Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
FACTS FACTS
- Petitioner Petra Borromeo seeks to enjoin respondent MTC Judge Pogoy from - Wilmon, Iloilo Multi Parts Supply, Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern Sales,
taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the administrator to refer and Chang Liang were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas owned
the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. in common by Solinap, Locsin, and Jarantilla.
- The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of the building - After the expiration of the lease, the lessors executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
which is being leased and occupied by Petra Borromeo at a monthly rental of upon which they sold the leased property to Star Group Resources. The deed
P500. stipulated that the Vendee shall deal with the lessees and occupants of the
- Private Respondent Atty Reyes, administrator of the estate, served upon properties sold without any further warranty or obligation on the part of the
Petra a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals covering March to Vendors.
September 1982, and to vacate the premises. Petra failed to do so, hence the - Star Group brought the separate actions of unlawful detainer in the MTC.
ejectment case. o The lessees refused to concede and impugned Star Group’s right to
- Petra moved to dismiss the case, advancing the want of jurisdiction of the trial eject them. They argued that the lessors and Star Group violated
court since Atty Reyes did not refer the dispute to the Brgy Court as required their leasehold rights because:
by PD 1508. § they (lessees) were not accorded the right of preemption
o Judge Pogoy denied the motion to dimiss § the buyer was not required to honor the leases
o MR was not secured by Petra, prompting her to come to the Court § the lessees were denied the option to renew their leases
and file a petition for Certiorari. upon the expiration
o Atty Reyes admitted not having availed of the barangay conciliation o The MTC decided to proceed only in some of the cases against
process but justified the omission by citing Par 4, Sec 6 of PD 1508 Virgilio Ang, Chang Liang, and Iloilo Multi Parts, but not against
which allows the direct filing of an action in court where the same Henry Tan and Southern Sales, and Wimon, as to which the
may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations as applying to summary procedure rules were inapplicable. The MR was denied.
the case at bar. The three lessees then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court for
the annulment and setting aside of the MTC orders. Cases were
W/N Atty Reyes is correct – NO referred to the RTC where they should have gone for relief in the first
- Under Art 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry place.
and detainer is 1 year, and this period is counted from demand to vacate the - In the RTC, the Judge issued a restraining order enjoining the proceedings in
premises. the unlawful detainer cases. But a judgment was later promulgated dismissing
- Less than a month has elapsed after the last letter-demand was made the petitioners and dissolving the preliminary injunction since the unlawful
when the complaint for ejectment was filed in court. Under the procedure detainer cases fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC. The RTC did not
in PD 1508, the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and warrant the suspension of unlawful detainer cases, “the only issue being
the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. This gives Atty Reyes 9 physical possession or possession de facto, while the earlier case is one
months within which to bring his case before the proper court should involving ownership.’
conciliation efforts fail. It cannot be truthfully asserted that Atty Reyes would - Wimon, Southern Sales, and Henry Tan appealed to the Court alleging abuse
be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the of discretion on the part of the MTC for not holding in abeyance the
Barangay Lupon. proceedings in the unlawful detainer cases.
Merits of the case W/N not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC against a lessee should
- PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED. be abated/suspended by an action filed in the RTC filed by the lessee on the claim
- PD 1508 refers to a dispute required only of individuals or natural persons. that he is entitled to a right of preemption/prior purchase of the premises in
Not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, question and wishes to have said right judicially enforced – NO
partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc. - An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with the RTC based
o Atty Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the on a tenant’s claim of violation of his right of preemption. The actions in the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. Since the estate is a juridical RTC didn’t involve physical possession. The case in the RTC was merely a
person, Atty Reyes may file the complaint directly in court, without ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding.
the same coursed to the Brgy Lupon.
Property Week 9
SEMIRA v CA - Where the land is sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure
GR No 76031 2 March 1994 or number, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract determine the
effects and scope of the sale, not the area thereof.
FACTS o Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the land included
- Juana Gutierrez sold a parcel of land, Lot 4221, to Buenaventura An for P850 within the boundaries regardless of whether the real area should be
by means of a Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa. The Kasulatan provides for an greater or smaller than that recited in the deed.
estimated area of 822.5sqm and as well as the boundaries of the lot.
