Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7747 July 14, 2008

CATHERINE & HENRY YU, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a complaint 1 for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña for alleged acts of defraudation, before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 2 Complainants attached therewith their
Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit3which they earlier filed before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati,
charging the respondent and his co-accused (in the criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).

The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:

Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. Uy) who introduced himself
as the Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a
corporation engaged in spot currency trading. 4 Mr. Uy persuaded the complainants, together with other
investors, to invest a minimum amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said company. They
were made to believe that the said company had the so-called "stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it to
stop trading once the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions, would be
reached. If, on the other hand, the company would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the
investors the principal amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth Marketing
promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated checks covering the principal investments. 5

It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketing’s promises were false and fraudulent, and that the checks
earlier issued were dishonored for the reason "account closed." The investors, including the
complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketing’s office. There, they discovered that Wealth Marketing
had already ceased its operation and a new corporation was formed named Ur-Link Corporation (Ur-
Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-
Link office where they met the respondent. As Wealth Marketing’s Chairman of the Board of Directors,
respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would assume the obligations of the former
company.6 To put a semblance of validity to such representation, respondent signed an Agreement 7 to
that effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to further deceive the investors. 8 This prompted
the complainants to send demand letters to Wealth Marketing’s officers and directors which remained
unheeded. They likewise lodged a criminal complaint for syndicated estafa against the respondent and
his co-accused.9

Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has been successful in
defying the law, to this date.

In an Order10 dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio B. Vinluan required
respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter failed to comply. Hence, the motion to
declare him in default filed by the complainants. 11 The case was thereafter referred to Commissioner
Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the lawful orders
of the Commission, respondent failed to attend the mandatory conference and to file his position paper.
Respondent was thereafter declared in default and the case was heard ex parte.

In his report,12 the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketing’s executives (which included
respondent herein) conspired with one another in defrauding the complainants by engaging in an
unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business where, in
fact, no such business existed, as Wealth Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketing’s
financial status could not support the investors’ demands involving millions of pesos. It also appears, said
the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The
Commissioner likewise found that respondent had been previously suspended by this Court for
committing similar acts of defraudation. 13 Considering the gravity of the acts committed, as well as his
previous administrative case and defiance of lawful orders, the Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, the pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of the documents presented, including
the jurisprudence laid down by the complainants involving the same respondent, and said decision of
the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land, the undersigned commissioner is recommending
that respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña be disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
upon the approval of the Board of Governors and the Honorable Supreme Court. 14

In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Commissioner’s report and recommendation. 15

This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.

Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers
may be disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for any conduct that is
wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor. 16
In the present case, two corporations were created where the respondent played a vital role, being
Wealth Marketing’s Chairman of the Board and Ur-Link’s representative. We quote with approval the
Commissioner’s findings, thus:

As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati, it appears that the executive officers
of Wealth Marketing Corporation conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the investors by engaging in
unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business. The
truth of the matter is that there was no actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is not duly
licensed or authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission to perform such task.

In the General Information Sheet (Annex "I") of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation, the
authorized capital stock is only P9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at the time of [in]corporation is
(sic) only P605,000.00. Said corporation, as the records will show, has been dealing with investors with
millions of pesos on hand, with the hope that their money would earn interests as promised. However,
their company resources and financial status will show that they are not in the position to meet these
demands if a situation such as this would arise.

xxxx

Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking for the return of their investments,
said respondent even formed and made him part of a new company, Ur-Link Corporation, which
according to the complainants, when they met the respondent, would assume the obligations of the
defunct Wealth Marketing Corporation. It is also evident that respondent is frolicking with the Securities
and Exchange Commission for the purpose of employing fraud. 17

To be sure, respondent’s conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of
the legal profession.

The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the same set of facts is still pending in
court is of no moment. Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if
the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. 18 Besides, it is not
sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer
may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to,
and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is
pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. 19 Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice law. 20 The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court.21

As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to be in order.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. x x x.

Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as
such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar.22

The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an administrative case, for he had
been previously suspended from the practice of law in Samala v. Palaña 23 and Sps. Amador and Rosita
Tejada v. Palaña.24 In Samala, respondent also played an important role in a corporation known as First
Imperial Resources Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer. As in this case, respondent committed the
same offense by making himself part of the money trading business when, in fact, said business was not
among the purposes for which FIRI was created. Respondent was thus meted the penalty of suspension
for three (3) years with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely.25 Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six (6) months for his continued refusal to settle his
loan obligations.261avvphi1

The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the warrant of arrest
issued by the court (where his criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense. 27

Finally, we note that respondent’s case is further highlighted by his lack of regard for the charges brought
against him. As in Tejada, instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to file an
answer and verified position paper, nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation
for his conduct.28 The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. 29 Verily, respondent’s failure to comply with
the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities. 30 As a
lawyer, he ought to know that the compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to
undertake the investigation of complaints against lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in
reality a gross and blatant disrespect of the Court. 31 By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent
exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court. 32

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct herein-before
mentioned for which he was penalized with a three-year suspension with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely; and another six-month suspension
thereafter, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal
profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty --- disbarment. 33 Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for
him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to
ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. 34

WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaña is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar;
and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

En Banc

[ADM. CASE No. 6595. April 15, 2005]

JOSEPH SAMALA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANTONUITTI K. PALAÑA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a complaint filed by Joseph Samala against respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaña for alleged
fraudulent activities that violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Sometime in February 2001, complainant was looking for a company where he could invest his dollar
savings. He met Raymond Taino, a trader-employee of First Imperial Resources, Inc. (FIRI), a company
located at Legaspi Village, Makati City. Taino introduced him to FIRI Manager Jun Agustin, Chief Trader
Diosdado Bernal, and Legal Officer Antonuitti K. Palaña, the respondent herein.

Complainant expressed his concern to the said three officers of FIRI about having been warned of
numerous fraudulent businesses in the Philippines. Respondent assured him that through FIRI he would
be directly putting his investment with Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited, a reputable company based in
the Virgin Islands which has been in the foreign exchange business for 13 years. The three officers
presented to him their company profile and documents purporting to establish their relationship with
Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited.

Due to the personal representations and assurances of respondent, Agustin, and Bernal, complainant
was convinced and he invested his dollar savings with FIRI on March 9, 2001.
Subsequently, complainant decided to pull out his investment. On April 5, 2001, he sent FIRI a letter
requesting the withdrawal of his investment amounting to US$10,000 and giving FIRI 10 days to prepare
the money.

On April 15, 2001, complainant asked Agustin when his money would be returned. Agustin told him that
the request was sent to Thomas Yiu of Eastern Vanguard at Ortigas Center. Complainant went to see
Thomas Yiu at his office. Yiu was surprised when he saw the documents involving complainant’s
investment. Yiu phoned Agustin and demanded an explanation as to where the money was. Agustin
said that he would return complainant’s investment at FIRI’s office in Makati. On the same day, in the
presence of respondent, Agustin delivered to complainant a check in the amount of P574,045.09, as the
peso equivalent of complainant’s investment with FIRI. On May 2, 2001, the said check was dishonored
because it was drawn against insufficient funds.

Complainant informed respondent of the dishonor of the check. Respondent assured him that the check
would be replaced. On June 1, 2001, respondent, as legal officer of FIRI, gave complainant P250,000 in
cash and a check in the amount of P329,045.09. Respondent told complainant that the check was
signed by FIRI President Paul Desiderio in his (respondent’s) presence and assured complainant that the
check would be funded. But on June 28, 2001, the check was dishonored because it was drawn against
insufficient funds.

On July 14, 2001, complainant charged Paul Desiderio of Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 at the Prosecutor’s Office of Makati. On November 4, 2001, Judge Evelyn Arcaya-Chua of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, issued a warrant of arrest against Paul Desiderio.

On March 5, 2002, complainant joined three police officers in serving the warrant of arrest against Paul
Desiderio at No. 10 Damascus St., Northeast Executive Village, B.F. Homes, Parañaque City. Complainant
got the said address of Paul Desiderio from the documents of FIRI. Although there was a street named
Damascus in the said village, there was no residence numbered “10.” The police officers checked the
existence of the said address and resident at the office of the subdivision association. They were told
that no such address existed and that no resident named Paul Desiderio lived in the subdivision.

Complainant alleged that respondent’s act of representing himself to be the legal officer of FIRI and his
assurance that the check he personally delivered to him was signed in his presence by FIRI Officer Paul
Desiderio, when no such person appears to exist, is clearly fraudulent and violative of the Canons of
Professional Ethics.[1]

Complainant requested the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for a thorough investigation of respondent
as a member of the bar.

In an Order dated January 27, 2003, Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez required respondent
to submit his Answer to the Complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof. Despite receipt of said order
as evidenced by a registry return receipt dated February 3, 2003, respondent did not submit an Answer.
The case was referred to Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation. Respondent failed to appear when the case was set for hearing on April 8, 2003, despite
due notice. Hence, respondent was declared in default and the case was heard ex parte.

Based on the evidence adduced, Commissioner Navarro reported, thus:

[R]espondent was instrumental in the issuance of the check signed by the alleged President of FIRI, Paul
Desiderio, whose whereabouts could not be located and whose identity was unknown[,] for respondent
was the one who handed personally to the herein complainant the check which was dishonored due to
insufficient funds, when it was the very respondent, Atty. Palaña, who allegedly assured that the check
was funded. Respondent was also one of those alleged officers of FIRI who assured complainant that his
investment was directly placed in a re[p]utable company.

Further investigation by the complainant with the assistance of NBI officers showed that respondent
Palaña was also linked with Belkin’s whose activity was the same as the FIRI and the SEC has on file the
By-Laws of FIRI wherein it was stated that[,] to wit: “the primary purpose of which is to act as consultant
in providing professional expertise and reliable data analysis related to partnership and so on. And the
corporation shall not engage in the business as securities advisor, stockbroker or investment house[:] Q.
x x x A. First Imperial is prohibited from engaging in foreign exchange business. Q. x x x A. And despite [.
. .] this prohibition, they went on and engaged in activities which are prohibited specifically in their by-
laws“ (TSN pages 16 and 17 of July 17, 2003, CBD Case No. 02-1048).

It is evident from the foregoing that respondent and his cohorts violated the main purpose of the FIRI By-
Laws particularly investment or foreign exchange business which must have been the reason why Yiu
was surprised and got mad when complainant approached him about his dollar savings investment of
USD10,000 received by the respondent as Legal Officer and the two (2) other alleged officers Agustin and
Bernal of the FIRI[,] a transaction expressly prohibited by the FIRI By-laws. [2]

Respondent was found to have violated Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states:

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Commissioner Navarro thus recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months.

