Safe Production of LNG on an FPSO

Martin Mayer
Process Manager, M.W.Kellogg Limited

Alan Robertson
Principal Safety Engineer, M.W.Kellogg Limited

John Sheffield
Process Technology Manager, M.W.Kellogg Limited

Roger Courtay
Naval Architect, Chantiers de l Atlantique

Rene Harr
Naval Architect, Chantiers de l Atlantique

Mayer
Introduction

A consortium of European companies within the Azure Project has developed the concept of
producing, storing and unloading LNG on an FPSO (Floating, Production, Storage and Off loading).
The AZURE project is a design collaboration of ship builders, process design contractors, equipment
suppliers and classification societies who are each designing and verifying part of the overall offshore
LNG chain. It s objective is to demonstrate that a fully floating LNG chain is a safe and
economically viable option.

Two hypothetical design cases have been developed for gas liquefaction:

• A stand-alone gas field located in the Australasian region with a gas liquefaction capacity of
3mtpa.
• An associated gas field located off the coast of West Africa, Gulf of Guinea with a gas liquefaction
capacity of 1mtpa.

Each design includes LNG and condensate storage, (LPG storage only for the Gulf of Guinea case), an
LNG unloading system based on the Boom To Tanker, (BTT), concept, and an accommodation
block. The processing facilities include gas reception, acid gas removal, dehydration, mercury
removal, liquefaction, fractionation, flares, utilities, and power generation facilities.

The safety analysis, layout issues, and the effect of motion on equipment in the development of the
LNG production facilities and the design of the steel hull are discussed in the following sections.

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Safety Analysis
One of the main objectives in the design of the LNG FPSO has been to develop an overall safety
assessment to verify the feasibility of the concept from a safety point of view. This included a
hazard identification process using zonal analysis.

Zonal analysis:

• Identifies the hazards that can potentially occur on an LNG FPSO on a zone by zone basis
• Categorises them by damage and frequency according to previous safety case experience
• Reviews the hazards against specific acceptability criteria.

This simplified qualitative analysis is consistent with the current level of design carried out on the
FPSO, i.e. PFD s and layout but not P&ID s.

Hazard Identification
The hazard identification process is based on typical systems associated with an LNG FPSO. This is
applicable to both the Australasia and Gulf of Guinea design cases. Those considered were riser
failure, turret failure, fire & explosion in process and liquefaction areas, storage tank hazards,
unloading operations, loss of essential utility & safety systems, blowdown and flare faults, dropped
loads, helicopter crashes and fire in accommodation block. For each system a worksheet is
completed incorporating the potential sources of accident, failure mode, triggering event, aggravating
and mitigating factors, means of detection, consequences and means to mitigate the consequences.

Frequency
The frequency of each event is subjectively estimated and classified according to the categories
defined in Table 1.
Table 1

FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY DEFINITIONS

F Annual Return Period
Frequency
1 <10-5 Extremely improbable: should not happen in recorded
history. i.e. considering several plants world-wide.
2 -5
10 - 10 -4 Extremely remote: should not happen in system life
3 10 -4 - 10-3 Remote: not expected in the system life
E.g. At most a few percent probability
4 10 -3 - 10-2 Probable: Could occur in system life
E.g. A few percent to 30% probability
5 10 -2 - 10-1 Occasional: expected sometimes in the system life.
E.g. 1 to 3 times.
6 >10-1 Frequent: expected several times in the system life
E.g. More than 3 times.

Consequences

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The consequences and potential damage of the hazards are defined in terms of:

• Loss of life
• Asset damage/delay in production
• Environment damage

The extent of the damage/loss was categorised into five categories:

1 - negligible
2 - minor
3 - severe
4 - critical
5 - catastrophic

Acceptability Criteria
For the non-numerical zonal analysis assessment a modified version of the non-mandatory safety
acceptance criteria suggested by EN 1473 Installation & Equipment for LNG - Design of Onshore
Installations has been used. EN 1473 criteria have been used as a basis as they included
environmental as well as economic aspects.

Generally it is understood that the EN1473 acceptability criteria are too demanding compared to
existing acceptability criteria. In fact it is estimated that the EN1473 acceptability criteria are
around 100 times more demanding than criteria applied by plant operators. Therefore the criteria
adopted by this project are more relaxed than the EN1473 criteria.

Table 2 shows the initial findings of the zonal analysis.

