossible for me to proceed with this project without
the generous and untiring assistance from my parents. Jae, Qinyi, Abby,
Stella, and Yingru shared with me the ordeal during my extended efforts on
this project.
xv
xvi Acknowledgments
I also wish to thank Hongying, Jinping, and Kaiyuan for their assistance
when I was preparing this book for publication.
Finally, I am very grateful to the numerous Chinese authors cited in this
book. Without their works, it would have been impossible for me to complete
this project. In this book about Chinese perceptions of the United States,
every descriptive detail can be traced to an utterance by one or, often, several
Chinese authors in the sample to ensure the reliability of the research.
Chapter 1
What Are China’s Foreign Policy

Motivations?
How will the Chinese define their greatness in the twenty-first century?
Will they define their greatness in terms of the incredible potential of
their people to learn, to produce, to succeed economically, culturally and
politically? Or will they define their greatness in terms of their ability to
dominate their neighbors and others, perhaps against their will, or to take
other actions which could destabilize the march toward democracy and
prosperity of other people?
—Bill Clinton1
THE PUZZLE
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the sole and
indisputable hegemon, while China, because of its territory and population,
and because of its economic development, was widely regarded as a rising
power in the international arena.2 If post–Cold War international politics was
scrutinized through the lens of international relations theories, one puzzle
emerged. According to classic realism, because of evil human nature, states
would try perennially to dominate other states and to avoid being dominated
by others. A dominant power therefore would necessarily try to decrease
the power of second-tier states and second-tier states would necessarily try
to increase, or at least to preserve, their power.3 Structural realism offers a
basically similar prediction: the preponderance of power in the hands of one
single state is dangerous, especially to the security of other great powers. As
Waltz puts it, “unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger
1
2 Chapter 1
to others,” because the dominant power will inevitably try to weaken other
great powers in order to preserve and strengthen its dominance, and other
great powers will not rest at ease until they are secure from the not impossible
attack by the dominant power.4 Power transition theory also predicts inherent
tension between the dominant power and second-tier states: all great powers
eventually decline and the most attractive approach to prolong a hegemon’s
dominance is to weaken or even destroy rising powers before they are strong
enough to deliver a credible challenge.5 Taken together, in the context of
post–Cold War international politics, all the above three IR theories predict
intensified confrontation between the United States and second-tier states,
and second-tier states’ efforts to balance against the United States. But for
around two decades after the end of the Cold War, the relations between the
United States and its traditional allies (Western Europe and Japan) remain
close, the relations between the United States and its traditional enemy (Rus-
sia) have significantly improved, the relations between the United States and
its Cold War ally of convenience (China) remain lukewarm, and the United
States apparently accepts and accommodates the rise of another new great
power—India.6 Why has the prediction of reputable IR theories so far failed
to materialize in the post–Cold War context? In the case of U.S.-China rela-
tions, the general puzzle can be translated into the puzzle of why during the
post–Cold War period engagement rather than containment has been the main
tone of the United States’ China policy, and why accommodation rather than
balancing has been China’s preferred U.S. policy.7 To address this puzzle
in U.S.-China relationship, as will be elaborated further below, we need to
answer the fundamental question of whether China is a status quo or a revi-
sionist country, which will be the research question of this project.
THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
As demonstrated in the heated debate concerning a possible China threat,

many scholars have one way or another tried to address the above puzzle in
the U.S.-China relations. This chapter will contain two parts. The first part
will discuss the heated debate in the 1990s over a possible China threat, and
the second part will justify the research question of this project: whether
China is a status quo or a revisionist country.
The China threat debate focused on two different but interrelated top-
ics: whether China posed a threat to the international system, and whether
containment or engagement was the better policy for managing the relations
with China. Scholarly descriptions and prescriptions could be captured by
Table 1.1.
What Are China’s Foreign Policy Motivations? 3
Table 1.1 Schools in the China Threat Debate
Engagement Containment
Threat A C
Kristof, Mazarr, Shinn, Bernstein and Munro, Betts,
S. Goldstein Buzan and Segal, Dibb, Friedberg,
Mearsheimer, Rachman, Roy,
Waldron, Pollack, Gertz, Pillsbury
No/Little B D
Threat Brooks and Wohlforth, Brzezinski, Segal
Cronin and Cronin, Gallagher, Gill,
A. Goldstein, Harris, Johnston,
Kissinger, Lampton, Lieberthal,
Mandelbaum, Nathan, Oksenberg,
Overholt, Papayoanou and Kastner,
Ross
The threat school was generally associated with the containment perspec-
tive—Cell C; and the no/little threat school was generally associated with
the engagement perspective—Cell B. Some scholars regarded China as a
threat, but nonetheless suggested that engagement at least for the time being
was the appropriate policy with regard to China—Cell A—because engage-
ment might produce a better result, or because it was infeasible to contain
China.8 Some scholars did not regard China as a threat, but insisted that China
should be contained—Cell D—because “sell the Philippines a couple of
cruise missiles and the much-discussed Chinese threat will be easily erased,”
but China was nonetheless “a problem to be circumvented or moved.”9 The
threat/containment school was the minority, but a vocal and influential one.
Containment here often did not mean outright and comprehensive confronta-
tion, as in the case of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, and it usually allowed for
engagement of one form or another, such as economic engagement.10 The
no/little threat/engagement school was apparently the majority, but different
scholars often had different things in mind when they talked about engage-
ment. Thus there were comprehensive engagement, constructive engagement,
realistic engagement, limited engagement, conditional engagement, coercive
engagement, etc. Because of the proliferation of engagement with adjectives,
engagement and containment sometimes become indistinguishable. Polite
containment, or hidden containment, for instance, was little different from
coercive engagement.11 Some scholars adopted different positions at different
times: Shambaugh 1995 (Cell C) vs. Shambaugh 1996 (Cell B); and Segal
1996 (Cell C) vs. Segal 1999 (Cell D). Some scholars suggested conflicting
policies at the same time: Betts’ article was containment in tone, but he also
pointed out that “active efforts to keep China poor or to break it up . . . would
4 Chapter 1
be counterproductive . . . Realist at best can passively hope for Chinese eco-

nomic misfortune.”12
Although the China threat debate had attracted extensive participation
and had generated a number of powerful arguments, with several of them
attaining the status of conventional wisdom,13 some problems nonetheless
remained. First, with rare exceptions, the debate generally speaking lacked
adequate theoretical grounding.14 Second, given the widespread interests in
the debate, it was interesting to notice that there were very few systematic
tests of relevant propositions. Third, while some works about the China threat
did touch upon the subject of China’s motivation, they did it usually in an
indirect and tentative way, such as inferring China’s inclination through its
ancient history, political and economic value systems, and records of conflict
with other countries.15 So the third defect in the China threat debate, as will be
further discussed below, was that few direct and in-depth studies of China’s
motivations had been carried out.
Two fundamentally important questions were at the core of the China threat
debate. The China threat scholars based their argument either on the proposi-
tion that threat came automatically from another state’s potential or growing
power, or on the proposition that threat came from both a state’s aggregate
power and its aggressive motivation. The no/little threat scholars were more
optimistic either because they regarded China as too weak to present a threat
to the international system, or because they regarded China as a status quo
country or as being capable of evolving into a status quo country.16
To see whether China will present a threat to the international system
therefore, one needs only to focus on two questions: whether China has the
capability to challenge the international system, and whether China has the
motivation to do so. Both psychological theories and international relations
theories support focusing on these two questions in testing the China threat
proposition. According to psychologists, outcomes are explained mainly by
four variables: internally, capability and resolve (motivation), and externally,
difficulty of task and luck.17 Since difficulty of task and, often, luck are
largely the function of both capability and preparedness, in testing the China
threat proposition we need to look only at two variables: China’s capability
and motivation.
International relations theories also support looking at these two variables.
Some IR theorists regard capability as the most important variable. Morgen-
thau, the modern-day father of realism, calls for guarding against the popular
fallacy of concerning with motives. He suggests that we should assume that
statesmen think and act only in terms of interest defined as power. Therefore,
analysts of international politics should ignore the different motives, prefer-
ences, and intellectual and moral qualities of different statesmen. Waltz, the
father of neorealism, claims that states can all be assumed to be security-

maximizers, and what explains the outcomes in international politics is the
structure of the international system (the most important being the distribu-
tion of capabilities across units), while the motives from which men act have
little, if not nothing at all, to do with the consequences of their actions. States’
motivation is therefore assumed to be a constant. Grieco, another prominent
realist, points out that states should pay attention mainly to other states’ capa-
bilities, which are the ultimate basis for their security and independence.18
I wish to argue that state motivation is at least as important as state capa-
bility in the test of the China threat proposition. If capability only were rel-
evant, we should not have had so much talk about a possible China threat,
because militarily, Russia was much stronger than China, India was set to
catch up with China in military capability, and China was behind not only
the United States and Japan but four other countries in military expenditure;
and economically, Europe and Japan were much wealthier than China, and
as we know, wealth could easily be converted into power.19 If capability only
is relevant, countries like the United States should never have to worry about
North Korea, which is miserably backward. But people in the United States
and Japan are nevertheless very much concerned about a possible threat from
the poverty-stricken North Korea, because with a not impossibly dangerous
motivation, a little material capability could go a long way in disrupting the
stability of the world, as demonstrated by the capability of North Korea to
develop advanced missiles from its meager material resources.20 Canada and
Mexico are (presumably) not concerned about a possible threat from the
United States, not because they have the capability to fend off a U.S. attack,
should there be one, but because they can rest assured that the United States
does not have the motivation to do so. In studying the China threat proposi-
tion, motivation therefore warrants at least as much attention as capability.
Segal points out, if China matters at all, it is not because of its capability but
because of its motivation.21
As a matter of fact, even though conventional wisdom is that realists are
against studying motivation, nearly every realist accepts the importance
of motivation. More specifically, they acknowledge the importance of dif-
ferentiating between status quo and revisionist states. According to Hans
Morgenthau, though a status quo country often seeks adjustments within the
existing system, it basically aims at the maintenance of the existing distribu-
tion of power, while an imperialist country seeks to overthrow the existing
distribution of power.22
To Kissinger, the dichotomy is between a status quo power and a revolu-
tionary power. A status quo power accepts the legitimacy of the current inter-
national framework, but a revolutionary power seeks to transform the system
6 Chapter 1
itself. One major power dissatisfied with the status quo would transform the
whole system into a revolutionary world order, thus greatly destabilizing the
world system. In his view, Napoleonic France and the former Soviet Union
were both revolutionary states.23
To Herrmann, the dichotomy is between offensively or defensively moti-
vated states. Offensively motivated states are power-maximizers with unlim-
ited aims while defensively motivated states are security-maximizers with
limited aims. Peaceful coexistence therefore is much easier with the latter
than with the former.24
Schweller distinguishes among a whole range of state interests (his term
for motivation), from states with unlimited ambitions to states strongly com-
mitted to maintaining the status quo. He regards a state’s level of satisfaction
with the status quo a critical variable for understanding its foreign policy,25
because a satisfied status quo country (e.g., the United States) would use
its power to help stabilize the world system and make other countries more
secure, while a dissatisfied revisionist country (e.g., Hitlerite Germany)
would use its power to disrupt or even destroy the existing world system.
Therefore, Schweller rightly points out that states are less concerned with
power imbalances than they are about who holds power.26
Waltz, who tends to regard all states as satisfied ones concerned mainly for
their own survival, has to admit that beyond the survival motive, the aims of
states may be endlessly varied: from the ambition to conquer the world to the
desire merely to be left alone. He also admits that things like the qualities and
the motives of actors are not uninteresting or unimportant.27
Even though Morgenthau is against studying state motives, he nonetheless
has to contradict himself by saying that identifying the motivation of possible
challengers is “the fundamental question” and the correct answer to which
determines the “fate of nations.”28 We may therefore conclude that realist
theorists would also support studying motivation as an indispensable task in
testing the China threat proposition.
Though different scholars give different predictions of the future evolution
of the international system, understanding the foreign policy orientation of
various major powers remains an important task. To Wohlforth, the world
system was unambiguously unipolar, and the unipolarity was both peaceful
and durable. In such an international system, balancing the United States by
any other countries was futile and impossible. The United States therefore
could afford not to learn, could be freer than most states to “disregard the
international system and its incentives” (meaning the systemic constraint
upon other countries to balance against the United States), because “a state
cannot be blamed for responding to systemic incentives” (meaning the sys-
temic constraint upon the United States to play the leading role in international
arena).29 Muravchik enthusiastically expresses his observations: “We can

afford whatever foreign policy we need or choose. We are the richest country
in the world, the richest country the world has ever known. And we are richer
today than we have ever been before.”30 Kristol and Kagan dismiss warnings
of a possible imperial overstretch as misguided, and advocate a sense of mis-
sion among Americans to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy, because
only such an American-style “empire management” can effectively protect
and promote American interests and principles, and perpetuate American
hegemony and international peace and order.31 Kagan points out that true mul-
tilateralism is impossible in a world of unequal powers, and the United States
should act decisively in spite of obstruction by other countries, either France
or Russia, “lest the entire international system come crashing down.” And by
acting more resolutely, the United States will increase the gap between the
hegemon and the rest. Brzezinski confidently refers to America’s allies and
friends as “vassals and tributaries.”32
But other scholars are more cautious.33 Haass declares that an effort to
assert or expand U.S. hegemony will fail, and the world is already becom-
ing more multipolar. Kupchan asserts that America’s unipolar moment will
not last long even if the U.S. economy grows at a healthy rate, and he also
suggests that the United States prepare for the decline of its preponderance
and encourage the emergence of regional unipolarity in Europe and East
Asia. Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky appeal for American restraint, caution
against leading a new crusade abroad, and call for the United States to come
home. Russett, Stam, and Art regard expanding NATO as courting disaster.
Walt perceives the waning of the most powerful alliance in human history,
between Europe and America. Huntington points out that “political and intel-
lectual leaders in most countries strongly resist the prospect of a unipolar
world and favor the emergence of true multipolarity.” Layne claims that three
mechanisms—differential growth rates, balancing, and sameness effect—will
make sure that the unipolarity is but a short-lived illusion. Maynes warns
against the perils of an imperial America because of domestic costs, impact
on the American character, international backlash, and lost opportunities.
Posen and Ross suggest that pursuit of primacy might be unsustainable and
self-defeating for the United States, and the mechanisms they mention are
somewhat similar to those of Layne and Maynes. The same Brzezinski who
regards America’s allies as vassals suggests a cautious policy of preserving
the American primacy not only by making the costs of challenging the United
States too high for other countries, but also by not threatening the vital inter-
ests of major Eurasian powers, a logical follow-up of Walt’s balance of threat
theory. Kissinger derides the “heroic efforts” in trying eagerly to turn the
United States into some Eurasian powers’ number one adversary.34
8 Chapter 1
No matter which prediction turns out to be more accurate, understanding

the motivation of other major powers would still be a worthy task. If Wohl-
forth, Muravchik, and Kristof and Kagan are correct, and the United States
can act without restraint and needs to be more assertive on the world stage
just as an all-powerful sovereign can in domestic politics, understanding the
motivations of other major powers would better help the United States to act
like a benign hegemon, which is psychologically satisfactory to Americans.35
Besides, if it is necessary for Americans to go abroad in search of monsters
to destroy, identifying the motivation of various secondary powers would help
accomplish this task. Muravchik gives a brilliant statement about American
foreign policy: “We should be strong, generous, and lawful. We should be
a good friend and a bad enemy. We should comport ourselves with honor
. . . Honor means behaving righteously ourselves, and it requires keeping our
promises and threats . . . We should shoulder international responsibilities not
just because that is the moral thing to do but because, as is usually the case
with following the moral path, it is also in our best interest.”36
But if other scholars are correct, understanding other major powers’ moti-
vation would be all the more important. In such a case when the systemic
constraint is to encourage second-ranking countries to balance against the
dominant power, it is important for the United States to adopt judicious for-
eign policies. If a particular country is a revisionist one, failure to properly
manage the potential threat might result in a severe disruption of the interna-
tional system by the potential challenger, and possibly even prematurely end
the unipolar distribution of power which is in the best interest of the United
States.37 On the other hand, as demonstrated by the balance of threat theory,
unwarranted assertiveness might provoke a balancing coalition, which also
would jeopardize the status of the United States as the sole hegemon. Addi-
tionally, confrontation with a big power would not only make it necessary
for the United States to spend a large amount of resources in this effort, in
order to win the cooperation from other countries and to prevent a balancing
coalition dictated by the system structure, the United States will also have to
pay ever greater prices to other countries, especially to an increasing number
of other second-tier powers.38
Jervis gives an oft-cited explanation for the necessity of adopting different
foreign policy strategies in dealing with the two different kinds of countries:
deterrence or assurance (corresponding to containment or engagement in the
China threat parlance). The deterrence model is applicable to cases where a
country is acting out of greed (thus a revisionist country), because a less reso-
lute strategy would most likely encourage its greater assertiveness. The assur-
ance model is applicable to cases when a country is acting out of fear (thus
a statue quo country), because an overly assertive strategy would most likely
intensify its apprehension, and result in an undesired spiral of hostility.39
The importance of correctly identifying second-ranking states’ foreign
policy motivation can also be shown by employing the concepts of type I and
type II errors in statistical hypothesis testing. Hard-liners would regard a type
II error as less risky than a type I error, since, according to them, mistaking a
status quo state as a revisionist one would only incur some unnecessary costs,
while failure to destroy a monster might curtail the United States’ primacy.
Soft-liners on the other hand tend to think that type II error is more danger-
ous, since, according to this perspective, unnecessarily coercive diplomacy
might create/exacerbate a threat from where there could have been none/little,
and eventually conjure up global catastrophes from what might have been
peaceful co-existence and benign hegemony, while failure to confront a revi-
sionist country in an early time would at worst result in another manageable,
if undesirable, cold war.40 To hard-liners, the fashion is “to commit type II
error is patriotic,” and to soft-liners, the catchword is “to avoid self-fulfilling
prophecy.” To hard-liners, demonization of a target country is natural, and to
soft-liners, the tendency is to give the target country the benefit of the doubt.41
As a social scientist, one should resist either temptation, avoid letting pre-
conception lead him astray, and allow only the reality principle to guide his
research.42 From a practical perspective, to err in either direction might lead to
serious, perhaps even disastrous, consequences. Hard-liners might think that
to demonize a target country might help mobilize internal support for the sake
of national interests, but such a posture might curtail the American primacy
through the mechanism of imperial overstretch. U.S.-China confrontation in
the 1950s and 1960s provides salient examples.43 On the other hand, Great
Britain’s inability to manage rising challengers resulted in the premature loss
of its vast empire.44
As mentioned in the above, a possible China threat can be studied from
two perspectives: China’s capability and its motivation. So far, scholars have
made solid contributions to the understanding of China’s capability. They
have done in-depth analyses of China’s military capability, the prospect of
China’s economic development, political stability, the possible integration of
a greater China, and China’s aggregate capability.45
As for China’s motivation, some relevant works have also been done. They
include those about Chinese nationalism, China’s prospect of democratization
and social development, China’s perceptions of the current world system,
China’s foreign/defense policy doctrine, China’s foreign policy behavior, and
China’s relations with other countries.46 Unlike works about China’s capabil-
ity, which directly and clearly present each author’s arguments and evidence
10 Chapter 1
as to whether China has or will have the capability to challenge the interna-
tional system, we do not yet have any direct and in-depth study of China’s
motivation. Each of the works cited in this paragraph can help shed light on
a certain aspect of China’s motivation, but as they are not meant to be stud-
ies of China’s motivation, they offer at most bits and pieces of circumstantial
and inconclusive evidence with regard to China’s motivation. Since China’s
motivation is one of the two fundamental questions in the study of a possible
China threat, a direct and in-depth study of China’s foreign policy motivation
is desirable, and indeed, imperative.
Notes
1. Cited in Ness, p. 149.

2. Nye, 1990; Kapstein, 1999; Krauthammer, 1990/91; Nolan, 1995; Lees, 1997;
Harris, 1995.
3. Morgenthau, pp. 4–13, 35–79, 1956; Carr, pp. 63–67, 80–88, 1964.
4. Waltz, pp. 102–128, 1979.
5. Levy, 1987; Organski, pp. 374–376, 1968; Gilpin, p. 191, 208–209, 1981;
Gilpin, p. 106, 1994.
6. Lepgold, pp. 80–85, 1998; Langdon, 2001; Oka, 2001; Okamoto, 2002,
Kupchan, pp. 73–76, 1999; Rumsfeld, p. 28, 2002, Johnston, 1999; Lieberthal, 2002;
Scobell, 2002, Singh, 1998; Rubinoff, 2001; Mistry, 2001.
7. Ross, 1999; Johnston, 1999.
8. Kristof, pp. 59–64, 70, 72–74, 1993; Mazarr, pp. 35–37; Shinn, pp. 3–11,
1996; S. Goldstein, pp. 21–22, 28–29, 1998.
9. Segal, pp. 29, 32, 1999.
10. Rachman, pp. 129–130, 1995; Segal, pp. 108, 134, 1996.
11. Lieberthal, Overholt, Cronin and Cronin, Gill, Shinn, Mazarr, Betts, Posen
and Ross.
12. Betts, p. 55.
13. Examples are self-fulfilling prophecy, Nye, p. 11, 1995; luxury to engage,
Ross, p. 44, 1997; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002.
14. Segal, p. 107, 1996; Johnston, p. 1, 1998.
15. Johnston, 1995; Shambaugh, p. 187, 1996; Chen, p. 194; Yan, pp. 6–7, May
1995, cited in Roy, p. 763, 1996; Betts, pp. 74–75; Roy, pp. 160–162; Overholt, p. 78,
1996, Nathan and Ross, p. 230, 1997; Gallagher, pp. 189–190, 1994.
16. Betts, pp. 42, 45, 47, 53, 55–64; Segal, pp. 108–110, 1996; Wohlforth, p. 32,
1999;, Bernstein andMunro, pp. 18–19, 24–26, 1997; Waldron; Roy, pp. 160–162,
1994; Shambaugh, pp. 19–33, 1996; Ross, p. 34, 1997; Hornik, pp. 28–42, 1994;
Gallagher, pp. 192–193; A. Goldstein, 1997/98; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002,
Christensen, p. 52, 1996; Overholt, p. 78, 1996; Mandelbaum, pp. 94–95, 1997; Nye,
pp. 11–12, 1996; Economy and Oksenberg, 1999.
17. Heider, pp. 79–100, 1958; Jones et al., 1971; Shaver, 1975; cited in Herrmann,
p. 177, 1988.
18. Morgenthau, pp. 5–6; Waltz, pp. 82, 93–97, 1979, 1997; Zakaria, pp. 190–96,
1992; Grieco, pp. 498, 500.
19. Segal, pp. 29–32, 1999; Betts, p. 42; Christensen, p. 55, 1999; Singh; Gholz,
Press, and Sapolsky, p. 8; Viner.
20. Eberstadt.
21. Segal, p. 29, 1999.
22. Morganthau, pp. 35–66.
23. Kissinger, pp. 1–3, 1964; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 111–116, 1981.
24. Herrmann, pp. 3–5, 1985.
25. Schweller, p. 184, 1998.
26. Ibid. pp. 189, 201.
27. Waltz, pp. 81, 91, 1979.
28. Morgenthau, p. 59.
29. Wohlforth, pp. 8, 18, 25, 29, 40–41, 1999.
30. Muravchik, p. 36.
31. Kristol and Kagan, pp. 20–23, 26–32, 1996.
32. Kagan, p. 33, 1998; Brzezinski, 1997, cited in Maynes, p. 36, 1998.
33. What Wohlforth calls “conventional wisdom,” p. 8.
34. Haass, p. 38, 1999; Kupchan, pp. 40–42, 1998, Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, pp.
5–17, 1997; Russett and Stam, 1998; Art, 1998, Walt, pp. 3–11, 1998/99, Huntington,
p. 42, 1991; Layne, pp. 133–141, 1993, Maynes, pp. 39–47, 1998; Posen and Ross,
pp. 42–43; Kissinger, 1999.
35. Claude, pp. 1–5, 18–21; Nincic, 1992; Yankelovich and Destler, 1994; Kocs,
1994; Holsti, 1992; Hagan, p. 125; Kagan, 1998.
36. Muravchik, pp. 209–210, 1996.
37. Waltz; Brzezinski, pp. 48–56, 1997; Posen and Ross, p. 17, n. 14, 1996/97;
New York Times, March 8, 1992, p. 14.
38. Walt, pp. 5–6, 18–32, 263–266, 1987; Mastanduno, pp. 146–149,151–157,
167–170, 1999; Kupchan, pp. 73–79, 1998; Posen and Ross, pp. 42–43, 52; Riker,
pp. 211–243; Walt; Kagan.
39. Jervis, pp. 58–67, 1976; pp. 167–214, 1978.
40. A. Goldstein, p. 73, 1997/98.
41. Herrmann, p. 183, 1988.
42. Steinbruner, pp. 97–101.
43. Christensen, 1996; Lebow, pp. 169–184.
44. Kennedy.
45. Vasey, 1993; Shambaugh, 1996; Gallagher, 1994; Ross, p. 35–3, 1997; A.
Goldstein, 1997/98; Gill/O’Hanlon, 1999; Lilley/Ford, 1999; Mulvenon, 1999;
Puchala, 2001; Tsai, 2001; Overholt, 1993; Jue, 1994; Segal, 1994; Hornik, 1994;
Nolan, 1995; Jim, 1995; Segal, 1994; Huang, 1995; Goldstone, 1995; Pei, 1999;
Crane, 1993; Chen and /Gong, 1994/95; Metzger and Myers, 1996; Kristof, 1993;
Gurtov, 1994; Roy, pp. 150–156; Ross, pp. 86–90; Segal, pp. 108–112; S. Goldstein,
pp. 1–22, 25–27, 1998; Segal, 1999.
12 Chapter 1
46. Pye, 1993; Unger, 1996; Zhao, 1997; Harris, 1997; Garver, 1998; Fitzgerald,
1999, Gries, 1999; Gries, 2001; Zheng, 1994; Tyson and Tyson, 1995; White, Howell,
and Shang, 1996; Shi, 1997; Pei, 1998; Peng, 1998; Zweig, 1999; Crane, 1999;
Nathan, 1999; Li, 2000; Foot, 2001; Oksenberg, 2001; Zhao, 1992; Chu, 1994; Faust/
Kornberg, 1995; Sheng, 1992; Shambaugh, 1994; Zhao, 1995; Garrett and Glaser,
1995; Johnston, 1995; Yao, 1995; Zhao, 1996; Feigenbaum, 1999; Cordner, 1994; Wu
and Mesquita, 1994; Roy, pp. 160–162, 1994; Christensen, September/October 1996;
Ross, 1997; Johnston, 1998; Lieberthal, 1995; Langlois and Langlois, 1996; Ross,
pp. 92–96, 1999; Christensen, 1999.
Chapter 2
Image Study as an Approach to

Explore China’s Motivations toward
the United States
Chapter 1 raises the research question: is China a status quo or a revision-

ist country, and what is China’s motivation vis-à-vis the United States? This
chapter will explain how this project is going to address this question sys-
tematically. As demonstrated in the series of works by Richard K. Herrmann
and others, one useful way of exploring a state’s foreign policy motivation is
through the image approach: to see what the source country’s image of the
target country is. Images can be considered sets of schemata consisting of the
components listed in Table 2.1.1
From the above schemata of images, we may infer the motivations of a
source country with regard to a target country. For instance, if the source
country holds an imperialist (barbarian) image of the target country, we may
infer that the source country perceives an overwhelming threat from the target
country. It recognizes the distinct superiority of the target country in capa-
bility, especially military, and it is apprehensive that the target country will
exploit its own weakness. The motivation of the source country with regard to
the target country, then, would be defensive, a desire to avoid conflicts with
the target country, and a general inclination to appease the target country. It
will be firmly resistant to the target country usually when it is convinced that
appeasement does not work. In the case of the imperialist image, the source
country perceives a distinct superiority of the target country also in culture,
so it is not confident that it could catch up with the target country anytime
soon. In the case of the barbarian image, the source country would adopt a
policy of appeasement, but as it believes in the superiority of its own culture
vis-à-vis the target country, it has confidence it will ultimately catch up with
the target country in capability.2
13
14 Chapter 2
Table 2.1 Components of National Images
Images Character of Foreign Capability Cultural Level

Policy toward One’s Compared to Compared to
Own Nation One’s Own One’s Own
Nation Nation
Imperialist Threatening Superior Superior
Barbarian Threatening Superior Inferior
Enemy Threatening Comparable Comparable
Rogue Presenting an opportunity Inferior Inferior
for exploitation
Degenerate Presenting an opportunity Comparable but Comparable but
for exploitation declining declining
Hegemon Presenting both a threat Superior Superior
and an opportunity
Neutral Presenting both a threat Comparable Comparable
(complex) and an opportunity
Child (colony) Presenting an opportunity Inferior Inferior
for exploitation
Patron Presenting mainly an Superior Superior
opportunity for mutual gains
Ally Presenting an opportunity Comparable Comparable
for mutual gains
Protégé Presenting mainly an Inferior Inferior
(dependent opportunity for mutual gains
ally)
If the source country holds a degenerate/colony image of the target

country, we may infer that it perceives weakness in the target country. It
recognizes that the target country enjoys a level of culture and capabil-
ity comparable to its own, but it also perceives degeneration in the target
country, and an inability on the part of the target country to make good use
of its own resources. In the case of the colony image, it understands that
the target country is clearly inferior in both capability and culture. The
source country therefore might have an inclination to take advantage of the
target country’s weakness, and to actively seek opportunities to exploit its
weakness. It is quite likely that the motivation of the source country with
regard to the target country is offensive. A degenerate image of the target
country therefore indicates a significant threat from the source country. And
a colony image of the target country signifies an even greater threat from
the source country.3
The above national images can be placed in a deductively derived table,
the two dimensions constituting each image being affect (threat, opportunity
Image Study as an Approach to Explore China’s Motivations 15
Table 2.2 National Images
Perceived Capability
Affect Superior Similar Inferior
Positive Patron Ally Protégé

Neutral Hegemon Neutral Child
Degenerate
Negative Imperialist Enemy Rogue
Barbarian
for exploitation, and opportunity for mutual gains; or positive, neutral, and
negative) and capability (material and/or cultural) (see Table 2.2).
In Table 2.2, except in the case of the barbarian image, which indicates
superior capability but inferior culture, the cultural level of all the other
images is the same as their capability level.
From the perspective of the perceiver, three images (patron, ally, pro-
tégé) indicate the perception of opportunity for mutual gains, another three
images (child, degenerate, rogue) indicate perception of opportunity for
exploitation, three images (imperialist, barbarian enemy) indicate percep-
tion of threat. And the remaining two images (hegemon, neutral) indicate
perception of both threat and opportunity for mutual gains. To see whether
China is a status quo or a revisionist country vis-à-vis the United States,
one useful way through the image approach is to see what China’s image
of the United States is. The more China perceives threat and/or opportu-
nity for mutual gains, the more likely it is to be a status quo country; and
the more China perceives opportunity for exploitation, the more likely
it is to be a revisionist country. The more positive China’s perception of
the United States is, the more likely it is to be a status quo country, and
the more negative its perception of the United States is, the more likely it
is to be a revisionist country.
In studying national images, an author needs to tackle the following ques-
tions. First, who are the perceivers? In other words, whose perception can be
regarded as representative of one state’s perception of another state? Second,
through what approaches does the author intend to obtain data from which
to construct a meaningful image of the target state? And third, what is to be
perceived, i.e., what information about the target state is important in helping
to shed light on the source state’s understanding of the target state? In the
following, I will discuss how the existing literature addresses these questions
and how this book will deal with them.
16 Chapter 2
Table 2.3 Perceivers of National Images
Perceiver Works
State as unitary actor Herrmann 1985, Frei 1986
Predominant leader Sheng 1997, Liu 1998
Decision-making elites R. Cottam 1977, Larson 1985
Influential elites Shambaugh 1992, Wang 2000
General public Steele 1966, Gries 1999
THE PERCEIVERS
Approaches in the Existing Literature

Who should the perceivers be in national image studies? As listed in Table
2.3, the existing literature offers five possibilities.
One approach is to treat a state as a unitary actor. In this approach, state-
ments of a head of state or other top official, documents of the government,
and editorials and other articles of government-owned newspapers may be
regarded as presenting the perception of a state as a unitary actor. Herrmann’s
Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy and Frei’s Perceived
Images: U.S. and Soviet Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament are
two important examples of this genre.
In some countries, a state’s foreign policy is determined solely or mainly
by one supreme leader, such as in Stalin’s USSR and Mao’s China. In such
cases, the perceptions of the supreme leader can to a great extent explain the
state’s foreign policy toward a target state. Sheng’s Battling Western Impe-
rialism is a good example of this genre, which studies Mao’s self-perception
and his perception of the United States and how such perceptions had a sub-
stantial impact on the U.S.-China confrontation for several decades.
In most cases, however, states rely on the expertise of a small group of top
elites for foreign policy decision making. Studying those top elites’ percep-
tions of target states therefore becomes necessary to explain a state’s foreign
policy decision making. Graham Allison’s The Essence of Decision and
Deborah Larson’s The Origin of Containment are two classic examples of
this genre. They explain how the United States handled the most serious for-
eign policy crisis in its history, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and how the United
States decided to enter into the Cold War with the USSR.
Studying influential elites’ perceptions may shed light on how a state for-
mulates its foreign policy. This approach is quite useful because sufficient
data about a state’s top elites are often not available. Influential elites, accord-
ing to Putnam, are defined as individuals with “substantial indirect or implicit
influence; those to whom decision-makers look for advice, whose opinions

and interests they take into account or from whom they fear sanctions.”4
Shambaugh’s Beautiful Imperialist and Jianwei Wang’s Limited Adversary
are two prominent examples of this genre. The former studies China’s
America watchers’ perceptions of the United States while the later explores
the mutual perceptions of the target country held by scholars, business people,
and diplomats in both the United States and China.
In democratic countries, the government’s power comes ultimately from
voters. Decision makers therefore often have to take public sentiments into
account in the formulation of the state’s foreign policy, especially in non-
crisis situations. Even in non-democratic countries government leaders have
to seek legitimacy at least partially through the support, or acquiescence, of
the masses. Going down further from the level of influential elites to the level
of masses therefore makes sense in studying a state’s foreign policy formu-
lation. A. T. Steele’s The American People and China is a good example
studying the American people’s perceptions of China and how they affect
U.S. China policy, and Peter Gries’ Face Nationalism: Power and Passion
in Chinese Anti-Foreignism focuses on some of the responses of the Chinese
people to the frustrations China encountered in its relations with other major
powers.
The Perceivers in This Book

I intend to focus on China’s influential elites as the perceivers. They in this
project refer to those who have published in China’s leading international
relations journals. The job of these scholars is to think about the United
States’ and China’s foreign relations, especially China’s relations with the
United States. Many of them have access to internal government documents
about foreign policy decision making. Moreover, they often serve as advis-
ers to decision-making elites in China. In writing articles for those journals,
they are communicating with their colleagues in the field and offering advice,
directly or indirectly, to decision-making elites.
Compared with public government documents or statements as sources,
academic writings are more candid, less for the purpose of propaganda, and
more thorough in analysis. Compared with focusing on predominant leaders
or the decision-making elite as the perceivers, academic writings are more
easily available, thus offering an opportunity for systematic analysis. Com-
pared with writings reflecting popular sentiment, academic writings offer
more in-depth analysis, less sentimentalism, and more direct relevance to
actual decision making.
18 Chapter 2
Table 2.4 Approaches for Studying National Perceptions
Approach Works
Experiment Herrmann 1997
Survey Steele 1966; Kusnitz 1984; Yue 1999; Hurwitz and Peffley
1990
Sampled interview Isaacs 1958; Nakanishi 1975; Hall 1980; Holt 1989; Wang
2000
Literature survey Shambaugh 1988–1, 1988–2, 1992; Wang and Lin 1992;
Gries 1999
Quotation collection Pillsbury 2000; Frei 1986
Impression collection Grayson 1978, 1979; Arkush 1989
Archival research Larson 1985; Sheng 1997; Liu 1998
Government statements Herrmann 1985; Shimko 1991; Frei 1986
Media analysis Wang 1998; Liu 1991; Su 1991
Mixed approaches Hunt 1988; Liu 1963; Tu 1973; Kulma 1999; Mosher 1990;
Bronfenbrenner 1961; Whiting 1989
Others Fairbank 1974
SOURCE MATERIALS

The second necessary decision to make when studying national images is to
decide how to obtain data from which inferences can be made concerning
what national image specific perceivers hold. There are many approaches to
this task, as is evident in Table 2.4.
The 11 approaches listed in Table 2.4 can be divided into five groups: (1)
survey, including survey in general terms and face-to-face interview; (2) con-
tent analysis, which is the most frequently used approach in national image
studies, including literature survey, quotation collection, impression collec-
tion, media analysis, archival research, and government statement analysis;
(3) experiment; (4) mixed approaches; and (5) others.
The survey is widely used in Western countries to study national percep-
tions. This approach is helpful in ensuring the representativeness of the
respondents, capturing diverse views, and identifying the distribution of vari-
ous opinions across the intended community. It is therefore the best approach
for studying national perceptions of the masses that are widely spread out
geographically. Like other approaches, it has disadvantages. For instance, it
requires simple questions and is thus unable to explore respondents’ percep-
tions in-depth, Another problem is low response rate. Yue offers a brief treat-
ment of China’s perceptions of the United States using this approach, and the
best work on U.S.-China mutual perceptions using this approach seems to be
A. T. Steele’s The American People and China.
Some scholars regard sampled interview as the best approach in studying

national perceptions. Akira Iriye, for instance, claims that “ideally, the same
approach should be used in any study of images.”5 Compared with studying
national perception from written sources, there are two salient advantages
with this approach. Firstly, it is potentially capable of tapping the perceptions
of those whose opinion is important in the decision making process but whose
profession does not require writing for publication, such as businessmen,
military leaders, and government officials.6 Second, this approach can also
tap perceptions that subjects find inconvenient to have published, especially
in a censored environment. Western academic practice, which emphasizes
protection of interviewees’ identities, makes it easier for subjects to utter
perhaps long-pent-up thoughts. There are also drawbacks with this approach.
One is that during the brief interview, usually between two total strangers, it
is virtually impossible to treat any subject thoroughly. Interviewees usually
can only provide literally on-the-spot responses rather than well-thought-out
answers. A second drawback is that the identity of the interviewer cannot
but affect interviewees’ responses. Some other problems with this approach
include the inability to talk to people whose perceptions really matter in the
decision making process, and the difficulties involved in assembling a repre-
sentative sample from a national population. Isaacs’ Scratches on our Minds
is a classic work using this approach. Wang’s Limited Adversary is perhaps
the most sophisticated example of it.
The content analysis of published literature is the most widely used
approach in the study of national perceptions. Virtually every written work
about a target country can serve as a source for studying perceptions of that
country. Thus, poems, essays, travelogues, academic treatises, etc. are all
potential sources. The strong point of a literature survey is its replicability,
as sources cited can also be read by other scholars, who can then see if the
text is as the scholar reports. But, ironically, the most serious problem with
this approach is also replicability. With the exponential increase of interna-
tional contacts, scholars adopting this approach often face the problem not
of insufficient source materials but of an overabundance of them. Conse-
quently, different authors may cite different sources and present readers with
very different pictures of what they claim are the national perceptions of a
target country. As a result, studies of perception that adopt this approach can
potentially become more the author’s subjective meta-perception than a fair
summary of the images evident in the source country.
One variant of content analysis is quotation collection. Two major works
adopt this technique in presenting national perceptions.7 Its strong point is that
each state can speak for itself. Since accuracy is most important in national
perception studies, and a sophisticated misrepresentation is much worse than
20 Chapter 2
an accurate but crude presentation, quotation collection can be a valuable

approach. By allowing the representatives of a state to speak for themselves,
the credibility of the work is greatly enhanced. But there are pitfalls in this
approach. Different people at different times might speak differently. The
author’s main task in this kind of research is to make sure that the quotations
collected faithfully represent a state’s dominant perception, rather than “rare
exceptions from a dominant theme.”8
Impression collection is to put together articles, usually by celebrities, to
represent national perceptions. What is best about this approach is that the
readers are treated with the unabridged version of the authors’ perceptions.
This largely avoids the quoting of fragments out of context. The most serious
problem with this approach is that readers have to rely completely on editors’
discretion to provide them with a representative sample of national percep-
tions. The author usually does not follow strict rules in selecting their sample.
As a result, it would be difficult for a sample to be truly representative of the
universe of national perceptions. This approach therefore is especially strong
in presenting different types of perceptions rather than the distribution of
different perceptions. The two books edited by Benson L. Grayson concern-
ing American perceptions of the USSR and China, respectively, and the one
edited by Arkush et al. are excellent examples of this genre.
There are two salient advantages of using media as sources for national
image studies. One is that media sources are easily available and in great
abundance, and the second is that media materials are the most sensitive of all
sources to a change of sentiment in a country. There are also two disadvan-
tages, however. One is that media are vulnerable to propaganda. Thus they
are often less valid than other approaches as a source of the national image
people actually hold. And the second is that media tend to reflect current sen-
timents and are thus often affected more by single recent events than by stable
long-term tendencies. Generally speaking, journalists tend to use media as a
source of national image studies much more often than political scientists.9
When it comes to studying national perceptions of the past, scholars often
resort to archival research. One advantage of this approach is that it usually
studies top elites whose perception directly affects foreign policy decision
making. One limitation is that it allows mainly the exploration of past rather
than current perceptions. Another limitation is that only a limited number
of individuals can be studied through this approach because it is quite time-
consuming. Michael Sheng’s Battling Western Imperialism is an excellent
example of this genre, exploring Mao Zedong’s perception of the United
States, which reputedly resulted in decades of confrontation between China
and the United States. Deborah W. Larson’s Origins of Containment is
another excellent example, exploring the perceptions of top American elites
that led to the Cold War between the United States and the USSR spanning
five decades.
Public government statements are also often used to study national per-
ceptions. When it comes to studying a state’s current perceptions, or past
perceptions for which relevant documents are not yet de-classified, public
documents remain a viable source. One problem with this approach is that
public statements are frequently meant for propaganda purposes and, in the
worst-case scenario, for “outright deception.”10 But according to Frei,11 for
the following reasons, public documents can still serve a useful purpose in
national image studies. First, there are strong incentives for governments to
be consistent in their statements. Playing around with foreign policy state-
ments could cost a government its “internal and external credibility,” which
few governments can afford. Second, words, especially those as authoritative
and official as statements by the representatives of a government, “tend to
create a reality of their own,” i.e., they are usually followed by deeds. Though
they do not necessarily determine deeds, they do usually guide or bound
deeds. Even in as closed a society as the former USSR, government state-
ments often provide ample information about subsequent behavior. Further-
more, judicious designs can ensure greater validity of the approach of relying
on governments’ public statements for research purposes, as in Herrmann’s
Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy.
Experiment often involves measuring the effect of an independent vari-
able on a dependent variable. Unfortunately, because we are interested in
foreign policy we are usually interested in leaders who will not participate in
experiments. Where necessary, scholars can use surrogates (such as univer-
sity students) in such experiments, but this practice raises serious questions
of validity. One effort to use an experiment to test the internal operation of
imagery is “Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cog-
nitive Schemata.”12 The experiments described in this article demonstrate that,
among other things, subjects’ judgment of a target state’s relative capability
and culture, together with the perception of threat and opportunity, consti-
tute important components of a national image, and that a national image
does carry with it a certain set of policy choices. As these experiments used
American students as subjects, it is doubtful whether the conclusion can
be applicable to other countries; for instance, people of the former Soviet
Union might not necessarily associate democratic decision making with more
benign intention.13
The most frequently applied approach in studying national images is a
mixed approach. In such works, authors use data gathered through various
approaches, such as literature survey, government documents, media reports,
surveys, and perhaps authors’ direct experiences, to reconstruct a national
22 Chapter 2
perception. The advantage of this approach is that it ensures an abundance of

source materials. If all data support the existence of one national image, the
accuracy and credibility of the reconstruction will be significantly enhanced.
But if authors are not able to use their data in a scientific way, the resultant
construct might more often be misleading than illuminating. Because of the
human inclination of selective attention to, retention of, and recall of infor-
mation, a misuse of this approach will often result in an author’s perception
of the perception of a country, rather than an objective representation of a
national perception.
In addition to the above, scholars occasionally also resort to other
approaches to study national perceptions. One example is John King Fair-
bank’s “Chinese Perception of the West and Westerners.” This article relies
mainly on a series of pictures published in a Chinese magazine. Conceivably,
the abundance of films, television programs, photographs, etc. may give rise
to more works on national perceptions using these vivid sources. This, how-
ever, would again raise the difficult question of how to select a representative
sample.
The Source Materials in This Book

Content analysis will be the approach for this study. More specifically, Chap-
ters 3 and 4 will adopt the quotation collection approach famously employed
by Michael Pillsbury, and Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will resort to the literature sur-
vey approach, the most successful relevant example of which is Shambaugh’s
Beautiful Imperialist.
The research in this project will be based on articles on the United States
and on U.S.-China relations between 1991 and 2000 in the following six
journals: Meiguo Yanjiu (American Studies), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Con-
temporary International Relations), Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Politi-
cal Studies), Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), Shijie Jingji
yu Zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics), and Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao
(Journal of the Foreign Affairs College).14 Each of these journals is affiliated
with one of China’s top foreign policy research institutes, and these institutes
reflect the perceptions of China’s Foreign Ministry, the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences—the top civilian think tank in China, the Ministry of State
Security—often called China’s CIA, and the Chinese Society for Strategy and
Management—a semiprivate organization staffed with senior scholars with
governmental and military backgrounds.
Table 2.5 lists the research institutes covered in this project and those in
David Shambaugh’s Beautiful Imperialist and in Michael Pillsbury’s China
Debates the Future Security Environment. The explanations concerning
Table 2.5 Research Institutes Covered in the Three Comparable Projects
Shambaugh Pillsbury Zhang Institutional Affiliation Journal

CIIS CIIS CIIS Foreign Ministry International Studies
SIIS SIIS Foreign Ministry
FAC Foreign Ministry Journal of Foreign Affairs
College
CASS CASS CASS Chinese Academy of American Studies Quarterly,
Social Science Journal of World Economics
and Politics
CICIR CICIR CICIR Ministry of State Security Contemporary International
(China’s CIA) Relations
CCIS State Council
CSSM Chinese Society for Strategy and Management
Strategy and Management
AMS Central Military
Commission, General
Staff Department
NDU Central Military
Commission
CIISS PLA General Staff’s
Second Department
various research institutes in China are based on the works of Shambaugh,

Saunders and, especially, Pillsbury.15
Both the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and the Shanghai
Institute of International Studies (SIIS) are affiliated with China’s Foreign
Ministry. CIIS publishes the journal Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Politi-
cal Studies). The articles in this journal are usually written by its staff, who
are often “diplomats in rotation.” In this project, I will regard the articles in
this journal, together with those in the Journal of the Foreign Affairs Col-
lege (Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao), which is considered to have become more
influential in the 1990s in China’s foreign policy decision making,16 more or
less representing the perception of the United States held by China’s Foreign
Ministry. The Foreign Affairs College is also affiliated with China’s Foreign
Ministry.
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) is regarded as highly
influential in China’s foreign policy decision making. The president of CASS
in the late 1990s was also a member of the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party. Two institutes in CASS, the Institute of
World Economics and Politics and the Institute of American Studies, conduct
research on the United States. In this project, I will use the journals of the two
institutes to represent CASS’s perceptions of the United States: Shijie Jingji
24 Chapter 2
yu Zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics) and Meiguo Yanjiu (American

Studies).
The China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) is
affiliated with the Ministry of State Security, reputedly China’s CIA. It is,
according to Shambaugh, “the main civilian current intelligence analysis unit
serving China’s top leadership and central government.”17 Its monthly journal,
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), will be used as
one source of China’s perceptions of the United States in this project.
The last source is Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), a
bimonthly published by the Chinese Society for Strategy and Management
(CSSM). “The chairman of CSSM was former Vice Premier of the State
Council Gu Mu, and one of the vice chairmen was former Defense Minister
Zhang Aiping,” “best known in China for his leadership in Chinese nuclear
weapons program.” This is often regarded as (one of) the most nationalistic
journal(s) in China. A study by the East-West Center in Honolulu in 1996
cited only articles of this journal to demonstrate the rise of nationalism in
China.18
Among the five important institutes with most regular policy input men-
tioned in Shambaugh’s Beautiful Imperialist, this project considers only three
of them. SIIS is not considered but as it is affiliated with the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, just as CIIS is, it is hoped that the inclusion of CIIS’s journal in
this study will to some extent make up for the omission of SIIS’s perspective.
It is regrettable that I was not able to locate a journal systematically represent-
ing the perspective of CCIS.
As for the seven institutes mentioned in Pillsbury’s book, I consider three
of them in this presentation. SIIS’s perspective can be discerned by focus-
ing on the journals of CIIS and the Foreign Affairs College, since all three
represent the perspective of the Foreign Ministry. The Academy of Military
Science (AMS) “performs analysis for the Central Military Commission and
the General Staff Department.” The National Defense University (NDU) also
operates under the Central Military Commission. The China Institute of Inter-
national Strategic Studies (CIISS) is “a research institution subordinate to the
PLA General Staff’s Second Department.”19 Obviously, these three institutes
can be regarded as more or less representing the views of the Chinese military.
Because of logistic problems, I will not explore the perspective of the Chinese
military, but it is hoped that my inclusion of CSSM’s journal Zhanlue yu Guanli
could to some extent make up for the omission of the military’s perspective.
Shambaugh, Pillsbury, and some other authors examining the Chinese
perception of the United States cover many more sources than I will in this
project. As I am interested mainly in exploring the dominant Chinese percep-
tion of the United States, I believe focusing only on a limited but sufficient
number of authoritative sources would serve my purpose better.
THE PERCEIVED

The third important question is to decide what to perceive in a perception
study. Regarding the national image, scholars tend to offer an all-encompass-
ing definition. To William Scott, a national image “constitutes the totality of
attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that
nation.” The definitions by other scholars such as Kenneth Boulding, Jianwei
Wang, and Allen Whiting are similar.20 Thus, whatever is perceived about a
target nation constitutes a part of the image of that nation. But as an image
study after all serves mainly the purpose of understanding a source country’s
behavioral inclination toward a target country, given the bounded rationality
of human information processing, it is obviously impossible to include every-
thing about a target country in a national image study. To solve this problem,
image scholars tend to resort to one of two schemes to organize important
facets of the national image. One is to organize what is to be perceived into
different issue areas, and the other is to organize information along different
dimensions. I will now discuss the two schemes a little further.
Issue Areas
Most image scholars organize what is to be included in national image studies
into different issue areas, as is made clear in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, which list
major books and articles in the existing literature on the Chinese perceptions
of the United States. From these two tables, we can see that these authors
generally agree that China’s perception of the American economy, polity, for-
eign policy (especially that concerning the perceivers’ own country), people,
society, and culture are important issue areas in national image studies. The
American Image of Russia, 1917–1977 is another example. The dozens of
articles in this book were written by well-known Americans in various fields:
politicians, diplomats, writers, journalists, lawyers, social activists, philoso-
phers, etc. These authors are not image scholars, but their articles nonetheless
reflect the stereotypical perceptions of the USSR held by Americans during
the Cold War. Obviously, they mostly also organized their perceptions of the
USSR into these issue areas.
Dimensions
Some image scholars, however, organize information in national image
studies along different dimensions. The reason these dimensions are used
is because they posit theoretically that it is these things that affect strategic
26 Chapter 2
Table 2.6 Objects Studied in Major Books on Chinese Perceptions

of the United States
Project Objects in the United States Studied

Shambaugh 1991 American economy, society, polity, and foreign policy
Pillsbury 2000 Current and future American power
Wang 2000 American people, society, culture, and international behaviors
Table 2.7 Objects Studied in Major Articles on Chinese Perceptions

Project Issue Areas

Tu 1973 China policy, political system, values, science and technology,
society including sex, eating, social customs, etc.
Wang/Lin 1992 China policy (fighting Chinese socialism, etc.), capabilities and
status in world politics
Hunt 1988 Political system, China policy, racial discrimination domestically
and internationally, economic development (including science and
technology), foreign policy, society, economic system
Liu 1991 Media’s anti-China reports, China policy, pop culture
Shambaugh 1988-1 China policy, political and economic systems, society, functioning
of U.S. politics and economy
Shambaugh 1988-2 People, political system, economic development, China policy,
social vices; especially during the PRC period: economy, politics,
society, foreign policy
Ren 1999 Wealth and power, China policy, foreign policy
Liu 1998 Foreign policy especially its China policy, racial tensions, politics
Xu 1998 China policy, society, media, U.S.-China economic relations
Li 1998 Activities of Chinese students in the United States in representing
China and in advising Chinese government, China policy
Sheng 1998 Ideology, China policy
Fairbank 1974 Western technological sophistication; interactions between
Westerners and local people in Chinese settlements (Shanghai);
China-West social, cultural, religious conflicts; Western lifestyles
Ch’en 1979 People, China policy, economic wealth, military might, religion,
legal system, lifestyles, economic system, education, political
system, race relations, art, culture, scholarship
Saunders 2000 China policy, power, how U.S. domestic politics affects its
China policy
Zhang 1999 The first section, on a general image of the United States, including
perception of its society, foreign policy, economic and military
capabilities, media’s anti-China tendency, Taiwan policy, China
policy in general
Table 2.8 Dimensions in Image Study
Snyder
Shimko Scott Boulding Frei Ole Holsti Stoessinger and Pruitt R. Cottam R. Herrmann M. Cottam
Diesing
Capabilities Perceived Strength/ Capabilities Power or Capabilities Capabilities Power
power weakness capabilities
Threatening Hostility/ Threat Threat and Threat and Threatening
or benign friendliness perception opportunity opportunity or benign
image intention
Like or Affect
dislike
Self-image Self-image
Culture Culture Culture
Intentions, Aims, Goals Intentions Ultimate

goals, and motives and aims,
objective underlying specific
aims aims
Strategies Choice of Strategies Probable

and tactics strategies, and tactics strategy
disarmament
and arms
control
policies
Motivation Sources of
motivation
28 Chapter 2
Table 2.9 Dimensions Endorsed by Very Few Authors
Author(s) Dimension
Scott Associated response repertoires
Snyder and Diesing Preference function
Snyder and Diesing Unity of government
Snyder and Diesing Bargaining style
Holsti Approaches to political calculation
R. Cottam Interaction of domestic forces
Pruitt Responsiveness
Boulding Geographical space
Frei Structure of adversary
Frei Assessment of information about the adversary
Shimko, R. Cottam Decision processes
Shimko, Frei Meta-perception
Pruitt, Frei Trust/distrust
Stoessinger Character of adversary
R. Cottam Decision loci
policy choice. Table 2.8 lists dimensions considered important by those

scholars. Some of dimensions are unique to one of two particular scholars
(see Table 2.9).
In this project, I intend to explore Chinese perceptions of the United States
using both schemes, i.e., issue areas and strategic dimensions. The rationale
will now be explained.
The Perceived in This Book

Image scholars in existing literature adopt one of two schemes in organiz-
ing what is perceived in national image studies: issue areas and image
dimensions. As both of these kinds of information affect a source country’s
behavioral inclination toward a target country, I will not neglect either one of
them. The sources of cooperation or conflict between two countries include
two aspects. The first is how interactions between two countries enhance or
impair each country’s national interests. The second is how perceptions of
similarities or differences affect each country’s inclination to develop rela-
tions with the other. The first aspect can be addressed by studying a country’s
perceptions of the target country’s relative capability and threat/opportunity
from that country, and the second aspect can be studied by exploring one
country’s perceptions of the key features of another country.
Dimension I: Why Study Capability?

Capability, or power, is one of the most important concepts in political
realism. The reputedly most frequently quoted sentence in Thucydides’
Peloponnesian War is about power: “What made war inevitable was the
growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” All the
other realists following Thucydides emphasize “the primary and inescapable
importance of power.”21 According to Morgenthau, “the struggle for power
is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience” and
states’ three basic types of foreign policy therefore are to keep power, to
increase power, and to demonstrate power.22
Similarly, many image theorists regard power, or capability, as one of the
most important dimensions in national image formation. M. Cottam offers a
fine explanation of the similarity and difference between the cognitive and
realist schools. “The cognitive perspective is not inconsistent with the realist
school of international politics. Capability calculation and power matrix are
certainly sources of national role conceptions. . . . The cognitive approach and
the realistic approach suit different analytical loci. The cognitive approach
can be applied to decision making process before policy is made, while
the realistic approach explains the success or failure of the policy after it is
made.”23
The reason why power/capability is an indispensable dimension in national
image formation is that the perception of relative power determines the policy
options available to parties involved, and it constrains the options decision
makers can seriously consider pursuing.24 In foreign policy decision making,
the decision maker must have some sense of the feasibility and utility of the
resources he has in pursuing his policy goals. Their perception of relative
power, for instance, will help decision makers to decide whether the use of
military (or economic) force, or other means, is a serious option for them
and whether it is likely to succeed.25 If a target country is perceived as much
weaker, a more coercive approach may be viable; if it is regarded as enjoying
substantial power, more cautious strategies will be considered; and if the tar-
get country is perceived as much stronger, appeasement will be among likely
options.26 Ralph White offers a succinct and persuasive explanation of the
great importance of capability in the perception of a target country: the fear
of another actor is the result of a perception that he or she has hostile inten-
tions toward you as well as the capability to inflict harm. Hostility without
power or vice versa is not a cause for concern because “if either is zero, the
product is zero.”27
In studying the Chinese perceptions of the United States as an approach
to understanding China’s foreign policy toward the United States, therefore,
Chinese perceptions of the United States’ capability or power should naturally
30 Chapter 2
be a vitally important component of that perception. Among the three major

works in the existing literature on China’s perceptions of the United States,
only Pillsbury’s book devotes serious attention to this aspect of China’s per-
ception. Pillsbury’s work focuses mainly on China’s perception of the United
States’ military power, and it is based mostly on materials in the first half
of the 1990s. In all the other existing works on the Chinese perceptions of
the United States, books and articles included, this important component of
national image has not received special attention. Chapter 5 in this project
will be devoted specifically to exploring China’s perception of American
power/capability.
Dimension II: Why Study Threat and Opportunity?

To realists, the dominant school in international relations, national interest
should be the sole consideration in the formulation of a state’s foreign policy.
Morgenthau’s prescription for a successful foreign policy is that it should
be based on the national interest “restrictively and rationally defined,” and
the national interest provides the foundation for a wise and prudent foreign
policy. He further argues that “a foreign policy guided by moral abstractions
without consideration of the national interest is bound to fail . . . all the suc-
cessful statesmen of modern times, from Richelieu to Churchill, have made
the national interest the ultimate standard of their politics.”28 “The term
‘national interest’ has been applied by statesmen, scholars, and military plan-
ners since the Middle Ages to the foreign policy and national security goals of
nation-states. American presidents and their secretaries of state have invoked
the term since the beginning of the republic, and today it is widely used to
define the broad purposes of U.S. foreign policy.”29
Given the primary importance of national interest in the formulation of
a state’s foreign policy, it is natural that a theory of foreign policy decision
making should take this aspect into account. Image theory as an approach to
studying foreign policy decision making should therefore necessarily include
national interest as an essential dimension. Indeed, quite a few scholars from
the image school have in one way or another taken it into consideration.
In the case of Shimko, Frei, Holsti, and Snyder and Diesing, national inter-
est is represented by the dimension of intentions, goals, and strategies; and
in the case of R. Herrmann, M. Cottam, Scott, and Boulding, national inter-
est is represented in the dimension of threat and/or opportunity, or hostility
vs. friendliness. In the case of Shimko, intentions/goals and strategies of the
target country serve their purpose in including national interest in national
image formation, since they study exclusively the image of a target country
as an adversary, and the adversary’s intentions and goals can be assumed to
be harmful to the source country’s interest. And the adversary’s strategies and
tactics can be assumed to be implementing the goals and intentions harmful
to the source country’s interest. This approach, however, is not satisfactory
on three counts. First, when a target country is not necessarily an adversary,
its goals and intentions cannot be assumed to be harmful to the interest of
the source country. Second, even when a target country is considered an
adversary, not all of its goals and intentions can be assumed to be contrary to
the interest of the source country. Third, focusing only on a target country’s
goals and intentions, even when it is an adversary, cannot adequately reflect
the extent of threat to the source country’s interest.
On the other hand, focusing on threat and opportunity can more adequately
take into account the relevance of a target country to the source country’s
national interest. In the existing image literature, Richard Herrmann gives
an excellent treatment of the dimension of threat and opportunity in national
image. He regards threat and opportunity as central to any image of another
national actor.30 According to him, if leaders believe that another nation poses
a challenge to preferred political values, they perceive that nation as a threat;
and if leaders observe a chance to foster preferred political values, either
through direct exploitation or cooperative alliances, they perceive a situation
as offering an opportunity.31 Thus, the threat the target country poses to the
source country is a purely negative value, but perception of opportunity is
different. It can represent negative affect when the target country represents
a source for exploitation, as in the British perception of its colonies in the
nineteenth century32 or the United States’ perception of Latin American coun-
tries, or positive affect, as in the United States’ perception of its allies during
the Cold War. Since China’s perception of the United States differs from both
Cold War superpowers’ perception of their adversaries, and from the United
States’ perception of its allies during the Cold War, an exploration of both
threat and opportunity will ensure adequate consideration of the relevance of
national interest in China’s perception of the United States.
In the existing literature on the Chinese perception of the United States,
this dimension has not received adequate treatment. As mentioned in the
above, Shambaugh and Wang study the Chinese perception of the United
States mainly along issue areas, not how relations with the United States
affect China’s national interest. Pillsbury discusses only the security aspect of
U.S.-China relations. Other analysts of the Chinese perception of the United
States treat the element of national interest generally by analyzing some of
the United States’ China policies. By examining China’s perception of threat
and opportunity in its relations with the United States, this project intends to
give this indispensable dimension in national image formation a systematic
treatment. Chapter 3 will be devoted specifically to China’s perception of
32 Chapter 2
threat from the United States, and Chapter 4 to China’s perception of oppor-
tunity from the United States.
Issue Area I: Why Study Chinese Perceptions of American Politics?