- An entered the premises observing the boundaries of the lot and not the area Dispositive: MTC decision reinstated. Semira is the lawful owner and possessor.
given.
- An acquired 2 other parcels of land, Lot 4215 located on the east of Lot 4221
from Sps Hornilla and Ilao, and the other lot from Santiago Asi.
- An sold Lot 4221 to his nephew Cipriano Ramirez by means of another
Kasulatan for P2,500 where the lot was described with the same area and
boundaries mentioned with the exception of the boundary on the east which
was changed from Juana Gutierrez to Buenaventura An.
- Ramirez occupied the lot by observing the boundaries. He later sold the lot to
Semira for P20,000. But the area stated in the Kasulatan was 2,200sqm, not
822.5 as appearing in the previous document. This was confirmed by the
Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey.
- Semira entered the premises and began construction of a new rice-mill. An
later filed a complaint for forcible entry claiming that the area of Lot 4221 was
822.5 sqm only and the excess formed part of Lot 4215 which he acquired
from the Hornillas.
- Semira admitted having entered the property but denies illegally doing so,
claiming ownership over the property and invoking the deed of sale in his favor
by Ramirez.
- During the pendency of the case, An applied for and was issued an OCT over
the lots he purchased by Hornillas and Asi.
- The MTC initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction since the issue of
prior physical possession could not be resolved without first deciding on the
ownership.
o It modified its decision and adjudged Semira as the lawful owner and
possessor hence, cannot be ejected therefrom.
o An appealed to the RTC which reversed the MTC ruling that it was
not necessary to delve on the issue of ownership since the question
of prior physical possession could be resolved independently and
that An clearly had prior possession. The RTC held that no matter
how righteous the claim of ownership may be, he has no right to take
the law into his own hands by forcible depriving An of his prior actual
possession of the property.
- Semira appealed to the CA without success.
W/N the CA erred in not holding that the question of ownership is so necessarily
involved that it would be impossible to decide the question of bare possession
without first setting that of ownership – NO
- The Court held in favor of Semira and sustained the MTC decision that the
issue of possession cannot be decided independently of the question of
ownership
- The question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the
real owner of the disputed portion is.
Property Week 9
WONG v CARPIO and Mercado - Possession passed from Giger to Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro.
GR L-50264 21 October 1991 The later sale a retro in favor of Wong failed to pass the possession because
there is an impediment – the possession exercised by Mercado. Possession
FACTS as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in 2 different
- Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land, lot 3 pcs-295, from William personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Giger by virtue of a deed of sale with right to repurchase executed in 1972 for - Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present
P3,500. In 1973 Giger again asked an additional amount fo P2,500 for possessor shall be preferred; if there are 2 possessions, the one longer in
Mercado so he required Giger to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro Sale. possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents
- In 1972, Mercado began harvesting only the coconut fruits and he paid taxes the title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
on the land for Giger. He went periodically to the land to make copra but he deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper
never placed any person on the land to watch it. Neither did he reside on the proceedings.
land as he resides in Lower Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur while the subject land
is at Colongan Sta. Maria. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that he
is in actual possession.
o He knew that Wong’s laborers were in the land as early as 1976 and
they have a hut there but he did not do anything to stop them. He
was instead happy that there were people and a hut on the land.
- 1976, Wong went to the land to find out if there were other people residing
there or claiming it besides the owner and he found none. So he bought the
parcel of land from Giger and his wife Valenzuela.
o Wong declared the land in suit for taxation purposes in his name. He
tried to register the pacto de retro sale but could not be registered
due to some technicalities.
o Wong placed laborers on the land in suit, built a small farm house
after making some clearings and fenced the boundaries. He also
placed signboards.
- Later that same year, Mercado went to the land again to make copras. The
matter was brought to the attention of the police and incident entered in the
police blotter.
- Wong ordered the hooking of the coconuts and nobody disturbed him.
- November 1976 Wong received a copy of Mercado’s complaint for forcible
entry. During the pendency of the complaint, Giger filed a case for reformation
against Mercado.
- MTC found that Wong had prior, actual and continuous physical possession
of the property, and dismissed the complaint and counter-claim.