The asset damage DB is less severe than for the loss of life and environmental damage. This is
primarily because the accidents have been selected principally with an interest in loss of life. It
would also be possible to consider accidents which have a large impact on production but which do
not affect life. For example an escalating fire in which the crew evacuate.

Overall, table 2 shows that the LNG FPSO should be capable of meeting existing safety acceptability
criteria. It may be possible to meet more stringent safety criteria but this requires a level of detailed
design that has not been undertaken at this stage of the project.

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 Table 2
First estimates of risk on acceptability matrices.
1) Loss of life:

5 *
4 ******* **
DA - Consequences

3 * ***
2 * **** ***

1 * *
1 2 3 4 5 6

Frequency
2) Asset damage/delay in Production:

5 *
4
DB - Consequences

3 ******* **
2 ** ******* **

1 * * *
1 2 3 4 5 6

Frequency
3) Fire/explosion — Environment:

5 *
4 ******* *******
Dc - Consequences

3 * *
2 ** * *

1 * * *
1 2 3 4 5 6

Frequency
Acceptability Key:

Unacceptable
ALARP ( AS Low As Reasonably Practicable)
Acceptable
The symbol * denotes a single hazard event.

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Quantitative Risk Assessment
A limited Quantitative Risk Assessment, (QRA), has been performed. This is based on global/high
level generic data, process hazards and immediate fatalities. An analysis of escalation and evacuation
has not been carried out.
The major objective is to provide an overall estimate of risk on the LNG FPSO. Data from this
exercise has also been used to distinguish between the different liquefaction processes on a risk basis.

Overall estimate of risk on the LNG FPSO

The study is based on the standard QRA method.

Risk = Hazard Frequency x Hazard Consequence

This is based on the consequences ensuing from hydrocarbon leaks together with additional
hazards such as helicopter crash, ship collision, unloading operations, turrets/risers, dropped loads,
turbine disintegration, trips, drowning, and electrocution.

Hazard Frequency
The frequency of process leaks was determined from the inventory of the process plant using typical
data for number of valves, flanges and pipe lengths from in house data for onshore LNG plants. Only
process units having a hydrocarbon inventory were selected, although some items allocated to these
process units would be in non-flammable utility services. This leads to a slightly conservative hazard
frequency. Together with these inventory values, typical failure data for LNG plants was used to
produce a table showing the frequency of process leaks for a given hole size distribution. This is
shown in Figure 1.

Figure1

1.60 x10-1
1.40 x10-1
-1
1.20 x10
Events/year

1.00 x10-1
8.00 x10-2
6.00 x10-2
4.00 x10-2
2.00 x10-2
0

0-10 10-50 50-150 150+

Hole Size (mm)

As would be expected small holes happen often and large holes happen infrequently. However since
the consequences of the large holes are disproportionately large these comparatively rare events
cannot be ignored.

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For a given process leak the probability of the different outcomes does depend on the probability of
ignition. For example immediate ignition may result in a jet fire whilst delayed ignition could result
in a pool or gas cloud fire.

Frequencies of the other hazards associated with the LNG FPSO are based on high level global/generic
data.

Hazard Consequences
From the hole size distribution, pressures, temperatures and compositions it is possible to model how
much material may flow out and what the consequences may be. Consequences for three process
conditions were evaluated:

• LNG spills at 4 bara.

• Mixed refrigerant leaks in order to evaluate the difference between nitrogen and hydrocarbon
liquefaction processes.
• Gas at the reception facility conditions representing the gas leaks throughout the LNG plant. As
this corresponds to the highest pressure the use of this condition should be conservative.

The physical consequences of ignition for these process conditions for representative hole sizes were
evaluated to give the following hazardous outcomes:

• Gas Cloud Fires.

• Jet Fires.
• Pool Fires.
• Explosions.

The output of the consequence modelling, in terms of the expected levels of thermal radiation and
blast overpressure, together with the expected manning levels on board the LNG FPSO, can then
be used to evaluate the potential loss of life.