What are the key features affecting one country’s inclination toward another?
In the case of U.S.-China relations, important differences between the two
countries include the following: political system and ideology (democracy vs.
non-democracy), economic system (market economy vs. planned economy),
culture (Christianity vs. Confucianism), and race (mainly Caucasian vs. Mon-
golian). Among these, political and economic differences in the recent world
history have been the most salient aspects affecting people’s identification of
friends and foes.
An examination of the existing literature indicates that to most scholars of
national perception, a state’s political system/ideology would be among the
most important. Among the three major works on the Chinese perceptions
of the United States, two (Beautiful Imperialist and Limited Adversary) treat
political system and ideology as an important issue area. Out of the 15 articles
on the Chinese perception of the United States, 8 take political system and/or
ideology into consideration. In The American Image of Russia, 1917–1977,
the articles were written by prominent Americans of various fields, most of
whom included perception of the USSR’s political system/ideology.
Why is political system/ideology so important in a national perception
study? One answer is that people have long been accustomed to identifying
friends and foes on the basis of political system/ideology. One study demon-
strates that to American college students, national enemies are determined
more often by ideological differences than by actual perception of threat from
the target country. Eighty-seven percent of students in the study identified the
USSR to be an enemy. As for the reasons why they considered the USSR as
an enemy, forty-eight percent mentioned clash of values, ideas, and policies,
while only forty-seven percent mentioned threat and military danger. In the
case of Cuba, only four percent of U.S. students in the study thought that
Cuba wants to harm the United States; but Cuba nonetheless was considered
an enemy, because fifty-four percent of the students mentioned, “they are
communists,” and “they have different beliefs and values.”33 In the opening
paragraph of Bill Gertz’s book The China Threat, the difference in politi-
cal system and ideology is considered the most important source of conflict
between nations, one which would end only when the political system/ideol-
ogy different from one’s own is eliminated or subdued to insignificance.34
In the China threat debate, which has been going on on and off in the
United States since the early 1990s, both engagement and containment
scholars attach great importance to the difference between the United States
and China in political system as a possible source of conflict between the two
countries. As Bernstein and Munro point out, “Of course, if China became
a democracy its military build-up would be far less threatening than if it
remained a dictatorship.”35 Mazaar argues that “Sino-American relations will
also suffer from a basic fact of life in international politics: democracies and
dictatorships generally do not get along well . . . The values, mode of opera-
tions, official personality, and many other aspects of democracies simply do
not accord with those of undemocratic nations.”36 Betts sees that a difference
in political system does matter in the case of U.S.-China relations: “Efforts
to prevent dominance by a single power center in East Asia should be limited
if the contender for dominance has a genuinely democratic government. The
level of tradeoffs with non-strategic interests (for example, absolute economic
gains), or of acceptable costs and risks in strategic competition, should vary
with the odds that a rival (in terms of national power) will be unfriendly and
dangerous. There is good reason to believe that such odds are lower with
kindred democracies.”37
Engagement scholars share this view with containment scholars. As Avery
Goldstein points out, this perspective suggests that democratic great powers
will feel justified in embracing confrontational policies against a Chinese
regime that rejects liberal democratic values and in which the foreign policy
decision-making process on crucial security matters is not much constrained
by institutions, but rather monopolized by at most a handful of leaders only
loosely accountable to a slightly larger elite. And because China’s small,
authoritarian ruling group believes that the West is engaged in a campaign
of “peaceful evolution” designed to subvert communist rule without a fight,
hostility and intransigence will be reciprocated.38 Zbigniew Brzezinski, in
his “Living with China,” clearly encourages China’s democracy though he
did not mention why. Mandelbaum suggests that “the desirable outcome, for
adolescents and post–Cold War Russia and China alike, is that they volun-
tarily adopt the norms of responsible adults—in the case of Russia and China,
those of the West.”39 “A democratic China would be more likely to work out
a mutually acceptable relationship with Taiwan. As full-fledged democra-
cies, both countries (Russia and China) would be more likely to cooperate
more closely with the United States to enforce international norms of nuclear
nonproliferation.”40
Obviously, people in the United States attach great importance to the dif-
ference between the two countries in political system and ideology. As the
other part of the dyad, what are the Chinese perceptions of U.S. politics, and
in what ways do these perceptions affect China’s choices with regard to the
United States? This is obviously an important but under-researched topic.
34 Chapter 2
Existing literature on the Chinese perceptions of the United States tends to

emphasize difference in the political system and ideology as a source of con-
flict between the two countries; it largely neglects the problem of how such a
difference would affect China’s intention with regard to the United States. It
is advisable therefore that we include this aspect of the Chinese perceptions
of the United States in this project (see Chapter 7).
Issue Area II: Why Study Chinese Perceptions of American

Economy?
The dominant economic system of the world is a free market system while the
dominant economic system in China is a planned economy. An exploration
of the Chinese perceptions of the U.S. economy would reveal whether China
perceives the dominant economic system of the world in a favorable or unfa-
vorable light, thus indicating whether to the Chinese differences in economic
system constitute a source of conflict between China and the United States.
Obviously, China in the last two decades of reform and opening has tried
to incorporate more and more market mechanisms into its own economic
system, but an exploration of China’s perceptions of the U.S. economy can
still add to our understanding of China’s intention as to whether it genuinely
accepts a more market-oriented economy and whether China is merely adapt-
ing reluctantly to the mainstream of world economy.
During the Cold War, economic system was one important way for a state
to identify itself as belonging to the West or the East camp, and thus an
important way to identify a target state as a friend or a foe. With the Cold
War having ended not very long ago, it is reasonable to expect that the way
people identify friends or foes has not changed much. An exploration of
China’s perceptions of the U.S. economy, especially its economic system,
would contribute to the understanding of whether China tends to identify the
United States as a friend or a foe in economic terms.
It has been widely acknowledged that the type of economic system is
closely associated with the type of political system. A planned economy,
which makes people dependent on the state, constitutes a foundation for an
authoritarian political system,41 while a market economy, which gives people
control over the means of production, is conducive to a democratic political
system. A study of China’s perceptions of the U.S. economy therefore would
not only reveal whether China will be moving toward a more market-oriented
economy, but would also provide an important clue as to whether China is
moving toward a more democratic political system.
China’s perceptions of the U.S. economy, as indicated above, would shed
light on whether China would accept a more market-oriented economic
system, which in turn would determine whether China would develop even
greater interdependence with the world economy. A great extent of inter-
dependence would change the interest preferences of China toward greater
willingness to cooperate with the world community, to solving disputes with
other countries through peaceful means. As a result, China’s perceptions of
the U.S. economy would shed light on whether China would be willing to
integrate itself more fully with the existing international community, thus
developing a stake in maintaining the system rather than challenging the sys-
tem. In a word, an exploration of China’s perceptions of the U.S. economy
may contribute greatly to the understanding of China’s inclination with regard
to both the current international system and the United States.
Notes
1. Herrmann, pp. 32–33, 1985; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, p. 428, 1995; Her-
rmann, pp. 413–417, 1997; R. Cottam, pp. 62–67, 1977; M. Cottam, p. 19, 1994.
2. R. Cottam, pp. 63, 70, 1977; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, pp. 426, 428,
430–431, 434–435, 1995; Herrmann et al, p. 409, 1997.
3. Herrmann, pp. 32–33, 37–38, 1985; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, pp. 430–431,
433, 435; Herrmann et al., 1997, pp. 409, 411. The implications of all the other images
can be spelled out in a similar way, but are omitted here due to space considerations.
4. Cited in Shambaugh, p. 21, 1992.
5. Iriye, p. 16.
6. Wang, Jianwei, p. 44.
7. Frei, 1986; Pillsbury, 2000.
8. Herrmann, pp. 27–28, 1986.
9. Montgomery, Wolfe, Gross, Perry, Liu Liqun, Mei-ling Wang, Yanmin Yu.
10. Frei, p. 19.
11. Frei, pp. 19–22.
12. Herrmann et al., 1997.
13. Herrmann et al., p. 422, Bronfenbrenner, White.
14. In selecting the sample of articles for the research in this project, the author
follows one arbitrary rule: in all five journals (except Meiguo Yanjiu), the United
States (or the names of its leaders) should be specifically mentioned in the title for
an article to be included in the sample. In the case of Meiguo Yanjiu, all the relevant
articles are included as all articles in this journal are essentially about the United
States.
15. Shambaugh, pp. 5–16; Saunders, pp. 42, 44; Pillsbury, pp. 363–377.
16. Saunders, p. 44.
17. Shambaugh, p. 127.
18. Pillsbury, p. 373.
19. Pillsbury, pp. 368–373, 376–377.
36 Chapter 2
20. Shimko, pp. 12–13; Kenneth Boulding, JCR, 1959, p. 120; Wang, Jianwei,
p. 34; Whiting, 1989.
21. Michael J. Smith, p. 4.
22. Morgenthau, pp. 21, 97–98.
23. M. Cottam, p. 55, 1992.
24. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, p. 425, 1995; Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and
Ciarrochi, p. 408.
25. M. Cottam, pp. 53–54, 1986.
26. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, p. 425, 1995.
27. White, p. 336, 1984.
28. Michael Joseph Smith, pp. 153–156.
29. Nuechterlein, p. 13.
30. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, p. 425.
31. R. Herrmann, p. 31, 1985.
32. R. Cottam.
33. Holt, pp. 43–45.
34. Gertz, p. xi, 2000.
35. Bernstein and Munro, p. 26.
36. Mazaar, pp. 21–22.
37. Betts, p. 74.
38. Goldstein, pp. 66–67.
39. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “Living with China,” p. 94.
40. Ibid, p. 95.
41. Walder, Oi.
Chapter 3
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from

the United States
METHODOLOGY
This project is intended to present the dominant Chinese perception of the

United States, and to largely ignore idiosyncratic utterances. For this purpose,
I will observe the four rules in Table 3.1, each of which would increase the
probability that the perception presented would reflect the dominant Chinese
perception of the United States. The four rules combined would ensure a sub-
stantial chance that this chapter reflects the dominant Chinese perception of
threat from the United States. Such a strategy would also enhance replicability
of this research. It is hoped that another scholar going through the same research
process would produce roughly similar results as the author of this project.
The six journals mentioned in Chapter 2 carried thousands of articles dur-
ing the 1991–2000 decade, each of which more or less discussed various
aspects of the United States. To cover all of those articles would be time-
consuming and unnecessary. For the two chapters on China’s perceptions
Table 3.1 Rules for Presenting the Dominant Chinese Perceptions

1 The source materials are authoritative journals in China.

2 The perceptions presented were based on a reasonably selected sample of a
limited number of articles rather than on any utterances which happened to
appear in a Chinese publication.
3 Ideally, the perceptions presented should be supported by similar ideas repeated
several times by different scholars across different journals in the limited sample.
4 A reasonably developed and largely preset system explaining how a state’s
national interest is evaluated guided the presentation in this chapter.
37
38 Chapter 3
Table 3.2 Articles in the Sample for Studying

Chinese Perceptions of Threat and Opportunity
from the United States
Journal Number of Articles

Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 7
Meiguo Yanjiu 28
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 70
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 14
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 44
Zhanlue yu Guanli 19
Total 182
of threat and opportunity from the United States, I focus only on articles
relevant to international politics in the 1990s and with both the United States
and China specifically mentioned in the titles.1 This approach reduces the size
of the sample to 182 articles (see Appendix A for the titles of these articles).
Obviously, many articles containing information about Chinese perception of
the United States will not be included in the sample, but it is expected that
most dominant Chinese perceptions of the United States will be present in
the articles selected. Table 3.2 shows the number of articles in each of the six
journals included in the sample.
After selecting articles in the sample, I carefully read these articles and put
together all the sentences and passages in these articles reflecting a percep-
tion of threat from the United States. In this chapter, I intend to answer the
following two questions. One, did China perceive a threat from the United
States; and, two, what were the contents of the Chinese perceptions of threat
from the United States? The answers to the two questions will be based on
the quotations collected in the way described above.
DID CHINA PERCEIVE THREAT FROM THE UNITED

STATES?
To answer this question, refer to Table 3.3, showing the number of articles
having expressed perceptions of threat from the United States. From the table,
we can see that an overwhelming majority of articles in the sample perceived
more or less a threat from the United States. Threat in this chapter is defined
as anything the United States had done to China arousing negative comments
by Chinese authors, either criticism or complaint. This is not an academically
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 39
Table 3.3 Number of Articles in the Sample Having Expressed Perceptions of Threat
Number of Articles in the Articles Containing Threat

Journal
Sample Perceptions
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 7 7
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 70 59
Meiguo Yanjiu 28 19
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 14 13
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 44 43
Zhanlue yu Guanli 19 14
Total 182 155
satisfactory definition, but it makes collecting quotations easier for this

project. Obviously, to decide whether the dominant Chinese perception of
the United States was threat or otherwise, we need to look further into the
contents of the threat perception, and balance the perception of threat with the
perception of opportunity and other major Chinese perceptions of the United
States, which will be the subject of the following chapters.
WHAT WERE THE CONTENTS OF THE CHINESE

PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT FROM THE UNITED STATES?
The answer to this question constitutes the bulk of this chapter. In order to
increase replicability, I adapt Nuechterlein’s national interest matrix2 for the
presentation in this section (see Table 3.4).
In presenting the Chinese perceptions of threat from the United States, I
will adopt the first three categories in Nuechterlein’s matrix, i.e., perceptions
of threat to China’s national security, economic well-being, and favorable
Table 3.4 Nuechterlein’s National Interest Matrix
Basic national
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
interest
Defense of homeland
Economic well-being
Favorable world order
Promotion of values
40 Chapter 3
world order. Nuechterlein’s interest matrix was designed to describe mainly

the United States’ perception of its own interest. After scrutinizing the Chi-
nese articles in the sample for the Chinese perceptions of threat and opportu-
nity from the United States, I noticed that I needed to add two more categories
so as to present the Chinese perceptions adequately: threat/opportunity to
China’s political system and internal stability, and threat/opportunity to
China’s national prestige. The promotion of values in Nuechterlein’s matrix
does not seem to fit well with the Chinese perceptions of the United States,
and I will ignore this category.
THREAT TO CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY
Territorial Integrity
When it comes to the Chinese perceptions of threat from the United States to
China’s territorial integrity, Taiwan was undoubtedly the most salient topic.
In the sample of 182 articles, numerous times Chinese scholars emphasized
the importance of Taiwan in China-U.S. relations. The following are a few
examples from each of the six journals.
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao: “The most important, and the most sensitive
problem affecting China-U.S. relations is the Taiwan problem.”3
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu: “Taiwan problem has always been the most sensitive
and the most important problem in China-U.S. relations.”4
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi: “Taiwan problem has always been a core factor
affecting and obstructing the development of China-U.S. relations.”5
Zhanlue yu Guanli: “The key problem in China-U.S. relations is the Tai-
wan problem.”6
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi: The Taiwan problem was “the biggest obstacle”
in the constructive strategic partner relationship between the United States
and China.7
Meiguo Yanjiu: “Among all the problems in U.S.-China relations, the Tai-
wan problem is the most sensitive one, and it has the potential of leading to
China-U.S. confrontation.”8
In explaining why China attached such great importance to the Taiwan
problem, Chinese authors emphasized that “the Taiwan problem is relevant to
China’s national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and national unifi-
cation, and it thus concerns China’s fundamental national interest.” Besides,
it is a problem involving profound national sentiment and pride. They cited
Deng Xiaoping’s words to the effect that in such a problem concerning
fundamental principles, “Chinese government and people do not have room

for compromise.”9
As for instances in which the United States was considered as violating
China’s territorial integrity regarding the Taiwan problem, Chinese authors
typically pointed to the following.
1. Weapon sales and military technology transfer to Taiwan. Zhang Qingming

pointed out that “the U.S.’s arms sale to Taiwan is a very sensitive problem
in the China-U.S. relations, is the core of U.S.-Taiwan substantive relations,
and is also an indicator of how the U.S. regards Taiwan as a political entity.
It is therefore strongly opposed by the Chinese government.” Zhang further
pointed out that there were two direct consequences of the United States’
arms sales to Taiwan. “One is to set a bad example for other countries,
thus greatly increasing China’s difficulties in preventing such transactions
between Taiwan and other countries,” and “the second is to seriously affect
China’s great cause of peaceful unification.” During the first post–Cold War
decade, the Bush administration’s decision to sell Taiwan 150 F-16 fighters
was the focus of Chinese authors’ resentment, because it was considered for
the first time to have unambiguously and seriously violated the August 17
communique between China and the United States signed during the
Reagan administration, and might possibly lead to more violations of a
similar nature in times to come. The United States’ transfer of military tech-
nology to Taiwan was also deeply resented by Chinese authors. It would
strengthen Taiwan’s military capability, making it difficult for the Chinese
military to control the sky and conduct a blockade when necessary, and
provide Taiwan with the capability to engage in a war of attrition.10
2. Direct military intervention in the mainland-Taiwan conflict. The United
States sometimes was portrayed as being willing to use its military forces
to back up Taiwan’s efforts toward separation from China. The most no-
ticeable case was in 1996 when China conducted war games in the Taiwan
Straits as a response to Lee Teng-hui’s U.S. visit to promote his Taiwan
independence cause. The United States went so far as to send two aircraft
carrier battle groups to the waters near Taiwan to directly intervene in the
mainland-Taiwan dispute.11
3. Possible TMD to cover Taiwan. Chinese authors perceived a possible
TMD cover over Taiwan as the United States’ potential step which would
seriously jeopardize China’s goal of reunification. China therefore asked
the United States not to include Taiwan in the TMD, but the United States
refused to make a commitment. In the near future, according to some Chi-
nese authors, it was unlikely for the United States to include Taiwan in
42 Chapter 3
the TMD, but the United States was taking steps in this direction “through
secret U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation and by providing Taiwan with
TMD-related equipments and weapons.” From a long-term perspective,
however, it may be possible that the United States would include Taiwan
in its TMD. One author pointed out the severe consequence for China of
the United States covering Taiwan with the TMD, since, according to a
senior U.S. officer, the TMD could basically be regarded as “a potential
anti-China alliance.” Another scholar pointed out that the TMD was “not
a simple problem of weapons technology, but a strategic problem with
comprehensive significance in China-U.S. relations. Once the TMD is
extended to cover Taiwan, a decisive change will take place in mainland-
Taiwan relations and in East-Asia strategic situation.”12 We may conclude
that the mainstream perception of Chinese authors was that China strongly
opposed covering Taiwan with the TMD and regarded it with great resent-
ment, since it would mean turning a part of China into a part of an anti-
China alliance.
4. Japan-U.S. security arrangement. Another salient source of Chinese alarm
and resentment was a Japan-U.S. security arrangement which used the
ambiguous term of “peripheral incidents” to indicate the areas covered.
Chinese authors generally believed that even though this security arrange-
ment did not exclusively target China, it did include China as one of its
targets, especially regarding the possible conflict over the Taiwan Straits.
The United States’ and Japan’s strategic ambiguity over the scope of their
security arrangement increased Chinese authors’ worry that the two big
powers in the Asia-Pacific region might gang up against China.13
The United States’ overall Taiwan policy was perceived to “maintain the
status quo” of “no independence and no unification, no war and no peace,” or
“separated but not independent” and “peaceful but not unified.”14
The United States’ weapon sales, military technology transfer, and secu-
rity guarantee to Taiwan was perceived as obstructing China’s unification,
and supporting separatist activities in Taiwan. It was because of the United
States’ support and connivance that “hidden independence” and “public
independence” forces in Taiwan coordinated with one another, and vigor-
ously promoted separatism. But the United States was also seen at times as
“properly containing the clamorous ‘Taiwan independence’ tendency and not
allowing Taiwan authorities to go too far on the road of separatism.” Con-
sequently, the United States was seen as encouraging dialogue between the
mainland and Taiwan, but at the same time hoping that the dialogue “would
not produce any substantive results.”15
On the whole, the United States’ Taiwan policy was perceived as vacil-
lating between prevention of China’s unification and support for Taiwan’s
independence. When U.S.-China relations were relatively peaceful, the
United States’ policy was perceived to prevent China’s unification, but when
there were more troubles in U.S.-China relations, the United States was
perceived to shift to promoting Taiwanese independence. During the Cold
War and after the establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations in 1979,
the United States’ policy was perceived as maintaining Taiwan’s separate-
ness from China, “implementing its security commitment to Taiwan but very
seldom publicly emphasized it.” Shortly after the end of the Cold War, the
United States was perceived as making a greater effort to promote Taiwan
independence, including comprehensively enhancing U.S.-Taiwan relations,
especially in Congress, publicly advocating “two Chinas” or “one China and
one Taiwan.” After President Clinton’s visit to China in 1998, the United
States was again perceived as returning to the policy of maintaining main-
land-Taiwan separateness rather than promoting Taiwan independence.16
The United States’ support had been considered “the main reason why Tai-
wan’s Lee Tenghui authorities had the audacity to promote Taiwan indepen-
dence.” The reason why Chinese authors were resentful of the U.S. Taiwan
policy was that they regard the Taiwan problem as purely one of “China’s
internal problems in which no other country has the right to intervene.”
They opposed the United States’ intervention because they regarded it as not
acceptable for the United States to draw its security boundaries in China’s
territory. One author pointed out, “no matter what reasons the United States
uses to justify its Taiwan policy, it has to admit one basic fact, i.e., it was
the United States’ intervention in China’s internal affairs that produced the
Taiwan problem.” Another author argued, “If China and the United States,
or any other countries, are to develop normal and friendly relations, each has
to demonstrate the basic respect for the other’s fundamental national interest
such as sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity.”17
Regarding the Chinese perception that the United States threatened China’s
territorial integrity, Tibet was also brought up from time to time by Chinese
scholars, though it was far less salient than Taiwan. The United States was
perceived as supporting Tibetan separatists and encouraging Tibetan indepen-
dence. “In November 1998, the Clinton administration ignored the Chinese
government’s firm opposition, and set up the position of Special Coordinator
for Tibetan Affairs”—perceived as an act of flagrant intervention in China’s
internal affairs. “In April 1999, during Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to the
United States, the United States urged China to conduct political negotiation
with the Dalai Lama.” From time to time, the U.S. president would drop by
44 Chapter 3
to meet with the visiting Dalai Lama. Just as in the Taiwan case, the U.S.
Congress, and especially Senator Jesse Helms, went much further than the
executive branch. It passed bills, resolutions, and amendments claiming that
Tibet was an occupied country even though the U.S. government, as well as
nearly every country in the world, officially recognized that Tibet was a part
of China.18
The Chinese articles reviewed here often described the United States as
using the protection of Tibetan religion as an excuse to intervene in Tibetan
affairs. Chinese scholars were resentful that some Americans ignored the fact
that after the serf system was abolished following the Dalai Lama’s depar-
ture, “human rights in Tibet have greatly improved.”19
The United States’ intention to intervene in Tibetan affairs was perceived
to obstruct China’s unification and disrupt its stability. It was seen as “urging
China’s central government to ‘retract’ its ‘control and influence’ in Tibet,
even to separate Tibet from China.” One most poignant comment was: “The
U.S. government and politicians know clearly that the Dalai Lama’s ultimate
goal is to pursue separatism, division of China, step-by-step, on the pretense
of ‘religion,’ ‘human rights,’ ‘protecting cultural heritage,’ and ‘autonomy.’”
The United States’ Tibetan policy fits well with Dalai’s goals. One cannot
but conclude that “the United States’ strategy and ultimate goal is the same
as that of the Dalai clique: to separate Tibet from China.” The United States’
intervention in Tibetan affairs aroused resentment from Chinese scholars
because it threatened China’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity,
“while China has not presented a threat to the United States’ sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and national security.” Chinese authors pointed out that
if some people inside and outside the U.S. government always tried to cause
troubles in things concerning China’s fundamental national interest, “it would
be very harmful to U.S.-China relations.”20
At one time, Hong Kong was perceived as one of the central foci in China-
U.S. security relations. The United States’ policy acts that Chinese observers
saw concerning Hong Kong included the following: (1) The U.S. Congress
passed six bills, resolutions, and amendments that concerned Hong Kong,
claiming that it had an interest in Hong Kong’s democratization and human
rights even after Hong Kong’s return to China; (2) the United States sent
delegations of representatives to Hong Kong to inspect implementation of
“one country, two systems” there; (3) the United States openly supported
Hong Kong’s British colonial authority in its confrontation with China; (4)
the United States president supported Hong Kong’s democracy advocates by
meeting their representative—Martin Lee.21 On the whole, Chinese authors
regarded the United States as having intervened inappropriately in Hong
Kong affairs. They regarded the United States as trying to “disrupt and
weaken the Chinese government’s resumption of its sovereignty in Hong
Kong” and to ensure the United States’ interest and status in Hong Kong.22
As Hong Kong concerns China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as
in the case of Taiwan, the United States’ perceived intervention in the Hong
Kong affairs was seen as evidence that the United States did not fully regard
Hong Kong to be a part of China. This posture was generally opposed by
Chinese authors, but some of them also believed that the capability of the
United States to cause trouble in Hong Kong was limited.
China authors generally perceived a non-constructive role for the United
States regarding disputes in the South China Sea. They thought that at times
the United States’ position concerning these disputes had been unfriendly,
for example, instigating the perception of China’s threat to Southeast Asian
countries which had disputes with China over territorial waters. The United
States was perceived as being ready to intervene in these disputes, and one
major instrument of intervention was the U.S.-Japan security arrangement.23
Strategic Encirclement of China

Quite a number of authors in the sample argued that the United States tried to
disrupt China’s relations with its neighbors and erect a strategic encirclement
around China. One author claimed, for example, that “some of the policies are
clearly targeted at China, and some others under present circumstances and
in near future are not targeted at China or are not directly targeted at China,
but from a deeper and longer strategic perspective, it is not difficult to discern
the indirect or implicit strategic intention of dealing with China.”24 Several
authors in several different journals listed specifically the potential members
of an alliance to encircle China, though the lists differed between authors.
Chu Shulong: Japan, South Korea, Australia, together with ASEAN;25 Liu
Jinsong: Japan, Australia, the Philippines, etc.; Wu Jiong: strengthening
military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, and
improving relations with Vietnam, and Mongolia; Xia Liping: Japan, South
Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines through bilateral military
alliances, “supplemented by various bilateral and multilateral mechanisms,”
including Taiwan; Lu Qichang: “strengthening existing security alliances
with Japan and South Korea, . . . signing various military cooperation agree-
ments with the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, etc.; incorporating the five
Central Asian countries into its ‘peaceful cooperation plan,’ and developing
military cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kurdistan, and Turkmenistan.”26
46 Chapter 3
It seems that none of the above was a complete list, and the status of dif-
ferent countries in the lists was also different. In the following, I will dwell
in some detail on each individual member, including some potential members
not mentioned above.
The most important member of this alliance was of course the United
States itself. The United States’ forward deployment of 100,000 troops in
Asia was regarded as having China as its likely target. It was seen as serving
several possible purposes, including: intervention in China’s internal affairs,
encircling China, and containing China’s rise in times of need.27 For some
Chinese authors, the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s speech on October 30, 1995
confirmed their concern that the U.S. troops in Asia were intended to deal
with China: Engagement (of China) was in complete conformity with the
United States adopting measures to prevent and stop the threat to the interest
of the United States’ allies and to the United States itself. It was because of
this that the United States would continue maintaining a strong force ready
for action and have a forward deployment of about 100,000 troops in the
Pacific region.28
Other than the United States itself, according to Chinese authors, Japan
was the most salient member in the United States’ design to encircle China.
On April 17, 1996, the United States and Japan promulgated a “Joint Com-
munique,” which expanded Japan’s defense parameter to encompass the
whole Asia-Pacific region. It only mentioned North Korea as a destabilizing
factor, and it did not specifically mention China. Instead, it mentioned that
“peripheral incidents” were not a geographical concept, but a situational
one.29
Chinese authors did not accept the United States’ and Japan’s claim, and
regarded this alliance as targeted at China. Some authors regarded the new
alliance as undoubtedly targeted at China, but most agreed that China was
not the sole target of this security arrangement. They pointed out that what
made China feel especially threatened was that this treaty openly or secre-
tively covered Taiwan, and its hidden purpose was to prevent China from
using non-peaceful means to prevent Taiwanese independence. One author
therefore argued that “the amendment of the Japan-U.S. security cooperation
guidelines gave Taiwan a wrong message.” Some authors pointed out that
the new U.S.-Japan defense treaty had changed from its defensive character
during the Cold War, covering only the security of Japan, to an offensive
treaty tasked with dealing with China’s rise, carrying with it the possibility
of containing China when necessary.30
The reason for their suspicion included the following.31 (1) “One of the
tasks of the U.S. base in Okinawa was to deal with situations in the Taiwan
Straits.” During the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, the U.S. aircraft carrier which
intervened in the crisis was based in Japan’s Yokosuka. (2) Japan’s nostal-
gia for its rule in Taiwan during the colonial period predisposed Japan to be
sympathetic to the United States’ intervention in Taiwan. (3) “The new U.S.-
Japan Security Guidelines and relevant acts did not clearly exclude Taiwan.”
(4) China was regarded by the United States as a potential adversary, and
the U.S.-Japan alliance could objectively play the role of containing China.
(5) The ambiguous concept of “peripheral incidents” in the treaty allowed
the U.S.-Japan security cooperation to cover any area in the world, espe-
cially in the Asia-Pacific region. (6) Given the different relations between
the Japan-U.S. dyad and the Japan-China dyad, if the United States chose
to contain China, “Japan might follow.” (8) “Everyone knew what its target
was, because there was no military alliance without a target.” (9) The U.S.
Defense Secretary once specifically pointed out that the Japan-U.S. secu-
rity alliance was the most important in preventing China’s strengthening of
military forces. (10) The United States’ and Japan’s joint efforts regarding
the TMD in recent years were mentioned, and a Chinese author used an
understatement: “it perhaps is not meant to deal only with North Korea.”
(11) According to a Japanese scholar, if the United States wanted to contain
China’s development, it conformed to Japan’s interest, since Japan was afraid
that its dominance in Asia might be “challenged by China’s economic rise.”
(12) Japan’s more aggressive action regarding the disputed Diaoyu Island
(Senkakus) was regarded as one result of the encouragement from the U.S.-
Japan new Security Guidelines. Therefore, one Chinese author pointed out,
the enhancement of security alliance relationship between the United States
and Japan “apparently includes the intention to erect a preventive ‘strategic
shield’ against China.”
In this probable alliance to encircle China, Taiwan was perceived, next
to Japan, as a salient potential member. Chinese authors argued that after
the Cold War, “U.S. political and military circles again recognize Taiwan’s
important strategic status,” and “consider the Taiwan problem more from
the perspective of the United States’ global strategy,” and in the context of
regarding China more than before as its “strategic competitor.” When the
United States played “the Taiwan Card,” it was perceived as a part of the dan-
gerous strategy of containing China’s rise. Taiwan constituted an integral part
of the United States’ effort to encircle China because the U.S. military was
afraid that a unified China may “break through the island chain of encircle-
ment and enter the Pacific.”32
Several Chinese authors mentioned South Korea as the United States’
potential partner in this alliance to encircle China, but none of them offered
a more detailed explanation. It seems that Chinese authors did not perceive
much threat from South Korea.33
48 Chapter 3
Another important potential member in this alliance was ASEAN. One

author pointed out that the United States tried to exploit some of the ASEAN
countries’ differences with China. The United States’ military exercises
with the Philippines in the South China Sea were thus perceived as targeted
at China. The possibility of the United States playing the Vietnam card
was mentioned several times. Another United States effort to use ASEAN
against China was that the United States tried hard “to reform the ASEAN
Forum into a multilateral security mechanism to ‘entangle’ China.” But on
the whole, authors in the sample did not perceive much threat from ASEAN
either. One author pointed out that even though “one or two ASEAN mem-
bers welcomed tensions in the South China Sea (because of the new Japan-
U.S. security guidelines) so as to pressure China for concessions regarding
the territorial disputes,” most ASEAN countries were described as wishing to
improve relations with China.34
Several authors pointed out that the Central Asia played a part in the
United States’ efforts to encircle China. Chinese authors regarded the United
States’ presence in Central Asia mainly as a threat to Russia, but some of
them regarded it also as a threat to China. One author pointed out that in
order to constrain Russia and China, the United States wanted very much to
penetrate central Asia. Another author pointed out that after the Cold War,
“the United States formulated a Central Asia strategy, the first ever Central
Asia strategy in U.S. history. It targets not only Russia, but also China.” One
major threat of the United States’ influence in this area was that “Central
Asia will become a forward position of Western countries, especially the
United States, to strategically contain China,” and another major threat was
that the United States’ “support of separatists might seriously threaten the
security and stability of China’s North Western region.” Another author,
however, pointed out that while the United States’ expansion of its military
influence to the Central Asia “might not target mainly China,” it nonethe-
less “takes ‘the China factor’ into consideration.” China’s sense of threat
from the United States was enhanced by the perception that this was “the
first time ever that the United States and other NATO members expanded
their military influence and presence to China’s North-Western border.”
NATO’s eastward expansion, though not specifically regarded as target-
ing China, was regarded as having objectively “changed China’s external
environment.” Some authors were concerned that the United States might
even try to use Mongolia and Russia to deal with China. Besides the security
threat from the U.S. presence in Central Asia, one author was afraid that the
United States’ control of the petroleum and natural gas in this area might
increase its leverage over Europe, Japan, China, and other Asian developing
countries.35
The United States’ change of support after the Cold War from Pakistan to
India was perceived as having taken into consideration the China factor, and
the strengthened military cooperation between India and the United States
was perceived to some extent as constituting a potential threat to China.36
Threat in Reducing China’s Nuclear Deterrence

The United States turned its full efforts to a NMD after President Bush
assumed office in 2001. But during President Clinton’s administration (the
sample for this research was based on articles written mostly during the
Clinton administrations), China and the United States already had serious
disputes concerning the NMD and the TMD. The reasons why China opposed
the NMD, according to Chinese authors in the sample, were as follows. China
perceived the United States as pursuing “absolute security” through the NMD
while China advocated “relative security.” “Relative security” to them meant
joint security of all countries, while “absolute security” meant security of
one country at the expense of insecurity of all the other countries. One article
explained the serious threat to China’s security by the United States’ NMD as
follows: if a nuclear state had both Mao (spear, meaning powerful offensive
weapons) and Dun (shield, meaning adequate defensive weapons), you can
imagine what would happen.” Another article was more straightforward, by
citing approvingly a Western scholar’s explanation: if a country had made
a surprising breakthrough in technology, such as having invented an air
defense and anti-ballistic missile defense system to effectively prevent retali-
ation, it would regard a preemptive strike much more advantageous than the
risk involved. Perhaps to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy, Chinese authors
on the whole were very careful not to spell out the scenario of the United
States’ possessing absolute power through the development of the NMD. In
international politics, Chinese authors seemed to be concerned that absolute
power would corrupt absolutely. Now that “the United States already has the
most powerful conventional forces and the most powerful nuclear arsenal,”
its policy of “insisting on the first use of nuclear weapons” and its supposed
impunity from retaliation because of the NMD would turn the world into a
highly dangerous place. Chinese authors therefore thought that the United
States’ NMD “would seriously affect the mutual trust and cooperation among
major powers, and is unfavorable to the stability of the world.” What made
Chinese authors especially apprehensive of the NMD was their perception
that it aimed at “reducing the deterrence of China’s strategic missiles.”
Understandably, after the world entered the 21st century more and more talks
in the U.S. Congress and media about the NMD targeting China would fur-
ther confirm their uneasiness.37
50 Chapter 3
THREAT TO CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND INTERNAL

STABILITY
After the collapse of the USSR, Washington was thought to regard China as
an ideological adversary, and as the last stronghold of communism. Some
Chinese observers believed that “the most fundamental conflict between the
United States and China was the one between two ideologies,” and China’s
rise was regarded by the United States as a challenge not only in a geopoliti-
cal sense, but also in terms of values.38
Consequently, the United States was seen as resorting to “peaceful evolu-
tion” as a strategy toward China, with China becoming a major target of
the United States’ crusade to promote democracy. Some Chinese observers
predicted that as the China-U.S. differences over ideology would persist for
a long time to come, “peaceful evolution” would be the United States’ long-
term strategy toward China.39
Most Chinese authors in the sample regarded peaceful evolution as pro-
moting evolution in China toward an “Americanized democratic political sys-
tem and capitalist economic structure.” This included, first of all, economic
liberalization, which in turn was seen as leading to political liberalization.
Some Chinese observers believed that peaceful evolution included dividing
China, and to divide and to Westernize China were closely related. The pur-
pose of peaceful evolution was perceived to be to “integrate China into the
Western world system led by the United States,” to force China to submit,
and to maintain the United States’ position as the world leader.40
Human rights were considered “a breakthrough point” to promote evolu-
tion in China, a big stick in the hands of the United States to cudgel China
into submission. Human rights were said to have become “the center of the
United States’ China policy.”41 The United States resorted to the following
approaches to promote human rights in China.
GATT/WTO: The United States’ policy regarding China’s GATT/WTO
membership was seen as having a political purpose, which was deeper than
the superficial economic purpose. The United States was thought to regard
China’s GATT/WTO application as an extremely favorable opportunity for
the United States to influence China’s domestic politics. And the United
States was seen as wanting to seize the opportunity to “force a major reform
in China, to compel China to deviate from the system of a socialist market
economy,” and to integrate China into the political and economic systems
dominated by the United States.42
MFN: Especially during Clinton’s first term, the MFN was seen as a fash-
ionable weapon for the United States to pressure China. Following its strategic
principle of promoting change through pressure, the Clinton administration
decided to link the MFN with human rights. In May 28, 1993 President
Clinton announced the extension of China’s MFN status for one more year.
At the same time, he put forward seven conditions, asking China to make
comprehensive and major progress in improving human rights conditions.
For Chinese authors, to accept the United States’ conditions meant accepting
the United States’ value system, and change China’s domestic policy and its
own political system. After the United States de-linked the MFN and human
rights, the MFN was seen as continuing to be a powerful tool for the United
States to pressure China over human rights.43
Taiwan/Hong Kong: The United States was thought to use Taiwan and
Hong Kong to promote peaceful evolution in China. The more or less sepa-
rate status of these two lands from China was seen as an incentive inducing
China to follow the road of Westernization. Several Chinese observers argued
that the United States supported the economic integration of Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and China, and wished to maintain the momentum toward democracy
in Taiwan and Hong Kong, in order to use them “to exercise political influ-
ence in China,” and to change China’s political and economic systems.44
Radio Broadcast: In the 1990s, the United States strengthened the VOA
broadcast and set up a new “Radio Free Asia.” Chinese observers saw China
as the main target and regarded Washington’s purpose as the promotion of
peaceful evolution. Just as one U.S. House representative put it, Radio Free
Europe helped break down the Iron Curtain, and Radio Free Asia could help
break down the Bamboo Curtain.45
Dissidents: The United States’ support of Chinese dissidents was con-
sidered an integral part of the United States’ strategy to promote peaceful
evolution in China. Washington was said to use human rights, freedom of
speech, etc. as excuses to protect those dissidents who attempted to overthrow
the Chinese government and China’s social and political systems. By doing
so, the United States was perceived to “sow the seeds of destruction” inside
China.46
Others: The United States was seen as resorting to other means than the
above to promote peaceful evolution in China. One author mentioned that in
order to promote peaceful evolution, the United States “urges American busi-
nesses in China to formulate ‘voluntary regulations’ to help promote China’s
human rights.” Soliciting support from Europe and Japan to pressure China
on human rights was another approach. And the United States also directly
used sanctions to promote human rights in China.47
Chinese authors generally agreed that human rights were one of the most
serious problems in U.S.-China relations. Even though it was “not as intense
as the Taiwan problem, it covered broad issue areas and had deep roots,”
causing disputes between the two countries. Both of these problems were seen
as the result of the United States’ intervention in China’s internal affairs. For
some Chinese scholars, human rights were no less a problem than the Taiwan
52 Chapter 3
problem, while for others, after the de-linking of human rights and the MFN,
human rights might “not assume a central position in the bilateral relations,”
but “would still be an important problem in the China-U.S. relations.”48
Some Chinese observers believed that the essence of peaceful evolution
was to overthrow the Chinese government and China’s political and eco-
nomic systems, and to disrupt China’s political stability. The collapse of the
USSR was perceived as the success of the United States’ peaceful evolution
strategy, and Chinese scholars did not want China to repeat the collapse.
Besides, to pressure other countries over human rights was said to violate
the UN Charter. According to the UN Charter, every sovereign state should
have the right to determine its own path of development. Chinese observers
argued that “the United States and China were different, and that each should
respect the other, and try to promote common interest while recognizing the
existence of differences. Differences should be the cause for exchange, but
not the reason for interfering in the other’s internal affairs.”49
Chinese observers suggested that China did want to change and to reform,
but “the process of China’s reform and opening has its own characteristics,
and it is China’s own national interest that determines the speed and extent of
China’s reform and opening, and it will not be determined or influenced by
any outside forces.”50 Chinese authors seemed to accept that the model which
China imported from the USSR might not be the right thing for China, but
they argued that “people of every country have the right to make their own
choice. Even if they have made a wrong choice, they can make the decision
again, and nobody should impose their decision on another country.” This,
according to Chinese scholars, was what “a real democratic spirit” should
be. Chinese scholars indicated that China did not reject the United States’
ideology and social system. One most liberal interpretation of socialism ran
like this: “whatever approach can help China realize modernization, can help
all the Chinese people to really get rich, we will adopt. This is the socialism
of our understanding.”51 Thus, they argued that the United States should not
overemphasize human rights in its relations with China, because it would
also hurt the United States’ realistic national interest, and create unnecessary
international tensions.
THREAT TO CHINA’S ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
Intellectual Property Rights

From the Bush administration in the early 1990s well into the Clinton admin-
istration in the first half of 1995, intellectual property rights were one of the
most prominent subjects in U.S.-China relations. The United States was seri-
ously dissatisfied with China’s efforts to protect intellectual property rights and
adopted quite an unfriendly policy toward China. Washington often resorted
to sanctions or threats of sanction to settle disputes over intellectual property
rights, which Chinese observers saw as trying to force China to behave in a
way consistent with the United States’ interest. Some interest groups in the
United States often opposed extension of the MFN to China on the ground of
China’s performance concerning intellectual property rights. Even advocates
of engagement supported U.S. pressure on China over intellectual property
rights. Sometimes the two countries were on the brink of a trade war over
this issue. Some scholars in the sample argued that the United States’ policy
toward China concerning intellectual property rights was unfair, unreason-
able, or discriminatory. One scholar pointed out that “solving the China-U.S.
intellectual property rights problem should be based on relevant international
conventions and treaties which the two countries had already participated in
or were about to participate in, and should not be based on the United States’
domestic laws.” Another scholar argued that “to a great extent, disputes
between China and the United States concerning intellectual property rights
reflect the different stages of development between the two countries . . .
After decades or perhaps over a century of efforts, developed countries have
a whole set of laws for the protection of intellectual property rights,” while
China had just begun making efforts in this direction. He thought it was not
helpful for the United States to readily resort to sanctions on this matter.
Some Chinese scholars did not deny that China had not done well concerning
intellectual property rights protection, but they at the same time argued that
“imposing sanctions on China over this problem will often be counterproduc-
tive because China is extremely unbalanced in development, and has a quite
immature market system.” Occasionally, Chinese authors complained that “if
China makes too many concessions to the United States concerning intellec-
tual property rights, China will suffer heavy economic losses.” They said this
was so because it had been the practice in developing countries to imitate a
lot of products in developed countries. One author cited developing countries’
argument that “it was because of exploitation by suzerain states that resulted
in the current backwardness of developing countries . . . Developed countries
which claim to help other countries to modernize should not limit their atten-
tion on the narrow scope of domestic laws in handling intellectual property
rights problem, but should put this problem in the broad historical context and
international relations context.”52 On the whole, intellectual property rights
disputes were not as serious as more sensitive disputes such as those concern-
ing human rights and Taiwan.
54 Chapter 3
Annual MFN Debate

As human rights were central to the United States’ China policy, MFN
became a major problem between the two countries in the 1990s. It was
sometimes considered by Chinese observers as more serious than the Taiwan
problem. Beginning in the late 1980s during the Bush administration and con-
tinuing throughout the two Clinton administrations, various interest groups
and anti-China elements in Congress formed a powerful alliance trying to
terminate China’s MFN status, attach conditions to it, and later on deny PNTR
to China.53 The height of the dispute over MFN came around 1993 when the
Clinton administration announced that it was linking MFN to China’s human
rights record. However, even after President Clinton announced de-linking
MFN and human rights, the annual MFN debate remained a serious problem
in U.S.-China economic relations.54
Chinese observers felt that the American market was very important to
China and that the annual MFN debate provided anti-China interest groups
an opportunity to make trouble every year. The debate was seen as subjecting
the economic relations between the two countries to “an extremely unstable
macro environment” and as seriously affecting bilateral economic relations.
For instance, AT&T was said to have planned a big project in China and
the annual MFN debate was one major factor affecting its final investment
decision. Another way the annual MFN debate was seen as harming China’s
economic interests was that the United States used it as an excuse to force
more concessions from China.55
From another Chinese perspective, the MFN debate was described as a
manifestation of the conflict for power and interest between those in power
and those aspiring for power in American politics and between various inter-
est groups in the United States In this picture, usually the non-ruling party
was seen as advocating a tough policy over MFN so that it could “gain politi-
cally without feeling responsible for the failure of the United States’ foreign
policy.” Chinese scholars resented the annual MFN debate. They believed
that MFN was a mutually beneficial arrangement and that it was inappropri-
ate for the United States to politicize bilateral economic relations and end up
in a lose-lose situation.56
Obstruction of China’s WTO/GATT Membership

China had a strong desire to return to/enter GATT/WTO and it began its
application in 1986. After more than a decade, China was still not a WTO
member. In the process, the United States, according to Chinese observers,
had tried hard to obstruct China’s accession into the WTO. Chinese scholars
regarded the United States’ repeated obstructionism as a major reason for

China’s inability to be admitted into GATT/WTO. They complained that the
United States set unreasonable conditions for China’s entry. For example,
they complained that the United States “insists that China enter the WTO
as a developed country,” intended to “completely occupy China’s huge
domestic market,” forced China to accept imported goods from the United
States which were harmful to China such as diseased wheat, and influenced
China’s fundamental economic policy. Besides, the United States was said to
raise demands on China from time to time forcing China to make bigger and
bigger concessions. One Chinese scholar complained that the United States
once made a commitment to China that it would be flexible in China’s appli-
cation for the WTO membership, but it reneged on its commitment. Another
scholar pointed out that “the United States in 1992 made the commitment
to support China’s re-entry into the GATT, but after most countries had
endorsed China’s membership, the United States was the only country that
tried every means to obstruct China’s re-entry.” In order to press concessions
from China, the United States was said to play the “Taiwan card,” threaten-
ing to allow Taiwan to enter the WTO before China, which China could not
tolerate.57
The United States’ obstruction of China’s WTO membership hurt China’s
economic development. As China was not a WTO member, it lost a lot of
benefits which most countries in the world enjoyed, such as general preferen-
tial system, and using WTO rules and regulations to settle economic disputes
with other countries. One Chinese scholar cited Charles Krauthamer’s article
to demonstrate that the United States’ obstruction of China’s GATT/WTO
membership was a part of its containment strategy against China.58
THREAT TO CHINA’S NATIONAL PRESTIGE
2000 Olympics
In 1993, China applied to hold the 2000 Olympics in Beijing, but lost to
Sidney in the third round by two votes. China attributed its failure to the
United States’ obstruction, because the U.S. House of Representatives passed
a resolution in 1993 using human rights as an excuse against China’s holding
the 2000 Olympics, and the United States actively lobbied against China in
the IOC. Several Chinese authors in the sample mentioned this case, and all of
them expressed resentment against the United States’ obstruction. The United
States’ opposition to Beijing holding the 2000 Olympics, along with linking
MFN to human rights, the Yinhe incident, increased arms sale to Taiwan, the
56 Chapter 3
sanctioning of China for allegedly providing M11 missile parts to Pakistan,

and the obstruction of China’s WTO application, was considered one of the
most serious offenses the United States had committed against China during
the early period of the first Clinton administration. It was also considered
by Chinese authors as one way the United States put pressure on China and
obstructed China’s rise. This incident, together with some others mentioned
above, reputedly aroused strong indignation in the Chinese people, since it
“hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.”59
UN Human Rights Commission

The UN Human Rights Commission was one major international forum for
intense confrontation between the United States and China concerning Chi-
na’s human rights. The United States was seen as the most active member of
the commission, trying to intervene in China’s internal affairs and to humili-
ate China through this forum. For most of the last decade, the United States
either put forward an “anti-China” bill condemning China’s human rights
records or endorsed other countries in doing so. Chinese authors regularly
regarded such activities as anti-China and unfriendly. In all these conflicts,
China defeated such bills and was perceived by Chinese observers as having
“safeguarded China’s national sovereignty and respect.”60
U.S. Media
China’s perception of United States media in the 1990s, as presented in the
sample, was more negative than positive. In the sample, Chinese authors bit-
terly complained about United States media and their role in China-U.S. rela-
tions. They argued that United States media were among the major culprits
in changing United States public opinion from idealizing China in the 1980s
to demonizing it in the 1990s. They complained that United States media
propagated the threat of China’s rise, opposed improvements in China-U.S.
relations, and advocated a tougher policy toward China.61 Chinese observers’
resentment toward American media was the result of their perception that
American media had both helped create and succumbed to the fashion of
China bashing, and they were reluctant to tell the truth about China to the
public, either distorting facts about China or focusing only on negative
aspects in China. They largely closed their eye to the profound changes in
China in recent decades.62 One author cited Owen Harris’ article approvingly
to the effect that the United States should recognize that individual freedom
in China had been greatly improved . . . “If we look back over the past 150
years, the last two decades have undoubtedly been the best years for China
and the Chinese people.” Occasionally, Chinese authors perceived “an atmo-
sphere in United States media that led American scholars who saw China
more comprehensively and more fairly to keep quiet and hesitate in uttering
their genuine opinion about China,” for fear of suffering dearly in their per-
sonal career.63
Chinese authors argued that it was difficult for the American people to
acquire sufficient independent information about China. The little they knew
about the country came mainly from the media and they were, therefore,
easily influenced by the media. As the media were seen as generally biased
against China, antipathy toward China spread among a significant portion
of the American public and China’s image was seriously tarnished. They
believed that the American people were friendly to the Chinese people, but
the media’s propaganda did arouse suspicion in them concerning China.64
Chinese authors argued that negative reports of China in American media
outlets affected the United States’ China policy and China’s interest was hurt
as a result of such reports. Chinese observers said that was true because the
media framed Americans’ thinking about China, “making it difficult for them
to treat some of China’s basic interest and basic national conditions reason-
ably.” The media’s negative reports “make the American people challenge
the United States’ China policy and challenge China’s core interests.”65
THREAT TO CHINA’S FAVORED WORLD ORDER
Chinese authors recognized that the United States had become the sole super-
power after the end of the Cold War. The fundamental goal of the United
States’ global strategy was perceived as maintaining and strengthening the
unipolar structure of the world, to lead the whole world, and to achieve world
hegemony. According to one observer, the United States “wants to be both
the world’s judge and policeman,” and “to pursue the leading position in the
world in both ‘material’ and ‘spiritual’ aspects.” Chinese observers said that
in order to maintain its sole superpower status, the United States intended to
prevent the emergence of any force in either Europe or Asia that would be
able to challenge the United States’ hegemony. Around the turn of the 1990s,
Washington was said to regard Japan and/or Germany as developing the
capability to challenge the United States. In the late 1990s, Washington was
said to regard China and Russia as potential challengers. The United States’
Eurasian strategy was described as “pressing from both East and West wings
toward the middle, trying to integrate the EU and Japan, another two potential
polar powers, into the United States’ unipolar hegemonic system, pressuring
and containing Russia and China, controlling the vast central regions such as
58 Chapter 3
the Middle East, the Central Asia, and the Balkans, which were strategically
important and rich in resources, so as to realize the ‘American dream’ of
dominating the world.”66
The potential actors promoting multi-polarity of the world were said to
include Russia, China, Europe, and Japan. Quite a number of Chinese schol-
ars did not accept the United States as the leader of the world, regarding its
leadership status to be self-proclaimed. One especially poignant comment put
it this way: “Though the United States was the undisputed leader in North
America, however, in Europe and Asia, it was not a natural leader, but rather
a guest insisting upon being a master.” Another author regarded the United
States’ hegemonic ambition in the world as originating from the key feature
of capitalism: monopoly, i.e., “to weaken others in order to enjoy an advan-
tageous position alone.” Chinese observers noticed that the United States
perceived China as one of the obstacles to American hegemony in the world
and in the Asia-Pacific region.67
China was described by Chinese observers as not entirely satisfied with the
current international order, and as wishing to have an international order in
which nonintervention in other countries’ internal affairs could be accepted
as a basic principle, and a nation’s sovereignty could be more fully respected.
China was said to be concerned that in a unipolar world the hegemonic
power would use excuses such as humanitarianism to practice the law of the
jungle.68
Chinese scholars expected that the world in the 1990s and the follow-
ing two or three decades would be in the process of a struggle between the
United States trying to establish world hegemony and other major powers
such as China, Russia, France, and developing countries trying to promote
a multi-polar world. Russia and China were described as two active mem-
bers of the current group opposing a unipolar world order and as advocating
multi-polarity, because these two countries were said to be “under the most
intense pressure of hegemonism.” That was why Chinese observers said they
opposed hegemonism and “advocate a more ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ world
order.” To Chinese authors, a unipolar world order threatened China’s inter-
ests, because the unipolar power tended to disregard national borders and
had an inclination to intervene in other countries’ internal affairs.69
Militarily, China “wishes to negotiate with the United States concerning
non-use of force between the two countries, especially the non-first use of
nuclear weapons.” Chinese authors complained that “because of the United
States’ pursuit of interventionism and military hegemony, and because of the
Taiwan factor, the United States has no interest in talking about non-use of
force with China.” China was said to oppose the United States’ use of force in
international relations not only because of moral principles, but also because
the United States “in the past has used force or threat of force against China
and intervened in China’s internal affairs.” Chinese authors were concerned
that “the United States may do so again in future.”70
Chinese authors also perceived cultural pressure from the West, especially
from the United States. They regarded the conflict between the United States
and China centering on peaceful evolution and human rights as one between
Table 3.5 Major Differences between the United States and China Regarding World
Order (Chinese Conception)
United States China

Strategic goal Strengthening and perpetuating Working for a multi-polar
a unipolar world and world and ultimately
ultimately achieving world achieving democratization of
hegemony international politics
Ideal status of The world to be made up of The world to be made up
countries in the world one country (the United States) of sovereign equals with all
as the leader and all the other countries, large or small, being
countries as followers equal
Intervention Supporting intervention in Opposing power politics and
other countries’ internal affairs intervention in other countries’
by using excuses such as internal affairs
human rights
Solution of Use of military force when Solution through dialogue,
international conflicts necessary consultation, and cooperation
Military alliance Strengthening military alliance Opposing military alliance
Threat to peace and Reluctance to submit to the Hegemonism and power
stability world leader politics
Grand strategy Pressing in Eurasia from both Together with other countries,
the West and the East toward especially other secondary
the middle, integrating Europe powers, developing each
and Japan under its leadership, country’s own capability and
and pressuring Russia and move the world toward multi-
China polarity
National security Absolute security of the United Relative security of all
States at the expense of other countries at the expense of
countries’ security any country’s capability to
intervene in another country’s
internal affairs
Social systems Americanized democracy Peaceful coexistence of all
being the ideal form of social countries regardless of their
system which the United States social systems and each
has the right to help to spread country having the right to
to all the other countries decide its own social system
60 Chapter 3
cultural hegemony and cultural sovereignty. “Human rights diplomacy repre-

sents the United States’ ‘value superiority’ and international prestige.” And
the root cause of such a conflict was the United States’ hegemonic pursuit.
The disputes between China and the United States over human rights arose
not just because of what Chinese observers called “superficial problems”
such as the “Tiananmen incident in 1989, Tibetan religious freedom, birth
control, and prison labor product, etc.”; U.S.-Chinese differences were said
to arise due to substantive differences of “intervention and anti-intervention,
and hegemony and anti-hegemony.”71
The perception that China was rising rapidly as a regional power together
with the perception that the United States’ grand strategy was to prevent the
emergence of any power in Eurasia capable of challenging its own hege-
mony added to the Chinese authors’ apprehension of a unipolar distribution
of power. Chinese authors pointed out that Russia had already been severely
weakened, and was already in the process of being integrated into the West-
ern world. Just the same, the United States in recent years was said to have
not treated Russia as an equal partner, but as a failed adversary, and still
pushed Russia further and further. Chinese observers were concerned that
the United States would treat China the same way. The major differences
between the United States and China concerning world order, in the Chinese
conception, could be summarized as shown in Table 3.5. It seems that the
world order ideal to the United States was not satisfactory to China, and the
United States’ efforts to strengthen a unipolar world order was regarded as
abridging China’s independence and sovereignty.72
This chapter focuses exclusively on the negative Chinese perception of the
United States. As mentioned earlier, to grasp the overall Chinese perception
of the United States, it is necessary to balance the perception of threat and
opportunity, and take into consideration other major Chinese perceptions of
the United States, which will be done in the subsequent chapters.
Notes
1. Including the names of leaders in either country and, in the case of China,
including Taiwan and Hong Kong. Phrases like “our country” in a title are regarded
as referring to China.
2. Donald E. Nuechterlein: America Recommitted: United States National Inter-
ests in a Restructured World, University Press of Kentucky, 1991, p. 19.
3. Li Shouyuan, “‘Lengzhan Siwei’ yu Lengzhan hou Meiguo de dui Hua
Zhengce” [“Cold War Thinking” and the United States’ Post Cold War China Policy],
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn 1996), p. 23.
4. Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu de dui Hua Zhengce ji qi Qianjing”

[On the Clinton Administration’s China Policy and Its Prospects], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
(Spring 1997), p. 7.
5. Ding Kuisong, “Zongjie Guoqu Mianxiang Weilai: Ping Zhong Mei Guanxi
50 Zhounian” [Reviewing the Past and Looking Forward toward the Future], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi (October, 1999), p. 3.
6. Gao E, “Zhong Mei Ri Sanbian Guanxi de Xianzhuang yu Wenti” [The
Current Status and Problems in China-U.S.-Japan Relations], Zhanlue yu Guanli
(November/December 1994), p. 75.
7. Ke Juhan, “Zhong Mei “Jianshexing Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi” Pingxi” [On
the China-U.S. “Constructive Strategic Partnership”], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(December 1997), p. 53.
8. Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi Xianzhuang: Gongtong Liyi
yu Zhengzhi” [An Appraisal of Post–Cold War Sino-U.S. Relations: Common Inter-
ests and Disputes], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1995), p. 35.
9. Chu Shulong, “Lengzhan hou Zhong Mei Shuangbian he Diqu Zhanlue yu
Anquan Guanxi” [The Post–Cold War China-U.S. Bilateral and Regional Strategic
and Security Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (May 2000), p. 14; Zhou Qi, “Leng-
zhan hou de Zhong Mei,” pp. 46–47; Zhang Linhong, “21 Shiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi:
Duikang Haishi Hezuo?” [China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century: Confrontation or
Cooperation?], Zhanlue yu Guanli (May/June 1997), p. 27.
10. Zhang Qingmin, “Bushi Zhengfu xiang Taiwan Chushou F-16 Zhandouji de
Jueding: Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce Jueding Yinsu de Yige Anli Fenxi” [The Bush
Administration’s Decision to Sell F-16 Fighters to Taiwan: A Case Study of the Deci-
sive Factors in American China Policy], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 2000), p. 99; Zhang
Qingmin, “Zhong Mei Guanxi zhong de Meiguo Shou Tai Wuqi Wenti” [The Problem
of the United States’ Arms Sale to Taiwan in China-U.S. Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan
Xuebao (Winter 1994), pp. 87–88; Su Ge, “Zhong Mei Guanxi Zonglun” [On China-
U.S. Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Summer 1996), p. 24; Lu Naideng, “Shi
Shu Zhong Mei E Sanguo Guanxi de Xinbianhua” [A Tentative Analysis of the New
Changes in China-U.S.-Russia Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Winter 1996),
p. 28; Liu Jinsong, “Zhong Mei Junshi Guanxi de Lishi Yanbian Wenti he Qianjing”
[The Evolution, Problems, and Prospects of China-U.S. Military Relations], Zhanlue
yu Guanli (September/October 1997), p. 109; Dai Bing, “Meiguo dui Taiwan de Jishu
Shuchu” [The United States’ Technology Transfer to Taiwan], Shijie Jingji yu Zheng-
zhi (September 1999), p. 77.
11. Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu,” pp. 5, 7; Guo Zhenyuan, “Meiguo dui
Taiwan Wenti Zhengce de Tiaozheng” [The United States’ Adjustment of Its Taiwan
Policy], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Spring 2000), p. 25.
12. Zhu Feng, “TMD yu Dangqian Zhong Mei Guanxi” [TMD and the Current
China-U.S. Relationship], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (May 1999), pp. 11–13, 15–16;
Chu Shulong, “Lengzhan hou Zhong Mei,” p. 12; Guo Zhenyuan, “Meiguo dui Tai-
wan,” p. 28; Liu Jinsong, “Zhong Mei Junshi Guanxi,” p. 110.
13. Liu Jiangyong, “Kelindun Fanghua yu Zhong Mei Ri Guanxi Xinqushi”
[Clinton’s China Visit and New Trends in China-U.S.-Japan Relations], Xiandai Guoji
62 Chapter 3
Guanxi (July 1998), p. 6; Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xinshiji Baquan
Zhanlue yu Zhongguo Guojia Anquan” [The United States’ Hegemonic Strategy in
the New Century and China’s National Security], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February
2000), p. 54; Xi Laiwang, “Jiji Tuijin Jianli Zhong Mei Jianshexing Zhanlue Huoban
Guanxi” [Actively Promote the China-U.S. Constructive Strategic Partnership], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (May 1998), p. 5.
14. Ding Shichuan and Wei Hongzhou, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo Ganshe Taiwan
Wenti Zhanlue Celue Pingxi” [Comments and Analyses of the United States’ Strat-
egy and Tactics in Its Post Cold War Intervention of Taiwan Problem], Shijie Jingji
yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), pp. 38–42; Xi Laiwang, “Jiji Tuijin Jianli,” p. 5; Guo Zhe-
nyuan, “Meiguo dui Taiwan,” p. 26; Zhuang Qubing, “Tuijian Yiben Haoshu: Meiguo
dui Hua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti Duhou” [Recommending a Good Book: Reading
the United States’ China Policy and the Taiwan Problem], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao
(Spring 1999), p. 45.
15. Ding Shichuan and Wei Hongzhou, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo,” pp. 39–41; Guo
Zhenyuan, “Meiguo dui Taiwan,” p. 28; Zhang Linhong, “21 Shiji de Zhong Mei
Guanxi,” p. 21; Xi Laiwang, “Jiji Tuijin Jianli,” p. 5.
16. Guo Zhenyuan, “Meiguo dui Taiwan,” p. 27; Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun
Zhengfu,” pp. 4–5; Pan Tongwen, “Zuihuiguo Daiyu yu Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The
MFN and China-U.S. Relations], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Winter 1994), p. 6; Jia Qingguo,
“Kelindun Zhizheng Yilai de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The Sino-U.S. Relationship Since
President Clinton Took Office], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1998), pp. 97–99; Gao E,
“Zhong Mei Ri Sanbian Guanxi,” p. 75; Ding Shichuan and Wei Hongzhou, “Leng-
zhan hou Meiguo,” pp. 39–40; Chu Shulong, “Jiji Tuijin Jianli Zhong Mei Jianshexing
Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi” [Actively Promote the China-U.S. Constructive Strategic
Partnership], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (May 2000), p. 13.
17. Cao Fumiao, “Cong Nanbei Zhanzheng Shiqi Mei Ying Guanxi Kan Jinri
Taiwan Wenti” [Perceiving Today’s Taiwan Problem from the U.S.-British Relation-
ship During the United States’ Civil War], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 1999),
p. 33; Li Shouyuan, “‘Lengzhan Siwei’ yu Lengzhan hou Meiguo,” p. 23; Niu Jun,
“Duoshizhiqiu: Zhong Mei Guanxi de Xianzhuang ji Qianjing” [Troubled Times:
Present and Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1995), p.
133; Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei Hezuo yu Fenqi” [China-U.S. Cooperation and Dif-
ferences], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 1998), p. 5.
18. Zhu Feng, “Renquan Wenti he Zhong Mei Guanxi: BianHua yu Tiaozhan”
[Human Rights Problem and China-U.S. Relations: Changes and Challenges], Shi-
jie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), p. 22; Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi:
Kelindun Zhengfu de dui Hua Zhengce Pouxi” [Engagement Plus Containment],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1996), pp. 13–14; Zhang Linjun and Lu Qichang, “Leng-
zhanhou Meiguo Guohui dui Zhong Mei Guanxi de Xiaoji Yingxiang” [The Negative
Influence of the U.S. Congress on China-U.S. Relations in the Post–Cold War Era],
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (October 1996), p. 15.
19. Sheng Jiru, “Zhong Mei Jianshexing Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi jiang Zaofu
yu Zhong Mei Liangguo Renmin: San Lun 21 Shiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [China-
U.S. Constructive Strategic Partnership Will Benefit the Two Peoples in China and
the United States], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 27; Xi Laiwang, “Jiji
Tuijin Jianli,” p. 6; Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” pp. 13–14.
20. Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” pp. 13–14; Chu Shulong, “Zhong
Mei Hezuo,” pp. 5–6; Chu Shulong, “Lengzhan hou Zhong Mei,” p. 12.
21. Zhang Linjun and Lu Qichang, “Lengzhanhou Meiguo,” p. 15; Wu Xianbin,
“Lun Meiguo dui Xianggang de Zhengce” [On the United States’ Policy toward
Hong Kong], Zhanlue yu Guanli (September/October 1997), p. 115; Jia Qingguo,
“Kelindun Zhizheng,” p. 101.
22. Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” p. 14.
23. Liu Jingsong, “Zhong Mei Junshi Guanxi de Lishi Yanbian Wenti he Qianjing”
[The Evolution, Problems, and Prospects of China-U.S. Military Relations], Zhan-
lue yu Guanli (September/October 1997), p. 106; Han Weidong and Han Yaodong,
“Meiguo Xinshiji,” p. 57; Zhang Linhong and Han Yugui, “Meiguo Yatai Anquan
Zhanlue yu Mei dui Ri dui Hua Guanxi” [The United States’ Asian-Pacific Security
Strategy and the United States’ Policies Toward Japan and China], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (March 1999), p. 10; Li Changjiu, “Bu Pingheng de Zhong Mei Ri Sanjiao
Guanxi” [Unequal Triangular Relations Among China, the U.S., and Japan], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (October 1998), p. 47.
24. Wang Chimin, “Shi Xi Wo Guo Zhoubian Huanjing zhong de ‘Meiguo Yinsu’”
[A Tentative Analysis of the U.S. Factor in our Country’s Surrounding Environment],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 1994), p. 57.
25. Chu Shulong, “Meiguo Anquan Zhanlue de Xinfazhan ji qi Zhongguo Yinsu”
[New Developments in the United States’ Security Strategy and the China Factor],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (November 1995), p. 59.
26. Liu Jingsong, “Zhong Mei Junshi,” pp. 108–109; Wu Jiong, “Ping Meiguo
‘Quanmian Ezhi Zhongguo’ Lun” [On the United States’ “Comprehensive Contain-
ment of China”], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (November 1996), p. 10; Xia Liping, “Xin-
shiji Meiguo Quanqiu Zhanlue yu Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The United States’ Global
Strategy and China-U.S. Relations in the New Century], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Octo-
ber 2000), p. 25; Lu Qichang, “Shi ji zhi jiao de Zhong Mei E Guanxi” [China-U.S.-
Russia Relations Around the Turn of the Century], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December
2000), p. 5.
27. Chu Shulong, “Lengzhan hou Zhong Mei,” pp. 9–10; Wang Haihan, “Lun
Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 7; Wu Jiong, “Ping Meiguo ‘Quanmian Ezhi Zhongguo’ Lun,”
pp. 9, 11; Xi Laiwang, “1995 nian Zhong Mei Guanxi Huigu yu Zhanwang” [A
Review of China-U.S. Relations in 1995 and the Future Prospects], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (December 1995), p. 8.
28. Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” pp. 12–13.
29. Liu Jiangyong, “Kelindun Fanghua,” p. 6.
30. Shi Ren, “Shiji zhi jiao Mei Ou Ri de Duiwai Zhanlue yu dui Hua Zhengce
Zouxiang” [The Foreign Strategy of the United States, Europe, and Japan Around
the Turn of the Century and the Trend of Their China Policy], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(March 1998), p. 2; Lu Zhongwei, “Zhong Mei Zhong Ri Shounao Hufang ji Zhong
Mei Ri Sanbian Guanxi” [China-U.S., China-Japan Summits and China-U.S.-Japan
Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 1997), p. 11; Wu Xinbo, “Mouqiu
64 Chapter 3
Zhong Ri Mei Sanbian Guanxi de Pingheng Fazhan” [Seeking Balanced Develop-

ment of China-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Relations], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February
1999), p. 22; Tang Yongsheng, “Zhong Mei Ri Sanjiao Guanxi yu Zhongguo Zitai de
Xuanze” [Relations Among China, United States, and Japan, and China’s Options],
Zhanlue yu Guanli (January/February 1997), p. 34.
31. Liu Jiangyong, “Mei Ri Chongjian Anquan Tizhi yu Zhong Mei Ri Guanxi”
[The Re-establishment of the U.S.-Japan Security System and China-U.S.-Japan
Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Winter 1996), p. 32; Zhang Yiting, “Kelindun
de ‘dui Hua Jiechu’ Zhengce ji qi bu Wendingxing” [Clinton’s “Engagement of China”
Policy and its Shaky Foundation], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Spring 1997), p. 38; Liu
Jiangyong, “Kelindun Fanghua,” p. 6; Su Hao, “Mei Ri Guanxi zhong de Zhongguo
Yinsu” [China Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Spring
1997), pp. 48–49; Li Changjiu, “Bu Pingheng de Zhong Mei Ri,” p. 47; Wang Yong,
“Meiguo zai Yatai de Zhanlue Xuanze yu Zhong Mei Ri Ao Guanxi: Bufen Guoji Wenti
Zhuanjia yu Aodaliya Qianzongli Huoke Zuotan Jiyao” [The United States’ Strategic
Options in the Asia-Pacific Region and Relations Among China, United States, Japan,
and Australia], Zhanlue yu Guanli (November/December 1996), p. 18; Lu Zhongwei,
“Zhong Mei Zhong Ri,” p. 14; Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” pp. 12–13;
Wang Chimin, “Shi Xi Wo Guo Zhoubian,” p. 61; Li Changjiu, “Tiaozheng zhong de
Zhong Mei Ri Guanxi” [China-U.S.-Japan Relations in Adjustment], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (June 1997), p. 43; Liu Jingsong, “Zhong Mei Junshi,” p. 110.
32. Guo Zhenyuan, “Meiguo dui Taiwan,” p. 25; Xia Liping, “Xinshiji Meiguo
Quanqiu Zhanlue,” p. 25; Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 7; Liu Jingsong,
“Zhong Mei Junshi,” p. 109.
33. Xi Laiwang, “1995 Nian Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 8; Ding Kuisong and Niu
Xinchun, “Zai Tansuo Hezuo zhong Fazhan de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [China-U.S.
Relations in Exploring Cooperation], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (January/February 1999),
p. 82; Wu Jiong, “Ping Meiguo ‘Quanmian Ezhi Zhongguo’ Lun,” p. 10.
34. Chu Shulong, “Meiguo Anquan Zhanlue,” p. 60; Wu Jiong, “Ping Meiguo
‘Quanmian Ezhi Zhongguo’ Lun,” p. 10; Wang Chimin, “Shi Xi Wo Guo Zhoubian,”
p. 57; Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 9; Han Weidong and Han Yaodong,
“Meiguo Xinshiji,” p. 57.
35. Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xinshiji,” pp. 55–56; Tang Yongsh-
eng, “Zhong Mei E Sanjiao Guanxi Zouxiang” [Trend in the Triangular Relations
Among China, the United States, and Russia], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (October
1998), pp. 51–52; Yan Julu, “Meiguo de Zhongya Zhanlue ji dui Zhongguo Anquan
Huanjing de Yingxiang” [The United States’ Central Asian Strategy and Its Impact on
China’s Security Environment], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 1999), pp. 22–24;
Wang Chimin, “Shi Xi Wo Guo Zhoubian,” pp. 60–61; Tang Yongsheng and Chen
Zhuhua, “Mei Ou E Sanjiao Guanxi de Yanbian ji Zhongguo Juese de Xuanze” [The
Evolution of the Triangular Relationship among the United States, Europe, and Rus-
sia, and China’s Role], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (May 1999), p. 9.
36. Wang Chimin, “Shi Xi Wo Guo Zhoubian,” pp. 60–61.
37. Fu Mengzi, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi :Jingzheng yu
Hezuo zhong Qiu Shuangying” [China-U.S. Relations Looking Forward to the New
Century: Seeking Win-Win in Competition and Cooperation], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi

(January/February 2000), p. 95; Zhu Feng, “TMD yu Dangqian,” p. 11; Chu Shulong,
“Lengzhan hou Zhong Mei,” p. 11; Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo
Xinshiji,” p. 54; Xia Liping, “Xinshiji Meiguo Quanqiu Zhanlue,” pp. 24–25; Liu
Jingsong, “Zhong Mei Junshi,” p. 109; James A. Nathan, “On Appeasement and
Parvenus: Managing the Challenge of New Power,” International Relations (XV (4),
2001), p. 28; Oliver North, “Anti-Missile Defense Whiners,” www.washtimes.com/
commentary/20010722–56639760.htm; Andrew Scobell, “Crouching Korea, Hidden
China,” Asian Survey (March/April, 2002), p. 356.
38. Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu,” pp. 7–8; Fang Zhou, “Meiguo dui
Hua Zhengce ji qi Zouxiang” [The United States’ China Policy and Its Future Trend],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 1993), pp. 38–39; Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xin-
shiji de Xinguanxi: Ping Kelindun Fanghua hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The New
Relationship Looking Forward to the New Century: On the China-U.S. Relationship
After Clinton’s China Visit], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 18.
39. Li Zhongcheng, “Zhongguo yu Mei Ri E Dongmeng Guanxi de Xianzhuang
ji Qushi” [The Current Status and Future Trends of China’s Relations with the United
States, Japan, Russia, and Southeast Asian Nations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July
1995), p. 25; Qian Wenrong, “Kelindun Zhizheng hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [China-
U.S. Relations After Clinton’s Inauguration], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February
1993), pp. 61–62; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei,” p. 32.
40. Liu Liandi, “Daxuannian zhong de Zhong Mei Guanxi he Meiguo dui Hua
Zhengce Quxiang” [China-U.S. Relations and the United States’ China Policy Trend
in the Election Year], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (September 1992), p. 54; Wang Jisi
and Zhu Wenli, “Meiguoren Yanzhong de ‘Dazhonghua’” [“Greater China” in Ameri-
can Eyes], Zhanlue yu Guanli (March/April 1994), p. 69; Zhang Linhong, “21 Shiji de
Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 25; Ding Kuisong and Niu Xinchun, “Zai Tansuo Hezuo,” p.
82; Zhang Ruizhuang, “Ye Tan Meiguo Xin Baoshou Zhuyi de Waijiao Sixiang ji qi
dui Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce de Yingxiang” [On the United States’ Neo-Conservative
Foreign Policy Thought and Its Impact on the United States’ China Policy], Guoji
Wenti Yanjiu (Summer 2000), p. 46; Zheng Baoguo, “Lengzhan hou de Meiguo dui
Hua Zhengce” [The United States’ China Policy in the Post–Cold War Era], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi (October 1998), p. 33.
41. Liu Liandi, “Daxuannian zhong de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 54; Liang
Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” p. 18; Pan Tongwen, “Zuihuiguo Daiyu,” p. 1;
Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” p. 17.
42. Zhao Yongqing, “Dangqian Shijie Jingji zhong Zhide Zhuyi de Yizhong
Qingxiang: cong Meiguo yu Zhong Ri Jingmao Guanxi Kan Shijie Jingji Zheng-
zhihua” [One Noticeable Trend in Current World Economy: the Politicization of
World Economy in Economic and Trade Relations between the United States and
China, Japan], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 1996), p. 26; Li Jiang, “Meiguo dui
Hua Zhengce ji qi Zouxiang” [The United States’ China Policy and Its Future Trend],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1997), p. 25.
43. Zhang Mingqian, “Meiguo Duiwai Zhengce Waijiao·Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The
United States’ Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and China-U.S. Relations], Shijie Jingji
66 Chapter 3
yu Zhengzhi (October 1993), p. 61; Chu Shulong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Zhong

