TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY the road or pavement; that the bus was
oad or pavement; that the bus was then being driven with extraordinary care, prudence and
G.R. No. L-28014-15 May 29, 1970
SPOUSES MARCELO LANDINGIN and RACQUEL BOCASAS, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendants-appellants.
SPOUSES PEDRO GARCIA and EUFRACIA LANDINGIN, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendants-appellants.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal on a question of law from the portion of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila ordering the defendants Pangasinan Transportation Co. (PANTRANCO) and Marcelo Oligan to
pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. D-1468 (L-28014) the sum of P6,500.00, and the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 1470 (L-28015) the sum of P3,500.00.
The complaints in said Civil Cases Nos. D-1468 and D-1470 were filed by the spouses Marcelo
Landingin and Racquel Bocasas, and the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin, respectively,
for damages allegedly suffered by them in connection with the death of their respective daughter,
Leonila Landingin and Estrella Garcia, due to the alleged negligence of the defendants and/or breach
of contract of carriage. In their complaints, plaintiffs averred, among others, that in the morning of
April 20, 1963, their above-mentioned daughters were among the passengers in the bus driven by
defendant Marcelo Oligan and owned and operated by defendant PANTRANCO on an excursion trip
from Dagupan City to Baguio City and back, that the bus was open on one side and enclosed on the
other, in gross violation of the rules of the Public Service Commission; that defendant PANTRANCO
acted with negligence, fraud and bad faith in pretending to have previously secured a special permit
for the trip when in truth it had not done so; that upon reaching an uphill point at Camp 8, Kennon
Road, Baguio City, on the onward trip, defendant driver, through utter lack of foresight, experience
and driving knowledge, caused the bus to stall and stop for a few moments; that through the said
defendant's fault and mishandling, the motor ceased to function, causing the bus to slide back
unchecked; that when the said defendant suddenly swerved and steered the bus toward the
mountainside, Leonila and Estrella, together with several other passengers, were thrown out of the
bus through its open side unto the road, suffering serious injuries as a result of which Leonila and
Estrella died at the hospital and the same day; and that in connection with the incident, defendant
driver had been charged with and convicted of multiple homicide and multiple slight physical injuries
on account of the death of Leonila and Estrella and of the injuries suffered by four others, although
it may be said, by way of parenthesis, that this case is now pending appeal in a higher court. The
plaintiffs prayed for awards of moral, actual and exemplary damages in the total sum of P40,000.00
in Civil Case No. D-1468, and in the total sum of P25,000.00 in Civil Case No. D-1470 as well as
attorney's fees in the amounts of P5,000.00 and P4,000.00, respectively.
Defendants filed a joint answer to each of the two complaints alleging, among others, that at the
time of the accident, defendant driver was driving the bus at, the slow speed of about 10 kilometers
per hour; that while the said defendant was steering his bus toward the mountainside after hearing
a sound coming from under the rear end of the bus, Leonila and Estrella recklessly, and in
disobedience to his shouted warnings and advice, jumped out of the bus causing their heads to hit
diligence; that defendant PANTRANCO observed the care and diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the accident as well as in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly of
defendant driver; and that the decision convicting the said defendant was not yet final, the same
having been appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was still pending.
By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly. On October 17, 1966, the court a quo
rendered its decision therein in which it made the following findings; that upon reaching the fatal
spot at Camp 8, a sudden snapping or breaking of metal below the floor of the bus was heard, and
the bus abruptly stopped, rolling back a few moments later; that as a result, some of the passengers
jumped out of the bus, while others stepped down; that defendant driver maneuvered the bus safely
to and against the side of the mountain where its rear end was made to rest, ensuring the safety of
the many passengers still inside the bus; that while defendant driver as steering the bus towards the
mountainside, he advised the passengers not to jump, but to remain seated; that Leonila and Estrella
were not thrown out of the bus, but that they panicked and jumped out; that the malfunctioning of
the motor resulted from the breakage of the cross-joint; that there was no negligence on the part of
either of the defendants; that only the day before, the said cross-joint was duly inspected and found
to be in order; and that defendant PANTRANCO had exercised the requisite care in the selection and
supervision of its employees, including the defendant driver. The court concluded that "the accident
was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of God brought about by some extra-ordinary
circumstances independent of the will of the Pantranco or its employees."
One would wonder why in the face of such factual findings and conclusion of the trial court, the
defendants, instead of the plaintiffs, should come to this Court on appeal. The answer lies in the
dispositive portion of the decision, to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment: (a) Absolving
the defendants from any liability on account of negligence on their part and therefore dismissing
the complaints in these two cases; (b) However, as stated above, the Court hereby orders the
defendant Pantranco to pay to the plaintiffs spouses Marcelo Tandingin and Racquel Bocasas in
Civil Case No. D-1468 the amount of P6,500.00; and the amount of P3,500.00 to the spouses Pedro
Garcia and Eufracia Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470, not in payment of liability because of any
negligence on the part of the defendants but as an expression of sympathy and goodwill. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As to what impelled the court below to include item (b) in the dispositive portion of its decision, can
be gathered from the penultimate paragraph of the decision, which reads:
However, there is evidence to the effect that an offer of P8,500.00 in the instant cases without any
admission of fault or negligence had been made by the defendant Pantranco and that actually in
Civil Case No. D-1469 for the death of Pacita Descalso, the other deceased passenger of the bus in
question, the heirs of the decease received P3,000.00 in addition to hospital and medical bills and
the coffin of the deceased for the dismissal of the said case without Pantranco accepting liability.
There was as a matter of fact during the pre-trial of these two cases a continuing offer of
settlement on the part of the defendant Pantranco without accepting any liability for such
damages, and the Court understood that the Pantranco would be willing still to pay said amounts
even if these cases were to be tried on the merits. It is well-known that the defendant Pantranco
is zealous in the preservation of its public relations. In the spirit therefore of the offer of the
defendant Pantranco aforesaid, to assuage the feelings of the herein plaintiffs an award of
P6,500.00 for the spouses Marcelo Landingin and Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468 whose
 daughter Leonila was, when she died, a third-year Commerce student at the Far Eastern University, the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaints. Costs against defendant-appellant
and P3,500.00 for the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470 whose PANTRANCO.
daughter Estrella was in the fourth year High at the Dagupan Colleges when she died, is hereby
made in their favor. This award is in addition to what Pantranco might have spent to help the
parents of both deceased after the accident.

Defendants-appellants complain that having found them to be absolutely free from fault or
negligence, and having in fact dismissed the complaints against them, the court should not have
ordered them to assume any pecuniary liability. There would be merit in his argument but for the
fact that defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was guilty of breach of contract of carriage. It will be
noted that in each of the two complaints it is averred that two buses including the one in which the
two deceased girls were riding, were hired to transport the excursionist passengers from Dagupan
City to Baguio City, and return, and that the said two passengers did not reach destination safely.

As a common carrier, defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was duty bound to carry its passengers
"safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances." (Article 1755, Civil Code.) Did defendant-
appellant PANTRANCO measure up to the degree of care and foresight required it under the
circumstances? We think not. The court below found that the cross-joint of the bus in which the
deceased were riding broke, which caused the malfunctioning of the motor, which in turn resulted
in panic among some of the passengers. This is a finding of fact which this Court may not disturb. We
are of the opinion, however, that the lower court's conclusion drawn from that fact, i.e., that "the
accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of God brought about by some extraordinary
circumstances independent of the will of the Pantranco or its employees," is in large measure
conjectural and speculative, and was arrived at without due regard to all the circumstances, as
required by Article 1755. In Lasam vs. Smith (45 Phil. 660), this Court held that an accident caused by
defects in the automobile is not a caso fortuito. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that
"the passenger has neither the choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the
equipment and appliances in use by the carrier." (Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75.)

When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common carrier is at fault or that it
acted negligently (Article 1756). This presumption is only rebutted by proof on the carrier's part that
it observed the "extraordinary diligence" required in Article 1733 and the "utmost diligence of very
cautious persons" required in Article 1755 (Article 1756). In the instant case it appears that the court
below considered the presumption rebutted on the strength of defendants-appellants' evidence that
only the day before the incident, the crossjoint in question was duly inspected and found to be in
order. It does not appear, however, that the carrier gave due regard for all the circumstances in
connection with the said inspection. The bus in which the deceased were riding was heavily laden
with passengers, and it would be traversing mountainous, circuitous and ascending roads. Thus the
entire bus, including its mechanical parts, would naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be
under ordinary circumstances. The mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and found to
be in order would not exempt the carrier from liability unless it is shown that the particular
circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered.

In the premises, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the complaints. The awards made by the
court should be considered in the concept of damages for breach of contracts of carriage.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is modified as indicated
above, and defendant-appellant PANTRANCO is ordered to pay to plaintiffs-appellees the amounts
stated in the judgment appealed from, as damages for breach of contracts, with interest thereon at
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY
G.R. No. L-10605 June 30, 1958
PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-10606 June 30, 1958
GERMAN NECESITO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
These cases involve ex contractu against the owners and operators of the common carrier known as
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, filed by one passenger, and the heirs of another, who injured as a result
of the fall into a river of the vehicle in which they were riding.
In the morning of January 28, 1964, Severina Garces and her one-year old son, Precillano Necesito,
carrying vegetables, boarded passenger auto truck or bus No. 199 of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
at Agno, Pangasinan. The passenger truck, driven by Francisco Bandonell, then proceeded on its
regular run from Agno to Manila. After passing Mangatarem, Pangasinan truck No. 199 entered a
wooden bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right; the driver lost control, and after wrecking
the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep.