Summary of Individual Risk

In the QRA only loss of life, not economic or environmental factors, was considered. The loss of
life is proportional to the number of operators exposed to the hazards, so there is a clear incentive to
minimise the manpower on the LNG FPSO. The QRA has been based on a full time manning level of
fifty personnel with additional manpower during unloading operations and non daily maintenance
activities.
The numerical safety assessment used a different acceptability criteria to the zonal analysis described
earlier in this paper. That is, the Individual Worker Risk should not exceed 10-3 fatalities per year.
A summary of the results of the overall individual worker risk on the LNG FPSO for both the
Australasia and Gulf of Guinea location is shown in Table 3. These conclude that a LNG FPSO should
be able to be built to existing safety standards and levels of acceptability.

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 Table 3

Summary of Average Individual Risk

Units are fatalities per year.
1N2 =1 mtpa LNG production with N2 liquefaction cycle.
3MR=3 mtpa LNG production with a dual mixed refrigerant liquefaction cycle
Plant Capacity & Type 1N 2 3MR
Jet fire 1.54 x10-6 9.89 x10-6
-8
Pool fire 4.99 x10 2.12 x10-8
Cloud fire 1.86 x10-6 8.66 x10-6
-6
Explosions 1.9 x10 1.18 x10-5
-6
SUB-TOTAL 5.36 x10 3.04 x10-5
Escalation factor 3 3
SUB-TOTAL Allowance for process leaks 1.61x10 -5 9.12x10 -5
OTHER ACCIDENTS NOT DIFFERENTIATED BY CAPACITY OR PROCESS
Helicopter Crash 2 x10-4 2 x10-4
-5
Ships Collision 4 x10 4 x10-5
Unloading Operations 6 x10-6 6 x10-6
-5
Turrets/Risers 1 x10 1 x10-5
-5
Dropped Loads 1 x10 1 x10-5
-6
Turbine Disintegration 1 x10 1 x10-6
Trips, Drowning, Electrocution, Other 3 x10-4 3 x10-4
-4
SUB-TOTAL 5.7 x10 5.7 x10-4
-4
TOTAL ESTIMATE 5.86 x10 6.61 x10-4
-3
Upper Limit 1 x10 1 x10-3

An escalation factor of three has been used. This is a provisional figure, as a detailed analysis was not
carried out for escalation and escape. However, this figure should be achievable based on other
offshore QRA s. The low pool fire figure can be explained because the assessment of the process
does not include the product storage tanks. A fire or explosion of these storage tanks would lead to
an incident in which the LNG FPSO would not survive. The safety argument is that accidents
affecting the main storage tanks will be extremely improbable rather than that such accidents can be
withstood.

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Relative Risks of Refrigerant Processes
Two liquefaction processes have been selected for the Azure study, a nitrogen expander cycle for the
Gulf of Guinea case, (1 MTPA associated gas), and a dual mixed refrigerant cycle for the Australasia
case, (3 MTPA gas field).

The nitrogen expander cycle was chosen as it is an inherently safer cycle than other liquefaction
processes. No refrigerant storage is required and hydrocarbon inventories within the process are
minimised. Although a less efficient process, this is less important on the overall cost for plants with
lower LNG production rates.
In the Australasia case, the liquefaction rate is much higher and the operating costs become more
prevalent. The dual mixed refrigerant cycle was chosen as it has a high efficiency yet minimises the
hydrocarbon inventories.

The risks from process leaks from using a nitrogen cycle refrigerant process to using a Mixed
Refrigerant cycle have been compared.

This comparison was made by including the fire & explosion risks of the refrigeration plant for the
Mixed Refrigerant option but excluding these for the Nitrogen Plant. Strictly speaking the nitrogen
plant may have slightly higher asphyxiation risks but these were regarded as representing risks of a
lower order of magnitude.

This approach produced the following table.

Table 4

Average Individual Risk due to Immediate deaths from Process Leaks

Units are fatalities per year.
1N2 =1 mtpa LNG production with N2 liquefaction cycle.
3MR=3 mtpa LNG production with a dual mixed refrigerant liquefaction cycle
Plant Capacity & Type 1N 2 1MR 3N 2 3MR
-6 -6 -6
Jet fire 1.54 x10 3.96 x10 3.87 x10 9.89 x10-6
Pool fire 4.99 x10-8 4.99 x10-8 2.12 x10-8 2.12 x10-8
Cloud fire 1.86 x10-6 3.71 x10-6 3.52 x10-6 8.66 x10-6
Explosions 1.9 x10-6 4.44 x10-6 4.69 x10-6 1.18 x10-5
-6 -5 -5
TOTAL 5.36 x10 1.22 x10 1.21 x10 3.04 x10-5

In general the Mixed Refrigerant option increases the risks attributable to the process plant by a
factor of 2 to 3. However, this difference is small when considering the overall risks from the LNG
FPSO. Therefore overall the difference in terms of Individual Risk using the nitrogen expander cycle
rather than the DMR cycle amounts to less than 10%.
The Nitrogen cycle is a relatively inefficient process so that for a high LNG production using such a
cycle can lead to a significant loss of revenue.
If this loss of revenue is equated with the reduced loss of life then an ALARP argument could be
made, using the normal cost-benefit criteria, to determine which cycle is the preferred liquefaction
process.