- On appeal, the CFI ruled in favor of Mercado since he took possession of the
property earlier in point of time and Wong is an intruder.
- Wong filed the instant petition to the CA. The CA certified the case to the Court
since the issue is pure question of law.
Property Week 9
JAVIER v VERIDIANO and Rosete LIM KIEH TONG, INC v CA, Judge Pizarro, Reginaldo Lim
GR L-48050 10 October 1994 GR 93451 18 March 1991
FACTS FACTS
- Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot 1641 of the Olongapo - Lim and his family resided for some time in Room 301 of a building owned by
Townsite Subdivision with the District Land Officer in 1963. petitioner corporation, until they transferred to their present residence at No 3
- In 1970, she alleged that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of the Igdalig Street, Quezon City.
land by Ben Babol prompting her to file a complaint for forcible entry.Lim o Room 301 was then utilized as a place where he keeps some of his
o The City Court dismissed the case considering the subject area to be important belongings, such as his law books, documents, and
outside Lot 1641. The decision became final and executory. appliances.
- In 1973, Javier was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT covering o The building has only 1 common maid door through which all the
Lot 1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol had sold the property he was occupying, occupants of the various rooms can enter.
including the portion in question, to Rosete.Javier demanded the surrender of o In 1987, Lim wanted to go inside his room to get 3 law books but he
the same area from Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply with the was surprised to find out that the key given him could no longer fit
demand. the door lock which was then already changed.
- 4 years from the finality of the forcible entry case, Javier instituted a complaint o Lim had to buy 3 new law books to prepare for his cases. He was
for the quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Babol only able to contact defendant through its OIC, MR. Rafael Lim the
and Rosete. following day, but his request to be provided for the appropriate key
- Rosete claims that the case should be dismissed based on res judicata. produced negative result, hence this suit.
- Lim claims that there was violation of his rights to use and enjoy Room 301 of
W/N res judicata applies – NO the building owned by the defendant corporation, such that there is an urgent
- While there is actual identity of the parties between the actions since Rosete and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
is a successor in interest of Babol, there is no identity of causes of action injunction/restraining order commanding the corporation to furnish Lim with
between the civil cases. the appropriate key in order to prevent great or irreparable damages upon Lim.
- The first case is a complaint for forcible entry where the issue is prior - MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Lim instituted another action
possession regardless of who has lawful title over the property (possession reiterating the same allegations. A TRO was issued by respondent Judge
de facto, not de jure). pending trial on merits and commanding the petitioner corporation to deliver
- The later civil case captioned as quieting of title and recovery, is in reality an the appropriate keys. Petitioner corporation filed the instant petition.
action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria. It is an action
whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks W/N an action for forcible entry and detainer is available to a LESSEE? – YES
recovery of its full possession. - Any person deprived of possession of any land or building may file an action
- The judgment in forcible entry which disposes no other issue than possession for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person
and declares who has right of possession, does not bar an action for unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him.
determination who has right or title of ownership. - This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a
lessee, or tenant, or any other person against whom the possession is
unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession within 1
year after such unlawful deprivation.
Property Week 9
Sps. Nazario Penas Jr. v. Court of Appeals and Lupo Calaycay Francel Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Sycip
GR No. 112734 GR No. 117051
July 7, 1994 January 22, 1996
Property Week 9
Sps. Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla v. Maria Coprada Leonardo Azarcon, Manuel Azarcon, and Esteban Abobo v. Victor Eusebio
GR No. 152423 GR No. L-11977
December 15, 2010 April 29, 1959
Property Week 9
Mangulon, Fernando, Asuncion, Mirasol, Arsenia, Paula, Cristituto, Candelaria, Jose Cruz v. Reynaldo Pahati et al
and Crispina Calagan v. Court of First Instance of Davao and Petra Sandoval GR No. L-8257
GR No. L-30402 April 13, 1956
January 28, 1980
Facts of the case
Facts of the case - The case is an action for replevin instituted by Cruz in the CFI of Manila to
- In 1954, petitioner (Mangulon and wife) were granted a homestead patent recover the possession of an automobile and a certain amount as damages.