The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned; the son, Precillano Necesito, was injured, suffering
abrasions and fracture of the left femur. He was brought to the Provincial Hospital at Dagupan, where
the fracture was set but with fragments one centimeter out of line. The money, wrist watch and cargo
of vegetables were lost.
Two actions for damages and attorney's fees totalling over P85,000 having been filed in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac (Cases Nos. 908 and 909) against the carrier, the latter pleaded that the
accident was due to "engine or mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the
defendants or of the driver Bandonell.
After joint trial, the Court of First Instance found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the bad
condition of the road; that the accident was caused by the fracture of the right steering knuckle,
which was defective in that its center or core was not compact but "bubbled and cellulous", a
condition that could not be known or ascertained by the carrier despite the fact that regular thirty-
day inspections were made of the steering knuckle, since the steel exterior was smooth and shiny to
the depth of 3/16 of an inch all around; that the knuckles are designed and manufactured for heavy
duty and may last up to ten years; that the knuckle of bus No. 199 that broke on January 28, 1954,
was last inspected on January 5, 1954, and was due to be inspected again on February 5th. Hence,
the trial court, holding that the accident was exclusively due to fortuitous event, dismissed both
actions. Plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court in view of the amount in controversy.
We are inclined to agree with the trial court that it is not likely that bus No. 199 of the Philippine
Rabbit Lines was driven over the deeply rutted road leading to the bridge at a speed of 50 miles per
hour, as testified for the plaintiffs. Such conduct on the part of the driver would have provoked
instant and vehement protest on the part of the passengers because of the attendant discomfort,
and there is no trace of any such complaint in the records. We are thus forced to assume that the
proximate cause of the accident was the reduced strength of the steering knuckle of the vehicle
caused by defects in casting it. While appellants hint that the broken knuckle exhibited in court was
not the real fitting attached to the truck at the time of the accident, the records they registered no
objection on that ground at the trial below. The issue is thus reduced to the question whether or not
the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and whether the evidence
discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755, new
Civil Code).
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
the all the circumstances.
It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passengers' safety. His liability rests upon negligence,
his failure to exercise the "utmost" degree of diligence that the law requires, and by Art. 1756, in case
of a passenger's death or injury the carrier bears the burden of satisfying the court that he has duly
discharged the duty of prudence required. In the American law, where the carrier is held to the same
degree of diligence as under the new Civil Code, the rule on the liability of carriers for defects of
equipment is thus expressed: "The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a
passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an
appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have been
discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was
incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. For the purposes
of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as
far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the good repute of
the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability" (10 Am. Jur. 205, s, 1324; see also
Pennsylvania R. Co. vs. Roy, 102 U. S. 451; 20 L. Ed. 141; Southern R. Co. vs. Hussey, 74 ALR 1172; 42
Fed. 2d 70; and Ed Note, 29 ALR 788; Ann. Cas. 1916E 929).
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over
the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no
privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no
remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while
not in insurer of the safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of
his equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. Thus Hannen, J., in Francis vs. Cockrell, LR 5 Q.
B. 184, said:
In the ordinary course of things, the passenger does not know whether the carrier has himself
manufactured the means of carriage, or contracted with someone else for its manufacture. If the
carrier has contracted with someone else the passenger does not usually know who that person
is, and in no case has he any share in the selection. The liability of the manufacturer must depend
on the terms of the contract between him and the carrier, of which the passenger has no
knowledge, and over which he can have no control, while the carrier can introduce what
stipulations and take what securities he may think proper. For injury resulting to the carrier himself
by the manufacturer's want of care, the carrier has a remedy against the manufacturer; but the
passenger has no remedy against the manufacturer for damage arising from a mere breach of
 contract with the carrier . . . . Unless, therefore, the presumed intention of the parties be that the
passenger should, in the event of his being injured by the breach of the manufacturer's contract,
of which he has no knowledge, be without remedy, the only way in which effect can be given to a
different intention is by supposing that the carrier is to be responsible to the passenger, and to
look for his indemnity to the person whom he selected and whose breach of contract has caused
the mischief. (29 ALR 789)
And in the leading case of Morgan vs. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 15 LRA (NS) 790, 16 Ann. Cas. 608, the
Court, in holding the carrier responsible for damages caused by the fracture of a car axle, due to a
"sand hole" in the course of moulding the axle, made the following observations.
The carrier, in consideration of certain well-known and highly valuable rights granted to it by the
public, undertakes certain duties toward the public, among them being to provide itself with
suitable and safe cars and vehicles in which carry the traveling public. There is no such duty on the
manufacturer of the cars. There is no reciprocal legal relation between him and the public in this
respect. When the carrier elects to have another build its cars, it ought not to be absolved by that
facts from its duty to the public to furnish safe cars. The carrier cannot lessen its responsibility by
shifting its undertaking to another's shoulders. Its duty to furnish safe cars is side by side with its
duty to furnish safe track, and to operate them in a safe manner. None of its duties in these
respects can be sublet so as to relieve it from the full measure primarily exacted of it by law. The
carrier selects the manufacturer of its cars, if it does not itself construct them, precisely as it does
those who grade its road, and lay its tracks, and operate its trains. That it does not exercise control
over the former is because it elects to place that matter in the hands of the manufacturer, instead
of retaining the supervising control itself. The manufacturer should be deemed the agent of the
carrier as respects its duty to select the material out of which its cars and locomotive are built, as
well as in inspecting each step of their construction. If there be tests known to the crafts of car
builders, or iron moulders, by which such defects might be discovered before the part was
incorporated into the car, then the failure of the manufacturer to make the test will be deemed a
failure by the carrier to make it. This is not a vicarious responsibility. It extends, as the necessity of
this business demands, the rule of respondeat superior to a situation which falls clearly within its
scope and spirit. Where an injury is inflicted upon a passenger by the breaking or wrecking of a
part of the train on which he is riding, it is presumably the result of negligence at some point by
the carrier. As stated by Judge Story, in Story on Bailments, sec. 601a: "When the injury or damage
happens to the passenger by the breaking down or overturning of the coach, or by any other
accident occurring on the ground, the presumption prima facie is that it occurred by the negligence
of the coachmen, and onus probandi is on the proprietors of the coach to establish that there has
been no negligence whatever, and that the damage or injury has been occasioned by inevitable
casualty, or by some cause which human care and foresight could not prevent; for the law will, in
tenderness to human life and limb, hold the proprietors liable for the slightest negligence, and will
compel them to repel by satisfactory proofs every imputation thereof." When the passenger has
proved his injury as the result of a breakage in the car or the wrecking of the train on which he was
being carried, whether the defect was in the particular car in which he was riding or not, the burden
is then cast upon the carrier to show that it was due to a cause or causes which the exercise of the
utmost human skill and foresight could not prevent. And the carrier in this connection must show,
if the accident was due to a latent defect in the material or construction of the car, that not only
could it not have discovered the defect by the exercise of such care, but that the builders could
not by the exercise of the same care have discovered the defect or foreseen the result. This rule
applies the same whether the defective car belonged to the carrier or not.
In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the steering knuckle
in question was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks developed. It nowhere
appears that either the manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested the steering knuckle to
ascertain whether its strength was up to standard, or that it had no hidden flaws would impair that
strength. And yet the carrier must have been aware of the critical importance of the knuckle's
resistance; that its failure or breakage would result in loss of balance and steering control of the bus,
with disastrous effects upon the passengers. No argument is required to establish that a visual
inspection could not directly determine whether the resistance of this critically important part was
not impaired. Nor has it been shown that the weakening of the knuckle was impossible to detect by
any known test; on the contrary, there is testimony that it could be detected. We are satisfied that
the periodical visual inspection of the steering knuckle as practiced by the carrier's agents did not
measure up to the required legal standard of "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" — "as far
as human care and foresight can provide", and therefore that the knuckle's failure can not be
considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility (Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil.
657; Son vs. Cebu Autobus Co., 94 Phil., 892.)
It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the strength of each and
every part of its vehicles before each trip; but we are of the opinion that a due regard for the carrier's
obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine the
condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the safe of the
passengers.
As to the damages suffered by the plaintiffs, we agree with appellee that no allowance may be made
for moral damages, since under Article 2220 of the new Civil Code, in case of suits for breach of
contract, moral damages are recoverable only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, and there is none in the case before us. As to exemplary damages, the carrier has not acted in
a "wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner" to warrant their award. Hence,
we believe that for the minor Precillano Necesito (G. R. No. L-10605), an indemnity of P5,000 would
be adequate for the abrasions and fracture of the femur, including medical and hospitalization
expenses, there being no evidence that there would be any permanent impairment of his faculties
or bodily functions, beyond the lack of anatomical symmetry. As for the death of Severina Garces (G.
R. No. L-10606) who was 33 years old, with seven minor children when she died, her heirs are
obviously entitled to indemnity not only for the incidental loses of property (cash, wrist watch and
merchandise) worth P394 that she carried at the time of the accident and for the burial expenses of
P490, but also for the loss of her earnings (shown to average P120 a month) and for the deprivation
of her protection, guidance and company. In our judgment, an award of P15,000 would be adequate
(cf Alcantara vs. Surro, 49 Off. Gaz. 2769; 93 Phil., 472).
The low income of the plaintiffs-appellants makes an award for attorney's fees just and equitable
(Civil Code, Art. 2208, par. 11). Considering that he two cases filed were tried jointly, a fee of P3,500
would be reasonable.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendants-appellees are
sentenced to indemnify the plaintiffs-appellants in the following amounts: P5,000 to Precillano
Necesito, and P15,000 to the heirs of the deceased Severina Garces, plus P3,500 by way of attorney's
fees and litigation expenses. Costs against defendants-appellees. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Felix, J., concurs in the result.