In its Resolution dated July 30, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with the modification that respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years.

This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession.[3] To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the profession.[4]

In this case, respondent assured complainant that by investing his dollar savings with FIRI, his investment
was in a stable company, even if, as it was later discovered, the by-laws of FIRI prohibited it from
engaging in investment or foreign exchange business and its primary purpose is “to act as consultant in
providing professional expertise and reliable data analysis related to partnership and so on.”

When complainant decided to withdraw his investment from FIRI, the first check given to him in the
amount of his total investment bounced. Thereafter, respondent, as legal officer of FIRI, gave
complainant P250,000 in cash and a check for P329,045.09. Respondent assured complainant that the
second check was a “good check” and that it was signed by Paul Desiderio, the alleged president of FIRI.
However, the said check bounced because it was drawn against insufficient funds, and the drawer of the
check, Paul Desiderio, could not be located when sought to be served a warrant of arrest since his
identity was unknown and his residential address was found to be non-existent.

Hence, it is clear that the representations of respondent as legal officer of FIRI caused material damage
to complainant. In so doing, respondent failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and lessened the confidence of the public in the honesty and integrity of the same.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaña is found GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of
respondent, and furnished to all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
SECOND DIVISION

SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA A.C. No. 7434

TEJADA,

Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

- versus - TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAÑA,

Respondent. August 23, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Petitioners-spouses Rosita and Amador Tejada filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña
for his continued refusal to settle his long overdue loan obligation to the complainants, in violation of his
sworn duty as a lawyer to do justice to every man and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

More specifically, the complaint alleges that:

3. Sometime on January, 2001, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana taking advantage of his
special knowledge as a lawyer represented to the petitioners that he has an alleged parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (73196) 16789 and that he needs an amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) so that he could reconstitute the torrens title on the same;

4. Respondent then induced by sweet promises and assurances petitioners spouses to finance
such undertaking with a solemn commitment on his part that after he has already reconstituted such
torrens title, he will deliver the same to the petitioners spouses as security for the amount they had
financed;

Thereafter, petitioner spouses shall earn an amount of P70,000.00 from the P100,000.00 they had
financed or all and [sic] all, respondent lawyer shall pay petitioner spouses a total amount of
P170,000.00;

5. The agreement between the petitioner spouses and respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana in
this regard is being partly evidenced by their written agreement thereon dated January 12, 2001, a xerox
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “A”. Likewise, the receipt by the respondent of the
P100,000.00 is being evidenced in the bottom part of page 1 of the agreement;

6. Under the clear terms of their agreement, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana solemnly
assured petitioner spouses that he will reconstitute, deliver the reconstituted title and give the
P170,000.00 to the petitioners spouses all within a period of three months reckoned from their
execution of their written agreement dated January 12, 2001;

7. However, after respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana had gotten the P100,000.00 amount
from the petitioner spouses, respondent from that time on up to the present had intentionally evaded
the performance of his due, just, legal and demandable obligations to petitioner spouses.
 It turned out that all his assurances that he had a torrens title, he will reconstitute the same and
deliver an amount of P170,000.00 to petitioner spouses were all fraudulent representations on his part
or else were only fictitious in character to defraud petitioner spouses of their hard owned monies;

xxxx

9. Legal demands had already been made to respondent lawyer to fulfill all his moral and legal
responsibilities to petitioner spouses but all of said demands simply went unheeded. A xerox copy of the
two legal demand letters to respondent lawyer in this regard is hereto attached as Annex “B” and “C.” [1]

Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint as required by the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Respondent likewise failed to appear on the scheduled date of
the mandatory conference despite due notice.

Thus, on March 10, 2005, the IBP declared respondent to have waived his right to submit evidence
and to participate further in the proceedings of the case.

After a careful consideration of the pleadings and evidence submitted by the complainants ex
parte, Investigating Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III submitted his February 1, 2006 Report to the IBP
Board of Governors, recommending respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months.

Based on said Report, petitioners were able to satisfactorily prove the following: that Rosita Tejada
and respondent and his companion executed a written agreement (Annex “A”); that respondent received
the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (PhP 100,000) from Rosita Tejada pursuant to said
agreement; and that petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent (Annex “C”), but, until now,
respondent has failed to settle his obligation. Petitioners, however, failed to present evidence to show
that respondent fraudulently represented himself to be the owner of the aforesaid lot. Noting
respondent’s indifference to the proceedings of the case, the Investigating Commissioner cited Ngayan
v. Tugade,[2] where the Supreme Court considered respondent’s failure to answer the complaint and his
failure to appear in four hearings below as evidence of his flouting resistance to a lawful order of the
court, and illustrate his despiciency to his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.

Thus, for respondent’s misconduct, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent’s

suspension for a period of three (3) months, guided by Supreme Court rulings in analogous cases,
viz: Sanchez v. Somoso,[3] where the lawyer was suspended for six (6) months for having issued personal
checks from a closed bank account and subsequently refused to pay for his medical expenses despite
demand after the checks were dishonored; Constantino v. Saludares,[4] where the lawyer was suspended
for three (3) months for his unwarranted refusal to pay a personal loan despite demand; and Lizaso v.
Amante,[5] where the lawyer was suspended indefinitely for his failure to return and account for the
money delivered to him for investment purposes. [6]

In its November 18, 2006 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, “considering Respondent's continued
refusal to settle his obligation to the complainants and for his failure to participate in the proceedings
before the Commission of Bar Discipline.”[7]

After a review of the records and especially sans the submittal of any response or evidence from
respondent, we find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Soriano.

Respondent, like all other members of the bar, is expected to always live up to the standards
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons, viz:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty,
and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its
continued possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession.[8]

Indeed, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. As
previously explained in Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his
duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar must maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
To this end, members of the legal fraternity can do nothing that might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. [9]

In the instant case, respondent’s unjustified withholding of petitioners’ money years after it
became due and demandable demonstrates his lack of integrity and fairness, and this is further
highlighted by his lack of regard for the charges brought against him. Instead of meeting the charges
head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a
valid explanation for his conduct.

The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it
is not enough that s/he denies the charges against him; s/he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him/her. S/he must show proof that s/he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him/her. [10]

Finally, respondent’s acts, which violated the Lawyer's Oath “to delay no man for money or malice”
as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against
him.

With respect to the recommendation to suspend respondent Palaña for three (3) months, we find
that the sanction is not commensurate to the breach committed and disrespect to the Court exhibited by
the erring member of the bar. We increase the suspension to six (6) months in view of our ruling
in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro.[11]

We find that the complainants could not have been defrauded without the representations of
respondent that he can easily have the torrens title of his lot reconstituted with his special knowledge as
a legal practitioner as long as he is provided PhP 100,000 to finance the reconstitution. Respondent
knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a petition for reconstitution in 2001 was
only PhP 3,145, and other expenses including the publication of the filing of the petition could not have
cost more than PhP 20,000. It is clear that he employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with
their hard earned money and the latter could not have been easily swayed to lend the money were it not
for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the bar. Moreover, when he failed to pay
his just and legal obligation, he disobeyed the provisions of the Civil Code which is one of the substantive
laws he vowed to uphold when he took his oath as a lawyer. Lastly, to aggravate his misconduct, he
totally ignored the directives of the IBP to answer the complaint when he fully knew as a lawyer that the
compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the investigation of
complaints against lawyers, among which is the instant complaint. In short, his disobedience to the IBP
is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Lawyers fully know, as respondent is aware or at
least is assumed to know, that lawyers like him cannot disobey the orders and resolutions of the
Court. Failing in this duty as a member of the bar which is being supervised by the Court under the
Constitution, we find that a heavier sanction should fall on respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months and is ordered to settle his loan obligation to petitioners-spouses Amador
and Rosita Tejada within two (2) months from the date of this Decision’s promulgation.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment 1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's
oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary
Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I
love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts,
she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on
its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for
you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal
pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for
the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to
love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the
life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime.
Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!" 2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11 th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also
learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent
during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter
was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended
social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple
attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM
Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila
Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together;
their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached
as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their
adulterous relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged
in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile
and known only to the immediate members of their respective families , and that Respondent, as far as
the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne
Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his
membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of
paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of
her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now they
are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding

his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit
to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not
under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in
fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship
with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten
letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with
respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2). 9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer,
has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked
the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits
adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being
thatunder the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to
grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court.11(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, 12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply,
as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth 13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as
the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's
Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS 14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to
the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil
case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for
adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer
were adopted as his testimony on direct examination. 16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine
complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule
13922 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-
word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment 23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in
theManila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying
on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record
which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being
[that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the
reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special"
relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of
Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an
illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In
the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted
his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has
not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared
void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is havingflaunted such relationship, he maintaining
that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that
the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a
"lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired
information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in
the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate 29 shows that they were affixed by one and
the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never
denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old
and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven
by more than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other 32 –
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is
all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not,
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the
phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit
with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the
following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not
so with respect tobetrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations
are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral
as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has
beencarrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders
him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers
upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support." 40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's
petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of
complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we
are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000,
which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the
same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as
though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a
lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 44 In
carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect
for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted
to state thatbefore complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review,
the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City
Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on
dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent
phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a
rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married
to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual
abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only
served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent
by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11 thStreet, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few
blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of
Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas
Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that
Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a
coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed
all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put
short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to
a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is
the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala
was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous
acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most
certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical
manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves
the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were
filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in
an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case 47 (Italics in the
original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
mayproceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his
oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M.
Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.

Complainant alleged the following:

Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the
respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised,
he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.

On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the
possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their
accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to
step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very
tightly.

Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee
shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the
meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way,
complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few
hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte,
Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face
and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked
(sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.

In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to
refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The
communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:

Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer
At 5:33:46 pm

replied by respondent - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"

at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)

sent by complainant - I feel bad. I can’t expect that u will take advantage of
at 6:17:59 pm the situation.

Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you don’t
Sent by complainant have relationship with her.
At 6:29:30 pm

Replied by respondent - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking advantage of the situation, 2
At 6:32:43 pm put it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (I’m very
sorry. Its not taking advantage of the situation, to put it
rightly it is an expression of feeling)

Follow up message - I’m s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u
by respondent my sincerity" (I’m so sorry. I’ll not do it again. Will you
at 6:42:25 pm still see me so I can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm
saying "I don’t know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I don’t know what to
do so you may forgive me. I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at
4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really sorry. Please
next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt. 2

In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that he
met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to
the case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for
collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he
held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of
Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming
with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.

By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of
Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor
in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married
to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was archived
pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental
Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never
bothered to discuss respondent’s fees and it was respondent who always paid for their bills every time
they met and ate at a restaurant.

A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.

On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on
respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting,
with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond
the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A.
Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. 5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or
which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.

Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondent’s actuations shall
have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I – x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing
condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good
moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte,
Jr.,7 we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar.
They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as
officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. 8 We explained in Barrientos
v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community."

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.10

In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective
clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 12

In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.

In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:

27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I
kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips.
We said goodnight and she got off the car.

xxxx

35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with
my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was
no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything
happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment."

During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas
City, respondent candidly recalled the following events:

ATTY. MACABATA:

That time in February, we met … I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and
Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along
the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I
said … she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese
dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were
there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay
for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing
matters about her case, so I said … it’s about 9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, let’s go. So
when I said let’s go so I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me
then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you
have been dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and
Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left
cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me
and when she’s already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night. She went
down the car, that’s it.

COMM. FUNA:

February 10 iyan.

xxxx

ATTY. MACABATA:

Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went
inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went
down , before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.

COMM. FUNA:

Pardon?

ATTY. MACABATA:

I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand,
pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and that’s it. x x x. 14 (Emphases
supplied.)

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. 15

In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not
simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:

In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife
and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her
and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondent’s act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women
during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct
warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with
the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and exacting
moral standards set for members of the law profession.

In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with
children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her
under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and
three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor"
so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal
remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines
the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our
children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and
for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits
respondent than to be disbarred."

In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant
with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral
conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession,"
warranting respondent’s disbarment.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character
required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter
satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which,
at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude,
or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. 26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere
gestures of friendship and camaraderie, 27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of
respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
grossly immoral.

Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer
to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on
the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who denies, must prove." 30 As a basic
rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit
probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. 31 In the
case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere
charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 32

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her
annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of
text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.

Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity
considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had
malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place
where he could freely accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.

The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of
misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors. 33 When deciding upon the appropriate
sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect
the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to
deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. 34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the
administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to be competent,
honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 35 While it is
discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice,
but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to
his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases
of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or
suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should
only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the
lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as
the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension
or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission
of the offense should also be considered. 36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also
imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter of
Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising
her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely
reflected on his fitness to practice law.

Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondent’s first
offense, reprimand would suffice.

We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her
honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of
gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial,
and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent
and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be
imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES A.C. No. 6270

LUCAS and FRANCISCA VILLANUEVA,

Complainants, Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
 Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. SALUD P. BERADIO, Promulgated:

Respondent. January 22, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Salud P. Beradio (respondent), filed by the heirs of the late
spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva (spouses Villanueva),
namely: Ardenio M. Fonacier, Araceli M. Fonacier,Alano M. Fonacier, Eusebio M. Fonacier, Jr., Rolando
V. Nazarro, Alejandro V. Nazarro, Margarita V. Collado, Felisa Collado,
and Herminigildo Ylhi (complainants).
The Facts

During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva acquired several parcels of land in Pangasinan, one of
which was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2522. Francisca died in 1968, and Lucas in
1974. Their five children, namely, Simeona, Susana, Maria, Alfonso, and Florencia, survived them.

On 22 May 1984, Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication [1] (affidavit of adjudication) stating
that as “the only surviving son and sole heirs (sic)” of the spouses Villanueva, he was adjudicating to
himself the parcel of land under OCT No. 2522. Alfonso then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale [2] (deed of
sale) on 5 July 1984, conveying the property to Adriano Villanueva. Respondent appeared as notary
public on both the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale.

Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister Florencia was still alive at the time he
executed the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale, as were descendants of the other children of
the spouses Villanueva. Complainants claimed that respondent was aware of this fact, as respondent had
been their neighbor in Balungao, Pangasinan, from the time of their birth, and respondent constantly
mingled with their family. Complainants accused respondent of knowing the “true facts and surrounding
circumstances” regarding the properties of the spouses Villanueva, yet conspiring with Alfonso to
deprive his co-heirs of their rightful shares in the property.

In a resolution dated 11 February 2004, this Court required respondent to comment on the
complaint.

In her Comment,[3] respondent admitted that she notarized the affidavit of adjudication and the
deed of sale executed by Alfonso in 1984. However, respondent denied that she conspired with Alfonso
to dispose of fraudulently the property. Respondent alleged that Alfonso executed the two documents
under the following circumstances:
 That the properties of the late spouses [Villanueva] have been divided equally among their
compulsory heirs, but said old couple left for themselves one titled lot, the subject now of the complaint
x x x That said titled property was the only property left by the old couple, to answer for their needs
while they are still alive until their deaths x x x. Alfonso [and his wife] were tasked to take care of the
old couple, as they were the ones living in the same compound with their late parents. This fact was
and is known by the other compulsory heirs, and they never questioned the said act of their parents,
as they already had their own share on the estate of the late [spouses Villanueva]. This fact was also
known to me because [Lucas] and [Alfonso] lived across the street from our house and I was requested
to the house of the old man when he gave said title to [Alfonso and Tomasa, his wife]. The other
compulsory heirs who were still alive at the time just made visits to their parents and never stayed in
their old house to help in the care of their parents. Even [when] the parents died, it was [Alfonso and his
wife] who took charge of the funeral and all other acts relative thereto.

xxxx

That said title remain[ed] in the custody of [Alfonso] and after the death of the old man, when the
spouses Alfonso [and Tomasa] needed money to finance the schooling of their children, it was then that
they thought of disposing the land x x x and said land was sold by them to one Adriano Villanueva of
which in both documents, I notarized the same (sic).

xxxx

I can say with all clean and good intentions, that if ever I notarized said documents, it was done in
good faith, to do my job as expected of me, to help, assist and to guide people who come to me for legal
assistance, as contained in my oath as a lawyer when I passed the bar. x x x[4] (Emphasis supplied)

According to respondent, the fact that none of Alfonso’s co-heirs filed their objections at the time
he executed the affidavit of adjudication proved that most of the properties of the spouses Villanueva
had earlier been distributed to the other heirs. It also proved that the heirs had agreed to abide by the
intention of the spouses Villanueva to leave the property to Alfonso. Respondent asserted that “the
personal appearances and acknowledgment by the party to the document are the core of the ritual that
effectively convert a private document into a public document x x x.”

On 26 May 2004, we resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
which designated Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (IBP Commissioner Villadolid) to investigate, and
submit his report and recommendation on, the complaint.

The IBP’s Findings

In his Report dated 16 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Villadolid found that respondent
violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the spirit and intent of
the notarial law when she notarized the affidavit knowing that Alfonso was not the sole compulsory heir
of the spouses Villanueva. Although he found no evidence of fraudulent intent on respondent’s part, IBP
Commissioner Villadolid held that respondent “engaged in conduct that lessened confidence in the legal
system.” Thus, he recommended suspension of respondent’s notarial commission for one year. He
further recommended that respondent be reprimanded or suspended from the practice of law for up to
six months.

The Court’s Ruling

We sustain partly the IBP’s findings and recommendations.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are
the acknowledgment and affirmation of a document or instrument. In the performance of
such notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as affixed
on a document. The notarial seal converts the document from private to public, after which it may be
presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. [5] Thus, notarization
should not be treated as an empty, meaningless, or routinary act.[6] As early
as Panganiban v. Borromeo,[7] we held that notaries public must inform themselves of the facts to
which they intend to certify and to take no part in illegal transactions. They must guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangements.[8]
 On its face, Alfonso’s affidavit does not appear to contain any “illegal or immoral” declaration.
However, respondent herself admitted that she knew of the falsity of Alfonso’s statement that he was
the “sole heir” of the spouses Villanueva. Respondent therefore notarized a document while fully aware
that it contained a material falsehood, i.e., Alfonso’s assertion of status as sole heir. The affidavit of
adjudication is premised on this very assertion. By this instrument, Alfonso claimed a portion of his
parents’ estate all to himself, to the exclusion of his co-heirs. Shortly afterwards, respondent notarized
the deed of sale, knowing that the deed took basis from the unlawful affidavit of adjudication.

Respondent never disputed complainants’ allegation of her close relationship with the Villanueva
family spanning several decades. Respondent even underscored this closeness by claiming that Lucas
himself requested her to come to his house the day Lucas handed to Alfonso a copy of OCT No. 2522,
allegedly so she could hear the conversation between them.

Respondent claims she is not administratively liable because at the time Alfonso executed the
affidavit, his co-heirs had already received their respective shares from the estate of the spouses
Villanueva. However, we are not concerned here with the proper distribution of the spouses Villanueva’s
estates. Rather, respondent’s liability springs from her failure to discharge properly her duties as a notary
public and as a member of the bar.

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court
must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public
confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

We also view with disfavor respondent’s lack of candor before the IBP proceedings. The transcript
of hearings shows that respondent denied preparing or notarizing the deed of sale, [9] when she already
admitted having done so in her Comment.
 WHEREFORE, for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
we REVOKE the commission of respondent Atty. Salud P. Beradio as Notary Public, if still existing,
andDISQUALIFY her from being commissioned a notary public for one (1) year. We
further SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality of this
decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007

CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano
D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions
as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary
evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a
reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 2
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the
parties filed their respective memoranda 3 and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation 4 dated January 12, 2006.
He found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.

In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six
months to one year.

We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the
recommended penalty.

On serving as counsel for contending parties.

Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272,
Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein
respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay,
Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga 6 by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. 7

In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled
"Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent
represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy.
Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his
decision dated May 2, 2000, 8Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from
repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.

But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez
v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a
Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case
No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and
Bayuga 10 albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. 11 Respondent
also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against
Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled
"Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two
were the owners of the property 12 and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for
ejectment. 13 But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers
that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with
estafa.14 Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. 15 He may not also undertake to discharge
conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on
the principles of public policy and good taste. 16 It springs from the relation of attorney and client
which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice. 17

One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. 18

The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to
maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of
an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. 19

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also
after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. 20 The bare attorney-client relationship with a
client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary
either in the same case 21 or in a different but related action. 22 A lawyer is forbidden from representing
a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for
the former client. 23

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24 that the termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the
former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested
by the expiration of the professional employment. 25 Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the
severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in
any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's
confidences acquired in the previous relation. 26

In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of
the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the
complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from
representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original
client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a
clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case.
Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been
severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his
client is required.

