Page 1 of 19
ART. 13 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING/EXEMPTING
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ELADIO C.
TANGAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 105830. February 23, 2001]
ELADIO C. TANGAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
At around 11:30 p.m. Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas
Boulevard heading south. At the same time, Generoso Miranda, was driving his car in the
same direction along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle, Manuel Miranda.
Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in
Generosos way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangans path. Tangan blew
his horn several times. Generoso slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated
and overtook Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried
four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane. As he
approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-turn. Generoso passed him,
pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got
out. As the Mirandas got near Tangans car, Generoso loudly retorted, Putang ina mo,
bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko? Generoso and Tangan then exchanged
expletives. Tangan pointed his hand to Generoso and the latter slapped it, saying, Huwag
mo akong dinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano ba ang pinagmamalaki mo? Tangan countered, Ikaw,
ano ang gusto mo? With this, Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on
the front seat.The subsequent events per account of the parties respective witnesses
were conflicting:
The prosecution claimed that Tangan shot the victim point-blank in the stomach at a
distance of about one foot. On the other hand, Tangan alleged that when he grappled with
Generoso and Manuel Miranda for possession of the gun, it fell to the ground and
accidentally fired, hitting the victim.Genoroso died while on the way to the hospital.
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
LOWER COURT RULING
The lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of
homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the
ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended
party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor; consequently, the trial
court ordered him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.[8] Tangan was released from detention after the
promulgation of judgment[9] and was allowed bail in the homicide case.
ISSUE:
WON the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense was
properly granted?
HELD: NO.It is noteworthy that during the trial, petitioner Tangan did not invoke self-
defense but claimed that Generoso was accidentally shot. As such, the burden of proving
self-defense, which normally would have belonged to Tangan, did not come into
play. Although Tangan must prove his defense of accidental firing by clear and convincing
evidence, the burden of proving the commission of the crime remained in the prosecution.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals appreciated in favor of Tangan the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13 (1), in relation to
Article 11 (1), of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
xxxxxxxxx
ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances. The following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding Chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify
the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating
circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the information is not
shifted to the accused. In order that it may be successfully appreciated, however, it is
necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the
requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or
in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-
defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or
incomplete, because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of
defense will have no basis.
There is no question that the bullet which hit the victim was fired from the caliber. 38,
which was issued to Tangan by the Philippine Navy. The cause of death was severe
hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound of the abdomen, caused by the bullet fired from
a gun of the said caliber.
It is established that the shooting was not accidental, the next issue to be resolved is
whether Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense. The element of unlawful aggression in
self-defense must not come from the person defending himself but from the victim.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. Likewise, the exchange of
insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how
objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with
physical assault. There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the
claim of incomplete self-defense falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but
the Mirandas tried to wrestle the gun from him. It may be said that the former had no
intention of killing the victim but simply to retain possession of his gun. However, the fact
that the victim subsequently died as a result of the gunshot wound, though the shooter
may not have the intention to kill, does not absolve him from culpability. Having caused
the fatal wound, Tangan is responsible for all the consequences of his felonious act. He
brought out the gun, wrestled with the Mirandas but anticipating that the gun may be taken
from him, he fired and fled.
The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself is not supported by evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas for
almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one who provoked the former. The repeated
blowing of horns, assuming it was done by Generoso, may be irritating to an impatient
driver but it certainly could not be considered as creating so powerful an inducement as to
incite provocation for the other party to act violently.
The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and
passion and obfuscation under Article 13, paragraphs 4 and 6, have no factual
basis. Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete self-defense is different from
sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance. As an element of self-defense, it
pertains to its absence on the part of the person defending himself; while as a mitigating
circumstance, it pertains to its presence on the part of the offended party. Besides, only
one mitigating circumstance can arise out of one and the same act. Assuming for the sake
of argument that the blowing of horns, cutting of lanes or overtaking can be considered as
acts of provocation, the same were not sufficient. The word sufficient means adequate to
excite a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its
gravity. Moreover, Generosos act of asking for an explanation from Tangan was not
sufficient provocation for him to claim that he was provoked to kill or injure Generoso.
For the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation to be appreciated, it is
required that (1) there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition
of mind; and
(2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his
normal equanimity.
In the case at bar, Tangan could not have possibly acted upon an impulse for there was
no sudden and unexpected occurrence which would have created such condition in his
mind to shoot the victim. Assuming that his path was suddenly blocked by Generoso
Miranda due to the firecrackers, it can no longer be treated as a startling occurrence,
precisely because he had already passed them and was already the one blocking their
path. Tangans acts were done in the spirit of revenge and lawlessness, for which no
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation can arise.
With respect to the penalty, under the laws then existing, homicide was penalized
with reclusion temporal, but if the homicide was committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty shall be death. The death penalty, however, cannot be imposed on
Tangan because in the meantime, the 1987 Constitution proscribed the imposition of
death penalty; and although it was later restored in 1994, the retroactive application of the
death penalty is unfavorable to him. Previously, the accused may be prosecuted for two
crimes: (1) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and (2) illegal possession
of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. 1866.
P.D. 1866 was amended by R.A. No. 8294, which provides that if an unlicensed firearm is
used in murder or homicide, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance and no longer considered as a separate offense, which means
that only one offense shall be punished murder or homicide. However, this law cannot
apply retroactively because it will result in the imposition on Tangan of the maximum
period of the penalty. Moreover, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the
information. Being favorable, this new rule can be given retroactive effect as they are
applicable to pending cases. In any case, Tangan was acquitted of the illegal possession
case.
Consequently, Tangan should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal. Pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, if the prescribed penalty is
composed of three periods, and there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance,
the medium period shall be applied. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which, in view of the attendant
circumstances, may be properly imposed, which in this case is reclusion temporal medium
with an imprisonment range of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence
shall be the next lower degree which is prision mayor with a range of from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.[51] Hence, petitioner Tangan is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. The
appealed decision subject of G.R. No. 105830 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties.
(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victims heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P42,000.00
as funeral and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
---------------------xxx----------------------
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. DENNIS TORPIO y ESTRERA
G.R. No. 138984 June 4, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.
CrimRev/ Mitigating Circumstances; Provocation
FACTS: (Konti lang discussion about Mitigating Circumstances)
Prosecution Version: A family of seven, Manuel Torpio and wife included, together with
an old woman visitor named Fausta Mariaca, were taking their supper. Anthony Rapas
knocked and asked for Dennis Torpio who, after eating, went and left home with Anthony
upon the latter’s invitation for a drinking spree. They have (sic) some round of drinks at a
nearby store together with another companion. Not contented, they left and proceeded to
the seashore where in a cottage there were people also drinking. Joining the group,
Anthony and Dennis again drank. Later, the two and their companion transferred to
another cottage and there they again drank now with gin liquor except Dennis who did not
anymore drink.
For one reason or another, because Dennis did not drink, Anthony got angry and he then
bathed Dennis with gin, and boxed or mauled him and tried to stab him with
a batangas knife but failed to hit Dennis as the latter was crawling under the table. He got
up and ran towards home. His family was awaken[ed], his mother shouted as Dennis was
taking a knife and appearing (sic) bloodied. Manuel Torpio woke up and tried to take the
knife from Dennis but failed and, in the process, wounded or cut himself in his left hand.
Dennis left with the knife, passed by another route towards the seashore and upon
reaching the cottage where Anthony and their companion Porboy Perez were, looked for
Anthony. Anthony upon seeing Dennis sensed danger and he fled by taking the seashore.
But Dennis, being accustomed to the place and having known the terrain despite the dark
(sic) knew, upon being suggested by somebody whom Dennis claimed to be Rey Mellang,
that there is only one exit Anthony could make and, thus, he went the other way through
the nipa plantation and he was able to meet and block Anthony. Upon seeing the shining
knife of Dennis, Anthony tried to evade by turning to his left and Dennis thus hit the back
portion of Anthony. Anthony ran farther but he was caught in a fishing net across the small
creek and he fell on his back. It is at this juncture (sic) Dennis mounted on (sic) Anthony
and continued stabbing the latter. He left the place but did not proceed to (sic) home,
instead, he went to the grassy meadow near the camp and there slept until morning. He
then went to a certain police officer to whom he voluntarily surrendered and together they
went to the police headquarters.3
Defense Version: [O]n October 11, 1997 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, while he
and his family, Manuel, his father and mother and an old woman visitor named Fausta
Mariaca included, were having dinner, Anthony Rapas knocked at their door. Anthony
invited Dennis for a drinking spree. Both left after dinner, went to the store of a certain
Codog and there started drinking. The store was about 70 meters away from Dennis’
house, in Barangay Camp Downes, Ormoc City. They consumed a half gallon of tuba,

drinking with a companion named Porboy Perez. Two small bottles of Red Horse beer
were added, after which the three proceeded to the seashore, in a cottage of a beach
resort there named Shoreline. Arriving there, there were some people drinking also and
they offered them drinks and the two obliged. Afterwards, they went to a cottage and later
Porboy arrived bringing with him a liquor gin. Dennis did not drink the gin, only Anthony
and Porboy did. [T]hen after drinking the gin, Anthony tried to let Dennis drink the gin and
as the latter still refused, Anthony allegedly bathed Dennis with gin and mauled him
several times. Dennis crawled beneath the table and Anthony tried to stab him with a 22
fan knife but did not hit him. Dennis got up and ran towards their home. Upon reaching
home, he got a knife and as his mother was alarmed and shouted, a commotion ensued.
Manuel, his father, awoke and tried to scold Dennis and confiscate from him the knife but
he failed, resulting to Manuel’s incurring a wound on his hand. He went back to the
cottage by another route and upon arrival Porboy and Anthony were still there. Upon
seeing Dennis, Anthony allegedly avoided Dennis and ran by passing the shore towards
the creek. Rey Mellang went out of his house at this time and said "meet him ‘Den,’"
alluding to Anthony and to Dennis, respectively. Dennis did meet him, virtually blocked
him and stabbed him. When he was hit, Anthony ran but then he got entangled with a
fishing net beside the creek and Anthony fell on his back, and Dennis mounted on (sic)
him and continued stabbing him. After stabbing (sic), Dennis left and went to the grassy
meadow at Camp Downes and slept there. At about 7:00 in the morning, he went to a
known police officer named Boy Estrera in San Pedro Street, Ormoc City and to whom he
voluntarily surrendered. He was later turned over to the police headquarters.
The trial court rendered judgment acquitting accused Manuel Torpio but convicting the
appellant of murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation and appreciating in his
favor the following mitigating circumstances: (a) sufficient provocation on the part of the
offended party (the deceased Anthony) preceded the act; (b) the accused acted to
vindicate immediately a grave offense committed by the victim; and, (c) voluntary
surrender.
ISSUES: W/N provocation must be appreciated as a mitigating circumstances. NO
HELD: It is axiomatic that qualifying and aggravating circumstances, like treachery and
evident premeditation, must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the crime
charged.8 Such circumstances cannot be presumed; nor can they be based on mere
surmises or speculations.9 In case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the
accused.10
There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the execution
of the crime which tends directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.11 There must be
evidence showing that the mode of attack was consciously or deliberately adopted by the
culprit to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself or
retaliate.12 Further, the essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack without the
slightest provocation by the victim.13
In this case, the record is barren of evidence showing any method or means employed by
the appellant in order to ensure his safety from any retaliation that could be put up by the
victim. The appellant acted to avenge Anthony’s felonious acts of mauling and stabbing
him. Although the appellant bled from his stab wound, he ran home, armed himself with a
knife and confronted Anthony intentionally. When the latter fled, the appellant ran after him
and managed to stab and kill the victim.
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation requires that the execution of the
criminal act by the accused be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon a resolution
to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.15 Evident premeditation needs proof of the time when the intent to commit the
crime is engendered in the mind of the accused, the motive which gives rise to it, and the
means which are beforehand selected to carry out that intent. All such facts and
antecedents which make notorious the pre-existing design to accomplish the criminal
purpose must be proven to the satisfaction of the court.16
Nothing in the records supports the trial court’s conclusion that evident premeditation
attended the commission of the crime in this case. It was not shown by the prosecution
that, in killing Anthony, the appellant had definitely resolved to commit the offense and had
reflected on the means to bring about the execution following an appreciable length of
time.Without any proof of any circumstance that would qualify it, the killing could not
amount to murder. The appellant should, thus, be held liable only for homicide for the
death of Anthony.
The Court agrees with the trial court that mitigating circumstances should be considered in
the appellant’s favor. However, only two out of the three mitigating
circumstances18 considered by the trial court can be credited to the appellant. The trial
court properly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as it had
been established that the appellant, after he killed Anthony, lost no time in submitting
himself to the authorities by going to Boy Estrera, a police officer.
The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense was, likewise, properly appreciated. The appellant was humiliated, mauled and
almost stabbed by the deceased. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased when the
appellant stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave offense for which the appellant
may be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance.19 But the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a
grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident, i.e., the
attack on the appellant by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one
mitigating circumstance.20
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion
temporal. However, considering that there are two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance attendant to the crime, the imposable penalty, following Article
64(5)21 of the Revised Penal Code, is prision mayor, the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that the court may deem applicable. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional. Hence, the imposable
penalty on the appellant is imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
------------------------------xxx-----------------------
G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
ART. 13. Mitigating Circumstances: Passion or Obfuscation
PANGANIBAN
(Included was the discussion about Battered Wife Syndrome and its effects in relation to
Self-defense)
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the
facts in this wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc
City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a
time, Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995,
Page 2 of 19
however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang,
Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl
Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their
salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass
Ben's house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that
appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while
Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiaorunner to
place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of
the Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben
replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive.
Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and
was always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor
living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going
to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle
to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going
to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each
one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he
was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph,
appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as
Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor
emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find
out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not
have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel
saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window
to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the
offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side
on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his
head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about
his son's misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the
dead body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the
police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas'
rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3
Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the
dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape
of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of
an aparadora metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a
wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of
one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one
end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be
taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted
by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte
responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to
three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr.
Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against
appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital
[bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November
15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone
gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for
Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found
Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's
request for her to sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight.
She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their
homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with
the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching
television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom,
but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and
screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she
wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew
into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the
neck, and told her 'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not
have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however,
'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet.
Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the
blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the
spot, though, but in the bedroom." (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the
prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping.
Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery,
because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed
asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court
allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death;
(2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine
her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said
experts' reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the
alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts'
testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's
Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological
and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the
lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit
copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by
two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan and Alfredo Pajarillo, supposedly experts
on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were

then presented to and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this
Court to form part of the records of the case.
The Issue
Whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible
error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's
disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of
the trial court.
xxx
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a
drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic
review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for
which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the
crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-
defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the
surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character,
especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense
and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is
incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing
evidence. Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly,
defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to
the defense.
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman
syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in
foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. By
appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign
courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who
has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time."
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be
classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs
a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional
beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon
the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and
false hopes that the relationship will improve.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of
violence," which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight
physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the
batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way.
What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are
comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by
the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory" and
passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not
usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses
the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the
persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she
becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and
abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control" and leads
to an acute battering incident.
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness
and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet
also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to
the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his
reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with
him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain,
although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face
of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger
physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back.
Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent
bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends.
During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the
batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he
has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and
promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to
convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for
the better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of
the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being.
The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional
help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him
does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of
remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's
psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each
other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable
cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner may believe that it is better to
die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning
without the other.
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his
Psychiatric Report, which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa.
The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked
good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until "Ben started to be attracted to
other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the
same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family,
particularly to his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses
Page 3 of 19
but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of
her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had
to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They
had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was
battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was
drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting
from the Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-
meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But
incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x."
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that
Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic
violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the
treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing
of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence
inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter's "ability to act decisively in her
own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape." In her
years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often escalates at the point of
separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then."
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman usually
has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing
characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they
provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they
provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them."
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not
readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's
belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact
at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for her spouse to
change.
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously
testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty
thousand" violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such
cases abounded. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in
about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the
woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic
stress disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism." After being
repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons "may believe that they are essentially
helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have
the effect of stimulating the development of coping responses to the trauma at the
expense of the victim's ability to muster an active response to try to escape further
trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have
a predictable positive effect."
A study conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania,
found that "even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not,
she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying
to escape." He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that
proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he
truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the individual's set of beliefs
or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women don't attempt to leave the
battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because
they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does
will alter their terrible circumstances."
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent
behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is
no escape. Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to
leave the relationship. Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only
because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she
leaves she would be found and hurt even more.
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing
that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long
period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed
to find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we
failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential
characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death
of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She
was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However,
that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she
failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through
a similar pattern.
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and
thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the
syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense.
Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how
the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of
repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They
corroborated each other's testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of
hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences
and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they
concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must
be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that
would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested
specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish
the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered
in the context of self-defense.
The Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the
battered woman at the time of the offense -- she must have actually feared imminent harm
from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense
must face a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent

and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following
requisites and effect of self-defense:
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual,
sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there
was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack
upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to
bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He
was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and
based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have
pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her
life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from
BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required.
Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered
person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to
sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" Still, impending danger (based on the conduct
of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force
must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required
imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-
defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-
defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or
incomplete -- on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely
justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying
circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate
in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that
an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which
has not been raised by the parties.
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke
down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she
developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed
continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part."
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of
"repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the
severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted
in "cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural
self-control," "psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of
memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous
to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however,
depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her
freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of
the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered
as a mitigating factor.
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It
has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of
an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance,
the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her
normal equanimity.
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor,
preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging
her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled
that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on
that of her fetus. His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the
lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation
overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her
emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise;
she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die.
In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she
took the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable
period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is
Dr. Pajarillo's testimony that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a victim of
"overwhelming brutality [or] trauma" -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were
real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-
experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She
thinks "of nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person
under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief
time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she
should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of
the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings
over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of
her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had
inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months
pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but
likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion and
obfuscation on her part.
Page 4 of 19
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty
is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for
parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
-----------------------xxx------------------
ART. 13 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE; PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
PEOPLE v. GONZALES
G.R. No. 139542 June 21, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS
On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot to death in
the course of her husbands altercation with the accused-appellant (Gonzales) and his son
along the Garden of Remembrance within the Loyola Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial
court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at
about 2:30 p.m. both the families of the private complainant Noel Andres and that of the
accused-appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park. The appellant was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and
three housemaids, while the private complainant was driving a maroon Toyota FX with his
pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his two year old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his
sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. At the intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while
the accused-appellant Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and the complainant
Noel Andres was headed straight along the road to the exit their two vehicles almost
collided. Noel Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. The appellant continued
driving along his way while Noel Andres drove behind the appellants vehicle for some time
and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so. Noel Andres then got out of his
vehicle and knocked on the appellants car window.
PROSECUTION’s VERSION: Noel Andres calmly told the appellant to be careful with his
driving and informed the latter that he, Andres, is with his family and to this Gonzalez
allegedly replied, Accidents are accidents, whats your problem. Andres stated that he saw
the appellant turning red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle when he was
blocked by the appellants son who said, Anong problema mo sa erpat ko. Andres testified
that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded his vehicle, sat at the drivers seat,
closed the door, and partially opened the car window just wide enough to talk back to
appellants son, Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers said Binaril kami. He turned to his
wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied and unconscious. He turned around and saw
his son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were also wounded. Andres admitted in court that he
and Dino were shouting at each other so that he did not hear the shot. Andres then got out
of his vehicle to warn the appellant not to flee. He then took the wounded members of his
family to the exit where there was an ambulance standing by. The three were then taken
to the Sta. Monica Hospital and were later transferred to the Quezon City Medical Center.
DEFENSE’s VERSION: Andres cut the appellants path by positioning his FX obliquely
along the appellants lane from the latters left side. Andres then got out of his vehicle,
stood beside the appellants car window, and repeatedly cursed the appellant, Putang ina
mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo mo. The
appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly replied, Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita,
nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang. The appellant Gonzalez and another witness for the defense,
Quidic, testified that Noel Andres went back to his vehicle to move it in such a way that it
is straight in front of the appellants car. Andres allegedly got out of his vehicle again and
continued shouting and cursing at the appellant.[4] Dino, the appellants son, who rode in
another vehicle decided to go back when he did not see his fathers car behind him. When
Dino arrived at the scene he confronted Andres and the two had an altercation. Both Dino
and the appellant stated that Andres remained outside his vehicle during the altercation
with Dino. When Andres suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle, Dino froze on
the spot where he stood. This prompted the appellant to get his gun from the glove
compartment and feeling that his son was threatened he got out of his car ready to shoot.
When he saw that Andres did not have a weapon he put down his hand holding the gun.
This is when the appellants daughter Trisha who was riding in Dinos car arrived at the
scene, walked past Dino and Andres, and pushed the appellant away. She hugged her
father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his
hand and with Trishas substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his
balance and the gun accidentally fired. The accused stated that he did not know he shot
somebody until the private complainants sister-in-law, Francar Valdez, got out of the
vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. The defense claims that the appellant did not try to
flee and even told the complainants sister-in-law to take the wounded to the hospital.
RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime
of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation
RULING (NO)
The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete
defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the
defense, were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the imposition of
penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellants pretense of
voluntary surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the appellant drove away towards the
gate of the memorial park while he was questioning him after the shooting and had not
Noel Andres and onlookers blocked his path the appellant could have fled the scene of the
crime.
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. For this
mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an unlawful act
sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2)
that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of
the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accuseds mind; and that (3) the

passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness
or revenge. Noel Andres act of shouting at the appellants son, who was then a nurse and
of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation as it is claimed by the
accused. Besides, the appellants son, Dino was shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not
a case wherein the appellants son appeared helpless and oppressed that the appellant
lost his reason and shot at the FX of Noel Andres. The same holds true for the appellants
claim of provocation on the part of Noel Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a
person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate
to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the
circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant
and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at
the complainants vehicle.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the
appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight
physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is
hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor in its medium period.
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code are not applicable in this case. Art. 48 applies if a single act constitutes two or
more grave and less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means of
committing another; in such a case, the penalty for the most serious offense shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 25
defines grave felonies as those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
afflictive penalties from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor; less grave felonies are those
to which the law attaches a penalty which in its maximum period falls under correctional
penalties; and light felonies are those punishable by arresto menor or fine not exceeding
two hundred pesos. Considering that the offenses committed by the act of the appellant of
firing a single shot are one count of homicide, a grave felony, and two counts of slight
physical injuries, a light felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes,
which requires two or more grave and/or less grave felonies, will not apply.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The appellant is
hereby found guilty of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres and is sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth
Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.
The pecuniary awards granted by the trial court are hereby sustained.
-------------------------------xxx-----------------------
PEOPLE V. THADEOS ENGUITO
G.R. No. 128812, 28 February 2000, J. Gonzaga
PRINCIPLE: Article 13, Mitigating Circumstance – Passion or Obfuscation
On 22 September 1991, at about 3 p.m., Requerme, a motorela driver who while driving
his motorela with his wife on board, from Lapasan towards Poblacion, CDO, picked up a
passenger near the Nazareno Church. The passenger was identified as the deceased,
Engr. Achumbre. Achumbre asked him to bring him across the Marcos bridge towards his
home. After travelling a distance of 300 meters more or less and near the Sacred Heart of
Jesus Montessori School, Requermo’s motorela was bumped by a white motor vehicle.
The vehicle kept on pushing the motorela causing it to run very fast for the next 400
meters until it reached the area in front of Wheels Marketing. According to the wife of
Requerma, she observed that the face of the driver of the vehicle bumping them was
bloody; she shouted and waved her hand signalling the driver to stop but the driver kept
on pushing the motorela violently. The push was so fasat and strong that the motorela
was already at the Marco Bridge. Then the motorela made a 180 degdrees. Struggling
out of the motorela she noticed that the white vehicle up the catwalk pursuing Achumbre
who was hit when he was already in the railing, who eventually died.
Because of the violent push the motorela turned around facing the direction where it came
from and fell on its right side. Requerma screamed for help thinking that his wife was
pinned underneath. A tamaraw pick-up stopped near them and he immediately informed
that they intentionally hit by the white vehicle. They were brought to the Operation
Kahusay ug Kalina (OKK), a 24-hour police station where all victims of crimes report in
CDO. The OKK, the driver of the white service pick-up who bumped his motorela arrived.
Requerma identified the driver as Enguito who he pointed inside the courtroom.
Requerme presented a medical certificate issued by the examining physician to establish
injuries suffered.
According to Enguito, the death of the victim was purely accident, he was a co-
employee of the victim, declared that they were close friends and they used to play
basketball together. He maintained that on the day of the accident, at 3 a.m., he was
about to bring Achumbre to his house, Enguito was driving a Cere Kia pick-up owned by
G&P Construction. At the crossroad going to the house of Achumbre, Achumbre refused
to step down compelling Enguito to go back to where they came from at Divisoria.
Enguito observed that Achumbre was already drunk. When Enguito decided to drive
home, Achumbre suddenly stepped on the brakes and attempted to take over the vehicle.
The car stopped and Enguito quickly jump out and ran towards his house with Achumbre
chasing him and mauled the former. As a result, Enguito became dizzy. When he noticed
that Achumbre left, he drove again the car in order to report the incident to the police.
Turning towards Recto Avenue, he saw a motorela which had Achumbre as passenger
cruising along and followed it with an intention of compelling Achumbre to surrender to the
police. Achumbre suddenly jumped towards the right of the Ceres Kia and he was hit.
Enguito attempted to apply the brakes but it was so sudden and Achumbre was so near.
In trying to avoid Achumbre, the Kia hit the railings damaging the windshield, right front
headlight, and siding of the vehicle.
Upon cross examination, Enguito affirmed that Achumbre mauled him and bloodied his
face he was very angry with the latter.
RTC Ruling: Enguito was found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide with Less Serious Physical Injuries.
CA Ruling: It was found that the accused killed the victim with the use of motor vehicle, he
should be guilty of the crime of murder and not of homicide
Page 5 of 19
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to invoke the mitigating circumstance of
passion.
The court find that this mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated. The
accused was allegedly still very angry, while he was following, bumping and pushing the
motorela which was in front of him. He was previously mauled by the deceased and he
was allegedly rendered unconscious by the blows inflicted on him. When he regained
consciousness, he claims that he wanted to look for a policeman to report the he was
mauled. Clearly, the accused state of mind after he was mauled and before he
crushed Achumbre to death was such that he was still able to act reasonably. In
fact, he admitted having seen a police mobile patrol nearby but instead, he chose to resort
to the dastardly act which resulted in the death of Achumbre and in the injuries of the
spouses Requerme. For passion to be considered as a mitigating circumstance,
facts must be proved to show causes sufficient to produce loss of self-control and
to overcome reason. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a
quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the
mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his
sanity and self-control.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a mitigating
circumstances in the case at bar will not affect the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Art.
63 of RPC. The crim committed is a complex crime of murder with less serious physical
injuries. Under Art. 48, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the penalty for the
most serious crime.
SC: Enguito is convicted of the complex crime of Murder with Less Serious
Physical Injuries
----------------------------xxx-----------------------------
CASE TITLE: ROSARIO T. DE VERA, petitioner, vs. GEREN A. DE VERA,
respondent.
CASE No.: G.R. No. 172832. April 7, 2009.
TOPIC: VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
PONENTE: JUSTICE NACHURA
FACTS: Petitioner Rosario T. de Vera accused her spouse Geren A. de Vera (Geren) and
Josephine F. Juliano (Josephine) of Bigamy. Upon arraignment, Geren pleaded Guilty.
However, in a Motion, he prayed that he be allowed to withdraw his plea in the meantime
in order to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The motion was
opposed by petitioner on the ground that not all the elements of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender were present. She added that voluntary surrender
was raised only as an afterthought, as Geren had earlier invoked a voluntary plea of guilty
without raising the former. Finally, she posited that since the case was ready for
promulgation, Geren’s motion should no longer be entertained.
The RTC granted Geren’s motion and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender in the determination of the penalty to be imposed. The RTC rendered
judgment finding Geren guilty of bigamy. According to the RTC, there being 2 mitigating
circumstances (Plea of guilty and voluntary surrender), and no aggravating circumstance,
Geren was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 MONTHS of ARRESTO MAYOR, as
minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS of PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as
maximum.
Unsatisfied, Petitioner moved for the partial reconsideration but was denied. In the
meantime, Geren applied for probation which was favorably acted upon by the RTC by
referring it to the Probation Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila.
For failure to obtain favorable action from the RTC, Petitioner instituted a special civil
action for certiorari before the CA. However, she failed to persuade the CA which
rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC Order and Sentence, and the assailed
resolution denying her MR. In sustaining the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the CA maintained that all its requisites were present. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE/s: Whether the MC of Voluntary Surrender may be appreciated in the instant case.
RULING: YES. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should
be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary.
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give
himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt
or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his
search and capture. Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the
supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the
surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as voluntary
surrender to serve as a mitigating circumstance.
Petitioner is correct in saying that in People v. Cagas and in People v. Taraya, the Court
added a fourth requisite before voluntary surrender may be appreciated in favor of the
accused that there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. Since the warrant of
arrest had been issued, petitioner insists that arrest was imminent and the surrender could
not be considered voluntary.
In Cagas, after the stabbing incident, the accused ran to the upper portion of the cemetery
where a police officer caught up with him. Thereupon, he voluntarily gave himself up. The
Court held that if the accused did then and there surrender, it was because he was left
with no choice. Thus, the surrender was not spontaneous.
In Taraya, when the accused learned that the police authorities were looking for him
(because of a warrant for his arrest), he immediately went to the police station where he
confessed that he killed the victim. Notwithstanding such surrender and confession to the
police, the Court refused to appreciate the mitigating circumstance in his favor.
Lastly, in People v. Barcino, Jr., the accused surrendered to the authorities after more
than one year from the incident in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the
victim. The Court refused to mitigate the accused’s liability because there was no
acknowledgment of the commission of the crime or the intention to save the government
the trouble and expense in his search and capture; and there was a pending warrant for
his arrest.
Certainly, we cannot apply the same conclusion to the instant case. Cagas is not
applicable because the accused therein did not surrender but was caught by the police. In
Taraya, the warrant of arrest had, in fact, been issued and was forwarded to the proper
authorities for implementation. In Barcino, it was a year after the commission of the crime
when the accused went to the police station, not for purposes of acknowledging his
culpability, nor to save the government the expense and trouble of looking for and
catching him, but actually to deny his culpability.