over a 5.29 hectares in Dawis Digos Davao and were issued the OCT therefor - Pahati admitted having bought the automobile from Bulahan for 4,900 which
- In 1955, the wife died, survived by her husband (Mangulan and their he paid in check.
children—petitioners) - When the Manila Police Dept. impounded the vehicle, he cancelled the sale
- On August 8, 1961, Mangulon and his daughter (Paula) sold a portion of 9230 and stopped the payment of the check, and as a result he returned the car to
sq. mtr. To Sandoval in consideration of 2,340.00 petitioner’s title to land was Bulahan who surrendered the check for cancellation
borrowed by Sandoval so he could have the sale annotated - Bulahan on his part claims that he acquired the car from Belizo for value and
- In 1963, Manuglon offered to the portion sold but Sandoval refused, there without having knowledge of any defect in his title
were offers to repurchase but he declined maintaining that she was to comply o That Cruz previously acquired title by purchase from Belizo as
with the demands of the Calagans provided she was to be reimbursed the evidenced by a deed of sale executed to that effect
value of the house she constructed on the land. o That later, Cruz delivered the possession to Belizo for resale and
- On April 15, 1966, petitioners brought an action for reconveyance and the trial gave him a letter of authority to secure a new certificate of registration
court ruled in their favor. in Cruz’ name
o Provided they return the 2340.00 and pay 3000 as the value of the - Bulahan claims that between 2 innocent parties, he who gave occasion,
house constructed in good faith through his conduct, to the falsification committed by Belizo, should be the
- Petitioners appeal the payment of 3000 as the value of the house. one to suffer the loss.
- Court rendered a judgment declaring Bulahan to be entitled to the automobile
Is Sandoval entitled to the reimbursement of the house? Yes. in question and ordered Cruz to return the sum of 4,900 with legal interest
- There can be no question that the house which was constructed by Sandoval - Automobile was originally owned by Northern Motors sold to Chinaman Lu
is a useful expense (increases the value or augments the income of the Dag, and sold it afterwards to Belizo and sold it later to Cruz.
nd
property) - Belizo was a dealer of 2 hand cars and 1 year after, Belizo offered to Cruz
- In applying Article 547 of the Civil Code, the homesteader desiring to to sell the automobile for him claiming to have a buyer for it, Cruz agreed
repurchase should be given the option to require the vendee to remove the - On March 7, 1952, the letter was falsified and converted into an
useful improvements on the land, under Article 1616, the vendor must pay for authorized deed of sale in favor of Belizo by erasing a portion thereof
the useful improvements introduced by the vendee otherwise, the latter may and adding in its place the words "sold the above car to Mr. Jesusito
retain possession until full reimbursementà which would render nugatory the Belizo of 25 Valencia, San Francisco del Monte, for Five Thousand Pesos
right of repurchase granted by law to a homesteader because the vendee can (P5,000)."
prevent repurchase by building something on the homestead beyond the o Armed with this deed of sale, Belizo obtained a registration in his
capacity to pay of the homesteader seeking to repurchase name on the same date and he sold the car to Bulahan who in turn
Petitioners are not exercising the option to refund the amount of the expenses sold it to Pahati
incurred nor to pay the increase in value, in turn, Sandoval, may remove her
house since this can be dome without damage to the principal thing, as Who has a better right over the car? Cruz.
stipulated in Article 547 - Under Article 559, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
- Calagans should not be made to refund the value of the house, else, the deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same,
salutary policy behind the Public Land Law would be thwarted and rendered and the only defense is if he acquired it in good faith at a public sale.
meaningless - Cruz had a better right to the car in question than Bulahan for it cannot
be disputed that Cruz had been illegally deprived of possession because
of an ingenious scheme utilized by Belize to enable him to dispose of it
as if he were the owner
- Cruz can still recover the possession of the car even if Bulahan acted in good
faith
Property Week 9
AZNAR v. YAPDIANGCO acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The said article
GR No. L-18536 establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when
March 31, 1965 the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof.
In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the
Facts of the case owner, who may recover it without paying any indemnity, except when
- In May 1959, Teodoro Santos advertised in 2 newspapers the sale of his Ford the possessor acquired it in a public sale.
Fairlane 500.