Mei Guanxi Zhanlue Kuangjia” [The Strategic Framework of China-U.S. Relations
Facing the New Century], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (October 1997), p. 2; Niu Jun,
“Lun Kelindun Zhengfu Diyi Renqi dui Hua Zhengce de Yanbian ji qi Tedian” [The
Evolution and Characteristics of the Clinton Administration’s China Policy in Its First
Term], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1998), p. 9; Pan Tongwen, “Zuihuiguo Daiyu,” p. 2.
44. Zhang Qingmin, “Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 91; Wu Xianbin, “Lun Meiguo dui
Xianggang,” p. 115.
45. Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” p. 14; Pan Tongwen, “Zuihuiguo
Daiyu,” p. 6; Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 9.
46. Wu Jiong, “Ping Meiguo ‘Quanmian Ezhi Zhongguo’ Lun,” p. 10; Shi Ren,
“Shiji zhi jiao,” p. 4; Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” p. 14; Pan Tongwen,
“Zuihuiguo Daiyu,” p. 6; Chen Demin, “90 Niandai Zhong Mei Guanxi Dongdang ji
qi Yuanyin Tanxi” [The Upheaval in the 1990s’ China-U.S. Relations and Its Causes],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (October 1999), p. 36.
47. Pan Tongwen, “Zuihuiguo Daiyu,” p. 6; Liu Liandi, “Daxuannian zhong
de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 51; Li Shouyuan, “ ‘Lengzhan Siwei’ yu Lengzhan hou
Meiguo,” p. 21; Zhao Pingan, Li Xuebao, and Guo Yuan, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo dui
Hua Zhengce de Tiaozheng yu Zhong Mei Guanxi de Zouxiang” [The Adjustment of
the United States’ China Policy and Future Trend of China-U.S. Relations], Waijiao
Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn 1996), p. 16.
48. Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” p. 6.
49. Su Ge, “Zhong Mei Gaoceng Hufang yu ‘Jianshexing Zhanlue Huoban
Guanxi’” [China-U.S. Mutual Top Level Visit and “Constructive Strategic Partner-
ship”], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 23.
50. Ding Kuisong and Niu Xinchun, “Zai Tansuo Hezuo,” p. 82.
51. Liu Ji, “21 Shiji Zhong Mei Guanxi de Xuanze” [Options for China-U.S.
Relations in the 21st Century], Zhanlue yu Guanli (September/October 1997),
p. 34.
52. Li Changjiu, “Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi de Xianzhuang he Qianjing”
[The Current Status and Prospects of China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (November 1992), pp. 55–56; Niu Jun, “Duoshizhiqiu,” pp.
133–134; Huang Renwei, “‘Shanghai Gongbao’ yu Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi de
Fazhan” [The Shanghai Communique and Developing Sino-U.S. Trade and Economic
Relations], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1997), p. 150; Sun Hongchang, “Lun Zhong
Mei Maoyi Zhang ai” [On Obstacles in China-U.S. Trade], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(February 1995), p. 48.
53. Wang Yong, “Shi Lun Liyi Jituan zai Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce zhong de
Yingxiang: yi Meiguo dui Hua Zuihuiguo Daiyu Zhengce Wei Li” [The Influence
of Interest Groups on U.S. China Policy: A Case Study of the MFN Issue], Meiguo
Yanjiu (Summer 1998), pp. 80–84.
54. Zhu Feng, “Renquan Wenti,” p. 19; Yu Guobin, “Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua
Zuihuiguo Daiyu zhi Zheng ji Qianjing Fenxi” [The United States’ Debates Regard-
ing China MFN and Its Prospects], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 1998), p. 67.
55. Chen Baosen, “Fazhan Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi de Zhengque Suoxiang”
[The Correct Way for Developing Sino-U.S. Economic Ties], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring
1994), p. 10; Yu Guobin, “Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua Zuihuiguo Daiyu,” pp. 67–68.
56. Li Jiang, “Meiguo Guonei Zhengzhi yu dui Hua Zhengce Bianlun” [Domestic
Politics in the United States and Debates Regarding the United States’ China Policy],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1997), p. 26; Xi Laiwang, “1995 Nian Zhong Mei
Guanxi,” p. 9.
57. Chen Xiangyang, “Cong Guoji Zhidu Jiaodu Kan Lengzhan hou de Zhongmei
Guanxi” [The Post Cold War China-U.S. Relationship from the Perspective of Inter-
national Institutions], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 2000), p. 55; Zhao Yongq-
ing, “Dangqian Shijie Jingji,” p. 26; Yu Zhida, “Zhong Mei Nongchanpin Maoyi de
Dongzhiwu Jianyi Zhengduan” [China-U.S. Disputes over Animal and Plant Inspec-
tion in Agricultural Trade], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (September 1996), pp. 26, 29; Xi
Laiwang, “1995 Nian Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 9; Gu Wenyan, “Meiguo Jingji Xingshi
ji dui Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi de Yingxiang” [Economic Situations in the United
States and the Impact on China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (April 1999), p. 18.
58. Zhang Ruizhuang, “Ye Tan Meiguo Xin Baoshou Zhuyi,” pp. 46–47.
59. Chu Shulong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” p. 2; Niu Jun, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu,”
p. 10; Lu Naideng, “Shi Shu Zhong Mei E,” p. 28.
60. Nai Zuji, “Kelindun Zhengfu Dier Renqi dui Hua Zhengce de Tiaozheng”
[The Second Clinton Administration’s Adjustment in Its China Policy], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (August 1997), p. 13; Su Ge, “Zhong Mei Guanxi Zonglun,” p. 21.
61. Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” p. 19; Li Shouyuan, “‘Lengzhan Siwei’ yu
Lengzhan hou Meiguo,” p. 21; Wang Jisi, “‘Ezhi’ Haishi ‘Jiaowang’: Ping Lengzhan
hou Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce” [Containment or Engagement: On the United States’
China Policy in the Post Cold War Era], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Spring 1996), p. 1; Zhao
Yongqing, “Dangqian Shijie Jingji,” p. 27.
62. Zhang Zhongyi, “Yingxiang Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce de Jizhong Zhuyao
Liliang” [Several Major Forces Affecting the United States’ China Policy], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi (January 1997), p. 14; Jiang Yuguo, “Zhongguo “Rushi” dui Zhong
Mei Guanxi de Yingxiang” [Impact of China’s Entry into the WTO on the China-
U.S. Relationship], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (September 2000), p. 10; Jia Qingguo,
“Kelindun Zhizheng,” p. 100; Niu Jun, “Duoshizhiqiu,” p. 134; Liang Gencheng,
“Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” p. 13; Xiong Zhiyong, “Meiguo Chuanmei yu Meiguo de
dui Hua Zhengce” [U.S. Media and the United States’ China Policy], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (July 1998), p. 39; Shi Yinghong, “Xifang dui Feixifang: Dangjin Meiguo dui
Hua Taidu de Genben Yuanyin” [West vs. non-West: The Fundamental Root of the
United States’ Current Attitude toward China], Zhanlue yu Guanli (May/June 1996),
p. 8; Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 8.
63. Zhu Feng, “Renquan Wenti,” p. 23; Shi Yinghong, “Xifang dui Feixifang,”
p. 8; Shi Yinghong, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce de Jiben Guonei Beijing” [The Basic
Domestic Backgrounds of the United States’ China Policy], Zhanlue yu Guanli
(November/December 1996), p. 35.
68 Chapter 3
64. Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” p. 16; Chu Shulong, “Mianxiang Xin-
shiji,” p. 5.
65. Jiang Yuguo, “Zhongguo ‘Rushi,’” p. 10.
66. Zhu Feng, “Renquan Wenti,” p. 22; Zhang Linhong, “21 Shiji de Zhong Mei
Guanxi,” p. 22; Zhao Jingfang, “Meiguo dui Hua ‘Jiechu’ Zhengce de Mubiao Fenxi”
[An Analysis of the Objectives of the United States’ “Engagement” Policy toward
China], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 1999), p. 13; Zhang Yiting, “Kelindun de ‘dui
Hua Jiechu,’” p. 38; Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xinshiji,” p. 54.
67. Jiang Lingfei, “Meiguo dui Hua Ezhi Zhanlue de Zhiyue Yinsu he Keneng
Zouxiang” [The Constraining Factors in the United States’ Containing China Strat-
egy and Possible Future Trends], Zhanlue yu Guanli (September/October 1996),
pp. 46–50; Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” pp. 15–16; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan
hou de Zhong Mei,” pp. 32–33;
68. Fu Mengzi, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” p. 93.
69. Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xinshiji,” pp. 55–56; Zheng
Baoguo, “Lengzhan hou de Meiguo,” p. 33.
70. Liu Jingsong, “Zhong Mei Junshi,” p. 111; Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei dui
Guoji Zhanlue Wenti de Kanfa Lichang he Zhuzhang” [The Opinions, Positions, and
Advocacies by China and the United States Regarding International Strategy], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), p. 52
71. Zhu Feng, “Renquan Wenti,” p. 22; Chen Zhuhua, “Zhong Mei Ri Sanjiao
Jiegou zhong de Wen Hua Yinsu” [Cultural Factors in the Triangular Relationship
Among China, United States, and Japan], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (May 1999), pp.
53–56.
72. Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei Hezuo,” pp. 4–5; Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei dui
Guoji Zhanlue,” pp. 48–50; Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xinshiji,”
pp. 53–57; Yuan Peng, “Dangqian Zhong Mei Guanxi Xingzhi Chuyi” [A Tentative
Comment on the Nature of Current China-U.S. Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(September 2000), pp. 3–4; Fu Mengzi, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” pp. 92–93.
Chapter 4
Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity

METHODOLOGY
Consistent with Chapter 3 on the perception of threat, in this chapter, on the

perception of opportunity, I will adopt the same four rules listed in the begin-
ning of Chapter 3, the same 182 articles as the sample, and the same quotation
collection approach as a source of materials. The two major questions I intend
to address in this chapter are as follows: whether China perceives opportunity
from the United States; and what are the contents of the Chinese perception
of opportunity from the United States? Finally, I will balance the perception
of threat and opportunity from the United States to see whether the United
States presents more a threat or more an opportunity to China.
WHETHER CHINA PERCEIVES OPPORTUNITY FROM THE

UNITED STATES
Table 4.1 demonstrates the number of articles in the sample in which a per-
ception of opportunity from the United States has been mentioned.
From Table 4.1, just as in Chapter 3 on the perception of threat, we can
see that an overwhelming majority of articles in the sample perceived more
or less an opportunity from the United States. Consistent with the research
in Chapter 3, opportunity in this chapter is defined as anything the United
States did to China which elicited positive comments from Chinese authors,
either approval or appreciation. Again, this definition is not academically
satisfactory, but is used just to serve the purpose of research in this chapter.
According to Richard Herrmann, perception of opportunity in international
69
70 Chapter 4
Table 4.1 Number of Articles Having Expressed a Perception of Opportunity from the
United States
Number of Articles Having

Number of Articles
Journal Expressed a Perception of
in the Sample
Opportunity
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 7 7
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 70 58
Meiguo Yanjiu 28 27
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 14 13
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 44 41
Zhanlue yu Guanli 19 16
Total 182 162
relations includes two aspects: perception of opportunity for exploitation and

perception of opportunity for cooperation.1 The former usually refers to a tar-
get country weaker than the source country, and the source country perceives
an opportunity to take advantage of the target country’s weakness for its own
interest. As this kind of perception is hardly present at all in the sample, in
this chapter, I will focus only on the perception of opportunity for cooperation
with the United States.
Contents of the Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity for

Cooperation with the United States
In this section, I will discuss opportunity for cooperation in two parts. One is
the perceived opportunity for the United States, and the other is the perceived
opportunity for China. In the first part, I will discuss only some of the per-
ceived opportunity in strategic and economic aspects, just to demonstrate that
Chinese authors perceived a win-win game rather than a zero-sum game in
China-U.S. bilateral relations. The second part, on perceived opportunity to
China, constitutes the bulk of this chapter. Again, for the purpose of academic
consistency, I will adapt Nuechterlein’s interest matrix for the presentation of
the second section.
OPPORTUNITY TO THE UNITED STATES
China Was Strategically Important to the United States

Chinese authors argued that China was important to the United States in sev-
eral ways, including strategically. Chinese authors often emphasized China’s
Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity from the United States 71
strategic importance to the United States, not only by their own arguments,
but also by citing speeches of American politicians or scholars. As they did
so approvingly, I in the following will treat such instances also as revelation
of Chinese scholars’ own perceptions.
China is a big country, a permanent member of the UN Security Council,
and a nuclear power. It had important influence in the Asia-Pacific region and
among developing countries. Consequently, China was strategically impor-
tant to the United States and the United States needed China’s cooperation to
deal with various international problems. Harry Harding pointed out that in
many international problems, China could either make things worse or bet-
ter for the United States. Former president Bush said that China could easily
influence stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which would affect the peace
and prosperity of the world.2 Typically, Chinese authors perceived China’s
strategic importance to the United States in the following international
hotspots or problem areas.
A. In the Asia-Pacific region, the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan problem, the
Cambodia problem, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and Central
Asia.3
B. Maintaining balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, restraining Japan,
and balancing Russia. In the case of Japan, one Chinese author explained
that the United States wanted to “use Japan to restrain China and at the
same time use China to balance Japan.”4
C. The Middle East, especially during the Gulf War in the early 1990s.5
D. Nuclear proliferation in general, the North Korean nuclear program, mis-
sile control, the nuclear programs in Pakistan and Iran, etc.6
E. Transnational problems such as environmental protection, drug trafficking,
international terrorism, illegal immigrants, and international crime.7
F. China’s support in the UN Security Council.8
Chinese authors pointed out that “whether the United States’ Asia-Pacific
strategy would be successful or not, to quite some extent depended on the state
of China-U.S. relations.” Since the United States regarded problems such as
those listed above as major threats to the United States in the post–Cold War
era, and China was considered capable of playing a major role in contributing
to the solution of many of the above problems, Chinese authors considered
their country as strategically important to the United States. But from a nar-
row security perspective, one Chinese author did agree with Robert Ross that
there was an asymmetry between the United States and China because the
United States did not depend on cooperation with China for its fundamental
interest and the guarantee of its national security. Another Chinese author
also pointed out that endeavors like controlling international crime “do not
72 Chapter 4
enjoy strategic status.” But on the other hand, things may change unexpect-
edly; anti-terrorism which was regarded in 1997 as not enjoying strategic
status, in 2001 became the first priority in the United States’ national security,
because “the United States has a far broader concept of national security than
any other country.”9
Chinese authors argued that China’s strategic importance to the United
States is more pronounced if viewed from a long-term perspective. China and
the United States have already engaged in substantial cooperation regarding
things important to the United States.10 In the following, I will briefly discuss
U.S.-China cooperation in the areas of non-proliferation and anti-terrorism.
U.S.-China Cooperation on Non-proliferation

Quite a few Chinese authors mentioned that one important area of coopera-
tion between the United States and China is to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, which one scholar regarded as constituting one
of the new foundations of China-U.S. bilateral relations. Both countries wish
to promote non-proliferation. Some authors seemed to suggest, however,
that in this area, the United States needed China’s cooperation more than
China needed the United States’, since proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction was a major threat to the United States, but not to China. One
author cited Alexander Haig to the effect that even though China was not the
complete answer to this problem, China was an important part of the solution
and could help the United States in this respect. The two countries in recent
years, especially during the visits by President Clinton to China and President
Jiang to the United States, had had extensive contacts and dialogue regard-
ing non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and some productive
cooperation.11
U.S.-China Anti-terrorism Cooperation

Quite a few Chinese authors mentioned that fighting terrorism was an area
in which the United States and China shared a common interest. This was a
threat facing both the United States and China, and “a problem which neither
country can solve by itself.” The need for bilateral cooperation in this respect
was seen as greater than in the past, and the two countries actually already
have had good cooperation in this respect. Threat of this kind promoted the
formation of a collective identity between the United States and China, and
offered a good potential for bilateral cooperation. The improvement of bilat-
eral relations would contribute positively to this common cause.12
Just as in the case of non-proliferation, Chinese authors seemed to believe

that terrorism was more a threat to the United States than to China,13 and
consequently the United States in this respect needed China more than China
needed the United States.
China Is Economically Important to the United States

Chinese authors argue that China is economically important to the United
States. Among other things, economic relations with China provided the
United States with increased employment, trade, and investment opportuni-
ties, and enhanced competitiveness. In the following, I will discuss briefly
the impact of China-U.S. economic relations on the United States’ job market
and trade.
According to Chinese authors, economic relations with China brought many
benefits to the United States, and one such benefit was the increase in jobs for
Americans. Chinese authors were not quite certain about the exact impact on
the United States’ job market, but their consensus was that the impact was not
negligible, and perhaps even great. For 1993, two authors mentioned that U.S.
exports to China reached $8 billion, providing 150,000 jobs for Americans.
Another author gave a somewhat different figure: 200,000 high-paying jobs
for Americans from exports to China in 1993. In 1995, one scholar pointed
out that denying China MFN status would cost the United States 170,000 jobs
due to, among other things, MFN’s impact on both exports and imports, and
on investment. In 1996, another scholar mentioned that the United States’
trade with China was “relevant to 150,000 jobs in the United States,” which
at least should include the impact of both exports and imports. In early 1998,
one scholar gave the most impressive figure in the sample: “According to
estimates, United States’ direct exports to China alone provide 300,000 jobs;
bilateral trade at least provides U.S. secondary and tertiary industries about
one million jobs.”14
Chinese authors also cited Americans’ own estimates to substantiate their
argument. One instance was the testimony of the China-U.S. Chamber of
Commerce chairman in the U.S. House of Representatives, in which he
reportedly mentioned that interests brought forth from China-U.S. trade
had permeated every corner of the United States, as demonstrated in tens of
thousands of jobs, enhanced competitiveness, and affordable consumer prod-
ucts. Another instance was President Clinton’s comment on the Intellectual
Property Rights Agreement between the United States and China, in which
he said this was “a very important agreement,” because it would mean tens of
thousands of jobs for the United States.15
74 Chapter 4
Chinese authors were without exception quite optimistic about the future
prospect of China-U.S. economic relations, and were confident that bilateral
economic relations in the future would provide many more jobs for Ameri-
cans. As early as in 1994, one author cited President Clinton approvingly
as stating that in the 21st century, China would become the most important
emerging market in the world, and therefore would be more important to the
U.S. economy. One author mentioned in 1997 that “in the remaining years
of the 20th century, China’s cumulative imports would reach 1 trillion U.S.
dollars, which undoubtedly would provide the United States an opportunity
to expand exports, create jobs, and speed up its economic growth.” For one
instance, to meet China’s demand for nuclear power plants, according to the
American Nuclear Society, in the next 25 years “American suppliers can
export to China annually $1.6 billion in technology and equipments. These
exports can guarantee 25,000 high tech jobs” for the United States.16
One article analyzed in detail the benefits to the United States of trading
with China. The author argued that inexpensive Chinese products entering the
American market had the following benefits to the United States.
1. They were quite beneficial to American consumers. To be more exact,

$25.68 billion of Chinese imports into the U.S. market in 1992 might mean
$25.68 billion earned for American consumers! Let us see how he reached
this interesting conclusion. According to him, in the United States, the
income from labor and capital accounted for 75 percent and 25 percent, re-
spectively (an assumption cited from Paul Samuelson’s Economics), while
in China labor and capital each accounted for 50 percent. If the price of
a Chinese product was $100 ($50 for labor and $50 for capital), the same
product made in the United States would be worth $200. Therefore, U.S.
imports from China of $25.68 billion in 1992 meant that American con-
sumers “saved $25.68 billion and enjoyed the same benefits.” The author
explained that the calculation above was not quite accurate because he re-
sorted to several assumptions, such as no price elasticity, no transportation
cost, no customs duties, and all imports being consumer goods, but it was
clear that the author thought that the United States reaped great benefits
from its trade with China. Another scholar gave a more modest estimate:
around 1995, without China’s imports, American consumers annually
would have to pay additional 14 billion dollars because of higher tariff and
replacement products from other countries.17
2. Chinese imports helped lower the inflation rate in the United States. As
China’s labor cost was about 1/65 of the United States’, Chinese products
“can enter the American market at a very low price and thus can play a
very positive role in lowering commodity price in the United States, which
in fact also increases American workers’ actual income.” One author pre-
dicted in 1995 that “without imports from China, the United States’ annual
inflation rate would increase by at least 0.15 percent.”18
3. Chinese imports helped increase U.S. saving and in turn promote U.S.
investment. The U.S. savings rate had been very low, about 5 percent, total-
ing 212.6 billion U.S. dollars in 1992. The author assumed that American
consumers saved all the money because of the reduced cost of buying
Chinese products. It meant that about 7.5 percent of U.S. savings in 1992
came from China’s imports.19
Over the years, China has become an increasingly important trade partner
for the United States. In 1995, China was already the United States’ sixth
largest trade partner. In 1997, China became the fourth largest trade partner
for the United States, behind Canada, Japan, and Mexico. In 2000, China
remained fourth and the volume of the bilateral trade kept increasing. One
author mentioned that “if China increases the number of telephones from 2
among every 100 Chinese to 40, the size of China’s telecommunication mar-
ket would be the sum total of the United States’ market in the last 100 years.”
He added, somewhat resentfully, that if the United States was unfriendly to
China, China would give parts of this market to its competitors.20
OPPORTUNITY TO CHINA
Opportunity to China’s National Security
The United States Was Committed to Peace

As for China’s national security, Chinese authors in the sample perceived
opportunity from the United States mainly in three aspects. First, the United
States was basically committed to peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Second,
the United States could serve as a counterweight to Japan. Third, the United
States practiced an engagement policy toward China. The perceived role of
the United States in maintaining peace will be discussed in a later section
about opportunity from the United States regarding China’s favored world
order. In the following two sections, I will discuss the United States’ per-
ceived role as a counterweight to Japan, and its engagement policy toward
China.
The United States’ Containment of Japan

Chinese authors mostly perceived a potential threat from Japan and they
regarded the United States as a counterweight to Japan. They argued that
the two countries had a common interest in this respect, since neither was
76 Chapter 4
willing to see Japan again “becoming militaristic or possessing nuclear weap-

ons.” One author accepted that “U.S.-Japan security relations may serve as
a bottle-cork to prevent Japan possessing nuclear weapons.” Another author
pointed out that “if the U.S.-Japan alliance collapses, Japan would adopt an
independent defense policy and greatly increase its military capability, which
would arouse concern and uneasiness among East Asian countries, and result
in a regional arms race.” He suggested that “if the United States and China
can reach a consensus regarding Japan’s military power development and its
role in regional political and security affairs, it will greatly reduce China’s
concern over Japan.” The development of China-U.S. relations was perceived
to have a positive effect on China-Japan relations, because it would constrain
Japan’s relations with Taiwan.21
The United States’ Engagement Policy toward China

Chinese scholars favored engagement. China’s strategic goal is reform
and opening, making every effort to develop economically, and should not
change in the next 100 years, given China’s extremely low per capita GNP. A
peaceful international environment and significant international cooperation
are therefore essential to China. “As the United States is the No. 1 power in
the world, China-U.S. relations are very important to China,” and “develop-
ing stable cooperative relations with the United States on a long term basis
conforms to China’s broadest strategic interest.” Since China and the United
States established diplomatic relations in 1979, “China has always tried to
improve and develop relations with the United States.” One of China’s moti-
vations in developing economic ties with the United States was to improve
bilateral relations. In reacting to American leaders’ frequent speeches claim-
ing that China-U.S. relations are among the most important foreign relations
for the United States, one Chinese author pointed out that, on their part, they
would say that “China-U.S. relations are China’s most important bilateral
relations.” One article put it more bluntly: in China’s pursuit of moderniza-
tion, “the United States is the most significant external factor. It may be either
the biggest cooperator or the biggest destroyer.” After the Tiananmen tragedy
in 1989, China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping said, “even though there
are problems and differences of this and that kind, ultimately, China-U.S.
relations should improve.” Shortly after President Clinton was elected, Chi-
nese president Jiang Zemin put forward a 16-character principle in guiding
China’s relations with the United States: “increasing trust, reducing trouble,
developing cooperation, and avoiding confrontation.” In the mid-1990s when
China-U.S. relations were beset by the serious Taiwan Straits crisis, Premier
Li Peng told former U.S. president Bush that “China is willing to maintain at
least normal state-to-state relations with the United States. It of course will be
better if the two countries can develop their friendly cooperation.”22
Virtually all Chinese scholars in the sample shared the same opinion.
Though Chinese authors had different opinions as to whether the United
States actually practiced engagement or containment toward China, all of
them prefered engagement to containment. One author argued that the United
States’ engagement policy had positive implications since “it leaves more
room for the development of China-U.S. relations.”23 Another mentioned that
China’s modernization depended on integration with the international com-
munity, and the Chinese government had realized that China should “shift
from a challenger to cooperator” in its relations with the current international
regimes.24 The United States’ engagement policy aimed at integrating China
into the international community therefore was welcome.
Engagement was the mainstream preference in the United States. Chinese
scholars were aware of two schools in the United States regarding its China
policy, the engagement school and the containment school. The two schools
had been locked in intense debates for an extended period until finally, around
1996–1997, after the relaxation of the Taiwan Straits crisis in March 1996,
perhaps with Clinton-Jiang Seattle summit as the landmark, the engagement
school emerged victorious and became, in Chinese eyes, the dominant school
in the United States’ China policy decision making.
The following, according to Chinese scholars, were manifestations that
engagement had become the dominant school: frequent speeches by U.S.
decision makers advocating engagement, the United States’ actual policy of
engagement toward China, major decision makers in the Clinton administra-
tion supporting engagement, and the support of most former U.S. presidents,
former cabinet ministers, etc. Chinese authors believed that engagement had
won not only the support of the Democrats, who controlled the White House,
but also the support of the Republicans, who controlled Congress. They were
pleased that as the 1990s progressed, China MFN, and later PNTR, won more
and more support in the United States, especially in Congress. They pointed
out that engagement was also the dominant school in U.S. academia and
among American opinion leaders.
As Chinese authors believed that the engagement policy was guided by
realism, and as engagement had become the mainstream position in the
United States, they argued that this position would not easily change. No mat-
ter who is elected in the future, engagement would survive the United States’
presidential elections. It was so in 1996, and again in 2000.25
For Campaign 2000, if Gore was elected, Chinese scholars had confidence
that he would carry on Clinton’s engagement policy with China. Though
Bush in his presidential campaign used “competitor” to describe China,
78 Chapter 4
Chinese authors still argued against excessive pessimism. One author claimed
that even though “Bush is not friendly toward China during his campaign, he
definitely is not hostile to China either.” Besides, even during his campaign
Bush was positive on some of the most important indicators of engagement,
such as supporting China’s membership in the WTO, supporting China
PNTR, and regarding it important to maintain the engagement policy toward
China. Chinese scholars perceived George W. Bush’s hard-line position
toward China during the presidential campaign as more serving his campaign
needs than serving the United States’ interest, and they therefore predicted
that after he assumed office in the White House, Bush would return to the
basic framework of the late 1990s’ China policy.26
A lot of Chinese authors largely agreed that the United States had a benign
intention in its China policy. They were pleased with the United States’
announcement that a stable, open, and successful China conformed to the
United States’ national interest,27 that the United States wished to maintain
friendly relations with a powerful, stable, prosperous and open China,28 and
that it was “more beneficial to the United States for China to succeed in
its reform than to fail.”29 They cited approvingly the speeches of President
Clinton and other senior U.S. officials, such as James Sasser, that an isolated
China was unfavorable to the United States and a China which played an
appropriate role in the world was good for the United States.30 Though some
scholars pointed out that U.S.-China relations would improve only when
China was weak, a lot of Chinese scholars insisted that it was the growth
of the Chinese economy and comprehensive national power that helped the
United States to adopt an engagement policy.31
Human Rights Disputes under Control

The United States’ human rights policy toward China had been in a state of
constant evolution during the 1990s. When Clinton first assumed office in the
early 1990s, there had been serious disputes between the two countries over
human rights. In 1993, President Clinton announced the linking of China’s
MFN status with human rights for the following year, an approach softer than
what he advocated during the presidential campaign but nonetheless arous-
ing significant controversy. According to Chinese scholars, many American
strategists, scholars, and businessmen, as well as almost all countries in Asia,
strongly opposed the linkage policy.
In May 1994, Clinton finally decided to de-link human rights and MFN.
After that, in Chinese eyes, the status of human rights in the United States’
China policy steadily declined and economic interest had become one of its
major foundations. Toward the end of the 1990s, China-U.S. confrontation

over human rights was significantly relaxed. In October 1997 during talks
with President Jiang, President Clinton for the first time said that he had an
understanding of China’s perspective that the stability of domestic politics
and the rights to development were primary human rights. The United States
consequently adopted a less confrontational approach in promoting human
rights in China. The two countries agreed to “open dialogue over China’s
human rights, and establish a private human rights forum.” In 1998, the U.S.
State Department’s human rights report for the first time praised China for
improvement. In March 1998, the United States for the first time in the 1990s
gave up its hard-line policy against China in the UN Human Rights Com-
mission. It neither initiated nor endorsed an anti-China bill in the Commis-
sion. The United States also adopted a more acceptable approach to promote
China’s human rights, such as exporting the United States’ human rights
ideal through the increase of bilateral economic interactions and making sure
that human rights disputes would not spill over to affect overall bilateral
relations. China in its turn made quite a few human rights concessions to
the United States. For instance, during President Jiang’s visit to the United
States, China signed the first UN human rights convention, and said it would
consider signing the second human rights convention. The Chinese govern-
ment also released some prominent dissidents in response to the United
States’ appeal.32
In spite of relaxation over human rights toward the end of the 1990s,
Chinese authors continued regarding the human rights issue as one of the
serious sources of contention between the United States and China. During
Campaign 2000, China’s scholars were still concerned that Gore as Clinton’s
possible successor might keep on pressuring China over human rights.33
In my opinion, even though human rights during the 1990s caused sig-
nificant upheavals in China-U.S. relations, the United States’ human rights
policy by the end of the 1990s was no longer a serious threat to China, as the
United States had largely given up its hard-line policy and adopted a more
acceptable approach. To some extent, if the United States handled bilateral
differences over human rights with deftness, and tried to promote China’s
human rights in a way that would convince China that the United States
meant only to help China rather than to humiliate China and to cause troubles
to China’s government and disrupt China’s social stability, the United States’
human rights policy should not be regarded as a threat to China but should
perhaps even be regarded as an opportunity to China, since admittedly,
China’s human rights conditions were not quite satisfactory, and improve-
ment in this respect was desirable.
80 Chapter 4
OPPORTUNITY TO CHINA’S ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
Complementarity
In talking about China-U.S. economic relations, Chinese authors often men-
tioned the strong structural complementarities between the two countries’
economies. They argued that the two countries had comparative advantages
in different areas, and economic cooperation would greatly benefit both of
them. Chinese authors often summarized the extensive complementarities
between the two countries by saying that the United States was the larg-
est developed country in the world while China was the largest developing
country, and there was therefore a great potential for economic and trade
cooperation between them. Because of the strong complementarities, some
scholars suggested that China in fact was one of the most ideal partners for
the United States.
According to Chinese scholars, the United States’ comparative advantages
were its capital, technology, and management skills, but labor costs in the
United States were too high. China’s comparative advantages were its cheap
and high-quality labor, and its natural resources, but China was short on capi-
tal and advanced technology. Both the United States and China had a huge
market, but as the two markets were vastly different, they might still comple-
ment each other. The U.S. market was considered highly important to China,
and the Chinese market was considered very important to the United States.
Different from the United States’ economic relations with Europe and
Japan, China-U.S. economic interactions were being conducted on two dif-
ferent levels, and there were therefore “only complementarities and basi-
cally no competition between the two economies.” The United States had
high-tech products, while China was a huge market for high-tech products.
For instance, transportation, energy, communications, etc. were the United
States’ comparative advantage while China’s huge market for infrastruc-
tural construction was China’s comparative advantage. China’s imports of
high-tech products from the United States contributed greatly to “the United
States’ structural adjustment and to the maintenance of the United States’
competitiveness in the high-tech area.” China had a large quantity of inex-
pensive consumer products, and the United States had a huge market for such
products. For instance, China made low-tech products such as “toys, shoes,
and electronic products, which the United States almost no longer produces,”
and the United States had a huge market for such products. Around early
1995, “over 40 percent of toys in the U.S. market were made in China, total-
ing about 4.7 billion U.S. dollars.”34
Chinese authors were pleased that the increased economic interactions
between the two countries had deepened their complementarities and
interdependence. They argued that once the United States’ comparative

advantage was fully combined with China’s, the two countries would both
benefit tremendously. And they said many people in U.S. business circles
shared the same opinion.35
Chinese authors also acknowledged that the interdependence between the
United States and China was asymmetrical. They accepted that the United
States’ market was more important to China than China’s to the United
States. China’s heavy dependence on the United States’ market could be
demonstrated by the fact that about one-fifth (China’s statistics before Hong
Kong’s return to China) or one-third (the United States’ statistics) of China’s
exports in 1996 went to the U.S. market, and ending China MFN would “cost
the jobs of millions of (Chinese) workers.” Some Chinese scholars therefore
candidly admitted that “China is much more dependent on the United States’
market than the United States on China’s.” One scholar, however, disagreed.
He suggested that as the United States needed to “compete economically with
Europe and Japan,” China was also very important to the United States and
that the idea that “China needs the United States more than the United States
needs China” was no longer true.36
Investment
Investments from the United States were considered very helpful to China’s
modernization. In order to attract foreign investments, the Chinese govern-
ment tried hard to improve the investment environment. When China made
big concessions to the United States concerning intellectual property rights
protection, Chinese scholars justified the concessions by arguing that it
helped to attract more foreign investments.37
Since 1992, direct U.S. investments in China had kept increasing, often
by leaps and bounds. Around the end of 1992, “some 1,000 U.S. companies
made investments in China totaling over 4 billion U.S. dollars.” Around the
end of 1993, in the city of Shanghai alone, “there were over 80 transnational
companies from the United States.” By the end of 1994, U.S. investment
in China reached over 16,000 projects, “with the cumulative investment of
7 billion U.S. dollars.” Around 1995, the United States had “over 8,500
investment projects in China totaling over 10 billion U.S. dollars.” And in
1996, some 50–100 out of the 500 largest U.S. businesses had made invest-
ments in China. “By the end of 1996, real U.S. investments in China had
reached 14.3 billion U.S. dollars.”38
Chinese scholars generally agreed that the United States was one of the
largest investors in China. By the end of 1994, the United States was con-
sidered the third largest investor in the Chinese mainland, behind only Hong
Kong and Taiwan. By the end of 1996, the United States was second in
82 Chapter 4
foreign investment in China. By 1998, the United States had become the big-
gest foreign investor in China. And in early 2000, the United States remained
the largest foreign investor in China.
Besides investments in the Chinese mainland, the United States also had
large investments in Hong Kong. In the early 1990s, “U.S. investments
in Hong Kong were around 7 billion U.S. dollars, and most investments
were relevant with China trade.” “By the end of 1996, U.S. investments in
Hong Kong reached over 14 billion, employing 250,000 Hong Kong people,
accounting for one-tenth of the Hong Kong labor force.” In the late 1990s
around 37,000 Americans lived in Hong Kong.39
Besides their large amount and rapid development, U.S. investments in
China were also notable for some other features. They “cover broad sectors
and are high in technology.” In the beginning, they concentrated mainly in
big cities and coastal areas, but in 1992 they began to spread out to areas all
over China, and from service industry to manufacturing industry. The biggest
U.S. companies cover “26 sectors such as agriculture, light industry, food,
textile machinery electronics,” etc.40
U.S. businesses had been described as having high confidence in the Chi-
nese market, and were especially active in making investments in China. In
1994–1995, Chinese scholars cited the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s investi-
gation of 1,069 big companies to the effect that “63 percent of those that had
not yet made investments in China intend to take action in the next five years,
and 89 percent of those having already made investments in China intended to
enlarge production and reinvestment in the next five years.” American inves-
tors were especially interested in investments in China’s infrastructure such as
“electricity, telecommunication system, ports, railway, airport, etc.”41
The U.S. government sometimes had been described as playing a positive
role in promoting American investments in China. For several years, the
United States’ Department of Commerce “listed China as No. 1 among the
ten emerging markets in the world,” and wished that American companies
“can be a winner in the competition for China’s market.” The importance of
the Chinese market to the United States was occasionally described as affect-
ing to a large extent whether U.S. economy would be successful.42
Even though the United States was considered one of the largest investors
in China, quite a few Chinese scholars complained that U.S. investments
in China were still too little, and the increase too slow, because the United
States’ actual investments in China were considered by far incompatible with
its huge investment capability. During the 1979–1992 period, “big U.S. trans-
national companies’ investments in China accounted for less than 1 percent
of their overall overseas investments in 1992.”43 In 1992, direct investments
in China by the U.S. manufacturing industry accounted for only 0.14 percent
of its overall foreign direct investment. This figure rose very slowly in 1995
to 0.4 percent, and in 1996 to 0.55 percent.
Chinese scholars typically described China as an attractive locus for for-
eign investments. They pointed out that 64 percent of British transnational
companies intended to make or to increase investments in China, 80 percent
of Japanese investors regarded their investments in China as successful, and
almost all U.S. businesses regarded China as an ideal locus of investment.
They claimed that making investments in China was more profitable than
elsewhere. Important reasons why China was a good place for investment
included the following: its high GDP growth rate, high foreign trade growth
rate, and its huge market with over 1.2 billion consumers, in addition to low
labor costs and preferential treatment for foreign businesses. China’s invest-
ment in infrastructure, 1,000 billion U.S. dollars in 1998–2000, was consid-
ered highly attractive to Europe and the United States. With the continued
development of China’s economy, the passage of China PNTR, China’s entry
into the WTO, and China’s efforts to protect intellectual property rights,
Chinese authors were quite optimistic that China in future would provide an
even bigger and better market for investments from the United States and
other countries.44
Trade
All Chinese observers agreed that the United States was one of China’s major
trading partners. When Hong Kong was considered as an external economic
entity, especially before its return to China in July 1997, the United States
was often considered as either the second or the third most important trad-
ing partner to China. As Hong Kong was a part of China though enjoying a
special status, the United States therefore was usually either the first or the
second trading partner to China. All Chinese scholars agreed that China-U.S.
trade had developed rapidly. According to Chinese statistics, “in the 1990–
1997 period, the average annual China-U.S. trade growth rate had been 22.6
percent, surpassing the annual growth rate of 15.9 percent, which had been
China’s overall foreign trade growth rate. According to U.S. statistics, in the
1990s, the average annual U.S.-China trade growth rate was 16 percent, sur-
passing the United States’ annual trade growth rate with Asia of 11 percent,
and its annual growth rate of 7 percent in its trade with other regions in the
world.” Other scholars reported different growth rates for different years dur-
ing the 1990s, but all data were impressive, with the highest annual growth
rate being 28 percent, and the lowest over 16 percent.45
In terms of the absolute amount, in 1979, bilateral trade was a measly
2.45 billion U.S. dollars. As late as in 1990, China-U.S. trade was still quite
84 Chapter 4
modest (19.9 billion—U.S. statistics), accounting only for 2 percent of the

United States’ foreign trade. In 1992, it surpassed $25 billion. In 1994, it
reached $35.4 billion. The bilateral trade was 40.8 billion U.S. dollars in
1995. “According to U.S. statistics, during the first Clinton administration,
the volume of China-U.S. trade increased from over 34 billion to over 63 bil-
lion U.S. dollars.” Chinese scholars were optimistic about the continued sub-
stantial growth of China-U.S. trade in the years to come. One author expected
that in about 25 years, China-U.S. economic and trade relations would “sur-
pass U.S.-Japan economic relations and become the most important bilateral
economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region.”46
Technology
Many Chinese authors mentioned that technology was an important area of
cooperation between the United States and China. As a developing country
trying to improve the economic well-being of its people, China was very
much interested in science and technology from the West, especially from
the United States. The United States was perceived as representing the pin-
nacle of human achievements in science and technology, and one Chinese
author argued that “for this reason alone, China should try to reach a his-
torical reconciliation with the United States.”47 One reason why China was
particularly interested in U.S. investments was that they were generally high
in technology.
Chinese authors deplored the U.S. government’s imposition of severe
restrictions on technology exports to China. They argued that restrictions
of this kind not only hurt China’s interests, but also the United States’. One
way it hurt the United States was that it weakened its competitiveness in
technology trade and enlarged its deficit with China. In 1998, for instance,
the United States exported only $8.9 billion of electronic products to China,
much less than Japan ($15.1 billion) and the EU ($14.8 billion), though Japan
and the EU were less competitive than the United States in this area. One
Chinese author argued that “if the United States increases the proportion of
technology exports to China to the normal ratio of such products in its overall
exports, the United States not only could make significant profit from such
trade, but it could also greatly reduce the deficit in the China-U.S. bilateral
trade.” American business circles were said by Chinese authors to realize
the negative effects of the United States’ over-sensitivity in technology trade
with China and complain about it. One technology transfer association in the
United States exclaimed that Congress’s investigation centering on the Cox
Report would bring disastrous consequences for U.S. exporters. As China
was one of the largest importers of technology, U.S.-China cooperation in
technology would not only fulfill China’s needs for modernization but it
would also serve the United States’ interest. In the case of technology trade,
for instance, “the United States currently has about 100 nuclear reactors
generating about 19 percent of its electricity, and it has no more plans for
additional nuclear stations,” but China intended to greatly increase its nuclear
electricity capacity. It meant that in the next 25 years, “U.S. exports to China
in commercial technology and relevant equipment will potentially reach 50 to
60 billion U.S. dollars . . . The U.S. (nuclear technology) suppliers can annu-
ally export to China 1.6 billion dollars, which alone, will provide 25,000 high
tech jobs for the United States.” In technology cooperation, China sometimes
could be the provider. Cooperation in satellite launching was a case in point.
“Launching one pound in the United States would cost 10,000 to 12,000 U.S.
dollars, while China charged only 4,000 to 5,000 U.S. dollars.” According
to one estimate, “in the next ten years, the United States will launch 1,200
commercial satellites, but the United States’ launching capability cannot meet
the need. Therefore, China-U.S. cooperation in this area alone will bring rich
benefits to both countries.”48
In spite of the United States’ restrictions, there still had been some coop-
eration in this area, and the U.S. government sometimes slightly relaxed its
restrictions on high-technology cooperation with China. As China-U.S. tech-
nology exchanges and cooperation conformed to the fundamental interests of
the two countries and the two peoples, some Chinese authors were optimistic
about the prospects for greater bilateral cooperation in this area.
Intellectual Property Rights

It took a long time for China and the United States to negotiate several
interim agreements and reach a final agreement concerning intellectual
property rights. Even though Chinese authors complained a lot in the process
about the United States’ tough demands, they seemed to be satisfied with the
final outcome, regarding it as a win-win conclusion capable of contributing
to the further development of bilateral economic relations.
The WTO and PNTR

WTO negotiations between the United States and China had been long and
difficult because the two countries had a lot of differences. The 13 years of
negotiation seemed to be a period in which the United States incessantly
made more and more demands on China, and China after stiff resistance
invariably backed down. But the United States turned out to be indeed sup-
portive of China’s WTO membership, and the two countries made slow but
86 Chapter 4
steady progress toward agreement. In November 15, 1999, the two countries
finally made a landmark breakthrough and reached a final agreement. In spite
of the abundance of their complaints during the negotiations, Chinese authors
again regarded the final agreement as a win-win solution for both countries.
They expected that China’s membership in the WTO would stimulate China’s
economic development.
After China made big concessions to the United States, the United States
agreed to grant China the PNTR. Chinese authors appreciated the fact that the
executive branch of the U.S. government strongly supported China’s PNTR
status. They noticed that even George W. Bush, who was perceived as less
friendly to China during his presidential campaign, supported it.
In the U.S. Congress, the China PNTR bill was passed by a wide margin
first by the House (237 to 197) and then by the Senate (83 to 15). The govern-
ments of both the United States and China welcomed the passage, regarding it
as consolidating U.S.-China relations. Chinese authors generally regarded this
passage as capable of comprehensively improving the bilateral relations.
OPPORTUNITY TO CHINA’S NATIONAL PRESTIGE
The United States Could Help Enhance China’s Status

Though somewhat resentful of the United States’ manipulation of world
affairs, especially its intervention in China’s internal affairs, Chinese authors
nonetheless recognized the status of the United States as the sole superpower,
and recognized that the United States’ approval and endorsement were one
way for China to enhance its international status. They wished that the United
States would respect China’s dignity more. Mutual criticism according to
them was justified and necessary, but “should not be done in an arrogant and
supercilious way.”49
They were glad that more and more people in the United States agreed
that “China is a big country with a population of 1.2 billion, and should be
accorded sufficient respect, and its importance recognized,” that quite a few
influential U.S. leaders and scholars supported enhancing China’s status in
the world, and that the United States often said that it would “treat China
as an equal” and would encourage China to “play an appropriate role in the
world.” They were glad to point out that the United States often indicated that
it “will not only ask China to abide by international rules and regulations, but
will also encourage China to participate in the formulation of those rules and
regulations.” The successful conclusion of the WTO negotiations between
the United States and China was one case in point. China expected that par-
ticipation in formulating WTO rules would “enhance China’s status in the
international community.” As a result of benign interactions between the two

countries, Chinese authors noticed that for China to behave in a responsible
way would win the United States’ appreciation and enhance China’s weight
and status in international affairs. Chinese authors often mentioned its more
or less altruistic approach toward the Asian financial crisis around 1997–
1998, and how the United States regarded it as an indication of China’s being
a responsible country. In this instance, China’s insistence on not devaluing its
currency reputedly contributed greatly to the control of the financial crisis in
Southeast Asia.50
Media Could Be Positive

The image of U.S. media in the sample was not uniformly negative. After
the steep setback in the late 1980s/early 1990s, U.S. media gradually became
more positive about China, concurrent with the slight improvement of U.S.-
China relations in general. After the Taiwan Straits crisis in the mid-1990s,
U.S. media were described as urging the U.S. government to adjust its China
policy. Opinion leaders in the United States used the media to advocate the
improvement of U.S.-China relations. Most of the positive presentations
of U.S. media in the sample occurred around President Jiang’s visit to the
United States in 1997, and President Clinton’s return visit in 1998. President
Clinton’s visit was presented as particularly helpful in turning U.S. media
in a positive direction with regard to China, as he brought with him a large
number of U.S. correspondents, trying to present a new image of China to
the American public. And U.S. media responded enthusiastically, running
intensive and positive reports of this visit, and demonstrated significant opti-
mism about U.S.-China relations. In the period leading to the passage of the
China PNTR, U.S. media were again portrayed as playing a positive role,
some urging the Congress to adopt the right approach: approving it as soon
as possible. The positive portrayal of China in U.S. media was perceived as
“contributing to the American people’s understanding of China,” and creating
“a favorable environment for the implementation of the policy of engagement
with China.”51
OPPORTUNITY TO CHINA’S FAVORED WORLD ORDER
Allies in Maintaining World and Regional Peace

Chinese authors proclaimed that peace and development were the themes
of the new era, and “the formulation of foreign strategy in both China and
the United States cannot deviate from this theme.”52 Most Chinese authors
88 Chapter 4
believed that world peace was beneficial to both the United States and China.
Both countries had made commitments to world peace and stability. Main-
taining world and regional peace and stability was therefore perceived as
one important common interest between the two countries. Some Chinese
scholars identified maintaining world peace as the biggest common interest
between the United States and China. In this respect, Chinese scholars per-
ceived a great potential for cooperation between the two countries.
They argued that favorable bilateral relations between the United States
and China were good for the world, since their peaceful coexistence was
a prerequisite for world peace. World peace and security therefore were
perceived as an important new foundation stone of bilateral relations. The
reasons why good relations between the two countries were important to the
world were that both countries were permanent members of UN Security
Council, and both were big countries with great influence in world affairs.
Consequently, Chinese scholars perceived not only common interests for the
two countries in maintaining peace and stability in the world and the region,
but also an obligation for the two countries to do so. One of the most forceful
arguments ran like this: “China and the United States as permanent members
of the UN Security Council and two big countries in the world, in quite a
few international issues they shoulder responsibility and play an important
role. For peace and development in the world, China and the United States
have the opportunity, conditions, responsibility, and obligation to engage in
dialogue and consultation regarding a lot of international issues.”53
According to Chinese scholars, in order to maintain world peace and stabil-
ity, the United States and China already had shown serious co-operation, for
instance, about the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the South Asia nuclear
crisis. The constructive strategic partnership facing the 21st century between
the United States under the Clinton administration and China under Jiang
Zemin was a serious attempt by the two countries to manage their bilateral
relations in the interest of maintaining peace and stability in the world.54
The United States’ Role in World Politics

Regarding the United States’ role in international politics, Chinese authors
differentiated between two concepts: dominant status and hegemonism.
Chinese authors accepted the United States’ dominant status in world affairs,
but opposed the United States’ so-called hegemonism and power politics.
They favored a multi-polar world order, but at the same time acknowledged
that it would take a long time to achieve. Chinese authors recognized that
for a long time to come the United States would remain the most powerful
country in the world in terms of CNP (comprehensive national power). They
accepted that the United States played a very important role in promoting
peace, stability, and prosperity in the world. They pointed out, with approval
bordering on admiration, that “it was the United States that played a leading
role in defeating the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and in bringing Israel/Palestine
and Bosnia/Herzegovina to the negotiating table.” Even one of the staunch-
est nationalists in the sample, Chu Shulong, expressed appreciation for the
United States’ role in the Middle East peace process. They at the same time
had reservations regarding a unipolar world order because they were not
comfortable with the United States’ presumed monopoly of world affairs, its
“self-proclaimed role as the world policeman, its habit of using U.S. domestic
law as international law, and forcing other countries to submit to the United
States’ will.” They argued that the United States should do unto others what
the United States itself would like done unto it.55 But they also recognized
that “the United States is not like other dominant powers in history, since the
United States attaches extreme importance to regulations and procedure.”
Chinese authors appreciate that “the United States would rather try to co-opt
other countries by resorting to apparently universal values than pressure them
with brute force.”56
Though China opposed a unipolar world order, Chinese authors regarded
the difference between the United States and China in this regard “not as a
conflict or confrontation of the two countries’ national strategies but rather
as the differences between the United States and China in ideal, ideology,
hope, and principle.”57 They insisted that “China favors multipolarization
only in theory, but in practice, in its relations with the United States,” China
recognized the United States’ superpower status, and regarded China itself as
only one of several secondary powers.
As for the United States’ military presence in Asia, its military alliance
with Japan, and the TMD, again, one of the staunchest nationalists in the
sample, Chu Shulong, believed that China’s position would be more moderate
if the United States was “not targeting China and not trying to intervene in
China’s internal affairs, and violating China’s independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity.” He also explained that “China’s opposition to any power
stationing troops abroad does not mean that China would try hard to push the
United States out of Asia.”58 Another scholar proclaimed that “China has no
intention of challenging the United States’ global strategic interests, but the
United States should fully respect China’s strategic interests.” He suggested
that “China-U.S. relations should be based on mutual respect, mutual trust,
and mutual interest.”59 Yet another scholar revealed that “some people in Bei-
jing even recognize the positive aspect of the United States’ military presence
in Asia,”60 perhaps referring to the United States’ role in containing possible
Japanese militarism. Regarding security in the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese
90 Chapter 4
authors argued that cooperation with the United States rather than confronta-
tion was a better way for China to play a greater role in this region.
One Chinese author expounded at length that China and the United States
should both accept and support international norms, and by doing so foster a
certain kind of collective identity, against threats facing normal states such as
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, “international crime, drug trafficking,
illegal immigration, international terrorism, and environmental pollution.”
According to this scholar, China in the 1990s had already tried hard to par-
ticipate in various kinds of international arrangements.61
BALANCING THE PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND

OPPORTUNITY
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate that Chinese scholars perceived both threat and
opportunity from the United States. One important question is whether the
United States presented more a threat or more an opportunity to China. Natu-
rally, different people respond to threat and opportunity differently. In the fol-
lowing I will present my position regarding this question from the perspective
of a Chinese person who has closely monitored U.S.-China relations.
National Security
In terms of China’s national security, let us first explore the extent of the
American threat to China. Chinese authors repeatedly argued that the most
serious problem between the United States and China was the Taiwan prob-
lem. We could therefore conclude that the most serious threat from the United
States, according to Chinese authors, was its role in frustrating China’s goals
with regard to Taiwan. Reunification with Taiwan under a one-country,
two-system formula (in which Taiwan would enjoy much greater autonomy
than Hong Kong, including military autonomy) could serve the following
purposes for China. First, it would improve China’s security environment,
ensuring that Taiwan would not be used as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”
against China. Second, it would satisfy China’s desire of ending its history
of national humiliation at the hands of foreign powers beginning in the mid-
19th century. On the other hand, Taiwan’s current status might also bring
tangible benefits to China, especially to the current Chinese government.
First, Taiwan’s current status contributed to China’s internal stability, as it
reinforced the Chinese government’s image as the representative of China’s
national interest (Interestingly, decades of U.S. efforts resulted in the percep-
tion by many Chinese in the late 1980s that the United States was more rep-
resentative of Chinese people’s interest than the Chinese government. Such
a perception led to the 1989 democracy movement, which almost toppled

the Chinese government.) Second, Taiwan’s economic and political success
provided an incentive for China to catch up. Third, Taiwan’s current status
helped stimulate greater efforts on the part of Chinese to strengthen their
country. Reunification with Taiwan economically was not very meaningful
to the Chinese mainland, as Taiwan was already one of China’s major inves-
tors and major trade partners. The temporary separation of Taiwan and the
Chinese mainland therefore did not represent a very serious threat to China,
so long as Taiwan was not moving further away from China’s orbit. But of
course, if Taiwan were in the near future to be fully incorporated into China,
things would be different. In that case, China’s comprehensive national power
would be enhanced with the addition of Taiwan’s wealth (but with China’s
continued development, Taiwan would soon no longer be valued mainly as
an economic powerhouse). As this scenario was unrealistic in the foreseeable
future, and China’s goal for a long time to come remained the unification of
Taiwan under the one-country, two-system formula, the threat to China of the
United States’ role regarding Taiwan could now be seen as moderate. Other
aspects of the perceived threat from the United States to China’s national
security could be determined accordingly.
How to determine the extent of the Chinese perception of opportunity
from the United States in terms of the national security? As China is a very
poor country in terms of per capita GDP, for a very long time to come, both
the Chinese government and the Chinese people will be preoccupied with
economic development and the improvement of people’s living standards.
A peaceful environment in which China is able to remain focused on eco-
nomic development therefore conforms to China’s greatest national inter-
est. The United States as the sole superpower which remains committed to
peace therefore means the greatest opportunity to China. The United States’
engagement policy toward China ensures peace between the two countries,
and the United States’ role in suppressing Japanese militarism further reduces
China’s concern for its national security. As a peaceful environment is more
important for China than the resumption of control over the tiny Taiwan,
even with other nuisances between the two countries (such as the perception
of encirclement of China, etc.), it is perhaps reasonable to say that in terms
of national security, the United States represents more of an opportunity than
a threat to China.
Political System and Internal Stability

Regarding China’s political system and internal stability, in the 1990s, there
were constant disputes between the two countries over China’s human rights
record, causing China severe headache. At one time, it seemed that the
92 Chapter 4
Chinese were concerned that the United States’ human rights offensive would
cause the country’s collapse just like the former USSR. The threat from
the United States during the first Clinton administration regarding China’s
political system and internal stability was substantial. After de-linking human
rights and the MFN, and with the passage of the China PNTR, it seemed that
human rights no longer occupied a prominent position in the United States’
China policy, and the United States’ threat to China was in this respect greatly
decreased. On the positive side, over one century, the Chinese on and off
regarded the United States as a model of democracy. As demonstrated in
Chapter 7, the Chinese in recent years again accepted the American political
model as admirable. Democratization in China therefore would just be a mat-
ter of when and how but not whether. If the United States was able to handle
human rights disputes with China in a more pleasant way, taking into con-
sideration Chinese people’s sentiments and the predominant concern of the
Chinese people in the present to maintain political stability for the purpose
of economic development and improving people’s living standards, with the
exemplary role of the United States’ political system, and the United States’
gentle prodding for China to move toward political liberalization, the United
States would mean more an opportunity than a threat to China in this issue
area. It seems that the United States’ treatment of human rights under both
the second Clinton administration and the George W. Bush administration
was much more acceptable to the Chinese people than during the first Clinton
administration. On the whole, I would rate more threat than opportunity to
China during the first Clinton administration in this issue area and perhaps
more opportunity than threat since the late 1990s.
Economic Well-Being
In terms of economic development, on the positive side, the United States
is one of China’s major trade partners, investors, and sources of technology
and management skills. Even though the United States probably was not
indispensable to China’s economic development, as evidenced by the non-
productive sanctions in the several years following the Tiananmen tragedy
in 1989, the United States did contribute importantly to China’s economic
growth. On the negative side, U.S. “troublemaking” in the 1990s regarding
China’s economic development, such as the constant disputes and troubles
over intellectual property rights, the MFN, and China’s WTO membership,
did indeed cause China no small amount of headache. But troubles of this
kind meant only a reduction in the substantial benefits China enjoyed from
its economic relations with the United States. Toward the end of the 1990s,
serious economic and trade problems between the two countries had been
solved one after another, and Chinese scholars generally are satisfied with the
solutions and regard them as win-win games between the two countries. We
may conclude therefore that in terms of U.S.-China economic relations, the
United States offered substantial opportunity and little threat to China.
National Prestige
As for China’s national prestige, the United States as the sole superpower was
in a position to either enhance China’s status or lower it. In the 1990s, the
U.S. media constantly criticized China, the U.S. Congress “brought China to
trial” every year over MFN, the United States year in year out tried to con-
demn China in the UN Human Rights Commission, and the United States
contributed to the defeat of China’s bid to hold the 2000 Olympic Games.
All these actions, according to Chinese authors, severely impaired China’s
national prestige. But in the late 1990s, the United States decided tentatively
to establish a strategic partnership with China, and to facilitate China’s entry
into the world community. In this golden era of the U.S.-China relationship,
U.S. media ran articles touting the importance of the bilateral relations, and
China’s progress in economic reform and human rights; the U.S. Congress
discontinued the annual ritual of China bashing; and the UN Human Rights
Commission ceased to be a forum for castigating China. Chinese authors
were pleased with the enhancement of their country’s national prestige as a
result. Shortly afterwards, China won the opportunity to host the 2008 Olym-
pic Games, and the United States did not resist China’s bid. We may conclude
therefore that with regard to China’s national prestige, for most of the 1990s,
the United States was more a threat than an opportunity to China, but in the
late 1990s, it was more an opportunity than a threat to China.
World Order
With regard to China’s preferred world order, the majority of Chinese schol-
ars regarded the United States as wanting to create a unipolar world system,
though some Chinese scholars regarded multi-polarity of a certain kind as
serving the United States’ interests. As China, like other countries, valued
sovereignty and independence, it was understandable that China preferred
a multi-polar world order. The United States’ presumed pursuit of a unipo-
lar world order, should it be true, would constitute more or less a threat to
China’s preferred world order. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, sus-
tained peace in the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, conformed
to China’s greatest interest. In this respect, the United States, which was
perceived by Chinese authors in the 1990s as committed to peace, constituted
94 Chapter 4
Table 4.2 Balancing Perceptions of Threat and Opportunity to China

Categories of Interest Balancing Perceptions of Threat and Opportunity

National security Perhaps more opportunity than threat
More threat than opportunity during the first Clinton
Political system and
administration, but perhaps more opportunity than threat
internal stability
since the late 1990s
Economic well-being Definitely much more opportunity than threat
More threat than opportunity during most of the 1990s, but
National prestige
more opportunity than threat in the late 1990s
Preferred world order Perhaps more opportunity than threat
an opportunity for China. If the United States decided to pursue its presumed
unipolar agenda regarding world order vigorously through military force,
especially in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States in this respect perhaps
would constitute more a threat than an opportunity tp China. If the United
States on the other hand pursued its foreign policy goals through peaceful
means, taking into consideration China’s strategic interests, it would be seen
as more an opportunity than a threat to China.
I would conclude that the United States in the 1990s on the whole consti-
tuted more an opportunity than a threat to China (see Table 4.3).
Notes
1. Richard K. Herrmann et al., International Studies Quarterly, 1997, p. 409.

2. Zhang Minqian, “Meiguo Duiwai Zhengce Waijiao·Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The
United States’ Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and China-U.S. Relations], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (October 1993), p. 61; Zhuang Qubing, “Tuijian Yiben Haoshu—Meiguo
dui Hua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti: Duhou” [Recommending a Good Book: Reading
the United States’ China Policy and the Taiwan Problem], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao
(Spring 1999), p. 46; Fang Zhou, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce ji qi Zouxiang” [The
United States’ China Policy and Its Future Trend], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January
1993), p. 35; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi Xianzhuang: Gongtong
Liyi yu Zhengzhi” [An Appraisal of Post–Cold War Sino-U.S. Relations: Common
Interests and Disputes], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1995), p. 42; Xiong Zhiyong, “Meiguo
dui Hua Zhengce Jichu de Yanbian ji Qianjing” [The Evolution and Prospect of the
Foundation of the United States’ China Policy], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn
1992), p. 52. (no quotation marks here because of translation from English to Chinese
and then to English).
3. Fang Zhou, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 35; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de
Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 42–43; Gao E, “Zhong Mei Ri Sanbian Guanxi de Xian-
zhuang yu Wenti” [The Current Status and Problems in China-U.S.-Japan Relations],
Zhanlue yu Guanli (November/December 1994), p. 75; Zheng Baoguo, “Lengzhan
hou de Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce”[The United States’ China Policy in the Post–Cold
War Era], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (October 1998), p. 30; Wang Shuzhong, “Zouxiang
Xiayige Shiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [China-U.S. Relations toward the Next Cen-
tury], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (December 1994), p. 4.
4. Zhai Xiaomin, “Zhong Mei Zhanlue Guanxi,” p. 35; Qian Wenrong, “Kelindun
Zhizheng hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [China-U.S. Relations after Clinton’s Inaugu-
ration], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February 1993), pp. 61; Zhou Lin, “Zhongmei
Maoyi Guanxi Zhanwang” [The Prospects of China-U.S. Trade Relations], Waijiao
Xueyuan Xuebao (Spring 1997), p. 53; Jiang Lingfei, “Meiguo dui Hua Ezhi Zhan-
lue de Zhiyue Yinsu he Keneng Zouxiang” [The Constraining Factors in the United
States’ Containing China Strategy and Possible Future Trends], Zhanlue yu Guanli
(September/October 1996), p. 48.
5. Chen Demin, “90 Niandai Zhong Mei Guanxi Dongdang ji qi Yuanyin Tanxi”
[The Upheaval in the 1990s’ China-U.S. Relations and Its Causes], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (October 1999), p. 33.
6. Jia Qingguo, “Kelindun Zhizheng Yilai de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The Sino-
U.S. Relationship Since President Clinton Took Office], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer
1998), p. 106; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 43; Yuan Ming
and Fan Shimin, “‘Lengzhan’ hou Meiguo dui Zhongguo (Anquan) Xingxiang de
Renshi” [China’s Security Role in Post–Cold War American Perceptions], Meiguo
Yanjiu (Winter 1995), p. 17; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,”
p. 43.
7. Fang Zhou, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 35; Zhang Yiting, “Kelindun de
‘dui Hua Jiechu’ Zhengce ji qi bu Wendingxing” [Clinton’s “Engagement of China”
Policy and Its Shaky Foundation], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Spring 1997), p. 36;
Yuan Ming and Fan Shimin, “‘Lengzhan’ hou Meiguo,” p. 17; Wang Yanjun, “Cong
Shidai Liyi he Zhengce,” p. 59.
8. Zhang Minqian, “Meiguo Duiwai Zhengce,” p. 61; Su Ge, “Zhong Mei
Guanxi Zonglun,” [On China-U.S. Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Summer
1996), p. 22.
9. Ding Kuisong, “Zongjie Guoqu Mianxiang Weilai: Ping Zhong Mei Guanxi
50 Zhounian” [Reviewing the Past and Looking forward toward the Future], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (October, 1999), p. 4; Wang Jisi, “‘Ezhi’ Haishi ‘Jiaowang’: Ping
Lengzhan hou Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce” [Containment or Engagement: On the
United States’ China Policy in the Post Cold War Era], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Spring
1996), p. 2; Sun Jianhang, “Zhanlue·Liyi·Geju: Lengzhan hou Shijie Geju de Yan-
bian he 90 Niandai Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce de Tiaozheng” [Strategy, Interest, and
Structure: The Evolution of World Structure and the United States’ Adjustment of
Its China Policy in the 1990s], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 2000), pp. 25–26;
Wang Yi, Zhang Jiqiong, Wu Changhua, and He Kebing, “Quanqiu Beijing xia de
96 Chapter 4
Nengyuan yu Huanjing Hezuo: Zhong Mei Guanxi zhong de Zhanlue pai” [Global
Energy and Environment Cooperation: A Strategic Card in China-U.S. Relations],
Zhanlue yu Guanli (November/December 1997), p. 54.
10. Shen Jiru, “Jian Lun Burejinsiji de Xinzhu <<Daqiju.>>: Yi Lun 21 Shiji
de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [A Brief Analysis of Brzezinski’s New Book Grand Chess-
board: A First Analysis of China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (June 1998), p. 37; Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Xinguanxi: Ping
Kelindun Fanghua hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The New Relationship Looking For-
ward to the New Century: On China-U.S. Relationship After Clinton’s China Visit],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), pp. 16–17.
11. Chu Shulong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi, Zhanlue Kuangjia”
[The Strategic Framework of China-U.S. Relations Facing the New Century], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (October 1997), p. 7; Xi Laiwang, “Jianli Mianxiang 21 Shiji de
Zhong Mei Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi” [Establishing the China-U.S. Strategic Partner-
ship Facing the 21st Century], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (November 1997), p. 5; Chu
Shulong, “Zhong Mei dui Guoji Zhanlue Wenti de Kanfa Lichang he Zhuzhang”
[The Opinions, Positions, and Advocacies by China and the United States Regard-
ing International Strategy], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), pp. 50–51; Wang
Haihan, “Dui Dangqian Zhong Mei Guanxi ji qi Fazhan Qianjing de Jidian Kanfa”
[Several Thoughts on Current China-U.S. Relations and the Prospects], Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu (Winter 1998), p. 7; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 43;
Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Xinguanxi,” p. 16.
12. Jia Qingguo, “Kelindun Zhizheng Yilai,” pp. 101–102; Liu Yongtao, “Guifan
Rentong he Zhong Mei Anquan Hezuo Qianjing” [Norm, Identity, and the Prospect
of China-U.S. Security Cooperation], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 1999), p. 36;
Liu Jiangyong, “Kelindun Fanghua yu Zhong Mei Ri Guanxi Xinqushi” [Clinton’s
China Visit and New Trends in China-U.S.-Japan Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(July 1998), p. 3; Chu Shulong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 7; Su
Ge, “Zhong Mei Gaoceng Hufang yu ‘Jianshexing Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi’” [China-
U.S. Mutual Top Level Visit and Constructive Strategic Partnership], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 20; Ma Jiali, “Zhongguo tong Mei E Ri de Guanxi ji qi
dui Nanya de Yingxiang” [China’s Relations with the United States, Russia, and Japan
and the Impact on South Asia], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (April 1998), pp. 22–23.
13. Wang Haihan, “Dui Dangqian Zhong Mei Guanxi ji qi Fazhan Qianjing de
Jidian Kanfa” [Several Thoughts on Current China-U.S. Relations and the Prospects],
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Winter 1998), p. 9.
14. Pan Tongwen, “Zuihuiguo Daiyu yu Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The MFN and
China-U.S. Relations], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Winter 1994), p. 3; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan
hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 43–44; Xu Song, “Shi Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chan-
quan Tanpan ji qi Yingxiang” [A Tentative Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights
Talks between China and the United States and the Impact], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(September 1995), p. 28; Su Ge, “Zhong Mei Guanxi Zonglun,” p. 23; Yu Guobin,
“Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua Zuihuiguo Daiyu zhi Zheng ji Qiangjing Fenxi” [The
United States’ Debates Regarding China MFN and Its Prospects], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (January 1998), p. 68.
15. Xiong Zhiyong, “Meiguo Chuanmei yu Meiguo de dui Hua Zhengce” [U.S.
Media and the United States’ China Policy], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 1998), p. 41;
Xu Song, “Shi Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” p. 28.
16. Pan Tongwen, “Zuihuiguo Daiyu yu Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 3; Zhou Lin,
“Zhongmei Maoyi Guanxi,” p. 52; Zhang Qingmin, “Zhongmei Guanxi zhong de
Meiguo,” p. 23.
17. Wei Wei, “Zhong Mei Maoyi zhong Shuangfang,” pp. 131–132; Xu Song, “Shi
Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” p. 28.
18. Wei Wei, “Zhong Mei Maoyi zhong Shuangfang,” p. 132; Xu Song, “Shi Xi
Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” p. 28.
19. Wei Wei, “Zhong Mei Maoyi zhong Shuangfang,” pp. 132–133.
20. Xu Song, “Shi Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” pp. 28, 31; Chu Shulong,
“Zhong Mei Hezuo yu Fenqi” [China-U.S. Cooperation and Differences], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (June 1998), p. 3; Xi Laiwang, “Cong PNTR Kan Mei dui Hua
Zhengce” [Perceiving the United States’ China Policy from the PNTR], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (October 2000), p. 4.
21. Liu Jiangyong, “Kelindun Fanghua,” p. 5; Liu Jiangyong, “Mei Ri Chongjian
Anquan Tizhi, yu Zhong Mei Ri Guanxi” [The Re-establishment of the U.S.-Japan
Security System and China-U.S.-Japan Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Win-
ter 1996), p. 32; Wu Xinbo, “Mouqiu Zhong Ri Mei Sanbian Guanxi de Pingheng
Fazhan” [Seeking Balanced Development of China-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Relations],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February 1999), p. 21.
22. Xiong Zhiyong, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 49; Wang Yanjun, “Cong
Shidai Liyi he Zhengce,” p. 60; Lu Qichang, “Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce
de Jidian Kanfa” [Several Observations on the United States’ China Policy], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (September 1995), p. 2; Wang Zhihong, “Meiguo Liyi Jituan yu
Zhong Mei Jingji Guanxi” [Interest Groups in the United States and China-U.S.
Economic Relations], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (September 1998), pp. 70–73; Li
Shenzhi, “Zhong Mei Guanxi de Huigu yu Qianzhan” [The Sino-U.S. Relation-
ship in Retrospect and Prospects] Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1997), p. 130; Yuan
Ming and Fan Shimin, “ ‘Lengzhan’ hou Meiguo,” p. 26; Zhao Pingan, Li Xuebao,
and Guo Yuan, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce de Tiaozheng yu Zhong
Mei Guanxi de Zouxiang” [The Adjustment of the United States’ China Policy
and Future Trend of China-U.S. Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn
1996), p. 18; Li Shouyuan, “‘Lengzhan Siwei’ yu Lengzhan hou Meiguo de dui
Hua Zhengce” [“Cold War Thinking” and the United States’ Post Cold War China
Policy], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn 1996), p. 23; Wang Jisi, “‘Ezhi’ Haishi
‘Jiaowang,’” p. 6.
23. Sun Jianhang, “Zhanlue·Liyi·Geju,” p. 29.
24. Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 47–48.
25. Yang Jiemian, “Meiguo Daxuan he Kelindun Zhengfu Tiaozheng dui Hua
Zhengce” [The American Presidential Election and Readjustment of Clinton’s China
Policy], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1996), p. 128; Lu Qichang, “Shi ji zhi jiao de Zhong
Mei E Guanxi” [China-U.S.-Russia Relations around the Turn of the Century], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (December 2000), p. 6.
98 Chapter 4
26. Fu Mengzi, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi: Jingzheng yu Hezuo

zhong Qiu Shuangying” [China-U.S. Relations Looking Forward to the New Century:
Seeking Win-Win in Competition and Cooperation], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (January/
February 2000), p. 93.
27. Lu Zhongwei, “Zhong Mei Zhong Ri Shounao Hufang, ji Zhong Mei
Ri Sanbian Guanxi” [China-U.S., China-Japan Summits and China-U.S.-Japan
Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 1997), p. 12; Xiong Zhiyong, “Meiguo
dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 52; Ma Chunshun, “Dui Yingxiang Zhong Mei Guanxi Yinsu de
Pouxi”[Analysis of Factors Affecting China-U.S. Relations], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(October 1993), p. 63; Zhang Yiting, “Kelindun de ‘dui Hua Jiechu’ Zhengce,” p. 35.
28. Wang Jisi, “‘Ezhi’ Haishi ‘Jiaowang,’” p. 3; Zhang Linhong, “21 Shiji de
Zhong Mei Guanxi: Duikang Haishi Hezuo?” [China-U.S. Relations in the 21st
Century: Confrontation or Cooperation?], Zhanlue yu Guanli (May/June 1997), p.
24; Wang Yanjun, “Cong Shidai Liyi he Zhengce,” pp. 59–60; Sheng Jiru, “Jian Lun
Burejinsiji de Xinzhu <<Daqiju>>: Yi Lun 21 Shiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [A Brief
Analysis of Brzezinski’s New Book Grand Chessboard: A First Analysis of China-
U.S. Relations in the 21st Century], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1998), p. 37.
29. Tao Jian, “Zouxiang Xiayige Shiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The United States
Increases Economic Considerations in Its Strategy toward China], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (March 1995), p. 68.
30. Zhang Linhong, “21 Shiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 27; Ding Kuisong and
Niu Xinchun, “Zai Tansuo Hezuo zhong Fazhan de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [China-U.S.
Relations in Exploring Cooperation], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (January/ February
1999), p. 80; Liu Liandi, “Meiguo Zhu Hua Dashi Sase zai Zhong Mei Guanxi zhong
Qizhe ‘Teshu de Zuoyong’” [U.S. Ambassador to China Sasser Plays a Special Role
in China-U.S. Relations], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (March 1997), pp. 78–80.
31. Zhang Yiting, “Kelindun de ‘dui Hua Jiechu’ Zhengce,” p. 36.
32. Zhu Feng, “Renquan Wenti he Zhong Mei Guanxi: BianHua yu Tiaozhan”
[Human Rights Problem and China-U.S. Relations: Changes and Challenges], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), pp. 20–21, 23–24; Liu Jiangyong, “Kelindun Fan-
ghua,” p. 2; Xi Laiwang, “Jiji Tuijin Jianli Zhong Mei Jianshexing Zhanlue Huoban
Guanxi” [Actively Promote the China-U.S. Constructive Strategic Partnership], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (May 1998), pp. 2–4; Wang Haihan, “Dui Dangqian Zhong Mei
Guanxi,” pp. 7–8; Shen Jiru, “Jian Lun Burejinsiji,” p. 40.
33. Chen Demin, “90 Niandai Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 36; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo
Daxuan yu Mei Zhong Guanxi” [U.S. Presidential Election and U.S.-China Rela-
tions], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 2000), p. 12.
34. Liu Ji, “21 Shiji Zhong Mei Guanxi de Xuanze: zai Hafo Daxue Fei Zhengq-
ing Dongya Yanjiu Zhongxin de Yanjiang” [Options for China-U.S. Relations in
the 21st Century], Zhanlue yu Guanli (September/October 1997), p. 31; Zhou Qi,
“Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 43–44; Jia Qingguo, “Kelindun Zhizheng
Yilai,” p. 105.
35. Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu de dui Hua Zhengce ji qi Qianjing”
[On the Clinton Administration’s China Policy and Its Prospects], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
(Spring 1997), p. 7; Liu Ji, “21 Shiji Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 32.
36. Yu Guobin, “Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua Zuihuiguo,” pp. 67–68; Xu Song, “Shi
Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” p. 30; Wang Shuzhong, “Zouxiang Xiayige Shiji,”
p. 4.
37. Xu Song, “Shi Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” p. 29.
38. Fang Zhou, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 35; Chen Baosen, “Fazhan Zhong
Mei Jingmao Guanxi de Zhengque Suoxiang” [The Correct Way for Developing
Sino-U.S. Economic Ties], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1994), pp. 9–11; Li Zhongcheng,
“Zhongguo yu Mei Ri E, Dongmeng Guanxi de Xianzhuang ji Qushi” [The Current
Status and Future Trends of China’s Relations with the United States, Japan, Russia,
and Southeast Asian Nations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 1995), p. 24; Zhou Qi,
“Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 43–44; Qin Fengmin, “Meiguo Gongs-
hangjie Zaici Sheng Chui ‘Dalufeng’” [Another Wave of China Craze in the U.S.
Business Circles], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1996), p. 37; Yang Jiemian,
“Meiguo Daxuan he Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 130 (one source says over 50, and the
other source says over 100); Yu Guobin, “Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua Zuihuiguo,”
pp. 68–69.
39. Fang Zhou, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 35; Wu Xianbin, “Lun Meiguo dui
Xianggang de Zhengce” [On the United States’ Policy toward Hong Kong], Zhanlue
yu Guanli (September/October 1997), pp. 114–115.
40. Deng Ruilin, “Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi Cunzai de Zhuyao Wenti yu
Duice” [The Main Problems in China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations, and Our
Response], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (November 1992), p. 61; Chen Jiyong, “Lun
80 Niandai Yilai Meiguo dui Hua Zhijie Touzi de Tedian Wenti ji qi Duice” [The
Characteristics and Problems in the United States’ Direct Investments in China and
Our Response], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (November 1992), pp. 17–20; Qin Fengmin,
“Meiguo Gongshangjie,” p. 37.
41. Chen Baosen, “Fazhan Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi,” pp. 9–11, 19–22; Qin
Fengmin, “Meiguo Gongshangjie,” p. 38.
42. Qin Fengmin, “Meiguo Gongshangjie,” p. 38; Zhang Linhong and Han Yugui,
“Meiguo Yatai Anquan Zhanlue yu Mei dui Ri dui Hua Guanxi” [The United States’
Asian-Pacific Security Strategy and the United States’ Policies Toward Japan and
China], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (March 1999), p. 11; Lu Qichang, “Shi ji zhi jiao de
Zhong Mei E Guanxi,” p. 5.
43. Qin Fengmin, “Meiguo Gongshangjie,” p. 37.
44. Xu Song, “Shi Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” pp. 28–29; Chen Baosen,
“Fazhan Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi,” p. 22; Qin Fengmin, “Meiguo Gongshangjie,”
p. 37; Wu Xinbo, “Mouqiu Zhong Ri Mei Sanbian Guanxi,” p. 22; Chu Shulong,
“Zhong Mei Guanxi Mianlin Zhanlue Xuanze,” pp. 5–6.
45. Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei Hezuo yu Fenqi,” p. 3; Ma Jiali, “Zhongguo tong
Mei E Ri,” pp. 20–21.
46. Li Zhongcheng, “Zhongguo yu Mei Ri E,” p. 24; Xiong Zhiyong, “Meiguo
dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 52; Zhang Yebai, “Zhong Mei Guanxi de Xingshi yu Women
de Duice” [China-U.S. Relations and Our Strategy in Response], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (June 1993), p. 39; Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi” [Engagement
Plus Containment], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1996), p. 9; Nai Zuji, “Kelindun Zhengfu
100 Chapter 4
Dier Renqi dui Hua Zhengce de Tiaozheng” [The Second Clinton Administration’s
Adjustment in Its China Policy], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (August 1997), pp. 13–14;
Huang Renwei, “‘Shanghai Gongbao’ yu Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi de Fazhan”
[The Shanghai Communique and Developing Sino-U.S. Trade and Economic Rela-
tions], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1997), p. 150.
47. Shen Jiru, “Jian Lun Burejinsiji,” p. 41.
48. Zhang Qingmin, “Zhongmei Guanxi zhong de Meiguo dui Hua Jishu Zhuan-
rang Wenti” [Technology Transfer to China in China-U.S. Relations], Zhanlue yu
Guanli (July/August 1999), pp. 23–24.
49. Shen Jiru, “Jian Lun Burejinsiji,” p. 37.
50. Yang Jiemian, “Meiguo Daxuan he Kelindun Zhengfu,” pp. 129–130; Song
Yimin, “Zhong E Mei E Zhong Mei Guanxi Yiji Sanzhe jian de Xianghu Zuoyong”
[China-Russia, U.S.-Russia, and China-U.S. Relations and Their Interactions], Guoji
Wenti Yanjiu (Autumn 1997), p. 17; Xi Laiwang, “Jianli Mianxiang 21 Shiji,” pp. 3–4;
Jiang Yuguo, “Zhongguo ‘Rushi’ dui Zhong Mei Guanxi de Yingxiang” [Impact of
China’s Entry into the WTO on the China-U.S. Relationship], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(September 2000), pp. 6–7; Wang Haihan, “Dui Dangqian Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 9;
Zhao Jingfang, “Meiguo dui Hua ‘Jiechu’ Zhengce de Mubiao Fenxi” [An Analysis
of the Objectives of the United States’ “Engagement” Policy Toward China], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi (June 1999), p. 12.
51. Zhang Yebai, “Zhong Mei Guanxi de Xingshi,” p. 38; Yang Jiemian, “Meiguo
Daxuan he Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 131; Wang Haihan, “Dui Dangqian Zhong Mei
Guanxi,” p. 10.
52. Zhang Linhong, “21 Shiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 27.
53. Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei Hezuo yu Fenqi,” p. 4
54. Shen Jiru, “Guojia de Liangzhong Zhineng he Kelindun Zongtong Maodun de
Hezhanlue: Er Lun 21 Shiji Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The Two Functions of the State and
President Clinton’s Contradictory Nuclear Strategy: A Second Analysis of China-U.S.
Relations in the 21st Century], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 1998), pp. 56, 60.
55. Li Shenzhi, “Zhong Mei Guanxi de Huigu,” p. 130.
56. Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Xinguanxi,” p. 18.
57. Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei dui Guoji Zhanlue,” p. 51.
58. Chu Shulong, “Lengzhan hou Zhong Mei Shuangbian he Diqu Zhanlue yu
Anquan Guanxi” [The Post–Cold War China-U.S. Bilateral and Regional Strategy and
Security Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (May 2000), pp. 9–10, 12.
59. Xi Laiwang, “Jianli Mianxiang 21 Shiji,” pp. 5–6.
60. Wang Yizhou, “Meiguo Gaoceng Renshi dui Zhong Mei Guanxi Ruogan
Zhongyao Wenti de Kanfa: 1994 Huashengdun “Zhong Mei Guanxi Yantaohui Ceji”
[American Elite’s Opinions on Several Important Issues in China-U.S. Relations],
Zhanlue yu Guanli (January/February 1995), p. 48.
61. Liu Yongtao, “Guifan Rentong he Zhong Mei,” pp. 35–36.
Chapter 5
Chinese Perceptions of American