In this case, it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005.
On March 1, 2005, the court issued an Order finding probable cause for the accused to
stand trial for the crime of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the
afternoon of the same day, Geren surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction
of bail. After the accused posted bail, there was no more need for the court to issue the
warrant of arrest.
The foregoing circumstances clearly show the voluntariness of the surrender. As
distinguished from the earlier cases, upon learning that the court had finally determined
the presence of probable cause and even before the issuance and implementation of the
warrant of arrest, Geren already gave himself up, acknowledging his culpability. This was
bolstered by his eventual plea of guilt during the arraignment. Thus, the trial court was
correct in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The SC would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of
a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender involuntary. In People v. Oco,
the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance because immediately upon learning that
a warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, the
accused surrendered to the police. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of a
warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in
case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving
himself up.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals February 28, 2006 Decision and its May 24, 2006 Resolution in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91916 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
-------------------------xxx-------------------------
TOPIC: Mitigating Circumstances (Voluntary Surrender)
[G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMPIE TARAYA y CANTUBA
@ Boyet, ARLY CANTUBA y DAIGO @ Beget and JONAR ESTRADA y
CANTUBA, accused-appellants.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants appeal from the decision[1] in Criminal Case No. S-1898 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which found them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellants are relatives. Ampie Taraya (hereafter AMPIE)
and Jonar Estrada (hereafter JONAR) are cousins and the nephew of Arly Cantuba
(hereafter ARLY). ARLY is the brother of the respective mothers of AMPIE and JONAR.
When asked in open court if he could identify the three persons who approached
Salvador, Mariano pointed to AMPIE, JONAR and ARLY.
David Angeles, Jr. testified that accused-appellants were his neighbors in Famy, Laguna.
ARLY, with whom AMPIE lived, was an adjacent neighbor, while JONAR lived some thirty
feet away from his house. He had known JONAR for some ten years, ARLY for about five
years and AMPIE for three years. He never had any misunderstanding with anyone of
them.[5]
According to David, in the late evening of 24 September 1995, he was at home and could
hardly sleep as he was suffering from a backache. He went out of the house to relieve
himself. On the street he saw AMPIE brandishing a one-foot long bolo. Behind AMPIE
were ARLY and JONAR. They were about five meters away from where David
stood. AMPIE approached a man who seemed to be urinating. AMPIE then held up the
head of the man and slashed his neck once while his companions ARLY and JONAR
stood nearby ready to assist AMPIE. The victim was able to free himself and ran towards
David until he dropped a few meters from the house. Immediately AMPIE, ARLY and
JONAR ran to their respective homes. David later learned that the victim was Salvador
Reyes.
Mariano Adillo a co-worker of the victim Salvador Reyes in a sash factory, testified that he
had known Salvador for two months. At about 10:00 p.m. of 24 September 1995, he,
Salvador and three other companions were in a beer house in Famy, Laguna. Salvador
drank his beer outside the pub and was in a conversation with a girl. Both were within the
view of Mariano. Later, Salvador was approached and surrounded by three men, one of
them faced him while the two others positioned themselves behind him. Mariano hollered
at the men, who immediately left.
Half an hour later Mariano went out, but Salvador was nowhere in sight. At about 11:00
p.m., Mariano and a boy searched for him up to a billiard hall which was about 200 meters
away. They returned to the beer house and he instructed the boy to hail a tricycle for his
ride home. When no tricycle could be found he and a companion walked home. [3] The
following day he learned of Salvadors death.
On 8 October AMPIE asked from his employer permission to leave for Pagsanjan,
Laguna. In Pagsanjan he was informed by his sister that the police was looking for him in
connection with the death of Salvador Reyes. Thus, the following day he and his sister
went to the police station, where he identified himself. He learned that his uncle ARLY and
cousin JONAR were both in jail as they too were implicated in the death of
Salvador. AMPIE denied the participation of ARLY and JONAR, and insisted that it was
only he and Salvador who had an altercation. AMPIE was thereafter detained at the police
station. He requested that he be allowed to contact his employer and consult with the
lawyer provided by the latter.
TRIAL COURT: AMPIE could not benefit from the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Salvador Reyes was killed on 24 September 1995. The complaint for murder
was filed on the third day of the following month, October, and a warrant of arrest was
issued the day after. He admitted the killing under claim of self-defense, it cannot be
believed that he was unaware of the filing of the case. The trial court concluded that the
purpose of AMPIEs visit to the police station on 9 October 1995, accompanied by his
sister, was not to surrender but to verify the charge filed against him.
ISSUE: whether AMPIE is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
RULING: NO.
The following are the requisites of voluntary surrender: (1) the offender had not been
actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the
latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of
arrest or information filed.[34] For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and
must also show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense incidental to his search and capture.[35]
It cannot be denied that when AMPIE learned that the police authorities were looking for
him in connection with the death of Salvador Reyes, he immediately went to the police
station on 9 October 1995. It was there where he confessed to killing Salvador in self-
defense. This is bolstered by the testimony of the investigating officer SPO2 Emmanuel
Martinez, who even entered in the police blotter that AMPIE voluntarily surrendered to the
police. However, the said surrender does not constitute one which would classify as a
mitigating circumstance. It must be emphasized that at the time of his surrender, AMPIE
already had a pending warrant of arrest[36] which was issued on 4 October 1995, or five
Page 6 of 19
days before his surrender. His arrest by that time was imminent. We cannot then
appreciate in favor of AMPIE the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
-------------------------------xxx----------------------------
CONFESSION OF GUILT
[G.R. No. 146247. September 17, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. EDGAR DAWATON, accused.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS: An Information for murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation was
filed against Edgar Dawaton. When first arraigned he pleaded not guilty, but during the
pre-trial, he offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide but was rejected by
the prosecution, hence, the case proceeded to trial.
Esmeraldo Cortez was entertaining visitors in his house. His brother-in-law Edgar
Dawaton, and kumpadre Leonides Lavares dropped followed by Domingo Reyes. They
started drinking and after having consumed four (4) bottles of gin, they went to the house
of Amado Dawaton, Edgar's uncle. They stayed at the balcony of the house and continued
drinking. Amad Dawaton was not in.
Already drunk, Leonides decided to sleep on a papag or wooden bench, lying down on his
right side facing Domingo and Edgar using his right hand for a pillow. Edgar, Domingo and
Esmeraldo continued drinking until they finished another bottle of gin. (20) minutes after
Leonides had gone to sleep, Edgar stood up and left for his house. When he returned he
brought with him a stainless knife. Without a word, he approached Leonides who was
sleeping and stabbed him near the base of his neck. Awakened and surprised, Leonides
got up and blurted: "Bakit Pare, bakit?" Instead of answering, Edgar again stabbed
Leonides on the upper part of his neck, spilling blood on Leonides' arm.Edgar only
stopped stabbing Leonides when the latter already expired. Edgar then ran away towards
the house of his uncle Carlito Baras situated behind the cockpit.
Edgar was later arrested at the house of his uncle, Carlito Baras, at Sitio Aves, Brgy.
Paltic, Dingalan.
(Edgar just had a different version of the story)He did not know where and exactly how
many times he struck Leonides but he recalled doing it three (3) times before his mind
went blank (nablangko). He also claimed that he was in this mental condition when he left
Leonides and ran to the house of Carlito Baras. He did not know that he had already killed
Leonides, only that he stabbed him thrice.He regained his senses only when he reached
his uncle Carlito's house. Edgar further said that he sought his uncle's help so he could
surrender but he was told to wait because his uncle was then taking a bath. It was while
waiting for his uncle when the policemen arrived to arrest him. He maintained that he
voluntarily went with them.
LOWER COURT:
Trial court convicted Edgar Dawaton of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him
to death.
ISSUE: W/N The penalty of Death imposed by the Trial Court is correct.
HELD: NO. We affirm the conviction of accused-appellant; we however modify the penalty
imposed on him.
The conclusion that accused-appellant murdered Leonides Lavares was sufficiently
proved by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who both witnessed the fatal
stabbing. This was not refuted by the accused himself who admitted that he stabbed the
victim three (3) times before his mind went blank and could no longer recall what he did
after that.
Treachery clearly attended the killing. The accused attacked the victim while the latter was
in deep slumber owing to the excessive amount of alcohol he imbibed. We are not
persuaded by the version of the accused that the victim threatened to harm him with a
grenade and that it was only to prevent this from happening that he was forced to stab
Leonides.
There is treachery when the attack is upon an unconscious victim who could not have put
up any defense whatsoever, or a person who was dead drunk and sleeping on a bench
and had no chance to defend himself. Clearly, the attack was not only sudden but also
deliberately adopted by the accused to ensure its execution without risk to himself.
The accused argues that trial court erred in imposing the death penalty despite the
attendance of mitigating and alternative circumstances in his favour. He avers that he is
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. We disagree. While the
accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, he was charged
with murder for which he had already entered a plea of not guilty. We have ruled that
an offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense cannot be considered as an
attenuating circumstance under the provisions of Art. 13 of The Revised Penal
Code because to be voluntary the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged.
Furthermore, Sec. 2, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor before an accused may be allowed to
plead guilty to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged. We note that
the prosecution rejected the offer of the accused.
Nor can the accused avail of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as he
himself admitted that he was arrested at his uncle's residence. The following elements
must be present for voluntary surrender to be appreciated: (a) the offender has not
been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority, and, (c) the surrender must be voluntary.
Resorting to sophistry, the accused argues that he was not arrested but "fetched" as he
voluntarily went with the policemen when they came for him. This attempt at semantics is
futile and absurd. That he did not try to escape or resist arrest after he was taken into
custody by the authorities did not amount to voluntary surrender. A surrender to be
voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt
or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily included in
his search and capture. It is also settled that voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated
where the evidence adduced shows that it was the authorities who came looking for the
accused.
Moreover, the evidence submitted by the prosecution belies the claim of the accused that
he intended to submit himself to the authorities. It is revealed that they chanced upon the
accused trying to escape from the rear of the cockpit building when they came looking for
him.
Similarly, there is no factual basis to credit the accused with the mitigating circumstance
of outraged feeling analogous or similar to passion and obfuscation. Other than his
self-serving allegations, there was no evidence that the victim threatened him with a
grenade. Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo Cortez testified that there was no prior
altercation or disagreement between Edgar and Leonides during the drinking spree, and
they did not know of any reason for Edgar's hostility and violence. On the contrary,
Esmeraldo Cortez even recalled seeing the two (2) in a playful banter (lambingan) during
the course of their drinking indicating that the attack on the accused was completely
unexpected.
The accused would want us to reconsider the penalty imposed on him on account of his
not being a recidivist. He contends that an appreciation of this factor calls for a reduction
of the penalty.

We are not persuaded. Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance the presence of which
increases the penalty. The converse however, that is, non-recidivism, is not a mitigating
circumstance which will necessarily reduce the penalty. Nonetheless, we hold that the trial
court erred in not appreciating the alternative circumstance of intoxication in favor of the
accused. Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall
be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offender commits a felony in
a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to
commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
The allegation that the accused was drunk when he committed the crime was
corroborated by the prosecution witnesses. The accused and his drinking companions had
consumed four (4) bottles of gin at the house of Esmeraldo Cortez, each one drinking at
least a bottle. It was also attested that while the four (4) shared another bottle of gin at the
house of Amado Dawaton, it was the accused who drank most of its contents. In addition,
Esmeraldo testified that when Edgar and Leonides arrived at his house that noon, they
were already intoxicated. There being no indication that the accused was a habitual
drunkard or that his alcoholic intake was intended to fortify his resolve to commit the
crime, the circumstance of intoxication should be credited in his favor.
Consequently, we find that the trial court erroneously imposed the penalty of death. The
accused was charged with murder for which the law provides a penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. Under Art. 63, par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, such as in this
case, when the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there
is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no aggravating
circumstance attended the killing but there existed the mitigating circumstance of
intoxication, the accused should be sentenced only to the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the court a quo finding the
accused EDGAR DAWATON guilty of MURDER qualified by treachery is AFFIRMED with
the modification that the penalty is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua. The accused
is ordered to pay the heirs of Leonides Lavares P50,000.00 in civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 in moral damages.
---------------------------xxx----------------------------
Cecilia Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 178626 / 13 June 2012./ Justice Peralta
Art. 13 – Mitigating Circumstances – Similar and analogous circumstances
FACTS:
On September 5, 1996, the Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit
(COA) for the Province of Zambales issued PAO Office No. 96-09directing an Audit Team
composed of State Auditor 1 Virginia D. Bulalacao, State Auditor 1 Teresita Cayabyab and
Auditing Examiner II Lourdes Castillo, to conduct an examination of the cash and account
of petitioner Cecilia Legrama, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio,
Zambales.
After the audit, the COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and
Accounts of Ms. Cecilia U. Legrama dated October 1, 1996. The report contained the
findings that petitioner’s cash accountability was short of ₱289,022.75 and that there was
an unaccounted Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) in the amount of ₱863,878.00, thereby
showing a total shortage in the amount of ₱1,152,900.75. Included in the shortage is the
amount of ₱709,462.80, representing the total amount of various sales invoices, chits,
vales, and disbursement vouchers, which were disallowed in the audit for lack of
supporting documents. From the total amount of the shortage, petitioner was able to
restitute the initial amount of ₱60,000.00,
Consequently, petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida), the Municipal Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales at the time the audit was conducted, were charged in an
Information dated December 15, 1998 with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. The
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about October 1, 1996 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of San Antonio, Province of Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable tribunal, the above named accused ROMEO D. LONZANIDA, being then
Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, in connivance and conspiracy with co-
accused CECILIA U. LEGRAMA, being then Municipal Treasurer of San Antonio,
Zambales, who, as such, is accountable for public funds received and/or entrusted to her
by reason of her office, both, while in the performance of their respective official functions,
taking advantage of their official positions, and committing the offense in relation to their
respective functions, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with grave
abuse of confidence, take, misappropriate and convert to their personal use and benefit,
the amount of ₱1,152,900.75 from such public funds, to the damage of the government, in
the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Both petitioner and Lonzanida voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash
bonds.
Upon arraignment, petitioner and Lonzanida pleaded not guilty to the offense charged;
hence, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimony of the Audit Team leader,
Virginia D. Bulalacao. On the other hand, the defense presented both the testimonies of
petitioner and Lonzanida. After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings and
evidence, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision acquitting Lonzanida. However, the
tribunal concluded that petitioner malversed the total amount of ₱1,131,595.05 and found
her guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds and sentenced her accordingly
Accused CECILIA U. LEGRAMA is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Considering the absence of any aggravating
circumstance and the presence of two mitigating circumstances, viz., accused Legrama’s
voluntary surrender and partial restitution of the amount involved in the instant case, and
being entitled to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the 2 mitigating circumstances were properly appreciated.
HELD:
Yes, it was properly appreciated.
In convicting petitioner of the crime charged against her, the Sandiganbayan concluded
that the prosecution established all the elements of the crime of malversation of public
funds. Although petitioner was able to restitute the total amount of ₱832,390.40, petitioner
failed to properly explain or justify the shortage in her accountability. However, the same
conclusion against petitioner’s co-accused was not arrived at by the court, considering
that there was no evidence presented to prove that he conspired with the petitioner in
committing the crime charged.
Page 7 of 19
However, as aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner enjoys the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and restitution. Although restitution is akin to
voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13, in relation to paragraph
10 of the same Article of the Revised Penal Code, restitution should be treated as a
separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused when the two circumstances are
present in a case, which is similar to instances where voluntary surrender and plea of
guilty are both present even though the two mitigating circumstances are treated in the
same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering that restitution is
also tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part of the accused, it was proper for the
Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of
petitioner.
NOTE: As to her crime of malversation:
Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crime are present in the case at bar. First, it is
undisputed that petitioner was the municipal treasurer at the time material to this case.
Second, it is the inherent function of petitioner, being the municipal treasurer, to take
custody of and exercise proper management of the local government’s funds. Third, the
parties have stipulated during the pre-trial of the case that petitioner received the subject
amount as public funds and that petitioner is accountable for the same. Fourth, petitioner
failed to rebut the prima facie presumption that she has put such missing funds to her
personal use.
Verily, in the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for conviction is
proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed to
account for the said funds upon demand without offering sufficient explanation why there
was a shortage. In fine, petitioner’s failure to present competent and credible evidence
that would exculpate her and rebut the prima facie presumption of malversation clearly
warranted a verdict of conviction.
-----------------------xxx----------------------
G.R. No. 140937 February 28, 2001
EXUPERANCIO CANTA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ART. 13. Mitigating Circumstances: Similar and Analogous Circumstances
MENDOZA
FACTS
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of the case,
upon its birth. The cow remained under the care of Erlinda Monter for sometime.
Subsequently, Narciso gave the care and custody of the animal, first, to Generoso
Cabonce; then to Maria Tura; and lastly, to Gardenio Agapay, when it was lost. It appears
that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay took the cow to graze in the
mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However,
when he came back for it at past 9 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay
found the cow gone. He found hoof prints which led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. He
was told that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal.
Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover the animal from
petitioner's wife, but they were informed that petitioner had delivered the cow to his father,
Florentino Canta, who was at that time barangay captain of Laca, Padre Burgos, Southern
Leyte. Accordingly, the two went to Florentino's house. On their way, they met petitioner
who told them that if Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow himself.
Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his father's house, where Maria
recognized the cow. As petitioner's father was not in the house, petitioner told Gardenio
and Maria he would call them the next day so that they could talk the matter over with his
father.
However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the
police of Malitbog, Southern Leyte. As a result, Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio were
called to an investigation. Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his
and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He presented two certificates of ownership, one
dated March 17, 1986 and another dated February 27, 1985, to support his claim.
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the
municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and female. On the
reverse side of the certificate is the drawing of a cow with cowlicks in the middle of the
forehead, between the ears, on the right and left back, and at the base of the forelegs and
hindlegs. All four caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the same one they had taken
care of, based on the location of its cowlicks, its sex, and its color.
Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the municipal treasurer,
who stated that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no Certificate of Ownership of Large
Cattle in the municipality of Padre Burgos. On the other hand, Telen testified that he
issued the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but, at
the instance of petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to February 27, 1985.
RTC RULING
The trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged.
CA RULING
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution failed to prove Canta’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
Whether he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance
SC RULING
First. Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow.
These contentions are without merit.
P.D. No. 533, §2(c) defines cattle-rustling as
. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the
owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or
whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force
upon things.
The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is taken; (2) it
belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking
is done by any means, methods or scheme; (5) the taking is with or without intent to gain;
and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against person
or force upon things.
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow belongs
to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner's only defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good
faith and in the honest belief that it was the cow which he had lost. Second, petitioner,
without the consent of the owner, took the cow from the custody of the caretaker,
Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that he knew all along that the latter was holding the
animal for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the taking to make it appear that he
owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner adopted "means, methods, or schemes" to
deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth, no
violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things attended the commission of
the crime.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle which
petitioner presented to prove his ownership was falsified. Franklin Telen, the janitor in the