 RESOLUTION
September 11, 1958
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Defendants-appellees have Submitted a motion asking this Court to reconsider its decision of June
30, 1958, and that the same be modified with respect to (1) its holding the carrier liable for the
breakage of the steering knuckle that caused the autobus No. 199 to overturn, whereby the
passengers riding in it were injured; (2) the damages awarded, that appellees argue to be excessive;
and (3) the award of attorneys' fees.
(1) The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction as established in previous decisions of this Court, cited in
our main opinion, is that a carrier is liable to its passengers for damages caused by mechanical defects
of the conveyance. As early as 1924, in Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 659 this Court ruled:
As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else
through the negligence of its driver. That is not caso fortuito.
And in Son vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil., 892, this Court held a common carrier liable in
damages to passenger for injuries cause by an accident due to the breakage of a faulty drag-link
spring.
It can be seen that while the courts of the United States are at variance on the question of a carrier's
liability for latent mechanical defects, the rule in this jurisdiction has been consistent in holding the
carrier responsible. This Court has quoted from American and English decisions, not because it felt
bound to follow the same, but merely in approval of the rationale of the rule as expressed therein,
since the previous Philippine cases did not enlarge on the ideas underlying the doctrine established
thereby.
The new evidence sought to be introduced do not warrant the grant of a new trial, since the proposed
proof available when the original trial was held. Said evidence is not newly discovered.
(2) With regard to the indemnity awarded to the child Precilliano Necesito, the injuries suffered by
him are incapable of accurate pecuniary estimation, particularly because the full effect of the injury
is not ascertainable immediately. This uncertainty, however, does not preclude the right to an
indemnity, since the injury is patent and not denied (Civil Code, Art. 2224). The reasons behind this
award are expounded by the Code Commission in its report:
There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's
commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show with certainty in terms
of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to calculate
moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress, from
the defendant's wrongful act." (Report of the Code Commission, p. 75)
In awarding to the heirs of the deceased Severina Garces an indemnity for the loss of her "guidance,
protection and company," although it is but moral damage, the Court took into account that the case
of a passenger who dies in the course of an accident, due to the carrier's negligence constitutes an
exception to the general rule. While, as pointed out in the main decision, under Article 2220 of the
new Civil Code there can be no recovery of moral damages for a breach of contract in the absence of
fraud malice or bad faith, the case of a violation of the contract of carriage leading to a passenger's
death escapes this general rule, in view of Article 1764 in connection with Article 2206, No. 3 of the
new Civil Code.
ART. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title
XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a comman carrier. ART. 2206. . . .
(3) The spouse, legitimate and eligimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Being a special rule limited to cases of fatal injuries, these articles prevail over the general rule of Art.
2220. Special provisions control general ones (Lichauco & Co. vs. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138; Sancio vs.
Lizarraga, 55 Phil. 601).
It thus appears that under the new Civil Code, in case of accident due to a carrier's negligence, the
heirs of a deceased passenger may recover moral damages, even though a passenger who is injured,
but manages to survive, is not entitled to them. There is, therefore, no conflict between our main
decision in the instant case and that of Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab Co., 101 Phil., 523, where
the passenger suffered injuries, but did not lose his life.
(3) In the Cachero case this Court disallowed attorneys' fees to the injured plaintiff because the
litigation arose out of his exaggerated and unreasonable deeds for an indemnity that was out of
proportion with the compensatory damages to which he was solely entitled. But in the present case,
plaintiffs' original claims can not be deemed a priori wholly unreasonable, since they had a right to
indemnity for moral damages besides compensatory ones, and moral damages are not determined
by set and invariable bounds.
Neither does the fact that the contract between the passengers and their counsel was on a
contingent basis affect the former's right to counsel fees. As pointed out for appellants, the Court's
award is an party and not to counsel. A litigant who improvidently stipulate higher counsel fees than
those to which he is lawfully entitled, does not for that reason earn the right to a larger indemnity;
but, by parity of reasoning, he should not be deprived of counsel fees if by law he is entitled to recover
them.
We find no reason to alter the main decision heretofore rendered. Ultimately, the position taken by
this Court is that a common carrier's contract is not to be regarded as a game of chance wherein the
passenger stakes his limb and life against the carrier's property and profits.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. So ordered.
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY
[G.R. No. L-46558 : July 31, 1981.]
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS V. SAMSON,
Respondents.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 18,
1977, affirming with modification the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay in Civil Case No.
1279, entitled “Jesus V. Samson, plaintiff, vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., defendant,” for damages.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff, the following sums:
P1988,000.00 as unearned income or damages; P50,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation, or a total of P273,000.00. Costs against the
defendant.”
The appellate court modified the above decision, to wit:
“However, Plaintiff-Appellee, who has been deprived of his job since 1954, is entitled to the legal
rate of interest on the P198,000.00 unearned income from the filing of the complaint (Sec. 8, Rule
51, Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, with the modification indicated above, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against defendant-appellant.”
The complaint filed on July 1, 1954 by plaintiff Jesus V. Samson, private respondent herein, averred
that on January 8, 1951, he flew as co-pilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi with stops at
Daet, Camarines Norte and Pili, Camarines Sur, with Captain Delfin Bustamante as commanding pilot
of a C-47 plane belonging to defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc., now the herein petitioner; that on
attempting to land the plane at Daet airport, Captain Delfin Bustamante due to his very slow reaction
and poor judgment overshot the airfield and as a result, notwithstanding the diligent efforts of the
plaintiff co-pilot to avert an accident, the airplane crashlanded beyond the runway; that the jolt
caused the head of the plaintiff to hit and break through the thick front windshield of the airplane
causing him severe brain concussion, wounds and abrasions on the forehead with intense pain and
suffering (par. 6, complaint).
The complaint further alleged that instead of giving plaintiff expert and proper medical treatment
called for by the nature and severity of his injuries, defendant simply referred him to a company
physician, a general medical practitioner, who limited the treatment to the exterior injuries without
examining the severe brain concussion of plaintiff (par. 7, complaint); that several days after the
accident, defendant Philippine Air Lines called back the plaintiff to active duty as co-pilot, and inspite
of the latter’s repeated request for expert medical assistance, defendant had not given him any (par.
8, complaint); that as a consequence of the brain injury sustained by plaintiff from the crash, he had
been having periodic dizzy spells and had been suffering from general debility and nervousness (par.
9, complaint); that defendant airline company instead of submitting the plaintiff to expert medical
treatment, discharged the latter from its employ on December 21, 1953 on grounds of physical
disability, thereby causing plaintiff not only to lose his job but to become physically unfit to continue
as aviator due to defendant’s negligence in not giving him the proper medical attention (pars. 10-
11, complaint). Plaintiff prayed for damages in the amount of P180,000.00 representing his unearned
income, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as expenses, or
a total of P255,000.00.
In its answer filed on July 28, 1954, defendant PAL denied the substantial averments in the complaint,
alleging among others, that the accident was due solely and exclusively to inevitable unforeseen
circumstances whereby plaintiff sustained only superficial wounds and minor injuries which were
promptly treated by defendant’s medical personnel (par. 5, answer); that plaintiff did not sustain
brain injury or cerebral concussion from the accident since he passed the annual physical and medical
examination given thereafter on April 24, 1951; that the headaches and dizziness experienced by
plaintiff were due to emotional disturbance over his inability to pass the required up-grading or
promotional course given by defendant company (par. 6, answer), and that, as confirmed by an
expert neuro-surgeon, plaintiff was suffering-from neurosis and in view of this unfitness and
disqualification from continuing as a pilot, defendant had to terminate plaintiff’s employment (pars.
7, 9, answer).
Further, defendant alleged that by the very nature of its business as a common carrier, it is bound to
employ only pilots who are proficient and in good mental, emotional and physical condition; that the
pilot, Captain Delfin Bustamante, was a competent and proficient pilot, and although he was already
afflicted with a tumor of the nasopharynx even before the accident of January 8, 1951, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration, in passing upon the fitness of pilots, gave Capt. Bustamante a waiver of
physical standards to enable him to retain his first class airman certificate since the affliction had not
in the least affected his proficiency (pars. 16-17, answer). By way of counterclaim, defendant prayed
for P10,000.00 as expenses for the litigation.
On March 25, 1958, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint is
essentially a Workmen’s Compensation claim, stating a cause of action not cognizable within the
general jurisdiction of the court. The Motion to Dismiss was denied in the order of April 14, 1958.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered on January 15, 1973 the decision, the
dispositive portion of which has been earlier cited.
The defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals as being
contrary to law and unsupported by the evidence. It raised as errors of the trial court (a) the holding
that the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff are attributable to the accident of January 8, 1951
which was due to the negligence of defendant in having allowed Capt. Delfin Bustamante to continue
flying despite his alleged slow reaction and poor judgment; (b) the finding that defendant was
negligent in not having given plaintiff proper and adequate expert medical treatment and assistance
for the injuries allegedly sustained in the accident of January 8, 1951; and (c) in ordering defendant
to pay actual or compensatory damages, moral damages and attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.
On April 18, 1977, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the lower
court but modified the award of damages by imposing legal rate of interest on the P198,000.00
unearned income from the filing of the complaint, citing Sec. 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court.
Its motion for reconsideration of the above judgment having been denied, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
filed this instant petition for Certiorari on the ground that the decision is not in accord with law or
with the applicable jurisprudence, aside from its being replete with findings in the nature of
speculation, surmises and conjectures not borne out by the evidence on record thereby resulting to
misapprehension of facts and amounting to a grave abuse of discretion (p. 7, Petition).