In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27 citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba, 28 we held that:

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the
lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the
other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to
the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of
the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of
undivided fidelity to both clients. 29

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated."

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge
must be considered sacred and guarded with care. 30

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante
and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of
interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his
representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court, 31 but the same will not
exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No.
2000-657-MK.

Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all
appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to
behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially
observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients. 32

On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment,
respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT
No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.

Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT
No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property. 33 During the hearing before
Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the
time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court
dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. 34 Respondent further avers that Valdez did
not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was filed in
2002.

Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract
and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, 35 before RTC, Branch 273,
Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002
when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval
that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in different courts
and at different times.

Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled
in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by
respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated
January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's
intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was
already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.

In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission
to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to his clients." 38He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusion. 39 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete
honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to
defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the
administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 40 As such, he should make himself more an
exemplar for others to emulate. 41

>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the
RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-
036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the
Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the
cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin
Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.

As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As payment for
his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to
their retainer agreement. 42

Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01-036162 44 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and
grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-
4306 45 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 46 against Alvin Valencia 47 for trespass to dwelling.

We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to
protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the
basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse
judicial processes to commit injustice.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his
own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute
the right of his client.

On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all
over 20 years of age, 48 while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by
his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married
Lagmay in 1998. 49 Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being
claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship 50 and
does not consider the latter as his second family. 51 He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay
because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina. 52

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge
of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his
transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he
sired three children by the latter, he does not consider them as his second family. It is noted that during
the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa,
where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay lives. 53 It is of no moment that respondent
eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not
live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral
delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral
conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 54 Thus, in several cases,
the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and
sense of morality of the community. 55 That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the
death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation
of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as
well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH A.C. No. 6010
SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF,

Complainant,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

PUNO,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,*

CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA, and
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ,
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Respondent.

Promulgated:

August 28, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-
Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on
the following grounds:

1) Gross Misconduct:

From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse
allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutor’s Office
of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an
Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating
money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the
NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent.

2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:

In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and

3) Malpractice:

In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at
Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a
subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4
October 1994, said second marriage was subsequently annulled for being bigamous.
 On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and
notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of
respondent’s notarialcommission on 31 December 1987. A Certification[1] dated 25 May 1999 was issued
by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not
applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to
1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents:

1. Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed

and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

2. Affidavit[3] dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed and sworn
to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

3. Affidavit[4] dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

4. Affidavit[5] dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and sworn
to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

5. Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor
of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties [7] dated 5 March 1994, executed by Evelyn
C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

7. Sworn Statement[8] dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

8. Deed of Sale[9] dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of

Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10] dated 1 June 1994, executed
by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

10. Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of
Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

11. Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in favor of Mario
R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13] dated 17 April 1996, executed
by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

13. Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated 27 February 1997, executed by Aurelia Demot Cados in
favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

14. Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO represented by Mr.
Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr. George Cham, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz.

Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal deduction
of salary and others which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutor’s Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations of
immorality in contracting a second marriage and malpractice in notarizing documents despite the
expiration of his commission.

After the filing of comment, We referred[16] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.

 The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their
allegations in their complaint.

Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his first
marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized certain
documents during the period when his notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered
some extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the
complained acts.

After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be

administratively penalized for the following acts:

a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to have the first
marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and

b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of
his notarial commission, he be suspended from the practice of law for another one (1) year or for a total
of two (2) years.[17]

On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the recommendation
of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex “A” and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent contracted a second marriage without
taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and for notarizing legal documents despite full
knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz isSUSPENDED from
the practice of law for another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of
law.[18]

This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the
penalty contained therein.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the
privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been
afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s right to practice law
may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or
to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of
suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an
office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice,
rather than to punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,[19] that the
Bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A
lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which
might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.

Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the
lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[20] Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the
good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on
the part of the proper authorities.[21]

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice must be continuous. Otherwise, “membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer
ceases to have good moral conduct.” [22]

In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted marriage
on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted ways owing to their
irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their
separation in-fact, respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms
of communication with her. Seven years thereafter, respondent became attracted to one Mary
Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in
1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch
68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent’s
prior marriage with TeresitaRivera was still subsisting, no action having been initiated before the court to
obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of respondent’s prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a
judicial declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.

Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage in
1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of
the law that before a second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must
first be annulled by the appropriate court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October
1994 before the RTC ofBenguet, Branch 9, or about five years after respondent contracted his second
marriage. The annulment of respondent’s second marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment
proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came after the respondent’s second bigamous
marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if
the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him,
or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarmentcase does not affect its course, then neither will the
judgment of annulment of respondent’s second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually
committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary
proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches. [23]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment.

The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis-à-
vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community” and what is “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.”[24]

Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his
disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. [25]

However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondent’s act as grossly
immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator
and IBP Board of Governors, thus:

The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost
seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom
he described to be very intelligent person;

c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;

d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
 e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and
child went to Australia;

f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. [26]

In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent was disbarred because his moral character was deeply
flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that her prior
marriage toBercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she was legally single and free to marry
him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law
school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent’s parents. After
respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the
complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely to a
hospital.

In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28] respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral acts
such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him; third, he mispresented himself as a “bachelor” so he could contract marriage
in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainant’s resources by securing a plane ticket
from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s daughter. He did this without complainant’s
knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant that “everything is legal.”

Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself acknowledged and
declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer no defense save for his love
and declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.

Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly
harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.
[29]
In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years suspension is more appropriate. The
penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is too light and not commensurate to the
act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-1997 after
his commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain
documents despite his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that
he received no payment in notarizing said documents.

It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,meaningless, routinary act. On the
contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.Notarization of a private document converts the document into a
public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document
is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe
with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. [30]

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere
casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission to do so as “reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also
x x x the crime of falsification of public documents.”[31]

The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of
the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may
be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a
violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by
making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By
acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7
of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession.

In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized five
documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment,
affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in
said case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances. Herein
respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents [33] without the requisite notarial commission.
 Other charges constituting respondent’s misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child
abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutor’s Office
of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before
an Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the
NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be
discussed, as they are still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of
innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years, and another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his
commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator, as well
as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for
serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, 1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal
complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document 4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A.
Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury 5 against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under
the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose
Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property
in his name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would
guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the
name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free
and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton. 6

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge
that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious
misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred
for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest
scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case
against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, 7 because
respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay.
Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its
genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner
San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme
to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines."
Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two years
and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
modification, the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six
months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he
was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He
also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP
had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws
which he is bound to uphold and obey. 9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. 10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real
property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified
his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by
preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s
recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect,
respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to
malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. 15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years
for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re:
Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing
a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them
to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006

MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO, represented by

their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold them a piece of property
over which he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to return to them the amount they have paid
him for it.

Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen currently residing in Cannes, France, together with
her minor children, Alexander and Jon Alexander.

In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into a Deed of Assignment. 1 For the price of P1.5M,
respondent transferred, in favor of the complainants, his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and
lot, located at 75 Granwood Villas Subd., BF Homes, Quezon City. Respondent also obligated himself to
deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse
developer, dated April 19, 1996. Upon full payment of the purchase price, respondent further undertook
to have Crown Asia execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of the complainants.
Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of Assignment. The
balance was to be paid by complainants in four equal quarterly installments of P187,500.00 each. Thus,
complainants issued in favor of respondent four postdated checks in the amount of P187,500.00 each.
Respondent was able to encash the first check dated August 17, 1999. 2

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that respondent has not paid in full
the price of the townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of Assignment. Respondent also failed to
deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia. For these
reasons, complainant Marili Ronquillo ordered the bank to stop payment on the second check she issued
to respondent in the amount of P187,500.00.

On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their counsel, wrote respondent, informing him that they
were still willing to pay the balance of the purchase price of the townhouse on the condition that
respondent work on Crown Asia’s execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. In the alternative,
complainants demanded the return of the amount of P937,500.00, plus legal interest, within ten
days.3 The amount of P937,500.00 represents theP750,000.00 down payment and the first quarterly
installment of P187,500.00 which complainants paid respondent.

In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed to complainants, 4 respondent claimed that he was "working
now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not long from now," and requested for "a
period of twenty days from May 15, 2000 within which to either completely pay Crown Asia or return the
money at your (complainants’) option." The period lapsed but respondent did not make good his
promise to pay Crown Asia in full, or return the amount paid by complainants.

On February 21, 2002, complainants’ counsel sent respondent a second letter 5 demanding the return of
the amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest, for failing to comply with his promise. The demand
was unheeded.

Hence, this administrative complaint 6 that respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Allegedly, respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and he ought to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the
instant disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and recommendation, found respondent
guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In her Report dated October 9, 2003, she recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors, through
Resolution No. XVI-2003-226, dated October 25, 2003, approved the recommendation of Commissioner
San Juan.

We agree.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds:
 (1) deceit;

(2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;

(3) grossly immoral conduct;

(4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(5) violation of the lawyer’s oath;

(6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and

(7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not engage
inunlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer
exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long
line of cases7 that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract
with complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot
in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to
transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of
dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not
inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot,
and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution of the
Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to Nine Hundred
Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it,
made matters worse for him.

Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she paid him, which
was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally reprehensible. By
his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality required by the Code of
Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in him as a member of the Bar,
and an officer of the court.

Respondent’s culpability is therefore clear. He received a letter from complainants’ counsel demanding
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the complainants, or, in the alternative, the return
of the money paid by complainants. In reply to said letter, respondent acknowledged his obligation, and
promised to settle the same if given sufficient time, thus:

xxx
I am working now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not long from now but I need a
little time to fix some things over. May I please request for a period of 20 days from May 15, 2000 within
which to either completely pay Crown Asia or return the money at your option. (Emphasis supplied)

In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having full ownership over the subject townhouse unit
and lot, as he has yet to completely pay Crown Asia. Respondent even failed to produce the Contract to
Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia over the subject unit, which would show the extent of his
right of ownership, if any, over the townhouse unit and lot in question.