Power 1
Power is a central concept in studies of international politics. For Hans

Morgenthau, the essence of international politics is a struggle for power, and
a state’s three basic types of foreign policy are to keep power, increase power,
and demonstrate power. For Kenneth Waltz, power is the single most impor-
tant attribute of a state; it is the distribution of power across states as units
that defines the structure of an international system. And John Mearsheimer
argues that a state’s primary goal is power maximization, for either survival
or expansion.2
One defining characteristic of the United States is its status as the sole
superpower, but American self-perception of its power has always been rife
with controversy. Although the United States in the last several years has
seemed to push for a unipolar world, back in the early 1970s President Rich-
ard Nixon had already put forward a five-pole thesis, arguing that a multi-
polar world would soon emerge. In the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan
vigorously challenged the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the
zenith of Soviet power, pessimism nonetheless permeated the United States.
Scholars argued that great powers invariably declined and the United States
would be no exception, and that Japan would soon rise like a phoenix from
the ashes of its World War II defeat to supersede the United States as the
number one power in the world. Some scholars even prepared a dirge for
American hegemony. It was in the midst of this chorus of American declin-
ism that the USSR collapsed and the United States emerged, overnight, as the
world’s sole superpower.
After the end of the Cold War, American scholars debated extensively
whether the United States had in fact won that war, whether the world power
structure was indeed unipolar, whether the supposed unipolarity would last
101
102 Chapter 5
just briefly, and whether sole superpower status was adequate for the United
States. Amid this uneasiness with American power, the so-called emerging
European suprastate remained fragmented, its economy stagnating. Japan,
once the much-heralded emerging “Number One,” slid further toward the
sidelines of world politics.
Consequently, self-perception of American power has experienced a drastic
reversal. Some scholars began to argue that U.S. unipolarity was stable and
long-lasting and that the country could afford to pursue any policy in world
politics.3 In the same vein, U.S. foreign policy became unprecedentedly
assertive. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was thrown into
the dustbin of history, military preemption for the first time became official
U.S. doctrine, and the United Nations dangled at the brink of irrelevance. In
the thick of this new triumphalism, however, some observers perceive a new
quagmire for the United States in Iraq that, together with the sluggishness of
the U.S. economy in the past few years, seems to foreshadow an America in
incipient decline.
Power is one central tool with which a state pursues its foreign policy, but
a state uses its power only on the basis of the self-perception of its relative
power status. To adapt a famous saying by Harold and Margaret Sprout: what
matters is how decision makers imagine the state’s power to be, not how it
actually is. An appropriate self-perception of its relative power status there-
fore is essential for a state to use its power to its advantage.
With the United States as the world’s sole superpower, every twist and turn
in American power status makes a significant impact on world politics. Schol-
arly discussions in the United States regarding American power raise some
important questions. In what sense was the United States a superpower? To
what extent had other countries recognized it as such? Was the United States
in decline or rejuvenation? And was American power adequate for ensuring
the country’s security?
While American scholars search tirelessly for answers to those questions,
it is illuminating to explore other countries’ perceptions of American power:
sometimes the onlooker sees most of the game. China was a good onlooker
for this purpose. Though Russia was militarily much stronger, China at
present seems to have more resources available for sustained development
of its comprehensive national power. Europe and Japan are economically
and technologically much more developed than China, but the latter is more
unified than Europe and a more normal state4 than Japan. India shares more
similarities with China than other secondary powers do, but China is now
one step ahead of India in economic development. To some extent, Chinese
perceptions of American power might represent perceptions of the United
States by all the secondary powers. Exploring the Chinese perceptions of
Chinese Perceptions of American Power 103
American power therefore might help the United States to better understand
its own power.
Chinese perceptions of American power are intrinsically valuable. Because
China has been widely regarded as a rising power, how it behaves toward the
United States depends to a large extent on how China perceives American
power. If China perceived a weak United States, there would be fewer inhi-
bitions for China to challenge it. If China perceived a strong United States,
Beijing might want to be very cautious in its U.S. policy. And if China
perceived a long-lasting American hegemony, bandwagoning would be its
optimal option. Only if and when the United States was perceived as being
overly imperialistic would China have a viable option of working with other
major powers to vigorously balance against it. Exploring Chinese perceptions
of American power therefore might not only help the United States to better
understand its own power, it might also shed important light on China’s U.S.
policy.
The research in this article was based on a sample of 256 articles in six
mainstream Chinese journals on international relations5 from 1991 to the
first half of 2004 whose titles suggest a focus on American power/capability.
In this article, I intend to explore the Chinese perceptions of American power
in the following areas: economics, science and technology, military, soft
power, and the perceived trajectory of American power.
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC

CAPABILITIES
With regard to the American economy, what deeply impressed Chinese

authors was its immense capability. Throughout the 1990s up to the early
twenty-first century, the United States had been perceived as the number
one economic power, enjoying vast superiority over other countries. Even in
the early 1990s, when the United States was suffering from a recession and
perceived as having declined economically, Chinese authors did not fail to
point out that the United States was still the primary economic superpower,
far stronger than any other country. The United States economy was so large
that it approximately equaled the combined total economies of over a dozen
countries in the EU. In the world of some 200 countries, the American gross
domestic product (GDP) accounted for some 30 percent of the world’s total
GDP. The fact that the United States on the one hand provided substantial aid
to other countries and on the other exercised sanctions of one kind or another
on more than 70 countries totaling over 50 percent of the world population,
plus the reality that the U.S. economy’s ups and downs severely affected
104 Chapter 5
many other countries, all reinforced the perception of tremendous American

economic power. Because a significant number of major transnational compa-
nies were U.S.-dominated, American economic power was often perceived as
being able to grant or deny economic development to other countries.6
What Chinese observers tended to focus on was the overall picture: the
United States was not only the largest economy but was also a leader in
many specific economic fields. It has a well-developed market economy and
the world’s biggest market. It was number one in exports, number one in for-
eign trade, number one in overseas investment, number one in transnational
companies, number one in the size of its service industry, and number one in
service trade. U.S. industry was highly modernized, highly competitive, and
the best in economic productivity. It was the main engine of world economic
development. Except in production, the United States was superior to other
industrialized countries in four out of five stages of the value chain: research,
development, production, sales, and service.7
Nevertheless, the perceived economic dominance of the United States was
less salient than the country’s perceived military dominance. While authors in
the sample generally accepted that the United States was a unipolar military
power, some argued that when it came to the economy, the United States
shared the lead with a few other actors, especially the EU and Japan.8
In the past few years, the U.S. economy has slowed down. Still, Chinese
authors were generally optimistic that the United States would avoid a tradi-
tional recession. The 9/11 tragedy was perceived as having had some impact
on the U.S. economy, but most Chinese authors were confident that because
the economy was robust, the impact of a recession would be limited. In 2002,
a series of corporate scandals rocked the United States, arousing conven-
tional Chinese comments that the U.S. economic system was, after all, not
perfect. The editorial board of Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi adopted the view that
although the U.S. economy not infrequently encountered problems, it was
robust enough to deal with a variety of problems: therein lies the solid power
of the United States.9
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPABILITIES IN

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The United States has been consistently perceived as enjoying absolute supe-
riority over other countries in science and technology. Some scholars argued
that the United States was about 10 years ahead of Europe and Japan in new
high technology, and 20 years ahead of China. They lamented that Western
countries, especially the United States, were far more advanced than develop-
ing countries in technology, and it was very difficult for developing countries
to narrow the gap. The United States was perceived as having by far more
research funding than any other country, more than that of several major
developed countries combined. In 1990, for instance, Japan’s research and
development (R&D) funding was only half that of America and Germany’s
was only one-fifth that of the United States. In 2000, one review article cited
an American source to the effect that the R&D funding of the G-7 accounted
for 90 percent of the world’s funding and the United States’ R&D funding
equaled the combined total of the other six G-7 countries.10
Chinese authors in the sample generally agreed that the United States
had many more R&D personnel than other developed countries. One author
pointed out in 1995 that Japan had 510,890 persons and Germany only
170,640, while the United States had 959,300 working in R&D. In 1995,
some 45 percent of global scientific research was conducted in the United
States, more than the combined total of the next several major countries such
as Japan, Germany, France, and Britain.11
The United States was perceived as being particularly strong in basic
research and military research, but its civilian technology was perceived as
developing relatively slowly. The United States possessed absolute superi-
ority in aerospace technology and was currently the only country trying to
develop a missile defense system. It was also considered to be particularly
strong in computer technology; about two-thirds of the world’s Internet-
capable computers were in the United States.
In the early 1990s, other Western countries, especially Japan, were per-
ceived as having become powerful U.S. competitors in high technology;
Japan was seen as poised to catch up in many high-tech areas. Toward the late
1990s, however, the United States was perceived as having again strength-
ened its lead in science and technology over other countries. The first Bush
and Clinton administrations were perceived as having strengthened Ameri-
can scientific research capability, leaving other countries lagging. Wang Jisi
argued in 1997 that because the United States was the first country to enter the
information age, it was well positioned to develop faster than other countries
in sophisticated areas such as bioengineering, medical science, aerospace, and
new materials. Writing the same year, Wu Yonghong drew from an American
source to note that in the 1990s, the United States “greatly increased its lead
over Japan and Europe in information and communication technology, [and]
enjoys superiority” in biology, medical science, agriculture, and the food
industry, although Japan and Europe had caught up with the United States in
manufacturing industry and energy and had moved closer to the United States
106 Chapter 5
in environmental protection.12 The 1990s appeared to be a lost decade for

Japan and a particularly prosperous one for the United States. With European
economies stagnating, the United States is perceived as having left Japan and
Europe further behind in science and technology.
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER
Superiority in Military Power

All authors in the sample acknowledged that the United States was a military
superpower. Compared with other major powers, the United States demon-
strated its most salient superiority in its military advantage. Even in the early
1990s, when the United States was seen as declining as a political and eco-
nomic superpower, its military status was viewed as stable.
The United States was seen as desiring to maintain superiority in strategic
nuclear forces and conventional forces, as well as in military theory. America
was capable of turning out a new generation of weapon systems every 5 to
10 years. Even when the United States was reducing its military expenditure
during the early post–Cold War years, it was perceived as having enhanced its
military capability through accelerated development of military technology.
The following points were presented by Chinese observers as evidence
of American military superiority. First, America’s military expenditure was
huge, more than the combined totals of eight other major military powers,
“about two times that of its NATO allies, three times that of Russia, and
over ten times that of China.”13 Yet, that was not the best the United States
could do, since during the post–Cold War period, American annual military
expenditure accounted for only about 3 percent of the country’s GNP, while
during the Cold War such expenditure usually ran about 6 percent of GNP. By
contrast, during World War II, U.S. overall federal expenditure accounted for
as much as 48 percent of GNP; much of this was military expenditure.
Second, the United States was seen as having the capability to prevail in
conventional warfare with any country. It had developed weapons to con-
duct highly advanced warfare and possessed the only blue-water navy in the
world; its air force was unquestionably the best, and it was the only country
capable of conducting military operations in any corner of the globe. And
third, the United States was a nuclear power with no peer. It maintained a
large arsenal of nuclear weapons, its nuclear deterrence was considerable, and
it was possibly the only country possessing a nuclear first-strike capability
against other major powers.
The U.S. deployment of a large number of troops abroad also contributed to

Chinese perceptions of American military superiority, although troop strength
had been reduced from Cold War levels. During the post–Cold War period,
the United States deployed forces abroad dozens of times, to areas in Europe,
Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. In the wake of 9/11, the
United States had greatly expanded its sphere of influence. When necessary, it
was capable of establishing regional defense headquarters in various corners
of the world. As a result, the United States was perceived by the Chinese as
having the greatest capability for foreign intervention, unrivaled by any other
single country or any group of countries.
U.S. Military Power Compared with Russia’s

Chinese authors in the sample generally agreed that Russia’s military capabil-
ity drastically declined following the end of the Cold War. When the United
States and the USSR were negotiating the first Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START I), the latter was perceived as being only slightly inferior to
the former in military capability. The unequal reduction of nuclear weapons
by the two countries prescribed by START II in 1993 decisively established
American superiority and Russia’s acceptance of its own strategic inferiority.
The American development of missile defense systems had been perceived as
further tilting the military balance in favor of the United States
Following the end of the Cold War, Russia was greatly weakened and its
military capability probably declined by 50 percent. As a result, as Wu Zhan
saw the matter in 1998, it was no longer possible for Russia to initiate a
nuclear first strike against the United States, although such an action might
be possible for the United States to take against Russia.14 NATO’s war against
Yugoslavia, and its expansion into Eastern Europe and the former USSR, both
demonstrated Russia’s impotence vis-à-vis U.S. military might. Washington’s
withdrawal from the ABM treaty was seen as reflecting Russia’s weakened
capability to compete with the United States in another arms race. On the
whole, Chinese authors noted that the United States now no longer took Rus-
sia’s position and sensitivities as seriously as it did in the past.
Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s until the present, most scholars in the
sample believed that Russia was still a military superpower capable of con-
fronting the United States. Liu Huaqiu and Qin Zhongmin tended to concur
with the U.S. assessment that Russia was capable of destroying the United
States in one all-out strike.15 As a result, authors in the sample tend to regard
the mutual deterrence between the United States and Russia as operating at
more or less the same level as during the Cold War.16
108 Chapter 5
U.S. Military Power Compared with China’s

The United States was perceived as being militarily much stronger than
China. The Pentagon deployed a large number of troops in Asia, potentially
to deal with China. Its military technology was perceived as being much more
advanced than China’s; simply by transferring such technology to Taiwan, the
United States made it difficult for China to solve the Taiwan problem through
military means.17
Even though China had a limited number of nuclear weapons, it could
not initiate a nuclear strike against the United States because such action
would spur disastrous retaliation; moreover, Washington’s missile defense
system, currently under development, had the potential of further neutral-
izing China’s nuclear deterrence. Chinese authors had generally agreed that
China should both ensure its deterrence against nuclear attacks and avoid an
arms race with other countries. Wu Zhan argued in 1998 that China should
accept the nuclear superiority of the United States and Russia because for
China, nuclear weapons were to be used solely for deterrence. Writing in
2002, Ge Lide confidently asserted that China was capable of maintaining its
nuclear deterrence.18 Though quite a few authors argued that it would not be
easy for the United States to monopolize nearby sectors of outer space, they
nonetheless conceded that it might not be a good idea for China to compete
with the United States in space technology. Zhang Wenmu suggested in 2003
that China should leapfrog to developing deep sea technology to avoid such
competition while retaining deterrence.19
Hu Angang and Liu Taoxiong the same year published an impressive com-
parison of national defense capital among the United States, China, Japan,
and India, concluding that China’s defense capital was approximately on a par
with India’s and Japan’s, while American defense capital totaled about twice
that of China, Japan, and India combined. Even though the United States
was regarded by all Chinese authors as militarily superior over China, they
nonetheless maintained that Washington did not have the need or capability
to comprehensively contain China.20
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN SOFT POWER
Soft power was new to Chinese authors but had quickly become a popular
term for assessing American power. Scholars in the sample generally agreed,
usually implicitly, that the United States enjoyed superiority in this respect.
Some authors approvingly cite American scholars such as Joseph Nye and
Samuel Huntington to the effect that the West, led by the United States, was
able to dominate the world because it enjoyed superiority not only in hard
power but also in soft power.
In rare cases, Chinese authors have explicitly accepted that the United States
enjoyed superiority not only in hard power but also in soft power, including
American culture, language, systems, values, and management capability.21
Authors in the sample did not dispute that the United States had advantages
in its political system, which constituted a source of American soft power.
Zhou Sanming, Li Desong, and Xu Lisun recognized that international orga-
nizations, laws, norms, regimes, rules of the game, etc. had been established
basically in accordance with U.S. political will and constituted a source of
American soft power. A sophisticated international financial regime helped
the United States to compete with other countries. Arrangements such as free
trade, intellectual property rights, nuclear non-proliferation, and intervention
by the International Monetary Fund in the economies of developing countries
all contributed to American political, economic, and security interests.22
Unlike the case of Chinese perceptions of U.S. hard power, Chinese authors
did not uniformly accept that the country enjoyed absolute superiority in soft
power. Wang Jisi asserted that the United States suffered from problems such
as poor education and weak social cohesiveness because of racial conflicts, a
high crime rate, broken families, political scandals, etc. As a result, America’s
weakness lay not in its hard power but in its soft power.23 Nevertheless 9/11
was perceived to have had the effect of overcoming this weakness by mobi-
lizing resources in the United States to carry out the government’s foreign
policy.
When the United States emphasized human rights and democracy in its
foreign policy toward developing countries, some Chinese authors acknowl-
edged that this approach could indeed put developing countries on the defen-
sive and produce effects that could not be accomplished by the use of hard
power, but they also claimed that because of the resistance of developing
countries, the effect of this approach was limited. Pang Zhongying conceded
in 1997 that developing countries usually had too little soft power and could
not compete with countries with great amounts of soft power, but he also
argued that in the case of Asian countries, their culture, traditional values, and
development patterns could potentially endow them with greater soft power
than they currently enjoyed.24
THE IMPACT OF THE IRAQ WAR
The Iraq War had been perceived by some Chinese observers as both a great
success for the United States in power politics and a serious setback in terms
110 Chapter 5
of its soft power. After the initial U.S. military success in Iraq, Chinese authors
generally agreed that the United States had demonstrated absolute dominance
in world politics. The United States could do anything it wanted to do, could
fight any war anywhere it chose, and no country could challenge its power
status.25 Secondary powers and international institutions were constrained by
the United States much more than the United States was constrained by them.
Insurgents in Iraq did cause serious difficulties for the United States, but they
did not constitute a substantial threat to the U.S. military. But gradually, the
United States had begun to be perceived as being limited in its capability for
foreign intervention. It did not have enough troops for rotation, it did not have
enough money to fund the occupation, and the American people were not psy-
chologically prepared for sustained operations involving steady, significant
casualties and enormous expenditure.26
Most authors in the sample agreed that the Iraq War had caused the United
States to suffer a tremendous loss of its soft power. Soft power here referred
to moral appeal, national image, and international legitimacy. Consequently,
while the United States enjoyed greater hard power than before, its influence
on other countries had declined. Moreover, it was sometimes portrayed as the
biggest challenger to the international order and thus encountered soft balanc-
ing, especially by its own allies and by international institutions.
Some scholars believed it might not be easy for the United States to recover
its loss in soft power and suggested that a vague confrontation between
the United States and the international community already existed. If in an
unlikely scenario the United States continued forcefully along its unilateral
road, this course might ultimately spawn a broad anti-U.S. coalition. But oth-
ers, such as Qin Yaqin, argued that the United States could recover from the
deterioration of relations with its allies and could also restore its international
legitimacy.27
THE PERCEIVED TRAJECTORY OF AMERICAN POWER

STATUS
Perceived American Decline in the Early 1990s

In the early 1990s, many authors in the sample perceived an America in
decline. They asserted that the United States had been declining economically
in the previous several decades and would decline further in the 1990s, both
within the world economy and in terms of its international influence. The
following were the perceived symptoms of the supposed American decline:
reduced competitiveness, weakened manufacturing industry, less attractive-
ness as a major locus of foreign investment, a shift from status as the biggest
creditor nation to the biggest debtor nation, lower status within the world
banking system, and decreased levels of investment in foreign countries.
Other symptoms were said to include a low rate of productivity growth, fixed
capital investment and infrastructure investment, plus a large trade deficit.28
The Rise of Europe, Japan, and China

At the same time, in the early 1990s Europe and Japan were perceived to
be on the rise; the relative American decline was, in fact, based mostly on a
comparison between the United States on the one hand and Japan and Europe,
especially Germany, on the other. Scholars in the sample thought that Japan
was gradually evolving into a powerful competitor of the United States in
terms of high technology, currency valuation, and overall competitiveness.
The Chinese scholars saw Japan as capable of economically surpassing the
United States before long, and they predicted faster economic growth in
Europe than in the United States over the decade.
The euro was thought to be developing as a powerful rival to the U.S. dol-
lar. These observers argued that Europe and Japan might soon emerge into
two new economic poles in the capitalist world, posing a serious challenge to
the U.S. role as an economic superpower.29
It was predicted that by 2020, Japan, Germany, Austria, France, and Nor-
way would all surpass the United States in per capita GNP. The American
lead over Japan and Europe in technology would dwindle and disappear over
the 1990s. EU integration was considered a factor contributing to the relative
American decline in the world economy. Countries like Germany and Japan
were perceived as competing with the United States not only economically
but also politically.
In the early twenty-first century, the “rise of China” became a salient sub-
ject in Chinese journals. Most Chinese scholars believed that China’s rise
would primarily be economic. They expected that by around 2050, China
would approach the United States in GDP, but they conceded that in most
other aspects of national power U.S. superiority over China would still be
obvious, especially in military capability and per capita GDP. In their 2003
study, Hu Angang and Liu Taoxiong seemed to support this estimate: in the
past 20 years, the gap in PPP (purchasing power parity) had narrowed from
four times to less than two times. But Shi Ming, cited in an article by Peng
Lei, believed such an estimate was too optimistic: if we look at the price of
hamburgers, China’s currency was indeed undervalued, but based on the price
of Hondas, which in China were sold at twice the global market price, China’s
currency was overvalued.30
In the same article, Tan Shizhong gave qualifying conditions of China’s
rise: no world wars, no major policy blunders, no serious social disturbances,
112 Chapter 5
and no extraordinary natural disasters. Somewhat differently, Shi Yinghong

emphasized the importance of political and social stability and economic
and political reforms in China’s rise. If everything were to go smoothly, Shi
Yinghong projected that around 2050, China would be markedly more power-
ful than any country except the United States, and the power gap between the
two would also be greatly narrowed.31
Somewhat in contrast with earlier discussions of the rise of other countries,
Chinese authors generally manifested a more moderate optimism regarding
China’s rise. They did not expect the ascent to be rapid, nor did they think
that China would surpass the United States anytime soon. While they agreed
that China most likely would continue to rise in the next several decades, they
also took the view that the twenty-first century would be an American century.
Multi-polarization Will Be the Trend

In the early 1990s, with the perceived relative decline of the United States and
the expected rise of Europe and Japan, many Chinese authors predicted that
the future global trend would be multi-polarization. Western Europe would
emerge as a new pole, and Japan likely would as well. As a result, Europe and
Japan would move toward becoming equal partners with the United States,
trying to share the leadership of world affairs. Because of multi-polarization,
the entire twenty-first century might not remain an American century. For one
instance, according to Guo Shixian, in the international monetary system a
tri-polarity between the U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, and deutschmark was pre-
dicted to emerge as early as around 2010; the rise of the euro would inevitably
weaken the capability of the United States to dominate world affairs.32
In addition to Europe and Japan, authors in the sample perceived an impor-
tant role for other powers, especially Russia and China. And they also took
notice of the rise of India, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, South
Korea, South Africa, and Brazil. Xi Runchang expected that a semblance of
the future multi-polar structure would emerge as early as around 1995. And in
terms of Southeast Asia, a multi-polar structure was seen as already existing
in the early 1990s.33
Since the Late 1990s, Chinese Authors Have Modified the

American Decline Thesis
By the mid-1990s, Chinese authors began to notice that the United States
economy was doing remarkably well. Quite a few authors marveled at its bril-
liant performance and were generally optimistic about its future. By the end
of the decade, they generally agreed that the U.S. economy had been doing
much better than its major competitors and America had increased its lead
over other countries. Since the mid- to late 1990s, the United States has been
perceived as either having solved its earlier problems or as being capable of
keeping them under control. In a sharp departure from scholars in the early
1990s, Song Yuhua and Chen Ze argued in 2002 that because the United
States was both the world’s largest importer and the largest exporter, a trade
deficit not only would not contribute to an American decline but ultimately
would be beneficial to this country.34
Toward the end of the 1990s, many Chinese authors predicted that the
United States would not decline and would maintain its status as the sole
superpower. Shi Ren was more cautious, expecting the status quo to continue
for at least the next 5 to 10 years, while Wu Yonghong and Zeng Bingxi pre-
dicted a much longer duration. Wang Jisi, Song Yuhua, and Lu Huajun argued
that the United States in many ways had not declined at all, even in the 1980s
and the early 1990s.35
Wang Fan was among the most optimistic observers, predicting that uni-
polarity would last for at least several more decades. Sun Shilian shared the
presumably dominant opinion toward the United States, tending to predict
that American economic expansion might continue endlessly. Wang Jisi was
more cautious, opining that the United States would not lose its status as
a superpower although its capability to dominate the world would become
somewhat limited. Li Desong, Xu Lisun, and Gu Wenyan argued that the
United States had positioned itself for continued economic dominance in the
world by developing economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region, transfer-
ring undesirable factories to other countries, and achieving a safe lead in areas
such as computers, information, and communication, regarded as the keys to
competitiveness through the twenty-first century.36
On the other hand, with the perceived rise of the United States in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, authors in the sample saw a relative decline of Japan
and Europe. Zhang Xiaotang in 1997 offered the gloomiest account of Japan,
comparing it to a “processing factory” for the United States. Some authors
were pessimistic about China’s development. Zeng Bingxi argued the next
year that because developed countries monopolized information technology,
it would be very difficult for developing countries to succeed in the so-called
information economy. Writing in 2002, Li Changjiu attributed the inability of
China to narrow the economic gap with the United States to China’s lack of
R&D funding, which in 1998 was less than one-thirtieth of the United States’,
one-eighteenth of Japan’s, and one-half of South Korea’s.37
In spite of the general optimism toward the end of the 1990s among Chinese
scholars regarding the U.S. economy, a minority continued to be cautious.
Wang Jian and Zhou Li asserted that U.S. prosperity was propped up by a large
114 Chapter 5
inflow of foreign capital and the economic bubble would explode sooner or
later. Somehow, even when the United States was perceived as having entered
a period of sustained economic growth in the mid- to late 1990s, most authors
in the sample continued arguing that multi-polarization would be the future
trend of the world. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, multi-
polarization was mentioned less often than before in the international relations
literature. “Speedy development toward multipolarity” quietly gave way to
“zigzag evolution toward multipolarity.”38 While in the 1990s Chinese authors
generally expected that the United States would maintain its absolute domi-
nance for another 10 to 20 years, by the early twenty-first century most leading
Chinese scholars had come to believe that the United States would remain the
sole superpower at least until 2050. Shi Yinghong and Jin Canrong claimed
that the United States actually was the strongest power in Western history,
stronger even than Rome at its zenith. Lin Limin argued that even if all great
powers would eventually decline, the United States would still be the longest-
lasting great power in history. Mei Renyi suggested that the United States at
the beginning of the twenty-first century was even more powerful than it was
right after the end of World War II. Wang Jisi nonetheless did not preclude the
possibility of an unexpected American decline stemming from major terrorist
attacks, high-cost wars, or loss of attraction for foreign talent, in addition to
the vague possibility of an anti-U.S. alliance among major secondary powers.39
Although in the 1990s Chinese authors obviously resented the United States’
self-proclaimed status as the leader of the world, in the early twenty-first
century, some Chinese scholars seemed to have accepted this status, although
sometimes grudgingly, saying that U.S. dominance was actually good for the
stability of the world and for China’s economic interests.40
Accounting for the Change in the Chinese Perceptions

of American Power
Chinese perceptions of American power had undergone substantial change
during the 14 years covered by this chapter. In the early 1990s, the United
States was perceived as being in decline, multi-polarization was thought to be
inevitable, and actors such as Japan and the European Union were regarded
as serious challenges to the unipolar status of the United States. In the late
1990s, the United States was thought to be in the process of rejuvenation,
and the gap between it and other major powers was viewed as widening
rather than narrowing. In the early twenty-first century, the United States was
perceived as being unquestionably the dominant power in the world: no coun-
try was thought to be in a position to challenge its unipolar status. Chinese
authors now generally believed that in the foreseeable future, perhaps at least
until 2050, the United States would remain the sole superpower. Why had
their perception undergone such a drastic change? I suggest the following
explanations.
1. The reality principle. The human mind is not divorced from reality and
actively seeks information to form a true picture of the environment. After
all, not accurately understanding the environment would result in decisions
costly to the perceiver or decision maker. This cognitive principle suggests
that Chinese scholars do try hard to learn about what has happened in the
United States; the change in their perceptions reflects the real change in
U.S. power over the past 14 years.
2. The consistency principle. The human mind works to keep internal beliefs
consistent with one another. New information inconsistent with existing
beliefs is uncomfortable and will therefore be either neglected or dis-
counted. This cognitive principle suggests that when U.S.-China relations
are in trouble, Chinese perceivers are more likely to discount American
power. One salient example is China’s characterization in the 1950s of the
United States as a paper tiger, even though the PRC’s economy was then
deplorably backward. Consequently, the change of Chinese perception over
the past 14 years more or less reflects a reduced threat perception and an
increased opportunity perception toward the United States
3. Groupthink. People behave differently in a group than they do as individu-
als. As individuals, they cannot but think independently, but as members of
a group, they face pressure to achieve consensus. Especially when things
are uncertain, people have a strong inclination to accept the opinions of
others in the group. Views conforming to the dominant opinion are easy to
express and require little effort to rationalize; dissident views are uncom-
fortable and may even be costly. Groupthink theory suggests that Chinese
scholars do not function completely independently of their American coun-
terparts. Thus, the change of Chinese perception more or less reflects the
change of Americans’ self-perception of American power.
4. The availability effect. The human mind seeks accurate information about
the environment, but because of internal and external constraints the mind
can be only boundedly rational. As a result, people routinely resort to heu-
ristics in decision making. One important heuristic device is the availabil-
ity effect: judgment making is strongly influenced by the extent to which
relevant cases can be brought to mind. The availability effect suggests that
countries that have successfully demonstrated their power will convey an
image of strength. Thus, it was the American use of force abroad, especially
116 Chapter 5
against the will of the UN and other major powers, that accounts for the
change in Chinese perceptions of American power.
Analysis of source materials suggests that all four mechanisms above

may have contributed to the change in Chinese perceptions of American
power. When the United States was in recession in the early 1990s, Chinese
authors tended to perceive a United States in decline, but when the American
economy prospered in the late 1990s, they tended to perceive a United States
in rejuvenation. When U.S.-China relations reached low tide following the
Tiananmen tragedy, Chinese authors were more likely to perceive a United
States in trouble; but when relations were back on the right track, observers
were more likely to perceive a strong United States. When American scholars
themselves are overwhelmingly pessimistic about American power, Chinese
authors often concur with them; when American scholars demonstrate greater
confidence in their country’s power, this image of strength is more or less
projected onto Chinese publications. And finally, when the United States is
particularly assertive, as in the case of Kosovo, Iraq, the ABM, and the pre-
emption doctrine, Chinese authors are more easily convinced of the United
States’ unrivaled power. Additionally, changes regarding Chinese perceivers
may also have accounted for the shifts in Chinese perceptions of the United
States, including generational change, changes in perceivers’ exposure to the
United States, differences in perceivers’ situations in China, etc. Accounting
for change in the Chinese perception of the United States is an important
subject and will be examined in future research.
CONCLUSION
The research in this paper generally supports some American scholars’ opti-
mism in recent years regarding American power. While during the Maoist
period, the United States was typically portrayed as a paper tiger, mainstream
Chinese authors in the past decade have accepted that the United States is the
sole superpower, enjoying vast superiority over other countries. The United
States was perceived as sharing economic leadership with Europe and Japan
in the early 1990s, but since the late 1990s its leadership status in the world
economy has become much more salient than that of Europe and Japan.
The United States, Europe, and Japan were similarly leaders in science and
technology, standing head and shoulders above the rest of the world in this
respect. While Europe and Japan were perceived as being on a par, the United
States was regarded as being about 10 years ahead of them. The United
States was a military superpower; Russia was barely capable of maintaining a
tenuous equilibrium with its rival. The United States was perceived as enjoy-
ing significant superiority even in soft power, but Chinese authors seemed to
believe that narrowing the gap in soft power between the United States and
Third World countries might not be as difficult as narrowing the gap in hard
power. Chinese authors often identified China as a rising power, but they were
realistic enough to acknowledge that a vast power gap existed with the United
States. For the foreseeable future, China’s rise therefore would be more about
relative improvement of the country’s status in the world than about catching
up with or overtaking the United States. Though Chinese scholars generally
hoped that everything would go well for China in the next several decades,
many observers, both Chinese and Western, cautioned that there would be too
many possible slips between cup and lip. Even if China were to be blessed
with propitious fortune, possibly in due time, as James Hoge suggests, it
could be overtaken by an even more robust India.
Because China was one of the most salient rising powers, Chinese percep-
tions of American power seemed to suggest that for the foreseeable future, the
United States would most likely remain the undisputable sole superpower; the
power gap, especially military, between the United States and the rest of the
world might not easily be narrowed; and no country may be in a position to
challenge U.S. primacy. The perceived Achilles’ heel in American soft power
might perhaps arouse some concern, as one scenario of the premature termi-
nation of American dominance is the vague possibility of a broad anti-U.S.
coalition emerging as a result of serious deterioration of the United States’
international legitimacy.
China has been remarkably conservative in its U.S. policy. When China
disapproved of America’s international behaviors, its response was habitually
no more than verbal protests. As a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, China had demonstrated the utmost reluctance in exercising its veto
power. The research for this article indicated that among other things, such as
the Chinese admiration of many aspects of the United States and the Chinese
wish to benefit from a bilateral partnership, the perception of the power gap
between the two countries might also be a major factor explaining China’s
restraint in its U.S. policy. As China perceived the likelihood of a relatively
long-lasting American hegemony, trying to improve bilateral relations quite
possibly might remain China’s preferred policy for the foreseeable future.
The absolute U.S. superiority poses the question of what to do with
American primacy. The dominant school in the 1990s believed that unipolar
distribution of power was but an anomaly in human history, and the logic
of international politics would before long maneuver the world away from
unipolarity. The best option for the United States, therefore, was to prepare
for inevitable multi-polarity. As it became clear that unipolarity would not
118 Chapter 5
evaporate after a brief moment, scholars such as William Wohlforth began to

argue for greater interventionism to manage the system. The essence of this
school’s argument was enshrined in the 2002 National Security Strategy of
the United States; its first experiment was the ongoing war in Iraq.
Soon enough the cost of an Iraq-style war sank in. A tremendous amount of
American wealth vanished tracelessly into the deserts, and the daily spilling
of American blood steadily wore down American patience. Most deplorably,
the United States had broadly ceased to be perceived as a benign hegemon:
anti-Americanism surged in various corners of the world. As the United States
fought to spread American values in foreign lands, American values seemed
to have lost some ground in their homeland. William Wohlforth suggested
that properly managing relations with major Eurasian powers was the key
to preserving American unipolarity, but recent events in Iraq indicated that
winning the hearts and minds of people in the street was no less important.
The most significant message from this research was perhaps that the United
States still had decades to figure out what to do with its primacy. On the one
hand, the United States should continue its efforts to promote its unipolar sta-
tus; on the other, it need not be too assertive in doing so. To err in either direc-
tion would risk prematurely curtailing its primacy. For many decades during
the 20th century, the interests of the United States and the world community
coincided well. In the twenty-first century, the United States similarly should
be able to make its leadership welcomed by the world community. After all,
the Soviet empire collapsed without a shot being fired by the United States,
Japan in recent years has been outdistanced without outright rivalry with the
United States, and European countries have been rendered impotent exactly
when they became close allies of the United States. In this sense, an adventure
like the one in Iraq might be a useful and perhaps not too costly experiment.
Notes
1. This chapter was earlier published in Asian Survey, September/October 2005,

Vol. 45, No. 5, pp. 667–686.
2. Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: Knopf, 1978); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Poli-
tics (New York: Norton, 2001).
3. See, for example, William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,”
International Security 24:1 (Summer 1999); Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of
American Leadership (Washington, DC: AEI [American Enterprise Institute] Press,
1996).
4. Every sovereign state theoretically has the right to use force in settling inter-
national disputes. Japan is not considered a “normal state” because it has thus far
renounced this right. According to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Japan for-
ever renounces war “as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force
as means of settling international disputes.” See http:// www.solon.org/Constitutions/
Japan/English/english-Constitution.html.
5. Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies Quarterly], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World
Economics and Politics], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies], Waijiao Xueyuan
Xuebao [Journal of China Foreign Affairs University], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Con-
temporary International Relations], and Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and Manage-
ment]. For more detailed references, see the author’s doctoral dissertation, “China’s
Perception of the United States: An Exploration of China’s Foreign Policy Motiva-
tions,” Ohio State University, 2002.
6. Wang Tiejun, “Kuaguo Ziben yu Meiguo Baquan” [Transnational Capital and
American Hegemony], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 246 (February 2001), p. 75.
7. Xiao Lian, “Shengchanlu he Meiguo de Lingdao Diwei Yishu Pingjie” [On
Productivity and the Leadership Status of the United States], ibid., 139 (March 1992),
p. 73.
8. Xin Benjian, “Meiguo 2002 Niandu Guofang Baogao: Pingxi” [Comment on
U.S. 2002 Annual Defense Report], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 155 (September 2002),
p. 16; Meng Honghua, “Guoji Jizhi yu Meiguo Baquan” [International Regimes and
American Hegemony], Meiguo Yanjiu 15:1 (Spring 2001), pp. 82–83, 85.
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2002), p. 1.
10. Ding Haojin, “Cong Chanye Jiaodu Kan Meiguo Jingji de Weilai” [Perceiving
the Future of the American Economy from Its Industry], Meiguo Yanjiu 6:1 (Spring
1992), p. 31; Wu Tianbo, “Mei Ou Ri Jingji Liliang Duibi jiqi Bianhua Quxiang”
[The Distribution of Economic Power among the United States, Europe, and Japan
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“Zhishi Ziben yu Meiguo de Zhishi Jingji” [Knowledge Capital and the Knowledge
Economy of the United States], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 107 (September 1998), p. 29;
Wang Fan, “Wending de Danji Shijie: Pingjie” [An Analysis and Introduction of The
Stability of Unipolarity], Meiguo Yanjiu 14:1 (Spring 2000), p. 135. The G-7 countries
are Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States.
11. Wei Min, “Mei Ou Ri Jingji Shili Duibi de Bianhua Qushi” [The Trend of
Change in the Distribution of Economic Power among the United States, Europe, and
Japan], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 55 (Spring 1995), p. 34; Gao Feng, “Mei Ri Ou Jingji Shili
Duibi de Xin Dongxiang” [New Trend in the Distribution of Economic Power among
the United States, Japan, and Europe], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 176 (April 1995),
p. 34; Qi Chaoying, “Meiguo Tiaozheng Gaojishu Zhanlue Tanxi” [An Exploration
of the United States’ Adjustment Strategy Regarding High Technology], ibid., 170
120 Chapter 5
(October 1994), pp. 17–20; Liu Saili, “Shixi Meiguo Jingji de Chixu Zengzhang”
[A Tentative Analysis of the United States’ Sustained Economic Growth], Waijiao
Xueyuan Xuebao 52 (Summer 1998), p. 37.
12. Wang Jisi, “Gaochu Bushenghan: Lengzhan hou Meiguo de Shijie Diwei
Chutan” [High Place Is Very Cold: A Preliminary Exploration of the U.S. Status in
the World in the Post–Cold War Era], Meiguo Yanjiu 11:3 (Fall 1997), pp. 15–16;
Wu Yonghong, “Meiguo zai Shijie Jingji zhong Diwei de Bianhua” [The Change in
Status of the United States in the World Economy], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 203
(July 1997), p. 67.
13. Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xin Shiji Baquan Zhanlue yu
Zhongguo Guojia Anquan” [The United States’ Hegemonic Strategy in the New Cen-
tury and China’s National Security], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 234 (February 2000),
p. 54; Wang Jisi, “Gaochu Bushenghan,” p. 16.
14. Wang Weimin, “Meiguo de Beiyue Dongkuo Zhanlue Pingxi” [An Analysis of
the U.S. Strategy for NATO Eastward Expansion], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 87 (Febru-
ary 1997), pp. 6–7; Wu Zhan, “Meiguo Dangqian de Hewuqi Zhengce yu Hecaijun”
[The United States’ Current Nuclear Weapon Policy and Nuclear Reduction], Meiguo
Yanjiu 12:2 (Summer 1998), pp. 7, 10–15.
15. Liu Huaqiu, Qin Zhongmin, “Ping Mei E Di’er Jieduan Xuejian Zhanlue
Wuqi Tiaoyue” [On START II of the United States and Russia], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
48 (Autumn 1993), p. 4.
16. Xie Deyuan, “Geju Bianhua hou de Meiguo Duiwai Zhengce” [U.S. Foreign
Policy after the Change of the Polar Structure], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 31 (Spring
1993), p. 28; Zhang Yeliang, “Shilun Meiguo de Fan Kuosan Zhanlue” [A Tenta-
tive Analysis of the United States’ Anti-proliferation Strategy], Meiguo Yanjiu 10:4
(Winter 1996), p. 79; Su Ge, “Lun Zhong Mei E Guanxi” [On China-U.S.-Russia
Relations], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 89 (May/June 2002), p. 107.
17. Dai Bing, “Meiguo dui Taiwan de Jishu Shuchu” [The United States’ Technol-
ogy Transfer to Taiwan], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 229 (September 1999), p. 77.
18. Wu Zhan, “Meiguo Dangqian de Hewuqi,” pp. 24, 27–28; Ge Lide, “Meiguo
Tuichu Fandao Tiaoyue ji Zhanlue Fandao Xitong de Fazhan Qianjing” [The United
States’ Withdrawal from ABM Treaty and the Prospect of Its Anti-Missile System],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 260 (April 2002), p. 42.
19. Zhang Wenmu, “Lun Zhongguo Haiquan” [On China’s Sea Rights], ibid., 278
(October 2003), p. 13.
20. Hu Angang and Liu Taoxiong, “Zhong Mei Ri Yin Guofang Shili Bijiao”
[National Defensive Power: A Comparison among China, United States, Japan, and
India], Zhanlue yu Guanli 61 (November/ December 2003), pp. 42–44.
21. Li Dongyan, “Ping Lengzhan hou Meiguo de Ganyu Zhengce” [On the United
States’ Intervention Policy in the Post–Cold War Era], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 167
(July 1994), p. 68.
22. Zhou Sanming, “Guoji Huobi Tixi yu Meiguo Baquan [International Currency
System and American Hegemony], ibid., 235 (March 2000), pp. 33–34; Li Desong
and Xu Lisun, “Meiguo Ruhe Liyong Zishen Guoji Youshi Weihu qi Jingji Anquan”
[How the United States Uses Its Own International Advantage to Safeguard Its Eco-
nomic Security], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 118 (August 1999), pp. 29–30; Wang Tiejun,
“Kuaguo Ziben,” pp. 71–76.
23. Wang Jisi, “Gaochu Bushenghan,” pp. 18–24, 34.
24. Liu Wenzhong, “Baquan Zhuyi de Zhuolie Biaoxian: Ping Meiguo Guowuyuan
Renquan Baogao” [An Awkward Demonstration of Hegemonism: On the U.S. State
Department’s Human Rights Report], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 40 (Summer 1995),
pp. 47–49; Pang Zhongying, “Guoji Guanxi zhong de Ruan Liliang ji Qita: Ping
Meiguo Yuesefu Nai de Zhuding Lingdao” [Soft Power in International Relations and
others: On American Scholar Joseph Nye’s Bound to Lead], Zhanlue yu Guanli 21
(March/April 1997), p. 51.
25. Zhang Liangui, “Caoxian de Hewuqi yu Meiguo de Jingcha Juese” [North
Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and the United States’ Police Role], ibid., 60 (September/
October 2003), p. 71.
26. Zhang Liangui, “Caoxian de Hewuqi,” p. 71; Li Zhilin, “Yilake Danqian Anquan
Xingshi zhi Wojian” [The Current Security Situation in Iraq], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
169 (November 2003), p. 39; Qian Qichen, “Yilake Zhanzheng yu Meiguo” [The Iraq
War and the United States], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 74 (Winter 2003), p. 6.
27. Qin Yaqing, “Quanshi Baquan, Zhidu Baquan, yu Meiguo de Diwei” [Power
Hegemony, Institutional Hegemony, and the Status of the United States], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi 173 (March 2004), pp. 7–8.
28. Chu Yukun, “Shilun Zhanhou Meiguo Dijiuci Jingji Shuaitui” [A Tentative
Analysis of the United States’ Ninth Economic Recession after World War Two],
Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 135 (November 1991), p. 10; Sun Haishun, “Lun Mei, Ri,
Xi’ou Guoji Ziben Diwei de Xinbianhua” [On the New Changes in Status of the
International Capital of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe], Meiguo Yanjiu
6:1 (Spring 1992), pp. 91–92; Jin Dexiang, “Why Does the U.S. Decline Relatively?
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 33 (February 1992), p. 13; Ji Wei, “Meiguo Jingji Mianlin de
Xinwenti” [The New Problems Facing the U.S. Economy], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi
158 (October 1993), pp. 6–8; Huang Hong, “Meiguo Quanqiu Zhanlue Tiaozheng
zhong de Neizai Maodun ji Zhiyue Yinsu” [The Intrinsic Contradictions and Con-
straining Factors in the Adjustment of the United States’ Global Strategy], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi 40 (March 1993), p. 32.
29. Ding Haojin, “Cong Chanye Jiaodu,” p. 31; Qi Chaoying, “Meiguo Tiao-
zheng,” p. 17; Wang Haihan, “Meiguo de Quanqiu Zhanlue Mianlin Yanzhong Tiao-
zhan” [The United States’ Global Strategy Faces Serious Challenge], Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu 46 (Winter 1992), p. 23; Xie Deyuan, “Geju Bianhua hou,” pp. 30, 32–33.
30. Cai Tuo, “NGO: Pingpan Meiguo Guoji Yingxiangli de yige Xinxiangdu”
[NGO: A New Dimension to Evaluate the United States’ International Influence],
in Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 173 (March 2004), pp. 24–25; Hu and Liu, “Zhong Mei
Ri Ying Guofang,” pp. 42–44; Peng Lei, “Zhongguo de Jueqi ji Zhongguo yu Qita
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China’s Relations with other Third World Countries], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 284
(April 2004), pp. 79–80.
122 Chapter 5
31. Peng Lei, “Zhonguo de Jueqi,” p. 79; Shi Yinghong, “Meiguo Guoji Quanshi:
Bijiao yu Bianhua” [The United States’ International Power Status: Comparison and
Change], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 173 (March 2004), p. 5.
32. Guo Shixian, “Luelun Zhanhou Meiyuan de Guoji Diwei Jiqi 90 Niandai
Qianjing” [A Brief Analysis of the U.S. Dollar’s International Status and Its Prospects
in the 1990s], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 154 (June 1993), p. 16.
33. Xi Runchang, “Qianxi Mei Ri Ou Sanji Jiegou he Shijie Duojihua Qushi” [A
Preliminary Analysis of U.S.-Japan-Europe Tripolarity and the Trend of the World
toward Multipolarity], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 15 (January 1991), pp. 4, 8.
34. Song Yuhua and Chen Ze, “Meiguo de Ju’e Maoyi Nicha Fenxi” [An Analysis
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(November 2002), p. 64.
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Development of the United States, Europe, and Japan around the Turn of the Century],
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 98 (January 1998) pp. 6–8; Wu Yonghong, “Meiguo zai Shijie
Jingji,” p. 68; Zeng Bingxi, “Dangqian Meiguo Jingji Kuozhang ji duiqi Baquan
Diwei de Yingxiang” [Current American Economic Expansion and the Impact on its
Hegemonic Status], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 73 (Autumn 1999), p. 45; Wang Jisi, “Gaochu
Bushenghan,” p. 33; Song Yuhua and Lu Huajun, “Guanyu Meiguo Waimao Nicha yu
Waimao Diwei de Shikao” [Thinking about the United States’ Foreign Trade Deficit
and Foreign Trade Status], Meiguo Yanjiu 11:3 (Fall 1997), p. 101.
36. Wang Fan, “Wending de Danji Shijie,” p. 143; Sun Shilian, “Meiguo Jingjijie
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Circles on America’s Economic Prospects], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 218 (October
1998), pp. 68–69; Wang Jisi, “Gaochu Bushenghan,” p. 33; Li and Xu, “Meiguo
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Guanxi de Yingxiang” [The United States’ Economic Situation and Its Impact on
China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 114 (April 1999),
p. 16.
37. Zhang Xiaotang, “Ping Meiguo Shuailuolun de Sida Jingji Zhidian” [On the
Four Economic Rationales of the American Decline Thesis], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
197 (January 1997), pp. 69–71; Zeng Bingxi, “Meiguo Xinjingji ji qi dui Shijie Jingji
de Yingxiang” [The New U.S. Economy and Its Impact on the World Economy],
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 65 (May/June 1998), pp. 45–46; Li Changjiu, “Zhongmei Jingmao
Guanxi de Weilai” [The Future of China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi 152 (June 2002), p. 2.
38. Wang Jian, “Jijiang Daolai de Meiyuan Weiji” [The Coming U.S. Dollar Cri-
sis], Zhanlue yu Guanli 29 (July/August 1998), pp. 31–37; Zhou Li, “Quanqiuxing
Shuaitui Jianghui Daolai: Meiguo de Haishishenlou ji Shijie de Weixian” [The Immi-
nence of Global Recession: The Fake U.S. Prosperity and the Danger to the World],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 235 (March 2000), p. 80; Wang Jisi, “Meiguo Baquan de
Luoji” [The Logic of American Hegemony], Meiguo Yanjiu 17:3 (Fall 2003), p. 28.
39. Wang Jisi et al., “Meiguo Guoji Diwei Zhoushi Pinggu” [Assessments on
the Future of the United States’ International Standing], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 173
(March 2004), pp. 2–28.
40. Guo Xuetang, “Baquan Zhouqilun de Pinkun” [The Poverty of the Theory
of Hegemonic Cycles], Meiguo Yanjiu 17:3 (Fall 2003), p. 45; Zhu Feng, “Yilake
Zhanzheng yu Guoji Zhanlue Geju de Xin Taishi” [The Iraq War and Its Implications
for International Strategic Patterns], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 279 (November 2003),
pp. 33–34; Jia Qingguo, “Danbian Zhuyi haishi Duobian Zhuyi” [Unilateralism or
Multilateralism], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 166 (August 2003), p. 10; Lin Limin, “Fuza
Tiaozhan xia de Nengli Xiandu” [Limit of Capability under Complicated Challenge],
ibid., 173 (March 2004), pp. 14–15.
Chapter 6
the American Economy
SHAMBAUGH’S PRESENTATION OF THE CHINESE

PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. ECONOMY
Shambaugh’s Beautiful Imperialist has become a classic in the study of the

American perception of China. One chapter in this book on Chinese percep-
tions of the American economy dealt with this subject in a comprehensive
and in-depth manner.1 Shambaugh discussed the Chinese perception before
the 1990s. What was the Chinese perception during the 1990s? Have there
been any changes since his book was published? Shambaugh’s work is a good
place to start the discussion in this chapter.
Shambaugh’s chapter includes discussions of four different Chinese per-
ceptions of the U.S. economy: the evolution of monopoly and state monopoly
capitalism in the United States; debates on economic crises in the United
States; the U.S. economy during the Carter years; and the U.S. economy
during the Reagan years. The first two parts are from a Chinese Marxist per-
spective, and the second two from a non-Marxist perspective. The four parts
combined “offer a fairly comprehensive assessment” of the Chinese percep-
tions of the American economy. In the following, I will briefly summarize
Shambaugh’s findings.
The concept of economic crisis, according to Shambaugh, was one major
component of Chinese Marxists’ interpretations of the U.S. economy. Sham-
baugh considered one fundamental issue related to economic crises in capital-
ist countries to be the question “why have the frequent crises that afflict the
American economy not led to its collapse?”
Prior to 1979, China’s American watchers were mainly university-based
and Marxist in orientation. They at that time painted a uniform picture of
125
126 Chapter 6
capitalist economies “on the verge of collapse.” By 1979, scholars in key

research institutes had come to present a different perception. There were
two opinion groups among Chinese Marxists. One group argued that all
crises in the United States since World War II have been “periodic” or
“cyclical” (zhouqixing). The other group argued that “some crises had been
‘intermediate’” (zhongjianxing). According to the “cyclical” scholars, crises
had become more and more serious, and would ultimately lead to a “general
crisis, “bringing about “the total collapse of the capitalist system.” According
to “intermediate” scholars, the process leading to the general collapse of capi-
talism was long and full of fluctuations. The United States was able to recover
temporarily from intermediate crises “through government intervention in
the economy.” On the whole, therefore, Marxists painted a bleak picture of
the U.S. economy before the 1990s. They either regarded the U.S. economy
as passing through a series of more and more severe crises until capitalism
finally collapses, or regarded capitalism as doomed to failure, though there
were some temporary recoveries in the process before the total collapse.
Non-Marxists were mainly in various major research institutes. They usu-
ally focused on current or recent events and were thus less ideological. They
were “not necessarily more positive than the Marxists about the prospects for
the American economy” and tended to dwell on many of its negative aspects
in the U.S. economy. Shambaugh presented non-Marxists’ perceptions by
analyzing their works on the U.S. economy during the Carter and Reagan
years.
For non-Marxists, the dominant perception during the Carter years was that
U.S. economy was in an ongoing process of recession, beset by both stagna-
tion and inflation, an unprecedented combination. Occasional successes were
but “sham prosperity,” oil shortages exacerbated the United States’ economic
woes, the economic prospects were bleak and the chances of recovery slim.
Repeated attempts at recovery by the Carter administration were all in vain.
Their assessment of the U.S. economy during the Reagan years was not
much better. During the first two years of this administration, they were full
of doubt and pessimism regarding the U.S. economy. When it recovered and
registered strong growth, their perception became somewhat more positive,
but many of them were cautious about its long-term prospects. They thought
it difficult for Reagan to “fundamentally cure the chronic malady of the U.S.
economy,” and emphasized the heavy price the United States had to pay for its
temporary growth. The one salient bright spot in their perception of the U.S.
economy was the new technological revolution in the United States, but their
acknowledgement of the United States’ economic renewal and technological
renovation was made begrudgingly. On the whole they regarded Reaganomics
as a failure, and believed that maladies such as “high fiscal and trade deficits,
Chinese Perceptions ofthe American Economy 127
Table 6.1 Number of Articles in Each Journal on

the U.S. Economy
Journal Number of Articles

Meiguo Yanjiu 51
Zhanlue yu Guanli 5
Total 160
high interest rates, bankruptcies,” etc. “more than offset any cosmetic gains
from Reaganomics.”
Thus, the Chinese perception of the U.S. economy before the 1990s, as
correctly presented by Shambaugh, was quite bleak, even the record-breaking
peacetime economic expansion during the Reagan administration failed to
impress Chinese authors. Was this still the case during the 1990s? In what
way can a study of Chinese perceptions of the U.S. economy shed light on our
understanding of China’s foreign policy orientation toward the United States?
This chapter will address these two questions.
METHODOLOGY
Sources
This chapter will be based on all articles on the U.S. economy, as indicated
by the titles, in the six journals in the 1991–2000 decade.2 Table 6.1 indicates
the number of articles in each of the six journals constituting the sample (see
Appendix 3 for the titles of these articles).
The articles in Table 6.1 can be further divided into two categories: those
on the overall economy and those on its specific fields. The former refers to
articles reflecting the overall condition of the U.S. economy and the latter
refers to discussion of one or more of its specific aspects. Table 6.2 lists the
number of articles in each category in the six journals.
What to Perceive Regarding the American Economy?

In studying Chinese perceptions of the American economy, one important
question is which perceptions are the most meaningful for the presentation.
128 Chapter 6
Table 6.2 Number of Articles in Each Journal on the Overall U.S.

Economy and on Specific Aspects of the U.S. Economy
Journal Total Overall Economy Specific Field

Meiguo Yanjiu 51 19 32
Zhanlue yu Guanli 5 1 4
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 6 4 2
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 15 10 5
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 9 8 1
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 74 29 45
Total 160 71 89
One effective way is to look at the major differences between the United
States and China in terms of economic system, which obviously is market
economy vs. planned economy. It is therefore essential to study the Chinese
perception of the market economy system.
To see Chinese authors’ perception of market economy, as opposed looking
into what they said about this economic system, it would be more illuminat-
ing to see whether they perceived the economy as actually working well. One
important link between perceptions of an economic system and its economic
performance is whether Chinese authors attributed the success or failure of
the U.S. economy to the economic system, which therefore will be the third
aspect this chapter is going to explore. As will be explained shortly after-
wards, the exploration of the above three aspects may shed light on China’s
foreign policy orientation regarding the United States The answers to another
two questions may also contribute to this effort. They are: whether Chinese
authors regarded it as desirable to learn from the United States in economic
management and whether the United States was perceived as playing a posi-
tive or negative role in the world economy. Table 6.3 lists the aspects of the
Chinese perception of U.S. economy this chapter is going to explore.
Table 6.3 What to Perceive Regarding the American Economy
1. What was the Chinese perception of the market economy system?