- A certain L. De Dios, claiming to be a nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the Petition DENIED.
Santos residence to answer the ad. Irineo, son of Teodoro, received and
talked with De Dios who informed him that Vicente Marella was interested in
buying the car.
- At a subsequent meeting Vicente agreed to buy the car for 14.7k with the
understanding that the price would be paid only after the car had been
registered in his name.
o The deed of sale and the registration of the car in Vicente’s name
was effected. Teodoro instructed his son, Irineo, not to part with the
documents until Vicente shall have given the full payment of the car.
o Ireneo and L. De Dios proceeded to Vicente’s place where they
demanded the payment. Vicente informed them that he was short by
some 2k, and begged off to be allowed to secure the shortage from
his sister, also living in Manila.
o Vicente ordered L. De Dios to go to that sister and suggested that
Irineo to go with him. He also requested for the documents under the
pretext that he would show them to his lawyer. Trusting the good faith
of Vicente, Irineo handed over the documents and went to the sister’s
house with L. De Dios.
- In Azcarrage Street, Manila, the place of the sister, Irineo was left to wait at
the sala while L. De Dios went inside a room. However, De Dios did not return.
After waiting for a length of time, Irineo discovered that the car and De Dios
was not there anymore. Irineo reported to his father and they promptly advised
the police.
- On the same day, Vicente sold he car to Jose Aznar for 15k, who was a
purchaser in good faith, and without notice of the defect to Vicente’s title.
- The car was seized by the Philippine Constabulary in consequence of the
report by Teodoro Santos. Aznar then filed for replevin.
Between Teodoro Santos and Jose Aznar, who had a better right to the
possession of the car? TEODORO SANTOS.
- Vicente did not have any title to the property because the same was never
delivered to him. He could have acquired ownership or title to the subject
matter thereof only by the delivery or tradition of the car to him.
o the car in question was never delivered to the vendee by the vendor
as to complete or consummate the transfer of ownership by virtue of
the contract. It should be recalled that while there was indeed a
contract of sale between Vicente Marella and Teodoro Santos, the
former, as vendee, took possession of the subject matter thereof by
stealing the same while it was in the custody of the latter's son.
- Art. 559 applies. Under it, if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the
finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have
Property Week 9
DE GARCIA v. CA DIZON v. SUNTAY
GR No. L-20264 GR No. L-30817
Jan. 30, 1971 Sept. 29, 1972
Petition DENIED.
Property Week 9
EDCA PUBLISHING v. SANTOS EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the
GR No. 80298 books.
April 26, 1990 - Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books belonged to Cruz
before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her
Facts of the case assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. Although the title of
- A certain Prof. Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with EDCA Publishing Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books,
for 406 books, payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more
and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check proof before deciding to buy them.
covering the purchase price of 8.9k. - EDCA’s remedy is against de la Pena, and not against Santos.
- Cruz subsequently sold 120 of the books to respondent Leonor Santos, who
paid him 1.7k. Petition DENIED.
- EDCA became suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before
the clearing of the fist check. They made inquiries with DLSU where he had
claimed to be a dean. They were informed that there was no such person.
Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account with the bank.
o EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz.
The investigation revealed that his real name is Tomas de la Pena.
o On the same day, EDCA sought assistance from the police, which
forced their way into the store of Santos and threatened Leonor with
prosecution for buying stolen property.
o They seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a van
belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them over to EDCA.
- Santos now files for the recovery of the books.
- It is the contention of EDCA that the Santos have not established their
ownership of the disputed books because they have not even produced a
receipt to prove they had bought the stock. This is unacceptable. Precisely,
the first sentence of Article 559 provides that "the possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title," thus dispensing with
further proof.
- Santos is in the business of buying and selling books and often deal with hard-
up sellers who urgently have to part with their books at reduced prices. To
Leonor Santos, Cruz must have been only one of the many such sellers she
was accustomed to dealing with. It is hardly bad faith for anyone in the
business of buying and selling books to buy them at a discount and resell them
for a profit.
- ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that
such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet
been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind
the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively
transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
- Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over
the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The
fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and
Property Week 9
LEDESMA v. CA because of the alteration merely amounted to a failure of consideration which
GR No. 86051 does not render the contract of sale void, but merely allows the prejudiced
Sept. 1, 1992 party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the contract.