To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time to fulfill his obligation. It was only after almost
two years had passed, after respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or return to complainants the
amount they paid him, that complainants sent respondent a second letter 8 demanding solely the return
of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest. By this time, it was indubitable that respondent
would not be able to perform his end of their agreement.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral
character.9 The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. 10 Lawyers must conduct
themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at
large,11 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. 12

Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants’ prayer that respondent be directed to return the
money he received from them in the amount of P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its
officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still
fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. 13 Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the
amount of money that should be returned to the complainants.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period ofTHREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
A.C. No. 6971 February 23, 2006

QUIRINO TOMLIN II, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint 1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Salvador N. Moya II for allegedly reneging on his
monetary obligations and for having issued bouncing checks; thereby violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility2 and Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.3

Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from him P600,000.00 partially covered by seven
postdated checks. However, when complainant tried to encash them on their respective due dates, the
checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank, to wit:

Check No. Due Date Amount Reason for Dishonor

MOB 1011326 May 16, 2001 P13,500.00 RTCOCI

MOB 1011311 June 11, 2001 P30,000.00 RTCOCI

MOB 1011328 June 17, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011313 August 12, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011329 August 16, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011314 August 19, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011330 September 18, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

Complainant made several demands, the last being a formal letter 4 sent on September 25,
2002;5 however, respondent still failed and refused to pay his debt without justifiable reason.
Consequently, complainant instituted a case for seven counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 6 In addition, he filed the instant case
for respondent’s disbarment.

On December 1, 2003, respondent was directed to file his answer but instead he filed several motions
for extension of time to file a responsive pleading 7 and a motion to dismiss complaint. 8

Respondent alleged that the case should be dismissed outright for violation of the rule on non-forum
shopping. He argued that complainant did not inform the IBP about the cases he filed for violations of
B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan.9 Respondent argued that the filing of the administrative case despite the pendency of the
criminal cases is a form of harassment which should not be allowed.

On April 28, 2004, the Commission on Bar Discipline denied 10 the motion to dismiss for being a
prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 3 of its Rules of Procedure. Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration11 was likewise denied on June 16, 2004.12

Thereafter, respondent filed several motions for extension of time to file an answer. 13 His last motion for
extension was however denied for lack of merit. Consequently, the Commission on Bar Discipline
declared him in default.14

Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings on the ground of
prescription15and omnibus motion to recall the default order. 16

On January 3, 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their respective
verified position papers after which the case shall be considered submitted for resolution. 17

Only the complainant submitted his position paper. 18

In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner noted that
respondent failed to file an answer and/or position paper despite several requests for extension, in
disregard of the orders of the IBP. Moreover, it was observed that the pending criminal action against
respondent does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the present
administrative case. Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for one year.

On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the Investigating
Commissioner, but modified the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from one year to two
years.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured.19 Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for
any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor. 20 Any gross misconduct
of a lawyer in his profession or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of
suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the
practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege.21

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complainant but offered no
justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and
written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his
financial obligations to the complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his
debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless
checks, an act constituting gross misconduct.22Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty as a
lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations. 23

The contention that complainant violated the rule against forum shopping with the filing of this
administrative complaint is bereft of merit. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another24 or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 25 Forum shopping applies
only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. 26 Moreover, Criminal Case Nos. 6-
367-03 to 6-373-03 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 refer to the respondent’s act of making or drawing and
issuance of worthless checks; while the present administrative case seeks to discipline respondent as a
lawyer for his dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.lavvph!1.net

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong
to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases.
The burden of proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative
case, only preponderance of evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.27

Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint
against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from applying the
rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole period that
the criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate.28

Finally, we note that respondent failed to file his answer and verified position paper despite several
opportunities given him by the IBP, that is, from the time he received on December 20, 2003 29 the
Order30 of the IBP requiring him to file an answer until March 31, 2005 when the Investigating
Commissioner submitted the Report and Recommendation. Instead, he filed several motions for
extension of time, motion to dismiss the complaint, motion for reconsideration, manifestation with
motion to terminate proceedings, and omnibus motion to recall the default order. Until the end,
respondent offered no plausible explanation for his failure to pay his debts. Instead, he kept on insisting,
on plainly unmeritorious grounds, the dismissal of the complaint. Verily, respondent’s failure to comply
with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial
authorities.31 Respondent should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue
of his membership therein. 32

In view of the foregoing, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years as
recommended by the IBP commensurate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years, effective
immediately, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6971 February 23, 2006

QUIRINO TOMLIN II, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint 1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Salvador N. Moya II for allegedly reneging on his
monetary obligations and for having issued bouncing checks; thereby violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility2 and Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.3

Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from him P600,000.00 partially covered by seven
postdated checks. However, when complainant tried to encash them on their respective due dates, the
checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank, to wit:

Check No. Due Date Amount Reason for Dishonor

MOB 1011326 May 16, 2001 P13,500.00 RTCOCI

MOB 1011311 June 11, 2001 P30,000.00 RTCOCI

MOB 1011328 June 17, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011313 August 12, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011329 August 16, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011314 August 19, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011330 September 18, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

Complainant made several demands, the last being a formal letter 4 sent on September 25,
2002;5 however, respondent still failed and refused to pay his debt without justifiable reason.
Consequently, complainant instituted a case for seven counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 6 In addition, he filed the instant case
for respondent’s disbarment.

On December 1, 2003, respondent was directed to file his answer but instead he filed several motions
for extension of time to file a responsive pleading 7 and a motion to dismiss complaint. 8

Respondent alleged that the case should be dismissed outright for violation of the rule on non-forum
shopping. He argued that complainant did not inform the IBP about the cases he filed for violations of
B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan.9 Respondent argued that the filing of the administrative case despite the pendency of the
criminal cases is a form of harassment which should not be allowed.

On April 28, 2004, the Commission on Bar Discipline denied 10 the motion to dismiss for being a
prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 3 of its Rules of Procedure. Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration11 was likewise denied on June 16, 2004.12

Thereafter, respondent filed several motions for extension of time to file an answer. 13 His last motion for
extension was however denied for lack of merit. Consequently, the Commission on Bar Discipline
declared him in default.14

Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings on the ground of
prescription15and omnibus motion to recall the default order. 16

On January 3, 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their respective
verified position papers after which the case shall be considered submitted for resolution. 17

Only the complainant submitted his position paper. 18

In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner noted that
respondent failed to file an answer and/or position paper despite several requests for extension, in
disregard of the orders of the IBP. Moreover, it was observed that the pending criminal action against
respondent does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the present
administrative case. Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for one year.
On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the Investigating
Commissioner, but modified the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from one year to two
years.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured.19 Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for
any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor. 20 Any gross misconduct of
a lawyer in his profession or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension
or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of
law and for the continuance of such privilege. 21

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complainant but offered no
justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and
written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his
financial obligations to the complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his
debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless
checks, an act constituting gross misconduct.22Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty as a
lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations. 23

The contention that complainant violated the rule against forum shopping with the filing of this
administrative complaint is bereft of merit. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another24 or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 25 Forum shopping applies
only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. 26 Moreover, Criminal Case Nos. 6-
367-03 to 6-373-03 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 refer to the respondent’s act of making or drawing and
issuance of worthless checks; while the present administrative case seeks to discipline respondent as a
lawyer for his dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.lavvph!1.net

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to
a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. The
burden of proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative case, only
preponderance of evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. 27

Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint
against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from applying the
rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole period that
the criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate.28

Finally, we note that respondent failed to file his answer and verified position paper despite several
opportunities given him by the IBP, that is, from the time he received on December 20, 2003 29 the
Order30 of the IBP requiring him to file an answer until March 31, 2005 when the Investigating
Commissioner submitted the Report and Recommendation. Instead, he filed several motions for
extension of time, motion to dismiss the complaint, motion for reconsideration, manifestation with
motion to terminate proceedings, and omnibus motion to recall the default order. Until the end,
respondent offered no plausible explanation for his failure to pay his debts. Instead, he kept on insisting,
on plainly unmeritorious grounds, the dismissal of the complaint. Verily, respondent’s failure to comply
with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial
authorities.31 Respondent should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue
of his membership therein. 32

In view of the foregoing, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years as
recommended by the IBP commensurate under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years, effective
immediately, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5499. August 16, 2005]

WILSON PO CHAM, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO D. PIZARRO, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Wilson Po Cham (complainant)
against Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro (respondent) for commission of falsehood and misrepresentations in
violation of a lawyer’s oath.

Complainant gives the following account of the facts that spawned the filing of the present
administrative complaint.
Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Cañete (Cañete), Elenita Alipio (Alipio), and now deceased Mario Navarro
(Navarro) who was then the Municipal Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for sale to him a parcel of
land with an area of approximately forty (40) hectares, identified as Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No. 262,
situated at Sitio Gatao, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan (the property).

He having expressed interest in the offer, Cañete and Navarro arranged a meeting between him and
respondent at the latter’s residence in Balanga, Bataan[1] where respondent categorically represented to
him that the property being offered for sale was alienable and disposable. [2] Respondent in fact
presented to him 1) Real Property Tax Order of Payment [3] dated July 10, 1995 covering the property
signed by Edna P. Pizarro as Municipal Treasurer and Navarro as Municipal Assessor; 2) a Deed of
Absolute Sale[4] dated July 25, 1995 purportedly executed by the alleged previous actual occupant of the
property, one Jose R. Monzon (Monzon), transferring all his rights, interest and possession thereover in
favor of Virgilio Banzon (Banzon), Rolando B. Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for an agreed consideration
of P500,000.00; and 3) Special Power of Attorney[5] dated July 25, 1995 executed by Banzon and Zabala
authorizing him (respondent) to:

1. x x x offer to sell [their] rights over a certain parcel of land, which is more particularly described as
follows:

AREA: 40 has. more or less

situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan covered by Tax Declaration No. 6066 PIN #108-
08-044-05-126

2. x x x negotiate and enter into a contract for the consumation (sic) of sale of the subject property;
and to sign the same.

3. x x x receive proceeds thereof with obligation to distribute the corresponding share of each co-
owner;

x x x[6] (Underscoring supplied)

On July 25, 1995, he as buyer and respondent as seller executed an Option to Buy, [7] the pertinent
portions of which provide:

WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner and Attorney-In-Fact of his co-owners of rights with planted trees
(improvements) containing an area of FORTY THREE (43) hectares, situated in Pook Batangas,
Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan; (Portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre), covered by Tax
Declaration 6066.