Petitioner raises the fundamental question in the case at bar as follows: Is there a causal connection
between the injuries suffered by private respondent during the accident on 8 January 1951 and the
subsequent “periodic dizzy spells, headache and general debility” of which private respondent
complained every now and then, on the one hand, and such “periodic dizzy spells, headache and
general debility” allegedly caused by the accident and private respondent’s eventual discharge from
employment, on the other? PAL submits that respondent court’s award of damages to private
respondent is anchored on findings in the nature of speculations, surmises and conjectures and not
borne out by the evidence on record, thereby resulting in a misapprehension of facts and amounting
to a grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner’s submission is without merit.
As found by the respondent court, the following are the essential facts of the case:
“It appears that plaintiff, a licensee aviator, was employed by defendant a few years prior to
January 8, 1951 as a regular co-pilot on a guaranteed basic salary of P750.00 a month. He was
assigned to and/or paired with pilot Delfin Bustamante.
Sometime in December 1950, he complained to defendant through its authorized official about
the slow reaction and poor judgment of pilot Delfin Bustamante. Notwithstanding said complaint,
defendant allowed the pilot to continue flying.
On January 8, 1951, the two manned the regular afternoon flight of defendant’s plane from Manila
to Legaspi, with stops at Daet, Camarines Norte, and Pili, Camarines Sur. Upon making a landing at
Daet, the pilot, with his slow reaction and poor judgment, overshot the airfield and, as a result of
and notwithstanding diligent efforts of plaintiff to avert an accident, the airplane crash-landed
beyond the runway into a mangrove. The jolt and impact caused plaintiff to hit his head upon the
front windshield of the plane thereby causing his brain concussions and wounds on the forehead,
with concomittant intense pain.
Plaintiff was not given proper medical attention and treatment demanded by the nature and
severity of his injuries. Defendant merely referred him to its clinic attended by general
practitioners on his external injuries. His brain injury was never examined, much less treated. On
top of that negligence, defendant recalled plaintiff to active duty as a co-pilot, completely ignoring
his plea for expert medical assistance.
Suffering periodic dizzy spells, headache and general debility, plaintiff every now and then
complained to defendant. To make matters worst for plaintiff, defendant discharged him from his
employment on December 21, 1953. In consequence, plaintiff has been beset with additional
worries, basically financial. He is now a liability instead of a provider, of his family.
On July 1, 1954, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages. Defendant vainly sought to dismiss the
complaint after filing an answer. Then, the judgment and this appeal.”
Continuing, the respondent Court of Appeals further held:
“There is no question about the employment of plaintiff by defendant, his age and salary, the
overshooting by pilot Bustamante of the airfield and crashlanding in a mangrove, his hitting his
head on the front windshield of the plane, his intermittent dizzy spells, headache and general
debility for which he was discharged from his employment on December 21, 1953. As the lower
court aptly stated:
‘From the evidence adduced by the parties, the Court finds the following facts to be
uncontroverted: That the plaintiff Jesus V. Samson, on January 8, 1951 and a few years prior
thereto, December 21, 1953, was a duly licensed pilot employed as a regular co-pilot of the
defendant with assignment in its domestic air service in the Philippines; that on January 8, 1951,
the defendant’s airplane met an accident in crashlanding at the Daet Airport, Camarines Norte
by overshooting the runway and reaching the mangroves at the edge of the landing strip; that
the jolt caused plaintiff’s head to hit the front windshield of the airplane causing him to suffer
wounds and abrasion on the forehead; that the defendant, instead of giving the plaintiff expert
and proper medical treatment called for by the nature and severity of the injuries of the plaintiff,
simply referred him to the clinic of the defendant’s physicians who are only general medical
practitioners and not brain specialists; that the defendant’s physicians limited their treatment
to the exterior injuries on the forehead of the plaintiff and made no examination of the severe
concussion of the brain of the plaintiff; that the Medical Director and Flight Surgeon of the
defendant were not able to definitely determine the cause of the complaint of the plaintiff as
to the periodic attack of dizziness, spells and headache; that due to this laxity of the defendant’s
physician and the continuous suffering of the ailment of the plaintiff complained of, he
demanded for expert medical assistance for his brain injury and to send him to the United States,
which demand was turned down and in effect denied by the defendant; that instead the
defendant referred the plaintiff to a neurologist, Dr. Victor Reyes; that from the time that said
accident occurred on January 21, 1953, he was ordered grounded on several occasions because
of his complaint of dizzy spells and headache; that instead of submitting the plaintiff to expert
medical treatment as demanded by him and denied by the defendant, he was discharged from
its employment on December 21, 1953 on the ground of physical disability, and that the plaintiff,
at the time when the defendant’s plane met the accident, up to the time he was discharged,
was regularly employed as a co-pilot and receiving a basic salary of P750.00 a month plus extra
pay for flying time, and bonuses amounting to P300.00 a month.’
Even defendant-appellant itself admits as not controverted the following facts which generally
admit what have been stated above as not controverted.
“In the case at bar, the following facts are not the subject of controversy:
‘(1) First, that from July 1950 to 21 December 1953, plaintiff was employed with defendant
company as a first officer or co-pilot and served in that capacity in defendant’s domestic
services.
(2) Second, that on January 1951, plaintiff did fly on defendant’s PI-C 94, as first officer or co-
pilot, with the late Capt. Delfin Bustamante in command as pilot; that while making a landing at
the Daet airport on that date, PI-C 94 did meet an accident as stated above.
(3) Third, that at or about the time of the discharge from defendant company, plaintiff had
complained of “spells of dizziness,” “headaches” and “nervousness”, by reason of which he was
grounded from flight duty. In short, that at that time, or approximately from November 1953 up
to the date of his discharge on 21 December 1953, plaintiff was actually physically unfit to
discharge his duties as pilot.
(4) Fourth, that plaintiff’s unfitness for flight duty was properly established after a thorough
medical examination by competent medical experts.’ (pp. 11-12, appellant’s brief)
hence, there can hardly be an issue, factual, legal or medical.”
Taking exception from “the rest of the essential facts of the case as found by the respondent court”
PAL claims said facts are not fully borne out by the evidence on record and insists that the injuries
suffered by private respondent during the accident on January 8, 1951 were superficial in nature;
that the “periodic spells, headache, and general debility” complaint of every now and then by private
respondent subsequent to the Jan. 8, 1951 incident were due to emotional disturbances and that no
negligence can be attributed to Capt. Delfin Bustamante much less to PAL for the occurrence on
January 8, 1951, hence PAL cannot be held liable for damages.
Petitioner claims absence of any causal connection between private respondent’s superficial injuries
and his alleged subsequent “periodic spells, headache and general debility,” pointing out that these
subsequent ailments were found by competent physician, including an expert neuro-surgeon, to be
due to emotional disturbances insights the conclusions of Dr. Trajano V. Bernardo that respondent’s
complaints were “psychosomatic symptoms” on the basis of declarations made by respondent
himself, which conclusions are supported by similar diagnosis made by Drs. Damaceno J. Ago and
Villaraza stating that respondent Samson was suffering from neurosis as well as the report of Dr.
Victor Reyes, a neurological specialist, indicating that the symptoms were probably, most probably
due to psychogenic factors and have no organic basis.
In claiming that there is no factual basis for the finding of the respondent court that the crash-landing
caused respondent’s “brain concussion . cra ., with concomittant intense pain, for on the contrary,
testimonial evidence establish the superficiality of the injuries sustained by respondent during the
accident of January 8, 1951,” petitioner quotes portions of the testimony of Dr. Manuel S. Sayas, who
declared that he removed the band-aid on the forehead of respondent and that he found out after
removal that the latter had two contussed superficial wounds over the supra orbiter regions or just
above the eyes measuring one centimeter long and one millimeter deep. He examined and found his
blood pressure normal, no discharges from the nose and ears. Dr. Trajano V. Bernardo also testified
that when he examined respondent Samson three days after the accident, the wound was already
healed and found nothing wrong with his ears, nose and throat so that he was declared fit for duty
after the sixth day.
Petitioner goes further. It contends that there is no causal connection between respondent’s
superficial injuries sustained during the accident on January 8, 1951 and plaintiff’s discharge from
employment with PAL on December 21, 1953. According to PAL, it was the repeated recurrence of
respondent’s neurasthenic symptoms (dizzy spells, headache, nervousness) which prompted PAL’s
Flight Surgeon, Dr. Bernardo, to recommend that plaintiff be grounded permanently as respondent
was “psychologically unfit to resume his duties as pilot.” PAL concludes that respondent’s eventual
discharge from employment with PAL was effected for absolutely valid reasons, and only after he
was thoroughly examined and found unfit to carry out his responsibilities and duties as a pilot.
We agree with the respondent court in finding that the dizzy spells, headache and general debility of
private respondent Samson was an after-effect of the crash-landing and We find that such holding is
supported by substantial evidence, which We quote from the court’s decision, to wit:
“Defendant would imply that plaintiff suffered only superficial wounds which were treated and
not brain injury. It would, by the opinion of its company doctors, Dr. Bernardo and Dr. Reyes,
attribute the dizzy spells and headache to organic or as phychosomatic, neurasthenic or
psychogenic, which we find outlandishly exaggerated.
That plaintiff’s condition as psychosomatic rather than organic in nature is allegedly confirmed by
the fact that on six (6) separate occasions after the accident he passed the required CAA physical
examination for airman’s certificate. (Exhs. 78, 79, 80, 81, 83 and 92). We noticed, however, that
there were other similar physical examinations conducted by the CAA on the person of plaintiff
the report on which were not presented in evidence. Obviously, only those which suited
defendants cause were hand-picked and offered in evidence.
We hesitate to accept the opinion of the defendant’s two physicians, considering that Dr. Bernardo
admittedly referred to Dr. Reyes because he could not determine the cause of the dizzy spells and
headache and the latter admitted that ‘it is extremely hard to be certain of the cause of his dizzy
spells,’ and suggested a possibility that it ‘was due to postraumatic syndrome, evidently due to the
injuries suffered by the plaintiff in hitting the forehead against the windshield of the plane during
the accident.’ Judgment are not based on possibilities.