2. Was the U.S. economy perceived as doing well?
3. What accounted for the success or failure of the U.S. economy?
4. Did Chinese authors regard it as desirable to learn from the United
States in matters of economic management?
5. What role was the United States perceived to play in the world
economy, especially with relevance to China?
Table 6.4 Inferences from the Chinese Perceptions of the American Economy
Facets of Perception If Inferences

Chinese perceptions If a market economy was Differences in economic systems
of a market economy perceived as a desirable did not constitute a source
approach in economic of conflict between the two
management, countries, and convergence of
China’s economic system on
the American model would be
possible though not inevitable.
If a market economy Differences in economic systems
was perceived as an might be a source of conflict
unsatisfactory approach in between the two countries, and
economic management, convergence of China’s economic
system toward the American
model would be less likely.
Chinese perceptions If the U.S. economy was It would be more likely that
of the performance of perceived as doing well, China would accept a market
U.S. economy economy as a viable form of
economic management and the
economy might well be a source
of cooperation between the two
countries.
If the U.S. economy was It would be less likely that China
perceived as not doing well, would regard a market economy
as a viable form of economic
management and less likely
for economy to be a source of
cooperation between the two
countries.
Chinese perceptions If the reasons for success It would be more likely that
of the reasons for were perceived as related to a market economy would be
the U.S. economic the economic system, regarded as a scientific approach
success of economic management.
If the reasons for success Convergence of China’s economic
were perceived as not system on the American model
related to the economic need not necessarily take place.
system,
Chinese perceptions If the reasons for failure It would be more likely that a
of the reasons for were related to the market economy was regarded
the United States’ economic system, as an erroneous approach to
economic failure economic management.
If the reasons for failure It would be less likely that market
were not related to the economy would be viewed as an
economic system, erroneous approach to economic
management.
(Continued)
130 Chapter 6
Table 6.4 Inferences from the Chinese Perceptions of the American Economy
(Continued)
Whether China If Chinese authors argued Difference in economic system
should learn from for learning from the United could be a source of cooperation
the U.S. in economic States, between the two countries.
management If Chinese authors argued Convergence of the Chinese
for system-related learning, economic system on the
American model would be likely.
If Chinese authors argued Convergence of China’s economic
for non-system-related system on the American model
learning, would not necessarily occur.
If Chinese authors argued Differences in economic system
against learning from the might, but not necessarily, be a
United States, source of conflict.
If Chinese authors argued Convergence of China’s economic
against system-related system on the American model
learning, would be less likely.
If Chinese authors argued It would be uncertain as to
against non-system-related whether convergence of China’s
learning, economic system on the
American model would occur.
China’s response to If the United States was It would be more likely that China
the U.S. economic perceived as playing a would try to further integrate its
performance positive role in world economy with that of the United
economy, States.
If the United States was The economy could be a source
perceived as playing a of conflict between the two
negative role in world countries.
economy,
Inferences
Inferences about China’s foreign policy orientation could be made from
a study of the various aspects of the Chinese perceptions of the American
economy listed in Table 6.3, and will be presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.
CHINESE PERCEPTION OF THE MARKET ECONOMY SYSTEM
In the sample, Chinese authors very seldom directly compared capitalism

with socialism in terms of economic management, but they seemed to have
accepted capitalism as the mainstream of the world economy and as enjoying
an unchallenged status. And the option for China was to join the mainstream.
Table 6.5 Summary Inferences in Chinese Perceptions of the American Economy
Positive Perceptions of the American Negative Perceptions of the American

Economy Economy
Market economy was perceived as a Market economy was perceived as a non-
laudatory form of economic management viable form of economic management
U.S. economy was perceived as doing U.S. economy was perceived as not doing
well well
The reasons for U.S. economic success The reasons for U.S. economic failure
were perceived as related to the economic were perceived as related to the economic
system system
Chinese authors argued for learning from Chinese authors argued against learning
the United States, especially in system- from the United States, especially in
related aspects system-related aspects
The United States was perceived as The United States was perceived as
playing a positive role in the world playing a negative role in the world
economy, especially in the development of economy, especially in the development of
the Chinese economy the Chinese economy
The economy would be more likely to The economy would be less likely to be
be a source of cooperation between the a source of cooperation between the two
two countries, difference in economic countries, the difference in economic
systems would be less likely to be a source system would be more likely to be a
of conflict, and convergence of China’s source of conflict, and convergence of
economic system on the American model China’s economic system on the American
would be more likely model would be less likely
Different from the portrayal in the 1980s, capitalism was described as

being full of vitality, and not at all moribund. Chinese authors generally
agreed that the United States’ economic system encouraged competitiveness
and was conducive to robust economic development. One author suggested
that the American economic model was actually one institutional foundation
of U.S. economic hegemony in the world.3
Chinese authors seldom displayed ebullient enthusiasm over capitalism
itself, but they were not hesitant in heaping lavish praise on the various under-
pinnings of capitalism. They were particularly positive about free trade. Chi-
nese authors had generally accepted the merits of institutions and practices
closely associated with capitalism, such as the United States’ Federal Reserve
System, its currency market, its social security system, etc. They argued that
the United States’ almost perfect legal system constituted an important source
of the United States’ sustained economic development. Positive evaluation of
sub-level management practices can be regarded as cumulative affirmation of
the macro-level system.
132 Chapter 6
Some aspects of market economy that were severely denounced in earlier

decades were viewed in a positive light in the 1990s. Thus, annexation was
not regarded as a cruel approach for the strong to take advantage of the weak,
but as an effective and healthful approach in business development. The rich
were presented as philanthropists rather than as exploiters of the poor.
Chinese authors often did find problems in the U.S. economy. One notable
problem was the cyclical crises which were perceived as inherent in the
system. But more often, Chinese authors did not associate problems in U.S.
economy, such as the United States’ relative decline, the weakened U.S. dol-
lar, or the trouble in long-term capital management, with the capitalist eco-
nomic system itself. Instead, it seemed to them that most of the problems with
the U.S. economy could be solved within the capitalist system.4
Chinese authors sometimes described some socialist elements in the U.S.
economy, such as agricultural cooperatives and the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity. It seemed to them that socialist elements could co-exist comfortably in
the context of the dominant capitalist economic system, and could also be
quite successful.
On the whole, Chinese authors’ evaluation of the American economic
model in the 1990s was quite positive. They not only had a generally favor-
able image of the market economy system, but many of them also advocated
adopting various aspects of the system in China’s economic management,
which will be discussed in the section on whether China should learn from
the United States.
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE PERFORMANCE

OF THE U.S. ECONOMY
To explore the Chinese perceptions of the performance of the U.S. economy,

we may look first at articles on the overall U.S. economy. Table 6.6 indicates
the number of articles in each journal conveying a positive or negative per-
ception as to the performance of the U.S. economy. An article was coded as
positive when it presented the U.S. economy as more successful than prob-
lematic, and it was coded as negative when the U.S. economy was presented
as more problematic than successful. When it was difficult to decide whether
an article should be coded as positive or negative, it was coded as neutral.
Overall Picture of the United States’ Economic Performance

From Table 6.6, it is obvious that most articles on the overall U.S. economy
in each of the six journals regarded the U.S. economy as quite successful, and
Table 6.6 Chinese Perception of the Performance of the U.S. Economy (1)
Positive/Negative
Journal Subtotal Positive Neutral Negative
Ratio
Meiguo Yanjiu 19 7 10 2 7/2
Zhanlue yu Guanli 1 1 0 0 1/0
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 29 19 3 7 19/7
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 8 5 0 3 5/3
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 4 3 1 0 3/0
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 10 6 2 2 6/2
Total 71 41 16 14 41/14
thus were in striking contrast to the perceptions before the 1990s as justifiably
presented by Shambaugh.
To repeat the process regarding articles on specific fields in U.S. economy,
refer to Table 6.7.
When we look at articles on specific fields in the U.S. economy, the pic-
ture is quite different from Table 6.6. In one journal (Guoji Wenti Yanjiu),
the U.S. economy was presented as simply negative, and in another three
(Zhanlue yu Guanli, Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao, and Xiandai Guoji Guanxi),
it was presented as neutral. As too few relevant articles in these four journals
were available in the sample, I would say the image of U.S. economy in these
articles was non-representative. If we combine all the articles across the
various journals, we may still find that an overwhelming number of articles
conveyed a positive rather than a negative perception of the performance of
the U.S. economy in various specific fields. If we further combine articles on
the overall U.S. economy and those on specific fields of it, we may conclude
Positive-Negative
Journal Sub-total Positive Neutral Negative
Ratio
Meiguo Yanjiu 32 17 11 4 17/4
Zhanlue yu Guanli 4 1 2 1 1/1
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 45 33 3 9 33/9
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 1 0 0 1 0/1
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 2 1 0 1 1/1
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 5 2 1 2 2/2
Total 89 54 17 18 54/18
134 Chapter 6
Positive/
Journal Total Overall Specific Positive Neutral Negative Negative
Ratio
Meiguo Yanjiu 51 19 32 24 21 6 24/6
Zhanlue yu
Guanli 5 1 4 2 2 1 2/1
Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi 74 29 45 52 6 16 52/16
Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu 9 8 1 5 0 4 5/4
Waijiao Xueyuan
Xuebao 6 4 2 4 1 1 4/1
Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi 15 10 5 8 3 4 8/4
Total 160 71 89 95 33 32 95/32
that a great majority of articles in each of these journals, except Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu, still conveyed a perception of prosperity (see Table 6.8). This conclu-
sion is supported by the reasoning that in evaluating the Chinese perception
of the United States’ economic performance as a whole, articles focusing on
the overall economy should be regarded as carrying more weight than articles
on specific fields.
To better understand the Chinese perception of the performance of the
U.S. economy, it is advisable to go into further detail. In the following, I will
first present the positive Chinese description of the United States’ economic
performance, then focus on the negative one, and finally combine the two for
an overall assessment. The following analysis will be based only on articles
on the overall U.S. economy.
Detailed Description of the United States’ Economic Performance

Looking further into the content of Chinese articles, we will find that the
majority of Chinese authors in the sample painted a highly rosy picture of
the U.S. economy. In the following, I will present the picture in two ways:
how Chinese authors perceived the success in various aspects of the U.S.
economy, and how Chinese authors compared the U.S. economy with that of
other countries.
Regarding the overall performance of the U.S. economy, Chinese authors
observed that the United States had made great progress in economic
structural reform in the 1990s, thus providing a relaxed macro-environment

for economic activity.5.What struck Chinese authors the most was its sustained
and strong growth in the 1990s. As the decade progressed, their descriptions
of the U.S. economy became more and more enthusiastic. In 1994, some
Chinese scholars noticed steady and moderate economic growth. In 1995,
“rapid growth” was used to describe the U.S. economy. In 1997, scholars in
the sample pointed out that the U.S. economic growth was not only stable but
its growth rate had steadily increased. One scholar remarked that U.S. eco-
nomic growth was also a high-quality one, with high interest rates and a low
inflation rate. In 1998, Chinese scholars began to notice the unusual duration
of the economic growth. They pointed out that the continued growth in the
U.S. economy had greatly lengthened the economic cycle, and that the pres-
ent cycle had become one of the longest in U.S. history. They marveled that
after such a long period of growth, the U.S. economy was able to maintain its
strong momentum and show no sign of slowing down. And finally in 2000,
Chinese scholars remarked that such sustained economic growth was quite
rare and broke the growth record in U.S. history.6
Conforming to the rosy picture of the overall U.S. economy, the Chinese
description of various aspects of the U.S. economy was also tinted with
enthusiasm and optimism. In the following, I will present the various parts
that made up the overall rosy picture of U.S. economic performance.
1. The United States’ achievements in science and technology had long been the
object of Chinese admiration, and continued to fascinate Chinese scholars
in the 1990s. They pointed out that the United States’ lead in science and
technology had increased in the 1990s, and it now led other countries by far
in this area. For instance, “the United States’ computer software accounted
for 59 percent in the world in 1985, and 70 percent in 1992.”7
2. Regarding traditional industries like automobile, steel etc., Chinese authors
observed that the United States in the 1990s had fully recovered its com-
petitiveness. Japan had already lost its leading position in manufacturing,
and “the United States’ production rate in this field was higher than Japan’s
and Germany’s by 17 percent and 21 percent respectively. At the same
time, its labor cost was lower than these two countries by 20 percent and
30 percent respectively.”8
3. U.S. achievements in agriculture were also regarded as extraordinary,
since “the United States was able to feed its entire population with a mere
2.6 percent of its labor force. In China over one-third of the labor worked
in the agricultural sector.”9
4. The United States was not only perceived as having greatly increased its in-
vestments in fixed assets, especially in information technology equipment,
136 Chapter 6
but was also perceived as the world’s No. 1 in foreign investment.10

Company profit in the United States had also increased.
5. Several authors mentioned the remarkable achievements of the United
States in promoting employment. It was perceived as having kept unem-
ployment low, and its employment rate was higher than what economists
termed “full employment.”11
6. At the same time that employment increased, U.S. labor’s production rate
increased, again becoming No. 1 in the world.12
7. The United States’ remarkable successes in exports did not escape Chi-
nese authors’ attention either. They pointed out that the United States’
national export strategy had proved to be quite successful, and the United
States’ “foreign trade deficit had markedly decreased.”13 Its exports in-
creased rapidly, growing much faster than Japan’s, Germany’s, etc., and
the United States was in the late 1990s the unchallenged No. 1 exporting
country in the world.
8. A lot of Chinese scholars mentioned the remarkable achievements of the
United States in finance. They pointed out that in the 1990s, “the United
States’ financial deficits were greatly reduced.” The United States was able
to keep inflation low. Its stock market was strong. Interest rates were low
and steady. The United States’ “financial status continued improving,” and
“it had again become the leading country in international finance,” while
Japan had lost its leading status. “The United States’ share of world stock
value had increased from 29 percent in 1988 to 37 percent in 1993 . . .
again assuming the leading position in international finance.”14
Chinese authors in the sample often compared the United States’ eco-
nomic performance with that of other countries, and quite a few Chinese
scholars regarded the U.S. economy as doing much better than Europe and
Japan. One scholar pointed out that in micro, medium, and macro levels, the
U.S. economy surpassed all other developed countries.15. One major reason
the U.S. economy was considered as doing better than other major Western
countries was its growth rate. Chinese authors repeatedly emphasized that the
U.S. growth rate had obviously been higher than that of other major Western
countries, was often higher than all the other major Western countries, and
was occasionally surpassed only by one of the major Western countries.
Another important area in which Chinese authors perceived a better per-
formance of the U.S. economy than that of other countries was its competi-
tiveness. Chinese authors pointed out that the United States greatly improved
its international competitiveness in the 1990s. Several scholars in the sample
mentioned that the United States was either obviously more competitive than
other major industrialized countries or was actually the most competitive
country in the world. In the economic competition among Western countries,

the United States led in almost every major area.16 Occasionally Chinese
authors would include non-Western countries in the comparison, claiming
that the United States’ economic performance sometimes “made even emerg-
ing markets, which were full of vitality in the early 1990s, look pale by
comparison.”17
As a result of the great success of the U.S. economy, Chinese scholars
remarked that the gap in overall CNP (comprehensive national power)
between the United States and other major Western countries widened. “The
United States re-established its leadership position in the global economy,”
and “had become more obviously a superpower in the world economy.” The
future of the U.S. economy was also perceived as quite rosy, since the United
States enjoyed absolute leadership status in the three areas decisive in eco-
nomic competition: technology, quality of workers, and system.18
Chinese scholars summarized the great success of the U.S. economy in var-
ious ways. As one scholar put it, “1 steady and 3 lows: . . . steady economic
growth; low unemployment, low inflation, and low interest rates.” Another
scholar put it as “3 highs and 2 lows”: high economic growth rate, high labor
production rate, and high enterprise efficiency; low unemployment, and low
inflation. A third scholar summarized it as “3 highs and 3 lows”: high eco-
nomic growth rate, high comprehensive competitiveness, and high enterprise
profit; low unemployment, low inflation, and low financial deficit. And a
fourth scholar presented a summary of 3 highs, 3 lows, and 3 increases: high
stock market, high consumer confidence, and high dollar exchange rate; low
financial deficit, low unemployment, and low inflation; increased export,
increased profit, and increased international competitiveness. So successful
was the U.S. economy in Chinese eyes that several scholars enthusiastically
evoked the same Chinese proverb to compare the U.S. economy in the world
to “the only flower in the garden that is blossoming.” One scholar simply used
“wonder” to describe it.19
Only 14 articles in the sample presented the U.S. economy more negatively
than positively.20 They were mostly written in 1991–1993 and concerned the
brief recession during the first Bush administration. These articles mentioned
that in the early 1990s, the U.S. economy fell into recession: “The red light
turned on in various economic indicators.”21 Industrial production greatly
declined, unemployment rapidly rose, and there were serious dangers in the
banking system. Economic growth slowed, and workers’ living standards
suffered.
Some argued that this recession was more serious in some respects than
those in the past, since it did not follow an overheated economy but followed
a period when the market was already weak. The service industry, which in
138 Chapter 6
the past was largely immune to recession, this time also suffered. Real estate,
which suffered little in the past from recession and which usually has a dif-
ferent cycle, this time not only fell into a recession, but one that occurred at
the same time as the general economic recession. One author summarized
the woes in U.S. economy during this period as 3 highs and 3 lows: high
financial deficit, high trade deficit, and high national debt; low saving, low
accumulation, and low investment. But some others pointed out that this was
just a moderate recession. Some Chinese authors were pessimistic about the
prospects for a quick recovery from this recession. They pointed out that the
two traditional approaches to dealing with recession may not work well this
time. Interest rates were already too low to be lowered any further, and a high
national debt made it difficult to stimulate the economy through increasing
government expenditure.22
When the U.S. economy began to recover from the recession, some Chi-
nese authors were not optimistic about its prospects. One pointed out that “20
months after the recession ended, the U.S. economy was still no good; unem-
ployment was still increasing” and the economy went up and down. Another
pointed out that it was a recovery without an increase in employment, and the
U.S. government faced serious difficulties in the management of the macro-
economy. The U.S. economic structure was in urgent need of adjustment.
There were more and more trade disputes with foreign countries, and the
United States’ competitiveness in manufacturing industry was declining.23
Some scholars related this recession to the famous U.S. decline thesis: the
United States’ superiority was decreasing—in GNP, per capita GNP, economic
growth, foreign trade, foreign reserves, status as a creditor/debtor nation, and
science and technology. The United States was declining, and Japan was
an emerging economic big power, with adequate capital, and sophisticated
applied science and technology. “The United States’ share of GDP in the
Western world declined from 52.59 percent in 1960 to 33.2 percent in 1990,”
and it “turned from the largest creditor country to the largest debtor country.”
As late as 1995, one scholar still argued that the process of relative decline in
U.S. economic power would continue on a long-term basis, although he also
mentioned that the United States was still the sole superpower, and would
remain so into the foreseeable future.24
When we consider the Chinese perceptions of the United States’ economic
performance as a whole, we may conclude that the dominant Chinese per-
ception in the 1990s was that U.S. economy was doing very well. First, as
demonstrated in Tables 6.3 and 6.5, many more articles were optimistic than
pessimistic about the U.S. economy. Second, articles optimistic about U.S.
economy covered the most part of the 1990s while articles pessimistic about
it covered mostly the brief recession in the early 1990s. Besides, articles
optimistic about the U.S. economy tended to use highly enthusiastic terms to
describe its success while articles pessimistic about U.S. economy often used
moderate terms to describe the recession.
ACCOUNTING FOR THE UNITED STATES’ ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE
As the dominant picture of the U.S. economy for the Chinese was highly
positive, in this section, I will present the Chinese explanations of why the
U.S. economy had been so successful and ignore their interpretations of the
United States’ economic problems in the early 1990s. In accordance with the
inferential logic in Tables 6.4 and 6.5, the discussion can be divided into two
categories: reasons not closely associated with capitalism and reasons closely
associated with capitalism. I will base the discussion in this section only on
articles on the overall performance of the U.S. economy.
A. Reasons not closely associated with capitalism. In explaining why the
U.S. economy had been so successful, Chinese authors often pointed to
things not closely associated with the United States’ capitalist system.
Their explanations tended to fall into the following four categories.
1. The United States’ great emphasis on science and technology. They

pointed out that the United States respected knowledge; emphasized
the importance of education; encouraged invention, technological inno-
vations, and scientific development; and managed to attract talent from
other countries. The United States had made substantial investments in
information technology and developed an information super highway,
and had thus been able to upgrade from an industrial economy to an
information economy. In developing high technology, it relied not only
on big businesses and the government, but also on venture capital and
small businesses.
2. Economic relations with foreign countries. Chinese authors pointed
out that globalization was an important reason for the United States’
economic success. The completion of GATT negotiations, the forma-
tion of NAFTA, and enhanced Asia-Pacific economic cooperation had
all contributed to the United States’ economic prosperity. Depreciation
of the U.S. dollar and the implementation of strategic trade policy had
promoted U.S. exports. And the greatly increased exports contributed
significantly to the United States’ economic prosperity.
3. Management of the U.S. economy. Quite a number of Chinese observers
gave President Clinton credit for the prosperity of the U.S. economy.
They pointed out that the United States’ macro-management was an
140 Chapter 6
important reason for the success of the U.S. economy. They argued that
the United States was able to achieve scientific management through
management reform or renovation. The United States’ successful man-
agement of its economy included adjustment of its overall economic
structure, adjustment in specific industries, micro-level enterprise re-
form, re-organization, innovation, improving working equipment, etc.
Big business annexations and economies of scale, better government-
enterprise cooperation, and coordination of various sectors in the na-
tional economy were considered as among the reasons contributing to
the United States’ prosperity. The United States’ appropriate financial
and monetary policy and its industrial development policy were also re-
garded as having contributed to the United States’ economic success.
4. Others. In addition to the above three major categories, quite a few
Chinese authors pointed to peace dividends—reduction in military
expenditure after the end of the Cold War—as an important explana-
tion. Other explanations included the result of the economic cycle,
hard working, always having a sense of crisis, “supporting medium and
small enterprises, protecting agriculture, improving infrastructure,”25
and rich natural resources.
B. Reasons closely associated with capitalism. In explaining the United
States’ economic success, some authors also pointed to things closely as-
sociated with capitalism. They included mainly a free and sophisticated
market system, little state intervention in economy, and a legal system
supporting the functioning of the market system. More details regarding
system-related reasons accounting for the United States’ economic pros-
perity will be discussed in the next section.
CAN CHINA LEARN FROM THE UNITED STATES’

ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT?
The United States as a Model

An exploration of Chinese perceptions of the U.S. economy quickly presents
to readers an image of the United States as a model. In the sample, 19 articles
specifically mentioned that China should learn from the United States in eco-
nomic management; 8 articles pointed out that China should learn selectively
from the United States; 4 articles strongly suggested that China should learn
from the United States, though they did not specifically say so. Sometimes,
Chinese authors suggested that China should draw lessons from the United
States’ lack of better results. Occasionally, Chinese authors argued that China
should not learn from the United States. On the whole, the overall enthusi-
astic portrayal of the United States’ economic success can be regarded as an
implicit endorsement of learning from the United States. Let us probe into
the details to see what Chinese authors accepted or rejected with regard to
the United States’ economic management and its economic system. In the fol-
lowing, I will focus mainly on aspects related to the United States’ economic
system.
System-Related Learning
Among the 33 articles on the U.S. economy touching specifically on the
topic of whether China should learn from the United States, 14 articles con-
tained information regarding Chinese authors’ assessment of the capitalist
system. They can be grouped under four broad categories: market system,
private property, legal system for a capitalist economy, and other trappings
of capitalism.
Chinese authors generally accepted the merit of the market economy sys-
tem. In explaining why the United States was able to achieve great success in
economic development, Su Ge argued that the market economy system was
one reason.26 Similarly, Wang Hao and Xing Daoyong explained that it was
the sophisticated market that led to continuing breakthroughs in science and
technology, and new productive forces which ensured the sustained growth of
the U.S. economy. They argued that “it is especially important for China to
establish and bring to perfection a market economy system.”27 In discussing
the performance of the U.S. economy in specific fields, Chinese authors often
revealed their preference for a market economy system. Guan Li and Liu
Ruling attributed the rapid development of the United States’ risk investment,
among other things, to a consummate market environment.28 In discussing
the United States’ IRA and reform of the retirement system in China, Xiao
Chen suggested turning the retirement problem over to society rather than
having the government take care of it, thus moving from a socialist to a more
capitalist problem solving approach.29 Wei Wei remarked with admiration
that “the United States has a most sophisticated market economy, actually
a model market economy, and China should learn from the United States in
some aspects of its economic system.”30 Chinese authors’ attribution of U.S.
economic prosperity to its capitalist market system was also apparent in quite
a number of other articles in the sample.
One key feature of a socialist economic system is state ownership of the
means of production, while one key feature of a capitalist economic system
is the private ownership of them. To advocate protection of property rights in
142 Chapter 6
China therefore could be regarded as advocating moving away from a social-

ist approach to a capitalist approach. In the limited sample of articles calling
for learning from the United States, several Chinese authors emphasized the
need to respect property rights. One author argued that the industrialization of
the United States and Japan had been quite successful, and one of the bases
of their industrialization was a clearly defined system of property rights, and
it should also be a sine qua non for China. Through analysis of the evolu-
tion of the United States’ banking system and problems in China’s banking
system, Ma Hongxia claimed that one fundamental problem to be solved was
“the reform of property rights in the banking system.” Guan Li and Liu Rul-
ing believed that risk investment had made an important contribution to the
development of the U.S. economy, and one of the reasons for its success was
a sophisticated property rights market.31
Chinese authors’ preference for moving away from the planned economy
could also be seen in their discussion of the legal background of U.S.
economic development. Su Ge claimed that the development of the U.S.
economy took place against the background of a legal system that had been
continually improved and the United States’ market economy system was
formalized through a national constitution.32 Li Li believed that U.S. eco-
nomic development did not follow an anarchic pattern. And it was a whole
series of laws, including the 77 major laws concerning competition, business
ethics, environmental protection, and labor protection, that provided order to
the development of the U.S. economy.33 The most enthusiastic and thorough
treatment of the legal basis of U.S. economic development was Xiao Chen’s
article, which discussed how the U.S. legal system ensured national economic
efficiency. It argued that the checks and balances in the United States’ legal
system were capable of turning out “an automatic mechanism for efficiency”
and “an automatic mechanism for correcting mistakes.” The United States’
social and legal systems encouraged each individual to reveal his prefer-
ences, generously rewarded anyone who made contributions, and encouraged
productive rather than distributive efforts. The United States’ legal system
protected cooperation and market competition. And the author regarded the
market mechanism as the most outstanding achievement of the human race.
And the U.S. government had also been designed in such a way as to ensure
efficiency in the functioning of the government itself and of society.34
Regarding the other trappings of the United States’ economic system, Chi-
nese authors in the sample mentioned the following as worthy of learning:
business annexation, which Chinese scholars, especially Marxist scholars,
regarded as a key feature of capitalism leading to monopoly; investment
funds; and the stock (share) system.
What Not to Learn?
In the above discussion, we can see that the overwhelming Chinese prefer-
ence was to move toward a more market-oriented economic system. This
perception, ironically, was also present when Chinese authors argued that in
some respects China should not learn from the United States.
When they sometimes insisted that China should not copy some U.S.
practices exactly, the reason was usually not because they regarded the U.S.
practices as unsatisfactory, but because China was not yet in the position to
adopt the U.S. model. Regarding, for example, whether China should copy
the United States’ IRA, one Chinese author lamented that China could not yet
adopt this approach because the IRA “set strict requirements on a country’s
market environment, financial environment, the quality of tax-payers, and the
quality of the public authorities.”35
China’s current social and economic systems had also been mentioned as
reasons why China could not copy U.S. practice exactly, for instance, in the
management of state-owned enterprises and in the management of the central
bank. But in the case of the latter, Chinese authors also pointed out that the
U.S. practice was the direction in which China should move, changing China-
style direct control into U.S.-style indirect control. Again, China was seen as
not yet able to do so only because conditions were not yet ripe. In another
article about commercial banking, the author pointed out that because all the
commercial banks in the United States were private, China could not exactly
copy the U.S. pattern. The author, however, also pointed out a middle ground
for China’s state to manage the economy in a more market-oriented way:
through shares owned by the state.36 In one article, the author did mention the
different economic and political systems in China and the United States as a
reason why China could not copy exactly the U.S. approach. But as the author
mentioned nothing about why China should stick to its own system, it gave
an impression that the author just wanted to take China’s local conditions into
consideration, and did not point to any merit in China’s existing system.37
Some authors pointed out aspects of the United States which China should
never copy whatever the change in China’s domestic conditions, such as
internal exploitation and oppression and foreign aggression.38 Here we see
remnants of Marxist thinking among some Chinese observers.
On the whole, when Chinese authors argued that China should not copy
some U.S. economic practices, they did not reject the United States’ eco-
nomic system per se. They still regarded U.S. practice as the direction in
which China should move. When they mentioned that China should not learn
from the United States in some respects, they more often regretted China’s
144 Chapter 6
not being in a position to adopt U.S. practice than they rejected the U.S.
approach for its own sake. Throughout the sample, abundant evidence was
available about how China should learn from the United States.
AFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES’

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
In exploring Chinese perceptions of the U.S. economy, one important ques-

tion is how Chinese observers react to its ups and downs. In other words,
did they welcome U.S. economic prosperity or did they resent it? As can
be seen in the section about U.S. economic performance, the profusion of
enthusiastic terms in Chinese observers’ description of the great prosper-
ity of the U.S. economy demonstrates their significant admiration of the
country’s economic vitality. A further question is how they perceive the rel-
evance of U.S. economic performance to the well-being of other countries,
including China.
The United States as a Leader

An exploration of relevant materials indicates that the United States was
perceived as a leader in the world economy. First, the United States was seen
as a leader in promoting world prosperity. When the U.S. economy did well,
other countries benefited. When the economy of other countries was not
doing well, the United States was perceived as a leader to play the role of
stimulating world economy. For instance, the United States was perceived as
having played this role successfully in 1993, as well as in 1998. Sometimes,
the United States was perceived even as an altruistic leader: its increased
trade deficit was regarded as a strategy not only to promote U.S. economic
expansion but also to promote world economic recovery. In the case of 1993,
the United States’ greater trade deficit was perceived as having contributed
significantly to the recovery of the world economy, even at the expense of
slowing down its own growth rate by 0.5 percent.39
Second, the United States was seen as a leader in trade liberalization.
Global trade liberalization was perceived to be the United States’ persistent
objective. One author claimed that, for a relatively long time to come, no other
country could substitute for the United States in this respect. He perceived
the United States’ trade strategy as “helping to relax the tense atmosphere in
international trade, and promoting further trade liberalization.”40
Third, the United States was seen as a leader in setting the future direction
of the world economy. The “new economy” that originated in the United States
in the 1990s was perceived as representing the direction the rest of the world
would follow. One author cited President Clinton’s speech approvingly: the
United States’ “new economy” symbolized the future direction of the world
economy, and would have a profound influence on the world economy. The
author pointed out that the significance of the information revolution could
be compared to that of the industrial revolution several hundred years earlier.
It was perceived as being beneficial not only to Western countries but also to
developing countries. In the case of China, the United States’ new economy
was perceived as offering an approach and an opportunity for China to main-
tain sustained economic growth into the 21st century.41
The Relevance of the United States’ Economic Prosperity to Other

Countries
Most Chinese authors in the sample who made relevant observations seemed
to welcome the United States’ economic prosperity rather than the reverse.
When the U.S. economy was prosperous, one author pointed out, it provided
the biggest market for East Asia and other countries in the world. Another
author shared the opinion: moderate growth in the U.S. economy was “help-
ful for maintaining the relative stability of the Western and world economy,
and the stability of international commodity and capital markets. It is also
favorable for China to expand exports and promote economic growth.” The
U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement was perceived as quite beneficial to the
U.S. economy. Its impact on the world economy was regarded as positive: it
would “urge the greater European market to attract participation from devel-
oping countries,” and promote cooperation in developed and newly developed
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese authors perceived increasing
interdependence between the United States and other countries in the Asia-
Pacific region.42
But when the U.S. economy was not doing well, other countries’ economies
also suffered. One author pointed out that if the U.S. stock market fell, it dealt
a heavy blow to the East Asian and European markets as well.43 Quite a num-
ber of authors associated the size of the U.S. trade deficit with the well-being
of other countries. It was the United States’ huge trade deficit which made
the United States impose sanctions on other countries, especially countries in
the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese authors did not like the United States’ greater
protectionism in the 1990s. They mentioned that the United States bargained
harder and harder in this respect in the 1990s, not only with developed coun-
tries such as Japan, France, and Germany, but also with developing countries,
which they regarded as demonstrating a lack of good manners on the part
of the United States as the sole superpower. They nonetheless attributed the
phenomenon to the great increase of the United States’ trade deficit.
146 Chapter 6
The status of the U.S. dollar was also often associated with the well-being
of other countries. Chinese authors believed that the relative stability of the
U.S. dollar was undoubtedly beneficial to the world economy. One author
claimed that one reason why the world economy was so prosperous in the
1960s was the stable exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and other major
Western currencies, and the successive dollar crises in the 1970s invariably
exerted a negative impact on the world economy. When the dollar was stable
in the 1980s, the world economy registered eight years of sustained growth.
The author predicted therefore that the dollar crisis in mid-1990s would
undoubtedly suppress world economic growth.44 The stability of the U.S.
dollar was associated with the expansion of world trade, since it was the most
important currency for international trade. Chinese authors asserted that the
stability of the U.S. dollar was important not only to developed countries
but also to developing countries. If the U.S. dollar depreciated, developing
countries would suffer heavy losses in their foreign reserves. The dollar crisis
in the mid-1990s again caused heavy losses to China because it had heavy
debt in Japanese yen. Chinese authors deplored the fact that in the 1986–1994
period, whenever there was a dollar depreciation, China suffered losses vary-
ing from one billion to several billion. The authors expected that the dollar
crisis in the mid-1990s would cost China at least US$10 billion.45
On the whole, the overwhelming majority of Chinese authors making
relevant observations welcomed economic prosperity in the United States,
regarding it as beneficial not only to other countries in the world, but also
to China. Some Chinese authors in the sample, however, also perceived the
growing importance of euro in the world economy as a positive development.
One author believed that the emergence of the euro might lead to change
in the international currency system, was favorable to the stability of inter-
national currency exchange rates, and might balance the hegemony of U.S.
dollar. He nonetheless was quick to point out that if the euro could compete
with the U.S. dollar, the United States “might give up dollar depreciation as
an approach to balance its trade deficit, and resort to other approaches. And
if the new approaches were strongly protectionist, it might arouse imitation
in other countries.” Such a scenario was considered unfavorable to China’s
efforts to participate in international economic competition.46
CONCLUSION
To see what conclusion we can draw from the evidence presented above, let
us first summarize the findings in this chapter. In terms of the Chinese percep-
tion of the market economy, evidence presented in this chapter indicates that
most Chinese scholars enthusiastically embraced the market economy not
only as the mainstream of world economic practice, but also as a highly suc-
cessful approach to economic management. Chinese scholars not only had a
positive assessment of the market economy system as a whole, but they were
also quite positive about the sub-level practices of the system. Even though
they regarded the U.S. economy as not without problems, they seemed to
agree that most of the problems could be solved within the framework of the
system.
As for their assessment of U.S. economic performance, many more articles
focused on the United States’ economic successes than on failures. The
United States was perceived as not only having achieved sustained growth
in the 1990s, but also as being much more competitive than other countries,
especially comparable economies in Europe and Japan. The evidence in this
chapter represents a sharp departure from the perception before the 1990s. It
might be significant to point out that during the Reagan administration, the
United States’ economic success was comparable to that during the Clinton
administration in the 1990s. Thus, it was quite likely that the difference
between the perception presented by Shambaugh and what was presented in
this chapter indicates much more a change in the perceiver (Chinese authors)
than a change in the perceived (the United States’ economic performance).
Chinese authors attributed the United States’ great economic success to
both the United States’ economic system and to factors not necessarily related
to that system. Some scholars regarded the United States’ market economy
system as having played an important role in its success story, but many
more scholars focused on non-system-related factors, which include mainly
the United States’ great emphasis on science and technology, its effective
management of economic relations with other countries, the successful man-
agement of the economy by the U.S. government and businesses, and other
factors such as peace dividends and Americans’ hard work.
Many Chinese scholars straightforwardly advocated learning from the
United States in the area of economic management. They did not hesitate to
recommend adopting U.S. practices closely related with the capitalist eco-
nomic system, especially the market, property rights, the legal background of
market economy, and other practices such as annexation and the stock system.
Many scholars also advised against proceeding too rapidly in adopting U.S.
economic practices. In doing so, however, they usually did not denigrate
the United States’ economic practices, but more often admitted that China’s
local conditions were not yet ripe for hasty acceptance of the United States’
approach.
Chinese scholars on the U.S. economy usually welcomed U.S. economic
prosperity. They had an image of the United States as a leader in world econ-
omy, playing a vitally important role in promoting world prosperity and eco-
nomic liberalization, and setting the direction for the future world economy.
148 Chapter 6
They agreed that when the U.S. economy was prosperous, other countries,
including China, benefited, and when the U.S. economy was in trouble, other
countries, including China, also suffered.
An exploration of the Chinese perceptions of the U.S. economy may shed
light on China’s foreign policy orientation toward the United States. Accord-
ing to the inferential logic of Tables 6.4 and 6.5, given the evidence presented
in this chapter and summarized in the section above, we may conclude that the
economy was quite likely a source of cooperation between the United States
and China and that differences in economic system did not constitute a source
of conflict between the two countries, making it quite likely that convergence
of China’s economic system with the American model would occur.
Notes
1. Shambaugh, pp. 85–136, 1991.

2. As in all the other empirical chapters in this book, the titles of articles in the
sample should specifically contain words like “United States,” “American”, or the
names of U.S. leaders, except for the case of Meiguo Yanjiu, where all articles focus
on the United States.
3. Lang Ping, “Qian Xi Meiguo ‘Xinjingji’ ” [A Preliminary Analysis of the
United States’ “New Economy”], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (April 1998), pp. 30–31.
4. Xie Yao, “Meiguo Zheci Jingji Shuaitui de Tedian ji qi Qianjing” [The Char-
acteristics and Prospect of the Economic Recession in the United States], Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu (February 1991), pp. 6–8; Zhang Xuesong, “Meiguo ‘Xin Qiye Wenhua’ gei
Wo Guo Qiye Fazhan Dailai de Qishi” [The Relevance of the United States’ “New
Business Culture” to the Development of Our Businesses], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(March 1997), pp. 46–47.
5. Gao Feng, “Mei Ri Ou Jingji Shili Duibi de Xindongxiang” [New Distribution
of Economic Power Among the United States, Japan, and Europe], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (April 1995), pp. 33–34; Song Yuhua, “Meiguo Jingji jiang zai Ruanzhuolu
zhong Jixu Kuozhan” [The U.S. Economy Will Continue Expansion in Soft Landing],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (March 1998), p. 22.
6. Tao Jian, Gu Wenyan, and Ke Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji Jinru Chixu Shidu Zeng-
zhangqi” [The U.S. Economy Entering into Sustained Moderate Development], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (January 1994), pp. 6–7; Gao Feng, “Mei Ri Ou Jingji Shili Duibi,”
p. 32; Ke Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji reng chu Wenhe Zengzhangqi” [U.S. Economy Is
Still in Moderate Growth Period], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February 1997), p. 58;
Zhang Xiaotang, “Ping Meiguo Shuailuolun de Sida Jingji Zhidian” [On the Four
Economic Pivots of the U.S. Declining Theory], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January
1997), p. 71; Lang Ping, “Qian Xi Meiguo ‘Xinjingji,’” pp. 28–30; Chen Dezhao,
“90 Niandai Meiguo Jingji, de Bianhua yu Zhanwang” [The Change and Prospects
of the U.S. Economy in the 1990s], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Spring 1998), p. 21; Dong
Fuquan, “Meiguo Jingji Jiegou kua Shiji de Quanmian Datiaozheng” [Comprehensive

Cross Century Adjustment of the United States’ Economic Structure], Shijie Jingji
yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 5; Li Changjiu, “Meiguo Jingji Zengzhang de Tedian
Wenti he Qishi” [The Characteristics, Problems and Relevance of the United States’
Economic Development], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (March 2000), p. 1.
7. Gao Feng, “Mei Ri Ou Jingji Shili Duibi,” p. 33.
8. Gao Feng, “Mei Ri Ou Jingji Shili Duibi,” p. 33.
9. Wei Wei, “Zhong Mei Jingji Zhuyao Zhibiao Bijiao” [A Comparison between
Major U.S. and Chinese Economic Indicators], Meiguo Yanjiu (April 1995), p. 74.
10. Wu Yonghong, “Meiguo zai Shijie Jingji zhong Diwei de Bianhua” [The
Change of the United States’ Status in the World Economy], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(July 1997), p. 66.
11. Tao Jian, Gu Wenyan, and Ke Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji Jinru,” p. 7; Ke Juhan,
“Meiguo Jingji reng chu Wenhe,” p. 58; Song Yuhua, “Xi Meiguo de ‘Xinjingji’ yu
Jinqi Jingji Xingshi ji Zoushi” [An Analysis of the United States’ “New Economy,”
Its Recent Economic Situation, and Its Future Trend], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(February 1998), pp. 16–17; Lang Ping, “Qian Xi Meiguo ‘Xinjingji,’” pp. 28–30;
Yang Hongling, “90 Niandai Yilai Meiguo Jingji Chixu Fanrong de Yuanyin ji Weilai
Zouxiang” [The Cause of the United States’ Sustained Economic Prosperity in the
1990s and Its Future Trend], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 46.
12. Ke Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji reng chu,” p. 58; Tao Jian, Gu Wenyan, and Ke
Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji Jinru,” p. 7.
13. Song Yuhua, “Xi Meiguo de ‘Xinjingji,’” p. 18.
14. Song Yuhua, “Xi Meiguo de ‘Xinjingji,’” p. 18; Gao Feng, “Mei Ri Ou Jin-
gji Shili Duibi,” pp. 33–34; Wu Yonghong, “Meiguo zai Shijie Jingji zhong Diwei,”
p. 66.
15. Song Yuhua, “Xi Meiguo de ‘Xinjingji,’” p. 17.
16. Wei Min, “Mei Ou Ri Jingji Shili Duibi de Bianhua Qushi” [The Trend in the
Change of the Distribution of Economic Power Among the United States, Europe, and
Japan], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 33–34.
17. Lu Qichang, Fu Mengzhi, Yuan Peng, “Meiguo Zhengzhi Jingji he Waijiao
Xingshi ji Quxiang” [The United States’ Politics, Economy, and Foreign Affairs,
Their Current Status and Future Trend], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (January/February
1999), p. 18.
18. Wang Yungui, “80 Niandai Yilai Meiguo Jingji Jiegou Tiaozheng de Jingyan
yu Qishi” [Structural Adjustment in the U.S. Economy since 1980s: Its Experi-
ence and Relevance to Us], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (October 1997), p. 8; Song
Yuhua, “Xi Meiguo de ‘Xinjingji,’” p. 17; Lang Ping, “Qian Xi Meiguo ‘Xinjingji,’”
pp. 30–31.
19. Song Yuhua, “Xi Meiguo de ‘Xinjingji,’” p. 17; Li Changjiu, “Meiguo Jingji
Zengzhang,” pp. 1–2; Li Bing, “Cong Meiguo” Xinjingji” Kan Jiasu Wo Guo Gaoji-
shu Chanye de Fazhan” [Perceiving Speeding up the Development of Our Country’s
High Technology Industry from the United States’ “New Economy”], Shijie Jingji
yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 42; Chen Dezhao, “90 Niandai Meiguo Jingji,” p. 23;
150 Chapter 6
Gu Wenyan, “Meiguo Jingji zai Xifang he yi Yizhiduxiu” [Why Only the Economy of
the U.S. among Western Countries is Prosperous], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 1998),
p. 7; Song Yuhua, “Meiguo Jingji jiang zai Ruanzhuolu,” p. 23.
20. Yu Kexing, “Qian Yi Dangqian Meiguo Jingji Xingshi” [A Tentative Comment
on the United States’ Current Economic Situation], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (Janu-
ary 1991), pp. 4–7; Wang Huaining, “Meiguo Jingji Zhouqi yu Haiwan Weiji” [The
United States’ Economic Cycle and the Gulf Crisis], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (March
1991), pp. 46–49; Chu Yukun, “Shi Lun Zhanhou Meiguo Dijiuci Jingji Shuaitui”
[The United States’ Ninth Economic Recession after World War II], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (November 1991), pp. 6–12; Xiao Lian, “Kelindun Jingji Zhengce de Shida
Zhuanbian” [Ten Major Changes in Clinton’s Economic Policy], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (February 1993), pp. 30–39; Ji Wei, “Meiguo Jingji Mianlin de Xin Wenti”
[New Problems Facing the U.S. Economy], Shijie jingji yu Zhengzhi (October 1993),
pp. 6–8; Wang Menghua, “Kelindun Xinjingji Jihua zai Tuixing zhong Shouzu” [Clin-
ton’s New Economic Plan in Difficulty], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (November 1993),
18–20; Zhou Li, “Quanqiuxing Shuaitui jiang hui Daolai? Meiguo de Haishishenlou
ji Shijie de Weixian” [ Is Global Recession Approaching? The United States’ Bubble
Economy and the Danger to the World], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (March 2000), pp.
76–81; Xie Yao, “Meiguo Zheci Jingji Shuaitui,” pp. 1–8; Wu Tianbo, “Mei Ou Ri
Jingji Liliang Duibi ji qi Bianhua Qushi” [A Comparison of United States, Europe,
and Japan’s Economic Powers and Their Trends], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Winter 1992),
pp. 13–18; Xie Yao, “Lue Lun Meiguo Zheci Jingji Fusu ji qi Fazhan Qushi” [A Brief
Comment on the Economic Recovery in the United States and Its Future Prospects],
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Autumn 1993), pp. 20–27; Jin Dexiang, “Meiguo he yi Xiangdui
Shuailuo?” [Why Does the United States Suffer from a Relative Decline?], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi (February 1992), pp. 13–19; Wang Huihong, “Kelindun neng Jiejue
Meiguo,” pp. 9–14; Chen Baosen, “Mianlin Tiaozhan xia de Jingji Tiaozheng: 1992
Nian Meiguo Zongtong Jingji Baogao Pingjie” [Comments on Economic Report of
the President 1992], Meiguo Yanjiu (March 1992), pp. 7–25; Chen Baosen, “Meiguo
Liangzhong Jingji Zhexue de Xinjiaoliang: Jian Lun Liangdang Yusuanzhan” [New
Trial of Strength Between Two American Economic Philosophies], Meiguo Yanjiu
(Summer 1996), pp. 93–109.
21. Yu Kexing, “Qian Yi Dangqian Meiguo Jingji,” p. 4.
22. Xie Yao, “Meiguo Zheci Jingji Shuaitui,” pp. 2–5; Wu Tianbo, “Mei Ou Ri
Jingji Liliang Duibi,” p. 15; Wang Huihong, “Kelindun neng Jiejue Meiguo,” p. 9;
Chu Yukun, “Shi Lun Zhanhou Meiguo,” pp. 11–12.
23. Xie Yao, “Lue Lun Meiguo Zheci Jingji Fusu,” p. 20; Ji Wei, “Meiguo Jingji
Mianlin de Xin Wenti,” pp. 6–8.
24. Jin Dexiang, “Meiguo he yi Xiangdui Shuailuo?” p. 13; Huang Su’an,
“Meiyuan Bianzhi yu Meiguo Jingji Shili Xiangdui Shuailuo” [Devaluation of the
U.S. Dollar and the United States’ Relative Economic Decline], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
(Autumn 1995), pp. 37–40.
25. Sun Jingshui, “Meiguo Jiyuexing Jingji Zengzhang Fangshi de Jingyan ji
Jiejian” [The United States’ Integrated Economic Growth Pattern: Its Experience and
Relevance to Us], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1997), p. 35.
26. Su Ge, “Meiguo Jingji Tengfei de Lishi Jingyan” [The Historical Experience
of the Take-off of the American Economy], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn 1994),
p. 63.
27. Wang Hao and Xing Daoyong, “Qian Tan Meiguo ‘Xinjingji’ ji qi Jiejian Yiyi”
[A Tentative Talk on the United States’ “New Economy” and Its Lessons to Us], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 40.
28. Guan Li and Liu Ruling, “Meiguo Fengxian Touzi de Fazhan Licheng ji qi
Jingyan Jiaoxun” [The Development of the United States’ Risk Investment, Its Expe-
rience and Lessons], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February 1998), p. 53.
29. Xiao Chen, “Meiguo ‘Geren Tuixiu Zhanghu(IRA)’ yu Zhongguo Shehui
Baozhang de ‘Jinronghua’” [The United States’ IRA and the Financialization of
China’s Social Security], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February 1996), pp. 41–42.
30. Wei Wei, “Zhong Mei Jingji Zhuyao Zhibiao,” p. 69.
31. Li Li, “Guojia Ganyu zai Mei Ri Jingji Fazhan zhong Zuoyong zhi Bijiao”
[A Comparison of the Role of State Intervention in the Economic Development of
the United States and Japan], Zhanlue yu Guanli (May/June 1995), pp. 21–22; Ma
Hongxia, “Meiguo Danyi Yinhang Zhidu de Gaige ji qi Qishi” [The Reform of the
United States’ Unit Banking System and Its Lessons to Us], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(January 1995), p. 28; Guan Li and Liu Ruling, “Meiguo Fengxian Touzi,” p. 53.
32. Su Ge, “Meiguo Jingji Tengfei,” p. 62.
33. Li Li, “Guojia Ganyu zai Mei Ri Jingji Fazhan,” p. 17.
34. Xiao Chen, “Lun Meiguo de ‘Fazhi Sheji’ dui qi Jingji Xiaolu de Zhichi” [On
the Compatibility of Law-Governing to Economic Efficiency in America], Meiguo
Yanjiu (Autumn 1995), pp. 70–87.
35. Xiao Chen, “Meiguo ‘Geren Tuixiu Zhanghu (IRA),’” p. 42.
36. Ma Hongxia, “Meiguo Danyi Yinhang Zhidu,” p. 28.
37. Ye Xiangsong, [Relevance of the United States’ State-Owned Businesses’
Management System to Our Country’s Reform on State-Owned Business Manage-
ment System], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 1996), p. 66.
38. Su Ge, “Meiguo Jingji Tengfei,” p.63.
39. Tao Jian, Gu Wenyan, and Ke Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji Jinru,” pp. 9–10; Chen
Baosen, “Meiguo Jingji de Xianzhuang Wenti ji qi Shijie Yingxiang” [The Current
Conditions and Problems of the U.S. Economy and the Impact on the World], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 2000), p. 32.
40. Zhang Linjun, [The Direction of the United States’ Trade Strategy after the
Cold War], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1996), p. 42.
41. Lang Ping, “Qian Xi Meiguo ‘Xinjingji,’” p. 30; Zeng Bingxi, “Meiguo ‘Xin-
jingji’ ji qi dui Shijie Jingji de Yingxiang” [The United States’ “New Economy” and
Its Impact on the World Economy], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Autumn 1998), pp. 45–46.
42. Gu Wenyan, “Meiguo Jingji zai Xifang,” p. 11; Ke Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji reng
chu,” p. 60; Tao Jian, Gu Wenyan, Ke Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji Jinru,” p. 10.
43. Gu Wenyan, “Meiguo Jingji zai Xifang,” p. 11.
44. Guo Shixian, “Qian Xi xin de Yici Meiyuan Weiji” [A Tentative Analysis of
the New U.S. Dollar Crisis], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (August 1994), p. 20.
152 Chapter 6
45. Qin Liufang and Guo Shixian, “Meiyuan Weiji ji Wo Guo de Xiangguan
Zhanlue Gouxiang” [The U.S. Dollar Crisis and China’s Relevant Strategic Think-
ing], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1995), pp. 16–17.
46. Zhou Xin, “Ping Oumeng Huobi Yitihua yu Mei, Ri Jinrongye Dachongzu”
[On the Integration of EU Currency and the Reconstitution of the Financial Industry in
the United States and Japan], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (September 1998), pp. 21–22.
Chapter 7
Chinese Perceptions of American

Politics
SHAMBAUGH’S PRESENTATION OF THE CHINESE

PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN POLITICS
Again, Shambaugh’s presentation of Chinese perceptions of American poli-

tics is the only piece in the existing literature which offers a systematic and
in-depth analysis of this subject.1 It is especially admirable because of its
extensive coverage of the relevant Chinese literature. As Shambaugh focused
on perceptions before the 1990s, the present chapter intends not only to
address the subject of China’s foreign policy orientation, but also to build on
and update Shambaugh’s presentation. First of all, let me summarize Sham-
baugh’s findings.
Shambaugh examined the following facets of the Chinese perceptions of
American politics: (1) Marxist perspectives on American politics; (2) non-
Marxist perspectives on American politics; (3) nongovernmental actors in the
American policy process; and (4) U.S. electoral politics.
Marxists among China’s America watchers focus mainly on caituans
(monopoly financial groups) in the United States and how these groups
influence government and political life. These Marxists basically argue
that political institutions such as the government and political parties in the
United States serve the interest of monopoly capitalists. “Wall Street rules
Washington” is their model of American politics. Each U.S. administration is
perceived to come to power because of support from various financial groups
and in turn to use its power to serve the interests of its masters.
The non-Marxist school was non-ideological in its interpretation of
American politics. Depending on the actors covered, this school was further
divided into statist and pluralist sub-schools. The statist sub-school studied
153
154 Chapter 7
the executive branch of the U.S. government, including various positions in it,
the personal character of leaders in it, the policy-making process, factions and
opinion groups in various administrations, etc. The pluralist school tended to
focus on the Congress, non-governmental actors (think tanks, interest groups,
etc.), and the electorate. They were interested in examining the liberal-
conservative orientation in American politics, and how a shift from liberalism
to conservatism or vice versa affected American domestic or foreign policies.
According to Shambaugh, non-governmental actors in the Chinese descrip-
tion included caituans, think tanks, interest groups, etc. Shambaugh explored
both Marxist and non-Marxist analysis of these groups, with the Marxist
approach focusing on caituans’ connections with other actors (such as politi-
cal parties, media, and schools) thought to be influential in the policy-making
process, while non-Marxist groups focused on more substantive issues such
as the policy orientations of various think tanks, interest groups, etc.
With regard to electoral politics, the Marxist school claimed that elections
were but futile exercises, examples of “sham democracy,” because both
parties serve monopoly capitalists. The non-Marxist approach to studying
American electoral politics tended to follow the ups and downs of election
campaigns and the different platforms of the candidates, voters’ preferences,
and so on. As time went by, Chinese authors were seen by Shambaugh as
becoming more and more sophisticated in their coverage of political cam-
paigns in the United States. By the end of the 1980s, very little Marxist
commentary appeared in the Chinese press regarding elections in the United
States.
METHODOLOGY
Sources
This chapter explores Chinese perceptions of American politics by examin-
ing all the articles on American politics published in the 1991–2000 decade
in the six mainstream Chinese journals on international relations identified in
Chapter 2.2 Table 7.1 lists the number of articles in each journal on American
politics constituting the sample.
What to Perceive Regarding American Politics?

In studying Chinese perceptions of American politics, one important question
is what facets of these perceptions are the most meaningful for presenta-
tion. Shambaugh’s purpose was to summarize the contents of the extensive
Chinese Perceptions of American Politics 155
Table 7.1 Number of Articles in Each Journal on

American Politics
Journal (1991–2000) Number of Articles

Meiguo Yanjiu 32
Zhanlue yu Guanli 0
Total 85
relevant Chinese literature, while the main purpose of this chapter is to

explore China’s foreign policy orientation through an analysis of the Chinese
image of American politics in a limited sample. This chapter therefore has to
adopt an approach different from Shambaugh’s.
One approach is to look at the major differences between the United States
and China in terms of their political systems. These are democracy vs. non-
democracy, and separation of powers among various branches of the U.S.
government vs. concentration of power in the hands of the ruling party in
China. From these two major differences, we can see that it would be mean-
ingful to explore the Chinese perceptions of American politics in the follow-
ing aspects. First, what are Chinese scholars’ perceptions of democracy? As
democracy has been almost universally accepted, and China’s traditional res-
ervations regarding Western democracy were that it was not genuine democ-
racy, we can explore whether Chinese scholars in the 1990s still regarded the
American democracy as sham democracy.
For this purpose, we can look into the Chinese perceptions of both the
process and the outcome of American democracy. Regarding the process, we
Table 7.2 What to Perceive Regarding American Politics
1. What were the Chinese perceptions of democracy?

2. What determined the outcome of elections in the United States?
3. What kind of people emerged victorious in American elections?
4. Whose interests did the American political system serve?
5. What were the Chinese perceptions of checks and balances?
6. What was the overall Chinese perception of the American political system?
7. Did Chinese authors regard it as desirable to learn from the U.S. political system?
156 Chapter 7
Table 7.3 Inferences from the Chinese Perceptions of American Politics
Facets of If Inferences
Perception
1. What were If Chinese scholars regarded It is less likely that differences in
the Chinese democracy as a desirable political system would be a source of
perceptions of form of governance, conflict between the two countries,
democracy? and convergence of China’s political
system more or less toward the
American model would be possible,
though not inevitable.
If Chinese scholars regarded It is likely that differences in political
democracy as a problematic system would be a source of conflict
form of governance, between the two countries, and
convergence of China’s political system
toward the American model would be
less likely.
2. What If election outcome was The U.S. political system was perceived
determines considered to be determined to represent mainly a handful of elite
the outcome mainly by money, or by the rather than the broad masses, and
of elections influence of the rich and the American democracy worked more to
in the United powerful, deceive voters than to serve them.
States? If election outcome was The American political system was
considered to be determined considered likely to be a fair one, and
mainly by voters’ will, American democracy was considered
to be genuine.
3. What kind If Chinese scholars perceived It is more likely that China regarded
of people more negative than positive the American political system as
emerged traits in most major unacceptable or repulsive.
victorious American politicians,
in American If Chinese scholars perceived It is more likely that they regarded
elections? more positive than negative the American political system as
traits in most major acceptable or laudatory.
American politicians,
4. Whose If the American political The system should be regarded as
interests did system was regarded as unfair, repressive, and undesirable, and
the American serving the interests of only a such a system might well be a source
political handful of the rich, a ruling of conflict between the perceivers’
system serve? class, etc., state and the target state.
If the American political The system should be regarded as fair,
system was regarded as desirable, and perhaps imitable, and
serving the interests of most such a system is less likely to become
people in the country rather a source of conflict between the
than only of a handful of perceivers’ state and the target state.
elite, or ruling class,
5. What were If checks and balances were Convergence of China’s political

the Chinese perceived as working well, system more or less toward the
perceptions American model would be likely.
of checks and If checks and balances were Convergence of China’s political
balances in perceived as problematic, system toward the American model
the American would be less likely.
political
system?
6. What was If the overall perception Political system was unlikely to be a
the overall of American politics was source of conflict between the two
Chinese positive, countries and convergence to some
perception extent would be possible.
of American If the overall perception Political system was likely to be a
politics? of American politics was source of conflict and convergence
negative, would be less likely.
7. Did Chinese If Chinese authors argued Convergence to some extent would be
authors regard for learning from the U.S. in likely.
it as desirable political system,
to learn from If Chinese authors argued for Convergence would be less likely.
the United not learning from the U.S.
States in terms political system,
of political
system?
can explore how American leaders are elected according to Chinese scholars’
presentations, and as for the outcome, we can explore, in the eyes of Chinese
observers, what kind of leaders were elected and whose interests the political
system served.
As for the second major difference between the two countries’ political sys-
tems, we can examine how checks and balances in the American political sys-
tem were perceived. In other words, did it work well or was it problematic?
Finally, it is important to explore whether the overall perceptions of Ameri-
can politics were positive or negative, and whether Chinese authors regard it
as desirable to learn from the American political system. Table 7.2 lists the
aspects of Chinese perceptions of American politics this chapter is going to
explore.
Inferences
Inferences concerning China’s foreign policy orientation can be made from
studying each of the facets of the Chinese perceptions of American politics
listed in Table 7.2, and presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
158 Chapter 7
Table 7.4 Summary Inferences in the Chinese Perceptions of American Politics
Positive Perception of American Politics Negative Perception of American Politics

Chinese scholars regarded democracy as Chinese scholars did not accept
an ideal form of governance democracy as an ideal form of governance
Election outcome perceived as determined Election outcome perceived as determined
mainly by voters’ will mainly by money or the influence of the
rich and powerful
Chinese scholars perceived more positive Chinese scholars perceived more negative
than negative traits in most major than positive traits in most major American
American politicians politicians
American political system perceived as American political system perceived as
serving the interests of people in general serving mainly the interests of the elite, the
rich, and the ruling class
Checks and balances perceived as working Checks and balances perceived as
well problematic
Overall perception of American politics Overall perception of American politics
was positive was negative
Chinese scholars argued for learning from Chinese scholars argued for not learning
the United States in politics from the United States in politics
Convergence of China’s political system Convergence of China’s political system
more or less toward the American model toward the American model not likely,
quite likely, and differences in political and differences in political system likely
system not likely to be a source of conflict to be a source of conflict between the two
between the two countries countries
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
In the sample, Chinese authors very seldom made a direct assessment of

democracy itself, but when they did so, their assessments were generally
positive. Zhou Qi had highly positive perceptions of democracy, especially
American democracy. He pointed out that “representative democracy in
essence was to recognize that all men were equal and that everyone, regard-
less of his family background, had the equal right to decide the system of the
state, and the management of the state,” which Zhou regarded as “a great step
forward in human history.” Ji Hong discussed the enhanced status of African
Americans, as demonstrated in their increased political participation. She
appreciated the fact that democracy provided equal rights even to minorities.
And Ren Feng approvingly discussed the idea of a social contract between
the government and the people.3
Interestingly, all the critics of American politics in the sample made posi-
tive comments about democracy, and some of the most enthusiastic reviews
of democracy in the sample were actually made by these critics. In one of

the most vehement critiques of the American political system in the sample,
Huang Zhaoyu acknowledged that “the essence of democratic politics is that
everyone enjoys equal political rights, and the state is governed by the people
or their representatives, in accordance with people’s will, on the principle of
fairness, openness, and justice, and for the interest of the greatest majority of
people.” The worst he could say about the American political system was that
it was “not perfect.” In a critique of the American political system as sham
democracy, Li Zhidong nonetheless agreed that “elections are an important
way for people to express their political will, and are the main approach
for the realization of democracy.” In an enthusiastic portrayal of Thoreau’s
political thought, Thoreau was presented as quite dissatisfied with the exist-
ing American political system, but the author also pointed out that Thoreau
“had accepted almost all the basic ideas of modern Western democracy,” such
as social contract, popular sovereignty, separation of powers, parliamentary
democracy, human rights, etc. The author argued that Thoreau’s criticism
of the existing system was done “on the basis of general acceptance” of the
system itself. It is significant to note that one author in the sample discussed
a most sensitive topic in China: anti-communism in the United States, with
overall fairness and sometimes even in sympathetic terms. He claimed that
the reasons why the United States was strongly anti-communist included the
following: opposing radicalism; safeguarding freedom, democracy, and indi-
vidualism; and mistakes by socialist countries such as Soviet expansionism
and Stalinist atrocities in domestic politics.4
Several authors did not hesitate to suggest that democracy represented the
right direction of political development. With great interest and admiration,
Su Pengfei discussed local autonomy in the city of Berkeley, and how local
people elected their leaders and supervised those leaders. Though he pointed
out that the democracy in Berkeley was far from perfect, undoubtedly he
regarded democracy as a desirable form of governance. Through discussion
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution, Cui Ziyuan
approvingly presented his understanding of the essence of the amendment:
“both the local and the central governments should safeguard the basic rights
of citizens and should both be democratized.” In discussing the historical sig-
nificance of democratic practice in the United States, Zhou Qi claimed that
the United States had “pointed out a bright future for the European people:
democracy is irresistible” (italics mine). By citing other Western authors,
Zhou Qi demonstrated that the United States in developing its representa-
tive democracy “won a foothold not only for itself, but also for the whole
world,” that the American political system really ensured “a government of
the people,” and that it had set an example for other countries.5
160 Chapter 7
Obviously, Chinese authors had generally accepted democracy as a desir-

able form of governance. The reason they often criticized the Western politi-
cal system was that they often did not regard Western, usually American,
democracy as genuine. This was often the case before the 1990s as Sham-
baugh presented. Was it still the case in the 1990s? To see whether Chinese
authors in the 1990s regarded the American democracy as genuine, let us
look into their perceptions of both the process and the outcome of American
democracy.
WHAT DETERMINES THE OUTCOME OF

AMERICAN ELECTIONS?
Among the 85 articles in the sample on U.S. politics, 47 articles more or less
discussed how U.S. leaders were elected. Some articles focused exclusively
on this topic, and others provided unambiguous information regarding their
position as to the determinants of the election outcome. According to Chinese
authors in the sample, the rich and powerful could affect election outcomes
in the United States in three ways. First, top elites could often help increase
voters’ support for a candidate and sometimes they could influence a candi-
date’s inclination to carry on the campaign. Second, the rich and powerful
could influence election outcome through campaign contributions. Third, the
rich enjoyed greater voting convenience than the poor. But materials in the
sample also indicated that the extent of top elites’ influence depended largely
on whether the elites themselves were popular among voters, and voting con-
venience for the rich constituted only a minor source of injustice. The greatest
source of injustice, according to the authors in the sample, was the role of
money in election campaigns.
Three positions were possible as to the role of money in U.S. elections.
First, election outcomes were determined mainly by money. Second, both
money and voters’ will played an important role. And third, money played
a limited role in American elections and it was mainly the voters’ will that
Table 7.5 Articles Holding Different Positions Concerning the Determinants of

Election Outcome in the United States
Mainly by Money Mainly by Voters’ Will By Both

Number of articles 4 31 12
Appear in journals 3 5 4
Appear in years 92, 96, 00. 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98,
97, 98, 99, 00. 00.
determined the outcome of elections. Table 7.5 lists the number of articles
among the 47 holding each of the three different positions.
From the table, we can see that among the 47 relevant articles, 4 held that
United States election outcomes were determined primarily by money, 12
suggested that they were determined by both money and the voters’ will, and
the overwhelming 31 articles suggested that they were determined mainly by
the voters’ will.6 The fact that articles holding different positions appeared
relatively evenly across the 1991–2000 decade in different journals indicated
that each of the three positions was not an occasional occurrence by some
idiosyncratic authors in a particular journal in a particular time period. Thus
with regard to the process of elections in the United States, an overwhelming
majority of Chinese authors in the 1990s regarded the U.S. democracy as a
genuine democracy, rather than a sham democracy as presented by Sham-
baugh when he described the Chinese perceptions, especially in the early
1980s. In the following, I will briefly discuss each of the three positions
concerning the outcome of U.S. elections.
Outcome Regarded as Determined Mainly by Money

Four articles attributed success in American elections mainly to money. As
two of them discussed the role of money very briefly,7 I will discuss the argu-
ments of the other two at some length. One of them actually focused exclu-
sively on this subject, as is evident from its title: “American Elections on the
Basis of U.S. Dollars.”8 It argued that success in elections required a huge
amount of money for advertisements and all kinds of propaganda, including
“TV series, movies, newspaper space, hiring people to write articles in one’s
own favor or against the opponent,” and so forth. More sensationally, money
was regarded as occasionally needed in the election process to “hire thugs to
disrupt opponents’ conventions,” or even to hire assassins to undermine or to
get rid of opponents. On the supply side of the equation, the author pointed
out that monopoly capitalists regarded contributions to political candidates
as profitable investments, “just as their investments in banks or in other
industrial/commercial enterprises.” The mechanism here was that “if you
contribute to my campaign, after I am elected, I will work to promote your
interests.” To strengthen his case, the author argued that in most elections in
U.S. history, whoever had more campaign funds usually won the election.
Eight years later another article in a different journal lambasted the U.S.
election system through analyzing Campaign 2000.9 It argued that the Ameri-
can election system itself was against democratic principles. First, the elec-
tion process was such that only 50.7 percent of eligible voters participated in
this election. Second, the process was complicated and confusing, resulting in
162 Chapter 7
quite a number of invalid votes, thus “violating some citizens’ voting rights.”
Third, the Electoral College system might result in the ridiculous consequence
of a candidate not winning in an election even though he might have won the
popular vote. In addition to the above “flaws” in American democracy, the
article argued that the role of money to a great extent corrupted the election.
Two instances were mentioned to illustrate the corruption. One natural gas
company contributed $500,000 to George W. Bush, and “Bush compensated
the company by reducing the limitation on harmful gas emissions.” As one
petroleum company was one of Gore’s principal contributors, “Gore ignored
objections from others and gave permission to the company for the use of 21
hectares of state-owned land.”
Outcome Regarded as Determined by Both Money and Voters’ Will

Twelve articles in the sample argued that election outcomes in the United
States were determined by both money and the will of voters. This position in
one article was obvious from the three reasons the author gave in explaining
why Clinton had been elected president in 1992.10 First, Clinton’s platform
satisfied voters’ strong desire for change. It explained that U.S. economic
growth under President Bush was only 1.3 percent. Voters were therefore
quite dissatisfied with the incumbents, and wished to have a change. Second,
Clinton was able to strengthen unity in Democratic Party, and formed a new
coalition including the AFL-CIO, women, blacks, the lower-middle class,
and some conservative white middle-class voters. Third, Clinton also won
the support of many financial groups (caituans), including Morgan, Boston,
Du Pont, Jews, and a number of Rockefeller, and other local caituans in the
south, west, and other places. As these caituans wanted to end economic
recession, they were quite positive about Clinton’s promises of increasing
investments in infrastructure and increasing employment.
If the article mentioned above regarded the support of voters as somewhat
more important than that of the rich, another article regarded the support of
the rich as somewhat more important than that of ordinary voters.11 It argued
that congressmen were indeed elected by winning most voters’ support, but it
also pointed out that it was money that enabled them to be elected. They may
serve ordinary voters, but more often they served the rich.
Another article of this genre was about Campaign 2000.12 On the one
hand, it cited approvingly the saying “Money is the mother’s milk of politics”
and the quotation of one presidential candidate that money has distorted the
process of American democracy. On the other hand it pointed out that Ameri-
can voters were satisfied with the health of the U.S. economy, and voters’
satisfaction had translated into the advantage for the Democratic candidate,
Al Gore. The almost equal importance of money and voters’ will had been
dramatically illustrated by author’s conclusion regarding the two candidates’
approximately equal chances of being elected. Al Gore’s strong point was
the economy and people’s satisfaction. George W. Bush’s advantage was the
support of big companies and the rich.
Election Outcome Regarded as Determined Mainly by Voters’ Will

But undoubtedly the overwhelming majority of articles on American politics
in the sample suggested that it was mainly the voters’ will that determined
the outcome of elections. As can be seen in Table 7.5, of the 47 articles con-
taining information about how U.S. leaders were elected, 31 articles held this
position, as compared with 4 holding the position that it was money which
played a vitally important role in U.S. elections, and 12 holding the position
that both money and voters played an important role. Among the 31 articles
holding this position, many did not mention the role of money at all. These
articles suggested that the voters’ will was the most important factor deter-
mining the outcome of U.S. elections, and the most effective way of winning
elections was to serve voters well. This included, most importantly, managing
the economy well, but also improving education, health care, crime control,
etc. In the majority of articles, not only were the rich not considered impor-
tant in determining the outcome of elections, but the authors in several articles
also specifically pointed out that association with the rich and the powerful
not only did not help in winning elections, but it harmed the chances of being
elected. In discussing the 1990 midterm election in the United States, three
authors in two articles pointed out that Republicans did not do well because
the party was perceived as serving mainly the interest of the rich.13 In yet
another article on the 1992 presidential election, the author pointed out that
the candidate regarded as serving the interest of the rich or as belonging to
the powerful was considered unlikely to be elected.14
WHAT KINDS OF PEOPLE EMERGED VICTORIOUS IN