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Overall Layout
The design concept for the LNG FPSO in the Australasia location is a steel hull with an external
turret. This leads to a degree of compromise in the layout of the FPSO that is not applicable on an
onshore liquefaction plant. In general on an onshore facility, accomodation, flare systems, LNG
loading systems and process plant are kept separate to minimise the overall risk. On the FPSO this is
not possible due to the restricted space available. In addition there is the hazard associated with the
turret.
Two generic layouts are possible:

• The accommodation block located at the front, near the turret.

• The accommodation block located behind or near the unloading facilities.

The limited QRA carried out does provide some insights over where the accommodation block should
be located.

Process leaks resulting in fires and explosions 1.6x10 -2/year

Ships collisions 0.2 /year
Ignited riser leaks 4.4x10 -4/year
Ignited unloading leaks 3.1x10 -4/year

In terms of fires and explosions the risers and unloading areas have similar hazard rates. The process
area has a much higher rate so being upwind of this has significant benefits. Ship collisions, which are
mainly due to loading operations, are more likely to affect the accommodation block if it is
positioned at the stern near the unloading boom.
These numbers suggest that positioning the accommodation block at the bow near the turret is
preferred to positioning at the stern near the unloading facilities.

Positioning of process units

Two factors influence the design and location of process equipment.

• The principle of placing the most hazardous systems furthest away from the accommodation
module.
• Minimising the effect of motion of key items of equipment.

The best way of evaluating which process units are the greatest risk to personnel is to conduct a QRA
which can take account of the inventory and leakage rate for each of the different units. In
particular at least two process conditions (1 liquid and 1 gas) would need be needed for each process
unit. The approach used took into account hazard rate density, fluid pressure and density, calorific
value and flammable inventories. This leads to a suggested process ordering as listed in the table 5.

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 Table 5

SUGGESTED PROCESS UNIT ORDERING

Position furthest from accommodation module
Large LNG storage tanks Relatively large inventory makes these items the most risky
on the LNG FPSO. These units and associated piping must be
segregated from Process Unit risks. These tanks will be
situated below the decks so it is essential that process risks
are prevented from escalating to the main tanks and their
associated pipework.
Ethane & Propane Storage Large liquid inventory with heavier MW (than methane) gas.
Bullets
Unloading area LNG plus regular connections and disconnections.
Refrigeration Unit Liquid processing and some stored liquids.
Risk reduced if nitrogen cycle adopted.
Fractionation Unit Liquid processing in column bottoms heavier MW (than
methane) gas.
Condensate Stabilisation Lower pressure (25barg instead of 63-73barg for gas units)
but presence of condensate likely to make fire cases worse.
Gas receiver/reception Highest gas pressure gives higher hazard rating than non-
facilities LNG downstream units.
Acid Gas Removal Reducing Pressure. Predominantly gas.
Mercury Removal Units
Dehydration Unit
Gas Turbines Some flammable gas inventory
Other Utilities
Position nearest accommodation module

The actual design follows this safety recommendation except:

• The reception facility with slightly higher gas pressure is close to the accommodation.
• The process units closest to the accommodation module are the pretreatment facilities.

Since these are at least 50 m away the present view is that it is not worth disturbing the natural
process order. In fact, to adopt a layout that does not conform to the process order would entail
extra pipework which would itself increase the risk.

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Effect of motion
A more detailed approach is required to assess the optimum location of equipment and design
guidelines that should be taken into account to ensure and maximise optimum process operation
under the prevalent sea conditions.

Basin model tests and computer simulations were carried out to define the motion characteristics of
the hull under various sea conditions. Using this data it is possible to identify the motion
characteristics of various items of equipment and hence ensure they are designed to operate
efficiently under most sea conditions, although the effect of motion on instrumentation and process
control must be considered.