The admitted difficulty of defendant’s doctors in determining the cause of the dizzy spells and
headache cannot be a sound basis for finding against the plaintiff and in favor of defendant.
Whatever it might be, the fact is that such dizzy spells, headache and general debility was an after-
effect of the crash-landing. Be it brain injury or psychosomatic, neurasthenic or psychogenic, there
is no gainsaying the fact that it was caused by the crash-landing. As an effect of the cause, not
fabricated or concocted, plaintiff has to be indemnified. The fact is that such effect caused his
discharge.
We are prone to believe the testimony of the plaintiff’s doctors.
Dr. Morales, a surgeon, found that blood was coming from plaintiff’s ears and nose. He testified
that plaintiff was suffering from cerebral concussion as a result of traumatic injury to the brain
caused by his head hitting on the windshield of the plane during the crash-landing (Exhibit “G”).
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neurologist and psychiatrist with experience in two hospitals abroad, found
abnormality reflected by the electroencephalogram examination in the frontal area on both sides
of plaintiff’s head (Exhibits “K”, “K-1”).
The opinion of these two specialist renders unnecessary that of plaintiff’s wife who is a physician
in her own right and because of her relation to the plaintiff, her testimony and opinion may not be
discussed here, although her testimony is crystallized by the opinions of Dr. Ador Dionisio, Dr.
Marquez, Dr. Jose O. Chan, Dr. Yambao and Dr. Sandico.
Even the doctors presented by defendant admit vital facts about plaintiff’s brain injury. Dr.
Bernardo admits that due to the incident, the plaintiff continuously complained of his fainting
spells, dizziness and headache everytime he flew as a co-pilot and everytime he went to
defendant’s clinic no less than 25 times (Exhibits “15” to “36”), that he complained of the same to
Dr. Reyes; that he promised to help send plaintiff to the United States for expert medical assistance
provided that whatever finding thereat should not be attributed to the crash-landing incident to
which plaintiff did not agree and that plaintiff was completely ignored by the defendant in his plea
for expert medical assistance. They admitted that they could not determine definitely the cause of
the fainting spells, dizziness and headache, which justifies the demand for expert medical
assistance.”
We also find the imputation of gross negligence by respondent court to PAL for having allowed Capt.
Delfin Bustamante to fly on that fateful day of the accident on January 8, 1951 to be correct, and We
affirm the same, duly supported as it is by substantial evidence, clearly established and cited in the
decision of said court which states as follows:
“The pilot was sick. He admittedly had tumor of the nasopharynx (nose). He is now in the Great
Beyond. The spot is very near the brain and the eyes. Tumor on the spot will affect the sinus, the
breathing, the eyes which are very near it. No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one
suffering from the disease.
“. cra . The fact First Pilot Bustamante has a long standing tumor of the Nasopharynx for which
reason he was grounded since November 1947 is admitted in the letter (Exh. 69-A) of Dr. Bernardo
to the Medical Director of the CAA requesting waiver of physical standards. The request for waiver
of physical standards is itself a positive proof that the physical condition of Capt. Bustamante is
short of the standard set by the CAA. The Deputy Administrator of the CAA granted the request
relying on the representation and recommendation made by Dr. Bernardo (See Exh. 69). We
noted, however, that the request (Exh. 69-A) says that ‘it is believed that his continuing to fly as a
co-pilot does not involve any hazard.’ (Italics supplied). Flying as a First Officer entails a very
different responsibility than flying as a mere co-pilot. Defendant requested the CAA to allow Capt.
Bustamante to fly merely as a co-pilot and it is safe to conclude that the CAA approved the request
thus allowing Bustamante to fly only as a co-pilot. For having allowed Bustamante to fly as a First
 Officer on January 8, 1951, defendant is guilty of gross negligence and therefore should be made
liable for the resulting accident.
As established by the evidence, the pilot used to get treatments from Dr. Sycangco. He used to
complain of pain in the face more particularly in the nose which caused him to have sleepless nights.
Plaintiff’s observation of the pilot was reported to the Chief Pilot who did nothing about it. Captain
Carbonel of the defendant corroborated plaintiff of this matter. The complaint against the slow
reaction of the pilot at least proved the observation. The observation could be disregarded. The fact
that the complaint was not in writing does not detract anything from the seriousness thereof,
considering that a miscalculation would not only cause the death of the crew but also of the
passengers.
One month prior to the crash-landing, when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet, plaintiff warned
him that they were not in the vicinity of Daet but above the town of Ligao. The plane hit outside the
airstrip. In another instance, the pilot would hit the Mayon Volcano had not plaintiff warned him.
These more than prove what plaintiff had complained of. Disregard thereof by defendant is
condemnable.
To bolster the claim that Capt. Bustamante has not suffered from any kind of sickness which
hampered his flying ability, appellant contends that for at least one or more years following the
accident of January 8, 1951, Capt. Bustamante continued to fly for defendant company as a pilot, and
did so with great skill and proficiency, and without any further accident or mishap, citing tsn. pp. 756-
765, January 20, 1965. We have painstakingly perused the records, particularly the transcript of
stenographic notes cited, but found nothing therein to substantiate appellant’s contention. Instead,
We discovered that the citation covers the testimony of Dr. Bernardo on the physical condition of
Bustamante and nothing about his skills or proficiency to fly nor on the mishaps or accidents, matters
which are beyond Dr. Bernardo’s competence anyway.
Assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the tumor did not affect the pilot in managing the plane,
the evidence shows that the overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at the mangrove was
caused by the pilot for which acts the defendant must answer for damages caused thereby. And for
this negligence of defendant’s employee, it is liable (Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308). At least, the
law presumes the employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees.
Defendant would want to tie plaintiff to the report he signed about the crash-landing. The report was
prepared by his pilot and because the latter pleaded that he had a family too and would have
nowhere to go if he lost his job, plaintiff’s compassion would not upturn the truth about the crash-
landing. We are for the truth not logic of any argumentation.
At any rate, it is incorrect to say that the Accident Report (Exh. 12 & 12-A), signed by plaintiff,
exculpated Capt. Bustamante from any fault. We observed that the Report does not categorically
state that Capt. Bustamante was not at fault. It merely relates in chronological sequence what Capt.
Bustamante and plaintiff did from the take-off from Manila to the landing in Daet which resulted in
an accident. On the contrary, we may infer the negligence of Bustamante from the following portion
of the Report, to wit:
“. cra . I felt his brakes strong but as we neared the intersection of the NE-SW runway, the brakes
were not as strong and I glanced at the system pressure which indicated 900 lbs. per sq. m.”
It was during the above precise instance that Capt. Bustamante lost his bearing and disposition. Had
he maintained the pressure on the brakes the plane would not have overshot the runway. Verily,
Bustamante displayed slow reaction and poor judgment. (CA decision, pp. 8-12).
This Court is not impressed by, much less can We accept petitioner’s invocation to calibrate once
again the evidence testified to in detail and plucked from the voluminous transcript to support
petitioner’s own conclusion. It is not the task of this Court to discharge the functions of a trier of facts
much less to enter into a calibration of the evidence, notwithstanding petitioner’s wail that the
judgment of the respondent court is based entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures. We
are convinced that respondent court’s judgment is supported by strong, clear and substantial
evidence.
Petitioner is a common carrier engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public, as
defined in Art. 1732, New Civil Code. The law is clear in requiring a common carrier to exercise the
highest degree of care in the discharge of its duty and business of carriage and transportation under
Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code. These Articles provide:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, and
1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further
set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passenger safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of common carriers is for the safety of
passengers as well as for the members of the crew or the complement operating the carrier, the
airplane in the case at bar. And this must be so for any omission, lapse or neglect thereof will certainly
result to the damage, prejudice, nay injuries and even death to all aboard the plane, passengers and
crew members alike.
Now to the damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of damages made by the trial court,
stating that “the damages awarded plaintiff by the lower court are in accordance with the facts, law
and jurisprudence.” The court further observed that “defendant-appellant is still fortunate,
considering that the unearned income was reckoned with only up to 1968 and not up to the present
as plaintiff-appellee is still living. Whatever mathematical error defendant-appellant could show by
abstract argumentation, the same must be compensated by such deficiency of the damages awarded
to plaintiff-appellee.”
As awarded by the trial court, private respondent was entitled to P198,000.00 as unearned income
or compensatory damages; P50,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation, or a total of P273,000.00.