municipal treasurer's office, admitted that he issued the certificate to petitioner 10 days
after Narciso's cow had been stolen.
Second. Petitioner contends that even assuming that his Certificate of Ownership is "not
in order," it does not necessarily follow that he did not believe in good faith that the cow
was his. If it turned out later that he was mistaken, he argues that he committed only a
mistake of fact but he is not criminally liable.
Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership is not only "not in order." It is fraudulent, having been
antedated to make it appear it had been issued to him before he allegedly took the cow in
question. That he obtained such fraudulent certificate and made use of it negates his
claim of good faith and honest mistake. That he took the cow despite the fact that he knew
it was in the custody of its caretaker cannot save him from the consequences of his act.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence fully supports the finding of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. There is
therefore no reason to disturb their findings.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
However, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be modified in two respects.
First, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender. The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the
following elements: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender
surrenders to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is
voluntary. In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not actually been
arrested. In fact, no complaint had yet been filed against him when he surrendered the
cow to the authorities. It has been repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary, there
must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention
to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and capture would
require. In petitioner's case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre
Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved them the
trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This circumstance can be considered
analogous to voluntary surrender and should be considered in favor of petitioner.
Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of §2(c) of P. D. No. 533,
otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred in imposing
the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months
and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed in its
minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i. e., prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of which is prision
mayor in its maximum period.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification
that petitioner Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccionalmaximum, as minimum, to ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
------------------------------xxx----------------------------
Art. 14 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ABUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION
FORTUNA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 135784 December 15, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J . :
FACTS
On 21 July 1992 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, while Diosdada Montecillo and her
brother Mario Montecillo were standing at the corner of Mabini and Harrison Streets
waiting for a ride home, a mobile patrol car of the Western Police District with three (3)
policemen on board stopped in front of them. The policeman seated on the right at the
front seat alighted and without a word frisked Mario. He took Marios belt, pointed to a
supposedly blunt object in its buckle and uttered the word "evidence." Then he motioned
to Mario to board the car. The terrified Mario obeyed and seated himself at the back
together with another policeman. Diosdada instinctively followed suit and sat beside
Mario. They cruised towards Roxas Boulevard. The driver then asked Mario why he was
carrying a "deadly weapon," to which Mario answered, "for self-defense since he was a
polio victim." The driver and another policeman who were both seated in front grilled
Mario. They frightened him by telling him that for carrying a deadly weapon outside his
residence he would be brought to the Bicutan police station where he would be
interrogated by the police, mauled by other prisoners and heckled by the press. As they
approached Ospital ng Maynila, the mobile car pulled over and the two (2) policemen in
front told the Montecillos that the bailbond for carrying a "deadly weapon" was
P12,000.00. At this point, the driver asked how much money they had. Without answering,
Mario gave his P1,000.00 to Diosdada who placed the money inside her wallet. Diosdada
was then made to alight from the car. She was followed by the driver and was told to go
behind the vehicle. There, the driver forced her to take out her wallet and rummaged
through its contents. He counted her money. She had P5,000.00 in her wallet. The driver
took P1,500.00 and left her P3,500.00. He instructed her to tell his companions that all
she had was P3,500.00. While going back to the car the driver demanded from her any
piece of jewelry that could be pawned. Ruefully, she removed her wristwatch and offered it
to him. The driver declined saying, "Never mind," and proceeded to board the car.
Diosdada, still fearing for the safety of her brother, followed and sat beside him in the car.
Once in the car, Diosdada was directed by the policeman at the front passenger seat to
place all her money on the console box near the gearshift. The car then proceeded to
Harrison Plaza where the Montecillos were told to disembark. From there, their dreadful
experience over, they went home to Imus, Cavite. The following day Diosdada recounted
her harrowing story to her employer Manuel Felix who readily accompanied her and her
brother Mario to the office of General Diokno where they lodged their complaint. Gen.
Diokno directed one of his men, a certain Lt. Ronas, to assist the complainants in looking
for the erring policemen. They boarded the police patrol car and scoured the Mabini area
for the culprits. They did not find them. When they returned to the police station, a line-up
of policemen was immediately assembled. Diosdada readily recognized one of them as
the policeman who was seated beside them in the back of the car. She trembled at the
sight of him. She then rushed to Lt. Ronas and told him that she saw the policeman who
sat beside them in the car. He was identified by Lt. Ronas as PO2 Ricardo Fortuna. A few
minutes later, Gen. Diokno summoned the complainants. As they approached the
General, they at once saw PO2 Eduardo Garcia whom they recognized as the policeman
who frisked Mario. The following day, they met the last of their tormentors, the driver of the
mobile car who played heavily on their nerves - PO3 Ramon Pablo. The three (3)
policemen were accordingly charged with robbery. After trial, they were found guilty of
having conspired in committing the crime with intimidation of persons.
Page 8 of 19
ISSUE: WON lower court failed to observe the aggravating circumstance of "abuse of
public position."
RULING (YES)
We are convinced that there was indeed sufficient intimidation applied on the offended
parties as the acts performed by the three (3) accused, coupled with the circumstances
under which they were executed, engendered fear in the minds of their victims and
hindered the free exercise of their will. The three (3) accused succeeded in coercing them
to choose between two (2) alternatives, to wit: to part with their money or suffer the burden
and humiliation of being taken to the police station. To our mind, the success of the
accused in taking their victims' money was premised on threats of prosecution and arrest.
This intense infusion of fear was intimidation, plain and simple.
Accused-appellant further argues that assuming arguendo that the element of intimidation
did exist, the lower court erred in holding that he conspired with his companions in
perpetrating the offense charged. This indeed is easy to assert, for conspiracy is
something which exists only in the minds of the conspirators, which can easily be denied.
However, conspiracy may be detected and deduced from the circumstances of the case
which when pieced together will indubitably indicate that they form part of a common
design to commit a felony; and, to establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be
actual proof evincing that all of the conspirators took a direct part in every act, it being
sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
In the present case, accused-appellant would want to impress upon this Court that his
silence inside the car during Marios interrogation confirmed his claim that he did not
participate in the offense.
We do not agree. As a police officer, it is his primary duty to avert by all means the
commission of an offense. As such, he should not have kept his silence but, instead,
should have protected the Montecillos from his mulcting colleagues. This accused-
appellant failed to do. His silence then could only be viewed as a form of moral support
which he zealously lent to his co-conspirators. In one case, we ruled that in conspiracy all
those who in one way or another helped and cooperated in the consummation of a felony
were co-conspirators. Hence, all of the three (3) accused in the present case should be
held guilty of robbery with intimidation against persons.
We however observe that the courts below failed to appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of "abuse of public position." The mere fact that the three (3) accused were
all police officers at the time of the robbery placed them in a position to perpetrate the
offense. If they were not police officers they could not have terrified the Montecillos into
boarding the mobile patrol car and forced them to hand over their money. Precisely it was
on account of their authority that the Montecillos believed that Mario had in fact committed
a crime and would be brought to the police station for investigation unless they gave them
what they demanded.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed should be modified. Under Art. 294, par. (5), of The
Revised Penal Code, the penalty for simple robbery is prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period. In view of the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of public position, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor
maximum to prision correccional medium in any of its periods the range of which is four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the trial court
finding accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna guilty of robbery and ordering him to pay
complaining witnesses Diosdada Montecillo and Mario Montecillo P5,000.00 representing
the money taken from them, P20,000.00 for moral damages and P15,000.00 for attorney's
fees, is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna is
SENTENCED to the indeterminate prison term of two (2) years four (4) months and twenty
(20) days of the medium period of arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional
medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of the maximum
period of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, as maximum.
Costs against accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna.
-------------------------xxx------------------------
PEOPLE V. EDNA MANGLAN
G.R. No. 170470, 26 September 2006, J. Chico-Nazario
PRINCIPLE: Article 14, Aggravating Circumstances – By means of Inundation, Fire,
Etc.
Around 4:45 a.m. on 2 January 2001 when Bernado and his tanods saw Edna, one hired
as a housemaid by Separa with her head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving
the house of her employer at Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab
which was driven by a person later identified as Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab
driver to have instructed that she be brought to Nipa St., but upon arrival there, she
changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan St. where she finally
alighted. 30 mins later,Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later discovered that a fire
gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid. When the chairman returned to the
Barangay Hall, he received a report form pedicab driver Gruta who was also a tanod, that
shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid) coming out of
the house. Edna was brought to the Barangay Hall and thereafter admitted that she is the
one who started the fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and
that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her just rid a broomstick
in going home. (Burned the house by lighting a crumpled newspaper and threw them on
top of the table inside the house).
The fire resulted in the destruction of the house of Separa and other adjoining houses and
the death of Separa Spouses and their 4 children.
RTC Ruling: Edna is guilty of the crime of arson with multiple homicide (death penalty)
CA Ruling: Affirmed with modification on the award of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged.
There is no crim of arson with multiple homicide. The information in this case
erroneously charged with a complex crime. There 2 laws that govern the crime of arson
where death results therefrom Article 320 as Mended by RA 7659 and Section 5 PD 1613.

RPC Art. 320: Destructive Arson: If as a consequence of the commission of any of the
acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory of penalty of death shall be
imposed
PD 1613: Sec. 5 (Simple Arson): Where Death results from arson: if by reason of or on the
occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed.
Art. 320 of the RPC as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of
PD No .1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one penalty for the commission
of arson, whether considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom.
The raison d’tre is that person is itself the end and death is simply the consequence.
Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was / were perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (1) if the
main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason
or on the occasion of arson, the crim is simply arson and the resulting homicide is
absorbed; (2) if on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person
who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to
accomplish such goal the crime committed is arson only; and (3) if the object is
likewise to kill a particular person and in fact the offender has done so, but fire is
resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and
distinct crimes committed homicide / murder or arson.
From the reading of the body of the information, “that on or about 2 January 2001, the said
accused with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully x x x and
deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of Separa x x x.
As stated in the information, accused was charged with having intentionally burned the
house of Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed 7 adjoining houses.
Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and
sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case notwithstanding
the error in the designation of the offense in the information, the information
remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.
There is, thus a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613
categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is reclusion
perpetua to death. No aggravating alleged in the information, the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua.
--------------------------xxx----------------------------
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO COMADRE,
GEORGE COMADRE and DANILO LOZANO, appellants.
CASE No.: G.R. No. 153559. June 8, 2004.
TOPIC: BY MEANS OF INUNDATION, FIRE, ETC.
PONENTE: PER CURIAM
FACTS: At around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe,
Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the
terrace of the house of Robert’s father, Barangay Councilman Jaime Agbanlog, situated in
Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Jaime Agbanlog was seated on the banister of
the terrace listening to the conversation of the companions of his son.
As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio
Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the
house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on
the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby
school.
The object, which turned out to be an MK2 hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the
roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and
Lorenzo Eugenio were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were
all rushed to hospital for medical treatment but Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the
hospital. The wounds sustained by the victim were inflicted by a grenade explosion and
that the direct cause of death was hypovolemic shock due to hand grenade explosion. The
surviving victims, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog and Gerry Bullanday
sustained shrapnel injuries.
Denying the charges against them, all appellants provided for their respective alibis and
defenses. After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and
convicted appellants of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and
sentenced them to suffer the imposable penalty of death. Hence, this automatic review
under Article 47 of the RPC.
At the outset, the trial court is correct in disregarding appellants defense of alibi and
denial. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.
Apart from testifying with respect to the distance of their houses from that of Jaime
Agbanlogs residence, appellants were unable to give any explanation and neither were
they able to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the
crime. Hence, the positive identification of the appellants by eyewitnesses Jimmy Wabe,
Jaime Agbanlog, Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday prevails over their defense of alibi and
denial.
It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog,
Jimmy Wabe and Gerry Bullanday were able to identify the culprits, namely, appellants
Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano because there was a lamppost in
front of the house and the moon was bright.
Also, the trial court’s finding of conspiracy was reassessed. The undisputed facts show
that when Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of
encouragement or performed any act to assist him. The trial court held that the mere
presence of George Comadre and Danilo Lozano provided encouragement and a sense
of security to Antonio Comadre, thus proving the existence of conspiracy. The SC
disagreed.
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence
of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.
A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown
to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence
Page 9 of 19
of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy
transcends companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any
participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere
presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are
insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in
furtherance of the crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving
moral assistance to his criminal act. The ratiocination of the trial court that their presence
provided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio, is devoid of any factual basis.
Such finding is not supported by the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a valid
basis of a finding of conspiracy.
Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten
men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man
for a crime he did not commit. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must
answer for the crime.
ISSUE/s: Whether the use of explosive in this case can be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance.
RULING: NO.
The RTC correctly ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crime. For
treachery to be appreciated two conditions must concur: (1) the means, method and form
of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) such means, methods and form of execution was deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused. Its essence lies in the adoption of ways to minimize
or neutralize any resistance, which may be put up by the offended party.
Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace where the unsuspecting
victims were having a drinking spree. The suddenness of the attack coupled with the
instantaneous combustion and the tremendous impact of the explosion did not afford the
victims sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less defend themselves; thus insuring
the execution of the crime without risk of reprisal or resistance on their part. Treachery
therefore attended the commission of the crime.
It is significant to note that aside from treachery, the information also alleges the use of an
explosive as an aggravating circumstance. Since both attendant circumstances can
qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, we should
determine which of the two circumstances will qualify the killing in this case.
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall
be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence support this view
but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates that
this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then
be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act No. 8294 which also
considers the use of explosives as an aggravating circumstance, there is a need to make
the necessary clarification insofar as the legal implications of the said amendatory law vis-
-vis the qualifying circumstance of by means of explosion under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code are concerned. Corollary thereto is the issue of which law should be applied
in the instant case.
R.A. No. 8294 was a reaction to the onerous and anachronistic penalties imposed under
the old illegal possession of firearms law, P.D. 1866, which prevailed during the
tumultuous years of the Marcos dictatorship. The amendatory law was enacted, not to
decriminalize illegal possession of firearms and explosives, but to lower their penalties in
order to rationalize them into more acceptable and realistic levels.
This legislative intent is conspicuously reflected in the reduction of the corresponding
penalties for illegal possession of firearms, or ammunitions and other related crimes under
the amendatory law. Under Section 2 of the said law, the penalties for unlawful
possession of explosives are also lowered. Specifically, when the illegally possessed
explosives are used to commit any of the crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which
result in the death of a person, the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but
it shall be considered only as an aggravating circumstance, thus: “When a person
commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special law with the use
of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devises, which results
in the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives, detonation agents or
incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (shall be
punished with the penalty of death is DELETED.)”
With the removal of death as a penalty and the insertion of the term xxx as an aggravating
circumstance, the unmistakable import is to downgrade the penalty for illegal possession
of explosives and consider its use merely as an aggravating circumstance.
Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to reduce the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Also, Congress clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as
aggravating circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of firearms
and explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes under the Revised
Penal Code.
It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend the definition of
murder under Article 248, but merely made the use of explosives an aggravating
circumstance when resorted to in committing any of the crimes defined in the
Revised Penal Code. The legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives as
a separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of any crime already defined in the Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294
merely added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of the aggravating
circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the aggravating
circumstance of explosion in paragraph 12, evident premeditation in paragraph 13, or
treachery in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance added by RA
No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder in Article 248.
Nonetheless, even if favorable to the appellant, R.A. No. 8294 still cannot be made
applicable in this case. Before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives can be
properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately
established that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is without
the corresponding authority or permit to possess. This follows the same requisites

in the prosecution of crimes involving illegal possession of firearm which is a
kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as amended. This proof does not obtain
in the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the information, but no evidence
was adduced by the prosecution to show that the possession by appellant of the
explosive was unlawful.
It is worthy to note that the above requirement of illegality is borne out by the provisions of
the law itself, in conjunction with the pertinent tenets of legal hermeneutics.
A reading of the title of R.A. No. 8294 will show that the qualifier illegal/unlawful
...possession is followed by of firearms, ammunition, or explosives or instruments...
Although the term ammunition is separated from explosives by the disjunctive word or, it
does not mean that explosives are no longer included in the items which can be
illegally/unlawfully possessed. In this context, the disjunctive word or is not used to
separate but to signify a succession or to conjoin the enumerated items together.
Moreover, Section 2 of R.A. 8294, subtitled: Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives, clearly refers to the unlawful
manufacture, sale, or possession of explosives.
What the law emphasizes is the act’s lack of authority. Thus, when the second paragraph
of Section 3, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by RA No. 8294 speaks of the use of the
aforementioned explosives, etc. as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of
crimes, it refers to those explosives, etc. unlawfully manufactured, assembled, dealt in,
acquired, disposed or possessed mentioned in the first paragraph of the same section.
What is per se aggravating is the use of unlawfully manufactured or possessed
explosives. The mere use of explosives is not.
The information in this case does not allege that appellant Antonio Comadre had
unlawfully possessed or that he had no authority to possess the grenade that he used in
the killing and attempted killings. Even if it were alleged, its presence was not proven by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure requires the averment of aggravating circumstances for their
application.
The inapplicability of R.A. 8294 having been made manifest, the crime committed is
Murder committed by means of explosion in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code. The same, having been alleged in the Information, may be
properly considered as appellant was sufficiently informed of the nature of the
accusation against him.
The trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple
attempted murder under Article 48 of the RPC. The underlying philosophy of complex
crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor
the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The
rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse
demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts and
several criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a
cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses
should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed
because the offender was impelled by a single criminal impulse which shows his lesser
degree of perversity.
Under Art. 48, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances, including the
generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this case. Applying the aforesaid
provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is death. The
trial court, therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed
decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Branch 39 in Criminal Case No. L-
16(95) is AFFIRMED insofar as appellant Antonio Comadre is convicted of the complex
crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P18,000.00 as actual damages and
likewise ordered to pay the surviving victims, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat
and Gerry Bullanday, P25,000.00 each as temperate damages for the injuries they
sustained. Appellants Gregorio Comadre and Danilo Lozano are ACQUITTED for lack of
evidence to establish conspiracy, and they are hereby ordered immediately RELEASED
from confinement unless they are lawfully held in custody for another cause. Costs de
oficio.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of pardoning power. SO ORDERED.
-----------------------------xxx-----------------------
TOPIC: Aggravating Circumstances (Evident Premeditation)
[G.R. No. 132568. February 6, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MATT G. CAMPOMANES
and EDWIN D. ROSITA, accused-appellants.
FACTS:
On December 30, 1994, at around 10:30 p.m., Aureada, a security guard at
the Rizal Park, was guarding the area around the monument of Dr. Jose Rizal when he
saw Matt Campomanes, a park photographer, running after Loreto Alkonga, also a park
photographer.[4] Campomanes caught Alkonga and grabbed the latters collar, causing
both of them to lose their balance and fall on the ground, about three (3) meters away
from Aureada.[5] Aureada blew his whistle, but the two, instead of stopping, began
grappling for Alkongas camera and hitting each other using the same.[6] Aureada then saw
Edwin Rosita, another park photographer, arrive. Rosita appeared very angry, and
brought out a balisong or fan knife, pointing the same in the direction of
Alkonga.[7] Aureada tried to fire a warning shot but his rifle misfired. Seeing what Aureada
was trying to do, Rosita instead went after the latter who started running away.[8] Aureada
took his mobile radio and called the park security patrol. Then Aureada saw Rosita begin
stabbing Alkonga who was sitting on the ground with his arms raised and held by
Capomanes.[9] After Rosita stabbed the victim several times, he, together with
Campomanes, ran towards Manila Hotel. Shortly thereafter, they were apprehended by
the park security patrol.
Meanwhile, Aureada brought Alkonga to the Philippine General Hospital. Thereafter, he
went to the headquarters of his security agency near the Rizal Park where he identified
Page 10 of 19
the two accused, Rosita and Campomanes, as the perpetrators of the crime.[10]Alkonga
died in the hospital at 2:00 a.m. the following day due to multiple stab wounds.[11]
Prosecution witness SPO2 Roberto Gutierrez testified that at about 1:00
a.m. on December 31, 1994, and while he was on duty at the Ermita Police Station, he
took the sworn statement of Renante Aureada regarding the stabbing of one Loreto
Alkonga. While making a sworn statement, Aureada identified Rosita as the one who
stabbed Alkonga, and Matt Campomanes as the one who held the arms of Alkonga while
the latter was being stabbed.[12]
SPO2 Jose Bagkus was the night shift investigator on duty at the Homicide Division of the
Western Police District on December 31, 1994. His testimony corroborated that of SPO2
Gutierrez on material points, particularly the identification by Aureada of Rosita as the one
who stabbed Alkonga, and of Campomanes as the one who held the arms of the victim
while the latter was being stabbed.[13] Aureada gave a sworn supplemental statement of
the same tenor in the presence of SPO2 Bagkus.
Anent the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that it is plain error
on the part of the lower court to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation on the basis of the presence of conspiracy. The Solicitor General joins in
this contention but alleges instead the presence of treachery to qualify the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not evident premeditation was attendant in the commission of the
crime to qualify it to murder
RULING: Evident premeditation may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance after the
following requisites are sufficiently established: (1) the time when the accused determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[32] It is true that where
conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of
the method, time and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident
premeditation can be taken for granted.[33] However, where no such evidence exists, and
where conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the
crime, as in the case at bar, the above requisites of evident premeditation need to be
established.[34] A careful perusal of the records of this case shows that evident
premeditation was not sufficiently proven, and thus, may not be appreciated.
We agree, however, with the Solicitor General that treachery is present. There are two
conditions for the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, viz: (1) the
employment of the means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of
execution.[35]
In the case at bar, eyewitness Aureada testified that when the victim was stabbed by
Rosita, said victim was in a sitting position with arms raised and held by Campomanes.
ATTY. NOGALES:
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you see him (Rosita) actually stab Loreto Alkonga?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far were you?
A 5 meters away, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Was that the first time he stabbed Loreto Alkonga after Edwin Rosita failed to get to
you?
A Yes, sir.
Q That was the first time?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. NOGALES:
Q And will you please tell the court the relative position between (sic) Edwin Rosita and
Loreto Alkonga when the first stabbed Loreto Alkonga?
A Loreto Alkonga was then sitting at the back of the monument with arms raised which
were being held by Matt Campomanes and in that situation he was being stabbed by
Edwin Rosita.
Q Now, if you are Edwin Rosita, how will you please demonstrate to the court how he was
stabbing Alkonga?
A (witness demonstrating by stooping while he was stabbing Loreto Alkonga with his right
hand and going at the other side and stabbing Loreto Alkonga).[36]
It is clearly deducible from the foregoing that the manner by which the victim was killed
was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused to ensure the execution of the
dastardly act without affording the victim any opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. In a sitting position with arms restrained by one of the accused, the victim
becomes a helpless and defenseless object of the attack. It is immaterial that the victim
initially grappled with Campomanes and was even able to hit the latter with the
camera. Crucial is the moment when Rosita came with a bladed weapon, and with the
victim in a sitting position with his arms raised and held by Campomanes, said victim was
repeatedly stabbed by Rosita. Such manner of killing had been declared by this Court in a
plethora of cases to be attended by treachery.
---------------------------xxx-----------------------
CRAFT FRAUD OR DISGUISE
GR. No. 196735, August 03, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS
VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, AND ROBERT
MICHAEL BELTRAN PROMULGATED: ALVIR, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS., Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS: On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7)
members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen,
near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were
attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them
sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from
his injuries.
An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris
fraternity and separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted and
frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members.
LOWER COURT RULING
RTC found Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder and attempted murder. Others were acquitted. The case against Guerrero
was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: W/N "masks and/or other forms of disguise" as an aggravating circumstance must
be appreciated.
HELD: In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like
nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out
his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the
accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including
disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an

aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The
inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the
accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to
conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing
masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that
"the act of one is the act of all." This would mean all the accused had been one in their
plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of
them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder,
and attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the
elements of the crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the
time, place, and persons involved in the offense
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N).
01158 dated November 26, 2010 is AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert
Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal
Case No. Q95-61133 with the MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135,
Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
--------------------------xxx------------------------
Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos, and Joselito Tamayo
vs. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108280-83 / 16 November 1995./ Justice Puno
Art. 14 – Aggravating Circumstances – Abuse of Superior Strength
FACTS:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the
1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of
President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and
other public fora by "Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into
violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known
"Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven
persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the
Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their
application was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them
gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled
day. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and
delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent
of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. No permit
could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse.
The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned
towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty.
Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used
tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of
them fought back and threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria
Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized.
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III
of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of
President Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of
their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory
hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin,
Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!"
The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the
police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued
and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the
color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man wearing a
yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!"
The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos
loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to
extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with
fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo
Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the
maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo
unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag
which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang
was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from
behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los
Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already
fallen. Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head
and ear. Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan.
Patayin!" Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again.
Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more
fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when
he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him. Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri
approach the victim but did not notice what he did.
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from
his face. He sat on some cement steps and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to
the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued
him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na
kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?"
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until
Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the
help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused
admission. So they took him to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions,
abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both
local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-
page news the following day, capturing national and international attention. This prompted
President Aquino to order the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District
to investigate the incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by
Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could give information
leading to the arrest of the killers. Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and
Page 11 of 19
Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their identification,
several persons, including the accused, were apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the
victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was
not in any of the photographs presented by the prosecution because on July 27, 1986, he
was in his house in Quezon City. Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at
the time of the incident. Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his
office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time. He claimed
to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things
forcefully. Richard de los Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling
but denies hitting Salcedo. He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains
why his face appeared in some of the photographs. Unlike the other accused, Nilo
Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement
and that he attended the rally on that fateful day. According to him, he saw Salcedo being
mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the incident. His face was in the
pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. Joel Tan also testified
that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however
ignored him
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo
Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the
crime of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20
days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the trial
court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused,
except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of
murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide
because the information against him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the aggravating circumstance of abuse of strength is present in this case.
HELD:
Yes, it is present.
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in
number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage
of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to
escape and free himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal
Monument several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already fallen
on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself against
the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers continued to pursue
him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he find means to defend
himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they continued beating him,
hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until
he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a
defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Other aggravating cirumstances discussed:
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There
is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure
the assailants' safety from any defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on
Salcedo was sudden and unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he
was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against the
rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well found, Salcedo had
the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run away from them but he,
unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being
attacked.
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information
against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case
because the attack against Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging
animosity against the so-called "Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and
reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were
committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a
concerted effort to bring about the death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is
proved, a showing as to who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not
required to sustain a conviction. Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the others
regardless of the intent and character of their participation, because the act of one is the
act of all.
-----------------------------xxx--------------------------
G.R. No. 175980 February 15, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ADRIANO CABRILLAS, Accused,
BENNY CABTALAN, Appellant.
ART. 14. Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery
DEL CASTILLO
FACTS
Version of the Prosecution
Prosecution witness Wilfredo Pacayra (Wilfredo) narrated that on July 11, 1999 at around
7:00 p.m., he went to the store of Susan Cabtalan (Susan) to buy salt. While thereat,
Benny and Adriano asked him to join them in their drinking spree to which Wilfredo
obliged. In the course of their drinking spree, Wilfredo noticed that Benny and Adriano had
bolos, locally known as sundang, tucked on their waists. He also heard the two talking
about their plan to assault someone that same night. Sensing that something wrong would
happen, Wilfredo left them and walked home.
Upon reaching his house, Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and Adriano circling the house of
Jesus Cabujat’s (Jesus) daughter, Elena Raypan (Elena), which is just about two arms
length away from his house. Thereafter, the duo stood on a dark portion of the road. Later
on, he saw Jesus and his 9-year-old granddaughter Jonalyn C. Raypan (Jonalyn) walking
towards the house of Jonalyn’s mother, Elena. Jesus stopped and turned towards a
grassy area to urinate when suddenly, Benny and Adriano emerged from their hiding
place. They held Jesus by his shoulders and alternately stabbed him. At that moment,
Jesus shouted "I am wounded, please help me because I was stabbed by Benny and
Adriano." Jesus then fell to the ground while Benny and Adriano immediately fled from the
crime scene.
For her part, prosecution witness Jonalyn narrated that on the night of the incident, she
fetched her grandfather Jesus from her Ate Susan’s house. She and her grandfather
walked side by side in going back to their house. However, upon reaching the vicinity of
their house, her grandfather went across the street to urinate. It was then that she saw
Benny and Adriano on the same street. She knew the two because Benny and her father
are cousins while Adriano and her mother are also cousins. She saw the two men take
hold of her grandfather’s arms, after which Benny stabbed her grandfather with a long
bolo. She heard her grandfather say "Donie, help me, I am wounded." After that, Jonalyn
saw Benny go home.

Elena also testified that when she heard her father shouting for help, she immediately
went outside the house and saw Benny releasing her father. As she got nearer to Jesus,
Benny and Adriano ran away. When Elena asked her father as to who stabbed him, the
latter replied that it was Benny and Adriano.
Jesus was rushed to a hospital where he was pronounced dead due to multiple stab
wounds. His family spent ₱18,500.00 for his wake and burial. At the time of his death,
Jesus was earning ₱1,000.00 a week as a farmer.
A case for murder was accordingly filed against Benny and Adriano and a warrant was
issued for their arrest which was, however, returned unserved since they could no longer
be located. It appears that on July 13, 1999, at around noontime, Benny and Adriano
escaped by ferryboat to Catbalogan, Samar. Two years later, or on July 31, 2001, Benny
was arrested in Las Piñas City by virtue of an alias warrant of arrest.
RTC Ruling
On August 29, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Benny of the crime of
murder. The trial court appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery since the attack upon Jesus who was unarmed and unsuspecting was without
any warning. It also found the existence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength as both Benny and Adriano held, subdued and attacked the 69-year-old
defenseless Jesus. The trial court further held that conspiracy was evident since Benny
and Adriano had common criminal intent and were united in its execution.
CA Ruling
The CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction through its August 29, 2006
Decision. However, it did not anymore consider the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength as the qualifying circumstance of treachery already absorbed it.
ISSUE
Whether treachery attended the killing as to qualify the crime to murder.
SC RULING
The appeal lacks merit.
Treachery attended the killing of Jesus, hence, the crime committed is murder.
Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a person, which is not parricide or
infanticide, committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated in Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, among which is treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which
the victim might make. "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape."
Based on the account of the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, there is no doubt that treachery
was present. It was established that Benny and Adriano were in the crime scene prior to
the incident. They hid in a dark portion of the road and assaulted Jesus with their bolos
while he was urinating with his back to them. They even held him by his shoulders to
render him defenseless and unable to resist the attack on him by his assailants.
All told, Jesus was unaware of the imminent peril to his life and was rendered incapable of
defending himself. From the suddenness of the attack upon Jesus and the manner it was
committed, there is no doubt that treachery indeed attended his killing.
The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses usually remains undisturbed.
The trial and appellate courts reached the same conclusion that the testimonies of
eyewitnesses Wilfredo and Jonalyn deserve credence as both narrated in a
straightforward manner the details of Benny and Adriano’s attack upon Jesus. Benny,
however, still disputes the credibility of these witnesses by pointing out that Wilfredo’s
testimony that he and Adriano took turns in stabbing Jesus differs from that of Jonalyn
who stated that while the two assailants attacked Jesus in unison, it was only Benny who
inflicted the mortal wounds. The Court, however, finds this inconsistency to pertain merely
to the manner the fatal stab wounds were inflicted on Jesus. The materiality of the
assailants’ exact position during their attack on the victim is a trivial and insignificant detail
which cannot defeat the witnesses’ positive identification of Benny as one of the
assailants. Besides, "[i]t is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the
occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one
witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence
even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could
mean that their testimonies were [fabricated] and rehearsed."
Benny’s assertion that Wilfredo is not a credible witness since he surfaced three years
after the incident to testify for the prosecution also fails to impress. It is worthy to mention
that the proceedings in this case was suspended for two years because Benny and
Adriano left Pinabacdao, Samar and the warrant for their arrest could not be served on
them. Also, deference or reluctance in reporting a crime does not destroy the truth of the
charge nor is it an indication of deceit. Delay in reporting a crime or an unusual incident in
a rural area is well-known. It is common for a witness to prefer momentary silence for fear
of reprisal from the accused. The fact remains that Wilfredo fulfilled his duty as a good
member of society by aiding the family of Jesus when they were seeking justice. In the
absence of other circumstances that would show that the charge was a mere concoction
and that Wilfredo was impelled by some evil motives, delay in testifying is insufficient to
discredit his testimony.
The fact that Wilfredo and Jonalyn are related to the victim also does not diminish their
credibility. While admittedly, Wilfredo is a relative of the husband of Julita, who is the
daughter of Jesus, and Jonalyn is Jesus’s granddaughter, relationship per se does not
evince ulterior motive nor does it ipso facto tarnish the credibility of witnesses. "Mere
relationship to a party cannot militate against the credibility of witnesses or be taken as
destructive of the witnesses’ credibility." What matters is that Wilfredo and Jonalyn
positively identified Benny and Adriano as the assailants of Jesus and that they testified in
a straightforward manner. These indicate that the two are telling the truth.
As to the inconsistencies in Elena’s testimony and in her affidavit as to who asked her
father the identity of the assailants, the same deserves scant consideration. It is settled
that "affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and
inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever
there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the
testimony commands greater weight." The trial court therefore did not err in affording more
credence to Elena’s testimony given in open court despite her having previously executed
an affidavit which was inconsistent with her testimony. To stress, "appellate courts do not
disturb the findings of the trial courts with regard to the assessment of credibility of
witnesses. The reason for this is that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination."
Benny’s defense of alibi was properly rejected.
"Alibi is the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove."
For this defense to prosper, proof that the accused was in a different place at the time the
crime was committed is insufficient. There must be evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be within the immediate vicinity of the crime during its commission.
Here, Benny did not satisfactorily demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the locus criminis at the night of its commission. While he denies being at the scene
Page 12 of 19
of the crime when it happened, he claims to be within a reasonably near area which is his
residence in Barangay Pilaon. The murder of Jesus occurred in Barangay Laygayon,
which is more or less 3½ kilometers away from the place where Benny claimed he was in.
Benny testified that the distance between these two barangays can be covered in an
hour’s walk. Thus, even if he traveled by foot to another barangay, it was still not too far
away to render it physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its
commission. Furthermore, Benny’s alibi is uncorroborated. "Courts may give credence to
alibi only if there are credible eyewitnesses who can corroborate the alibi of accused." In
contrast, alibi becomes weaker in the face of the positive identification made by the
witnesses for the prosecution, as in this case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00039 that affirmed with modifications the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33, is AFFIRMED with further modifications. Appellant Benny
Cabtalan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jesus Cabujat the following: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) ₱ 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (4)
₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages; and (5) interest on all damages awarded at the legal
rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
-------------------------------xxx-------------------------------
ART. 14. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY
PEOPLE VS. VILLACORTA
G.R. No. 186412 Sept. 7, 2011
LEONARDo-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Villacorta was charged with the crime of murder. The Information stated that Villacorta,
armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed Danilo
Cruz, thereby inflicting serious wounds which caused immediate death. Upon arraignment,
Villacorta pleaded not guilty.
Immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-
patient at Tondo Medical Center. It was only after 22 days that Cruz was admitted to San
Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following
day. Dr. Belandres, Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital, testified
that, using Cruz’s medical chart and diagnosis, he was able to determine that Cruz died of
tetanus infection secondary to stab wound. The prosecution did not present evidence of
the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent
visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical
treatment of his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities within the 22 days.
RTC: Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. He was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz of P50,000 as civil
indemnity plus the costs of suit.
CA: Affirmed in toto the RTC judgment against Villacorta. Hence, this appeal before the
SC.
ISSUE: WON Villacorta is guilty of murder, qualified by treachery
RULING (NO)
We do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the
event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight
physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs
death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound. Proximate cause has been defined
as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of
January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical
Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for
symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on February 15,
2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment Cruz
received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center
or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities
between January 23 to February 14, 2002.
There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date
when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus
infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms
would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano,
severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that
exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent
(100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab wound was merely the
remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate
cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight
physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he
inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt
for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter
offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight
physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder. We
cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because the
prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill. The intent must be proved in
a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal (or
murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-appellant but
on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When
such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but
physical injuries only. Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical
Center for medical treatment immediately after the stabbing incident. Right after receiving
medical treatment, Cruz was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-