Equipment on an FPSO can be categorised into the following areas, columns, separators, heat
exchangers and rotating equipment. In general equipment that is greatly affected by FPSO motions
should be located as close as possible to the centre of gravity. Less sensitive equipment can be
located further away.

Columns
Packed columns have been specified, with reduced packed heights and increased number of
redistributors to reduce liquid channelling and improve performance. In the detailed design of these
units all internals will need to be carefully designed to take account into the accelerations of process
fluids due to the FPSO s motion.

Separators
In general wherever possible vertical vessels have been specified to take advantage of the inherently
limited movement of the liquid interface. Large vessels, especially horizontal ones are located
physically as close as possible to the FPSO s centre of gravity so that the vertical component of the
FPSO motion is minimised.

Heat Exchangers
Generally the FPSO s motion has little effect on the operations of heat exchangers.
Three different types of heat exchangers whose operation can affected by the FPSO motion are:

• Plate Fin Heat Exchanger (PFHE)

• Spiral Wound (SWHE)
• Kettle Reboilers

Plate Fin Heat Exchangers

Two-phase flows feeding a PFHE should be separated into the respective phases prior to entering.
This eliminates the requirement for a 2-phase inlet distributor that is inherently difficult to operate
effectively when subjected to the FPSO s motions. The heat transfer performance of streams within
a PFHE is unlikely to be affected.

Spiral Wound Heat Exchangers

These are not proven in an FPSO service. There are both mechanical integrity and process
efficiency issues to be resolved. A research programme is currently being carried out at Lehigh
University and Heriot-Watt University for Air Products to assess these issues and to recommend
design changes that will enable spiral wound exchangers to perform effectively under the conditions
expected on an FPSO.

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The mechanical integrity portion of the programme has been completed and shows that a SWHE can
operate satisfactorily in an FPSO environment. The analysis and methodology used to validate the
structural integrity have been certified by DNV. The process portion of the programme is still
ongoing and expected to be completed later this year.

Kettle Reboilers
Kettle type reboilers behave similarly to horizontal separators. The use of internal baffles can reduce
the adverse effect of any waves generated.
In addition to baffles, the overflow weirs in reboilers need to be higher so that sufficient liquid depth
is maintained and tubes are not uncovered during motion.

Rotating equipment
Pumps, compressors and expanders are generally expected to be unaffected by the FPSO s motion.
As long as the rotating equipment vendors are aware of the service location in which the equipment
is to be operated, equipment can be expected to operate efficiently and to mechanically withstand
the effects of motion.

An exception is the liquefaction compressors. These are very large machines that have a number of
stages using the same shaft. The vibration of the common shaft increases due to the motion of the
FPSO. This increased vibration of the shaft may reduce the overall efficiency of the machine and
thus affect LNG production.
In order to reduce vibration of this long single shaft it may be necessary to reduce the length and
hence have two shafts. Reducing the length of the shaft will increase the stiffness and hence reduce
the possibility of vibration occurring.
In addition to reducing the length of the shaft, more substantial supports may be required to reduce
and eliminate vibration.

Instrumentation and control

The main problem with instrumentation is in the measurement of differential pressure for:

• level measurement.
• liquid-liquid interface measurement.
• density measurement.

The movement of phase boundaries between the measurement tappings disrupts all these
measurements.
To minimise these problems differential pressure (d/p) type sensors should be used in favour of float
type level sensors.

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Steel Hull Design

Technical requirements

The design was optimised to meet the following requirements:

• LNG storage capacities large enough for several days production and export to shore terminals by
LNG carriers.
• Large deck area to accommodate liquefaction plant, flare structure, accommodation, Boom To
Tanker, (BTT), unloading system and cargo pipes.
• Limited motions under severe sea conditions for safe operation of :

Liquefaction plant.

Off-loading to LNG shuttle tankers.

Partially filled cargo tanks and related sloshing aspects.

Mooring system.