AMERICAN ELECTIONS?
In this section, I will explore the descriptions of major American politicians,

limited to various presidents and presidential candidates, as scant informa-
tion about other American politicians was available in the sample. Somewhat
detailed information about the following politicians was available: 2 articles
about Bob Dole, 12 about Bill Clinton, 3 about George W. Bush, 4 about Al
Gore, and 1 about Bill Bradley.
164 Chapter 7
Dole was portrayed as a dull, old man, mediocre in public speaking and
unable to inspire voters’ enthusiasm. But Chinese authors’ perceptions of
Dole were generally more positive than negative, since he was also rec-
ognized as having extensive experience in politics, widespread influence,
and a profound political foundation. What was more, according to Chinese
authors, Dole was untainted in character, was free from any scandals, and
was “one of very few respectable politicians in American politics.”15 Thus
on the whole, Dole was perceived as having mediocre capability but out-
standing character.
Clinton was described as the opposite of Dole. He was young and ener-
getic, with good manners and oratory talents. Chinese scholars tended to
marvel at Clinton’s remarkable capabilities. As a student, he attended the best
schools in the world and excelled there. As a governor, he was not only one
of the youngest in the United States, but also one of the best. As a politician,
he was flexible and pragmatic, and was able to accommodate various groups
with competing interests. As a candidate, he was a highly skillful campaigner,
and his Electoral College votes were way above those of his competitors. As a
president, he managed the U.S. economy so well that the United States under
his administration enjoyed the longest prosperity after the Second World War,
and European leaders rushed to the United States to learn from him. As a
humanist, he believed in racial harmony and a just society, was sympathetic
to the poor and minorities, and was hugely popular among them. And as a
fighter, he had a strong will, and again and again was able to survive the most
severe crisis.
Again in contrast to Dole, Clinton was described as heavily involved in
scandals, which was seen more as a factor affecting his political career than
as an unpardonable defect in his character. Not a single Chinese author took
advantage of him as an opportunity to revile the U.S. political system for
allowing such a scandal-ridden politician to succeed. Instead, they tended to
downplay Clinton as an unfaithful husband, and to focus on him more as a
successful president.
George W. Bush was described as somewhat like a combination of Dole
and Clinton. When he was young, he had Clinton’s character and Dole’s
capabilities. At that time, he liked mischief, and indulged himself in drink-
ing, parties, and girls. And he was engaged in various jobs, which he left with
unimpressive records. After he grew older, he seemed to have completely
changed, and to have developed Dole’s character and Clinton’s capabilities.
Now he was a devout Christian, faithful to his wife and true to his word. He
had been one of the most successful governors in the United States, and he
was hugely popular among not only elites but also poor people and especially
Hispanic minorities. And he was so popular that he collected more funding

for his presidential campaign than any other politician in U.S. history.
Al Gore was described as quite a positive political figure, and his whole
career was somewhat like that of George W. Bush minus Bush’s early years.
He had good family values and a perfect marriage. He was trustworthy and
hardworking. He had great loyalty and a strong sense of responsibility. He
was a perfectionist and strictly followed rules and regulations. He had an
illustrious career, serving two terms as a U.S. senator and two terms as the
vice president of the United States. Different from other U.S. presidential
politicians, he was also a remarkable scholar, having keen insights on many
issues of the new century. He had even authored a book on environmental
protection. His only defects were that he lacked the charisma of a great leader,
was occasionally dull, and was involved in a campaign finance scandal.
Bill Bradley was least like a politician in Chinese eyes. In his university
days, he was a nationally famous basketball star. In the U.S. Senate, he
was a maverick and often voiced unusual opinions. As a politician, he was
unskilled in communicating with ordinary people and lacked understanding
of them.
With the exception of Bill Bradley, Chinese perceptions of the U.S. presi-
dential politicians, Republican or Democrat, were much more positive than
negative, and sometimes hugely positive. The candidates were not saints with
spotless characters and superhuman capabilities, but they were all admirable
political figures. In the case of Bill Bradley, whom only one article in the
sample discussed at some length, on the one hand he was not elected presi-
dent, and on the other he was still described perhaps slightly more positively
than negatively.
One quotation from the sample perhaps may serve as a useful summary of
Chinese scholars’ perceptions of the U.S. political system as revealed through
their descriptions of top American politicians. “In an election system in which
candidates have to face voters directly, we can hardly imagine that a politician
with flaws in his character, with no remarkable achievements, and advocat-
ing policies against voters’ will, will be nominated or ultimately elected as a
governor, a member of the Congress, or a president. It would be even harder
to believe that a candidate who is corrupt and mediocre at his job would be
re-nominated and re-elected. Looking back at the United States’ election
history, we may find that those elected, including presidents, may possibly
not be the most capable, but in the least their character has been accepted by
most voters. Elections provide politicians with an opportunity to demonstrate
their outstanding character and excellent capabilities, and elections are also a
process for weeding out corrupt politicians.”16
166 Chapter 7
WHOSE INTEREST DOES THE AMERICAN POLITICAL

SYSTEM SERVE?
In terms of the outcome of elections, another important way to evaluate a

political system is to see whose interests it serves. According to Shambaugh’s
presentation, in the eye of the Chinese Marxists, the American political sys-
tem mainly served the interests of the rich, especially the monopoly capital-
ists. Was this still the case with the Chinese perceptions of American politics
in the 1990s? Shambaugh mentioned that toward the late 1980s, Chinese
observers of American politics had become less ideological, but he did not
address the question of whose interest the American political system served
according to China’s non-Marxist America watchers. In the following, I will
explore how China’s America watchers answered this question in the 1990s.
Chinese answers to this question ran the spectrum, from the system’s
serving the interest of only the ruling class to its serving the interest of
mainly ordinary people. At one end of the spectrum was the opinion that the
American political system served only the interest of the ruling class. One
author argued that, ostensibly, U.S. presidents represented the interest of the
whole nation, but in fact, they represented “the interest of the most power-
ful capitalist groups,” and the strengthening of presidential power means
“the strengthening of the monopoly status of big capitalist groups over the
country’s politics and economy.”17 Another author held a similar opinion: “in
implementing the foreign policy, both the president and the department of
state serve the fundamental interest of the ruling class” in the United States.
Even though different parties and groups have different interests, “they also
share a common interest, i.e., the overall interest of the ruling class.”18
Moving away from this extreme position, many more authors argued that
even though the American political system served the interest especially
of the rich or the ruling class, it had not completely ignored the interest of
ordinary people. In an article about the U.S. upper class, the author asserted
that it was a small group of people who actually controlled the power of the
state, and “their family members automatically belonged to the pool from
which the elite of the state were selected.” But the author also pointed out
that often what was beneficial for big businesses would also be beneficial for
the state, and even poor people would benefit from policy serving the interest
of the rich. In another article about the U.S. Congress, the author argued that
congressmen and women indeed worked hard to serve the interest and wishes
of voters, but Congress members in fact more often served the interest and
wishes of the rich, and it was the rich who “enjoy the decisive say” in this
system. Several other authors shared the opinion that the U.S. political system
served the interest more of the rich than of the poor. And the rich and interest
groups had disproportionate influence in this system.19
Moving farther away from the above position, some authors were of the
view that the U.S. political system served the interest of both the rich and the
poor, with the Republicans more inclined to serve the interest of the rich and
Democrats more sensitive to that of the poor.20
In the sample of 85 articles, with the exception of 13, most articles pro-
vided information relevant to the question of whose interest the U.S. political
system served. Quite a number of authors presented an image that the U.S.
political system served the interest of the United States as a whole. One arti-
cle argued that the goal of the United States’ Founding Fathers in designing
the political system was to promote democracy in the country and prevent the
monopoly of power by any particular group. In an article comparing the plat-
forms of George W. Bush and Al Gore, the author argued that both of them
aimed at maintaining economic prosperity, promoting education and high
technology, enhancing the United States’ CNP, and strengthening national
security. In yet another article about Clinton’s victory in the 1992 presiden-
tial election, the author pointed out that domestically Clinton would focus on
solving economic problems, and in foreign policy, he would try to promote
the United States’ leadership role and American values in the world.21 Quite
a number of other articles took the similar position that the U.S. political
system served the interest of the United States as a whole.
In a similar vein, several articles presented the image that the American
political system was designed to serve the interest of the American people. Su
Pengfei explained with great admiration how the system of local autonomy
in the United States ensured that local governments closely follow the wishes
of local residents. Zhang Minqian argued that the U.S. political system was
such that corruption was very difficult and government officials were more
likely to be public servants than overlords.22 Many other scholars took a simi-
lar position.
For the greatest number of articles, the American political system was seen as
serving the interest of voters. According to Zhou Qi, popular sovereignty was
the guiding principle of the United States as a state, and it was voters who
were the masters of the state. Wang Guang demonstrated that voters’ wishes as
revealed in the 1994 midterm election forced Clinton to adopt some of the
conservative policies of the Republican Party, while at the same time attending
to “the wishes of the Union, the poor, minorities, and women.” Bi Yunhong
claimed that politicians cared a lot about messages from voters, which made
Clinton more conservative than before regarding welfare, abortion, the size of
the government, and so forth, and also made Dole accept some Republican
168 Chapter 7
Table 7.6 Whose Interests Does the American Political System Serve?
Position: Serving Whose Interest? Number of

Articles
1. United States as a whole 14
2. Voters 26
3. American people 9
4. Ordinary people more than the rich 2
5. Respecting women’s interest 2
6. Respecting blacks’ interest 2
7. Individuals 2
8. Republicans more for the rich and Democrats more for the poor 2
9. More for the rich than for the poor 4
10. The people, but cannot violate the interest of the ruling class 1
11. Interest groups, including foreign interest groups 3
12. Voters, but money and interest groups have disproportionate 1
influence
13. Ruling class and in turn the people 1
14. Voters, but especially the rich 1
15. Big businesses 1
16. Ruling class 1
17. Committee members or the whole Congress 1
18. Not coded 13
conservatives’ opinions, and at the same time become more moderate regard-
ing abortion.23 Many other articles can be classified under this category.
Chinese authors noted that the American political system not only served
the interest of the majority of people, it was also careful to protect the interest
of minorities, especially women and blacks. Thinkers such as Thoreau and
Hayek who emphasized the importance of individualism consolidated the
belief that in the U.S. political system, everyone’s interest would be respected
and protected. Some authors present an image of the U.S. political system
more often serving the interest of the poor and ordinary people than those of
the rich and privileged.
As discussed above, regarding the question of whose interest the United
States’ political system served, Chinese authors gave a wide variety of
answers. But what were the dominant perceptions? Table 7.6 lists the number
of articles holding each of the positions.
As the coding has been done inductively, following no strict coding

scheme, some categories in Table 7.6 are similar to one another. Generally
speaking, items 1 through 8 can be regarded as falling into group I: the
American political system serving the interest of the American people as a
whole, rich and poor included, sometimes the ordinary people more than the
rich. Items 9 through 14 fall in group II: serving the interest of the rich more
than the poor. Items 15 and 16 are in group III: serving only the interest of
the rich. The article in row 17 discussed the operation of the U.S. Congress.
It was unique in that it did answer the central question of this section—
serving either committee members or the whole Congress—but it did not
address the question of serving the interest of the people vs. those of the rich.
Row 18 refers to articles which did not contain information relevant to the
central question of this section. To see Chinese authors’ dominant percep-
tions of the U.S. political system, we should therefore compare group I with
groups II and III. As group I has 57 articles, while groups II and III combined
have only 13 articles, we may conclude that the dominant perception among
Chinese authors was that the American political system mainly served the
interest of the American people as a whole rather than only those of the rich
and privileged.
CHECKS AND BALANCES IN THE

AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
The second of the two major differences between the U.S. political system
and China’s is the division of powers in the American political system and the
concentration of power in the hands of the ruling party in China. As one Chi-
nese author put it, “the principle of checks and balances is the most important
feature of the American political system.”24 It therefore would be advisable
to study how Chinese authors perceived this feature in the American political
system.
Chinese observers noticed the checks and balances among the different
branches of the American government. They found that the Congress in the
United States had substantial power, not only in domestic affairs but also in
foreign affairs. Most relevant articles in the sample offered information about
the checks and balances between the executive and the legislative branches,
but occasionally some authors also discussed the role of checks and balances
by the judicial branch. They noticed that the system of checks and balances
seemed to tie the hands of government leaders, rendering decision making
quite difficult, sometimes even impossible.
170 Chapter 7
As for the overall assessment of the United States’ checks and balances
system, Chinese authors pointed out that this system had both merits and
defects. Quite a few authors argued that checks and balances induced more
moderate policies by the government. Gao Huandong pointed out that the
pattern of divided government reflects the American people’s preference for
moderate policies as opposed to radical political changes. Lu Qichang and
others mentioned that though President Clinton was a Democrat, he took
care to move away from the Democratic Party’s traditional liberal policies
and accepted many Republican policies regarding tax reduction, abortion,
welfare, etc. Jin Canrong noticed that Clinton after 1995 was more receptive
to some of the Republicans’ policies which were popular among the people,
and as a result, the policies of the two parties had converged. Pan Tongwen
explained that Clinton made concessions to the Republicans mainly because
the Republicans had become the majority party in Congress.25
Another perceived advantage of the checks and balances system was that it
provides opportunities for more people to be involved in the decision making
process. In the establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations, because of
a lawsuit by Senator Goldwater, all three branches of the government were
involved in the decision making. A more salient case is the passage of the
China PNTR, which drew into the process not only the executive and legisla-
tive branches, but also an unprecedented number of interest groups across the
nation, resulting in a final decision reflecting the wishes of the nation as a
whole. Because of checks and balances, the U.S. government was forced to
be more attentive to people’s preferences. Several scholars pointed out that
as a result of the growing influence of the Republicans in Congress, Clinton
had to improve the image of the Democratic Party and consolidate its sup-
port among workers, the minorities and women. Clinton’s greater efforts to
cooperate with the Republicans after the 1994 mid-term election were also
perceived as catering to voters’ wishes.26
Most importantly, however, the system of checks and balances was per-
ceived as enhancing the quality of decision making. The main mechanism
was that Congress’s supervision helped avoid mistakes.27 Congress was
perceived as helping to “sharpen the decision makers’ thinking,” so that they
would consider things more thoroughly and more comprehensively. When
the same party controlled both the White House and Congress, the executive
branch’s decision making was less careful.28
Chinese authors also noticed that the checks and balances system had
serious problems. It seemed to be strong in obstruction and weak in con-
struction. The biggest problem was that it affected government efficiency in
that it made it very difficult to reach decisions and to implement policies.
One Chinese author basically regarded the checks and balances system as a
failure, complaining that Congress in the United States was so powerful and
the checks and balances system so problematic that the U.S. government had
almost lost the ability to make decisions. The worst example of this ineffi-
ciency was the government shutdown which in mid-1990s lasted almost one
month, and at one time 1.05 million federal employees were unable to go
to work. Too much checking and balancing was also perceived as making it
difficult to fill numerous important government positions within a time con-
ducive to the normal operation of the government.29
But most Chinese scholars in the sample seemed to regard the checks and
balances system in a much more positive than negative light. They pointed
out that “the American political system has its internal mechanism and rigor
to maintain its vitality” and, unlike the pessimistic view mentioned in the
last paragraph, they did not think that checks and balances caused serious
efficiency problems for the government. One author mentioned that the
executive branch had a lot of ways to bypass the problem of inefficiency.
One way was for the president to resort to executive orders rather than going
to Congress for a law. The presidential staff system was also considered an
effective way of enhancing the efficiency of the government, since the staff
were responsible only to the president and were beyond Congress’s supervi-
sion. Though Congress tried very hard to seize the war-making power, the
president could almost always succeed in launching a war when he deemed
it necessary.30
Besides, Chinese authors pointed out, the two parties in the United States,
or the executive and the legislative branches, had basically similar interests,
and their policy platforms were not much different from each other. They
therefore often had a strong incentive to cooperate so that checks and bal-
ances, though real, did not seriously affect government efficiency. Pressure
from voters also forced leaders from different branches of the government to
keep the practice of checks and balances from getting out of control.31
As a matter of fact, some Chinese authors actually perceived real efficiency
in the checks and balances system. One especially enthusiastic admirer of the
American political system argued that checks and balances were actually the
“automatic mechanism of efficiency,” since they made it very difficult for
a bad idea to become a policy or law, which he regarded as real efficiency
because a wrong policy would be much more costly than slow decision mak-
ing. He also argued that when it came to vital national interests, checks and
balances almost never prevented the U.S. government from making remark-
ably wise decisions, such as the Louisiana Purchase, the Monroe Doctrine,
etc., all of which had brought unbelievably huge benefits to the American
people. Checks and balances were also perceived to prevent lazy, corrupt,
or incompetent officials from getting into important positions, which again
172 Chapter 7
is socially efficient. What was more, checks and balances were regarded as
helpful in promoting political stability and preventing the misuse of power.
Moreover, political stability was probably the greatest source of efficiency
for the country.32
Thus, on the whole, the dominant Chinese perceptions of the system of
checks and balances in the American political system were more positive
than negative. It was perceived as having several major advantages, such
as inducing moderate policies, making decision makers more sensitive to
people’s interests, and improving the quality of decision making. Its only
major perceived defect was lack of efficiency, but many Chinese authors
either regarded the American political system as vigorous enough to keep this
problem under control, or regarded checks and balances as actually increasing
rather than reducing efficiency.
OVERALL PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND

WHETHER TO LEARN FROM THE UNITED STATES
Should China Learn from the United States?

Unlike articles on Chinese perceptions of the American economy, only two
articles specifically argued for learning from the United States in terms of
its political system. One of them was about the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.33 With great admiration, the author discussed three theoretical
problems regarding the 14th Amendment: (1) federal government vs. state
government; (2) judicial review vs. democracy; and (3) due process vs. equal
protection. The author argued that the U.S. experience provided useful les-
sons for China’s constitutional reform. The fact that the author actually was a
Chinese professor teaching at MIT reduced the representativeness of this arti-
cle in reflecting the Chinese perception, even though the fact that it appeared
in one of China’s most authoritative journals did indicate some acceptance by
the Chinese scholars of the views expressed therein. Another article, however,
was a highly positive evaluation of the American political system. The author
seemed to have almost completely accepted the United States’ political sys-
tem since he argued that checks and balances among the three branches of the
government, legal supervision, election and media supervision, and reward
and punishment in the government system all inhibited corruption and the
misuse of power, which in turn ensured economic prosperity for the United
States.34 And the author straightforwardly argued for learning from the United
States in terms of political system.
In quite a few other articles, Chinese authors’ inclination to do so was obvi-
ous in spite of the fact that they made no specific appeal in this regard. To see
Table 7.7 Number of Articles in Each Journal Conveying a Positive, Neutral, or

Negative Image of American Politics
Journal Positive Neutral Negative Positive/ Total

Negative Ratio
Meiguo Yanjiu 17 10 5 17/5 32
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 19 7 4 19/4 30
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 2 1 2 2/2 5
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 4 2 4 4/4 10
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 3 4 1 3/1 8
Zhanlue yu Guanli 0 0 0 0/0 0
Total 45 24 16 45/16 85
whether there would be convergence in China’s political system toward the

American pattern, an exploration of Chinese scholars’ overall perceptions of
the American politics as positive or otherwise can be revealing.
Overall Perceptions of the American Political System

Finally, let us look at the overall picture of American politics in the sample.
Table 7.7 lists the number of articles presenting a positive, neutral, or nega-
tive image of American politics. An article was coded positive when it mainly
conveyed an image of American politics as fair, efficient, serving the people’s
interests or wishes, promoting economic development and social stability,
making progress in the above direction, and portrayed American political
figures as capable, honorable, and moderate. An article was coded negative
when it conveyed an image of American politics using terms opposite those
used above. And when it was difficult to decide whether an article should be
coded as positive or negative, it was coded as neutral.
The articles in each category are listed in the endnote.35 From the table, it
is clear that the overall Chinese perceptions of American politics were quite
positive. Among the five journals having articles on American politics, three
journals published many more positive articles than negative ones (Meiguo
Yanjiu, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, and Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao). In the other
two journals, there were equal numbers of positive and negative articles, but
these two journals published far fewer articles on American politics than the
other three, especially Meiguo Yanjiu and Xiandai Guoji Guanxi. Overall,
there were almost three times as many positive articles as negative ones. It is
quite likely that a different person may code these articles somewhat differ-
ently, but, because of the large gap between the two categories, the conclusion
174 Chapter 7
will remain the same: in the authoritative Chinese journals, there were many
more positive articles on American politics than negative ones.
CONCLUSION36
What conclusions can be drawn from the evidence presented in this chapter?
Let us first of all summarize the findings. Regarding the Chinese perceptions
of democracy, evidence presented in the section “Chinese Perceptions of
Democracy” indicates that Chinese scholars generally accepted democracy
as a laudable form of governance, representing the right direction in human
political development. Some observers enthusiastically embraced democracy,
regarding it as inevitable, while others, though with some reservations as to
actual practices of democracy, nonetheless accepted its basic ideas.
As for whether democracy in the United States was genuine or not, this
chapter has explored the Chinese understanding of how American leaders
were elected, what kind of politicians emerged victorious in the American
political system, and whose interests the American political system served.
Chinese scholars agreed that money did play an important role in American
politics, but their dominant perceptions were that it was mainly the voters’
will that ultimately determined the outcome of elections in the United States.
Chinese scholars on the whole had a much more favorable than unfavorable
image of political leaders elected in the United States, regarding them as
quite capable of managing the country, and their character was acceptable to
most voters. According to some Chinese authors, the United States’ politi-
cal system served the interest of the ruling class, but most Chinese scholars
agreed that this system served the American people as a whole, rich and poor
included.
As for the efficiency of the American political system, i.e., the mechanism
of checks and balances, though some scholars regarded it as too inefficient
in decision making, more of them perceived many more advantages than dis-
advantages in the system, including inducing moderate policies, encouraging
greater participation of various groups in society, and improving the qual-
ity of decision making. Some scholars even perceived real efficiency in the
checks and balances system.
There were many more positive than negative articles in the sample regard-
ing the overall perceptions of the American political system. Though only a
few articles specifically argued for learning from the United States in terms of
the political system, quite a few implicitly endorsed the idea, and the overall
positive presentation of the American political system suggests that Chinese
authors again, as in the early 20th century, assumed the position that the
American political system offered a viable model for China to emulate.
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the purpose of exploring
Chinese perceptions of the American political system is to understand China’s
foreign policy orientation regarding the United States. According to the infer-
ential logic spelled out in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, we may conclude that it is quite
likely that China’s political system would converge more or less toward the
American model, and in Chinese eyes, any difference in political system
between the United States and China did not constitute a source of conflict
between the two countries. But the rarity of articles in the sample arguing
specifically for Chinese learning from the United States in terms of political
system indicates that the process of convergence might not be quick.
Notes
1. Shambaugh, 1991, pp. 166–199.

2. As in all the other empirical chapters, the titles of the source articles in the
sample had to specifically mention the United States or its political leaders.
3. Zhou Qi, “Meiguo dui Xifang Jindai Minzhuzhi de Gongxian: Daiyizhi
Minzhu” [American Contribution to Modern Western Democracy: Representative
Democracy], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1994), p. 57; Ji Hong, “Minquan Yundong yu
Meiguo Nanfang Heiren Zhengzhi Liliang de Xingqi” [Civil Rights Movement and
the Rise of Black Political Influence of Black Southerners], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer
2000), pp. 109–142; Ren Feng, “Kelindun de Zhexue Sixiang” [Clinton’s Philosophi-
cal Thought], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (February 1998), p. 45.
4. Huang Zhaoyu, “Cong xin Zongtong Nanchan Kan Meiguoshi Minzhu de
Biduan” [Perceiving the Defects in the Americanized Democracy from the “Difficult
Labor” in Producing the New President], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 2000),
p. 21; Li Zhidong, “Baoweier yu Meiguo Zhengzhi” [Colin Powell and American
Politics], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1997), p. 120; Ni Feng, “Suoluo Zhengzhi Sixiang
Shuping” [The Political Thought of Henry D. Thoreau], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1993),
pp. 118–128; Liu Jianfei, “Lun Fangongchanzhuyi zai Meiguo Chansheng yu Fazhan
de Genyuan” [Causes for the Emergence and Development of America’s Anticom-
munism], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 2000), pp. 85, 91, 93–94, 107–108.
5. Su Pengfei, “Cong Bokelishi Xianzhang Kan Meiguo Difang Zizhi Zhidu”
[U.S. Local Autonomy: Charter of the City of Berkeley], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn
1999), pp. 81–92; Cui Zhiyuan, “Guanyu Meiguo Xianfa Di Shisitiao Xiuzhengan de
Sange Lilun Wenti” [Three Theoretical Questions Concerning the 14th Amendment
to the United States Constitution], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1997), p. 126; Zhou Qi,
“Meiguo dui Xifang Jindai Minzhuzhi,” pp. 58–59.
176 Chapter 7
6. The 4 articles holding the “by money” position are as follows: Gong Weijing,
“Jianli zai Meiyuan Jichu shang de Meiguo Xuanju” [The U.S. Election Founded on
the Basis of U.S. Dollars], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (December 1992), pp. 41–45;
Tang Hao, “Meiguo Guonei Jituan Zhengzhi,” pp. 11–14; Huang Zhaoyu, “Cong xin
Zongtong Nanchan,” pp. 21–25; Zhou Qi, “Meiguo de Shangceng Jieji” [America’s
Upper Class], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1996), pp. 41–62.
The 31 articles holding the “by voters” position are as follows: Fan Ying,
“Xianru Jiangju de Meiguo Yusuan zhi Zheng” [The United States’ Fight over Bud-
get in Deadlock], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Summer 1996), pp. 49–53; Dong Xiuli,
“Meiguo Zongtong Xuanju yu Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The United States’ Presidential
Election and China-U.S. Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn 2000), pp.
57–61; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1990 Nian Zhongqi Xuanju ji qi Yingxiang” [The
United States’ Midterm Election in 1990 and Its Impact], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Sum-
mer 1991), pp. 15–20; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1992 Nian de Zongtong Xuanju he
Kelindun Zhengfu de Zhengce Quxiang” [The 1992 Presidential Election in the
United States and Policy Trend of the Clinton Administration], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
(Spring 1993), pp. 1–5; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1994 Nian Zhongqi Xuanju ji qi
Yingxiang” [The United States’ Midterm Election in 1994 and Its Impact], Guoji
Wenti Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 18–22; Zhao Shenggan and Lu Qichang, “Meiguo
Zhongqi Xuanju he Zhengju Qushi” [The United States’ Midterm Election and Politi-
cal Trend], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 1991), pp. 60–63; Zhang Xingping,
“Bushi hui Lianren ma?” [Will Bush Be Re-elected?], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (April
1992), pp. 45–47; Jin Canrong, “Daxuan hou de Meiguo Zhengju yu Zhengce Zouxi-
ang” [U.S. Politics and Policy Trend after the Presidential Election], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (November 1996), pp. 12, 40–43; Lin Hongyu, “Meiguo Gongzhong Yulun
yu Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce” [Public Opinion in the United States and Its China
Policy], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1997), pp. 67–70; Luo Yunli, “Qian Lun
Kelindun Disantiao Daolu dui Xi’ou Shehuiminzhuzhuyi de Yingxiang” [A Tenta-
tive Analysis of the Impact of Clinton’s Third Way on Social Democracy in Western
Europe], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), pp. 43–47; Zhao Shenggan, “Meiguo
Zongtong Jingxuan de Xingshi” [The United States’ Presidential Election Situations],
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (April 1992), pp. 15–22, 36; Zhao Shenggan and Lu Qichang,
“Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju,” (December 1994), pp. 26–32; Gao Huandong, “Meiguo
Xinyijie Guohui Liangdang Liliang Duibi ji qi dui Hua Taidu” [The Balance of Power
in the New U.S. Congress and Their Attitude toward China], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(May 1997), pp. 17–19; Lu Qichang, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo Liangdang Zhengzhi
de Yixie Xianzhu Bianhua” [Some Obvious Changes in the United States’ Bi-Party
Politics after the Cold War], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (September 1997), pp. 7–12; Lu
Qichang and Zhang Yanyu, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju Chuxi” [A Preliminary Analy-
sis of the United States’ Midterm Election], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 1998),
pp. 22–24; Lu Qichang, Fu Mengzhi, and Yuan Peng, “Meiguo Zhengzhi Jingji he
Waijiao Xingshi ji Quxiang” [The United States’ Politics, Economy, and Foreign
Affairs, Their Current Status and Future Trend], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (January/Feb-
ruary 1999), pp. 17–22; Chen Xiangyang, “Meiguo Guonei Zhengzhi dui Lengzhan
hou Zhong Mei Guanxi de Yingxiang” [Domestic Politics in the United States and
Its Impact on China-U.S. Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 1999),
pp. 29–31; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Daxuan yu Mei Zhong Guanxi” [The United States’
Presidential Election and U.S.-China Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 2000),
pp. 9–13; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Minzhudang Zongtong Houxuanren Ge er” [Gore:
The U.S. Presidential Candidate for the Democratic Party], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(August 2000), pp. 39–41; Chen Yu-jun, “Baoshoupai Liyi Jituan yu Gonghedang
Xuanmin Jiegou de Zhuanhua” [Conservative Interest Groups and the Changes in the
Republican Constituency], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1992), pp. 30–51; Jiang Jingsong,
“Lun Meiguo Guohui zhong Duoshudang de Lingdao Fangshi” [On the Style of
Majority Leadership in the U.S. Congress], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1992), pp. 52–65;
Jia Hao, “YijiujiuerNian Daxuan yu Meiguo Zhengzhi Chaoliu de Xinbianhua”
[The 1992 Presidential Election and the New Changes in the U.S. Political Trend],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1993), pp. 45–75; Jiang Jingsong, “Lun Xianshi Meiguo de
Xianzheng Weiji” [The Present Crisis of the U.S. Constitutional System], Meiguo
Yanjiu (Autumn 1993), pp. 53–76; Zhou Qi, “Meiguo dui Xifang Jindai Minzhuzhi,”
pp. 55–72; Jin Canrong, “Zhengzhi: Wenhua Fenlie yu Meiguo Zhengju Yanbian”
[The U.S. Politico-Cultural Split and Evolution of U.S. Politics], Meiguo Yanjiu
(Spring 1995), pp. 7–28; Fang Xiaoguang, “Xuanmin de Zaofan: Shi Xi 1994 Nian
Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju” [The Voters’ Rebellion: An Analysis of the 1994 U.S.
Midterm Election], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 125–129; Zhang Liping,
“Lindeng Yuehanxun yu Minquan Fa’an” [Lyndon Johnson and Civil Rights Acts],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1996), pp. 110–132; Cui Zhiyuan, “Guanyu Meiguo Xianfa,”
pp. 121–136; Su Pengfei, “Cong Bokelishi Xianzhang,” pp. 81–92; Liu Jianfei, “Lun
Fangongchanzhuyi,” pp. 81–108; Ji Hong, “Minquan Yundong yu Meiguo Nanfang,”
pp. 109–142.
The 12 articles holding the “by both” position are: Ren Xiaoping, “Meiguo
Xinwen Meijie yu Zongtong Jingxuan” [The United States’ News Media and Its
Presidential Elections], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Summer 1993), pp. 68–75; Jiang
Chengzhong, “Cong Meiguo Guohui,” pp. 15–19; Jin Junhui, “Shi Xi 2000 Nian
Meiguo Daxuan,” pp. 34–38; Zhao Shenggan, “Kelindun Dangxuan Zongtong,”
pp. 3–8; Lu Qichang, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo Liangdang Zhengzhi,” pp. 7–12; Lu
Qichang and Zhang Yanyu, “Dui hua PNTR An zai Meiguo Zhongyiyuan Tongguo de
Pingxi” [An Analysis of the Passage of China PNTR in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 2000), pp. 40–44; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Daxuan
yu Mei Zhong Guanxi,” pp. 9–13; Huang Zhaoyu, “Cong xin Zongtong Nanchan,”
pp. 21–25; Zhou Qi, “1994 Nian Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju Xunshi” [A Survey of the
1994 U.S. Mid-term Election], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 111–120; Jin Can-
rong, “Zhengzhi — Wenhua Fenlie,” pp. 7–28; Li Zhidong, “Baoweier yu Meiguo
Zhengzhi,” pp. 105–124; Xiong Zhiyong, “Jianxi dui Meiguo Guohui de Youshui: yi
Meiguo Duiwai Zhengce Wei Li” [Lobbying in the U.S. Congress and Foreign Policy
Making], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1998), pp. 71–89.
7. Zhou Qi, “Meiguo de Shangceng Jieji,” p. 58; Tang Hao, “Meiguo Guonei
Jituan Zhengzhi,” pp. 11–13.
178 Chapter 7
8. Gong Weijing, “Jianli zai Meiyuan Jichu shang,” pp. 41–45.

9. Huang Zhaoyu, “Cong xin Zongtong Nanchan,” pp. 21–25.
10. Zhao Shenggan, “Kelindun Dangxuan Zongtong ji Meiguo Zhengju he
Zhengce Quxiang” [Clinton Being Elected President, U.S. Politics, and Policy Trend],
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 1992), pp. 3–8.
11. Jiang Chengzhong, “Cong Meiguo Guohui Kan Meiguo de Zichan Jieji Yihui
Minzhu” [Perceiving the United States’ Capitalist Parliamentary Democracy from the
American Congress], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn 1993), pp. 15–19.
12. Jin Junhui, “Shi Xi 2000 Nian Meiguo Daxuan” [A Tentative Analysis of the
United States’ Year 2000 Presidential Election], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Spring 2000),
pp. 34–38.
13. Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1990 Nian Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 15–20; Zhao Sheng-
gan and Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju he Zhengju Qushi” [The United
States’ Midterm Election and Political Trend], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January
1991), pp. 60–63.
14. Zhao Shenggan, “Meiguo Zongtong Jingxuan,” pp. 15–22, 36.
15. Bi Yunhong, “Meiguo Daxuan Zhengzhi Xingshi Fenxi” [An Analysis of the
United States’ Presidential Election Situation], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1996),
p. 25.
16. Zhang Minqian, “Shi Lun Meiguo de Lianzheng Jianshe ji qi Jiejian Yiyi” [A
Tentative Analysis of the United States’ Clean Government Construction and Its Les-
sons to Us], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1994), p. 42.
17. Yuan Ruijun, “Meiguo Zongtong Muliao yu Geyuan de Quanli Xiaozhang”
[The Power Balance Between the White House Staff and the Cabinet Members],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1992), pp. 109, 115.
18. Su Ge, “Cong Mei Zhong Jianjiao Yinqi de Fengbo Kan Meiguo de Sanquan
Fenli” [Perceiving the United States’ Division of Three Powers from the Troubles
Caused by the Establishment of U.S.-China Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao
(Spring 1992), pp. 65–66.
19. Zhou Qi, “Meiguo de Shangceng Jieji,” pp. 51, 53, 59; Jiang Chengzhong,
“Cong Meiguo Guohui,” pp. 17–19; Lu Qichang, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo Liangdang
Zhengzhi,” pp. 7–12.
20. Jin Junhui “Shi Xi 2000 Nian Meiguo Daxuan,” pp. 34–38; Fan Ying, “Xianru
Jiangju de Meiguo Yusuan,” pp. 49–53.
21. Jiang Jingsong, “Lun Xianshi Meiguo,” pp. 57–58; Lu Qichang, “Xiaobushi
yu Ge’er de Zhengce Zhuzhang Bijiao” [A Comparison of the Policy Platforms of
George W. Bush and Gore], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (October 2000), pp. 26–28; Pan
Tongwen, “Meiguo 1992 Nian de Zongtong Xuanju,” pp. 4–5.
22. Su Pengfei, “Cong Bokelishi Xianzhang,” pp. 81–92; Zhang Minqian, “Shi
Lun Meiguo de Lianzheng Jianzhe,” pp. 32, 38–43.
23. Zhou Qi, “Meiguo dui Xifang Jindai Minzhuzhi,” pp. 55–72; Wang Guang,
“Meiguo Chuyu Guodu Shiqi” [The United States in Transition], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (January 1997), pp. 10–11; Bi Yunhong, “Meiguo Daxuan Zhengzhi,” p. 24.
24. Yuan Ruijun, “Meiguo Zongtong Muliao,” p. 113.
25. Gao Huandong, “Meiguo Xinyijie Guohui,” p. 17; Lu Qichang, “Dangqian

Meiguo Guonei Zhengzhi Xingshi” [Domestic Political Situations in the Current
United States], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 1998), p. 12; Jin Canrong, “1997 Nian
Meiguo Zhengju de Jiben Tedian” [The Basic Features of American Politics in 1997],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1998), p. 139; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1994 Nian Zhongqi
Xuanju,” pp. 21–22.
26. Su Ge, “Cong Mei Zhong Jianjiao,” pp. 61–67; Lu Qichang and Zhang Yanyu,
“Dui hua PNTR An,” pp. 40–44; Lu Qichang, Zhao Shenggan and Tang Leilei,
“Kelindun Zongtong 1994 Nian de Shizheng Zhongdian” [The Focus of the Clinton
Administration in 1994], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (February 1994), p. 4; Zhou Qi,
“1994 Nian Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 120–121.
27. Jiang Chengzhong, “Cong Meiguo Guohui,” pp. 16, 19.
28. Lin Hongyu, “Meiguo Gongzhong Yulun,” p. 70.
29. Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1994 Nian Zhongqi Xuanju,” p. 21; Lu Qichang,
“Dangqian Meiguo Guonei Zhengzhi,” p. 14; Jiang Jingsong, “Lun Xianshi Meiguo,”
pp. 53, 59–66, 68–73; Jiang Chengzhong, “Cong Meiguo Guohui,” p. 16; Fan Ying,
“Xianru Jiangju de Meiguo Yusuan,” pp. 51–52; Qian Chunyuan, Lu Qichang, and
Tao Jian, “Kelindun Zhengfu de Neiwai Zhengce Tiaozheng ji qi Qianjing” [Clinton
Administration’s Adjustment of Domestic and Foreign Policies and Their Prospects],
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (August 1993), pp. 20–21.
30. Zhou Qi, “1994 Nian Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 120–121; Lu Qichang,
“Daxuannian Meiguo Guonei Xingshi” [Domestic Situations in the United States in
the Presidential Election Year], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (January/February 2000), p.
35; Yuan Ruijun, “Meiguo Zongtong Muliao,” pp. 111–112; Yang Jian, “Cong Yuenan
Zhanzheng Kan Meiguo Guohui yu Zongtong jian de Zhanzhengquan zhi Zheng”
[Contention for War Power between the Congress and the President], Meiguo Yanjiu
(Winter 1992), pp. 7–29.
31. Lu Qichang, “Dangqian Meiguo Guonei Zhengzhi,” p. 14.
32. Xiao Chen, “Lun Meiguo de ‘Fazhi Sheji’ dui qi Jingji Xiaolu de Zhichi” [On
the Compatibility of Law-Governing to Economic Efficiency in America], Meiguo
Yanjiu (Autumn 1995), pp. 70–71, 84; Bai Xuefeng, “Lun Meiguo Sifa Duli de Queli”
[On the Establishment of Judicial Independence], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 2000),
pp.114–131; Zhang Minqian, “Shi Lun Meiguo de Lianzheng Jianshe,” p. 40.
33. Cui Zhiyuan, “Guanyu Meiguo Xianfa,” pp. 121–136.
34. Zhang Minqian, “Shi Lun Meiguo de Lianzheng Jianshe,” pp. 32, 38–43.
35. Positive: Chen Yu-jun, “Baoshoupai Liyi Jituan,” pp. 30–51; Jiang Jingsong,
“Lun Meiguo Guohui zhong Duoshudang,” pp. 52–65; Ni Feng, “Suoluo Zhengzhi
Sixiang Shuping,” pp. 107–128; Zhu Shida, “Guanyu Meiguo Zhongchan Jieji de
Yanbian yu Sikao” [On the Middle Class in the U.S.A.], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter
1994), pp. 39–53; Zhou Qi, “Meiguo dui Xifang Jindai Minzhuzhi,” pp. 55–72; Zhou
Qi, “1994 Nian Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 111–120; Wang Enming, “Dangdai
Meiguo de Funu Yundong” [The Women’s Movement in Contemporary America],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1995), pp. 31–47; Xiao Chen, “Lun Meiguo de ‘Fazhi
Sheji,’” pp. 67–89; Huan Yahong, “Shi Xi Meiguo Nuquan Yundong de Qiyuan”
180 Chapter 7
[The Origin of the Women’s Movement in America], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1995),
pp. 127–132; Zhang Ye, “‘Xingbie Jiaodu’ he ‘Funu yu Fazhan’” [Gender Perspective
and Women in Development: Two Hot Subjects in the Women’s Movement],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1995), pp. 133–136; Zhang Liping, “Lindeng Yuehanxun,”
pp. 110–132; Li Zhidong, “Baoweier yu Meiguo Zhengzhi,” pp. 105–124; Cui Zhi-
yuan, “Guanyu Meiguo Xianfa,” pp. 121–136; Jin Canrong, “1997 Nian Meiguo
Zhengju,” pp. 138–140; Su Pengfei, “Cong Bokelishi Xianzhang,” pp. 81–92; Ji Hong,
“Minquan Yundong yu Meiguo Nanfang,” pp. 109–142; Bai Xuefeng, “Lun Meiguo
Sifa Duli,” pp. 114–131; Zhao Shenggan, “Kelindun Dangxuan Zongtong,” pp. 3–8;
Sheng Zhixun, “Meiguo xin Dangxuan Zongtong Kelindun” [The United States’
President Elect Clinton], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 1992), pp. 60–62; Ding Kui-
song and Sheng Zhixun, “Cong Kelindun Zhengfu Banzi Kan qi Zhengce Zouxiang”
[Perceiving the Clinton Administration’s Policy Trend from the Constitution of His
Administration], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (February 1993), pp. 15–17; Zhao Shenggan,
“Meiguo xin Guohui ji yu Kelindun Zongtong de Guanxi” [The Relations between
the United States’ New Congress and President Clinton], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (April
1993), pp. 6–11; Lu Qichang, Zhao Shenggan, and Tang Leilei, “Kelindun Zongtong
1994 Nian,” pp. 2–5; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Zongtong Jingxuan Xingshi” [The Situ-
ation of the American Presidential Election], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (October 1996),
pp. 10–13; Lu Qichang, “Kelindun Lianren hou Guonei Mianlin de Zhuyao Renwu
he Wenti” [The Main Tasks and Problems within the United States Facing the Sec-
ond Clinton Administration], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (February 1997), pp. 2–5; Gao
Huandong, “Meiguo Xinyijie Guohui,” pp. 17–19; Ren Feng, “Kelindun de Zhexue
Sixiang,” p. 45; Lu Qichang, “Dangqian Meiguo Guonei Zhengzhi,” pp. 12–15; Ou
Bingmei, “Dangqian Ou mei “Disantiao Daolu” Chuyi” [A Preliminary Comment
on “the Third Way” in Current Europe and the United States], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(December 1998), pp. 2–5; Lu Qichang and Zhang Yanyu, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju
Chuxi,” pp. 22–24; Lu Qichang, “Xiaobushi Miaozhun Baigong” [George W. Bush
Takes Aim at the White House], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (August 1999), pp. 33–35;
Lu Qichang, “Daxuannian Meiguo Guonei Xingshi,” pp. 34–38; Lu Qichang and
Zhang Yanyu, “Dui hua PNTR An,” pp. 40–44; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Daxuan yu
Mei Zhong Guanxi” [The United States’ Presidential Election and U.S.-China Rela-
tions], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 2000), pp. 9–13; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Minzhu-
dang Zongtong Houxuanren Ge er” [Gore: The U.S. Presidential Candidate for the
Democratic Party], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (August 2000), pp. 39–41; Lu Qichang,
“Xiaobushi yu Ge er de Zhengce Zhuzhang,” pp. 26–29; Huang Zhaoyu, “Cong xin
Zongtong Nanchan,” pp. 21–25; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1992 Nian de Zongtong
Xuanju,” pp. 1–5; Pan Tongwen, “Dui Kelindun Ruzhu Baigong hou de Yixie Chubu
Kanfa” [A Few Tentative Thoughts Since Clinton’s Inauguration], Guoji Wenti Yan-
jiu (Winter 1993), pp. 8–11; Wen Yan, “Daxuan hou de Meiguo Neiwai Zhengce
Quxiang Yantaohui Zongshu” [A Summary of the Symposium on the Trend of the
United States’ Domestic and Foreign Policies after the Presidential Election], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (March 1993), pp. 57–60; Zhang Minqian, “Shi Lun Meiguo de
Lianzheng Jianshe,” pp. 32, 38–43; Jin Canrong, “Daxuan hou de Meiguo Zhengju,”
pp. 12, 40–43; Jiang Xinxue, “Meiguo Guohui de Fenquan he Lifa Kunjing” [The
Dilemma of Division of Powers and Legislature in the U.S. Congress], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (April 1998), pp. 73–76; Tang Xiao, “Shi Lun Meiguo Xianfa zhong Yanlun
Ziyou Quanli de Xiandu ” [A Tentative Comment on the Limitation on the Freedom
of Speech in American Constitution], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Summer 1991),
pp. 40–53, Su Ge, “Cong Mei Zhong Jianjiao,” pp. 61–67; Jiang Chengzhong, “Cong
Meiguo Guohui,” pp. 15–19
Neutral: Yuan Ruijun, “Meiguo Zongtong Muliao,” pp. 97–117; Yang Jian,
“Cong Yuenan Zhanzheng,” pp. 7–29; Jia Hao, “1992 Nian Daxuan yu Meiguo
Zhengzhi Chaoliu de Xinbianhua” [Presidential Election and the New Changes in
the U.S. Political Trend], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1993), pp. 45–75; Jin Canrong,
“Zhengzhi—Wenhua Fenlie,” pp. 7–28; Yang Dazhou, “Meiguo 1994 Nian Zhongqi
Xuanju de Yingxiang Chutan” [A Preliminary Study of the Impact of the 1994 U.S.
Midterm Election], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 106–110; Zhou Qi, “Meiguo
de Shangceng Jieji,” pp. 41–62; Zhu Shida, “Kelindun Zhengfu zai Kendingxing
Xingdong,” zhong de Liangnan Chujing” [The Clinton Administration’s Dilemma
in Affirmative Action], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1996), pp. 63–84; Xiong Zhiyong,
“Jianxi dui Meiguo Guohui de Youshui,” pp. 71–89; Liu Jianfei “Lun Fangongchan-
zhuyi,” pp. 81–108; Qian Chunyuan, Lu Qichang, and Tao Jian, “Kelindun Zhengfu
de Neiwai Zhengce,” pp. 19, 20–23; Peng Yan, “Meiguo Xuezhe Tan Meiguo xin
Zhengfu xin Guohui ji qi Neiwai Zhengce” [American Scholars on the United
States’ New Administration, New Congress, and the United States’ Domestic and
Foreign Policies], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 1993), pp. 37–41; Zhao Shenggan and
Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 26–32; Lu Qichang, “Lengzhan hou
Meiguo Liangdang Zhengzhi,” pp. 7–12; Lu Qichang, Fu Mengzhi, and Yuan Peng,
“Meiguo Zhengzhi Jingji he Waijiao Xingshi ji Quxiang” [The United States’ Politics,
Economy, and Foreign Affairs, Their Current Status and Future Trend], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (January/February 1999), pp. 17–22; Chen Xiangyang, “Meiguo Guonei
Zhengzhi,” pp. 29–31; Tang Hao, “Meiguo Guonei Jituan Zhengzhi,” pp. 11–14; Jin
Junhui, “Shi Xi 2000 Nian Meiguo Daxuan,” pp. 34–38; Zhang Xingping, “Bushi hui
Lianren ma?” pp. 45–47; Lin Hongyu, “Meiguo Gongzhong Yulun,” pp. 67–70; Liu
Wenzhong, “Ping Meiguo Zuigao Fayuan Pizhun cong Waiguo Bangjia Xianyifan
dao Meiguo Shoushen de Caijue” [On the U.S. Supreme Court’s Approval to Kid-
nap Suspects from a Foreign Country to Stand Trial in the United States], Waijiao
Xueyuan Xuebao (Winter 1992), pp. 29–31; Ren Xiaoping, “Meiguo Xinwen Meijie,”
pp. 68–75; Qin Yaqing, “Meiguo Guohui Weiyuanhui de Goucheng yu Quanli: Xin
Zhidu Zhuyi he Xinxi Xuepai Pingjie” [The Constitution and Power of Committees
in the U.S. Congress: An Introduction of and Comment on Neo-Institutionalism and
Information School], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Winter 1995), pp. 50–53; Dong Xiuli,
“Meiguo Zongtong Xuanju,” pp. 57–61.
Negative: Jiang Jingsong, “Lun Xianshi Meiguo,” pp. 53–76; Jin Junhui, “Meiguo
Shifou hui Chuxian Gengda de Dongdang: Zhongqi Xuanju hou de Yidian Sikao”
[Will the United States Become More Turbulent? An Afterthought on the U.S.
Midterm Election], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp.121–124; Fang Xiaoguang,
182 Chapter 7
“Xuanmin de Zaofan,” pp. 125–129; Jin Canrong, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju Yan-
taohui Zongshu” [A Report of the Workshop on the 1994 U.S. Midterm Elections],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 145–148; Zhao Shenggan, “Meiguo Zongtong
Jingxuan,” pp. 15–22, 36; Lu Qichang, “Kelindun Mianlin de Kunnan he Tiaozhan”
[Difficulties and Challenges Facing Clinton], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (October 1994),
pp. 29–32; Wang Guang, “Meiguo Chuyu Guodu Shiqi,” pp. 6–12; Shi Ren, “Shiji zhi
jiao de Mei Ou Ri Zhengzhi Zouxiang” [On the Political Trend of the United States,
Europe, and Japan around the Turn of the Century], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (February
1998), pp. 2–5; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1990 Nian Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 15–20; Pan
Tongwen, “Meiguo 1994 Nian Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 18–22; Zhao Shenggan and Lu
Qichang, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 60–63; Gong Weijing, “Jianli zai Meiyuan
Jichu shang,” pp. 41–45; Bi Yunhong, “Meiguo Daxuan Zhengzhi,” pp. 23–25; Song
Shiming, “Gonggong Xuanze Lilun yu Meiguo Xingzheng Gaige” [Public Choice
Theory and the United States’ Administrative Reform], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (May
1997), pp. 40–44, 60; Fan Ying, “Xianru Jiangju de Meiguo Yusuan,” pp. 49–53.
36. I wish to mention a few points as a caveat. (1) In this chapter, I have not
explored every aspect of the Chinese perceptions of the American politics. It is pos-
sible that other scholars looking at different aspects in the source materials may see
something not consistent with the overall image presented in this chapter. (2) The
inferential logic spelled out in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 should be regarded as suggesting
likelihood rather than a law-like relationship. (3) In coding articles as positive or
negative, I focused only on the performance of the American political system itself.
It was possible that an article would be coded as positive even though it at the same
time conveyed an image of the United States threatening China’s interests, so long as
the article presented an image of the American political system as working well. In
spite of the above reservations, the overall conclusion for this chapter would still be
valid, since it was quite limited.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
We are now in a position to draw together the findings from various chap-
ters and address the fundamental research question of this project: what are
China’s motivations vis-à-vis the United States? As discussed in Chapter 2,
a state formulates its policy toward another state mainly on the basis of two
considerations. One is the consideration of national interest, and the other is
the consideration of the character of the target state. One’s interest is usually
the more important consideration. When substantial interest is involved, a
state is willing to do business with another state even though it might find the
character of the target state objectionable. The U.S.-USSR alliance during the
Second World War was a case in point. And a state may not have much of a
problem supporting a regime led by a “son of a bitch” so long as he is “our
son of a bitch.” But when no substantial interest is involved, the character of
the target state is the paramount consideration in a state’s formulation of the
policy regarding a target state.
To explore China’s foreign policy motivations with regard to the United
States, this book is essentially divided into two parts. The first part, consist-
ing of Chapters 3, 4 and 5, explores the interest involved in the formulation
of China’s policy toward the United States. And the second part, consist-
ing of Chapters 6 and 7, explores Chinese scholars’ perceptions of two key
national characteristics of the United States, namely its economic and politi-
cal systems.
Using the research findings in the various chapters, we can probe China’s
motivations toward the United States through the following approaches. One
approach is to explore China’s motivations in two parts. The first part is to
see how consideration of national interest affected the formulation of China’s
policy toward the United States. And the second part is to see how China’s
183
184 Chapter 8
perception of key characteristics of the United States affected China’s foreign

policy orientation toward the United States. Another way is to summarize the
dominant Chinese images of the United States and thereby try to find out Chi-
na’s motivations toward the United States As this book is an effort to test the
supposed China threat, I will use the findings of this research to address the
question of to what extent China is a threat to the United States. And finally,
we will be able to see how U.S.-China relations can be characterized.
HOW CONSIDERATION OF NATIONAL INTEREST

AFFECTED CHINA’S MOTIVATIONS
According to the findings in Chapter 5, Chinese scholars accepted that the

United States was superior over China in almost every major dimension of
national power. The U.S. economy was many times larger than China’s, the
United States was decades ahead in science and technology, and its military
equipment enjoyed the advantage of several generations. Even in soft power,
most Chinese authors acknowledged U.S. superiority. The findings in Chapter
3 demonstrate that the United States was perceived as sometimes using its
superior power in a way that harmed China’s national interest. The United
States’ massive arsenal of nuclear weapons hung like a sword of Damocles
over other countries, and the development of its NMD threatened to cut at the
string which held the sword. U.S. involvement in Taiwanese affairs severely
affected the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. The security arrange-
ments between the United States and countries around China were like the
gentle tightening of a noose. The United States’ lecturing about China’s
human rights was perceived as a serious intervention in China’s internal
affairs, and at one time such lecturing was perceived to have almost caused
complete chaos in China. The United States was also perceived as sometimes
affecting China’s economic development and attacking China’s reputation
both in the United States and on the international stage.
The implications of the research in Chapters 3 and 5 were that the Chinese
were more or less resentful of U.S. intervention in China’s internal affairs,
and such resentment often revealed itself in the Chinese media. As a result,
while Chinese authors were resentful of China bashing in U.S. media and
think tanks, they themselves often were not very restrained in America bash-
ing in the Chinese media. It is laudable that the image of the United States
in the Chinese publications of the 1990s was much more positive than in the
1980s, not to mention the 1970s and earlier, but there was still room for an
improved understanding of the United States by Chinese scholars.
Conclusion 185
The more important behavioral implications of the research were that China
would on the whole adopt an appeasement approach toward the United States,
hoping that it would lead to restraint in the United States’ China policy. Usu-
ally only incidents perceived as intolerable would prompt China’s measured
response. It is understandable that China was aware of its weakness and was
apprehensive that the United States would take advantage of it. To prevent
the United States’ “abuse” of its power, it might be conceivable for China
occasionally to resort to strong responses. But the findings in Chapters 3 and
5 indicate that on the whole appeasement would be one of China’s predomi-
nant policy approaches toward the United States.
On the other hand, as revealed in Chapters 4 and 5, the United States was
perceived as having employed its superior power in a way that promoted
China’s national interest. The United States’ commitment to peace and its
engagement policy ensured a peaceful environment for China. The vast
American market provided an important outlet for China’s mostly labor-in-
tensive products, a tiny percentage of the United States’ overseas investment
would mean to China a significant inflow of foreign capital, and the occa-
sional relaxation in technology transfer could boost the quality of China’s
economy. Besides, assistance from the United States facilitated China’s entry
into the world community and enhanced China’s status as one of the major
powers in the world. With the steady development of U.S.-China relations,
the United States had been perceived as increasingly more important to
China’s pursuit of modernization.
The implications of the research in Chapters 4 and 5 were that Chinese
scholars were also appreciative of the U.S. role in promoting China’s national
interest, especially its role in facilitating China’s economic development. If
the drastic change in Chinese perceptions of the United States from the 1980s
to the 1990s is any indication, it would be predictable that such appreciation
would engender an increasingly positive image of the United States in China,
and cultivate new generations of pro-American Chinese.
The behavioral implications of China’s perception of opportunity from the
United States were that promoting cooperation would be another of China’s
predominant policy approaches toward the United States, in the hope of gain-
ing greater benefits from the bilateral relations. Obviously, when the Chinese
perceived opportunity from the United States, the United States’ superior
capability was no longer a target of resentment but one of appreciation.
Thus, from the perspective of national interest, China’s dominant tendencies
in its policy toward the United States would be appeasement and coopera-
tion. Brooks and Wohlforth1 were correct that in China’s perceptions of the
United States, there were both elements of resentment and fear, and elements
186 Chapter 8
of appreciation and admiration. These elements combined to determine that

reducing troubles and promoting cooperation would be the dominant orienta-
tion in China’s policy formulation regarding the United States. The explora-
tion of the national interest involved in the U.S.-China relations suggests
therefore that to be a status quo country would be China’s rational policy
preference.
HOW CONSIDERATION OF KEY CHARACTERS OF THE

UNITED STATES AFFECTED CHINA’S MOTIVATIONS
Chapters 6 and 7 explore Chinese perceptions of the U.S. economy and

politics, two of the defining characteristics of the Western world represented
by the United States. This project found that, compared with the perceptions
in the 1980s and earlier, the Chinese perceptions of the U.S. economy had
undergone a fundamental change. In the 1990s, Chinese authors generally
accepted that market economy was an ideal form of economic management.
They had discarded the degenerate image of the U.S. economy that was prev-
alent during most of the PRC era, and regarded U.S. economic performance
as highly successful. They acknowledged the United States’ leadership status
in world economy, and often expressed an earnest desire to learn from the
United States in economic management. The evidence presented in Chapter
6 suggests strongly that convergence of China’s economic system with the
American model would be quite likely and differences in economic system
between the United States and China, from the Chinese perspective, did not
constitute a source of conflict between the two countries.
As for American politics, Chinese perceptions in the 1990s also represented
a significant departure from the 1980s and earlier. Democracy, just as in the
early 20th century, became a revered form of governance. Usually implicitly,
but occasionally explicitly, Chinese authors accepted that the United States’
political system represented more a genuine democracy than a sham one.
One of its defining features, checks and balances, was generally perceived
as working very well. The overall perception of American politics was more
positive than negative and some authors in authoritative Chinese journals
occasionally appealed directly for learning from the United States in politi-
cal system. Thus, the evidence presented in Chapter 7 suggests that China
would move gradually toward the American political model, and differences
in political system, again from the Chinese perspective, would not constitute
a serious core of contention between the United States and China.
Thus, the findings in Chapters 6 and 7 indicate that, when national interest
was not directly involved, the great differences between the United States and
Conclusion 187
China in economic and political systems would not necessarily lead to con-
flict between the two countries. Indeed, the differences would provide a basis
more for cooperation between the two countries than for conflict. Exploration
of Chinese perceptions of key characteristics of the United States suggests
therefore that China had been moving toward joining the international com-
munity. Progress had been more rapid regarding the economic system and
more slow but still steady regarding the political system.
HOW CHINA’S IMAGES OF THE UNITED STATES REVEAL

CHINA’S MOTIVATIONS
Another way to explore China’s foreign policy motivations regarding the

United States is through understanding China’s images of the United States.
In the following, I will first identify the dominant Chinese images of the
United States, and then try to explain how these images reveal China’s moti-
vation regarding it. The research of this project indicates that the dominant
Chinese images of the United States in the 1990s included the following:
a partner image, a model image, and an imperialist image. The degenerate
image was salient in the early 1990s, but it was replaced by an image of
preponderant America in the second half of the 1990s. I will discuss each of
these images in some detail.
WHAT ARE THE DOMINANT CHINESE IMAGES OF

THE UNITED STATES?
Partner Image
A review of the existing works on image indicates that the partner image had
long been among the Chinese perceptions of the United States. During the
late Qing Dynasty, Chinese officials already entertained the idea of establish-
ing a partnership with the United States in the area of commerce.2 In the early
20th century, China thought about offering its market to the United States
in exchange for its capital and goods, and for its “strategic counterpoise”
to imperialists threatening China’s security.3 China-U.S. cooperation during
World War II almost elevated the Chinese image of the United States from a
potential partner to a virtual patron, with American aid perceived as “divine
wind” and the GI’s fighting in China against the Japanese invasion as “glori-
ous angels.”4 Following the Korean War, however, the partner image of the
188 Chapter 8
United States almost completely vanished even though Mao had long thought
about improving relations with the United States.5
As China-USSR relations deteriorated, China began more seriously to
seek improvement of relations with the United States and to establish trade
relations with it.6 But throughout the history of the China-U.S. contact up to
the end of the 1980s, the partner image of the United States in the existing
literature remained flimsy and largely latent.
It was in the 1990s that “partner” became one of the major images in the
literature on Chinese perceptions of the United States. The most prominent
portrayal of this image was by Wang and Lin,7 who regarded it as one of the
three major images of the United States. These authors argued that Chinese
scholars of this school perceived bilateral relations “in terms of interdepen-
dence rather than a zero-sum game,” with China accepting the United States
as playing a positive role in the world and the United States accepting China’s
development as befitting the United States’ interest.8 Saunders also presented
the partner image as one of the major Chinese images of the United States
in the 1990s. He, however, distinguished a liberal school of Chinese schol-
ars who perceived mainly mutual benefits in China-U.S. cooperation from
a realist school who reluctantly accepted interdependence with the outside
world and at the same time was “keenly aware of the political vulnerabilities
interdependence creates.”9
The research of this project, especially Chapter 4, indicates that the partner
image was indeed one of the dominant Chinese images of the United States
in the 1990s. Chinese scholars generally agreed that China-U.S. cooperation
was mutually beneficial. Some Chinese scholars also accepted that the inter-
dependence between the two countries was asymmetrical, with China being
dependent on the United States more than the United States on China. The
partner image was especially salient in the area of economic cooperation.
By the end of the 1990s, most of the serious problems in the two countries’
bilateral economic cooperation had been resolved, such as intellectual prop-
erty rights disputes, MFN/PNTR, and China’s WTO membership. Thus, in
economic relations, Chinese scholars perceived mainly mutual benefits and
little threat from the United States. In terms of security relations between the
two countries, however, some Chinese scholars perceived mainly a conflict
management type of cooperation rather than strong security needs in both
countries to cooperate in order to deal with an overwhelming common threat
as in the Cold War period. As China’s strategic goal for a long time to come
was to develop its economy and to improve Chinese people’s living standards,
and the China-U.S. economic relations conform strongly to China’s national
interest, the partner image was one dominant Chinese image of the United
States in the 1990s.
Conclusion 189
Model Image
The model image was once a salient Chinese image of the United States. In
the history of the U.S.-China relations, the first predominant Chinese image
of the United States was as a model. Science and democracy were considered
the “defining characteristics of American society,” U.S. foreign policy was
considered qualitatively different from the “unmitigated expansionism” of
imperial powers such as Japan and the European countries, and the United
States’ political system reminded Chinese of their own “legendary golden
age.” At the beginning of the 20th century, the great aspiration of Chinese
intellectuals was to create a new society in China with the United States as
its model. Tu Wei-ming divided the history of the Chinese perception of the
United States into four periods, and the first was the period of admiration.
Jerome Ch’en’s lengthy article on Chinese perceptions of the West is
mainly a presentation of the model image, especially of the United States.
In explaining the rapid change of the Chinese image of the West after initial
contact, the famous Chinese scholar Wei Yuan lamented, “They are extraor-
dinarily talented and should be considered as our good friends. How can
they be called ‘barbarians’?”10 Perhaps the best presentation of the model
image was by another well-known scholar, Hu Shih, who once studied
philosophy at Columbia University under the tutelage of John Dewey: “We
are not yet qualified to criticize other people’s (the Westerners’) shortcom-
ings. We should do well to notice only their strength.”11 Hu’s model image
was somewhat qualified by his sense of etiquette, but Professor Wen I-to
put forward this model image without such a concern: “Compare Chinese
and Western styles? What do you have to compare Western styles with?
Are you good enough for any comparison? In spite of your mealy mouth
and silver tongue, you cannot conceal your smallness, vulgarity, cowardice,
and hypocrisy; nor can you hide your greed, stealth, selfishness, and other
ugly characteristics . . . What else do you have to compare with the West?”12
According to Ch’en’s presentation, many Chinese often attributed the best
to almost everything American. American women were “the most lovely and
admirable,” the American political system ensured “the most virtuous man
at the helm of power,” American foreign policy was “almost altruistic,” and
the American economic system helped its people to “pursue their enterprises
with success.”13
Jerome Ch’en’s and Tu Wei-ming’s articles are the only pieces in the
existing literature on the Chinese perceptions of the United States to devote
significant attention to the model image of the United States, but they both
describe the image as reflecting Chinese perceptions before the PRC period.
In other relevant image works, the model image has been largely absent.
190 Chapter 8
This situation might reflect the fact that during the PRC period up to the
end of the 1980s, the Chinese usually did not think it desirable to learn from
the United States. Works published during the 1990s similarly paid scant
attention to this image. This might be the result of selective information pro-
cessing, as people tend to pay more attention to dramatic events such as the
Tiananmen tragedy, the Taiwan Strait crisis, and the Chinese embassy bomb-
ing, to the neglect of non-dramatic but momentous changes in the Chinese
people’s perceptions, such as the revival of the model image.
The research of this project indicates that the model image was prevalent
in the Chinese perception of the United States in the 1990s. As demonstrated
in Chapters 6 and 7, Chinese authors had generally accepted that the Ameri-
can economic model was worthy of emulation, and the model image in this
respect was prevalent, strong, and explicit. As for the Chinese perception of
the American political model, Chapter 7 indicates that Chinese authors had
also accepted the merits of democracy and often agreed that the American
political model worked very well in the United States. They sometimes even
acknowledged that convergence more or less toward the American political
model should be the direction of China’s political reform. But they seldom
advocated immediate and unconditional acceptance of this model in China.
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, regarding the perception of threat to China’s
government and political stability, they seemed to prefer a go-slow approach
regarding political reform. Chinese model image of the United States in this
respect therefore was tentative, moderate, and usually implicit.
Chapter 4 also provides evidence supporting the model image of the United
States, especially regarding learning from the United States in terms of sci-
ence and technology. A cursory review of articles in the six journals on the
Chinese perceptions of the American culture (not discussed in detail in this
project) seems to indicate that the model image was present in this area as
well. We may conclude therefore that the model image had again become
one of the dominant images in the Chinese perceptions of the United States
in the 1990s.
Imperialist Image
According to the existing literature, “the imperialist” was one of the most
salient and persistent images in the Chinese perception of the United States.
It ran all the way from the late 19th century to the 1990s. As early as the late
Qing Dynasty, some Chinese were already concerned that the United States
was as covetous as other imperialist powers and that China might fall prey
to its expansionist foreign policy.14 During the Republican period in the early
Conclusion 191
twentieth century, more Chinese perceived the United States as oppressing

and exploiting them.15 The United States’ “illegitimate ambition” over China
at that time was mainly exemplified in its support for the corrupt Guomind-
ang regime.16 Its China policy was considered unfair and hostile, and Chinese
students’ experience in the United States was humiliating and bitter.17
During the Maoist period, especially in the 1950s, the Chinese distaste
for the United States reached its zenith.18 The United States was accused of
resorting to germ warfare during the Korean War and of trying hard to “prey
upon China’s weakness.” The American treatment of China was one of subju-
gation, aggression, exploitation, and suppression of China’s development.19 It
was perceived as a “greedy and violent nation,” trying to “control the world’s
natural resources,” supporting the “worst enemy of the Chinese people,”
and obstructing China’s development.20 The Chinese complained that their
backwardness was due in no small part to the United States’ embargo.21 The
Chinese regarded the United States as being ready to use forces to satisfy its
selfish pursuit of power and wealth at other nations’ expense. The U.S.-USSR
rivalry was considered one for global hegemony, and the United States’ rela-
tions with Third World countries was for the exploitation of them. The United
States was considered the major source of instability in the world.22 Chinese
authors accused the United States of interfering in China’s internal affairs,
particularly in the case of Taiwan,23 and of trying to isolate China and encircle
it with military bases. And they perceived the United States as a chronic
aggressor, invading other countries one after another.24
As late as in the 1990s, the imperialist image of the United States was still
salient. The United States was perceived as trying to contain China’s rise,
obstruct China’s economic development, tarnish China’s international image,
and subvert China’s government and political system. It was interested in
world hegemony rather than democracy.25 It was a selfish and unfriendly
country that liked to intervene in other countries’ internal affairs for its own
interest.26
The research from this project, especially the evidence presented in Chap-
ters 3 and 5, supports the imperialist image described in the existing litera-
ture. In Chapter 5, the United States was described as much superior over
China in various major dimensions of power, and in Chapter 3 the United
States was presented as having used its superior power in a way that harmed
China’s national interests. What was unique in Chapter 3 was the attempt to
systematically describe the Chinese perceptions of threat from the United
States, while each work in the existing literature usually focused only on a
few aspects of this imperialist image. According to this chapter, the United
States was perceived as constituting more or less a threat to China’s national
192 Chapter 8
security, political stability, international prestige, economic development,

and China’s preferred world order. But the imperialist image as presented
in Chapter 3 was not as serious as those describing the Chinese perceptions
of the United States before the 1990s, especially before the China-U.S. rap-
prochement. This image of the United States to a great extent was diluted
in the overall Chinese perceptions of the United States when we take into
account the Chinese perceptions of opportunity from the United States
described in Chapter 4 and other aspects of the Chinese perception presented
in Chapters 6 and 7.
Degenerate Image?
Several scholars in the existing literature presented more or less a degenerate
image of the United States held by Chinese perceivers. In Tu’s 1973 article,
the degenerate image was but one of many of the United States presented.
The degenerate image itself received sketchy attention, more a reflection of
China’s lack of understanding of the United States as a result of sustained
isolation than an informed assessment of the United States. The United States
was described as a paper tiger, “with utter chaos at home and extreme isola-
tion abroad,” unable to meet the challenges facing the nation.27
In a lavish portrayal of a dominant model image, Jerome Ch’en inserted a
few passages describing the United States’ degeneration: its educational sys-
tem on the verge of collapse, corruption in politics, the severity of economic
problems, and the poverty of the underprivileged.28
The most systematic studies of the degenerate image of the United States
held by Chinese perceivers were done by Shambaugh and Pillsbury. In
Shambaugh’s study of the Chinese perceptions of the American economy,29
Chinese scholars were described as trying to support and flesh out the classic
Marxist arguments that capitalism had been beset with insoluble contradic-
tions which would inevitably lead to a general crisis, and that capitalism was
on its last legs. But toward the late 1980s, Chinese authors were presented
as having somewhat revised their prediction of the American economy, and
they claimed that capitalism still had some vitality and was not “in danger of
dying any time soon.”
The predominant image presented in Pillsbury’s China Debates the Future
Security Environment is the degenerate image. According to Pillsbury, Chi-
nese authors argued that the American decline would be inevitable, and multi-
polarity would be the future trend of the world. Pillsbury focused mainly on
the United States’ military power. The United States would fail to implement
the RMA (revolution in military affairs), its logistics was unable to support
Conclusion 193
its military ambition, its aircraft carriers were like sitting ducks waiting to be
sunk, its allies were becoming more independent, and a small country like
North Korea was capable of defeating the United States.30
This degenerate image of the United States is somewhat supported by
the research of this project, in the section “Perceived American Decline in
the Early 1990s” (Chapter 5). Major differences between Pillsbury and this
author include the following.
1. Pillsbury claimed that the dominant Chinese perception of the United

States in the 1990s was the American decline. I maintain that, in terms
of the Chinese perceptions of American power, the American decline was
indeed a salient feature in the first half of the 1990s, but in the second
half of the 1990s the more salient Chinese perception was the American
rejuvenation.
2. Pillsbury seemed to suggest that a perception of the American rejuvena-
tion reappeared in China because of American military clout, such as the
American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. I maintain that
the Chinese perception of American vitality was based mainly on a per-
ception of American economic prosperity.31
3. Pillsbury claimed that multi-polarity was proclaimed by a Chinese author
in 1986. I believe that China’s multi-polarity thesis dates back much ear-
lier than 1986, and the most significant source of this thesis was President
Nixon’s five-pole statements of the early 1970s.32
4. Pillsbury described a perception of decline in the American military
power, but the research of this project indicates that the United States’
military power suffered no perceived decline at all, even when the Ameri-
can (economic) decline was a salient image among Chinese scholars in
the early 1990s.
It seems that the degenerate image had been persistent in the Chinese
perception of the United States. In the early China-U.S. contact, this image
received sketchy support, far from being the dominant Chinese perception
of the United States. It became the dominant Chinese image of the United
States during the Maoist period, supported not only by the dominant Marx-
ist theories but also by a lack of understanding of the United States because
of China’s isolation. During the 1980s, as presented by Shambaugh, the
degenerate image of the United States continued to be dominant. In the early
1990s, however, this image was salient but based more on empirical studies
of the United States, especially the American economic performance. In the
late 1990s, mainly because of the remarkable performance of the American
194 Chapter 8
economy, the degenerate image ceased to be the dominant perception in

terms of the Chinese understanding of the American power, but it nonetheless
remained an important perception.
EXPLORING CHINA’S MOTIVATIONS FROM CHINA’S