- It was therefore erroneous for the respondent Court to declare that the private
Facts of the case respondent was illegally deprived of the car simply because the check in
- A certain Jojo Consunji purchased for his father Rustico, two brand new motor payment therefor was subsequently dishonored; said Court also erred when it
vehicles form Citiwide Motors: divested the petitioner, a buyer in good faith who paid valuable consideration
o One (1) 1977 Isuzu Gemini, 2-door Model PF 50ZIK, with Engine No. therefor, of his possession thereof.
751214 valued at P42,200.00; and
o One (1) 1977 Holden Premier Model 8V41X with Engine No. 198- Petition GRANTED.
1251493, valued at P58,800.00.
- The next day, the vehicles were delivered, and Jojo issued a manager’s check
of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank for the amount of 101k as
full paymet. However, upon deposit, it was dishonoured on the ground that it
was tampered from P101.00 to P101,000.00.
- Citiwide reported the Philippine Constabulary, and it was found out that the
impostor is Armando Suarez who has a long line of criminal cases for using
the similar modus.
- The Holden Premier was recovered from an abandoned place in QC. On the
other hand, the Isuzu Gemini was transferred by Suarez to the possession of
Jaime Ledesma.
o Ledesma for his defense, claims that he purchased the car in good
faith.
Property Week 9
CHUA HAI v. KAPUNAN o 4) That the judge taking cognizance of the criminal case against the
GR No. L-11108 vendor of the possessor in good faith has not right to interfere with
June 30, 1958 the possession of the latter, who is not a party to the criminal
proceedings, and such unwarranted interference is not made
Facts of the case justifiable by requiring a bond to answer for damages caused to the
- Roberto Soto purchased from Youngstown Hardware, owned by Ong Shu, possessor.
700 corrugated galvanized iron sheets and 249 pieces of round iron bar for
6.1k. In payment thereof he issued a check for 7k. When the check was Petition GRANTED.
presented for payment, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
- Soto sold 165 sheets in Pangasinan and 535 sheets in Calapan, Mindoro. Of
those sold in Pangasinan, 100 were sold to petitioner Chua Hai.
- Ong Shu filed for estafa and asked that the 700 iron sheets be returned to
him. Chua Hai opposed with respect to the 100 he bought from Soto.
- The court ordered the return of the 700 to Ong Shu.
- Chua Hai’s good faith is not questioned. To deprive the possessor in good
faith, even temporarily and provisionally, of the chattels possessed, violates
the rule of Art. 559 of the Civil Code. The latter declares that possession of
chattels in good faith is equivalent to title; i.e., that for all intents and purposes,
the possessor is the owner, until ordered by the proper court to restore the
thing to the one who was illegally deprived thereof. Until such decree is
rendered (and it can not be rendered in a criminal proceeding in which the
possessor is not a party), the possessor, as presumptive owner, is entitled to
hold and enjoy the thing; and "every possessor has a right to be respected in
his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or
restored to said possession established by the means established by the laws
and the Rules of Court."(Art. 539, New Civil Code).
- The decision of the court below, instead of conforming to Arts. 559 and 539 of
the Civil Code, directs possessor to surrender the chattel to the claimant Ong
Shu before the latter has proved that he was illegally deprived thereof, without
taking into account that the mere filing of a criminal action for estafa is no proof
that estafa was in fact committed. Instead of regarding the possessor as the
owner of the chattel until illegal deprivation is shown, the court below regards
the possessor of the chattel not as an owner, but as a usurper, and compels
him to surrender possession even before the illegal deprivation is proved.
- In sum:
o 1) That the acquirer and possessor in good faith, of a chattel or
movable property is entitled to be respected and protected in his
possession, as if he were the true owner thereof, until a competent
court rules otherwise;
o 2) That being considered, in the meantime, as the true owner, the
possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to I surrender
possession nor to be required to institute an action for the recovery
of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor;
o 3) That the filing of an information charging that the chattel was
illegally obtained through estafa from its true owner by the transferor
of the bona fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the
possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor; and
Property Week 9