• Mooring with an external turret

Main characteristics of the steel hull

Taking into account the above factors the selected design for the steel hull located in the
Australasian region with a 3 mtpa LNG production plant has the following key design parameters:

• A large size steel FPSO offering a large inertia with approximately 250 000 t displacement and
15˚m draught,
• 16,000m2 deck area to accommodate liquefaction plant, accommodation, BTT and flare,
• Twin hull offering large ballast volumes for constant draught and trim, at all LNG liquid storage
levels,
• Twin hull for safe anti-collision protection, continuous hull sections between LNG and
condensate tanks,
• Optimised hull shape and large draught for reduced sensitivity to wave excitations but still
ensuring a minimum cost,
• Forward turret mooring away from cargo area for weather vaning,
• Three large size (approximately 70 000m3 each) LNG membrane type tanks with transverse
shape and length optimised to minimise the risk of sloshing and allowing safe operation of the
tanks without filling restrictions.

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Sea Keeping and Model Tests
The FPSO is designed to operate in Australasia in approximately 1000 m sea depth. Model tests of
the moored FPSO have been performed by MARIN (NETHERLANDS) to check motions at sea and
compatibility with the design requirements already listed. The models were constructed to a scale of
1 to 50.

The model tests have been carried out in two parts:

• LNG FPSO moored with external turret which allows weather-vaning of the vessel.
• Operational conditions with turret moored FPSO in tandem with a standard large LNG carrier.

For both parts survival and operational tests were carried out. Turret mooring stiffness was modelled
assuming the LNG carrier was connected to FPSO by a 75 meters long hawser with maximum 7730
KN breaking load.

LNG FPSO with external turret mooring

Roll Motions

Table 6 shows a summary of the maximum roll motions for the various tests, survival conditions,
wind and current in same direction, (operational collinear), wind and current perpendicular to each
other, (operational crossed), with or without a thruster in operation.

Table 6

Test no. Roll motions in degrees roll Remark

period
Mean st.dev A max + A max - 2A max
202006 0.39 0.52 2.33 -1.32 3.65 17.5 s Survival crossed
203006 0.20 0.08 0.50 -0.10 0.49 16.5 s Operational collinear
202014 0.26 0.08 0.57 -0.06 0.51 16.6 s Operational crossed
202025 0.19 0.07 0.45 -0.06 0.32 16.8 s Operational crossed
70 kN FPSO thrust

From the table it can be concluded that the roll motions are small for the tests carried out. Maximum
roll motions are in the range of 2¡ for survival conditions and below 0.6¡ for operation of the process
plant.
The block coefficient of the FPSO is large, which means that there is a relatively large amount of
buoyancy at the bow, sides and stern of the vessel. Combined with the sharp edges between the
bottom and sides of the FPSO results in damping of the roll motion.

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Accelerations

An important aspect of the process plant design is the accelerations due to the motion of the FPSO.
Table 7 shows the mean accelerations for the survival conditions with the wind and waves
perpendicular to the current. From the table it can be concluded that the measured accelerations are
small.

Table 7

mean St.dev A max + A max - 2A max No.

AX FPSO BL m/s2 0.01 0.11 0.30 -0.33 0.59 867
AY FPSO BL m/s2 0.00 0.11 0.35 -0.37 0.72 694
AZ FPSO BL m/s2 0.03 0.23 0.72 -0.66 1.37 835

Mooring line loads.

Motions of the FPSO induce the variations of the mooring line loads. These motions consist of a
wave frequency and a low frequency part. The forces in the mooring system counteract the low
frequency motions, whereas the wave motions are only slightly reduced by the mooring system.
Figure 2 show the horizontal turret loads. Horizontal motions of the FPSO are small and hence the
resulting standard deviations of the mooring line loads are small.

Figure 2

3900
mean( FH_TUR) = 2201kN

stdev ( FH_TUR) = 523kN

2600
FH_TUR

max( FH_TUR) = 3839kN

kN
1300

min( FH_TUR) = 401kN

0
. 4 . 4
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 1 10 1.2 10
time
s

LNG FPSO and LNG carrier in tandem

During the tandem offloading test, the following points were observed:

• The system is stable without a thruster (on FPSO or LNG carrier, limited fish-tailing was observed
with a long period - above 10 minutes).
• The FPSO and LNG carriers both head to wind and waves, hence reducing roll motion for both
the FPSO and LNG carrier.
• The hawser connecting the FPSO to the LNG carrier is subject to very limited forces (about 20 %
of maximum allowable load) and hawser does not become slack during tests.

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Figure 3 shows the force in the hawser during tandem offloading. The maximum force is observed in
the conditions where wave, wind and currents are in the same direction. The peak force, 463 kN
occurs 4350 seconds after the start of the test. This load occurs adjacent to the minimum load. The
peak load is significantly lower than the breaking load of 7730 kN for the hawser.