WHEREAS, the BUYER is interested to buy the same for a total price of THREE MILLION AND SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P3,700,000.00) payable in two (2) gives (sic), as follows:

a) Earnest money of P10,000.00 upon signing of this contract and the balance of full payment within
three (3) weeks from date hereof which offer the SELLER accepts;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the terms and conditions
hereunder specified the parties have agreed on the following:

1) That the Buyer shall give an option money and earnest (sic) of P10,000.00 upon signing of this
contract, which shall form part of the contract price if and when the buyer comply (sic) with his
obligation to pay in full within three (3) weeks from date hereof, otherwise should the BUYER fails (sic) to
comply with his obligation to pay in full on the scheduled period the P10,000.00 earnest money shall be
forfeited in favor of the SELLER and the Option to Buy is automatically cancelled.

2) That the SELLER upon full payment of the price shall execute a final Deed of Sale and shall
surrender all documents, plans and paper relative to the properties subject of sale;

3) That the SELLER shall warrants (sic) their rights and claims over the above stated properties
including the trees planted on it as against the rights of third party except that of the government.
[8]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In accordance with the terms of the Option to Buy, he paid respondent the amount of P10,000.00 for
which respondent issued the corresponding Receipt [9] reading:

Received the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) from MR. WILSON CHAM, representing
earnest/option money for Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No. 262 situated at Boundaries:

NORTH : Right of Catalino Agujo

SOUTH : National Road-Bagac-Morong

WEST : Right of Nicasio Canta

EAST : Sapang Batang Panao

including the trees and improvement situated thereon.

Full payment shall be paid within three (3) weeks from date hereof. [10] (Underscoring supplied)

On August 21, 1995, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute Sale [11] over the property in his favor, the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:

For and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE (P3,372,533.00), Philippine Currency, the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged from the BUYER to the entire satisfaction of the SELLERS, the said SELLERS do by these
presents SELL, TRANSFER and CONVEY, in manner absolute and irrevocable, in favor of the said BUYER,
his heirs and assigns, all their rights, interest and participation over that certain real estate destined for,
and in actual use as fruit land, situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan and more
particularly described as follows:

Location : Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan

Area : That portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre, containing an area of 392,155 square
meters more or less.

Boundaries : North : Right of Catalino Agujo

South : National Road, Bagac-Morong

West : Right of Nicasio Canta

East : Sapang Batang Panao

The SELLERS do hereby declare that the boundaries of the foregoing land are visible by means of
monuments, creeks and trees; that the land including the permanent improvements existing thereon
consist of fruit-bearing trees assessed for the current year at TWO HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED P262,400.00 as per Tax Declaration No. 5010; and that the property is presently in the
possession of the SELLERS.

The SELLERS hereby agree with the BUYER that they are the absolute owners of the rights over the said
property; that they have the perfect right to convey the same; that they acquired their rights over the
said property by absolute deed of sale from Jose R. Monzon who acquired his rights over the property
from Marianito Holgado; that Marianito Holgado acquired his right from Pedro de Leon who, in turn,
acquired his right from Julian Agujo who was the original owner who cleared the land and who was in
possession of the same immediately after the Second World War.

The SELLERS warrant their rights and claims over the aforedescribed real estate including the trees
planted thereon and they undertake to defend the same unto said Vendee, his heirs and assigns against
the claims of any third person whomsoever.[12](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent thereafter furnished him with a copy of Tax Declaration No. 5010 [13] with Property Index No.
018-08-004-05-126 issued in his (respondent’s) name and his alleged co-owners, and Real Property Tax
Receipt No. 025201[14] dated August 17, 1995 issued in his (respondent’s) name.

He thus gave respondent two checks dated August 21, 1995 representing the purchase price of the rights
over the property, Asian Bank Corporation Check No. GA063210 [15] in the amount of P168,627.00 payable
to respondent, and Asian Bank Manager’s Check No. 004639GA [16] in the amount of P3,193,906.00
payable to respondent, Banzon and Zabala.

He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its front
portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that the property could
not be fenced as it was part of the Bataan National Park.[17]

Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land susceptible of
private ownership. He thus secured a Certification[18] from the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENR) in Bagac, Bataan of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) dated July 2, 1998, signed by CENR Officer Laurino D. Macadangdang, reading:
This pertains to your request for a certification as to the status of land claimed by spouses Perfecto and
Purificacion, Jose Monson, et. al, Virgilio Banzon and Edilberto Pizarro, all located at Nagbalayong,
Morong, Bataan.

Please be informed that per verification conducted by the personnel of this Office, said lands fall within
the Bataan Natural Park per L.C. Map/N.P. Map No. 34 as certified on December 1, 1945. Under
the Public Land Law, lands within this category are not subject for disposition. [19] (Underscoring supplied)

He also obtained a Letter-directive [20] dated August 31, 1995 issued by Officer-in-Charge Ricardo R.
Alarcon of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENR) of Balanga, Bataan to the
Municipal Assessor, the pertinent portions of which read:

Please be informed that it comes to our attention that there are some forest occupants that are
securing land tax declarations from your office in (sic) the pretext that the area they
occupied (sic) were (sic) within alienable and disposable lands. Presently, this tax declaration is being
used in the illegal selling of right [of] possession within the Bataan Natural Park which is prohibited
under our laws.

xxx

In this regard, I would like to request for your assistance by way of informing us and in controlling this
land rush and massive selling and buying of rights of possession within prohibited areas as stated above.
[21]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Upon his request, the PENR issued a Certification [22] dated March 14, 1996 stating that those named by
respondent as prior owners of rights over the property from whom respondent and his alleged co-
owners acquired their alleged rights were not among those inventoried as occupants per the PENR’s
1978 to 1994 Forest Occupancy Census (IFO) Survey.

Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to return the purchase price of the rights over the
property.[23]

In his present complaint[24] dated September 10, 2001, complainant charges respondent to have violated
his oath as a member of the Bar in committing manifest falsehood and evident misrepresentation by
employing fraudulent means to lure him into buying rights over the property which property he
represented to be disposable and alienable. [25]

In his Comment[26] dated January 12, 2002, respondent denied having employed deceit or having
pretended to co-own rights over the property or having represented that it was alienable and
disposable. He claimed that complainant, being engaged in speculation in the purchase of property,
knew exactly the character and nature of the object of his purchase; [27] and that despite complainant’s
awareness that he was merely “buying rights to forest land,” he just the same voluntarily entered into
the transaction because of the property’s proximity to the Subic Bay Economic Zone.
Respondent surmised that complainant bought the rights over the property in the hope that lands
belonging to the public domain in Morong “would be eventually declared alienable and disposable to
meet the rising demand for economic zones.” [28]

By Resolution[29] of February 6, 2002, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from notice.

On May 6, 2002, complainant filed before the IBP his Reply [30] to respondent’s Comment, maintaining
that the sale of rights over the property was attended with deceit as respondent deliberately did not
disclose that the property was within the confines of the Bataan National Park. [31] And he denied being
engaged in speculation, he claiming that with his purchase of the property, he would venture into low-
cost housing for the employees of the nearby Subic Bay area.[32]

To complainant’s Reply, respondent filed his Rejoinder on June 21, 2002.[33]

Complainant later filed his Affidavit[34] and Position Paper[35] on June 21, 2002 and September 17, 2001,
respectively, reiterating his assertions in his previous pleadings.

The record shows that complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent, Banzon,
Zabala, Cañete, Alipio and Navarro in 1999 [36] arising from the questioned sale of rights. The complaint
was twice dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On petition for review, however, the
Department of Justice, through then Secretary Hernando B. Perez, by Resolution [37] of March 6, 2002,
reversed the dismissal of the complaint as it found probable cause to indict respondent et al. in
court. An information for estafa was thereupon filed against respondent et al. before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-00-94232.

By Report and Recommendation of April 20, 2004, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, finding respondent to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar to
do no falsehood and misrepresentations, recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) months, subject to the approval of the members of the Board of Governors. Pertinent portions
of the Report and Recommendation read:

. . . [I]t is evident that as early as of (sic) 1992, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of NIPAS
ACT[38] prohibited the illegal selling of rights or possession of the areas occupied within the Bataan
Natural Park, the subject property not excluded as per letter of OIC CENRO Laurino D. Mapadanig
[illegible], Bagac, Bataan per L.C. map/N.P. Map No. 34 to the Municipal Assessor therein and certified
on December 1, 1945 that subject property which is within this category was not subject for
disposition; a fact supposed to be known by the respondent being a resident of Balanga, Bataan and was
in the practice of his profession also in said area.

Aside from the fact that the alleged original owner Monzon was not among those inventoried
occupants as per Forest Occupancy (IFO) Survey since 1978 up to the latest census in 1994 from whom
respondent allegedly bought the subject property; theAbsolute Deed of Sale executed between the
complainant Wilson Po Cham and the respondent relative to the same subject property was not
notarized which partook the nature of a private and not official document.

Although respondent furnished complainant the foregoing documents to prove their rights, interest and
possession to the subject property, respondent and his co-owners failed to show a permit from the
government conferring upon them rights or concessions over the subject property, which formed part of
the Bataan Natural Park classified as public and not subject to disposition, therefore respondent and his
co-owners have no rights and interests whatsoever over the subject property and theirrepresentations
to complainant were simply not true but a falsehood.

Respondent being extensively conversant and knowledgeable about the law took advantage of his
versatility in the practice of law and committed misrepresentations that he and his co-owners have
irrevocable rights, interests and possession over the subject property which convinced complainant into
purchasing subject property unmindful that the same is not alienable or disposable being a portion of
the public domain; whereby respondent violated his solemn oath as member of the Philippine Bar for
having committed such falsehood and misrepresentations to the complainant.[39] (Underscoring
supplied).

By CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-407 of October 7, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the April 20, 2004 Committee Report and Recommendation.

The case was forwarded to this Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. [40]

The IBP findings are well-taken.

The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard of not only legal proficiency but of honesty and fair
dealing.[41] Thus, a member should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. [42]

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or
suspension.[43]

Thus, under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5)
violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.

And he may be faulted under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates a
member of the Bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law. Rule 1.01 of the Code
specifically enjoins him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. “Conduct,” as
used in this rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional
duties.[44]
In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented certifications from the DENR that the
property is part of the public domain and not disposable as it is within the Bataan National Park. Indeed,
by virtue of Proclamation No. 24[45] issued on December 1, 1945, all properties of the public domain
therein designated as part of the Bataan National Park were withdrawn from sale, settlement or other
disposition, subject to private rights.