IMAGES OF THE UNITED STATES
Partner Image. China’s partner image of the United States indicates that
China often perceived the bilateral relations in win-win terms. It perceived
a substantial opportunity for mutual benefits and wanted the two countries
to make full use of such opportunities. China’s partner image of the United
States demonstrated its desire to integrate itself into the international com-
munity, and it thus supported the proposition that China was a status quo
country.
Model Image. China’s model image of the United States indicates that
there were elements of admiration in China’s perception of the United States.
It means that China not only took note of many things in the United States
which were superior over China’s, but also wished to learn from the United
States in important ways. A model image carries the implications that China
not only did not regard differences between the two countries as sources of
conflict, but regarded them as offering opportunities for cooperation between
the two countries. China’s model image of the United States implied a strong
desire on the part of China to integrate itself into the international community
more or less represented by the United States. This image therefore also sup-
ports the proposition that China was a status quo country.
Imperialist Image. China’s imperialist image of the United States indicates
that there were some elements of resentment and conflict in China’s policy
toward the United States. But the image also indicates that when China
resorted to confrontation, it was usually done in a defensive and reactive way.
China recognized the superior power of the United States in various aspects,
and would be generally reluctant to engage in conflicts with the United States.
The imperialist image also carries the implication that the United States was
perceived as trying to exploit China’s weakness. In the Chinese eye, there-
fore, confrontation between the two countries would usually occur when the
United States was trying to intervene in China’s internal affairs. The sup-
posedly defensive and reactive nature of China’s policy toward the United
States suggests that China was a status quo country, or at least that it wished
to be one.
Degenerate Image. China’s degenerate image of the United States in the
early 1990s involved mostly a descriptive dimension, an effort to present an
Conclusion 195
image of the United States in decline. Chinese scholars perceived mainly a

relative decline rather than an absolute decline, and they nonetheless believed
that the United States for a long time to come would remain a superpower
much stronger than any other country in the world. As a result, they did not
perceive an opportunity for exploitation. Consequently, if the degenerate
image of the United States in the early 1990s did not support the idea that
China was a status quo country, it did not support the idea that China was a
non–status quo country either.
On the whole, all three dominant Chinese images of the United States
(partner, model, imperialist) suggest that China was a status quo country,
having a strong desire to cooperate with the United States and to integrate
itself into the international community. The degenerate image of the United
States, prevalent in the early 1990s, does not support the proposition that
China was a status quo country, but it does not support the idea that China
was a non–status quo country either. In the second half of the 1990s, the
image of relative American decline was replaced by the image of American
rejuvenation, further supporting the proposition that China was a status quo
country.
TO WHAT EXTENT IS CHINA A THREAT?
As this project is an analysis of the supposed China threat, before the end
of this book I would like to address the question of to what extent China is
a threat to the United States. To answer this question, we need to explore
whether there have been things the two countries wanted and could not both
have. If the United States wanted A while China wanted B, and the two coun-
tries did not have overlapping claims and neither was a threat to the other.33
But when the two countries had overlapping claims, they were more or less
a threat to each other, and the more the overlapping claims, the more serious
the threat.
As it is impossible for two big countries in the world not to have any
conflicting interests, it is unrealistic to say that one big country presented
absolutely no threat to another. Thus, Europe could be a threat to the
United States because it was capable of evolving into a pole more power-
ful than the United States. As a matter of fact, World War I and especially
World War II could be construed as wars between Europe and the United
States. One 2002 article pointed out that “it is time to stop pretending
that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or
even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of
power—the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of
196 Chapter 8
power—American and European perspectives are diverging.”34 Russia

could be a threat to the United States because it could destroy the United
States if Russian leaders were crazy enough to do so. Obviously, the Cold
War was between the United States and Russia. One study of Russian
attitudes toward America mentioned that “almost all (Russian) elites,
including liberals, are hostile toward the United States,” even though “the
masses have mixed feelings on this subject.”35 Japan could be a threat
to the United States because it is capable of developing “thousands of
nuclear warheads at short notice.”36 The U.S.-Japan duel constituted one
major component of the World War II. One scholar argued that “many
(Japanese) on the right are ready to assert more independence from the
United States, relying more on Japan’s own armed forces.” And he warned
that “Americans anxious about China may lend support to Japanese
nationalism without realizing its long-term damage. Chinese anxious
about the United States may someday do the same.”37 India could be a
threat to the United States because, with its huge population, steady eco-
nomic development, and nuclear and space programs, it is undoubtedly a
major rising power. India’s potential to dominate the Indian Ocean might
in time become a major concern for the United States. Brazil could be a
threat to the United States because, if a “pro-Castro candidate is elected
president of Brazil, the results could include a radical regime in Brazil re-
establishing its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs, developing
close links to state sponsors of terrorism such as Cuba, Iraq and Iran, and
participating in the destabilization of fragile neighboring democracies.
This could lead to 300 million people in six countries coming under the
control of radical anti-U.S. regimes and the possibility that thousands of
newly indoctrinated terrorists might try to attack the United States from
Latin America.”38 Saudi Arabia could be a threat to the United States
because, according to a Rand analyst, “the Saudis are active at every level
of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot-soldier,
from ideologist to cheerleader,” and 15 of the 19 September 11 hijack-
ers were Saudis.39 U.S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld refused to
disagree with the Rand analyst’s finding that Saudis were enemies of the
United States.40 Even small and friendly countries could be a threat to the
United States—for instance, in rebuffing the United States’ claim to a seat
in the UN Human Rights Commission, in weakening the legitimacy of the
United States’ support for Israel, and in denying immunity to Americans
in the International Criminal Court.41 In testing the China threat thesis,
it would be more realistic therefore to ask to what extent China was a
threat to the United States than whether China was a threat to the United
States.
Conclusion 197
Table 8.1 Conflicting Interests between the United States and China
China United States

1. The United States should refrain from 1. The United States would do whatever
intervention in China’s internal affairs necessary to defend Taiwan, would
such as Taiwan, Tibet, etc. continue showing interest in Tibet, etc.
2. The two countries should make 2. The United States would maintain
arrangements regarding the non-use of military activity, including nuclear
force, including the non-use of nuclear deterrence with regard to China.
weapons.
3. The United States’ encirclement made 3. The United States would insist on strong
China uneasy. security ties with countries around China.
4. China should decide its own political 4. China should move faster toward
system, and China’s human rights were democracy, and the United States had
basically China’s internal affairs. the right to show concern for China’s
human rights situation.
5. The United States should not press too 5. The United States would vigorously
hard for economic concessions from defend its economic interests in its
China. relations with China.
6. The United States should refrain from 6. The United States would judge China as
tarnishing China’s image either in the it saw fit.
international stage or in U.S. media.
7. China wished to have a world in which 7. The United States should be able to
no country could impose its will on defend its interests around the globe.
another.
To what extent was China a threat to the United States? We can answer
this question by exploring the overlapping claims by the two countries. The
findings in Chapter 3 may serve this purpose.
The findings in Chapter 3 as summarized in Table 8.1 demonstrate that
the United States and China did have conflicting interests. But do the
findings indicate that China was a serious threat to the United States? We
may resort to three concepts to discuss the extent of China’s threat to the
United States. The first is relative threat, the second is absolute threat,
and the third is relative tolerance. From the perspective of relative threat,
it is possible for China to argue that in rows 1 through 4 in Table 8.1, the
conflict of interests between the two countries results mostly from the
United States’ efforts to intervene in China’s internal affairs. Row 5 no
longer represented a serious problem between the two countries because
the major causes of contention, such as MFN, PNTR, and WTO, had
already been removed.
Regarding row 6, from the Chinese perspective, even though both the
United States and China had the right to express their opinions regarding the
198 Chapter 8
other’s behavior, the United States’ criticism of China nonetheless carried a

much greater threat to China than China’s criticism did to the United States.
The U.S. media had a worldwide reach while Chinese media reached basi-
cally only a Chinese audience. More importantly, the United States’ criticism
of China carried much more serious behavioral implications than China’s
criticism of the United States. As the United States was much stronger than
China in almost every aspect (see Chapter 5), the United States had the
capability to turn its verbal criticism into concrete actions against China,
while China’s criticism of the United States served mostly the function of
psychological satisfaction. As demonstrated in some clashes between the
two countries, the United States could easily cause the accidental death of
Chinese personnel, either in a Chinese embassy or in a Chinese aircraft, while
China’s resentment of the United States might just result in the smearing of
the U.S. embassy in China and in holding U.S. pilots as reluctant but lavishly
treated guests for 10 days.
As for row 7, if the United States indeed had a worldwide ambition,
China’s preference for a multipolar world might constitute more or less of an
obstacle to the United States. But as mentioned in Chapter 4, multipolariza-
tion for China was more an ideal and a hope than a strategy in foreign policy.
Thus, regarding the United States’ frequent use of force abroad, China had
usually just expressed some disagreement and not made any efforts to bal-
ance the United States. Verbal objections after all meant only very limited
threat. While it was China’s wish that the United States guard against a self-
fulfilling prophecy in any talk about a China threat, Chinese scholars should
also guard against a self-fulfilling prophecy in their criticism of the United
States’ hegemonism. Traditionally the United States has been a live-and-let-
live country.
From the perspective of relative threat, therefore, it is understandable for
Chinese scholars to argue that China not only was not a threat to the United
States, but also suffered from a serious deficit,42 and the United States was
not only not threatened by China but also enjoyed a substantial surplus. Some
Chinese therefore were likely to concur with Christopher Layne that “a hege-
mon is a threat to the security of others simply because it is so powerful.”43
If the United States actually enjoyed substantial surplus threat, why did
some Americans persistently advocate the China threat thesis? Besides fac-
tors such as parochial self-interest, the concepts of absolute threat and rela-
tive tolerance of threat might explain part of the story. If two countries have
conflicting interests, one presents more or less an absolute threat to the other.
Table 8.1 demonstrates that the United States and China did have some con-
flicting interests, and it was therefore understandable to say that China did
present more or less an absolute threat to the United States. But as the United
Conclusion 199
Table 8.2 Claims and Accommodation between the United States and China
United States China

1. The Taiwan problem should be 1. China would try hard to solve the Taiwan
resolved peacefully, and the problem through peaceful means. China
United States supported the one- would accept Taiwan’s status quo so long as
China policy. Taiwanese leaders, as in the past, accepted
that Taiwan was a part of China.
2. The United States would maintain 2. China could accept the United States’
military including nuclear nuclear superiority so long as the United
deterrence regarding China. States would not use its nuclear weapons
against China.
3. The United States would maintain 3. China would not try to push the United
strong security ties with countries States out of Asia, and China sometimes even
around China. accepted the positive role of U.S. military
presence in Asia.
4. It would be desirable for China to 4. China accepted the merits of democracy
move toward democracy and show and was gradually moving toward greater
more respect for human rights. democracy, though at a pace more consistent
with China’s local conditions. China’s human
rights situation had been steadily improving
over the last two decades.
5. The United States would 5. China would play win-win games in its
vigorously defend its economic economic relations with the United States.
interests in its relations with China.
6. The United States in recent years 6. Chinese resentment regarding “China
had been more careful in its media bashing” in recent years had been
reports about China. significantly reduced.
7. The United States sometimes had 7. China appreciated the United States’
to practice unilateralism, but more multilateralism and it opposed the United
often multilateralism. States’ unilateralism, but only verbally.
States had only limited claims on China, and China in recent decades had
more or less accommodated the United States’ wishes, the mutual absolute
threat therefore was limited (see Table 8.2).
Table 8.2 indicates that even though the two countries had conflicting
interests, they had been able to work out accommodations largely acceptable
to both. Although China made a lot of accommodations to the United States,
China often did so more or less voluntarily, because, after all, the Chinese
often accepted the universal values embodied in some of the United States’
claims, such as peace, democracy, human rights, mutual benefits, etc. Conse-
quently, even in terms of absolute threat, China’s threat to the United States
was limited. Besides, as discussed in Chapters 4, 6, and 7, China’s percep-
tions of threat had been greatly counterpoised by perception of opportunity,
200 Chapter 8
Table 8.3 Relative Tolerance of Threat
China United States

Much weaker than the U.S. United States Much stronger than China in almost every
in almost every aspect of national power aspect of national power
A long history of national humiliation A long history of triumph in most wars
with other countries, large or small
Economically and technologically much Economically and technologically much
more dependent on the United States than less dependent on China than China was
the United States was on China on the United States
Lower international prestige than the Higher international prestige than China
United States
A long history of involvement in China’s No history of involvement in the United
internal affairs States internal affairs
Generally reactive posture in its foreign Generally proactive posture in its foreign
policy policy
Identity as a regional power concerned Identity as a global power concerned with
mainly with changes in the regional changes in the global distribution of power
distribution of power
and China’s model and partner images of the United States further enhanced
the image of the United States more as an opportunity than as a threat.
To gauge the extent of the China threat to the United States, it may also
be helpful to bring in the concept of relative tolerance. Table 8.3 lists factors
which contributed to the differences between the two countries in relative
tolerance of threat.
Table 8.3 indicates that China might have a greater tolerance of foreign
threat than the United States. Thus, when India and Pakistan as China’s
neighbors turned nuclear, China did not perceive much threat and was ready
to accommodate them,44 while the United States perceived much threat from a
distant Iraq, which might have the potential in future to develop a small arse-
nal of nuclear weapons without means to deliver them. One Chinese author
argued that China should not overreact to the United States’ overwhelming
number of nuclear warheads targeting China if the United States demon-
strated a sincere intention not to actually use them against China.45 One of the
reasons why Chinese scholars enthusiastically applauded the constructive-
strategic-partnership relationship between the United States and China during
the late 1990s was that such a relationship reduced China’s threat perception
from the United States and therefore reduced China’s resentment, which in
turn would also reduce the supposed China threat to the United States. In
exploring the extent of the U.S.-China mutual threat. therefore, we should not
Conclusion 201
only look at the relative threat, but also take into consideration the absolute
threat and the different relative tolerance of threat between the two countries.
Ideally, the United States should pay more attention to relative threat, while
China should consider more the United States’ less tolerance of threat. One
laudable example was China’s low-key handling of Chen Shui-bian’s pro-
vocative speech about Taiwan independence in August 2002 and the United
States’ pressure on Taiwan.46 Chinese authors should be careful that their
criticism of the United States’ intervention in China’s internal affairs might
well be construed by some Americans, because of their lesser tolerance, as
evidence of threat.47 Americans, on the other hand, should perhaps perceive
Chinese criticism in their media more as resentment because of unrequited
love than as genuine anti-U.S. sentiment. By looking at the mutual threat
more from the other’s perspective, the United States and China could improve
efforts to promote mutual benefits and avoid playing a lose-lose game.
HOW CAN WE CHARACTERIZE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS?
Throughout this project, I have been concerned mainly with presenting the
Chinese perception of the United States. A relevant question is how U.S.-
China relations should be defined. I will first summarize what China was and
would become, and what it wanted, and then I will address this question.
What was China? China was country full of contradictions. It was a very
large country, but a very underdeveloped one. It had a huge population, over
20 times that of a medium country like the United Kingdom, but the overall
size of its economy was smaller even than that of the United Kingdom. Its
economy was developing steadily but scholars were seriously suspicious of
the statistics behind its growth. It was supposedly a rising power, but it was
also regarded as being on the verge of collapse.48 It was considered one of the
major powers in the world, but it was still not able to achieve national unifica-
tion, not even a symbolic one. It had the largest military in the world, but its
military expenditure was less than one-fifth that of the United States. It was
sometimes called the most conflict-prone power in the world, but since the
founding of the PRC over 50 years ago, it had been rarely involved in inter-
national military conflicts, and for several decades it had never fought a war
beyond its own borders. It was afraid of being encircled, but it was sometimes
singled out as a threat. It was not a democracy, but its scholars, even in official
journals, had generally accepted democracy as an ideal form of governance.
It did not yet have a full-fledged market economy system, but it was moving
vigorously in that direction. As demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, though
its political reform lagged far behind its economic reform, democracy in the
202 Chapter 8
1990s had already been accepted not only by the general populace, but also
in China’s authoritative publications, and elections had begun to be practiced
at the grassroots level. The research of this project indicates that the strategy
of “peaceful evolution” initiated by American leaders in the 1950s and vigor-
ously promoted by the Bush and Clinton administrations in the 1990s had
already begun to bear fruit in the Chinese land.
What did China want? Because of the very low per capita GNP, and because
of the embarrassing underdevelopment in its economy, military, and science
and technology, for a very long time to come China would concentrate on
developing its economy and improving the living standard of its people. For
this purpose, it needed a peaceful international environment, especially in the
Asia-Pacific region, and it wished to make friends with every country in the
world—especially developed countries, whose partnership could contribute
significantly to China’s efforts for modernization, and neighboring countries,
whose cooperation could extend China’s economic potential. It did not want
to be a threat to other countries, especially to the United States, but it did not
want to see other countries using force against China either, including the
use of nuclear weapons. Out of the prospect of benefits, admiration, and fear,
China wished to be the United States’ friend, partner, and perhaps even ally;
at the same time, it insisted on being the master of its own house.
Given what China was and would be, and what it wanted, how can U.S.-
China relations be defined? In the following, I will offer my understanding.
1. Neighbors in the global village. In spite of what had happened in the past
and what would happen in future between the two countries, because of the
advances of technology and globalization, they would remain neighbors in
the increasingly smaller global village. Given the size of either country,
one would have to take into consideration the interest and concern of the
other, and it would be highly costly for either country to be viewed as an
implacable adversary by the other. This was even more true for China than
for the United States because of the latter’s superior power.
2. Non-adversaries. As China was committed to improving relations with the
United States, the fact that China was equally committed to remaining the
master of its own house did not constitute an adequate ground for an adver-
sarial relationship. Even though China-U.S. confrontation would be highly
detrimental to China’s national interest, and would go against the Chinese
people’s enthusiastic preference for friendly U.S.-China relations, devel-
opment in that direction would also be quite costly for the United States.
Unlike the case of the U.S.-USSR rivalry, most countries in the world per-
ceived more of an opportunity than a threat in their relations with China. If
the two countries were to become adversaries, the United States not only
Conclusion 203
could not expect assistance from other countries in dealing with China,
but it would have to expend a large amount of resources to bribe every rel-
evant player against conducting normal operations with China. Besides, if
one country’s natural development was justification for another to become
confrontational, such a posture would make many countries in the world
feel threatened. Other secondary and tertiary powers, such as Russia,
Japan, India, Europe, and many others, would feel that they might be the
next on the list of the United States’ targets. To prevent the emergence of
a powerful anti-hegemonic coalition, much more in the way of resources
would be needed. Since China was enthusiastic about improving relations
with the United States and since it did not serve the United States’ interest
to turn China into an adversary, we can conclude that “adversaries,” “com-
petitors,” etc. were not appropriate terms to define China-U.S. relations.
3. Partners. The research of this project demonstrates that the United States
and China had both conflicting interests and common interests. Upon
closer reading of Chapters 3 and 4, one finds that while the common in-
terests between the two countries kept steadily increasing, the conflicts of
interest between the two countries could either be reduced and eliminated,
or they could be inflated and exasperated. Generally speaking, the United
States’ threat to China was massive but potential, especially in its not-
impossible effort to separate Taiwan from China and in its improbable use
of nuclear weapons against China. On the other hand, the United States’
opportunity to China was substantial and concrete, especially in its imple-
mentation of the engagement policy and its economic cooperation with
China. As discussed in Chapter 4 on balancing threat and opportunity, if
the status quo in U.S.-China relations since the second half of the 1990s
would be maintained, the United States in my opinion presented much
more of an opportunity than a threat to China. Consequently, the United
States was a valuable partner to China.
On the other hand, China has been able to provide the United States with
a substantial opportunity to enhance its interests. With the development of
China’s economy, the United States will gain more and more benefits from its
relations with China. Thus we may say that China was also a valuable partner
to the United States, and it will be more and more valuable a partner to the
United States in the days to come.
As China for a long time to come would remain inferior to the United
States in almost every dimension of national power, especially military
power, China would not constitute a threat to the United States. Indeed,
because of the tremendous cost to both countries of a confrontational rela-
tionship and the great benefits to both of a friendly relationship, U.S.-China
204 Chapter 8
relations should be defined in terms of partnership. Jointly, the two countries,

together with others, could help promote peace, stability, and prosperity in
the Asia-Pacific region and in the world. The two countries could both benefit
greatly from economic cooperation and a peaceful international environment.
As discussed earlier, the two countries are at the minimum neighbors in a
shrinking global village, with some inevitable but reconcilable conflicts of
interest, as in any neighborly relationship, and also with a great opportunity
for mutual benefits if the two neighbors can manage to cooperate with rather
than confront each other. It is rational to define the bilateral relationship as
one of partnership.
Notes
1. Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. “American Primacy in Per-

spective,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002.
2. Hunt, Michael. “Themes in Traditional and Modern Chinese Images of
America,” in Michael Hunt et al. (eds.), Mutual Images in U.S.-China Relations,
1988, p. 4.
3. Hunt, p. 12.
4. Tu, Wei-Ming. “Chinese Perceptions of America,” in Michel Oksenberg and
Robert Oxnam (eds.), Dragon and Eagle, p. 96.
5. Liu, Yawei. “Mao Zedong and the United States: A Story of Misperceptions,
1960–1970,” in Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong (eds.), Image, Perception, and the
Making of U.S.-China Relations, pp. 193–194, 216.
6. Liu, p. 199.
7. Wang, Jianwei, and Zhimin Lin. “Chinese Perceptions in the Post–Cold War
Era: Three Images of the United States,” Asian Survey, October 1992.
8. Wang and Lin, pp. 912–915.
9. Saunders, Phillip C. “China’s America Watchers: Changing Attitudes Towards
the United States,” China Quarterly, 2000, pp. 49–50.
10. Ch’en, Jerome. “China’s Image of the West,” in China and the West, 1979 ,
p. 61.
11. Ch’en, p. 70.
12. Ch’en, p. 89.
13. Ch’en, pp. 76–82.
14. Hunt, pp. 4–5; David L. Shambaugh. “Anti-Americanism in China,” in
Thomas Perry Thornton (ed.), Anti-Americanism: Origins and Context, May 1988,
pp. 144, 145, 147, 154.
15. Hunt, pp. 10–15.
16. Shambaugh, David L. “Conflicting Chinese Images of America During the
People’s Republic of China,” in Michael Hunt et al. (eds.), Mutual Images in U.S.-
China Relations, June 1988, pp. 21, 22.
Conclusion 205
17. Hongshan, Li. “The Unofficial Envoys: Chinese Students in the United States,
1906–1938,” in Hongshan Li et al. (eds.), Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-
China Relations, 1998.
18. Hunt, pp. 14–15.
19. Iriye, Akira. Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American–East Asia Rela-
tions, 1967, pp. 300–305.
20. Tu, p. 104.
21. Shambaugh, June 1988, pp. 21–22.
22. Shambaugh, May 1988, pp. 144, 145, 147, 154.
23. Shambaugh, David L. Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America,
1972–1990, 1991, pp. 226–276.
24. Liu, Yawei, 1998.
25. Xu, Guangqiu. “Anti-American Nationalism in China since 1989,” in Hong-
shan Li et al. (eds.), Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations,
1998, pp. 233–251; Ming Zhang, “Public Images of the United States,” in Yong Deng
et al. (eds.), In the Eyes of the Dragon, 1999, pp. 141–156.
26. Ren, Yue. “China’s Perceived Image of the United States: Its Sources and
Impact,” in Peter H. Koehn et al. (eds.), The Outlook for U.S.-China Relations Follow-
ing the 1997–1998 Summits: Chinese and American Perspectives on Security, Trade,
and Cultural Exchange, 1999, pp. 251–252.
27. Tu, pp. 104–106.
28. Ch’en, pp. 77, 80–81.
29. Shambaugh, May 1988, 1991.
30. Pillsbury, Michael. China Debates the Future Security Environment, 2000,
esp. pp. 63–105.
31. This difference may partly be attributed to the fact that Pillsbury focused
mainly on security while I more often focus on economy.
32. This argument is based mainly on this author’s reading of Chinese articles in
the 1980s, which have not been included in the sample for this project.
33. Snow, Donald M., and Eugene Brown. The Contours of Power. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1996, pp. 58–59.
34. Kagan, Robert. “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, 2002, www.policy
review.org/Jun02/kagan_print.html.
35. Shlapentokh, Vladimir. “Russian Attitudes toward America: A Split between
the Ruling Class and the Masses,” World Affairs, Summer 2001, p. 17.
36. Joyce, Colin. “Japan Politician Threatens China with Nuke Talk,” Washington
Times, April 10, 2002.
37. Rozman, Gilbert. “Japan’s Quest for Great Power Identity,” Orbis, Winter
2002, pp. 88, 90.
38. Menges, Constantine C. “Blocking a New Axis of Evil,” Washington Times,
August 7, 2002.
39. Ricks, Thomas E. “Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies,” Washington Post,
August 6, 2002.
206 Chapter 8
40. Thomas, Cal. “Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe?” Washington Times, August 11,
2002.
41. Becker, Elizabeth. “United States Warns that Backers of Tribunal May Lose
Aid,” New York Times, August 12, 2002.
42. For instance, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji in his visit to the United States in
1999 implicitly expressed such an idea.
43. Layne, Christopher. “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” Washington Quarterly,
Spring 2002, p. 243.
44. Yuan, Jing-dong. “India’s Rise after Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assess-
ments,” Asian Survey, November/December 2001.
45. Jiru, Shen. “Er Lun 21 Shiji Zhong Mei Guanxi” [Second Analysis of
China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century], Shijie Jingji yu zhengzhi (July 1998),
pp. 59–60.
46. Pomfret, John. “China and Taiwan Back away from New Confrontation: Bei-
jing Plays Down Provocative Speech,” Washington Post, August 10, 2002.
47. Gries, Peter Hays. “Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Bel-
grade Embassy Bombing,” China Journal, July 2001.
48. Chang, Gordon G. The Coming Collapse of China. New York: Random House,
2001; Joe Studwell. The China Dream: The Quest for the Last Great Untapped Mar-
ket on Earth. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2002; Peter F. Drucker. Managing
in the Next Society. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002.
Appendix I
The Sample of Chinese

Articles for Chapters 3 and 41
GUOJI WENTI YANJIU (7)
Pan, Tongwen, “The MFN and China-U.S. Relations,” Winter 1994, pp. 1–7.
Wang, Jisi, “Containment or Engagement—on the U.S.’s China Policy in the Post
Cold War Era,” Spring 1996, pp. 1–6.
Wang, Haihan, “On Clinton Administration’s China Policy and its Prospect,” Spring
1997, pp. 3–9.
Song, Yimin, “China-Russia, U.S.-Russia, and China-U.S. Relations and Their Inter-
actions,” Autumn 1997, pp. 12–18.
Wang, Haihan, “Several Thoughts on Current China-U.S. Relations and the Prospect,”
Winter 1998, pp. 7–11.
Guo, Zhengyuan, “The U.S.’s Adjustment of its Taiwan Policy,” January/February
2000, pp. 25–28, 44.
Zhang, Ruizhuang, “On the U.S.’s Neo-Conservative Foreign Policy Thought and its
Impact on the U.S.’s China Policy,” March/April 2000, pp. 44–51.
MEIGUO YANJIU (28)
Zhang, Hanlin and Chunlin Cai, “On the U.S. China Policy of Export Control and its
Prospect,” Summer 1991, pp. 21–36.
Wang, Jisi, “The ‘Strategic Triangle’ in U.S. Policy toward China,” Summer 1992,
pp. 7–35.
Zhu, Shida, “Thoughts on Sino-American Cultural Impact-Response Model,” Sum-
mer 1993, pp. 76–93.
1
I did the translation in the four appendices except the titles of articles in Meiguo Yanjiu, which
were done by the journal.
207
208 Appendix I
Chen, Baosen, “The Correct Way for Developing Sino-U.S. Economic Ties,” Spring
1994, pp. 7–23.
Wei, Wei, “Analyzing Gains of Both Parties in Sino-U.S. Trade,” Spring 1994,
pp. 131–134.
Zhu, Shida, “The Pattern of American Culture: Enlightenment for Chinese Culture,”
Autumn 1994, pp. 90–107.
Jia, Qingguo, “Re-Conceptualizing Sino-American Relations,” Spring 1995,
pp. 29–49.
Zi, Zongyun and Hong Ji, “Studies of Sino-U.S. Relations in America,” Spring 1995,
pp. 50–78.
Yuan, Ming and Shimin Fan, “China’s Security Role in Post-Cold War American
Perceptions,” Winter 1995, pp. 7–29.
Zhou, Qi, “An Appraisal of Post-Cold War Sino-U.S. Relations—Common Interests
and Disputes,” Winter 1995, pp. 30–50.
Wei, Wei, “A Comparison of Major U.S. and Chinese Economic Indicators,” Winter
1995, pp. 69–82.
Niu, Jun, “Troubled Times—Present and Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship,” Win-
ter 1995, pp. 131–134.
Liang, Gencheng, “Engagement Plus Containment,” Summer 1996, pp. 7–20.
Zhang, Yebai, “Perceptions of the U.S.-China-Japan Relations,” Autumn 1996, pp.
116–122.
Zi, Zhongyun, “Building the Bridge of Understanding—Comments on the Results of
the Studies of Sino-U.S. Relations History in the Last Fifteen Years of Reform and
Opening,” Autumn 1996, pp. 133–141.
Yang, Jiemian, “The American Presidential Election and Readjustment of Clinton’s
China Policy,” Winter 1996, pp. 128–133.
Zhang, Qingmin, “A Comparative Study of the U.S.’s Arms Sales and Technology
Transfer Policy toward Mainland China and Taiwan,” Spring 1997, pp. 34–61.
Li, Shenzhi, “The Sino-U.S. Relationship in Retrospect and Prospect,” Summer 1997,
pp. 125–131.
Wang, Jisi, “China-U.S. Relations at the Turn of the Century,” Summer 1997, pp.
134–137.
Tao, Wenzhao, and Jun Niu, “Drawing on Experience in Sino-U.S. Reconciliation,”
Summer 1997, pp. 137–141.
Li, Mingde, “Sino-U.S. Scientific and Technological Exchanges and Cooperation in
Retrospect,” Summer 1997, pp. 144–147.
Huang, Renwei, “The Shanghai Communiqué and Developing Sino-U.S. Trade and
Economic Relations,” Summer 1997, pp. 147–150.
Bao, Jiaquan, “An Introduction to a New Bridge of Mutual Understanding: Review of
the History of U.S.-China Relations and Forecasts,” Winter 1997, pp. 144–147.
Niu, Jun, “The Evolution and Characteristics of the Clinton Administration’s China
Policy in its First Term,” Spring 1998, pp. 7–28.
Yuan, Ming, “Post Cold War U.S. China Policy: American ‘Strategic Elites’ and Sino-
U.S. Relations,” Summer 1998, pp. 48–59.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapters 3 and 4 209
Wang, Yong, “The Influence of Interest Groups on U.S. China Policy: A Case Study
of the MFN Issue,” Summer 1998, pp. 60–91.
Jia, Qingguo, “The Sino-U.S. Relationship since President Clinton Took Office,”
Summer 1998, pp. 92–112.
Zhang, Qingmin, “The Bush Administration’s Decision to Sell F-16 Fighters to
Taiwan: A Case Study of the Decisive Factors in American China Policy,” Winter
2000, pp. 97–122.
SHIJIE JINGJI YU ZHENGZHI (70)
Fang, Xiaoguang, “China MFN and the U.S.’s China Policy,” August 1991, pp. 10–13.
Zhou, Shijian, “1992 China-U.S. MFN: Observations and Suggestions,” February
1992, pp. 47–49.
Liu, Liandi, “China-U.S. Relations and the U.S.’s China Policy Trend in the Election
Year,” September 1992, pp. 51–54.
Chen, Jiyong, “The Characteristics and Problems in the U.S.’s Direct Investments in
China and our Response,” November 1992, pp. 16–23, 61.
Li, Changjiu, “The Current Status and Prospect of China-U.S. Economic and Trade
Relations,” November 1992, pp. 55–57.
Deng, Ruilin, “The Main Problems in China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations, and
our Response,” November 1992, pp. 58–61.
Dong, Fuquan, “The Current Status, Problems, and Prospect in China-U.S. Economic
Fang, Zhou, “The U.S.’s China Policy and its Future Trend,” January 1993,
pp. 35–39, 54.
Qian, Wenrong, “China-U.S. Relations after Clinton’s Inauguration,” February 1993,
pp. 60–63.
Zhang, Yebai, “China-U.S. Relations and our Strategy in Response,” June 1993,
pp. 38–40.
Liu, Liandi, “Perceiving Clinton Administration’s Strategic Considerations and Policy
Trend from MFN,” September 1993, pp. 46–48.
Zhang, Minqian, “The U.S.’s Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and China-U.S. Relations,”
October 1993, pp. 57–61.
Ma, Chunshun, “Analysis of Factors Affecting the China-U.S. Relations,” October
1993, pp. 62–63, 68.
Wang, Chimin, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S. Factor in our Country’s Surrounding
Environment,” January 1994, pp. 56–61.
Guo, Shixian, “U.S. Dollar in the Next Five Years and Our Response,” April 1994,
pp. 17–23.
Liu, Liandi, “New Trends in the U.S.’s China Policy after China-U.S. Summit,” May
1994, pp. 56–58.
Chen, Yaoting and Linan Zhu, “The Trade Relations between China and the U.S.,
Japan,” August 1994, pp. 9–12.
210 Appendix I
Zhou, Bolin, “China’s Principle and Strategy toward the U.S.,” September 1994,
pp. 7–12.
Wang, Shuzhong, “China-U.S. Relations toward the Next Century,” December 1994,
pp. 3–7.
Sun, Hongchang, “On Obstacles in China-U.S. Trade,” February 1995, pp. 46–50.
Liu, Liandi, “The Trend in Clinton Administrations’ Taiwan Policy and China-U.S.
Relations,” March 1995, pp. 63–66, 58.
Tao, Jian, “The U.S. Increases Economic Considerations in its Strategy toward
China,” March 1995, pp. 67–70.
Zhou, Shijian, “A Review of the U.S.’s Sanction against China,” March 1995,
pp. 70–74, 32.
Qin, Liufang and Shixian Guo, “U.S. Dollar Crisis and our Strategies,” June 1995,
pp. 14–20.
Xu, Song, “A Tentative Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights Talks between China
and the U.S. and the Impact,” September 1995, pp. 27–31.
Chu, Shulong, “New Developments in the U.S.’s Security Strategy and the China Fac-
tor,” November 1995, pp. 58–61.
Xiao, Chen, “ ‘IRA’ in the U.S. and China’s Social Security,” February 1996, pp. 41–42.
Yang, Yunzhong, “The Evolution and Features of Clinton Administrations’ China
Policy,” April 1996, pp. 62–65.
Zhao, Yongqing, “One Noticeable Trend in Current World Economy—the Politiciza-
tion of World Economy in Economic and Trade Relations between the U.S. and
China, Japan,” July 1996, pp. 25–27.
Ye, Xiangsong, “The Management System of the U.S.’s State-Owned Enterprises and
the Revelations for the Reform of the Management System in our State-Owned
Enterprises,” July 1996, pp. 64–67.
Qin, Fengmin, “Another Wave of China Craze in the U.S. Business Circles,” August
1996, pp. 37–39.
Yu, Zhida, “China-U.S. Disputes over Animal and Plant Inspection in Agricultural
Trade,” September 1996, pp. 26–29.
Zhang, Ruhai, “A Tentative Analysis of China’s Status in the U.S.’s Foreign Strategy
after the Cold War,” October 1996, pp. 20–23, 68.
Lin, Jue, “The Disputes between the Two Major Political Parties in the U.S. and Their
Impact on Foreign Trade Policy, and our Response,” February 1997, pp. 21–25.
Zhang, Xuesong, “The Revelations of the U.S.’s ‘New Enterprise Culture’ to the De-
velopment of our Enterprises,” March 1997, pp. 46–47.
Liu, Liandi, “U.S. Ambassador to China Sasser Plays a Special Role in China-U.S.
Relations,” March 1997, pp. 78–80.
Xia, Liping and Jia Xu, “U.S. Policy toward Hong Kong’s Return to China and its
Impact on China-U.S. Relations,” April 1997, pp. 32–34.
Li, Jiang, “Domestic Politics in the U.S. and Debates Regarding the U.S.’s China
Policy,” June 1997, pp. 24–26.
Li, Changjiu, “China-U.S.-Japan Relations in Adjustment,” June 1997, pp. 39–43.
Lin, Hongyu, “Public Opinion in the U.S. and its China Policy,” August 1997,
pp. 67–70.
Ke, Juhan, “On China-U.S. ‘Constructive Strategic Partnership’,” December 1997,

pp. 50–53.
Yu, Guobin, “The U.S.’s Debates Regarding China MFN and its Prospect,” January
1998, pp. 67–71.
Liu, Shitian and Shifa Xia, “Zhou Enlai and China-U.S. Relationship,” April 1998,
pp. 53–57.
Wang, Yanjun, “The Trend in China-U.S. Relationship from the Perspectives of Era,
Interest, and Policy,” April 1998, pp. 58–60.
Wei, Xiaofeng, “A Tentative Analysis of the Basic Trend of the U.S.’s China Policy in
the 21st Century and China’s Response,” May 1998, pp. 58–61.
Sheng, Jiru, “A Brief Analysis of Brzezinski’s New Book the Grand Chessboard—A
First Analysis of China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century,” June 1998, pp. 37–41.
Sheng, Jiru, “The Two Functions of the State and President Clinton’s Contradictory
Nuclear Strategy—A Second Analysis of China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Cen-
tury,” July 1998, pp. 56–60.
Jin, Canrong, “The New Relationship Looking Forward to the New Century—On
China-U.S. Relationship After Clinton’s China Visit,” August 1998, pp. 15–19.
Su, Ge, “China-U.S. Mutual Top Level Visits and “Constructive Strategic Partner-
ship,” August 1998, pp.20–23.
Sheng, Jiru, “China-U.S. Constructive Strategic Partnership Will Benefit the Two
Peoples in China and the U.S.,” August 1998, pp. 24–27, 71.
Li, Bing, “Perceiving Speeding up the Development of our High Technology Industry
from the U.S.’s ‘New Economy’,” August 1998, pp. 41–45.
Wang, Zhihong, “Interest Groups in the U.S. and China-U.S. Economic Relations,”
September 1998, pp. 70–73.
Li, Changjiu, “Unequal Triangular Relations among China, the U.S., and Japan,”
October 1998, pp. 46–48, 67.
Tang, Yongsheng, “Trend in the Triangular Relations among China, the U.S., and Russia,”
October 1998, pp. 49–52, 71.
Zhang, Zongbin, “Revelations of the U.S.’s Annexation of Enterprises for China’s
Enterprise Expansion,” November 1998, pp. 52–54, 70.
Liu, Yongtao, “Norm, Identity, and the Prospect of China-U.S. Security Cooperation,”
January 1999, pp. 33–36, 45.
Wu, Xinbo, “Seeking Balanced Development of China-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Rela-
tions,” February 1999, pp. 20–23.
Zhang, Linhong and Yugui Han, “The U.S.’s Asian-Pacific Security Strategy and the
U.S.’s Policies toward Japan and China,” March 1999, pp. 8–12.
Tang, Yongsheng and Zhuhua Chen, “The Evolution of Triangular Relationship
among the U.S., Europe, and Russia, and China’s Role,” May 1999, pp. 5–9, 20.
Zhu, Feng, “TMD and the Current China-U.S. Relationship,” May 1999, pp. 10–16.
Chen, Zhuhua, “Cultural Factors in the Triangular Relationship among China, the
U.S., and Japan,” May 1999, pp. 52–57.
Dai, Bing, “The U.S.’s Technology Transfer to Taiwan,” September 1999, pp. 73–77.
Chen, Demin, “The Upheaval in the 1990s’ China-U.S. Relations and its Causes,”
October 1999, pp. 33–37.
212 Appendix I
Shi, Yinhong, “ ‘The Triangular Relationship’ among China, the U.S. and Japan,”
January 2000, pp. 49–51.
Chen, Xiangyang, “The Post Cold War China-U.S. Relationship from the Perspective
of International Institutions,” January 2000, pp. 52–55.
Han, Weidong and Yaodong Han, “The U.S.’s Hegemonic Strategy in the New Cen-
tury and China’s National Security,” February 2000, pp. 53–57.
Zhu, Feng, “Human Rights Problem and China-U.S. Relations: Changes and Chal-
lenges,” July 2000, pp. 19–24.
Ding, Shichuan and Hongzhou Wei, “Comments and Analyses of the U.S.’s Strategy and
Tactics in its Post Cold War Intervention of Taiwan Problem,” July 2000, pp. 38–42.
Chu, Shulong, “The Opinions, Positions, and Advocacies by China and the U.S. Re-
garding International Strategy,” July 2000, pp. 48–52.
Sun, Jianhang, “Strategy, Interest, and Structure—The Evolution of World Structure and
the U.S.’s Adjustment of its China Policy in the 1990s,” August 2000, pp. 25–29.
WAIJIAO XUEYUAN XUEBAO (14)
Yang, Zhicai, “Random Talks on Chinese and American Culture,” Summer 1991,
pp. 20–25.
Xiong, Zhiyong, “The Evolution and Prospect of the Foundation of the U.S.’s China
Policy,” Autumn 1992, pp. 49–54.
Zhang, Qingmin, “The Problem of the U.S.’s Arms Sale to Taiwan in China-U.S.
Relations,” Winter 1994, pp. 84–92.
Xiong, Zhiyong, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s Consistent Taiwan Policy,” Winter 1995,
pp. 46–49.
Su, Ge, “On the China-U.S. Relations,” Summer 1996, pp. 16–26.
Zhao, Pingan, Xuebao Li, and Yuan Guo, “The Adjustment of the U.S.’s China Policy
and Future Trend of China-U.S. Relations,” Autumn 1996, pp. 14–18.
Li, Shouyuan, “ ‘Cold War Thinking’ and the U.S.’s Post Cold War China Policy,”
Autumn 1996, pp. 19–23, 48.
Lu, Naideng, “A Tentative Analysis of the New Changes in China-U.S.-Russia Rela-
tions,” Winter 1996, pp. 24–29.
Liu, Jiangyong, “The Re-establishment of U.S.-Japan Security System and the China-
U.S.-Japan Relations,” Winter 1996, pp. 30–35.
Zhang, Yiting, “Clinton’s ‘Engagement of China’ Policy and its Shaky Foundation,”
Spring 1997, pp. 35–38, 30.
Su, Hao, “China Factor in the U.S.-Japan Relations,” Spring 1997, pp. 44–50.
Zhou, Lin, “The Prospect of the China-U.S. Trade Relations,” Spring 1997,
pp. 51–54.
Zhuang, Qubing, “Recommending a Good Book—Reading The U.S.’s China Policy
and the Taiwan Problem,” Spring 1999, pp. 44–47.
Yang, Jiemian, “The Role of American Academia in the U.S.’s China Policy Decision
Making in the Post Cold War Era,” Winter 1998, pp. 51–55, 96.
XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXI (44)
Ke, Juhan, “The Characteristics and Prospect of China-U.S. Economic and Trade
Liu, Wei and Wenyan Gu, “The Main Problems Facing the China-U.S. Economic and
Trade Relations and Our Suggestions,” June 1995, pp. 8–12.
Li, Zhongcheng, “The Current Status and Future Trends of China’s Relations with the
U.S., Japan, Russia, and Southeast Asian Nations,” July 1995, pp. 24–28.
Lu, Qichang, “Several Observations on the U.S.’s China Policy,” September 1995,
pp. 2–5.
Xi, Laiwang, “A Review of China-U.S. Relations in 1995 and the Future Prospect,”
December 1995, pp. 6–9, 15.
Gu, Wenyan, “Economic Situations in the U.S. and the Trends of China-U.S. Eco-
nomic and Trade Relations,” April 1996, pp. 25–29.
Yu, Xiaohui, “The Adjustment and Evolutions of the U.S.’s Taiwan Policy after World
War II, June 1996, pp. 33–36.
Zhang, Linjun and Qichang Lu, “The Negative Influence of U.S. Congress on China-
U.S. Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” October 1996, pp. 14–18.
Chu, Shulong, “China-U.S. Relations Face Strategic Choices,” November 1996, pp.
2–7.
Wu, Jiong, “On the U.S.’s ‘Comprehensive Containment of China’,” November 1996,
pp. 8–11, 7.
Zhang, Zhongyi, “Several Major Forces Affecting the U.S.’s China Policy,” January
1997, pp. 13–16.
Gao, Huandong, “Distribution of Power between the Two Parties in the New U.S.
Congress and Their Attitude Toward China,” May 1997, pp. 17–19.
Nai, Zuji, “The Second Clinton Administration’s Adjustment in its China Policy,”
August 1997, pp. 12–14.
Chu, Shulong, “The Strategic Framework of China-U.S. Relations Facing the New
Century,” October 1997, pp. 2–8.
Xi, Laiwang, “Establishing China-U.S. Strategic Partnership Facing the 21st Cen-
tury,” November 1997, pp. 2–6.
Lu, Zhongwei, “China-U.S., China-Japan Summits and China-U.S.-Japan Relations,”
December 1997, pp. 9–14.
Shi, Ren, “The Foreign Strategy of the U.S., Europe, and Japan around the Turn of the
Century and the Trend of Their China Policy,” March 1998, pp. 2–5.
Ma, Jiali, “China’s Relations with the U.S., Russia, and Japan and the Impact on
South Asia,” April 1998, pp. 20–24.
Xi, Laiwang, “Actively Promoting China-U.S. Constructive Strategic Partnership,”
May 1998, pp. 2–7.
Chu, Shulong, “China-U.S. Cooperation and Differences,” June 1998, pp. 2–6.
Liu, Jiangyong, “Clinton’s China Visit and New Trends in China-U.S.-Japan Rela-
tions,” July 1998, pp. 2–7.
Xiong, Zhiyong, “U.S. Media and the U.S.’s China Policy,” July 1998, pp. 39–42.
214 Appendix I
Zheng, Baoguo, “The U.S.’s China Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” October 1998,
pp. 29–33.
Zheng, Ziyi, “Political Factors in China-U.S. Economic and Trade Conflicts,” No-
vember 1998, pp. 22–25.
Ding, Kuisong and Xinchun Niu, “The China-U.S. Relations in Exploring Coopera-
tion,” January/February 1999, pp. 79–83.
Gu, Wenyan, “Economic Situations in the U.S. and the Impact on China-U.S. Eco-
Zhao, Jingfang, “An Analysis of the Objectives of the U.S.’s ‘Engagement’ Policy
toward China,” June 1999, pp. 11–15.
Ding, Kuisong, “Reviewing the Past and Looking forward toward the Future,” Octo-
ber 1999, pp. 1–6.
Yan, Julu, “The U.S.’s Central Asian Strategy and its Impact on China’s Security
Environment,” December 1999, pp. 22–24.
Chen, Xiangyang, “Domestic Politics in the U.S. and its Impact on Post Cold War
China-U.S. Relations,” December 1999, pp. 29–31.
Cao, Fumiao, “Perceiving Today’s Taiwan Problem from U.S.-British Relationship
during the U.S.’s Civil War,” December 1999, pp. 31–33.
Fu, Mengzi, “China-U.S. Relations Looking Forward to the New Century: Seeking
Win-Win in Competition and Cooperation,” January/February 2000, pp. 91–95.
Lu, Qichang, Yanyu Zhang, and Wenfeng Wang, “The Features and Backgrounds of the
U.S.’s Renewed Efforts in Anti-China Human Rights Bill,” March 2000, pp. 8–10.
Lu, Qichang and Yanyu Zhang, “ ‘Taiwan Security Enhancement Act’ is a Dangerous
Political Move,” March 2000, pp. 17–21.
Chu, Shulong, “The Post-Cold War China-U.S. Bilateral and Regional Strategy and
Security Relations,” May 2000, pp. 7–14.
Lu, Qichang and Yanyu Zhang, “A Comment on and Analysis of U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives’ Passage of China PNTR,” June 2000, pp. 40–44.
Lu, Qichang, “U.S. Presidential Election and U.S.-China Relations,” July 2000, pp. 9–13.
Jiang, Xinfu, “China Entering the WTO and the China-U.S. Relations,” August 2000,
pp. 11–14.
Yuan, Peng, “A Tentative Comment on the Nature of Current China-U.S. Relations,”
(xian, September 2000, pp. 1–5.
Jiang, Yuguo, “Impact of China’s Entry into the WTO on the China-U.S. Relation-
ship,” September 2000, pp. 6–10.
Tang, Hao, “The U.S.’s Internal Group Politics and China-U.S. Relations,” September
2000, pp. 11–14.
Xi, Laiwang, “Perceiving the U.S.’s China Policy from the PNTR,” October 2000,
pp. 1–5.
Xia, Liping, “The U.S.’s Global Strategy and China-U.S. Relations in the New Cen-
tury,” October 2000, pp. 22–25.
Lu, Qichang, “China-U.S.-Russia Relations around the Turn of the Century,” Decem-
ber 2000, pp. 4–7, Lu Qichang.
ZHANLUE YU GUANLI (19)
Wang, Jisi and Wenli Zhu, “ ‘Greater China’ in American Eyes,” March/April 1994,
pp. 65–69.
Gao, E, “The Current Status and Problems in the China-U.S.-Japan Relations,” No-
vember/December 1994, pp. 73–76.
Wang, Yizhou, “American Elite’s Opinions on Several Important Issues in China-U.S.
Relations,” January/February 1995, pp. 47–52.
Jiang Lingfei, “The Constraining Factors in the U.S.’s Containing China Strategy and
Possible Future Trends,” September/October 1996, pp. 46–50.
Shi, Yinhong, “West vs. non-West: The Fundamental Root of the U.S.’s Current At-
titude toward China,” May/June 1996, pp. 8–9.
Wang, Yong, “The U.S.’s Strategic Options in Asia-Pacific Region and Relations
among China, the U.S., Japan, and Australia,” November/December 1996, pp.
14–20.
Shi, Yinhong, “The Basic Domestic Backgrounds of the U.S.’s China Policy,” Nove-
meber/ December 1996, pp. 33–36.
Tang, Yongsheng, “Relations among China, the U.S., and Japan, and China’s Op-
tions,” January/February 1997, pp. 32–35.
Wang, Jian, “U.S.-Japanese Models of Regional Economy, and their Revelations to
China’s Cosmopolitan Areas,” March/April 1997, pp. 1–15.
Xu, Baoyou, “American Economist on the Development of China’s Regional Econ-
omy and Relevant Strategies,” March/April 1997, pp. 18–19.
Zhang, Linhong, “China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century: Confrontation or Coop-
eration?” May/June 1997, pp. 21–28.
Mei, Junjie, “China-U.S. Economy and Trade Relations and China’s Economy,” May/
June 1997, pp. 29–34.
Liu, Ji, “Options for the China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century,” November/De-
cember 1997, pp. 29–35.
Yang, Ping and Richard Bernstein, “Is China-U.S. Conflict Coming?” November/
Liu, Jingsong, “The Evolution, Problems, and Prospect of China-U.S. Military Rela-
tions,” September/October 1997, pp. 105–113.
Wu, Xianbin, “On the U.S.’s Policy toward Hong Kong,” September/October 1997,
pp. 114–118.
Wang, Yi, Jiqiong Zhang, Changhua Wu, and Kebing He, “Global Energy and En-
vironment Cooperation: A Strategic Card in China-U.S. Relations,” November/
Nolan, Peter and Xiaoqiang Wang, “The Reorganization of the U.S.’s Military In-
dustry and its Revelations to China’s Industrial Integration,” November/December
1997, pp. 60–67.
Zhai, Xiaomin, “A Reflection on the China-U.S. Strategic Relations,” January/Febru-
ary 2000, pp. 33–36.
Appendix II

Articles for Chapter 5
Xie, Yao, “The Characteristics of the Economic Recession in the U.S. and the Pros-
pect,” Summer 1991, pp. 1–8.
Pan, Tongwen, “A Preliminary Exploration of Bush’s New World Order,” Winter
1991, pp. 15–19, 26.
Liu, Huaqiu, “Analysis of the U.S.-USSR Nuclear Reduction in 1991,” Spring 1992,
pp. 9–15.
Wu, Tianbo, “The Distribution of Economic Power among the U.S., Europe, and
Japan and the Trend of Change,” Winter 1992, pp. 13–18.
Wang, Haihan, “The U.S.’s Global Strategy Faces Serious Challenge,” Winter 1992,
pp. 19–24.
Liu, Huaqiu and Zhongmin Qin, “On U.S.-Russia’s START II,” Summer 1993,
pp. 1–6.
Xie, Yao, “A Brief Analysis of the U.S. Economic Recovery at the Present Time and
its Future Trend,” Autumn 1993, pp. 20–27.
Wei, Min, “The Trend of Change in the Distribution of Economic Power among the
U.S., Europe and Japan,” Spring 1995, pp. 33–37.
Huang, Suan, “The Devaluation of U.S. Dollar and the Relative Decline of American
Economic Power,” Autumn 1995, pp. 37–40.
Ruan, Zongze, “The U.S. Forging Ahead with TMD and its Impact,” Autumn 1996,
pp. 38–42.
Song, Yimin, “The U.S. Pulls Ahead Temporarily but the Trend for Further Multipo-
larization has not Changed,” Spring 1998, pp. 7–10, 6.
Chen, Dezhao, “The Changes in the U.S. Economy in the 1990s and its Prospect,”
Spring 1998, pp. 21–26.
Zeng, Bingxi, “The U.S.’s ‘New Economy’ and its Impact on World Economy,” Au-
tumn 1998, pp. 42–46.
217
218 Appendix II
Song, Yimin, “The New Adjustment in the U.S. Concerning Security Strategy, World
Distribution of Power, and Foreign Policy,” Winter 1998, pp. 1–6, 19.
Zeng, Bingxi, “Current American Economic Expansion and the Impact on its Hege-
monic Status,” Autumn 1999, pp. 41–45, 49.
Yang, Yonghong, “New Development of American hegemonism,” April 1999,
pp. 6–8.
Zhang, Lijun, “The U.S.’s Objectives in its Central Asia-Outer Caucasus Policy and
the Contradictions it Faces,” May/June 2000, pp. 38–43.
Guo, Xiangang, “The U.S.’s Sanction on Cuba Has Already Become Impotent,” July/
August 2000, pp. 38–40.
Yang, Jiemian, “The U.S.’s Global Strategy in the Cross-Century World Structure,”
November/December 2000, pp. 23–30.
Zhou, Jianming, “A Comparison between Quadrennial Defense Report of 1997 and
that of 2001,” January/February 2002, pp. 26–30.
Ruan, Zongze, “The U.S.’s Recent Reflection of its Foreign Policy and its Impact,”
January/February 2002, pp. 31–36.
Song, Yimin, “The U.S.’s Security Strategy and Foreign Relations Enter a New Ad-
justment Stage,” January/February 2002, pp. 37–42.
Guo, Xiangang, “The Changes in the U.S.’s Foreign Policy in the One Year of Bush
Administration and its Impact,” March/April 2002, pp. 32–36.
Zhou, Yunhua, “The Evolution of the U.S.’s Policy Regarding CTBT,” March/April
2002, pp. 49–53, 48.
Su, Ge, “On China-U.S.-Russia Relations,” May/June 2002, pp. 1–7.
Yin, Chengde, “A Tentative Analysis of China-U.S. Relations and the Prospect,” May/
June 2002, pp. 13–17, 26.
Zeng, Bingxi, “A Preliminary Analysis of the U.S.’s First Economic Recession in the
21st Century,” May/June 2002, pp. 42–48.
Guo, Xiangang, “The U.S.’s War on Terrorism in the New Stage,” July/August 2002,
pp. 11–15.
Xing, Yuchun, “U.S.-Russia Relations and NATO’s Strategic Adjustment,” July/
August 2002, pp. 20–24.
Zeng, Bingxi, “On China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations,” Winter 2002, pp.
38–45.
Yong, Qiang, “The Seminar on ‘Soft Power’: its Status and Impact in U.S. Foreign
Policy was Held in Beijing,” November/December 2002, p. 59.
Xia, Liping, “On New Conceptions of Global Strategy of the Realization of China’s
Peaceful Rise,” November/December 2003, pp. 31–35.
Qian, Qichen, “Readjustment of U.S. National Security Strategy and Interna-
tional Relations at the Beginning of the New Century,” January/February 2004,
pp. 1–3.
Xu, Jian, “Peaceful Rise: China’s Strategic Option,” March/April 2004, pp. 1–8.
Song, Yuhua and Hongya Xu, “Factors Underlying the Speedy Recovery of U.S.
Economy in 2004 and its Prospects,” March/April 2004, pp. 40–44.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapter 5 219
MEIGUO YANJIU (47)
Chen, Baosen, “The Economic Position of the United States in the West during the
Nineties,” Spring 1991, pp. 7–24.
Zheng, Weimin, “Is the U.S. Economy Declining or Reviving?” Summer, 1991,
pp. 7–20.
Zhang, Hanlin and Chunlin Cai, “On the U.S. China Policy of Export Control and its
Prospect,” Summer 1991, pp. 21–36.
Zhang, Yebai, “Isolationism and U.S. Intervention in Asia,” Autumn 1991,
pp. 30–48.
Xu, Xin, “America and the Post-Cold-War Balance of Power in Southeast Asia,”
Autumn 1991, pp. 77–93.
Li, Yalian, “The Impact of U.S.-Mexican Free Trade Agreement on World Economic
Pattern,” Winter 1991, pp. 18–22.
Xiao, Lian, “Dynamics of Changing World Economic Structure: U.S. Role and Influ-
ence,” Spring 1992, pp. 7–28.
Ding, Haojin, “The Future of American Economy,” Spring 1992, pp. 29–41.
Xiao Chen, “The Influence of U.S. Defense Budget Cut on Economy,” Spring 1992,
pp. 59–69.
Li, Changjiu, “The Status of U.S. Foreign Trade and its Prospects,” Spring 1992,
pp. 72–81.
Sun, Haishun, “On the Changing Relative Standing of U.S., Japanese and E.C. Inter-
national Capitals,” Spring 1992, pp. 82–92.
Du, Houwen and Qiang Zhang, “Changing U.S. and German Economic Statuses and
Their Bilateral Economic Relations in the 1990s,” Spring 1992, pp. 110–119.
Huang, Weiping and Wenhui Zhu, “A Discussion of the U.S. International Financial
Standing in the 1990s,” Spring 1992, pp. 120–134.
Xu, Guoqi, “America in Crisis: A Review of the Debate on American Decline,” Spring
1992, pp. 135–158.
Zhou, Maorong, “Impact of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement on the United
States,” Summer 1992, 93–106.
Chen, Baosen, “Comments on Economic Report of the President 1992,” Autumn
1992, pp. 7–25.
Chen, Baosen, “A Blue-Print for Revitalizing U.S. Economy,” Summer 1993,
pp. 29–44.
Peng, Guangqian, “U.S. National Security Strategy and the Drastic Change of Inter-
national Strategic Pattern,” Winter 1993, pp. 7–21.
Jia, Shaofeng and Xiangjing Meng, “Is U.S. Territory too Large to Sustain a Good
Economy?” Winter 1994, pp. 114–125.
Wang, Xiaode, “A Historical Reflection of U.S. ‘Export of Democracy’ to Latin
America,” Summer 1995, pp. 134–138.
Liu, Jinghua, “Seeking Balance between Power and Morality: On Henry Kissinger’s
‘Balance of Power’ Theory in the Post-Cold War Era,” Autumn 1995, pp. 48–66.
220 Appendix II
Qin, Yaqin, “Hegemonic System and Regional Conflict—On the U.S.’s Supportive
Actions in Major Regional Armed Conflicts,” Winter 1995, pp. 51–68.
Wei, Wei, “A Comparison between Major U.S. and Chinese Economic Indicators,”
Winter 1995, pp. 69–82.
Liang, Gencheng, “Engagement Plus Containment,” Summer 1996, pp. 7–20.
Zhang, Yeliang, “U.S. Counterproliferation Strategy,” Winter 1996, pp. 76–93.
Shi, Yinhong, “Intervention in International Politics: A U.S. Case,” Winter 1996,
pp. 111–127.
Wang, Jisi, “Lonely at the Top: A Reassessment of America’s Power Position in the
World,” Autumn 1997, pp. 7–38.
Song, Yuhua and Huajun Lu, “U.S. Trade Deficit and its Foreign Trade Status,” Au-
tumn 1997, pp. 82–103.
Wang, Rongjun, “U.S. Economy in 1997,” Spring 1998, pp. 141–142.
Wu, Zhan, “Current U.S. Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Disarmament,” Summer 1998,
pp. 7–28.
Xiao, Minghan, “Dynamics of the Southern Renaissance,” Summer 1999, pp. 77–97.
Li, Xiaohua, “An Analysis of ‘The Benign Unipolar Peace’,” Autumn 1999,
pp. 119–131.
Ni, Shixiong and Yiwei Wang, “Hegemonic Balance of Power: Post-Cold War U.S.
Strategic Choices,” Spring 2000, pp. 7–23.
Wang, Fan, “Comments on ‘The Stability of A Unipolar World,’ an Article by William
C. Wohlforth,” Spring 2000, pp. 133–146.
Zhang, Liping, “On American’s Role in the World: Comments on From Wealth to
Power by Fareed Zakaria,” Spring 2000, pp. 147–150.
Huang, Weiping, “Probing U.S. Economic Status and the Possibility of a ‘Soft-
Landing’,” Summer 2000, pp. 31–43.
Fan, Jishe, “Threat Assessment, Domestic Politics, and Post-Cold War U.S. Policy for
Missile Defense,” Autumn 2000, pp. 66–88.
Men, Honghua, “International Regimes and American Hegemony,” Spring 2001,
pp. 74–88.
Li, Haidong, “The Clinton Administration’s Role in NATO Expansion,” Summer
2001, pp. 54–69.
Liu, Jianfei, “The Role of Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Summer 2001, pp. 70–86.
Shi, Yinhong, “The Impact of September 11 Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Postures,”
Winter 2001, pp. 21–28.
Wu, Zhan, “The ABM Treaty and U.S. Missile Defense Program,” Spring 2002,
pp. 7–21.
Ruan, Zhongze, “Neo-Imperialism and the Integration Doctrine,” Autumn 2002,
pp. 36–49.
Yang, Jiemian, “United States National Security Strategy and Relations between the
Major Powers,” Winter 2002, pp. 7–20.
Wang, Jisi, “The Logic of American Hegemony,” Autumn 2003, pp. 7–29.
Guo, Xuetang, “The Poverty of the Theory of Hegemonic Cycles: An Analysis of
Whether American Hegemony is Going Downhill,” Autumn 2003, pp. 42–51.
Ding, Xinghao and Fan Deng, “How Far Can a Lonely Hegemon Go?” Autumn 2003,
pp. 65–73.
Yu, Kexing, “A Preliminary Analysis of Current American Economic Situation,”

Spring 1991, pp. 4–7.
Wang, Huaining, “The U.S.’s Economic Cycle and Gulf Crisis,” March 1991, pp.
46–49.
Fang, Xiaoguan, “The U.S.’s Post War Middle East Diplomacy in Serious Difficul-
ties,” July 1991, pp. 39–42.
Chu, Yukun, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Ninth Economic Recession after
World War II,” November 1991, pp. 6–13.
Pan, Rui, “The U.S. has Already Realized its ‘Out of Containment’ Strategy,” Novem-
ber 1991, pp. 56–58.
Xue, Da and Liangqiao He, “A Preliminary Analysis of the U.S. Government’s For-
eign Aid in the Post War Era,” February 1992, pp. 27–32.
Xiao, Lian, “On Productivity and the U.S.’s Leadership Status,” March 1992,
pp. 71–76.
Guo, Shixian, “A Brief Analysis of U.S. Dollar’s International Status and its Prospect
in 1990s,” June 1993, pp. 10–16.
Ji, Wei, “The New Problems Facing the U.S. Economy,” October 1993, pp. 6–8.
Wang, Menghua, “Clinton’s New Economic Plan Meets with Obstruction in the
Implementation,” November 1993, pp. 18–22.
Guo, Shixian, “A Forecast of Dollar Trend in the Next Five Years and Our Response,”
April 1994, pp. 17–22.
Ke, Juhan and Jian Tao, “New Trade Conflicts between the U.S. and Japan and their
Impact,” May 1994, pp. 8–12.
Li, Dongyan, “On the U.S.’s Intervention Policy in the Post Cold War Era,” July 1994,
pp. 64–69.
Qi, Chaoying, “An Exploration of the U.S.’s Adjustment Strategy Regarding High
Technology,” October 1994, pp. 17–20.
Zhou, Shijian, “A Review of the U.S.’s Sanction on China,” March 1995, pp. 70–74, 32.
Gao, Feng, “New Trend in the Distribution of Economic Power among the U.S., Ja-
pan, and Europe,” April 1995, pp. 32–40.
Wang, Guang, “The Demonstrations, Sources and Impact of the U.S.’s Domestic
Contradictions,” April 1995, pp. 55–61.
Qin, Liufang, Guo Shixian, “Dollar Crisis and China’s Relevant Strategic Concep-
tion,” June 1995, pp. 14–20.
Zhao, Ziyu, “On the Contradictions in the U.S.’s Adjustment of its Military Strategy,”
November 1995, pp. 61–65.
Li, Jun, “A Preliminary Analysis of the U.S.’s Trade Deficit,” January 1996,
pp. 50–51.
222 Appendix II
Chu, Yukun, “Difficulties Facing the U.S.’s Export Strategy in Asia,” June 1996,
pp. 43–44, 42.
Du, Jian, “The Sources and Revelation of Constant Troubles in the U.S.’s Banking
System,” August 1996, pp. 46–48, 65.
Zhang, Xiaotang, “On the Four Economic Rationales of American Decline Thesis,”
January 1997, pp. 69–71.
Ke, Juhan, “American Economy is still in the Period of Moderate Growth,” February
1997, pp. 58–60.
Zhang, Jikan, “The Challenges and Competition Facing the U.S.’s Oligarchic Enter-
prises in Internationalized Industries,” July 1997, pp. 18–22.
Wu, Yonghong, “The Change of the U.S.’s Status in World Economy,” July 1997,
pp. 65–68.
Song, Yuhua, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s ‘New Economy’ and Recent Economic Situ-
ation and Future Trend,” February 1998, pp. 16–20.
Song, Yuhua, “U.S. Economy will Continue to Expand in Soft Landing,” March 1998,
pp. 21–26.
Li, Bing, “The U.S.’s ‘New Economy’ and How China Should Speed up the Develop-
ment of its High Tech Industry,” August 1998, pp. 41–45.
Yang, Honglin, “The Reasons for the Continued Economic Prosperity in 1990s and
Future Trend,” August 1998, pp. 46–49, 76.
Sun, Shilian, “Debate among American Economic Circle on American Economic
Prospect,” October 1998, pp. 68–71.
Ge, Chengqun, “The Basic Experience and Revelation from the U.S.’s Efforts to En-
hance Research and Development Capability,” January 1999, pp. 73–77.
Yu, Yanchun, “The Trend of Change in the Structure of the U.S.’s High Tech Industry
and the Reasons,” March 1999, pp. 54–58.
Dai, Bing, “The U.S.’s Technology Transfer to Taiwan,” September 1999, pp. 73–77.
Chen, Baosen, “The Current Status, Problems of U.S. Economy and its Impact on the
World,” January 2000, pp. 27–32.
Han, Weidong and Yaodong Han, “The U.S.’s Hegemonic Strategy in the New Cen-
tury and China’s National Security,” February 2000, pp. 53–57.
Zhou, Sanming, “International Currency System and American Hegemony,” March
2000, pp. 30–34.
Zhou, Li, “The Imminence of Global Recession—the U.S.’s Faked Prosperity and the
Danger to the World,” March 2000, pp. 76–81.
Zhai, Xiaomin, “An Analysis of American Dominated Hegemony in the Post Cold
War Era,” April 2000, pp. 71–75.
Zhang, Lihua, “It is Really Not Easy to Dominate the Whole World—An Analysis of
the Constraining Factors to the U.S.’s Hegemonism,” June 2000, pp. 52–56.
Ding, Shichuan and Hongzhou Wei, “The U.S.’s Strategy and Tactics in its Interven-
tion of Taiwan Problem in the Post Cold War Era,” July 2000, pp. 38–42.
Tang, Renwu, “A Few Points about ‘American Century’,” April 2001, pp. 63–68.
Chen, Baosen, “Re-Understanding of the U.S.’s ‘New Economy’,” May 2001,
pp. 28–29.
Zhou, Bolin, “Strategic Thinking on China-U.S. Relations in the New Century,” May
2001, pp. 40–43.
Tan, Yaling and Lianying Zhang, “The U.S.’s Economic Prospect from The U.S.’s
Current Economic Conditions and Risk,” July 2001, pp. 44–48.
Xiao, Chen, “Perceiving the U.S.’s ‘Quasi Recession’ and ‘New Cycle’ from Internet
Economy,” August 2001, pp. 4–10.
Fan, Jishe, “Several Factors Affecting the U.S.’s Arms Control Policy in the Post Cold
War Era,” September 2001, pp. 28–33.
Wang, Yizhou, “9/11 Syndrome and New International Security Posture,” November
2001, pp. 4–9.
Fu, Mengzi, “The Rise of China: The U.S.’s Basic Assessment and Its Disputes re-
garding its China Policy,” February 2002, pp. 20–25.
Liu, Haijun, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Alliance Hegemony,” February 2002,
pp. 32–37.
Mou, Weihan, “Institutional Analysis of Japan’s Backwardness Compared to the U.S.
in Information Technology,” March 2002, pp. 60–65.
Ge, Lide, “The U.S.’s Withdrawal from ABM Treaty and the Prospect of its Anti-
Missile System,” April 2002, pp. 37–42.
Chen, Changshen, “9/11 and the Adjustment of the U.S.’s Global Strategy,” May
2002, pp. 27–33.
Song, Wei, “Geo-Political Comparison between China’s Rise and the Rise of Great
Britain and the U.S.,” June 2002, pp. 33–37.
Zhu, Feng, “ ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ and Bush Jr. Administration’s New Nuclear
Strategy,” June 2002, pp. 21–26.
Li, Dongyan, “The U.S.’s Foreign Strategy Options: Thinking and Practice,” July
2002, pp. 16–21.
Sun, Zhong, “Some Thoughts on Ideology and American Foreign Relations,” July
2002, pp. 66–70.
Li, Xiaohua, “The Limits of Engagement: The Poverty of American Strategic Think-
ing and the Dilemma of its China Policy,” August 2002, pp. 10–15.
Zhufu, Xiaofei and Jingfang Zhao, “America’s Cultural Hegemony and China’s
Choices,” September 2002, pp. 23–27.
Hu, Xin, “From Restraint to ‘Strike First’—American New Strategy in the Era of Post
Cold War,” October 2002, pp. 34–39.
Xin, Benjian, “The Vulnerable Spots in American Hegemony and Its Strategy of Pre-
serving Hegemony,” November 2002, pp. 54–59.
Song, Yuhua and Zhe Chen, “An Analysis of American Large Unfavorable Balance of
Trade,” November 2002, pp. 60–65.
The Editorial Board, “The Dilemma of the American-Styled Capitalism and the
Transformation,” December 2002, p. 1.
Jin, Canrong, “U.S. Hegemony Came Across Soft Balancing,” December 2003, p. 1.
Zhang, Wenmu, “On China’s Sea Power/Right,” October 2003, pp. 8–14.
Xin, Benjian, “The Ascendancy of American Neoconservatives and the Grand Strat-
egy of the Bush Administration for the New Empire,” October 2003, pp. 27–32.
224 Appendix II
Wang, Shuying and Yunze Ma, “The Level of Information in America and its Influ-
ence on the American Economy,” August 2003, pp. 75–79.
Jian, Junbo and Jinglin Zhang, “The Crisis of a Conceited Empire: Unilateralism and
the End of the Legitimacy of Hegemony,” August, 2003, pp. 35–40.
Sun, Zhe, “Structural Reorientation: China’s New International Strategy of Rising
Peacefully as a Powerful State,” December 2003, pp. 58–63.
Ren, Haiping, “An Evaluation of Comparison of the Competitiveness of the Defense
Science and Technology Industry,” December 2003, pp. 64–69.
Zhu, Feng, “Iraq War and its Implications for International Strategic Patterns,” No-
vember 2003, pp. 31–36.
Li, Changjiu, “War and the U.S.,” November 2003, pp. 37–41.
Wang, Yizhou, “Chinese Should Study China’s Rise,” January 2004, p. 1.
Yu, Sui, “On the Multipolarization of the World,” March 2004, pp. 15–20.
Peng, Lei, “Seminar Briefing: China’s Rise and China’s Relations with Other Third
World Countries,” April 2004, pp. 79–80.
Xie, Deyuan, “U.S. Foreign Policy after the Change of the Polar Structure,” Spring
1993, pp. 27–34.
Su, Ge, “Historical Experience of the U.S.’s Economic Take-off,” Autumn 1994,
pp. 55–64.
Liu, Wenzhong, “An Awkward Demonstration of Hegemonism—On U.S. State De-
partment’s ‘Human Rights Report’,” Summer 1995, pp. 47–49.
Liu, Shuguang, “A Tentative Comment on the Dollar Exchange Rate in Recent Times
and its Impact,” Winter 1995, pp. 54–57, 69.
Su, Ge, “The U.S.’s National Security Strategy of ‘Engagement and Enlargement’,”
Winter 1997, pp. 23–30.
Liu, Saili, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Sustained Economic Growth,” Summer
1998, pp. 36–39, 47.
Liu Wenzong et al., “Strong Protests against the U.S.’s Hegemonic Behavior,” Sum-
mer 1999, pp. 1–10.
Wen, Bing, “A New Version of ‘Might is Right’—Comments on two Articles in For-
eign Affairs Advocating Neo-Interventionism,” Spring 2000, pp. 52–56.
Chi, Wencen, “A Tentative Analysis of the Reasons for Sustained Economic Develop-
ment in the U.S.,” Autumn 2000, pp. 71–74.
Zheng, Baoguo, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s Global Hegemonic Strategy across the
Turn of the Century,” Winter 2000, pp. 43–63.
Zhao, Lei, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s BMD,” Spring 2001, pp. 90–93.
Sha, Benwang and Hong Shang, “Comment on Clinton’s Administration’s Foreign
Policy,” Summer 2001, pp. 39–46.
Di, Huisen, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Current Economic Trend,” Autumn
2001, pp. 57–60.
Zhu, Qiangguo, “U.S. Unilateral Withdrawal from ABM Treaty,” Spring 2002,
pp. 62–69.
Wang, Fan, “The U.S.’s Adjustment of its Asia-Pacific Alliance Strategy after the
Cold War,” Summer 2002, pp. 29–35.
Zhou, Lin, “U.S. Company Scandals: the Whys and Wherefores,” Winter 2002,
pp. 50–54.
Qian, Qichen, “Iraq War and the U.S.,” Winter 2003, p. 26.
Zhou, Lin, “Exports from China and the U.S.’s Manufacturing Industry,” April 2003,
pp. 65–69.
Lu, Shiwei, “An Analysis of the Hegemony of U.S. Dollar and the Impact of the Iraq
War on it,” Autumn 2003, pp. 102–107.
Xi, Runchang, “A Preliminary Analysis of U.S.-Japan-Europe Tripolarity and the