Figure 3

c Test 203006
r
600
o
f
400
r
e
s 200
w
a
H 0

200
4000 4500 5000 5500
time in seconds

The maximum relative motions between FPSO and LNG carrier are shown in Figures 4 and 5. These
occur when the wind, waves and currents are collinear. The motions are well within the operating
limits of the Boom To Tanker loading system. As stated earlier the relative motions consist of a
wave frequency and a low frequency part. The wave frequency motions are small compared to the
low frequency motions. The low frequency motion results in the typical fish tailing motions. First
the bow of the shuttle starts to move starboard (t=2500s), when the shuttle has a small angle with
respect to the wind and current a lift force on the vessel results in a sway motion to starboard. A few
minutes later, (t=2750 s), the force on the hawser pulls the bow to portside. The lift due to wind and
current is now in the opposite direction and the shuttle sways to the port side. This can continue for
a long time and can be reduced by shortening the length of the hawser line or using the backward
stern thrust of the LNG carrier.

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In summary the relative motions between the FPSO and LNG carrier show:

Small axial displacements.

Slow (period in excess of 10 minutes) lateral drift due to fish tailing which
can be compensated by BTT crane rotation.

Position within operating range of boom head.

Figure 4

horizontal relative motions in test 203006

t = 3000 s t = 2750 s
75 t = 3100 s

X FPSOLNGC
t = 2500 s
80
t = 2900 s

20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15
YFPSOLNGC

Figure 5 shows the relative motions between the FPSO and LNG carrier assuming the
FPSO is fixed. The arcs represent the possible positions of the loading boom end and the
space where loading is possible assuming the crane is in the correct position. A circle
with a diameter of 16 m represents the offloading area under the boom end.

Figure 5

67.5

60

Boom location
52.5
8m from center
45 F PSO
b d
37.5

30

22.5

15
8m offloading
7.5 iti
Offloading circular zone
0 under the booms end
(diameter 16 metre)
7. 5

15
Boom
22. 5
22.5 15 7.5 0 7. 5 15 22. 5 30 37.5 45 52.5 60 67. 5 75

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Failure cases

The following failure cases were tested:

Bow hawser breakage during offloading.

LNG carrier stern thrust failure.

For both cases the relative velocity between the vessels was determined. This is an
important parameter to estimate the available time to disconnect the hose line after a
bow hawser breakage. For the stern thrust failure this velocity gives an indication of the
risk of collision of the two vessels when during off loading the main thruster on the LNG
carrier fails. The test was carried out with a 30 tonne backward thrust applied to the
LNG carrier tanker.

Figure 6 shows the surge motion of the LNG carrier after the hawser failure at t=0. From
this figure it is clear that after hawser failure the LNG carrier starts to accelerate. After
approximately 50 seconds the maximum velocity is reached. The vessel drifts away with
a relative velocity of 0.38 m/s.

Figure 6

X FPSOLNGC in metre
80

test_203008 90

test_203009

test_203010

100

110
40 20 0 20 40 60 80 100
time

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A similar test was carried out to investigate the risk of collision in calm water in case of
failure of backward thrust of LNG shuttle, due to the spring effects of both hawser and
mooring system. See Figure 7. The results of the test showed a forward speed of
0.11˚m/s for the LNG carrier. In the first 400 seconds after failure of the thruster the
LNG carrier sails forward 45 m. This figure would need to be used to determine the
period in which the BTT would need to be disconnected.

Figure 7
Test 203011, test in CALM water.
LNGC with initially 370 kN stern thrust

First 400 sec. after thrus ter failure

30

40

50
XFPSOLNGC Meters

60

70

80
0 20 40
YFPSOLNGC Meters

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Conclusions
The development work carried out for the Project Azure shows that a large steel hull FPSO can be
designed and built such that it provides sufficient topsides area for the process plant, utilities and
accommodation with and LNG storage capacity for a liquefaction capability of 3 mtpa. The steel
hull can be designed to be very stable under most sea conditions thus minimising motion on the
process equipment and the unloading operations as well as avoiding excessive impact on the LNG
storage tanks due to the effects of sloshing.

The safety assessments carried out show that the LNG FPSO should be capable of meeting existing
safety acceptability criteria.

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