On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having
irrevocable rights and interests over the property which he could have conveyed to
complainant. E.g., he could have presented any document issued by the government conferring upon
him and his alleged co-owners, or even upon his alleged predecessors-in-interest, with any such right or
interest, but he presented none. He merely presented a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by
a certain Jose R. Monzon in his, Banzon’s and Zabala’s favor on July 25, 1995, a month shy of the
execution on August 21, 1995 of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of complainant.

The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do not help his cause any as neither tax
receipts nor realty tax declarations are sufficient evidence of the right of possession over realty unless
supported by other effective proof. [46] The presentation of a tax declaration must indeed have been a
“pretext,” as observed by the PENR in its earlier-quoted portion of its letter-directive to the Balanga
Municipal Assessor “that the area occupied . . . [is] within alienable and disposable land.”

Respondent must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to purchase, for P3,372,533.00,
non-existent “irrevocable rights, interest and participation” over an inalienable property.

In Lizaso v. Amante[47] where therein respondent lawyer enticed the therein complainant to invest in the
casino business with the proposition that her investment would yield her substantial profit, but therein
respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the principal
thereof, this Court took occasion to expound on sanctioning lawyers for committing fraud, deceit or
falsehood in their private dealings:

It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent Amante and
complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. The transaction that complainant entered into with respondent did not
require respondent to perform professional legal services for complainant nor did that transaction relate
to the rendition of professional services by respondent to any other person.

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez the principle that it can exercise
its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client.
xxx

“x x x [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many
exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point thatthe attorney has shown, through misconduct
outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of
public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. The reason
why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar, and
the court requires for such admission the possession of a good moral character.

x x x”

The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness, whether relating to professional
or non-professional matters, justifies suspension or disbarment, was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice
Prentice in In Re Disbarment of Peck, with eloquence and restraint:

“As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters which
may be intrusted to him, it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy. Unfortunately, it is
not easy to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard of test of fitness. But
scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in the determination of the qualification of
professional fitness, non-professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be
ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and
dishonor in other relations. x x x misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it
be professional or non-professional, justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar.”

The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v. Abordo x xx:

“The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled
to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney’s
character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the
powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.”[48] (Italics in the original)

This Lizaso ruling was reiterated in Co v. Bernardino[49] and Lao v. Medel.[50]

To be sure, complainant is not entirely blameless. Had he exhibited a modicum of prudence before
entering into the transaction with respondent, he would have spared himself from respondent’s sham.

It is jurisprudentially established though that in a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the

complainant is not blameless or is in pari delicto as this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the
complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members to protect the public and the
courts.[51]

The record does not disclose the status of the estafa case against respondent. His conviction or acquittal
is not, however, essential insofar as the present administrative case against him is concerned. [52]

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of x x x criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all
that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same
facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily
exculpate him administratively.[53] (Emphasis supplied)

It is not thus sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint
against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from vigorously
applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole
period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are
vastly disparate.[54]

While the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the imposition of so severe a penalty as
disbarment, the inherent power of this Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar must,
nonetheless, be exercised as it cannot be denied that respondent violated his solemn oath as a lawyer
not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct. [55]

The penalty of suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP is not, however, commensurate
to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent. This Court finds that respondent’s suspension
from the practice of law for One (1) Year is warranted.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1)
Year and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will merit a more severe
penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 3637. January 24, 2001]

RURAL BANK OF SILAY, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO H. PILLA, respondent.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:
Rural Bank of Silay. Inc. (complainant) filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla (respondent) alleging deceit and gross misconduct on the part of the latter. The
complaint alleges as follows:

1. That on July 23, 1975 the respondent executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the complainant
over a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Sagay, Negros Occidental, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-55380, purportedly as Attorney-in-Fact of the registered owners thereof, Pedro
N. Torres and Oscar D. Granada. A copy of this Real Estate Mortgage is herewith attached as Annex “A”.

2. That together with the aforesaid Real Estate Mortgage the respondent submitted a Special Power of
Attorney by virtue of which he was purportedly authorized and empowered by the registered owners
Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of land in favor of the
complainant. A copy of this Special Power of Attorney is herewith attached as Annex “B”.

3. That on the security of, among others, the aforesaid parcel of land over which the respondent
represented that he is authorized to mortgage, complainant extended and released a loan to the
respondent in the amount of P91,427.00.

4. That complainant subsequently and much later learned that the respondent was not at all authorized
and empowered by the registered owner Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of land
when it was joined as a defendant in a complaint filed by the aforesaid Oscar D. Grananda for removal of
cloud on title with preliminary injunction and damages. A copy of this complaint is herewith attached as
Annex “C”.

5. That in the aforesaid complaint as well as in the hearing conducted in connection therewith Oscar D.
Granada specifically and categorically denied having executed and signed the Special Power of Attorney,
Annex B, submitted by the respondent to the complainant in support of his application for a loan.

6. That the aforesaid civil case, Civil Case No. 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch
60, was subsequently decided against the respondent wherein the aforesaid Court found that the Special
Power of Attorney, Annex B, was indeed forged and falsified because the spouses Oscar D. Grananda and
Lolita L. Granada have not signed the same and wherein the Court also made the finding that the
defendant, considering that he has benefited from the said falsified document, is presumed to have a
hand in the preparation of the same. A copy of this Decision is herewith attached as Annex “D”.

7. That the respondent has not appealed from the aforesaid Decision thereby making the findings of fact
made therein final as against him.

8. That the foregoing acts of the respondent in presenting to the complainant Bank a forged and falsified
Power of Attorney for the purpose of obtaining a loan is a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer to do
falsehood to no man and by his conduct herein has forfeited his right to continue further in the practice
of law.[1]

Upon the instance of the Court, respondent filed his comment refuting the charges of deceit and gross
misconduct against him. Respondent denied employing any deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a
loan from complainant rural bank. According to respondent, he did not know that the signature of Oscar
Granada on the special power of attorney appointing him (respondent) as attorney-in-fact was
forged. The special power of attorney purportedly authorized respondent to mortgaged the parcel of
land in Sagay, Negros Occidental in favor of complainant rural bank. Respondent also claimed that if
indeed said document was forged, he was not a party to the forgery. He cited the findings of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 1-C, thus:

Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of the
spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually benefited from the said falsified
documents, he is presumed to have a hand on the same. (Decision, p. 20-annex “D”.) [2]

Respondent maintained that he obtained the loan from complainant rural bank without depriving it of
the opportunity to investigate his financial capacity as well as to ascertain the genuineness of the special
power of attorney under which he acted as the mortgagor. Thus, respondent is of the view that, under
the circumstances, it cannot be said that he employed deceit and gross misconduct against complainant
rural bank.

After receipt of respondent’s comment, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Both parties adduced their respective evidence before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Upon agreement of the parties, the matter was resolved on the
basis of their respective pleadings and the annexes attached thereto. From these pleadings, the IBP,
through Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, established the following uncontroverted facts:

Purportedly acting as attorney-in-fact of a certain Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada, by virtue of a
special power of attorney, respondent applied for a loan and concomitantly executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of the complainant bank covering the property of Pedro Torres and Oscar D.
Granada. With such security, complainant extended to the respondent his loan in the amount of
P91,427.00. In view of the failure of the respondent to pay the loan, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed by the complainant bank. Later, Oscar Granada, the real registered owner of the mortgaged
property filed a complaint against the respondent and the complainant for the annulment of the Real
Estate Mortgage and Special Power of Attorney. After the trial, the court declared null and void the said
Special Power of Attorney as well as the Real Estate Mortgage for being products of forgery. This
decision was not appealed by the defendants.

There is no showing that respondent, despite the adverse decision, returned or offered to return the
money he took from the complainant bank. The bank then instituted this disbarment proceeding against
the respondent.[3]

The IBP found from the above facts that respondent violated his oath as a lawyer to do no falsehood,
thus:

This office believes that the actuation of the respondent constitutes a betrayal of his oath as a
lawyer. The findings of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental has persuasive effect in this
proceeding.
As found by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental in its decision in Civil Case No. 1-C, entitled
“Spouses Oscar D. Granada and Lolita L. Granada vs. Ernesto H. Pilla, et al”, the plaintiffs Granada
spouses have not signed the questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of the respondent and the
said spouses’ signatures as appearing in the Special Power of Attorney are not their true and genuine
signatures for actually they have not executed nor granted a Special Power of Attorney in favor of herein
respondent authorizing him to mortgage the one-third (1/3) share of the said spouses in the mortgaged
property. The trial court stressed that:

“…Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of the
spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually benefited from the said falsified
documents, he is presumed to have a hand on the same.

Defendant Antonio Pura testified and in fact he admitted that he notarized the said documents, Exhibit
“A” and “B”, with the assurance of Atty. Pilla that the signatures appearing in the said documents were
the signatures of Atty. Oscar D. Granada and of Pedro Torres, registered owners of the property in
question.”

Antonio G. Pura, the notary public who notarized the questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of
the respondent, testified in said Civil Case as follows:

“Q Now, compañero, will you please relate to this Honorable Court the circumstances under which you
notarized this Special Power of Attorney now marked as Exh. “A” on April 21, 1975?

“A Yes, sir. I remember that on the same day, April 21, 1975, defendant Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla personally
appeared before me and he brought along with him this Special Power of Attorney executed in his
favor. He told me to notarize it. I asked him about the signature of Atty. Oscar D. Granada if this is his
signature and he said “Yes”. I also asked him about the signature of the other principal and he said also
“Yes”. With that assurance and being a brother lawyer I accommodated him. Knowing that he will not
do anything that is illegal and I have confidence in him considering that he is a lawyer and he knows
what he was doing, I accommodated him.”