The trial court arrived at the sum of P198,000.00 as unearned income or damages by considering that
respondent Samson “could have continued to work as airline pilot for fifteen more years, he being
only 38 years at the time the services were terminated by the defendant (PAL) and he would have
earned P120,000.00 from 1954 to 1963 or a period of ten (10) years at the rate of one thousand per
month (P750.00 basic salary plus P300.00 extra pay for extra flying time and bonuses; and
considering further that in 1964 the basic pay of defendant’s pilot was increased to P12,000.00
annually, the plaintiff could have earned from 1964 to 1968 the sum of P60,000.00 in the form of
salaries and another P18,000.00 as bonuses and extra pay for extra flying time at the same rate of
P300 a month, or a grand total of P198,000.00 for the entire period. This claim of the plaintiff for loss
or impairment of earning capacity is based on the provision of Article 2205 of the New Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides that “damages may be recovered for loss or impairment of earning
capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury.” This provision of law has been
construed and interpreted in the case of Aureliano Ropato, et al. vs. La Mallorca General Partnership,
56 O.G., 7812, which rules that law allows the recovery of damages for loss or impairment of earning
capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury.” (Decision, CFI, pp. 98-99, Record on
Appeal)
The respondent appellate court modified the above award by ordering payment of legal interest on
the P198,000.00 unearned income from the filing of the claim, citing Sec. 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner assails the award of the total sum of P198,000.00 as unearned income up to 1968 as being
tenuous because firstly, the trial court’s finding affirmed by the respondent court is allegedly based
on pure speculation and conjecture and secondly, the award of P300.00 a month as extra pay for
extra flying time from 1954 to 1968 is likewise speculative. PAL likewise rejects the award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 on the ground that private respondent’s action before the trial
court does not fall under any of the cases enumerated in the law (Art. 2219 of the New Civil Code)
for which moral damages are recoverable and that although private respondent’s action gives the
appearance that it is covered under quasi-delict as provided in Art. 21 of the New Civil Code, the
definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code expressly excludes cases where there is a
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, as in the case under consideration, where an
employer-employee relationship existed between PAL and private respondent. It is further argued
that private respondent’s action cannot be deemed to be covered by Art. 21, inasmuch as there is no
evidence on record to show that PAL “wilfully cause(d) loss or injury to (private respondent) in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy . cra .” Nor can private respondent’s
action be considered “analogous” to either of the foregoing, for the reasons are obvious that it is
not.” (Memorandum of petitioner, pp. 418-421, Records)
Having affirmed the gross negligence of PAL in allowing Capt. Delfin Bustamante to fly the plane to
Daet on January 8, 1951 whose slow reaction and poor judgment was the cause of the crash-landing
of the plane which resulted in private respondent Samson hitting his head against the windshield and
causing him injuries for which reason PAL terminated his services and employment as pilot after
refusing to provide him with the necessary medical treatment of respondent’s periodic spells,
headache and general debility produced from said injuries, We must necessarily affirm likewise the
award of damages or compensation under the provisions of Art. 1711 and Art. 1712 of the New Civil
Code which provide:
Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death
or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may
have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose
out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the
employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature
of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee’s own notorious negligence, or voluntary
act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee’s lack
of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.
Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow-worker, the latter and the
employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow-worker’s intentional or malicious act
is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be
shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiffs
fellow-worker.
The grant of compensatory damages to the private respondent made by the trial court and affirmed
by the appellate court by computing his basic salary per annum at P750.00 a month as basic salary
and P300.00 a month for extra pay for extra flying time including bonus given in December every year
is justified. The correct computation however should be P750 plus P300 x 12 months = P12,600 per
annum x 10 years = P126,000.00 (not P120,000.00 as computed by the court a quo). The further
grant of increase in the basic pay of the pilots to P12,000 annually for 1964 to 1968 totalling
P60,000.00 and another P18,000.00 as bonuses and extra pay for extra flying time at the same rate
of P300.00 a month totals P78,000.00. Adding P126,000.00 (1964 to 1968 compensation) makes a
grand total of P204,000.00 (not P198,000.00 as originally computed).
As to the grant of moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 We also approve the same. We have
noted and considered the holding of the appellate court in the matter of bad faith on the part of PAL,
stated hereunder, this wise:
“None of the essential facts material to the determination of the case have been seriously assailed:
the overshooting of runway and crash-landing into the mangroves; the hitting of plaintiff’s head
to the front windshield of the plane; the oozing of blood out of his ears, nose and mouth; the
intermittent dizzy spells, headaches and general debility thereafter for which he was discharged
from his employment; the condition of not to attribute the cause of the ailment to the crash-
landing imposed in bad faith for a demanded special medical service abroad; and the resultant
brain injury which defendant’s doctors could not understand nor diagnose.”
xxx
“The act of defendant-appellant in unjustly refusing plaintiff-appellee’s demand for special medical
service abroad for the reason that plaintiff-appellee’s deteriorating physical condition was not due
to the accident violates the provisions of Article 19 of the Civil Code on human relations “to act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” (CA Resolution, pp. 151-
152, Records)
We reject the theory of petitioner that private respondent is not entitled to moral damages. Under
the facts found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court and under the law and
jurisprudence cited and applied, the grant of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is proper
and justified.
The fact that private respondent suffered physical injuries in the head when the plane crash-landed
due to the negligence of Capt. Bustamante is undeniable. The negligence of the latter is clearly a
quasi-delict and therefore Article 2219, (2) New Civil Code is applicable, justifying the recovery of
moral damages.
Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an employer-employee relationship between
it and private respondent arising from the contract of employment, private respondent is still entitled
to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith or malice by the appellate court, which finding
We hereby affirm, applying the provisions of Art. 2220, New Civil Code which provides that willful
injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that,
under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
The justification in the award of moral damages under Art. 19 of the New Civil Code on Human
Relations which requires that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, as applied
by respondent court is also well-taken and We hereby give Our affirmance thereto.
With respect to the award of attorney’s fees in the sum of P20,000.00 the same is likewise correct.
As pointed out in the decision of the Court of Appeals, “the plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees
because he was forced to litigate in order to enforce his valid claim (Ganaban vs. Bayle, 30 SCRA 365;
De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz, 22 SCRA 33; and many others); defendant acted in bad faith in refusing
plaintiff’s valid claim (Filipino Pipe Foundry Corporation vs. Central Bank, 23 SCRA 1044); and plaintiff
was dismissed and was forced to go to court to vindicate his right (Nadura vs. Benguet Consolidated,
Inc., 5 SCRA 879).”
We also agree with the modification made by the appellate court in ordering payment of legal
interest from the date judicial demand was made by Pilot Samson against PAL with the filing of the
complaint in the lower court. We affirm the ruling of the respondent court which reads:
“Lastly, the defendant-appellant claims that the legal rate of interest on the unearned
compensation should be computed from the date of the judgment in the lower court, not from
the filing of the complaint, citing a case where the issue raised in the Supreme Court was limited
to when the judgment was rendered in the lower court or in the appellate court, which does not
mean that it should not be computed from the filing of the complaint.
Articles 1169, 2209 and 2212 of the Civil Code govern when interest shall be computed.
Thereunder interest begins to accrue upon demand, extrajudicial or judicial. A complaint is a
judicial demand (Cabarroguis vs. Vicente, 107 Phil. 340). Under Article 2212 of the Civil Code,
interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent upon this point.” (CA Resolution, pp. 153-154, Records).
The correct amount of compensatory damages upon which legal interest shall accrue from the filing
of the complaint is P204,000.00 as herein computed and not P198,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the appellate court is hereby affirmed with
slight modification in that the correct amount of compensatory damages is P204,000.00. With costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY
G.R. No. 113578 July 14, 1995
SULPICIO LINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS and TITO DURAN TABUQUILDE and ANGELINA DE PAZ
TABUQUILDE, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32864, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 85, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-89-3048.
I
The Court of Appeals found:
On October 23, 1988, plaintiff Tito Duran Tabuquilde (hereinafter, "Tito") and his three-year old
daughter Jennifer Anne boarded the M/V Dona Marilyn at North Harbor, Manila, bringing with
them several pieces of luggage.
In the morning of October 24, 1988, the M/V Dona Marilyn, while in transit, encountered
inclement weather which caused huge waves due to Typhoon Unsang.
Notwithstanding the fact that Storm Signal No. 2 had been raised by the PAG-ASA authorities over
Leyte as early as 5:30 P.M. of October 23, 1988 and which signal was raised to Signal No. 3 by 10
P.M. of the same day, the ship captain ordered the vessel to proceed to Tacloban when prudence
dictated that he should have taken it to the nearest port for shelter, thus violating his duty to
exercise extraordinary diligence in the carrying of passengers safely to their destination.
At about the same time, plaintiff-appellee Angelina Tabuquilde (hereinafter, "Angelina") mother
of Jennifer Anne, contacted the Sulpicio Office to verify radio reports that the vessel M/V Dona
Marilyn was missing. Employees of said Sulpicio Lines assured her that the ship was merely "hiding"
thereby assuaging her anxiety.
At around 2:00 P.M. of October 24, 1988, said vessel capsized, throwing plaintiff-appellee Tito and
Jennifer Anne, along with hundreds of passengers, into the tumultuous sea.
Tito tried to keep himself and his daughter afloat but to no avail as the waves got stronger and he
was subsequently separated from his daughter despite his efforts.
He found himself on Almagro Island in Samar the next day at round (sic) 11:00 A.M. and
immediately searched for his daughter among the survivors in the island, but the search proved
fruitless.
In the meantime, Angelina tried to seek the assistance of the Sulpicio Lines in Manila to no avail,
the latter refusing to entertain her and hundreds of relatives of the other passengers who waited
long hours outside the Manila Office. Angelina spent sleepless nights worrying about her husband
Tito and daughter Jennifer Anne in view of the refusal of Sulpicio Lines to release a verification of
the sinking of the ship.
On October 26, 1988, Tito and other survivors in the Almagro Island were fetched and were
brought to Tacloban Medical Center for treatment.
On October 31, 1988, Tito reported the loss of his daughter, was informed that the corpse of a
child with his daughter's description had been found. Subsequently, Tito wrote a letter to his wife,
reporting the sad fact that Jennifer Anne was dead. Angelina suffered from shock and severe grief
upon receipt of the news.
On November 3, 1988, the coffin bearing the corpse of Jennifer Anne was buried in Tanauan, Leyte.
On November 24, 1988, a claim for damages was filed by Tito with the defendant Sulpicio Lines in
connection with the death of the plaintiff-appellee's daughter and the loss of Tito's belongings
worth P27,580.00. (Appellees' Brief, pp. 2-4) ( Rollo, pp. 52-54).
On January 3, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. Q-89-3048 in favor of the
plaintiffs Tito Duran Tabuquilde and Angelina de Paz Tabuquilde (private respondents herein) and
against defendant Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (petitioner herein) ordering defendant to pay P27,580.00 as
actual damages, P30,000.00 for the death of Jennifer Tabuquilde, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner
then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition.