patient. There was no other evidence to establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor
and/or required medical attendance for more than nine days. Without such evidence, the
offense is only slight physical injuries.
We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently alleged
in the Information and proved during trial. The Information specified that accused, armed
with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said
weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ. Treachery exists when an offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend
directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the
defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out what must be shown
by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such
means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To
reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack
of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real
opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor. Likewise, even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person,
treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this case, and we sustain such
finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without
provocation.
With the aggravating circumstance of treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with
imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in the maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21)
to thirty (30) days. Consequently, we impose upon Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty
(30) days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has been in jail since July 31, 2002
until present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence, we order his immediate
release.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of slight physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor.
Considering that Villacorta has been incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty
herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacortas
immediate release, unless Villacorta is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform
this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance with such
order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Danilo Cruz moral damages in the
sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
----------------------------xxx---------------------
PEOPLE V. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ
G.R. No. 139542, 21 June 2001, J. Gonzaga-Reyes
PRINCIPLE: Article 14, Aggravating Circumstances – Treachery
On about 2:30 p.m, 31 October 1998, both the families of Noel Andres and that of
Gonzales were on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection
near the Garden of Remembrance, while Gonzales was turning left towards the exit and
Andres was headed straight along the road to the exit, their vehicles almost collided.
Gonzales continued driving while Andres drove behind for some time and cut him off when
he found the opportunity to do so. Andres then get out of the vehicle and knocked on the
appellants car window.
Prosecution: Andres calmly told Gonzales to be careful with his driving and that he was
with his family. He saw Gonzales turning red in anger so he decided to go back to his
vehicle when he was blocked by Gonzales son (said anong problema sa erpat ko kineme).
Andres testified that he felt threatened so he immediately boarded his vehicle and partially
opened the car window just wide enough to talk back to Gonzales son. Suddently, one of
his passengers said binaril kame. He turned to his wife and saw her bloodied and
unconscious. He turned around and saw his son and nephew wounded.
Defense: It was Andres who cut Gonzales path by positioning the FX obliquely along his
lane. Andres went out from the car and cursed them (Shutang ina mes, mashonda ka na
di ka marunong magmaneho, bobita ka – ganern). Gonzales stayed inside the car and
replied (pasensya na bes, nasilaw ako, aksidente lang). Andres allegedly go out again of
his vehicle and continued shouting and cursing. Dino, son of Gonzales who was riding
another car confronted Andres. And when Andres went inside his car, this prompted
Gonzales to get his gun from he glove compartment and feeling that his son was
threatened he go out of his car ready to shoot. Trisha, her daughter, arrived and pushed
Gonzales right away. She hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the
hand. Gonzales wanted to free his hand and with Trishas substantial body weight pushing
against him, Gonzales lost his balance and accidentally fired. Gonzales stated that he did
not know he shot somebody until the complainants got out of the vehicle carrying a
bloodied small boy.
An information for the complex crime of murder, double frustrated murder and attempted
murder were filed.
RTC: convicted with the following circumstances qualifying the offense: treachery and
abuse of superior strength upon the person of Andres, but instead hitting Feliber Andres
(pregnant wife) on the left back portion of the head, as well as John Andres and Kevin
Ordoo physical injuries (only because of timely medical attention)
Records show that the wife of Andres did not die instantaneously. She lived to give
birth to a baby girl by CS and died the following morning but as to medical finding,
the cause of death is gunshot wound. While the other two was treated for
extraction of metallic fragments on their faces. There is treachery when the offender
commits any crime against persons, employing means, methods, and forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. To appreciate
treachery, two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
Defendant contended that the shooting happened in a matter of seconds and that is was
preceded by a heated argument between the parties. It is argued that the shooting could
Page 13 of 19
not have been attended by treachery. There was no time for Gonzales to consciously and
deliberately employ the mode of attack against Andres, nor any against the victim, to
insure its execution and at the same time to eliminate any form of retaliation from the
alleged intended victim (of which the OSG agreed that there is no attendant of treachery
and that he is only liable for homicide and frustrated homicide as regards the other victims
as the children sustained head injuries which could lead to their death if not treated
immediately) (No mitigating as there is no voluntary surrender – inconsistent with his
testimony).
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an attendant of treachery in appreciating the case against
the Gonzales.
The appeal has merit. Treachery under par. 16 of Article 14 is defined as the
deliberate employment of means methods or forms in the execution of a crime
against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise.
(See above requisites so treachery will be appreciated). The suddenness of the
attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the
victim at the time the attack was made or the fact that the victim was unarmed do not by
themselves render the attack treacherous. This is of particular significance in a case
of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he gained an
advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was
rendered defenceless.
The means employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must
be shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to
insure the consummation of the crim and at the same time eliminate or reduce the
risk of retaliation from the intended victim.
Accordingly, it has been consistently held by the SC that chances encounters,
impulse killings or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were
preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of
opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack.
Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of the
victims provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden attack made by the
accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or acts taunting the accused
to retaliate or the rebellious aggressive behaviour of the victim were held to be
without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. For the
rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the
accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter.
The determining factor on whether or not the commission of the crim is attended by
treachery is not the resulting crim committed but the mode of attack employed in its
execution. Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must
be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.
The SC affirmed the recommendation of the OSG that the shooting was not attended by
treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of the wife of Andres is
homicide and not murder. The encounter between the two parties was a chance
encounter. They were total strangers before their vehicles almost collided at an
intersection inside the memorial park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks that
followed the near collision was fanned by a short temper, which in the case of Gonzales,
was augmented by the improvident use of firearm. From the readings of the TSN, it
was Andres who provoked the altercation by tailing to the vehicle of Gonzales after
the near collision towards the exit until he had the chance to cut him off to scold
him for his failure to observe traffic rules. Andres statement that he calmly
approached Gonzales was belied by the witnesses. When he met Dino, while
walking back to his car, Andres shouted onto the former, and as a result, Gonzales
alighted the vehicle and fired a single shot.
The SC did not find any conclusive evidence to appreciate treachery. The pictures
indicate that Gonzales fired at the FX at an angle away from Andres and that Gonzales
was not aiming at anybody in particular. It is clear that the shot was fired away from
Andres. The bullet hit his wife near her temple above the left eye indicating that she was
facing left towards her husband when the shot was fired. Therefore belying any attempt to
shoot Andres. The fact that Gonzales fired his gun from behind the victim does not
by itself amount to treachery. There is no evidence in record that Gonzales
positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired the
shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the position of the
appellants car was not of his own doing but it became so when Andres overtook his
car and cut off his path.
The Trial Courts finding that the loading of the gun, the cocking of the hammer and finally
the pulling of the trigger constitute a deliberate effort on the part of Gonzales to use the
gun as a means of treacherous attack is patently erroneous. A single and continuous
attack cannot be divided into stages to make it appear that treachery was involved.
The entire incident happened in a matter of minutes. It was an error to divide the assault
in stages to arrive at the conclusion that the mode of attack was consciously employed by
Gonzales. He prepared the gun before getting out of his car, had loaded it when he was
still at home, and ready to fire when he alighted his car. There was no time for him to
reflect on the mode of attack since he just picked up his gun and alighted from his
car and shot at the FX a few seconds after Dino and Andres started shouting at
each other.
The Court does not also agree that the weapon used by itself is determinative of
treachery unless it is shown, and it is not herein shown, that the appellant
deliberately used the gun to insure the commission of the crim and to render the
unarmed victim defenceless. The encounter between them was a chance encounter.
Th shooting was clearly a spur of the moment or impulsive decision made by Gonzales
preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of Andres.
As regards to the injuries sustained by the two children, the crime committed are two
counts of slight physical injuries (there is no intent to kill). The mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete self defense of a relative and
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong were not convincingly proved and none can be
considered in the imposition of penalties.
SC: Triacl court decision is modified. Andres is guilty of homicide and sight physical
injuries for the other two victims.
-----------------------------xxx--------------------------
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DONATO B.
CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL

DOE and SEVERAL OTHER DOES (at large), accused, DONATO B. CONTINENTE
and JUANITO T. ITAAS, accused-appellants.
CASE No.: G.R. Nos. 100801-02. August 25, 2000
TOPIC: TREACHERY
PONENTE: JUSTICE DE LEON
FACTS: On April 21, 1989 at around 7:00am, the car of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe, Deputy
Commander, Joint U. S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), was ambushed at the
corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Initial investigation by
the Central Intelligence Service (CIS), shows that on the date and time of the ambush,
Col. James Rowe, was on board his gray Mitsubishi Galant car which was being driven by
Joaquin Vinuya; and that they were at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog
Avenue in Quezon City on their way to the JUSMAG Compound along Tomas Morato
Street when gunmen who were on board an old model Toyota Corolla car suddenly fired
at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya.
The car that was used by the gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car when it
sped away from the site of the ambush. The same Toyota Corolla car was later recovered
on the same day by a team from the Philippine Constabulary (PC), at No. 4 Windsor
Street, San Francisco Del Monte in Quezon City.
Upon further investigation of the case, the CIS agents established through a confidential
intelligence information the involvement of appellant Donato Continente, an employee of
the U.P. Collegian in U.P. Diliman, Quezon City, in the ambush. After accosting appellant
Continente inside the said U.P. campus, the CIS team took him to Camp Crame in
Quezon City for questioning. During the interrogation in the presence of Atty. Bonifacio
Manansala in Camp Crame on June 17, 1989, appellant Continente admitted to his
participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver as a member of the
surveillance unit under the Political Assassination Team of the CPP-NPA. Among the
documents confiscated from appellant Continente by the CIS agents, and for which a
receipt dated June 16, 1989 was prepared and issued by Sgt. Reynaldo dela Cruz, was a
letter addressed to "Sa Kinauukulan". At the dorsal right hand side of the letter appear the
acronyms "STR PATRC" which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng Rebolusyon" and
"Political Assassination Team, Regional Command".
Another confidential intelligence information established the participation of appellant
Juanito Itaas in the said ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver on April 21, 1989.
Appellant Itaas, who was a known member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in
Davao City was arrested in Davao City and was brought to Manila for investigation. CIS
investigated and took down the statements of appellant Itaas who disclosed during the
investigation that he was an active member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in
Davao City and confessed, in the presence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz who apprised and
explained to him his constitutional rights, that he was one of those who fired at the gray
Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. James Rowe. The said appellant identified the Toyota
Corolla car that the assailants rode on April 21, 1989 and the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of
Col. Rowe.
Meanwhile, it appears that the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver was witnessed
by a certain Meriam Zulueta. Zulueta was about to cross the Tomas Morato Street on her
way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend a practicum in the JUSMAG
Mess Hall when she heard several gunshots. Upon looking at the direction where the
gunshots emanated, she saw persons on board a maroon car firing at a gray car at a
distance of more or less one (1) meter at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog
Avenue in Quezon City. Zulueta returned to the side of the street to seek for cover but
could not find any so she docked and covered her head with her bag while continuously
looking at the persons who were firing at the gray car. She recognized appellant Juanito
Itaas when the latter was presented for identification in Camp Crame as the person,
directly behind the driver of the maroon car, whose body was half exposed while he was
firing at the gray car with the use of along firearm. The shooting incident lasted for about
five (5) seconds only after which the maroon car made a U-turn to Timog Avenue toward
the direction of Quezon Boulevard while being followed by a white Mitsubishi Lancer car.
Zulueta also recognized appellant Donato Continente whom she had encountered on at
least three (3) occasions at a carinderia outside the JUSMAG Compound. Her first
encounter with appellant Continente was at around three o'clock in the afternoon on April
17, 1989 when she went out of the JUSMAG Compound to a carinderia nearby. She
mistook the said appellant for a tricycle driver who was simply walking around the
premises. She saw appellant Continente in the same carinderia again on the following
day, April 18, 1989, and she was even teased by her companions that he was her escort.
On April 19, 1989, Zulueta saw appellant Continente for the third time inside the same
carinderia while the latter was merely standing. She came to know the identity of appellant
Continente when Continente was presented to her in Camp Crame for identification. She
thought that he was the tricycle driver whom she had seen in the carinderia near the
JUSMAG Compound.
Zulueta likewise recognized the driver of the white Mitsubishi Lancer car as the same
person whom she had encountered on two occasions. Zulueta disclosed that in the
morning of April 19, 1989, the white Mitsubishi Lancer car was parked along the side of
Tomas Morato Street which was near the corner of Scout Madrinas Street. Her attention
was caught by the driver of the car, who was then reading a newspaper, when the latter
remarked "Hoy pare, ang sexy. She-boom!" as she was walking along the street toward
the JUSMAG Compound. On April 20, 1989, she saw the same person inside the white
Mitsubishi Lancer car which was then parked along the side of Tomas Morato Street while
she was again on her way to attend practicum in the JUSMAG Compound. She learned of
the identity of the driver as a certain Raymond Navarro, who is allegedly a member of the
NPA, from the pictures shown her by the CIS investigators in Camp Crame.
Joaquin Vinuya testified that he was employed by the JUSMAG, as driver, and assigned
to Col. James Rowe. On April 21, 1989, he fetched Col. Rowe from his house in Potsdam
Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong to report for work in JUSMAG. While he was making a
right turn at the intersection of Timog Avenue toward Tomas Morato Street, he noticed
four (4) people on board a red car, two (2) of whom suddenly opened fire at the car that he
was driving hitting him in the process. The shooting incident happened very fast and that
he had no opportunity to recognize the persons inside the red car. Despite the incident,
Vinuya managed to drive the car to the JUSMAG Compound. Upon arrival at the JUSMAG
Compound, he found out that Col. James Rowe, who was sitting at the back seat of the
car, was also hit during the shooting incident.
Col. James Rowe and Joaquin Vinuya were initially brought to the V. Luna Hospital in
Quezon City for treatment. Subsequently, they were transferred to the Clark Air Base
Hospital in Pampanga but then Capt. Rowe was already dead. Vinuya was treated in the
Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga for four (4) days for the injuries he sustained on his
head, shoulder, and on the back portion of his left hand. Thereafter, he was taken back to
JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to recuperate.
For the foregoing, 2 informations were filed against Itaas and Continente for the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder. The RTC rendered its decision finding both appellants
Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.
Continente and Itaas separately instituted the instant appeal.
ISSUE/s: Whether treachery can be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this
case.
Page 14 of 19
RULING: YES.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 248. Murder.-- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death
if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse."
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by
treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended party might make. The evidence clearly shows that the mode of
execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the
crime without the least danger unto themselves arising from the possible resistance of
their victims. Appellant Itaas and his companions, who were all armed with powerful
firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the
corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning,
appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the said car upon reaching the said
place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe during the said
ambush is murder.
AS TO CONSPIRACY AND LIABILITY:
At the outset, in the case at bench, the SC reversed the finding of conspiracy by the RTC.
Accordingly, appellant Donato Continente is liable for the crimes charged in these criminal
cases only as an accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code. In order that a
person may be considered an accomplice in the commission of a criminal offense, the
following requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b)
he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c)
there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice. The prosecution failed to establish, either directly or by
circumstantial evidence, that appellant Donato Continente was privy to any conspiracy to
carry out the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver on that fateful morning of April
21, 1989. The evidence adduced disclose that the participation of appellant Continente
was made only after the plan or decision to ambush Col. Rowe was already a fait
accompli. Continente was merely assigned to the vicinity of the JUSMAG Compound in
Tomas Morato Street, Quezon City, before the shooting incident to gather certain data,
specifically the number of people and volume of vehicles in the area, the measurement of
the streets, and the distance of the JUSMAG Compound from Tomas Morato Street.
Subsequently, Continente reported his findings to Freddie Abella and that thereafter the
latter had taken over the activity. Significantly, appellant Continente was not even present
at the scene of the crime on April 21, 1989.
The error of the trial court in its appreciation of appellant Continente's participation in the
crimes charged lies in its apparent confusion regarding the distinction between a
conspirator and an accomplice. In view of its effect on the liability of appellant Continente,
the distinction between the two concepts as laid down by this Court in the case of People
vs. de Vera, et al. needs to be reiterated, thus: “Conspirators and accomplices have one
thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however,
know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of
action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision,
and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a
crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide
whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in
its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of the crime; accomplices are merely
their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.”
With respect to appellant Juanito Itaas, however, the trial court correctly found that the
evidence against him which consist of his written confession and the straightforward and
credible testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta, even if taken
independently, are sufficient to convict him. Appellant Itaas categorically admitted in his
written confession that he and his companions fired at the gray Mitsubishi car of Col.
James Rowe at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City.
Moreover, prosecution witness Meriam Zulueta positively identified appellant Itaas as one
of the persons she saw on board a car who fired at a gray car at the same time and place
where Col. Rowe and his driver were ambushed.
With respect to the liability of appellant Itaas for the wounding of Joaquin Vinuya, it
appears that the said victim sustained injuries on his scalp, on the left shoulder and on the
back portion of the left hand from the ambush. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The evidence
adduced by the prosecution, particularly the opinion of Dr. Jose Santiago in his testimony,
is not sufficient to establish the crime of frustrated murder. This Court notes that the
wounds sustained by the victim are not fatal wounds but merely superficial wounds. The
records disclose that Joaquin Vinuya managed to drive the car of Col. Rowe toward the
JUSMAG Compound which is 200 meters away from the site of the ambush. It also
appears that Vinuya was treated for his wounds for only four (4) days at the Clark Air Base
Hospital in Pampanga after which he was brought back to the JUSMAG Compound in

Quezon City to recuperate. Hence, the crime committed as against him is only attempted
murder.
In view of the foregoing, appellant Juanito Itaas should be held liable for the crimes of
murder and attempted murder for his direct participation in the killing of Col. James Rowe
and in the wounding of his driver Joaquin Vinuya, respectively. Due to the absence of any
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in both cases, the penalty to be imposed on
appellant Itaas is reclusion perpetua for the murder of Col. James Rowe and the medium
period of prision mayor for the attempt on the life of Joaquin Vinuya. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in the latter case, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed
on appellant Itaas is the medium period of prision mayor and the minimum shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense, that is, prision correccional.
On the other hand, being an accomplice to the crimes of murder and attempted murder,
the penalty to be imposed on appellant Donato Continente shall be the medium periods of
reclusion temporal and prision correccional, respectively. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law in both cases, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on appellant
Continente as an accomplice to the crime of murder is the medium period of reclusion
temporal and the minimum shall be prision mayor, while the maximum of the penalty to be
imposed on the said appellant as an accomplice to the crime of attempted murder is the
medium period of prision correccional and the minimum shall be arresto mayor.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-89-4843 and Q-89-4844 is hereby
MODIFIED, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, as principal and as
accomplice, respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Appellant Continente as accomplice, is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Both
appellants Itaas and Continente are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally the amount of
P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, Col. James Rowe, by way of civil indemnity.
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder, as principal
and as accomplice, respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years
and six (6) months of prision mayor, as maximum. Appellant Continente, as accomplice, is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum. SO ORDERED.
---------------------------------xxx-----------------------------
TOPIC: Aggravating Circumstances (Treachery)
[G.R. No. 128900. July 14, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO S. ANTONIO, SPO4
JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR., accused-appellants.
FACTS:
The victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former professional basketball player, succumbed
instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly
precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto Ambet S. Antonio, a one-time
chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). It was during his stint as such that
he and Tuadles became socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became
reacquainted when they both started frequenting the International Business Club (IBC),
located along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which houses amenities such as a
dining room, music bar and gameroom. Often, the two would meet with other members
and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the club. Their preferred
games were poker or pusoy dos, ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran
into the tens of thousands of pesos.
The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1, 1996. Antonio,
Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at
the club for another poker session, their third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club
first, followed by Tuadles at around midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after
waiting for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play pusoy dos, a game for two (2)
players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only when either of them had
to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00 oclock in the morning of
November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an
argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and the defense presented two
very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged and sought to prove that in the course of
an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and
shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the
nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of
one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles
occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the testimony of
accused Antonio himself, who testified that their argument was caused by Tuadles refusal
to pay Antonios winnings. In the middle of a heated altercation where they traded
expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonios gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his
life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles hand and they grappled for possession
of the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell face down to the floor, and
Antonio was left too stunned to recall who had actually pulled the trigger. In fine, Antonio
alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his only motivation was to defend
himself. He also refuted the testimony of the prosecutions eyewitness, averring that SG
Bobis could not have seen the actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4
Juanito Nieto, who were alerted by Antonios yells, reached the scene when Tuadles had
already been shot and was lying on the floor.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an ambulance or check if
he was still alive. Instead, and there is no dispute in these succeeding events, Antonio
convinced the two (2) security guards, prosecution eyewitness SG Bobis included, to
accompany him to his home in Greenmeadows Subdivision, Quezon City, after which they
proceeded to the San Juan Police Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a member of the
San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonios residence for several hours, during
which time Antonio made phone calls and summoned his lawyer. At around 3:00 oclock in
the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied by SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in the
custody of San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and the police authorities. Later, the two
security guards and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to the club where they waited for the
Page 15 of 19
police investigators. Sometime thereafter, SG Bobis narrated the events and executed his
statement at the police station, a statement which he would repudiate three (3) days later.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for the crime of
murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.
ISSUE: Whether or not treachery attended the commission of the offense charged
RULING:
There was no treachery in this case.
There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused Antonio consciously and
deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal
design without risk to himself.[34] It ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The
trial court did not explain the basis for the qualification except for a terse citation that there
was a sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. As
stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71-page decision, typed single space, the trial
court devoted only a few sentences to the issue of treachery.
It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a
conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the
moment crime.
The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them:
Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where accused made no
preparation or employed no means, method and form of execution tending directly and
specially to insure the commission of a crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from
defense which the victim may take.[35]
A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor did
not consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to
himself.[36]
A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of alevosia where it did not
appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate
the perpetration of the homicide without risk to himself, as where the appellant followed
the victims when the latter refused appellant's invitation to have some more alcoholic
drinks.[37]
The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a finding of alevosia if the
mode adopted by the accused does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk
to themselves arising from the defense that might be offered.[38]
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack was
arrived at on the spur of the moment.[39]
The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the means, methods, or form
of execution of the offense was without danger to the offender arising from the defense or
retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to
be appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously
adopted by the offender.[40] Such deliberate or conscious choice was held non-existent
where the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment.[41]
The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the killing a murder
because of treachery is not consistent with the decisions of this Court. [42] Conscious
deliberation or conscious adoption of the mode of attack has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. For it is likewise an established principle that the quantum of evidence
to prove a person's being guilty of a crime is also required to prove treachery. The same
degree of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may also
be reached respecting the attendance of treachery, whether as qualifying or aggravating,
in a criminal case.[43] There is no such proof in this case.
There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio and Tuadles spent several
hours having fun playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles
could not pay to appellant Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument arose, with
appellant Antonio and Tuadles standing face to face three (3) feet away from each other,
a fact attested to by the defense and even by the prosecution eyewitness himself.
Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were arguing. Antonio even called
out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just before the shooting, Bobis heard Antonio saying: Putang
ina ka kasi. The argument precluded the presence of treachery. If Antonio had consciously
adopted means and methods to kill Tuadles, there was no reason to call for a Sergeant or
any eyewitness for that matter.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar,[44] where we held that there was
no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercation. More recently,
in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a
heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with
his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforseen.[45] (Underscoring
Ours)
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no
treachery. In People v. Chua,[46] we reiterated our consistent view that:
While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was preceded by
acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an imminent attack
and should have put the deceased on guard.
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned and could
have anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles
was preceded by a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as
admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting
was committed with treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles in the first
place. His criminal act was an offshoot of their argument which neither of them had
foreseen. Hence, there was no treachery because treachery requires that the mode of
attack must have been thought of by the offender and must have sprung from an
unforeseen occurrence.[47]
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull his gun and
shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-exist with treachery. In passion, the
offender loses his reason and control. In treachery, on the other hand, the means
employed is adopted consciously and deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion, loses
his reason and self-control, cannot consciously employ a particular means, method or
form of attack in the execution of the crime.[49] Thus, the killing of Tuadles by appellant
Antonio was not attended by treachery.
That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and favorably considered by the
trial court to elevate the killing to murder, was not proven by convincing evidence [50] is
advocated by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief. He agreed with Appellant
Antonio's contention on the matter:
On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to agree with this particular
submission of Antonio. Antonio and Tuadles engaged in pusoy dos. In the beginning, they
were heard laughing and kidding each other (nagtatawanan at nagkakantiyawan).Later,
the banter turned into verbal altercation.
Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the incipient violence. Hence,
Tuadles could have braced himself with the aggression of Antonio. There is no treachery
when the killing results from a verbal altercation or spat between the victim and the