Trend of the World toward Multipolarity,” Spring 1991, pp. 3–8.
Jin, Dexiang, “Why the U.S. Declines Relatively?” March/April 1992, pp. 13–19.
Zhao, Guilin, “A Tentative Analysis of the Constant Factors in the U.S.’s Global Mili-
tary Strategy and the Weaknesses,” May/June 1992, pp. 9–15, 8.
Wang, Huihong, “Can Clinton Solve the U.S.’s Difficult Economic Problems?” No-
vember/December 1992, pp. 9–14.
Ke, Juhan, Jian Tao, and Wenyan Gu, “Clinton’s Set of Plans for Revitalizing U.S.
Economy,” March 1993, pp. 1–4, 25.
Huang, Hong, “The Intrinsic Contradictions and Constraining Factors in the Adjust-
ment of the U.S.’s Global Strategy,” March 1993, pp. 31–35.
Tao, Jian, Wenyan Gu , and Juhan Ke, “U.S. Economy Enters a Period of Sustained
Moderate Growth,” January 1994, pp. 6–10.
Guo, Shixian, “A Preliminary Analysis of the New Dollar,” August 1994, pp. 18–22.
Lu, Qichang, “The Difficulties and Challenges Facing Clinton,” October 1994,
pp. 29–32.
Hong, Guoqi and Xiaode Wang, “The Cultural Factors Accounting for the Frustra-
tions in Clinton’s Asia-Pacific Policy,” May 1995, pp. 18–22.
Wen, Weiji, “The U.S.’s Military Strategy for Seeking Dominant Status in the World,”
March 1996, pp. 2–6.
Li, Guofu, “The Intention and Impact of the U.S.’s Attack on Iraq,” October 1996,
pp. 19–22.
Wu, Jiong, “On the U.S.’s ‘Comprehensive Containment of China’,” November 1996,
pp. 8–11, 7.
Gu, Wenyan, “Economic Situation in the U.S. and the Trend of China-U.S. Economic
and Trade Relations,” April 1996, pp. 25–29.
Lu, Qichang, “Major Domestic Tasks and Problems Facing the Second Clinton Ad-
ministration,” February 1997, pp. 2–5.
226 Appendix II
Wang, Weimin, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s Strategy for NATO’s Eastward Expansion,”
February 1997, pp. 6–10, 5.
Liu, Guiling, “The Contradiction between Russia and the U.S. Regarding NATO’s
Eastward Expansion and the Relevant Test of Strength,” April 1997, pp. 2–6.
Li, Li, “Perceiving U.S.-Iran Relations from the Frustration in ‘Double Containment’
Policy,” October 1997, pp. 19–22.
Shi, Ren, “On the Economic Development of the U.S., Europe, and Japan around the
Turn of the Century,” January 1998, pp. 4–9.
Gu, Wenyan, “Why U.S. Economy Alone has been Prosperous among Western Coun-
tries?” June 1998, pp. 7–11.
Li, Huiming, “Knowledge Capital and the U.S.’s Knowledge Economy,” September
1998, pp. 26–29.
Lu, Qichang, Mengzi Fu, and Peng Yuan, “The Political, Economic and Diplomatic
Situations in the U.S. and the Future Trend,” January/February 1999, pp. 17–22.
Gu, Wenyan, “The U.S.’s Economic Situation and its Impact on China-U.S. Economic
and Trade Relations,” April 1999, pp. 16–18.
Li, Desong and Lisun Xu, “How the U.S. Uses its own International Advantage to
Safeguard its Economic Security,” August 1999, pp. 27–30.
Wu, Xingzhuo, “The U.S.’s R&D Regarding Missile Defense System Hurt Interna-
tional Security,” September 1999, pp. 16–18.
Meng, Liang, “Military Struggle between the U.S. and Russia regarding the Five
Countries in Central Asia and the Prospect,” September 1999, pp. 32–34.
Gu, Wenyan, “The Trend in the U.S.’s Economic Development around the Turn of the
Century,” December 1999, pp. 5–8.
Li, Changjiu, “The Characteristics, Problems and Revelations in the U.S.’s Economic
Growth,” March 2000, pp. 1–7.
Sun, Xiaoqing, “Internationalization of Euro and the Geo-Economic Struggles be-
tween Europe and the U.S.,” June 2000, pp. 13–16.
Feng, Zhongping, “Europe’s Response to the U.S.’s NMD and its Impact,” September
2000, pp. 24–28.
Lu, Qichang and Yanyu Zhang, “The U.S. Temporarily Postpones but Will not Give
Up Deploying NMD,” October 2000, pp. 10–12.
Gu, Wenyan, “The U.S.’s Economic ‘Soft Landing’ and its Impact,” February 2001,
pp. 30–33.
Liu, Guiling, “The Test of Strength between Russia and the U.S. and its Trend,”
March 2001, pp. 30–34.
Chen, Fengying, “The Beginning of American Economic Decline after Great Prosper-
ity and the Future Prospect,” April 2001, pp. 12–15.
Lu, Qichang, “Bush jr. Administration’s New Military Strategy,” May 2001, pp. 33–37.
Xin, Benjian, “Security Dilemma, Balance of Power Theory and the U.S.’s China
Policy in the Post Cold War Era,” September 2001, pp. 24–27.
Shi Yinhong et al., “The Impact of 9/11 on International Relations,” October 2001,
pp. 2–23.
Chen, Baosen, “The Impact of 9/11 on the Economy of the U.S. and World,” Novem-
ber 2001, pp. 1–6.
Gao, Zihu, “A Brief Comment on the U.S.’s Quadrennial Defense Report,” December
2001, pp. 61–63.
Zhao, Ganzang, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s New Military Strategy,” January 2002,
pp. 48–53.
Zhu, Qiangguo, “The Adjustment of the U.S.’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,”
February 2002, pp. 28–31.
Qian, Chuntai, “A Preliminary Analysis of Naval Military Security between China
and the U.S.,” April 2002, pp. 8–11, 7.
Zhu, Feng, “The U.S.’s ‘Nuclear Posture Review’: Blackmail or Policy?” April 2002,
pp. 17–23.
Jiao, Shixin, “Canada and the U.S.’s NMD,” April 2002, pp. 34–48.
Li, Changjiu, “The Future of China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations,” June 2002,
pp. 1–5.
Yang, Mingjie, “The Military-Industrial ‘Iron Triangle’ in the U.S.’s National Security
Strategy,” July 2002, pp. 33–39.
Guo, Xiaobing, “How the U.S. Formulates its National Security Policy,” July 2002,
pp. 61–63.
Liu, Jianfei, “Ideological Elements in the U.S.’s China Policy after the Cold War,”
August 2002, pp. 13–17, 28.
Xia, Liping, “The U.S.’s ‘Return to Southeast Asia’ and its Impact on Asia-Pacific
Security,” August 2002, pp. 18–22.
Jiang, Xiaoyan, “On Bush Administrations’ ‘Pre-Emptive’ Strategy,” September 2002,
pp. 7–11.
Xin, Benjian, “Comment on U.S. 2002 Annual Defense Report,” September 2002,
pp. 12–16.
Tan, Guodong, “A Preliminary Analysis of the Latest National Security Strategy of
the United States of America,” October 2002, pp. 18–22.
Zheng, Yingping, “The Thought of Bush Administration’s New Alliances Strategy,”
November 2002, pp. 43–47.
Gao, Zugui, “Soberly Understand U.S. Status and its Foreign Policy—A Comment on
The Paradox of American Power,” November 2002, pp. 62–63.
Wang, Jun, “Preventing the Weaponization of Space and its Prospect,” December
2002, pp. 8–13.
Li, Zidong and Xuezheng Liu, “Russia Factor in Post Cold War China-U.S. Rela-
tions,” December 2002, pp. 29–34.
Guo, Xiaobing, “The U.S. Intends to Monopolize the Space by the Offensive ‘Nega-
tion’ Strategy,” July 2003, pp. 37–38.
Liu Jianfei etc., “On the U.S.’s Global Strategy,” August 2003, pp. 1–21,)
Da, Wei and Li Li, “On the U.S.’s ‘Transforming the Middle East’ Strategy and Its
Limitations,” September 2003, pp. 16–21.
Li, Zhilin, “Current Security Situation in Iraq,” November 2003, pp. 38–39.
Ren, Xiao, “ ‘American Empire’ Thesis and the U.S.’s Grand Strategy,” December
2003, pp. 1–8.
Wang Jisi et al., “Assessments of the Trend of the U.S.’s International Standing,”
March 2004, pp. 1–28.
228 Appendix II
Jiang, Lingfei, “The Constraining Factors in the U.S.’s Containment Strategy against
China and its Possible Evolution,” September/October 1996, pp. 46–50.
Pang, Zhongying, “Soft Power in International Relations and Others—On American
Scholar Joseph Nye’s Bound to Lead,” March/April 1997, pp. 49–51.
Zhang, Qingmin, “The U.S.’s Technology Transfer to China in China-U.S. Relations,”
July/August 1999, pp. 19–25.
Wang, Jian, “Coming U.S. Dollar Crisis,” July/August 1998, pp. 31–37.
Zhang, Wenmu, “The U.S.’s Petroleum Geo-Strategy and the Security of China’s
Tibet and Xingjiang,” March/April 1998, pp. 100–104.
Gu, Guoliang, “China’s Response to Arms Control,” July/August 2002, pp. 77–84.
Lin, Guorong and Xiaoli Zhao, “President Bush’s Rhetoric and Intention,” Septem-
ber/October 2001, pp. 98–106.
Tang, Shiping and Xiaoyang Cao, “Looking for the Basis of Mutual Security among
China, the U.S., and Japan,” January/February 2002, pp. 99–109.
Hu, Angang and Honghua Meng, “A Comparison of Tangible Strategic Resources of
China, the U.S., Japan, Russia, and India,” March/April 2002, pp. 26–41.
Lai, Hongyi, “Transfer of the Center of the World Economy – Rise and Fall of America
and Asia from the View of Endowment of Resources and Economy of Scale,” July/
August 2003, pp. 82–89.
Zhang, Liangui, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.’s Police Role,” Sep-
tember/October 2003, pp. 65–77,)
Hu, Angang and Taoxiong Liu, “National Security Capability: A Comparison among
China, the U.S., Japan and India,” November/December 2003, pp. 40–45.
He, Fan, Zhizhong Yao, and Jingchun Zhang, “Rethinking the U.S.’s Role in China’s
Economic Development,” November/December 2003, pp. 111–117.
Zhao, Hua-Sheng, “Can China, Russia and the U.S. Cooperate in Central Asia?”
March/April 2004, pp. 94–107.
Appendix III

GUOJI WENTI YENJIU (9)
Xie, Yao, “The Characteristics and Prospect of the Economic Recession in the U.S.,”
Summer 1991, pp. 1–8, Xie Yao.
Wu, Tianbo, “A Comparison of the Economic Power of the U.S., Europe, and Japan
and their Trends,” Winter 1992, pp. 13–18.
Xie, Yao, “A Brief Comment on the Economic Recovery in the U.S. and its Future
Prospect ,” Autumn 1993, pp. 20–27.
Zhou, Xingbao, “Clinton’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Centered around Economy,”
Winter 1993, pp. 12–18.
Wei, Min, “The Trend in the Change of the Distribution of Economic Power among
the U.S., Europe, and Japan,” Spring 1995, pp. 33–37.
Huang, Suan, “Devaluation of U.S. Dollar and the U.S.’s Relative Economic Decline,”
Autumn 1995, pp. 37–40.
Chen, Dezhao, “The Change and Prospect of U.S. Economy in 1990s,” Spring 1998,
pp. 21–26.
Zeng, Bingxi, “The U.S.’s ‘New Economy’ and its Impact on World Economy,” Au-
tumn 1998, pp. 42–46.
Zeng, Bingxi, “The Current Expansion of U.S. Economy and its Impact on the U.S.’s
Hegemonic Status,” Autumn 1999, pp. 41–45, 49.
MEIGUO YANJIU (51)
Chen, Baosen, “The Economic Position of the United States in the West during the
Nineties,” Spring 1991, pp. 7–24.
Wang, Shusheng, “The Influence of American Private Enterprises on Government
Decision,” Spring 1991, pp. 52–69.
229
230 Appendix III
Zhu, Chuanyi, “New Strategies in Raising Social Welfare Funds,” Spring 1991,
pp. 133–143.
Zheng, Weimin, “Is U.S. Economy Declining or Reviving?” Summer 1991,
pp. 7–20.
Fang, Shaowei, “American Stock Exchanges and Their Transactions,” Summer 1991,
pp. 37–49.
Xiao, Chen, “Wall Street and Electronic Age,” Winter 1991, pp. 23–35.
Liu, Xuyi, “TVA (The Tennessee Valley Authority),” Winter 1991, pp. 36–43.
Xiao, Lian, “Dynamics of Changing World Economic Structure: U.S. Role and Influ-
ence,” Spring 1992, pp. 7–28.
Ding, Haojin, “The Future of American Economy,” Spring 1992, pp. 29–41.
Wei, Wei, “An Analysis of U.S. Investment, Trade and Government Budget,” Spring
1992, pp. 42–58.
Xiao, Chen, “The Influence of U.S. Defense Budget Cut on Economy, Spring 1992,
pp. 59–71.
Li, Changjiu, “The Status of U.S. Foreign Trade and its Prospect,” Spring 1992,
pp. 72–81.
Sun, Haishun, “On the Changing Relative Standing of U.S., Japanese and E.C. Inter-
national Capitals,” Spring 1992, pp. 82–92.
Feng Zhaokui, “U.S.-Japanese Economic Friction and Their Contention in Asia,”
Spring 1992, pp. 93–109.
Du, Houwen, and Qiang Zhang, “Changing U.S. and German Economic Statuses and
Their Bilateral Economic Relations in the 1990s,” Spring 1992, pp. 110–119.
Huan, Weiping and Wenhui Zhu, “A Discussion of the U.S. International Financial
Standing in the 1990s,” Spring 1992, pp. 120–134.
Zhou, Maorong, “Impact of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement on the United
States,” Summer 1992, pp. 93–106.
Chen, Baosen, “Comments on Economic Report of the President 1992,” Autumn
1992, pp. 7–25.
Zhan, Baohong, “Celler-Kefauver Act and American Corporation Merger,” Winter
1992, pp. 104–120.
Chen, Baosen, “A Blue-Print for Revitalizing U.S. Economy,” Summer 1993,
pp. 29–44.
Zhang, Jian, “The Trend of U.S. Trade Policy in the 1990s,” Autumn 1993,
pp. 32–52.
Wang, Chunfa, “Merits and Demerits of the Education-Research-Extension System of
American Agriculture,” Winter 1993, pp. 43–62.
Wei, Wei, “Analyzing Gains of Both Parties in Sino-U.S. Trade,” Spring 1994,
pp. 131–134.
Chen, Kerong, “The Economics Bill Clinton Needs,” Spring 1994, pp. 134–136.
Chen, Baosen, “Comments on the Domestic and Foreign Economic Policies of the
Clinton Administration,” Winter 1994, pp. 7–22.
Jia, Shaofeng and Xiangjing Meng, “Is U.S. Territory Too Large to Sustain a Good
Economy?” Winter 1994, pp. 114–125.
Chen, Baosen, “Postwar International Monetary System and U.S. International Finan-
cial Policy,” Summer 1995, pp. 7–24.
Xiao, Chen, “On the Compatibility of Law-Governing to Economic Efficiency in
America,” Autumn 1995, pp. 67–89.
Wei, Wei, “A Comparison between Major U.S. and Chinese Economic Indicators,”
Winter 1995, pp. 69–82.
Zhang, Xin, “U.S. Federal Deficits and Bonds,” Spring 1996, pp. 90–104.
Chen, Baosen, “New Trial of Strength between Two American Economic Philoso-
phies,” Summer 1996, pp. 21–39.
Zhang, Youlun, “Two Breakthroughs in U.S. Agriculture and Basic Experiences
Therein,” Summer 1996, pp. 93–109.
Huang, Keke, “A Fine Work in U.S. Urbanization Study --Comments on Wang Xu’s A
Study of American Big Cities on West Coast,” Summer 1996, pp. 140–144.
Jiang, Jingsong, “The U.S. Budget War in 1995,” Winter 1996, pp. 47–75.
Wang, Zeke, “The Hard-to-Change Federal Income Tax,” Summer 1997, pp. 52–68.
Huang, Annian, “Clinton’s Policy toward Family Welfare Reform,” Summer 1997,
pp. 87–104.
Huang, Renwei, “The Shanghai Communiqué and Developing Sino-U.S. Trade and
Economic Relations,” Summer 1997, pp. 147–150.
Song, Yuhua and Huajun Lu, “U.S. Trade Deficit and its Foreign Trade Status,” Au-
tumn 1997, pp. 82–103.
Tao, Wenzhao, “A Seminar on U.S.-China Economic Relations in the 20th Century,”
Autumn 1997, pp. 149–156.
Hu, Guocheng, “The Current Wave of American Enterprise Merging,” Spring 1998,
pp. 79–106.
Wang, Zihong, “An Analysis of America’s Bilateral Economic Relationships,” Spring
1998, pp. 107–121.
Wang, Rongjun, “U.S. Economy in 1997,” Spring 1998, pp. 141–142.
Chen, Baosen, “The Changing U.S. Economic-Financial Theory and Policy,” Summer
1998, pp. 29–47.
Sheng, Bing, “U.S. Foreign Trade Policy in the Changing World Economy,” Autumn
1998, pp. 30–49.
Wang, Xu, “Metropolitanization: The Main Trend of American Urban Development
in the Twentieth Century,” Winter 1998, pp. 65–77.
Liang, Xiwei and Shaojun Chen, “The Operational Mechanism of U.S. Venture Capi-
tal,” Autumn 1999, pp. 19–27.
Jin, Canrong, “Congress Role in the Formulation of American Trade Policy: History
and the Post-Cold War Characteristics,” Summer 2000, pp. 7–30.
Huang, Weiping, “Probing U.S. Economic Status and the Possibility of a ‘Soft-
Landing’,” Summer 2000, pp. 31–43.
Hu, Guocheng, “An Analysis of the Case of Microsoft Monopoly,” Autumn 2000,
pp. 21–41.
Li, Zhihui, “An Analysis of the Changes in the Management and Administration of
American Banks,” Autumn 2000, pp. 42–65.
232 Appendix III
Wei, Wei, “The Impact of Electronic Business on U.S. Economy,” Winter 2000, pp.
123–145.
Yu, Kexing, “A Tentative Comment on the U.S.’s Current Economic Situation,”

January 1991, pp. 4–7.
Wang, Huaining, “The U.S.’s Economic Cycle and Gulf Crisis,” March 1991,
pp. 46–49.
Xiao, Chen, “The U.S.’s Tax Reform and its Impact,” June 1991, pp. 9–13, 81.
Chu, Yukun, “The U.S.’s Ninth Economic Recession after World War II,” November
1991, pp. 6–13.
Xiao, Lian, “Introduction of and Comments on Productivity and the U.S.’s Leadership
Status,” March 1992, pp. 71–76.
Xiao, Chen et al., “The U.S.’s Economic Mechanism and its Operation under the New
Situation,” October 1992, pp. 27–36, 67.
Xiao, Lian, “Ten Major Changes in Clinton’s Economic Policy,” February 1993,
pp. 30–39.
Wang, Haijun, “An Analysis of Clinton Administration’s Economic Strategy,” March
1993, pp. 19–22.
Guo, Shixian, “A Brief Analysis of the International Status of U.S. Dollar and its
Prospect in 1990s,” June 1993, pp. 10–16.
Ke, Juhan, Jian Tao, and Wenyan Gu, “Clinton’s Economic Plan, Policy Thoughts and
their Impact,” August 1993, pp. 12–16.
Ji, Wei, “New Problems Facing U.S. Economy,” October 1993, pp. 6–8.
Wang, Menghua, “Clinton’s New Economic Plan in Difficulties,” November 1993,
pp. 18–22.
Xiao, Chen and Jiangchun Yu, “Observing the Transaction of the U.S.’s SIF,” Decem-
ber 1993, pp. 44–49.
Guo, Shixian, “Forecasting the Trend of U.S. Dollar in the Next Five Years and our
Appropriate Response,” April 1994, pp. 17–22.
Huang, Taiyan, “The Collection of Capital and its Employment by the U.S. Govern-
ment for Constructing Express Ways,” June 1994, pp. 16–20.
Qi, Chaoying, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s Adjustment of its High-Tech Strategy,”
October 1994, pp. 17–20.
Zhang, Ling, “Mutual Funds: One of the Most Vigorous and Successful Industries in
the U.S.,” December 1994, pp. 20–25.
Ma, Hongxia, “The Reform of the U.S.’s Unit Banking System and its Lessons to Us,”
January 1995, pp. 23–28.
Liu, Penghui, “The U.S.’s Foundations and Social Welfare,” March 1995, pp. 75–78.
Gao, Feng, “New Distribution of Economic Power Among the U.S., Japan, and
Europe,” April 1995, pp. 32–35, 40.
Qin, Liufang and Shixian Guo, “U.S. Dollar Crisis and China’s Relevant Strategic
Thinking,” June 1995, pp. 14–20.
Shan, Sha, “The U.S.: From NAFTA to the American Free Trade Zone,” August 1995,
pp. 35–38, 50.
Li, Jun, “A Preliminary Analysis of the U.S.’s Trade Deficit,” January 1996,
pp. 50–51.
Du, Xijiang, “Characteristics of the U.S.’s Foreign Trade Policy,” January 1996,
pp. 52, 14.
Xiao, Chen, “The U.S.’s IRA and the Financialization of China’s Social Security,”
February 1996, pp. 41–42.
Zhao, Shumin and Ge Wang, “The Management and Development of Human Capital
in U.S. Businesses,” February 1996, pp. 48–51, 56.
Zhang, Ling, “U.S. Laws Concerning Investment Capital and the Latest Relevant
Legislature,” March 1996, pp. 37–39.
Zhang, Linjun, “The Direction of the U.S.’s Trade Strategy after the Cold War,” June
1996, pp. 40–42.
Chu, Yukun, “The Difficulties Confronting the U.S.’s Export Strategy in Asia,” June
1996, pp. 43–44, 42.
Zhao, Yongqin, “Perceiving the Politicization of World Economy from Economic and
Trade Relations between the U.S. and China, Japan,” July 1996, pp. 25–27.
Ye, Xiangsong, “Revelation of the U.S.’s Management System of State-Owned Busi-
nesses to Our Country’s Reform of State-Owned Business Management System,”
July 1996, pp. 64–67.
Du, Jian, “The Causes and Revelation of Incessant Incidents in the U.S.’s Banking
Industry,” August 1996, pp. 46–48, 65.
Li, Shujie, “The U.S.’s Federal Reserve System: Currency Policy, Finance Regu-
lations, and Electronics of Service, and the Revelations to Us,” October 1996,
pp. 65–68.
Zhao, Lingdi and Yanjing Hu, “The U.S.’s Foreign Trade Strategy is in Urgent Need
of Transformation,” December 1996, pp. 38–41.
Zhang, Xiaotang, “On the Four Economic Pivots of American Decline Thesis,”
January 1997, pp. 69–71.
Ke, Juhan, “U.S. Economy is Still in Moderate Growth Period,” February 1997,
pp. 58–60.
Ye, Xiangsong, “On the Constitution of the U.S.’s Currency Market and its Charac-
teristics,” March 1997, pp. 38–40, 45.
Zhang, Xuesong, “The Revelation of the U.S.’s ‘New Business Culture’ to the Devel-
opment of our Businesses,” March 1997, pp. 46–47.
Ding, Dasong, “On the Trend of the U.S.’s Social Security,” April 1997, pp. 57–60.
Dai, Nianning, “On the U.S.’s Non-Banking Financial Institutions,” May 1997,
pp. 37–39, 64.
Sun, Jingshui, “The U.S.’s Integrated Economic Growth Pattern: its Experience and
Revelations to Us,” June 1997, pp. 35–38, 62.
Zhang, Jikang, “The Challenges and Competitions Facing the U.S.’s Oligarchic Busi-
nesses in Internationalized Industries,” July 1997, pp. 18–22.
Wu, Yonghong, “The Change of the U.S.’s Status in World Economy,” July 1997,
pp. 65–68.
234 Appendix III
Chen, Dejun, “Agricultural Cooperatives in the U.S.: Characteristics, Types, and

Functions,” September 1997, pp. 65–67.
Wang, Yungui, “Structural Adjustment in the U.S. Economy since 1980s: its Experi-
ence and Revelation to Us,” October 1997, pp. 5–9.
Chen, Baosen, “A Preliminary Analysis of Useful Experience of the U.S.’s Stock
System,” December 1997, pp. 38–40, 62.
Song, Yuhua, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s ‘New Economy,’ its Recent Economic Situ-
ation, and its Future Trend,” February 1998, pp. 16–20.
Guan, Li and Ruling Liu, “The Development of the U.S.’s Risk Investment, its Experi-
ence and Lessons,” February 1998, pp. 50–53.
Song, Yuhua, “The U.S. Economy Will Continue Expansion in Soft Landing,” March
1998, pp. 21–26.
Lang, Ping, “A Preliminary Analysis of the U.S.’s ‘New Economy’,” April 1998,
pp. 28–31.
Dong, Fuquan, “Comprehensive Cross-Century Adjustment of the U.S.’s Economic
Structure,” August 1998, pp. 5–9, 45.
Wang, Hao and Daoyong Xing, “A Tentative Talk of the U.S.’s ‘New Economy’ and
its Lessons to Us,” August 1998, pp. 38–40.
Li, Bing, “Perceiving Speeding up the Development of Our Country’s High Technol-
ogy Industry from the U.S.’s ‘New Economy’,” August 1998, pp. 41–45.
Yang, Hongling, “The Causes of the U.S.’s Sustained Economic Prosperity in the
1990s and its Future Trend,” August 1998, pp. 46–49, 76.
Sun, Shilian, “Debates Concerning the Prospect of the U.S.’s Economy among Per-
sonnel in the U.S. Economic Field,” October 1998, pp. 68–71.
Zhang, Zongbin, “Perceiving China’s Business Expansion from the U.S.’s Business
Annexation,” November 1998, pp. 52–54, 70.
Ge, Chengqun, “The Basic Experience of How the U.S. Enhances its Research and
Development Capability and its Revelations to Us,” January 1999, pp. 73–77.
Yu, Yanchun, “The Evolutionary Trend of High-Tech Industrial Structure in the U.S.
and its Causes,” March 1999, pp. 54–58.
Zhang, Tianwei, “A Few Thoughts Regarding the U.S.’s ‘Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment’ Incident,” April 1999, pp. 33–35, 45.
Chen, Baosen, “The Current Conditions and Problems of the U.S. Economy and the
Impact on the World,” January 2000, pp. 27–32.
Zhou, Li, “Is Global Recession Approaching—the U.S.’s Bubble Economy and the
Danger to the World,” March 2000, pp. 76–81.
Xiao, Chen, “On the U.S.’s ‘New Economy’ and ‘New Cycle’,” April 2000,
pp. 5–10.
Liu, Shengxiang, “The U.S. and the Globalization of World Economy,” June 2000,
pp. 65–68.
Pei, Guifen, “A Comparison between the U.S.’s Management of Financial Crisis and
Japan’s,” July 2000, pp. 60–64.
Tan, Yaling, “Perceiving the Development in the U.S. and in the World from the Fluc-
tuation of the U.S.’s Stock Market,” October 2000, pp. 71–74.
Wang, Zhaofeng, “A Study of the Market Relationship between the U.S.’s Banking
System and its Enterprises,” December 2000, pp. 52–56.
Su, Ge, “The Historical Experience of the Take-off of the American Economy,” Au-
tumn 1994, pp. 55–64.
Liu, Shuguang, “A Tentative Comment on the Recent Trend of U.S. Dollar Exchange
Rate and its Impact,” Winter 1995, pp. 54–55-.
Liu, Saili, “A Tentative Analysis of the Sustained Development of the American
Economy,” Summer 1998, pp. 36–39, 47.
Zhu, Liqun, “Perceiving the U.S.’s Explication of Economic Security from the Theory
of Strategic Trade,” Spring 2000, 66–71.
Yang, Ning and Zhanwu Ma, “A Preliminary Analysis of the U.S.’s Federal Reserve
and its Currency Policy,” Summer 2000, pp. 60–63, 72.
Chi, Wenchen, “A Tentative Analysis of the Causes of the U.S.’s Sustained Economic
Growth,” Autumn 2000, pp. 71–74.
Jin, Dexiang, “Why the U.S. Suffers from a Relative Decline?” March/April 1992,
pp. 13–19.
Wang, Huihong, “Can Clinton Solve the U.S.’s Troublesome Economic Problems?”
Ke, Juhan, Jian Tao, and Wenyan Gu, “Clinton’s Series of Plans for American
Economic Rejuvenation,” March 1993, pp. 1–4, 25.
Ke, Juhan, Jian Tao, and Wenyan Gu, “Why Clinton Administration Attaches Great
Importance to Foreign Trade?” July 1993, pp. 9–12.
Tao, Jian, Wenyan Gu, and Juhan Ke, “U.S. Economy Entering into Sustained Moder-
ate Development,” January 1994, pp. 6–10.
Guo, Shixian, “A Tentative Analysis of the New U.S. Dollar Crisis,” August 1994,
pp. 18–22.
Gu, Wenyan, “Economic Situations in the U.S. and the Trend of China-U.S. Eco-
Shi, Ren, “On the Economic Development of the U.S., Europe, and Japan around the
Turn of the Century,” January 1998, pp. 4–9.
Gu, Wenyan, “Why Only the Economy of the U.S. among Western Countries is Pros-
perous,” June 1998, pp. 7–11.
Zhou, Xin, “On the Integration of EU Currency and the Reconstitution of Financial
Industry in the U.S. and Japan,” September 1998, pp. 18–22.
Li, Huiming, “Intellectual Capital and the U.S.’s Intellectual Economy,” September
1998, pp. 26–29.
236 Appendix III
Shu, Jingxiang, “The Reform of Financial Supervisory Systems in the U.S., Europe,
and Japan,” November 1998, pp. 36–39.
Lu, Qichang, Mengzhi Fu, and Peng Yuan, “The U.S.’s Politics, Economy, and
Foreign Affairs, Their Current Status and Future Trend,” January/February 1999,
pp. 17–22.
Li, Changjiu, “The Characteristics, Problems and Revelations of the U.S.’s Economic
Development,” March 2000, pp. 1–7.
Gu, Wenyan, “The Prospect of the U.S.’s Economy at the Turn of the Century,”
Li, Li, “A Comparison of the Role of State Intervention in the Economic Development
of the U.S. and Japan,” May/June 1995, pp. 16–23.
Wang, Jian, “Regional Economy Models in the U.S. and Japan and their Revelation to
China’s Cosmopolitan Development Strategy,” March/April 1997, pp. 1–15.
Wang, Yi, Jiqiong Zhang, Changhua Wu, and Kebing He, “Global Energy and
Environment Cooperation: A Strategic Card in China-U.S. Relations,” November/
Nolan, Peter and Xiaoqiang Wang, “The Revelation of the U.S.’s Military Indus-
try Reformation to China’s Industrial Integration,” November/December 1997,
pp. 60–67.
Wang, Jian, “Coming Dollar Crisis,” July/August 1998, pp. 31–37.
Appendix IV

Pan, Tongwen, “The U.S.’s Midterm Election in 1990 and its Impact,” Summer 1991,
pp. 15–20.
Pan, Tongwen, “The 1992 Presidential Election in the U.S. and Policy Trend of Clin-
ton Administration,” Spring 1993, pp. 1–5.
Pan, Tongwen, “A Few Tentative Thoughts since Clinton’s Inauguration,” Winter
1993, pp. 8–11.
Pan, Tongwen, “The U.S.’s Midterm Election in 1994 and its Impact, Spring 1995,
pp. 18–22.
Jin, Junhui, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Year 2000 Presidential Election,”
MEIGUO YANJIU (32)
Yuan, Ruijun, “The Power Balance between the White House Staff and the Cabinet
Members,” Autumn 1992, pp. 97–117.
Yang, Jian, “Contention for War Power between the Congress and the President,”
Winter 1992, pp. 7–29.
Chen, Yu-jun, “Conservative Interest Groups and the Changes in the Republican Con-
stituency,” Winter 1992, pp. 30–51.
Jiang, Jingsong, “On the Style of Majority Leadership in U.S. Congress,” Winter
1992, pp. 52–65.
Jia, Hao, “The 1992 Presidential Election and New Changes in U.S. Political Trend,”
Summer 1993, pp. 45–75.
Jiang, Jingsong, “The Present Crisis of U.S. Constitutional System,” Autumn 1993,
pp. 53–76.
237
238 Appendix IV
Ni, Feng, “The Political Thought of Henry D. Thoreau,” Winter 1993, pp. 107–128.
Zhu, Shida, “On the Middle Class in the U.S.A.,” Winter 1994, pp. 39–53.
Zhou, Qi, “American Contribution to Modern Western Democracy—Representative
Democracy,” Winter 1994, pp. 55–72.
Jin, Canrong, “Politico-Cultural Split in the U.S. and the Evolution of U.S. Politics,”
Spring 1995, pp. 7–28.
Yang, Dazhou, “A Preliminary Study of the Impact of the 1994 U.S. Midterm Elec-
tion,” Spring 1995, pp. 106–110.
Zhou, Qi, “A Survey of the 1994 U.S. Mid-term Election,” Spring 1995,
pp. 111–120.
Jin, Junhui, “Will the United States Become More Turbulent?—An After-Thought on
the U.S. Midterm Election,” January 1995, pp. 121–124.
Fang, Xiaoguang, “The Voters’ Rebellion: An Analysis of the 1994 U.S. Midterm
Election,” Spring 1995, pp. 125–129.
Jin, Canrong, “A Report of the Workshop on the 1994 U.S. Midterm Elections,”
Spring 1995, pp. 145–148.
Wang, Enming, “The Women’s Movement in Contemporary America,” Autumn 1995,
pp. 31–47.
Xiao, Chen, “On the Compatibility of Law-Governing to Economic Efficiency in
America,” Autumn 1995, pp. 67–89.
Huan, Yahong, “The Origin of the Women’s Movement in America,” Autumn 1995,
pp. 127–132.
Zhang, Ye, “Gender Perspective and Women in Development: Two Hot Subjects in the
Women’s Movement,” Autumn 1995, pp. 133–136.
Zhang, Liping, “Linden Johnson and Civil Rights Act,” Summer 1996, pp. 110–132.
Zhou, Qi, “America’s Upper Class,” Autumn 1996, pp. 41–62.
Zhu, Shida, “The Clinton Administration’s Dilemma in Affirmative Action,” Autumn
1996, pp. 63–84.
Yang, Jiemian, “The American Presidential Election and the Readjustment of Clinton’s
China Policy,” Winter 1996, pp. 128–134.
Li, Zhidong, “Colin Powell and American Politics,” Summer 1997, pp. 105–124.
Cui, Zhiyuan, “Three Theoretical Questions Concerning the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution,” Autumn 1997, pp. 121–136.
Jin, Canrong, “The Basic Features of the American Politics in 1997,” Spring 1998,
pp. 138–140.
Xiong, Zhiyong, “Lobbying in U.S. Congress and Foreign Policy Making,” Autumn
1998, pp. 71–89.
Sun, Ru, “An Analysis of the Fund-Raising Enquiry,” Autumn 1998, pp. 91–108.
Su, Pengfei, “U.S. Local Autonomy: Charter of the City of Berkeley,” Autumn 1999,
pp. 81–92.
Liu, Jianfei, “Causes for the Emergence and Development of America’s Anticommu-
nism,” Summer 2000, pp. 81–108.
Ji, Hong, “Civil Rights Movement and the Rise of Black Political Influence of Black
Southerners,” Summer 2000, pp. 109–142.
Bai, Xuefeng, “On the Establishment of Judicial Independence,” Autumn 2000,

pp. 114–131.
Zhao, Shenggan and Qichang Lu, “The U.S.’s Midterm election and Political Trend,”
January 1991, pp. 60–63.
Zhang, Xingping, “Will Bush be Re-elected?” April 1992, pp. 45–47.
Gong, Weijing, “U.S. Election Founded on the Basis of U.S. Dollars,” December
1992, pp. 41–45.
Wen, Yan, “A Summary of the Symposium on Trend of the U.S.’s Domestic and For-
eign Policies after the Presidential Election,” March 1993, pp. 57–60.
Zhang, Minqian, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Clean Government Construction
and its Lessons to Us,” August 1994, pp. 38–43, 32.
Bi, Yunhong, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s Presidential Election Situation,” June 1996,
pp. 23–25.
Jin, Canrong, “U.S. Politics and Policy Trend after the Presidential Election,”
November 1996, pp. 40–43, 12.
Song, Shiming, “Public Choice Theory and the U.S.’s Administrative Reform,” May
1997, pp. 40–44, 60.
Lin, Hongyu, “Public Opinion in the U.S. and its China Policy,” August 1997,
pp. 67–70.
Jiang, Xinxue, “The Dilemma of Division of Powers and Legislature in U.S.
Congress,” April 1998, pp. 73–76.
Tang, Xiao, “A Tentative Comment on the Limitation on the Freedom of Speech in

American Constitution,” Summer 1991, pp. 40–53.
Su, Ge, “Perceiving the U.S.’s Division of Three Powers from the Troubles Caused by
the Establishment of U.S.-China Relations,” Spring 1992, pp. 61–67.
Liu, Wenzhong, “On U.S. Supreme Court’s Approval to Kidnap Suspects from a For-
eign Country to Stand Trial in the U.S.,” Winter 1992, pp. 29–31.
Ren, Xiaoping, “The U.S.’s News Media and its Presidential Elections,” Summer
1993, pp. 68–75.
Jiang, Chengzhong, “Perceiving the U.S.’s Capitalist Parliamentary Democracy from
the American Congress,” Autumn 1993, pp. 15–19.
Qin, Yaqing, “The Constitution and Power of Committees in U.S. Congress—An
Introduction of and Comment on Neo-Institutionalism and Information School,”
Winter 1995, pp. 50–53.
Fan, Ying, “The U.S.’s Fight over Budget in Deadlock,” February 1996, pp. 49–53.
240 Appendix IV
Dong, Xiuli, “The U.S.’s Presidential Election and China-U.S. Relations,” Autumn
2000, pp. 57–61.
Zhao, Shenggang, “The U.S.’s Presidential Election Situations,” July/August 1992,

pp. 15–22, 36.
Zhao, Shenggang, “Clinton Being Elected President, U.S. Politics, and Policy Trend,”
Sheng, Zhixun, “The U.S.’s President Elect Clinton,” November/December 1992,
pp. 60–62.
Ding, Kuisong and Zhixun Sheng, “Perceiving Clinton Administration’s Policy Trend
from the Constitution of his Administration,” February 1993, pp. 15–17.
Zhao, Shenggang, “The Relations between the U.S.’s New Congress and President
Clinton,” April 1993, pp. 6–11.
Peng, Yan, “American Scholars on the U.S.’s New Administration, New Congress, and
the U.S.’s Domestic and Foreign Policies,” July 1993, pp. 37–41.
Qian, Chunyuan, Qichang Lu, and Jian Tao, “Clinton Administration’s Adjustment of
Domestic and Foreign Policies and Their Prospect,” August 1993, pp. 20–23, 19.
Lu, Qichang, Shenggang Zhao, and Leilei Tang, “The Focus of Clinton Administra-
tion in 1994,” February 1994, pp. 2–5.
Lu, Qichang, “Difficulties and Challenges Facing Clinton,” October 1994, pp. 29–32.
Lu, Qichang and Shenggang Zhao, “The U.S.’s Midterm Election and the Trend of its
Politics,” December 1994, pp. 26–32.
Lu, Qichang, “The Situation of the American Presidential Election,” October 1996,
pp. 10–13.
Wang, Guang, “The U.S. in Transition,” January 1997, pp. 6–12.
Lu, Qichang, “The Main Tasks and Problems within the U.S. Facing the Second
Clinton Administration,” February 1997, pp. 2–5.
Gao, Huandong, “The Balance of Power in the New U.S. Congress and Their Attitude
toward China,” May 1997, pp. 17–19.
Lu, Qichang, “Some Obvious Changes in the U.S.’s Bi-Party Politics after the Cold
War,” September 1997, pp. 7–12.
Shi, Ren, “On the Political Trend of the U.S., Europe, and Japan around the Turn of
the Century,” February 1998, pp. 2–5.
Ren, Feng, “Clinton’s Philosophical Thought,” February 1998, p. 45.
Lu, Qichang, “Domestic Political Situations in the Current U.S.,” June 1998, pp. 12–15.
Ou, Bingmei, “A Preliminary Comment on “the Third Road” in Current Europe and
the U.S.,” December 1998, pp. 2–5.
Lu, Qichang and Yanyu Zhang, “A Preliminary Analysis of the U.S.’s Midterm
Election,” December 1998, pp. 22–24.
Lu, Qichang, Mengzhi Fu, and Peng Yuan, “The U.S.’s Politics, Economy, and Foreign
Affairs, Their Current Status and Future Trend,” January/February 1999, pp. 17–22.
Lu, Qichang, “George W. Bush Takes Aim at the White House,” August 1999,
pp. 33–35.
Chen, Xiangyang, “Domestic Politics in the U.S. and Its Impact on China-U.S.
Relations,” December 1999, pp. 29–31.
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Index
ABM. See Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty anti-U.S. coalition, 110, 114

absolute security, 49, 59 appeasement, 185. See also motivations;
absolute threat, 197–199, 201 foreign policy orientation
Academy of Military Science, 24 archival research, 18, 20
adversarial relationship, 202 Arkush, David, 20
aerospace technology, 105 arms race, 108
agriculture, 135 ASEAN. See the Association of
agricultural cooperatives, 132 Southeast Asian Nations
allies, 87–88 Asian financial crisis, 87–88
Allison, Graham, 16 the Association of Southeast Asian
America: bashing, 184; watchers, Nations, 45, 48, 112
125–126, 153–154 assurance model, 8
American: century, 112; culture, 190; AT&T. See American Telephone and
decline, 102, 110–114, 138, 193; Telegraph Company
hegemony, 117. See also sole August 17 Communiqué, 41
superpower; leaders, 155–156. Australia, 45
See also politicians; primacy, 7; availability effect, 115
rejuvenation, 112–114, 193, 195,
See also economic performance; balance of threat theory, 7–8
values, 118 Bamboo Curtain, 51
American Telephone and Telegraph banking system, 142–143
Company, 54 barbarian image, 13–15
annexation, 132, 140, 142 behavioral implications, 185
anti-Americanism, 118 benefits to American consumers, 74
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 102, 107 benign hegemon, 8–9, 118
anti-China alliance, 42, 56 Bernstein, Richard, 33
anti-communism, 159 Betts, Richard, 33
anti-terrorism, 72–73 bilateral cooperation, 88
257
258 Index
birth control, 60 China Institute of Contemporary

blue–water navy, 106, International Relations, 23–24
Boulding, Kenneth, 25, 27–28, 30 China Institute of International Strategic
bounded rationality, 25 Studies, 24
Bradley, Bill, 163, 165 China Institute of International
Brazil, 112, 196 Studies, 23
Brooks, Stephen G, 185 China threat debates, xiii, 2–10, 32–33,
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 7, 33 77. See also China
Bush, George H. W., 52, 54, 71, 76, 105 China’s Foreign Ministry, 22
Bush, George W.: as a politician, China’s Ministry of State Security, 22,
163–165; campaign corruption, 162; 24
China as a competitor, 77–78; human Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
rights policy more acceptable, 92; 22–23
NMD, 49; MFN/PNTR policy, 86 Chinese embassy bombing, 190,
business ethics, 142 193, 198
Chinese images of the U.S., 184,
Cambodia, 71 187–195
campaign contribution, 161, 165 the Chinese Society for Strategy and
Campaign 2000, 77–79, 162 Management, 22–24
capability, 29, 101–123 CICIR. See China Institute of
capital, 80 Contemporary International
capitalism, 131, 139, 141–142. See also Relations
market system CIIS. See China Institute of
capital management, 132 International Studies
Carter, Jimmy, 125–126 civilian technology, 105
CASS. See Chinese Academy of Social Clinton, William J.: as a politician,
Sciences 162–164, 170; engagement with
Central Asia, 45, 48, 71 China, 1, 77, 87–88; human rights
checks and balances, 142, 155, policy, 50–51, 54, 78–79, 92;
157–158, 169–172 management of economy, 105, 139;
Ch’en, Jerome, 26, 189, 192 intellectual property rights policy,
Chen, Shui-bian, 201 52; NMD and TMD policy, 49;
China: as a country full of Taiwan and Tibet policy, 43
contradictions, 201; as an ideal locus Clinton-Jiang Seattle summit, 77
for investment, 83; bashing, 56–57, cognitive perspective, 13–15, 29
199; comparative advantages, 80; Cold War, 1–2, 16
concessions to the United States collective identity, 72, 90
over human rights, 79; concessions colony image, 14
to the United States over intellectual company profit, 136
property rights, 81; foreign policy competitiveness. See international
motivations, 183–195; military competitiveness
power, 108; status quo or revisionist, complementarity, 80
2, 4–5, 9, 13, 185–186, 195; threat, components of national images, 14
2–4, 32, 57–58, 195–202 computer technology, 105
Index 259
Congress, 154, 166. See also checks and dimensions, 25–28

balances dissidents, 51, 79
conservatism, 154 divided government, 170
consistency principle, 115 Dole, Bob, 163–164
Constitution, 172 dollar crisis. See U.S. dollar
constructive strategic partnership, dominant power, 1–2
88, 200 dominant status, 88
consumers, 74, 137 drug trafficking, 71, 90
containment, 2–3, 8, 32–33, 77, 108 due process, 172
content analysis, 19, 22
conventional warfare, 106 economic bubble, 114
convergence toward the American economic crisis, 125–127
model. See learning from the U.S. economic cycle, 135, 140
corporate scandals, 104 economic hegemony, 103–104, 131
corruption, 167, 172 economic importance to the United
Cottam, Martha, 27, 29–30 States, 73–75
Cottam, Richard, 16, 27–28 economic performance, 113, 128–129,
Cox Report, 84 132–139
creditor nation, 138 economic structural reform, 134–135
crisis: periodic, 126; cyclical, 126, 132 economic system not as a source of
CSSM. See the Chinese Society for conflict, 148. See also sources of
Strategy and Management conflict
Cuba, 32 economic well-being, 39, 52–53, 92
Cuban Missile Crisis, 16 education, 139
cultural hegemony, 59–60 Electoral College, 162
cultural sovereignty, 59–60 electoral politics, 153
currency market, 131 emerging market, 74
employment, 136. See also job
the Dalai Lama, 43–44 opportunity
decision-making elites, 16–17 encirclement of China, 45–49, 191
decision-making process, 170 engagement: as a strategic model, 8; as
decision-making quality, 170, 174 the U.S.’s dominant China policy,
debt, 138 75–78, 185, 203; debates regarding,
debtor nation, 138 2–3; indicators of, 78; relevance of
deep sea technology, 108 political system to, 32–33
degenerate image, 14, 186, 192–195 enterprise efficiency, 137
democracy, 109, 156–160, 174, 186 environmental protection, 71, 142, 165
Democratic Party, 167–168, 170–171 euro, 111–112, 146
demonization of China, 56–57 Europe: as an independent actor, 48, 58,
Deng, Xiaoping, 40, 76 80, 102, 195–196; power compared
determinants of elections, 155, 160–163 with the United States, 104, 106; rise
deterrence model, 8 and decline of, 111, 113
deutschmark, 112 European Union integration, 111
Diaoyu Island (Senkakus), 47 executive orders, 171
260 Index
experiment, 18, 21 Gulf War, 71

exports, 136–137 Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, 22–23
f-16 fighters, 41 Haass, Richard, 7

Fairbank, John K., 22, 26 hard power, 109–110, 117
favorable world order, 39–40, 57–60 hard working, 140
federal government, 172 Harding, Harry, 71
Federal Reserve System, 131 hardliners, 9
finance, 136–138 Hayek, Friedrich, 168
financial regime, 109 hegemonism, 88
first strike, 106 Helms, Jesse, 44
five-pole thesis, 101, 193 Herrmann, Richard: approach to
Foreign Affairs College, 23–24 studying motivations by, 13, 16, 21,
foreign intervention, 107, 110 27, 30–31, 69; kinds of motivations
foreign investment, 136 by, 6
foreign policy motivations/orientation, Hoge, James, 117
1–10, 28–35, 128–131, 155, 175 Holsti, Ole, 27–28, 30
foreign reserves, 138, 146 Hong Kong, 44, 45, 51, 82
forward deployment, 46, 89, 108 hidden independence, 42
Founding Fathers, 167 human rights: as a perceived threat
fourteenth amendment, 172 to Chinese stability, 50–56,
free trade, 109, 131 59–60, 91–92, 109, 184; declining
Frei, Daniel, 16, 21, 27–28, 30 importance in the U.S.’s China
policy, 78–79, 92
GATT. See General Agreement on Huntington, Samuel, 108
Tariff and Trade Hu, Shih, 189
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade,
50, 54, 55 ideal status of countries in the world, 59
general public, 16 ideological differences, 32
Germany, 57 illegal immigration, 71, 90
Gertz, Bill, 32 image theory, 13–15
globalization, 139 IMF. See International Monetary Fund
global village, 202 imperialist image, 13, 190–192, 194
Goldstein, Avery, 33 imperial overstretch, 9
Gore, Al, 77, 79; as a politician, 163, impression collection, 18, 20
165; campaign corruption, 162 India: as a secondary power, 102; rise
government efficiency, 170–171, 174 of, 112, 117, 196; U.S. support
government shutdown, 171 for, 49
government statements, 18, 21 individual retirement arrangement,
grand strategy, 59 141, 143
Grayson, Benson, 20 Indonesia, 45
Gries, Peter, 17 industrial revolution, 145
groupthink, 115 inferences, 129–131, 148, 156–158, 175
growth rate, 136–138 inflation rates, 74–75, 137
Index 261
influential elites, 16–17 security arrangement with the United

information age, 105, 145 States, 42, 45, 89
information economy, 113, 139 Japanese yen, 112
information technology, 135, 139 Jervis, Robert, 8
Institute of American Studies, 23 Jiang, Zemin, 72, 76–77, 79, 87–88
Institute of World Economics and job opportunity, 73–74, 82, 85
Politics, 23 judicial review, 172
insurgents in Iraq, 110
intellectual property rights, 52–53, 73, Kagan, Robert, 7–8
81, 85, 109 Kazakhstan, 45
interdependence, 35, 81, 145, 188 key national characteristics, 32–35,
interest groups, 154, 168, 170 125–183, 186–187
interest rates, 136–137 Kissinger, Henry, 5
internal stability, 40, 50–52, 90–92 Korea, 71. See also North Korea; South
international competitiveness: Chinese Korea
contribution to the United States’, Korean War, 191
73, 80, 84; United States’ impressive, Kristol, William, 7–8
113, 131, 135–138; United States’ Kupchan, Charles, 7
reduced, 84, 110–111 Kurdistan, 45
international crime, 71, 90
international institutions, 110 labor cost, 135
international legitimacy, 110, 117 labor protection, 142
International Monetary Fund, 109 Larson, Deborah, 16, 20
international norms, 90 laws, 142
international status, 86–87 Layne, Christopher, 198
intervention, 58–59 leadership in global economy, 137,
investment, 73, 75, 81, 83, 138, 185 144–145
investment funds, 142 learning from the U.S., 189–190,
IRA. See individual retirement 194; in economic management,
arrangement 128–130, 132, 141–144, 148,
Iran, 71 186; in politics, 155–158,
Iraq War, 109–110 172–175, 187
Iriye, Akira, 19 Lee, Martin, 44
Iron Curtain, 51 Lee, Teng-hui, 41, 43
Isaacs, Harold, 19 legal system, 140–141, 172
Israel, 196 liberalism, 154
issue areas, 25 Li, Hongshan, 26
Li, Peng, 76
Japan: as a potential member to encircle literature review, 2–10, 101–103,
China, 45–46; as a subnormal actor, 125–127, 153–154
119n4; as an independent actor, 48, literature survey, 18, 22
71, 75–76, 80, 89, 102, 104–105; Liu, Liqun, 26
decline of, 106, 113; militarism, 91; Liu Yawei, 26
rise of, 101, 105, 111, 57–58, 196; Louisiana Purchase, 171
262 Index
lower commodity price, 74–75 Muravchik, Joshua, 7–8

luxury to engage, 10n13 mutual accommodation, 199
management reform, 140 NAFTA. See North American Free

management skills, 80 Trade Agreement
Mandelbaum, Michael, 33 national defense capital, 108
Mao, Zedong, 16, 188, 191, 193 National Defense University, 24
market system, 34–35, 128–132, national image, 25,
140–142 national interest, 28, 30–32
Marxist perspective, 125–127, 143, national interest matrix, 39–40
153–154, 166 nationalism, 9, 24
Maynes, Charles, 7 national missile defense, 49, 184
Mazaar, Michael, 33 national prestige, 40, 86–87, 93
Mearsheimer, John, 101 national security, 39, 59
media, 56–57, 87, 93, 198 National Security Strategy of the United
media analysis, 18 States, 118
Meiguo Yanjiu, 22, 24 national unification, 40–41
methodology, 13–38, 69, 103, 127–128 NATO. See the North Atlantic Treaty
MFN. See Most Favored Nation Organization
military: alliance, 59; expenditure, 106, natural resources, 140
140; intervention, 41, 107; power, neighbors in the global village, 202
106–108; technology, 106 neorealism, 4–5
military technology transfer to “new economy”, 144–145
Taiwan, 41 New Zealand, 45
missile control, 71 Nixon, Richard, 101, 193
missile defense system, 105, NMD. See national missile defense
107–108 non-adversary, 202
misuse of power, 172 non-governmental actors, 154
mixed approaches, 18, 21–22 non-Marxist perspectives, 125–127,
model image, 140–144, 189–190 153–154
modernization, 52 non-system-related learning,
money in elections, 156, 161–163, 174 129–130
Mongolia, 45, 48 non-use of force, 58
monopoly capitalism, 125–126, 161 normal state, 90, 102
Monroe Doctrine, 171 The North American Free Trade
Morgenthau, Hans, 4–6, 29–30, 101 Agreement, 139
Most Favored Nation, 50–55, 73, 77, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
92–93 48, 107
motivations, xiii-xiv. See also foreign North Korea, 5, 46–47, 193
policy motivations nuclear deterrence, 49, 107–108, 184
multilateralism, 199 nuclear first-strike, 106–107
multipolarity, 88–89, 112, 114, 117, nuclear power plant, 74
198; potential actors promoting, nuclear proliferation, 71–72, 109
58–59 nuclear reactors, 85
Index 263
Nuechterlein, Donald Edwin, political system, 32, 40, 50–52, 91, 155,
39–40, 70 166–169, 172; not as a source of
Nye, Joseph, 108 conflict, 175
Olympics: 2000, 55, 93; 2008, 93 politicians, 156, 163–165
one China and one Taiwan, 43 popular sovereignty, 159, 167
one-country-two-systems, 44, popular vote, 162
90–91 power, 29, 101–123
opportunity: for cooperation, 14–15, 70; power transition theory, 2
for exploitation, 14–15, 70. See also predominant leader, 16–17
threat and opportunity prerequisite for world peace, 88
overlapping claims, 196–197 presidential staff system, 171
prison labor, 60
Pakistan, 49, 56, 71 private property, 141
paper tiger, 116, 192 production rate, 135–137
parliamentary democracy, 159, promotion of values, 39–40
partner, 80, 203–204 property rights, 141–142
partner image, 187–190, 194 Pruitt, Dean, 27–28
peace, 87–88, 185 psychological theories, 4
peace dividends, 140 public independence, 42
peaceful coexistence, 59, 88, 202 puzzle in U.S.-China relations, 1–2
peaceful evolution, 33, 50–52, 59
perceived, 25–35 quality of workers, 137
perceivers, 15–18, 147 quotation collection, 18–19, 22
perceptions of: democracy, 155, 174;
economy 34–35, 125–152; economic Radio Free Asia, 51
capabilities, 103–104; military Rand, 196
power, 30, 106–107; opportunity, R&D funding, 105, 113
69–100; politics, 32–34, 153–182, R&D personnel, 105
caveat, 182n36; power, 101–123; Reagan, Ronald, 41, 101, 125–127, 147
prosperity, 132–137; science and realism, 1, 4, 29–30, 77
technology, 104–106; threat, 37–68, reality principle, 9, 115
191–192 reasons for economic success or failure,
peripheral incidents, 42, 46–47 128–129, 139–140
permanent normal trade relations, 54, recession, 137–139
77–78, 85–87, 92, 170 reconnaissance plane collision, 198
philanthropists, 132 relative decline, 101–102, 110–111,
Philippines, 45, 48 132, 138
Pillsbury, Michael, 22–24, 26, 30–31, relative security, 49, 59
192–193, 205n31 relative threat, 197–198, 201
planned economy, 34–35, 128, 142 relative tolerance of threat, 197, 200
pluralist sub-school, 153–154 Ren, Yue, 26
PNTR. See permanent normal trade replicability, 37, 39
relations representative democracy, 159
political stability, 172, 190 Republican Party, 167, 170–171
264 Index
research question, 2–10, 183 sham democracy, 154–155,

revolution in military affairs, 192 159–161, 186
rise of China, xiii, 1, 111–112, 117 sham prosperity, 126
risk investment, 141–142 Shanghai Institute of International
RMA. See revolution in military affairs Studies, 23, 24
role in world economy, 128, 144 Sheng, Michael, 16, 20, 26
Ross, Robert, 71 Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, 22–24, 104
ruling class, 166 Shimko, Keith L., 27–28, 30
Rumsfeld, Donald, 196 SIIS. See Shanghai Institute of
Russia: containment by the United International Studies
States, 48, 60, 71; military power, Singapore, 45
107; promotion of multipolarity, sixteen-character principle guiding
57–58, 102, 196 relations with the U.S., 76
Snyder, Glenn, 27–28, 30
sample, 35n14, 148n2, 175n2 social contract, 158–159
sampled interview, 18–19 social security system, 131
sanctions, 92, 103 social systems, 59, 142
Sasser, James, 78 socialism, 52, 141
satellite launching, 85 soft balancing, 110
Saudi Arabia, 196 softliners, 9
Saunders, Philip, 23, 26, 188 soft power, 108–110, 117
savings, 75, 138 sole superpower: promoting unipolarity,
scandals, 164–165 57; as an unrivalled power, 86,
schemata of images, 13–14 101–102, 113–114, 116–117, 138
Schweller, Randall, 6 solutions to international conflicts, 59
science and technology, 104–106, 116, sources of conflict, 30–35, 37–60,
135, 138–139, 141 129–131, 148, 186, 194
Scott, William, 25, 27–28, 30 sources of this research, 38, 60n1, 69,
secondary powers, 1–2, 89, 102, 103, 127, 154
110, 203 South Africa, 112
security boundaries, 43 South Asia nuclear crisis, 88
self-fulfilling prophecy, 9, 10n13, 49, 198 South China Sea, 45, 48, 71
Senkakus. See Diaoyu Islands Southeast Asia, 71
separation of powers, 159. See also South Korea, 45, 47, 112
checks and balances space technology, 108
separatism, 42 sphere of influence, 107
September 11th, 107, 109, 196 Stalin, Joseph, 16, 159
Shambaugh, David: approach to study START I and II. See the Strategic Arms
perceptions, 16–17, 22–24, 26, 31; Reduction Treaty
degenerate image by, 192–193; in state as a unitary actor, 16
China threat debate, 3; perceptions state government, 172
of American economy, 125–127; state monopoly capitalism, 125–126
perceptions of American politics, state ownership, 141
153–154 statist sub-school, 153–154
Index 265
Steele, A. T., 16–18 trade liberalization, 144

stock market, 136–137, 145 traditional industries, 135
strategic ambiguity, 42 Turkmenistan, 45
the Strategic Arms Reduction Tu, Wei-ming, 189
Treaty, 107 two Chinas, 43
strategic competitor, 47, 77
strategic encirclement. See encirclement unilateralism, 199
of China unipolarity, 7, 58–59, 95, 101, 114, 117
strategic goal, 59 United Nations Human Rights
strategic importance to the United Commission, 56, 93
States, 70–73 United Nations Human Rights
strategic trade, 139 Convention, 79
stock, 142 United Nations Security Council, 71
Stoessinger, John, 27–28 United States: as a leader, 58; as a
superpower, 137. See also sole counterweight to Japan, 75–76; as an
superpower investor in China, 82; commitment to
survey, 18 peace, 75; comparative advantages,
sustained growth, 134–135 80–81; economy during Carter
system-related learning, 129–130 years, 125–127; economy during
Reagan years, 125–127; engagement
Taiwan: and China, 46–47, 51, 55; policy toward China, 76–78; power
independence of, 43; military trajectory, 110; respect for China, 86;
technology transfer to, 108; U.S. role in world economy, 128; role in
relations with, 40–45, 58, 71, 90 world politics, 88–90; stronger than
Taiwan Strait Crisis, 41, 46–47, 87, 190 Rome, 114
technology, 80, 84–85 unsinkable aircraft carrier, 90
telecommunication market, 75 upper class, 166
Tennessee Valley Authority, 132 U.S. dollar, 111–112, 132, 139, 146
territorial disputes, 48 U.S.-USSR rivalry, 191, 202
territorial integrity, 40–45 USSR, 52, 101
terrorism, 71, 90
Thailand, 45 venture capital, 139
Theater Missile Defense, 41–42, 47, veto power in UN, 117
49, 89 Vietnam, 45, 48
Thoreau, Henry, 168 VOA. See the Voice of America
threat and opportunity, xiii-xiv, 30–32, the Voice of America, 51
37–68, 69–100 voters’ will in election, 156, 163, 174
threat to peace and stability, 59
Thucydides, 29 Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao, 22–23
Tibet, 43–44, 60 Waltz, Kenneth, 1, 4, 6, 101
TMD. See Theater Missile Defense Wang, Jianwei, 16–17, 19, 25–26, 31,
trade, 73–75, 83 188
trade deficit, 113, 136, 138, 144–146 war-making power, 171
trade disputes, 138 war of attrition, 41
266 Index
weapon systems, 106; to Taiwan, 41 worldviews, xiii–xiv

Wei, Yuan, 189 WTO. See World Trade Organization
Wen, I-to, 189,
Westernization, 51 Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, 22, 24
White, Ralph, 29 Xu, Guangqiu, 26
Whiting, Allen, 25
win-win game, 70, 86, 93, 194, Yinhe incident, 55
199
Wohlforth, William, 6, 8, 118 zero-sum game, 70, 188
world order, 57, 93 Zhang, Aiping, 24
World Trade Organization, 50, 54–56, Zhang, Ming, 26
78, 85–86, 92 Zhanlue yu Guanli, 22, 24

Chinese Perceptions of The U.S.

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Chinese Perceptions of The U.S.

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Chinese Perceptions of

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Table 1.1 Schools in the China Threat Debate 3

Table 3.4 Nuechterlein’s National Interest Matrix 39

Table 7.7 Number of Articles in Each Journal Conveying a

to generalize about a single Chinese worldview. Instead, he looks at a range

What Are China’s Foreign Policy

THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

As demonstrated in the heated debate concerning a possible China threat,

Table 1.1 Schools in the China Threat Debate

be counterproductive . . . Realist at best can passively hope for Chinese eco-

father of neorealism, claims that states can all be assumed to be security-

arena).29 Muravchik enthusiastically expresses his observations: “We can

No matter which prediction turns out to be more accurate, understanding

1. Cited in Ness, p. 149.

Image Study as an Approach to

Chapter 1 raises the research question: is China a status quo or a revision-

Table 2.1 Components of National Images

Images Character of Foreign Capability Cultural Level

If the source country holds a degenerate/colony image of the target

Table 2.2 National Images

Positive Patron Ally Protégé

Table 2.3 Perceivers of National Images

Approaches in the Existing Literature

influence; those to whom decision-makers look for advice, whose opinions

The Perceivers in This Book

Table 2.4 Approaches for Studying National Perceptions

Approaches in the Existing Literature

Some scholars regard sampled interview as the best approach in studying

an accurate but crude presentation, quotation collection can be a valuable

perception. The advantage of this approach is that it ensures an abundance of

The Source Materials in This Book

Table 2.5 Research Institutes Covered in the Three Comparable Projects

Shambaugh Pillsbury Zhang Institutional Affiliation Journal

various research institutes in China are based on the works of Shambaugh,

yu Zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics) and Meiguo Yanjiu (American

Approaches in the Existing Literature

Table 2.6 Objects Studied in Major Books on Chinese Perceptions

Project Objects in the United States Studied

Table 2.7 Objects Studied in Major Articles on Chinese Perceptions

Project Issue Areas

Culture Culture Culture

Intentions, Aims, Goals Intentions Ultimate

Strategies Choice of Strategies Probable

Table 2.9 Dimensions Endorsed by Very Few Authors

policy choice. Table 2.8 lists dimensions considered important by those

The Perceived in This Book

Dimension I: Why Study Capability?

be a vitally important component of that perception. Among the three major

Dimension II: Why Study Threat and Opportunity?

Issue Area I: Why Study Chinese Perceptions of American Politics?

Existing literature on the Chinese perceptions of the United States tends to

Issue Area II: Why Study Chinese Perceptions of American

Chinese Perceptions of Threat from

This project is intended to present the dominant Chinese perception of the

Table 3.1 Rules for Presenting the Dominant Chinese Perceptions

1 The source materials are authoritative journals in China.

Table 3.2 Articles in the Sample for Studying

Journal Number of Articles