(TSN, Hearing March 15, 1993, pp. 22-23, Civil Case No. 1, RTC, Branch LX, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental)

If indeed, respondent is not responsible for the falsification of the Special Power of Attorney, why did he
not explain before the trial court or before this office the circumstances on how he obtained the
same. He did not even bother to identify his alleged client who provided him the forged Special Power
of Attorney. Instead, respondent is banking on his defense that the complainant bank has not
introduced any evidence to prove that he forged the Special Power of Attorney. He relied on the
argument that his transaction with the complainant bank was purely commercial business and did not
involve his capacity as a lawyer. Further, if it is true that the respondent maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity as he asserted, why did he represent before the notary public that the signatures
appearing in the Special Power of Attorney were the signatures of the real owners if he was not actually
aware that the signatures were that of the real owners.
The office is convinced that the actuation of the respondent is misrepresentation constituting gross
misconduct at the very least. This is a violation of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man. [4]

In conclusion, Commissioner Elamparo recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for five (5) years. The IBP, through Resolution No. XIV-00-175, dated 7 April 2000, of its Board of
Governors, substantially adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner
Elamparo but modified the penalty. The IBP RESOLVED as follows:

…to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision
as annex “A”, and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, said recommendation is with modification that Respondent
be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for THREE (3) years for misrepresentation.[5]

We fully agree with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

As correctly pointed out by the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, since respondent actually benefited from
the falsified document, he is presumed to have a hand in the falsification of the same. Respondent
miserably failed to rebut this presumption with his barefaced denial that he had no knowledge of the
forgery. The Court cannot give credence to respondent’s negative assertion that he did not know that
the special power of attorney issued in his favor was falsified. As a lawyer, respondent knows or ought
to know that parties to a public document must personally appear before the notary public to attest
that the same is their own free act and deed. In utter disregard of this requirement, respondent
caused the special power of attorney to be notarized without the parties appearing before the notary
public. Thereafter, respondent presented the same to complainant rural bank in order to obtain a loan
therefrom. It is thus apparent that respondent had a hand in the falsification of the document especially
considering that it was he who chiefly benefited from it. Indeed, “the settled rule is that in the absence
of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger
and therefore guilty of falsification.”[6] Further, “if a person had in his possession a falsified document
and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is
that he is the material author of the falsification.” [7]

Respondent’s acts clearly fall short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 1.01 thereof, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” The fact that the conduct pertained to respondent’s private dealings with
complainant rural bank is of no moment. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, or good demeanor. [8] Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition
precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. [9]

Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years is approved.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla guilty of misconduct. He is
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective from receipt of this
Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt
with.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 1474 January 28, 2000

CRISTINO G. CALUB, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ABRAHAM A. SULLER, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against respondent premised on grossly immoral
conduct for having raped his neighbor's wife.

In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller
went to the complainant's abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade.

As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife let him in.
Thereafter, respondent began touching her in different parts of her body. When she protested,
respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. At that moment,
complainant returned home to get money to pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the house, he
saw his wife and respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed. 1 She was kicking respondent with one
foot while the latter pressed on her arms and other leg, preventing her from defending herself.

On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union a criminal
complaint2 for rape against respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court of First Instance,
Agoo, La Union.
On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint for disbarment
against respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller. 3

On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within ten (10) days from notice. 4

On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a fabrication. 5

On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and
recommendation.6

From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings where both parties
appeared with their respective counsel. In a petition filed on November 6, 1978, respondent prayed for
the suspension of proceedings pending final termination of Criminal Case No. A-420 pending with the
Court of First Instance, La Union, Branch 3, Agoo. 7

On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor General, the case having been
referred to him previously.8

In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. On August 28, 1991 the latter sent notice of hearings to both parties. 9

On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the proceedings and considering the
case submitted for resolution as notice to complainant remained unserved while respondent failed to
appear despite due notice.10

On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution
recommending that the disciplinary penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year be meted on respondent. 11

The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent Suller for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Such acquittal, however, is not determinative of
this administrative case.

The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the complainant suffice to
show that respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having carnal knowledge of his
neighbor's wife without her consent in her very home.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.12

In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is not sufficient punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The rape of his neighbor's wife
constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in the
criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. The privilege to practice
law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important,
morally.13 "Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession,
but it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and
honored fraternity."14

WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practise of law. Let his name be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ADM. CASE No. 5252 May 20, 2004

PRISCILLA Z. ORBE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. HENRY ADAZA, respondent.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

On 27 March 2000, Mrs. Priscilla Z. Orbe charged respondent Atty. Henry Adaza with gross misconduct
and as being unfit to continue his membership in the Bar. In a three-page complaint-affidavit
complainant averred that respondent obtained a loan from the former and, to secure the repayment
thereof, drew and issued two BPI Family Bank checks. When the first check (No. 0350973) was presented
for payment upon maturity, the same was dishonored for insufficient funds. According to complainant,
respondent, acting with malice and deceit, dated the second check "January 24, 1996," so that, once
presented for payment, it would be, considering, in passing, that the loan was incurred on 23 November
1996, a stale check. She alleged that, despite repeated verbal and written demands, respondent had
failed to make good his obligation.

Acting on the complaint, the Court required respondent to comment thereon within ten (10) days from
notice. In a letter, dated 26 September 2000, complainant asked that the complaint be now considered
submitted for resolution in view of the failure of Atty. Adaza to comply with the order of the Court
requiring him to file his comment. In a resolution, dated 06 December 2000, the Court noted the letter
of complainant, and it directed that the complaint be thereby referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Despite proper notice to respondent requiring him to file his answer to the complaint, respondent
continued to ignore the matter. Finally, on 20 February 2002, the case was set for hearing by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline. The complainant appeared. Respondent did not show up despite his
having been duly notified of the hearing by personal service effected on 12 February 2002. Respondent’s
failure to appear prompted the Commission on Bar Discipline to grant the request of complainant to
allow her to adduce evidence ex-parte. An order was issued setting the proceedings on 18 March 2002
for such reception of evidence. A copy of the order was served on respondent on 28 February 2002 at his
given address.

On 21 February 2002, the Commission received a letter from Atty. Adaza, sent via the facilities of PTT,
requesting for a resetting of the hearing from 18 March to 18 April 2002, claiming that he was already
committed to attend a hearing at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, of Dipolog City on 20 March 2002.

The proceedings set for 18 March 2002 for the reception of complainant’s evidence ex-parte was held,
but the same was without loss of right on the part of respondent to conduct, if desired, a cross-
examination of the witness. The evidence of complainant showed that complainant used to avail of the
notarial services of Atty. Adaza at his law office at Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila. In 1995, respondent
requested complainant, and the latter agreed, to be the primary sponsor in the baptismal of his
daughter. In November 1996, respondent accompanied by a certain Arlene went to the residence of
complainant to seek a loan. The latter lent respondent the sum of P60,000.00 payable with interest at
5% a month. Respondent issued two (2) BPI Family Bank Checks No. 35073 and No. 35076, each for
P31,800.00, dated 23 December 1996 and 24 January 1996, respectively. When presented for collection
Check No. 035073 was dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
The other check, Check No. 035076, bearing the date 24 January 1996, was not accepted for being a
stale check.

Efforts were exerted by complainant to see respondent but her efforts proved to be futile. Several
demand letters were sent to the respondent by Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, complainant’s lawyer, but these
letters also failed to elicit any response. A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City for Check No. 035073. Finding probable cause, the
complaint was subsequently elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court. A warrant of arrest was issued by
the court, but respondent somehow succeeded in evading apprehension. Sometime in November 2000,
respondent went to the house of complainant and promised to pay the checks within a month’s time.
Complainant agreed to have the service of the warrant of arrest withheld but, again, respondent failed
to make good his promise.

The cross-examination of complainant Priscilla Orbe was set on 22 May 2002. The stenographer was
directed to transcribe the stenographic notes as soon as possible for the benefit of Atty. Adaza. An order
was issued to this effect, and a copy thereof was served upon respondent on 09 April 2002.

On 22 May 2002, the complainant appeared for cross-examination but Atty. Adaza did not appear
despite due notice. In light of the manifestation of complainant that she had no other witness to present
and was ready to close her evidence, she was given a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a
formal offer and respondent was given a like period to thereupon submit his comment and/or opposition
thereto. The order, dated 22 May 2002, was served on Atty. Adaza on 28 May 2002. The formal offer of
complainant’s evidence was deemed submitted for resolution on 25 June 2002 pending proof of service
of a copy thereof upon respondent and the filing of the necessary comment or opposition thereto by the
latter.

In an order, dated 16 October 2002, the Commission set the reception of evidence for respondent on 13
November 2002 in order to give him another opportunity to rebut the evidence of complainant.
Respondent again failed to appear on the date set therefor, prompting the Commission to rule on the
admissibility of Exhibits "A" to "D" with their submarkings. There being no appearance on the part of
respondent despite due notice, the case was considered submitted for resolution by the Commission in
its order of 26 February 2003.

The Commission submitted its report and recommendation, dated 28 May 2003, recommending the
suspension of respondent Atty. Henry Adaza from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and
that he be ordered to pay to complainant the value of the two unpaid checks he issued to complainant.

The Court adopts the recommendation.

A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended from office as an attorney for any deceit,
malpractice, or misconduct in office.1 The word "conduct" used in the rules is not limited to conduct
exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties but it also refers to
any misconduct, although not connected with his professional duties, that would show him to be unfit
for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. The
grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court are not limitative 2 and are broad
enough to cover any misconduct, including dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private
capacity.3 Such misdeed puts his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to continue in the advocacy of law, 4 in
serious doubt.

Respondent’s issuance of worthless checks and his contumacious refusal to comply with his just
obligation for nearly eight years is appalling5 and hardly deserves compassion from the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Henry M. Adaza is found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt hereof. This
decision is without prejudice to the outcome of the Criminal Case for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 filed against him. Let copies of this decision be spread on his record in the Bar Confidant’s Office and
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled “People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad,
Accused.” During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused,
tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account
with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her
client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid
upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check
which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the
check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which
led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.

When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the
reason: “Account Closed.” On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that
she pay the face value of the check. [1] However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he
instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22,
1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva. [2]

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of
respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. [3]

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondent’s given address at Carmelo Compound,
Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10)
days from notice.[4] However, it was returned unserved with the notation “Moved”. [5] The Assistant
National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street,
Pasig City.[6]

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint
filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the
notation: “Refused”. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for
investigation, report and recommendation. [7]

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent
guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. Thus, he recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for two (2) years.

We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of
settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have
sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing
his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to
deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized. [8] Such an
act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138,
Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. – A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral
character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law,
the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of
the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may render
her unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9]

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment,[10] because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the
highest standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession,
whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be
disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not
speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer’s professional and personal conduct must at all times be
kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. [12]

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays
a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. [13] Her
conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker
and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to
continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice
because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would
respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple
directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not
be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondent’s persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not
even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a
lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this
by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients. [14] We can not
tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be
entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.