II
Generally, the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and not disturbed except
for cogent reasons (Gatmaitan v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 37 [1991]). One of the accepted reasons
is when the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence (Sandoval Shipyard, Inc. v. Clave, 94
SCRA 472 [1979]). Corollary to this is the rule that actual or compensatory damages, to be recovered,
must be proved; otherwise, if the proof is flimsy, no damages will be awarded (Dichoso v. Court of
Appeals, 192 SCRA 169 [1990]).
In the case at bench, the trial court merely mentioned the fact of the loss and the value of the
contents of the pieces of baggage without stating the evidence on which it based its findings. There
is no showing that the value of the contents of the lost pieces of baggage was based on the bill of
lading or was previously declared by respondent Tito D. Tabuquilde before he boarded the ship.
Hence, there can be no basis to award actual damages in the amount of P27,850.00.
The Court of Appeals was correct in confirming the award of damages for the death of the daughter
of private respondents, a passenger on board the stricken vessel of petitioner. It is true that under
Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, only deaths caused by a crime as quasi delict are
entitled to actual and compensatory damages without the need of proof of the said damages. Said
Article provides:
 The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi delict shall be at least Three Thousand
Pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. . . .
Deducing alone from said provision, one can conclude that damages arising from culpa contractual
are not compensable without proof of special damages sustained by the heirs of the victim.
However, the Civil Code, in Article 1764 thereof, expressly makes Article 2206 applicable "to the
death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier." Accordingly, a common
carrier is liable for actual or compensatory damages under Article 2206 in relation to Article 1764 of
the Civil Code for deaths of its passengers caused by the breach of the contract of transportation.
The trial court awarded an indemnity of P30,000.00 for the death of the daughter of private
respondents. The award of damages under Article 2206 has been increased to P50,000.00 (People v.
Flores, 237 SCRA 653 [1994]).
With respect to the award of moral damages, the general rule is that said damages are not
recoverable in culpa contractual except when the presence of bad faith was proven (Trans World Air
Lines v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 143 [1988]). However, in breach of contract of carriage, moral
damages may be recovered when it results in the death of a passenger (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. v. Esguerra, 117 SCRA 741 [1982]; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 [1985]).
With respect to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2232 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
gives the Court the discretion to grant said damages in breach of contract when the defendant acted
in a wanton, fraudulent and reckless manner (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]).
Furthermore, in the case of Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 83 (1989), we ruled that:
. . . . The Court will take judicial notice of the dreadful regularity with which grievous maritime
disasters occur in our waters with massive loss of life. The bulk of our population is too poor to
afford domestic air transportation. So it is that notwithstanding the frequent sinking of passenger
in our waters, crowds of people continue to travel by sea. This Court is prepared to use the
instruments given to it by the law for securing the ends of law and public policy. One of those
instruments is the institution of exemplary damages; one of those ends, of special importance in
an archipelagic state like the Philippines, is the safe and reliable carriage of people and goods by
sea. . . . (at p. 100).
A common carrier is obliged to transport its passengers to their destinations with the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person (Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Tiongson, 16 SCRA 940 [1966]). The
trial court found that petitioner failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of a common
carrier, which resulted in the sinking of the M/V Dona Marilyn.
The trial court correctly concluded that the sinking of M/V Dona Marilyn was due to gross negligence,
thus:
. . . [i]t is undisputed that Typhoon Unsang entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility on October
21, 1988. The rain in Metro Manila started after lunch of October 23, 1988, and at about 5:00 p.m.
Public Storm Signal No. 1 was hoisted over Metro Manila, Signal No. 2 in Leyte and Signal No. 3 in
Samar. But at 10:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning of October 23, 1988, Public Storm Signal No. 1 was
already hoisted over the province of Leyte, which is the destination of M/V Dona Marilyn. This was
raised to Signal No. 2 at 4:00 p.m. and Signal No. 3 at 10:00 p.m. on the same date. The following
day, October 24, 1988, at 4:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Storm Signal No. 3 remained hoisted in Leyte.
At 4 p.m. on October 24, 1988, Storm Signal No. 3 remained hoisted in Leyte but was reduced to
Storm Signal No. 2 (Exh. G). Signal No. 1 has maximum winds at 60 kph within 36 hours; Signal No.
2 has maximum winds of from 60 kph to 100 kph within a period of 24 hours; and Signal No. 3 has
maximum winds of 100 kph and above within a period of 12 hours.
Warnings of the storm signal are issued by PAG-ASA thru DZZA, Office of Civil Defense, Philippine
Navy, Coast Guard, Radio Stations, and other offices, every six (6) hours as soon as a cyclone enters
the Philippine Area of Responsibility.
At 10:30 a.m. on October 24, 1988, the vessel was estimated to be between Mindoro and Masbate,
and the center of the typhoon then was around 130 degrees longitude with maximum winds of 65
kph (Exh. G-3), with a "radius of rough to phenomenal sea at that time of 450 kms. North and 350
kms. elsewhere; 350 kms. North center and all throughout the rest" (p. 12, TSN, Lumalda, Feb. 19,
1990).
xxx xxx xxx
In the same manner, (referring to the negligence of the crew of the ship that sank in Vasquez v.
Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 [1985]) the crew of the vessel M/V Dona Marilyn took a calculated
risk when it proceeded despite the typhoon brewing somewhere in the general direction to which
the vessel was going. The crew assumed a greater risk when, instead of dropping anchor in or at
the periphery of the Port of Calapan, or returning to the port of Manila which is nearer, proceeded
on its voyage on the assumption that it will be able to beat and race with the typhoon and reach
its destination before it (Unsang) passes ( Rollo, pp. 45-47).
The award of attorney's fees by the trial court to respondents is also assailed by petitioner, citing
Mirasol v. De la Cruz, 84 SCRA 337 (1978). In this case, the petitioner filed before the Municipal Court
an action for forcible entry against the private respondent. The said court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur sustained the decision of the lower court,
dismissed the appeal and awarded attorney's fees in the sum of not less than P500.00 in favor of
private respondent. Upon appeal to us, we deleted the award of attorney's fees because the text of
the appealed decision was bereft of any findings of fact and law to justify such an award. Moreover,
there was no proof, other than the bare allegation of harassment that the adverse party had acted
in bad faith. The aforementioned decision is inapposite to the instant case where the decision clearly
mentions the facts and the law upon which the award of attorney's fees were based.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of P27,580.00 as actual damages for the loss of the contents of the pieces of baggage is deleted
and that the award of P30,000.00 under Article 2206 in relation Article 1764 is increased to
P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY
G.R. No. 161730 January 28, 2005
JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL ASUNCION and JEANETTE ASUNCION, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to reverse and set aside the October 9, 2002 decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution,2 which affirmed in toto the June 10, 1997 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 in Civil Case No. 92-3635.3
On March 27, 1992, respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion left Manila on board Japan Airlines’
(JAL) Flight 742 bound for Los Angeles. Their itinerary included a stop-over in Narita and an overnight
stay at Hotel Nikko Narita. Upon arrival at Narita, Mrs. Noriko Etou-Higuchi of JAL endorsed their
applications for shore pass and directed them to the Japanese immigration official. 4 A shore pass is
required of a foreigner aboard a vessel or aircraft who desires to stay in the neighborhood of the port
of call for not more than 72 hours.
During their interview, the Japanese immigration official noted that Michael appeared shorter than
his height as indicated in his passport. Because of this inconsistency, respondents were denied shore
pass entries and were brought instead to the Narita Airport Rest House where they were billeted
overnight.
The immigration official also handed Mrs. Higuchi a Notice5 where it was stated that respondents
were to be "watched so as not to escape".
Mr. Atsushi Takemoto of the International Service Center (ISC), the agency tasked by Japan’s
Immigration Department to handle passengers who were denied shore pass entries, brought
respondents to the Narita Airport Rest House where they stayed overnight until their departure the
following day for Los Angeles. Respondents were charged US$400.00 each for their accommodation,
security service and meals.
On December 12, 1992, respondents filed a complaint for damages6 claiming that JAL did not fully
apprise them of their travel requirements and that they were rudely and forcibly detained at Narita
Airport.
JAL denied the allegations of respondents. It maintained that the refusal of the Japanese immigration
authorities to issue shore passes to respondents is an act of state which JAL cannot interfere with or
prevail upon. Consequently, it cannot impose upon the immigration authorities that respondents be
billeted at Hotel Nikko instead of the airport resthouse.7
On June 10, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs ordering
defendant JAL to pay plaintiffs as follows:
1. the sum of US$800.00 representing the expenses incurred at the Narita Airport with interest at
12% per annum from March 27, 1992 until the sum is fully paid;
2. the sum of P200,000.00 for each plaintiff as moral damages;
3. the amount of P100,000.00 for each plaintiff as exemplary damages;
4. the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
5. costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court dismissed JAL’s counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
On October 9, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Its motion
for reconsideration having been denied,9 JAL now files the instant petition.
The basic issue for resolution is whether JAL is guilty of breach of contract.
Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier such as JAL is bound to carry its passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger,
confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has
every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date and it becomes the
carrier’s obligation to carry him and his luggage safely to the agreed destination.10 If the passenger is
not so transported or if in the process of transporting he dies or is injured, the carrier may be held
liable for a breach of contract of carriage.11
We find that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. It may be true that JAL has
the duty to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however, such duty
does not extend to checking the veracity of every entry in these documents. JAL could not vouch for
the authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries therein. The power to admit or not
an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by JAL. This is not
within the ambit of the contract of carriage entered into by JAL and herein respondents. As such, JAL
should not be faulted for the denial of respondents’ shore pass applications.