assailant such that the victim must have been forewarned of the impending danger. In this
case, Bobis testified that he saw Antonio and Tuadles facing each other before Antonio
raised his hand and shot Tuadles on the forehead. The proximate distance of three feet
between Tuadles and Antonio immediately before the fatal shooting allowed and gave
Tuadles opportunity to defend himself.[51]
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal code.
--------------------------xxx-------------------------
TREACHERY
G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE,
JR., accused-appellant.
FACTS: In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Makati.
Roland John Chapman went with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked
Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the
way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino
offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car,
driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the
middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: “Who are
you? (Show me your) I.D.” When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and
pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: “Why
are you bothering us?” Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and
fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: “Why did
you shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to
assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then
turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: “Do you want a trouble?” Leino
said “no” and took a step backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became
hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: “Oh, my God, he’s got
a gun. He’s gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?” All the while, accused was pointing his
gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to
sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused
stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay
still. She strayed to the side of accused’s car. Accused tried but failed to grab her.
Maureen circled around accused’s car, trying to put some distance between them. The
short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and
repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside
Leino on the sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot
Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his
head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino
struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the
incident.
As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND
CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of
JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97
days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for
Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.
Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi.
ISSUE: W/N THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF
CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS ATTENDED BY
TREACHERY.
HELD:
The accused claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman and
Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman consciously
and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the
crime. The accused asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
The 3 Informations charged the accused with having committed the crimes with treachery
and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court
for, admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting
on the street since the victims were unknown to the accused and vice-versa. It, however,
appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman.
Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting. He
testified that for no apparent reason, the accused suddenly alighted from his car and
accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his
I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on. Chapman then
stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong. There and
then, the accused pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The
gun attack was unexpected. “Why did you shoot me?” was all Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance
to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of
his criminal design without risk to himself. The accused acted on the spur of the moment.
Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the
initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was
thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of the accused rather than a
deliberate act of will. Mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself,
constitute treachery. Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, the accused should only
be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, treachery clearly attended the
commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold
blood, the accused ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and
wandered to the side of appellant’s car. When the accused went after her, Maureen
moved around his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or two,
the accused got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While
seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by the accused .
Clearly, the accused purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position
before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of
Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman – a period which the accused used to
prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to
himself.
DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the
Decision of the trial court, dated December 22, 1992, thus:
Page 16 of 19
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr.,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland
John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for the victim's death; and, One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr.,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for
the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death;
Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and
Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four
Thousand Fourty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of
earning capacity of said deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
damages; and Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr.,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the
said offended party the following amounts: (P30,000.00) pesos as Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) pesos as indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand
Three Hundred Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One
Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two Million (P2,000,000.00)
pesos as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three (3)
offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three
Million [P3,000,000.00] pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
-------------------------------xxx--------------------------------
People of the Philippines vs. Rene Siao
G.R. No. 126021 / 03 March 2000./ Justice Gonzaga-Reyes
Art. 14 – Aggravating Circumstances – Ignominy
FACTS:
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this
wise:
Joy Raymundo and private complainant Estrella Raymundo are cousins. They worked as
house maids of appellant's family. Reylan Gimena was also a helper of appellant's family.
Estrella was then a 14-year old "probinsiyana" from Palompon, Leyte.
On May 27, 1994, at about 3:00 p.m., in the Siao residence located at 417-A Basak
Brotherhood, Cebu City, appellant ordered Reylan Gimena, a houseboy of the Siaos, to
pull Estrella to the room of the women. Gimena dragged her toward the women's quarters
and once inside, appellant pushed her to the wooden bed (naomog). Appellant pointed a
pistol colored white at Gimena and the face of Estrella.
Producing a candle and a bottle of sprite, appellant asked Estrella to choose one among a
pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite. He also told Gimena "Reylan, birahi si Ester." (Reylan
do something to Ester.) Appellant lighted the candle and dropped the melting candle on
her chest. Estrella chose a bottle of sprite because she was afraid of the pistol. She was
made to lie down on her back on the bed with her head hanging over one end.
Whereupon, appellant poured sprite into her nostrils as she was made to spread her arms.
While appellant dropped the bottle of sprite into her nostrils, he pointed the gun at her
face. Estrella felt dizzy and her eyesight became blurred. She tried to fold her arms to
cover her breasts but appellant ordered Gimena to hold her hands.
Appellant then tied her feet and hands with an electric cord or wire as she was made to lie
face down on the bed. After that, appellant untied her hands and feet but tied her back
with the same wire.
As appellant pointed his pistol at her, he ordered Estrella to remove her pants and T-shirt,
she sat on the bed and did as she was told and when she was naked, appellant
commanded her to take the initiative (ikaw ang mauna sa lalaki.) She did not understand
what appellant meant. At this point, appellant poked the gun at her temple.
Appellant then commanded Gimena to remove his shorts. But Gimena refused. Gimena
did not remove his shorts but let his penis out.
Appellant spread the arms of Estrella and made her lie down spread. She felt dizzy and
shouted for help twice. Appellant ordered Gimena to rape Estrella. At first Gimena refused
to heed the command of appellant to rape Estrella (birahi) because, according to Gimena,
he has a sister. Appellant said that if they would not obey, he would kill both of them.
Appellant told Gimena, "Reylan, do something (birahi) to Ester!" Estrella was made to
suck the penis of Gimena at gunpoint. She complied with the order of appellant and when
the penis of Gimena was inside her mouth, appellant kept looking and pointing his
handgun at them.
Thereafter, Gimena got on top of Estrella (gisakyan) and did the sexual act (kayatan). She
felt excruciating pain. Gimena made push-and-pull movements for around 10 minutes.
Appellant looked on and said, "why did it take you long to penetrate?" While Gimena was
making the push-and-pull movements, appellant held the legs of Estrella to keep them
apart.
After Gimena had sexual intercourse with Estrella, she sat down. Not long after, appellant
said: "You do it again." Gimena said that he could not do it again because he was already
very tired. But appellant pointed the pistol at Gimena's temple. Gimena obeyed the order
of appellant because the pistol was pointed at him. They were made to lay side by side
while appellant kept on pointing the pistol at them. Gimena, who was behind Estrella
made a push-and-pull movements so that his organ would reach her private part.
After the side by side position, they were made to assume the dog position (patuwad).
Appellant commanded her to do it but she refused because she was already tired.
Appellant pointed the pistol at her, so she obeyed his order. Gimena said: "I will not do
that because I am already tired." At that, appellant pointed the pistol at Gimena. Thus,
Gimena copulated with Estrella in the manner dogs perform the sexual intercourse.
Gimena shouted for help. Somebody knocked on the door and they heard the voice of
Teresita Pañares, the older sister of appellant. Appellant ignored Pañares and kept on
pointing the pistol at Estrella and Gimena, as he looked at them with wide-open eyes
(siga). Shortly, appellant told them to go to the boy's room. They complied with his order
tearfully, after he followed them laughing all the while. Appellant then warned them: "If you
will tell the police, I will kill your mothers.".
At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Estrella and Joy Raymundo sought
permission to go home. On their way home, they met an old man who saw Estrella crying.
The old man took them to his house. After the incident was reported to the police, Senior
Police Officer Reynaldo Omaña conducted the investigation and arrested Gimena, who

was identified by Esrtrella as the one who raped her on orders of appellant. The police
officers looked for appellant to shed light on the reported rape. But they could not locate
him.”
To sum up, Ester Raymundo and Reylan Gimena were forced and intimidated at gunpoint
by accused-appellant Rene Siao to have carnal knowledge of each other. Rene Siao
called Reylan Gimena inside the women's quarter. After Rene Siao closed the door, he
told Reylan, "Reylan, birahi si Ester". Since Reylan was at a loss as to what to do, Rene
Siao commanded Ester at gunpoint to "suck (um-um) the penis" of Reylan Gimena. Both
Reylan and Ester performed the sexual act because they were afraid they will be killed.
Thereafter, accused-appellant commanded Reylan to rape Ester in three (3) different
positions, pointing the handgun at them the whole time.
(Yung defense ni Rene Siao, magulo. Basta tungkol sa nawawalang watch. Medyo
unrelated. Ito yung kinuwento ni Sir sa class, yung prosecution’s version)
ISSUE/S:
Whether the aggravating circumstance of ignominy is present in this case.
HELD:
Yes, it is present in this case.
Accused-appellant was held guilty of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. But the trial court overlooked and did not take
into account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant
to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the
accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior,
female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven
like the crime itself in the instant case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended
the commission thereof.
However, the use of a weapon serves to increase the penalty. Since the use of a deadly
weapon increases the penalty as opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which
only affects the period of the penalty, said fact should be alleged in the information,
because of the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Considering that the complaint (which was later converted into the
Information) failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon, specifically, that herein accused-
appellant was armed with a gun, the penalty to be reckoned with in determining the
penalty for rape would be reclusion perpetua, the penalty prescribed for simple rape under
Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Simple rape is punishable by the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, which must be applied regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance which may have attended the commission of the
deed. Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is correct.
NOTE: (Re: Rape)
Third, accused-appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do
not conform to common experience due to the following reasons: Reylan Gimena
ejaculated three times in a span of less than 30 minutes; the rape took place within
earshot and near the presence of other people; Ester and Reylan did not make a dash for
freedom during the ten minutes it took Rene Siao to follow them from the women's quarter
to the male's quarter where the latter wanted them to resume their copulation; a barangay
tanod was present at the place of the alleged rape at about 4:00 p.m.; the private
complainant reported the incident to an old man she chanced upon on her way home.
Again, the points raised by accused-appellant are trite and of no consequence. First of all,
the important consideration in rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the
female genitalia by the male organ. Well-settled is the rule that penetration, however
slight, and not ejaculation, is what constitutes rape. Thus, this factor could not affect the
case for the prosecution. Second, accused-appellant's argument that it is impossible to
commit a rape in house where there are many occupants is untenable. We have held in a
number of cases that lust is no respecter of time and place. It is not impossible to
perpetrate a rape even in a small room. Rape can be committed in a house where there
are many other occupants. Third, Ester and Reylan could not be expected to flee or even
to attempt to flee under the circumstances. Undoubtedly, considering that Ester was only
fourteen-years old and a newly employed housemaid, while Reylan Gimena a seventeen-
year old houseboy, they were easily intimidated and cowed into submission by accused-
appellant, who aside from being their "amo" or employer, was menacingly threatening to
kill them or their family with a gun if they did not do as he commanded them to do. Thus, it
was not improbable for them not to attempt to escape when as accused-appellant
perceived they had an opportunity to do so. Moreover, while most victims will immediately
flee from their aggressors, others become virtually catatatonic because of the mental
shock they experience. It was also not improbable for them to report the incident to an old
man they met on the road as there was no on else to turn to.
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the
story. Accused-appellant sought to establish by his story that since Ester was caught
stealing money and the personal belongings of the people in the household she had
motive to implicate accused-appellant in such a serious charge. We cannot see how a 14-
year old girl from the rural area could fabricate such charges borne out of a desire for
revenge.
On the contrary, this theory of accused-appellant backfires on him because it appears that
due to the thefts allegedly committed by Ester, Rene Siao decided to vent his ire by
subjecting her to a perverted form of punishment and using Reylan as an instrument
thereof. As to the charge of accused-appellant that the father of Ester tried to extort a
huge sum of money from the accused-appellant's family so that the case against him will
be dropped, we agree with the trial court that this contention is largely self-serving as it is
uncorroborated.
-------------------------xxx----------------------
G.R. No. 145993 June 17, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG, Appellant.
ART. 14. Aggravating Circumstances: By means of motor vehicle
DAVIDE, JR.
Version of the Prosecution
Liza Galang testified that on 7 July 1996 at around 4:00 p.m., her common-law husband
Joseph admonished Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix Mallari not to drive fast while
passing by Joseph’s house. Rufino and his brothers, who were then hot-tempered,
challenged Joseph to a fight. The latter just ignored the challenge; and, instead he and his
own brothers Radi and Manny asked apology from Rufino.
Later that afternoon, while Joseph and Liza were watching a basketball game at the
barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed
weapons, arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When
they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near
the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which
caused his instantaneous death.
Liza further testified that at the time of his death, Joseph was 37 years old. He was a
foreman in a construction firm with a daily income of ₱350 and also a carpenter and
mason with a daily income of ₱250. She spent less than ₱20,000 for the coffin, tomb,
funeral, and other expenses during the wake of Joseph.
Edgar Bawar, a friend of Joseph, testified that at 6:24 p.m. on 7 July 1996, while Joseph
was watching a basketball game, Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix, who were carrying
Page 17 of 19
bladed weapons, arrived and chased Joseph. Joseph ran away, and Rufino pursued him
with the truck. Upon catching up with him, Rufino bumped Joseph, as a result of which the
latter died on the spot.
Dr. Erwin Escal testified that the cause of death of Joseph, as stated in the Medico-Legal
Report, was "[c]rushing injury on the head secondary to vehicular accident." Joseph’s
head was deformed with multiple skull fractures and lacerations and brain tissue
evisceration.
RTC RULING
The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Liza Galang
and Edgar Bawar that Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph. Appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it convicted Rufino of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the death penalty.
ISSUE
Whether Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph with the truck he was driving.
SC RULING
The antecedent events show that, indeed, Rufino deliberately ran over Joseph. At around
4:00 p.m. of 7 July 1996, when Rufino passed by Joseph’s house while driving the truck,
he got angry when Joseph admonished him not to drive at high speed in front of Joseph’s
house. Rufino, already in a fighting mood, challenged Joseph to a fight, but the latter just
ignored it. To put an end to the argument, Joseph and his brothers apologized to Rufino.
Apparently, Rufino was not appeased by the apology and continued to harbor ill-feelings
against Joseph. Rufino got the chance to vent his anger not long thereafter. At around
5:30 p.m., while Joseph was watching a basketball game at the basketball court located
beside Rufino’s house, Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix, carrying with them bladed
weapons, attempted to stab Joseph. But before they could do it, Joseph was able to run
away. They chased Joseph, but were unable to catch up with him. Instead of giving up on
his evil design, Rufino went back to the basketball court, boarded the truck parked nearby,
and resumed his pursuit of Joseph. Upon seeing Joseph on the road, Rufino hit him with
the truck.
We note that the testimonies of Liza and Edgar were consistent with their respective
sworn statements, which they gave to the police investigator in the morning of 8 July 1996.
Considering that less than twenty-four hours had elapsed from the time of the bumping
incident, Liza and Edgar could not have concocted a story to pin down Rufino for the
death of Joseph. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the sworn statements
and the testimonies of Liza and Edgar.
Moreover, the defense has not shown any reason why Edgar, who corroborated Liza’s
testimony about the incident, would perjure himself to pin down Rufino. Absent any
evidence showing any reason or motive for the prosecution witnesses to perjure, the
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus
worthy of full faith and credit.
In comparison, Rufino and Myrna gave inconsistent testimonies. Myrna wanted the court
to believe that her husband was in no way at fault by stating that Rufino was driving at a
slow pace, while Rufino himself declared that he was driving at a speed of eighty
kilometers per hour. Myrna’s attempt to cover up the misdeed of her husband is obvious;
hence, the integrity of her declarations becomes questionable.
Rufino himself made inconsistent statements. At first, in the course of the direct
examination, Rufino declared that prior to the bumping incident he saw Joseph pass by
his house, walking in a zigzag manner. This testimony was an attempt to give credence to
his allegation that Joseph was drunk, which was why he threw stones at the truck for no
reason at all. But when he was asked during his cross-examination about his altercation
with Joseph earlier that fateful day, Rufino made a complete turnaround and declared that
he saw Joseph for the first time at the place where he was run over.
Moreover, the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna do not inspire belief for being improbable
and not in accord with human experience. It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to
be credible, it should come not only from the mouth of a credible witness, but should also
be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience.
According to Rufino, he saw Joseph when the truck was four meters away from the latter
and he blew his horn three times. This is altogether unbelievable. At a speed of eighty
kilometers per hour, a four-meter distance could easily be covered by the truck in a split
second, and there would be no time for the driver to blow the horn before the impact.
Much less could there be time for a person on the road to pick up a stone and hurl the
same to an oncoming truck. Thus, it is simply impossible that Joseph was able to hurl a
stone at the truck before he was run over.
Neither can we believe Rufino’s testimony that he first saw Joseph on the road when the
truck was just four meters away from him. According to Rufino, the road was clear
because only Joseph and the truck he was driving were on the road.
From Rufino’s own testimony, it appears that his view was unobstructed. He could have
seen Joseph from afar and could therefore have avoided bumping the latter had he really
wanted to.
Obviously, the stone-throwing incident was concocted by the defense as a last ditch effort
to have Rufino absolved from his criminal act. Unlike the prosecution witnesses who
executed their sworn statements on the morning after the subject incident, Rufino’s sworn
statement was executed only on 15 August 1996, or more than one month after the
incident. Thus, Rufino had enough time to reflect and come up with a plot. Unfortunately
for him, the story he concocted is so incredible that we are not inclined to believe it.
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Rufino deliberately bumped
Joseph with the truck he was driving.
Rufino’s culpability having been resolved, we now come to the penalty to be imposed. The
trial court imposed the death penalty on the ground that the qualifying circumstance of use
of motor vehicle is present. Rufino, however, argues that the use of a motor vehicle was
only incidental, considering that he resorted to it only to enable him to go after Joseph
after he failed to catch up with the latter. The fallacy of this argument is obvious.
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon
catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died
instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate
the killing of Joseph.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another "by means of a
motor vehicle" is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to
murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the penalty is
composed of two indivisible penalties, we shall apply Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads:
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
In the present case, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery, which were alleged in the information, were not proved. What was proved was
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender through the testimonies of Rufino and
Myrna, which were not rebutted by the prosecution.
We have held that for voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2)
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in
authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender is considered voluntary if it is

spontaneous and shows the intention of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to
the authorities because he either acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the
government the trouble and expense necessarily included for his search and capture. All
these requisites are present in this case.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating
circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on
Rufino.
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, of Biñan,
Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 9621-B convicting appellant RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG of
the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. The penalty is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua;
2. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱50,000 is reduced to ₱25,000, and
the awards of actual and moral damages are reduced to ₱9,200 and ₱50,000,
respectively; and
3. Appellant Rufino Mallari y Ilag is further ordered to pay the heirs of Joseph Galang an
indemnity ex delictoin the amount of ₱50,000.
Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
-----------------------------xxx--------------------------------
ART. 14 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; BY MEANS OF MOTOR VEHICLE
PEOPLE v. ENGUITO
G.R. No. 128812 February 28, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS
on September 22, 1991 at about 3:00 o'clock early dawn at Marcos Bridge, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with intent to kill and with treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously chased, bumped and hit the motorela which
Wilfredo S. Achumbre was riding with his Ceres Kia automobile bearing Plate No. 722 and
as a consequence thereof, the motorela was dragged and fell on the road causing the
driver (Felipe Requerme) and its passenger Rosita Requerme to sustain serious bodily
injuries while the deceased Wilfredo S. Achumbre was able to run towards the railings at
Marcos Bridge but accused with intent to kill him hit instantaneously immediately rammed
and hit him with his driven vehicle cutting his right leg and thereafter ran over him thereby
causing mortal harm on his body which was the direct and immediate cause of his
instantaneous death. the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission. Upon arraignment,
accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide with Less Serious Physical Injuries. CA found that since the prosecution's
evidence showed that accused killed the victim by means of motor vehicle, he should be
guilty of the crime of murder and not of homicide.
ISSUE: WON accused should be guilty of crime of murder aggravated by means of motor
vehicle
RULING
The basic rule in criminal law is that a person is responsible for all the consequences of
his unlawful or wrongful act although such consequences were different from those which
he originally intended. Even if it be assumed that the real intention of accused-appellant
was to surrender the victim to the police for mauling him, his act of pursuing the victim,
who was a passenger of the motorela, resulted in the injuries of the driver and the other
passenger of the motorela. Appellant himself testified that when he followed the motorela,
he was "very near" and that he saw the deceased Achumbre jump out on the right side of
the motorela but he went ahead; he allegedly "tried to evade, but he was so near." Upon
seeing that Achumbre was trying to jump out of the motorela, accused-appellant should
have known that by closely following, pushing and bumping the motorela, he could injure
the passengers, which is what happened in this case. Moreover, accused-appellant
ignored the pleas of Rosita Requerme, the other passenger and wife of the driver of the
motorela, for him to stop bumping and pushing the motorela. Instead, he persisted
resulting in the motorela turning on its side and in the opposite direction. Verily, the act of
accused-appellant in relentlessly pursuing the motorela is a manifestation of his intention
to perpetrate the crime.
The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of motor vehicle.
The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by
means thereof. Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to
stop the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he
testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing. Accused-appellant could
have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking the law into his own
hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of
the motorela but he still continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the
deceased who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the Marcos bridge.
Accused-appellant further used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more
than one (1) kilometer away from the place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle
upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. Evidence
shows that accused-appellant was further pursued by the police. Appellant himself
testified that he stopped his vehicle just after the police mobile stopped but admitted
having "stopped farther than the police mobile". The foregoing notwithstanding, the
existence or non-existence of a mitigating circumstance in the case at bar will not affect
the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime
committed by accused-appellant is the complex crime of murder with less serious physical
injuries. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime shall
be the maximum period of the penalty for the most serious crime. The crime was
committed in 1992 where the penalty for the crime of murder, which is the most serious
crime, was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. The death penalty being the maximum period of the penalty for
murder should be imposed for the complex crime of murder with less serious physical
injuries considering that under Article 63, an indivisible penalty cannot be affected by the
presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Page 18 of 19
WHEREFORE, the decision convicting accused-appellant Thadeos Enguito of the
complex crime of Murder with Less Serious Physical Injuries and sentencing him to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of deceased Wilfredo Achumbre the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P1,680,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; P 16,300.00
as actual damages; P 50,000.00 as moral damages; and to further pay the spouses Felipe
and Rosita Requerme the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages.
---------------------------xxx--------------------------
PEOPLE V. STEPHEN MARK WHISENHUNT
G.R. No. 123819, 14 November 2001, J. Ynares- Santiago
PRINICIPLE: Article 14, Aggravating Circumstances – Cruelty
Accused and victim (Elsie) were lovers. They met at the Apex Motor Corp. where
accused was the manager while Elsie was the assistant personnel manager. Both of
them were married but they were estranged from their respective spouses. In April 1993,
Elsie resigned from Apex to avoid nasty rumors about her illicit affairs with the accused. It
appears however that she continued her affair with the accused even after she resigned
from Apex. On 23 September 1993, an Apex employee assigned to drive the accused,
reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at the latters condominium in Annapolis Greenhills.
Accused ordered him to fetch Elsie at her parents house in Blumentritt. At 2 p.m., Elsie
told the driver to go to the Apex office in Mandaluyong to deliver the paper bag to Amy
Serrano, the Personnel Manager. He proceeded to the Apex Office and then returned to
Platinum. Accused asked him to stay because he had to drive Elsa home at 10 p.m. He
waited until a little past 10 p.m. when he had not heard from the accused, he told Lucy,
the housemaid, the he was going home.
The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-appellants unit. At around noon,
Lucy asked if he had seen a kitchen knife which was missing. He then overheard Lucy ask
accused-appellant who told her that the kitchen knife was in his bedroom. Demetrio saw
accused-appellant go inside the room and, shortly thereafter, hand the knife to Lucy. At
3:40 p.m., Lucy told Demetrio to buy cigarettes for accused-appellant. He went out to buy
the cigarettes and gave them to Lucy. At 5:00 p.m., accused-appellant told Demetrio to go
home. On September 25, 1993, Demetrio reported at the Platinum Condominium at
around 8:00 a.m. He was allowed by accused-appellant to go to Apex to follow up his
salary. While he was there, Amy Serrano asked him if Elsa was still in accused-appellants
condominium unit. Although Demetrio did not see Elsa there, he answered yes. Amy gave
him black plastic garbage bags which he turned over to accused-appellant upon his return
to the condominium. The latter then ordered him to drive Lucy to Cubao and to go home to
get some clothes, since they were leaving for Bagac, Bataan. On the way to Cubao, Lucy
told Demetrio that she was going home. He dropped her off in front of the Farmers
Market. Thereafter, he proceeded to his house in Fairview, Quezon City, to pick up some
clothes, then returned to the condominium at around 10:00 a.m.
Accused-appellant asked him to check the fuel gauge of the car. He was told to go to
Apex to get a gas slip and then to gas up. At around noon, he went back to the
condominium. He had lunch outside at Goodah, then returned to accused-appellants unit
and stayed in the servants quarters. While Demetrio was in the servants quarters
watching television, accused-appellant came in. He asked Demetrio how long he wanted
to work for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for him forever, and
expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this, accused-appellant shed tears and
embraced Demetrio. Then accused-appellant said, May problema ako, Rio. Demetrio
asked what it was, and accused-appellant told him that Elsa was dead. Demetrio
asked, Bakit mo siya pinatay? Accused-appellant answered that he did not kill Elsa, rather
she died of bangungot.
Demetrio suggested that Elsas body be autopsied, but accused-appellant said that he had
already beheaded her. He asked Demetrio if he wanted to see the decapitated body, but
the latter refused. The two of them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping
Center and bought a big bag with a zipper and rollers, colored black and gray.[15] Demetrio
noticed that accused-appellant seemed nervous and his eyes were teary and bloodshot.
When they returned to the condominium, accused-appellant asked Demetrio to help him
wrap the body in the black garbage bags. Demetrio entered accused-appellants bathroom
and found the dismembered hands, feet, trunk and head of a woman. He lifted the
severed head by the hair and, when he lifted it, he saw Elsas face. He placed this in a
black trash bag. He helped accused-appellant place the other body parts in three separate
garbage bags. They packed all the garbage bags in the bag with the zipper and rollers,
which they had bought in Shoppesville. Then, they brought the bag down and loaded it in
the trunk of accused-appellants car. After that, they boarded the car. Demetrio took the
wheel and accused-appellant sat beside him in front.[16]
It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant left the
condominium. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to drive around Batangas and Tagaytay
City. After leaving Tagaytay, they entered the South Luzon Expressway and headed
towards Sta. Rosa, Laguna. When they were near Puting Kahoy and Silangan, accused-
appellant told Demetrio to turn into a narrow road. Somewhere along that road, accused-
appellant ordered Demetrio to stop the car. Accused-appellant alighted and told Demetrio
to get the bag in the trunk. Accused-appellant took the plastic bags inside the bag and
dumped them by the roadside. Then, accused-appellant returned the empty bag in the
trunk and boarded the car. He called Demetrio and said, Tayo na Rio, tuloy na tayo sa
Bataan. It was already 6:30 p.m.
Demetrio drove to the Sta. Rosa exit gate, along the South Luzon Expressway, through
EDSA and towards the North Luzon Expressway. They stopped at a gasoline station to
refuel. They then took the San Fernando, Pampanga exit, and were soon en route to the
Whisenhunt family mansion in Bagac, Bataan. Before reaching Bagac, accused-appellant
ordered Demetrio to stop the car on top of a bridge. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to
get off and to throw a bag into the river. Later, they passed another bridge and accused-
appellant again told Demetrio to pull over. Accused-appellant alighted and threw Elsas
clothes over the bridge. On the way, Demetrio noticed that accused-appellant took
something from a bag, tore it to pieces and threw it out of the window. When they passed
Pilar, Bataan, accused-appellant threw Elsas violet Giordano bag. As they reached the
road boundary of Bagac, accused-appellant wrung a short-sleeved dress with violet and
green stripes, and threw it on a grassy lot. It was about midnight when accused-appellant
and Demetrio arrived at the mansion. Demetrio was unable to sleep that night, as he was
scared that he might be the next victim.
The next morning, at 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to clean the trunk of
the car, saying, Rio, linisan mo ang sasakyan para ang compartment hindi babaho. At
1:00 p.m., accused-appellant and Demetrio started off for Manila. As they passed a place
called Kabog-kabog, he saw accused-appellant take out an ATM card. Accused-appellant
burned the middle of the card, twisted it and threw it out of the window. They arrived at the
corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue at 2:30 p.m. Demetrio asked accused-appellant if he
can get off since he wanted to go home to Fairview. Before Demetrio left, accused-
appellant told him, Rio, you and your family can go on a vacation. I will give you
money. Accused-appellant then gave Demetrio P50.00 for his transportation going to
Fairview.
 Page 19 of 19
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what happened. His wife told him
to report the incident to Fiscal Joey Diaz. Demetrio and his wife went to the house of
Fiscal Diaz in Fairview to talk to him. And thereafter went to NBI.
In his defense, he first learned of Elsa’s death when he was arrested by the NBI on
September 28, 1993. He denied having anything to do with her death, saying that he had
no reason to kill her since he was in love with her. Sometime during his relationship with
Elsa, he claimed having received in the mails two anonymous letters. The first one reads:
Salamat sa pagpapahiram mo ng sasakyan at driver. Pero masyado kang pakialamero,
Steve. Walanghiya ka. Para kang demonyo. Pinakialaman mo ang di sa yo. Lintik lang
ang walang ganti. Matitiyempuhan din kita. Putang ina mo. The second letter says: Steve,
Ang kay Pedro kay Pedro. Kapag pinakialaman ay kay San Pedro ang tungo. Mahal mo
ba ang pamilya mo? Iniingatan mo ba ang pangalan mo? Nakakasagasa ka na. Upon
Elsa’s knowledge, she got very upset and said that the letters came from Fred, her
estranged husband.

RTC Ruling: Accused was convicted of the crime of murder (Demetrio as credible
witness).
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged.
Findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great weight
and respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while the testified in
court. Perhaps more damning to accused-appellant is the physical evidence against
him. The findings of the forensic biologist on the examination of the hair samples and
bloodstains all confirm Elsas death inside accused-appellants bedroom. On the other
hand, the autopsy report revealed that Elsa was stabbed at least three times on the
chest. This, taken together with Demetrios testimony that accused-appellant kept the
kitchen knife inside his bedroom on September 24, 1993, leads to the inescapable fact
that accused-appellant stabbed Elsa inside the bedroom or bathroom.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the
hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence. For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the
highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.
While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death of Elsa, the confluence of
the testimonial and physical evidence against accused-appellant creates an unbroken
chain of circumstantial evidence that naturally leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion
that accused-appellant was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others. The
rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than
one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the
accused.
In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully proven by the
prosecution without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to
accused-appellants condominium unit on September 23, 1993; that on September 24,
1993, accused-appellants housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-
appellant gave it to her, saying that it was in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993,
accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body parts of Elsa
from the bathroom inside accused-appellants bedroom; that accused-appellant disposed
of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna; that accused-appellant
also disposed of Elsas personal belongings along the road going to Bagac, Bataan; that
the mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were
found by the police and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio pointed; that hair
specimens found inside accused-appellants bathroom and bedroom showed similarities
with hair taken from Elsas head; and that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants
bedspread, covers and in the trunk of his car, all matched Elsas blood type.
Accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Mendez,
did not examine the pancreas of the deceased notwithstanding Demetrios statement that,
according to accused-appellant, Elsa died ofbangungot, or hemorrhage of the
pancreas. Because of this, accused-appellant insists that the cause of death was not
adequately established. In any event, the foregoing does not detract from the established
fact that Elsas body was found mutilated inside accused-appellants bathroom. This clearly
indicated that it was accused-appellant who cut up Elsas body to pieces.Naturally,
accused-appellant would be the only suspect to her killing.
As already stated above, Demetrios testimony was convincing. Accused-appellant
attempts to refute Demetrios statements by saying that he had repeatedly reprimanded
the latter for discourteous and reckless driving, and that he had already asked the latter to
tender his resignation. Thus, accused-appellant claims that Demetrio imputed Elsas death
on him in order to get back at him. This Court finds the cruel treatment by an employer too
flimsy a motive for the employee to implicate him in such a gruesome and hideous
crime. Rather than entertain an accusation of ill-motive and bad faith on Demetrio Ravelo,
this Court views his act of promptly reporting the incident to his family and, later, to the
authorities, as a genuine desire to bring justice to the cruel and senseless slaying of Elsa
Santos Castillo, whom he knew well.
The court do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently proved the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present
whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a
situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. From viewing the
photograph of accused-appellant that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance
of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not adequately proved
and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the
victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the
victims head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus
qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded
Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered
parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the
ground. The sight of Elsas severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the
photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the
viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her
remains.
Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be murder because of
the dismemberment of the dead body. One of the qualifying circumstances of murder
under Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code is outraging or scoffing at (the)
person or corpse of the victim.
SC: Accused is guilty as charged.
-------------------------------END-------------------------------