Prior to their departure, respondents were aware that upon arrival in Narita, they must secure shore
pass entries for their overnight stay. Respondents’ mother, Mrs. Imelda Asuncion, insisted though
that Ms. Linda Villavicencio of JAL assured her that her children would be granted the passes. 12 This
assertion was satisfactorily refuted by Ms. Villavicencio’s testimony during the cross examination, to
wit:
ATTY. GONZAGA:
Q I will show to you Exh. 9 which is the TIM and on page 184 hereof, particularly number 10, and
I quote, "Those holding tickets with confirmed seats and other documents for their onward
journey and continuing their journey to a third country provided that they obtain an indorsement
with an application of shore pass or transit pass from the airline ground personnel before
clearing the immigration formality?"
 WITNESS: Mrs. Higuchi did all she could to assist the respondents. Upon being notified of the denial of
A Yes, Sir. respondents’ applications, Mrs. Higuchi immediately made reservations for respondents at the Narita
Q Did you tell this provision to Mrs. Asuncion? Airport Rest House which is really more a hotel than a detention house as claimed by respondents. 16
A Yes, Sir. I did.
Q Are you sure? More importantly, nowhere in respondent Michael’s testimony did he state categorically that Mrs.
A Yes, Sir. Higuchi or any other employee of JAL treated them rudely or exhibited improper behavior
Q Did you give a copy? throughout their stay. We therefore find JAL not remiss in its obligations as a common
A No, Sir, I did not give a copy but verbally I explained to her the procedure they have to undergo carrier.1awphi1.nét
when they get to narita airport.
….
Moral damages may be recovered in cases where one willfully causes injury to property, or in cases
Q And you read the contents of this [TIM]?
of breach of contract where the other party acts fraudulently or in bad faith. Exemplary damages are
A No, Sir, I did not read it to her but I explained to her the procedure that each passenger has to
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, when the party to a contract acts in
go through before when they get to narita airport before they line up in the immigration counter.
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. Attorney’s fees are allowed when exemplary
Q In other words, you told Mrs. Asuncion the responsibility of securing shore passes bears solely
damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is compelled to incur expenses to protect his
on the passengers only?
interest.17 There being no breach of contract nor proof that JAL acted in wanton, fraudulent or
A Yes, Sir.
malevolent manner, there is no basis for the award of any form of damages.
Q That the airline has no responsibility whatsoever with regards (sic) to the application for shore
passes?
A Yes, Sir.13 Neither should JAL be held liable to reimburse respondents the amount of US$800.00. It has been
sufficiently proven that the amount pertained to ISC, an agency separate and distinct from JAL, in
payment for the accommodations provided to respondents. The payments did not in any manner
Next, respondents claimed that petitioner breached its contract of carriage when it failed to explain
accrue to the benefit of JAL.
to the immigration authorities that they had overnight vouchers at the Hotel Nikko Narita. They
imputed that JAL did not exhaust all means to prevent the denial of their shore pass entry
applications. However, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed JAL’s counterclaim for litigation
expenses, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The action was filed by respondents in utmost
good faith and not manifestly frivolous. Respondents honestly believed that JAL breached its
To reiterate, JAL or any of its representatives have no authority to interfere with or influence the
contract. A person’s right to litigate should not be penalized by holding him liable for damages. This
immigration authorities. The most that could be expected of JAL is to endorse respondents’
is especially true when the filing of the case is to enforce what he believes to be his rightful claim
applications, which Mrs. Higuchi did immediately upon their arrival in Narita.
against another although found to be erroneous. 18

As Mrs. Higuchi stated during her deposition:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The October 9, 2002
decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 57440, are
ATTY. QUIMBO REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the finding of breach on the part of petitioner and the award of
Q: Madam Witness, what assistance did you give, if any, to the plaintiffs during this interview? damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondents is concerned. Accordingly,
A: No, I was not present during their interview. I cannot assist. there being no breach of contract on the part of petitioner, the award of actual, moral and exemplary
Q: Why not? damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondents Michael and Jeanette
A: It is forbidden for a civilian personnel to interfere with the Immigration agent’s duties.14 Asuncion, is DELETED for lack of basis. However, the dismissal for lack of merit of petitioner’s
…. counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, is SUSTAINED. No
Q: During the time that you were in that room and you were given this notice for you to sign, did pronouncement as to costs.
you tell the immigration agent that Michael and Jeanette Asuncion should be allowed to stay at
the Hotel Nikko Narita because, as passengers of JAL, and according to the plaintiff, they had
SO ORDERED.
vouchers to stay in that hotel that night?
A: No, I couldn’t do so.
Q: Why not?
A: This notice is evidence which shows the decision of immigration authorities. It shows there that
the immigration inspector also designated Room 304 of the Narita Airport Resthouse as the place
where the passengers were going to wait for their outbound flight.1awphi1.nét I cannot interfere
with that decision.15
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
G.R. No. L-29462 March 7, 1929
IGNACIO DEL PRADO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO., defendant-appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Ignacio del Prado to recover
damages in the amount of P50,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of te defendant, the Manila Electric Company, in the operation of one of its street cars in
the City of Manila. Upon hearing the cause the trial court awarded to the plaintiff the sum of P10,000,
as damages, with costs of suit, and the defendant appealed.
The appellant, the Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the City for the
conveyance of passengers; and on the morning of November 18, 1925, one Teodorico Florenciano,
as appellant's motorman, was in charge of car No. 74 running from east to west on R. Hidalgo Street,
the scene of the accident being at a point near the intersection of said street and Mendoza Street.
After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and letting off passengers, just east of
the intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate speed under the guidance of the motorman.
The car had proceeded only a short distance, however, when the plaintiff, Ignacio del Prado, ran
across the street to catch the car, his approach being made from the left. The car was of the kind
having entrance and exist at either end, and the movement of the plaintiff was so timed that he
arrived at the front entrance of the car at the moment when the car was passing.
The testimony of the plaintiff and of Ciriaco Guevara, one of his witnesses, tends to shows that the
plaintiff, upon approaching the car, raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his desire to
board the car, in response to which the motorman eased up a little, without stopping. Upon this the
plaintiff seized, with his hand, the front perpendicular handspot, at the same time placing his left
foot upon the platform. However, before the plaintiff's position had become secure, and even before
his raised right foot had reached the flatform, the motorman applied the power, with the result that
the car gave a slight lurch forward. This sudden impulse to the car caused the plaintiff's foot to slip,
and his hand was jerked loose from the handpost, He therefore fell to the ground, and his right foot
was caught and crushed by the moving car. The next day the member had to be amputated in the
hospital. The witness, Ciriaco Guevara, also stated that, as the plaintiff started to board the car, he
grasped the handpost on either side with both right and left hand. The latter statement may possibly
be incorrect as regards the use of his right hand by the plaintiff, but we are of the opinion that the
finding of the trial court to the effect that the motorman slowed up slightly as the plaintiff was
boarding the car that the plaintiff's fall was due in part at lease to a sudden forward movement at
the moment when the plaintiff put his foot on the platform is supported by the evidence and ought
not to be disturbed by us.
The motorman stated at the trial that he did not see the plaintiff attempting to board the car; that
he did not accelerate the speed of the car as claimed by the plaintiff's witnesses; and that he in fact
knew nothing of the incident until after the plaintiff had been hurt and some one called to him to
stop. We are not convinced of the complete candor of this statement, for we are unable to see how
a motorman operating this car could have failed to see a person boarding the car under the
circumstances revealed in this case. It must be remembered that the front handpost which, as all
witness agree, was grasped by the plaintiff in attempting to board the car, was immediately on the
left side of the motorman.
With respect to the legal aspects of the case we may observe at the outset that there is no obligation
on the part of a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points
than those appointed for stoppage. In fact it would be impossible to operate a system of street cars
if a company engage in this business were required to stop any and everywhere to take on people
who were too indolent, or who imagine themselves to be in too great a hurry, to go to the proper
places for boarding the cars. Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop
to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do act that would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's
peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration of the car was, in our
opinion, a breach of this duty.
The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and
in failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty
(culpa contructual) under articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the duty that
the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those
alighting therefrom. The case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), supplies an instance
of the violation of this duty with respect to a passenger who was getting off of a train. In that case
the plaintiff stepped off of a moving train, while it was slowing down in a station, and at the time
when it was too dark for him to see clearly where he was putting his feet. The employees of the
company had carelessly left watermelons on the platform at the place where the plaintiff alighted,
with the result that his feet slipped and he fell under the car, where his right arm badly injured. This
court held that the railroad company was liable for breach positive duty (culpa contractual), and the
plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of P2,500 for the loss of his arm. In the opinion in that
case the distinction is clearly drawn between a liability for negligence arising from breach of
contructual duty and that arising articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code (culpa aquiliana).
The distiction between these two sorts of negligence is important in this jurisdiction, for the reason
that where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive
obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of article 1903
of the Civil Code, by providing that he had exercised due degligence to prevent the damage; whereas
this defense is not available if the liability of the master arises from a breach of contrauctual duty
(culpa contractual). In the case bfore us the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used
all the deligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and to
establish this contention the company introduced testimony showing that due care had been used
in training and instructing the motorman in charge of this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in
view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation under article 1101
of the Civil Code and related provisions. (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compana Transatlantica and Atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875, 887; De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706,
710.)
Another practical difference between liability for negligence arising under 1902 of the Civil Code and
liability arising from negligence in the performance of a positive duty, under article 1101 and related
provisions of the Civil Code, is that, in dealing with the latter form of negligence, the court is given a
discretion to mitigate liability according to the circumstances of the case (art 1103). No such general
discretion is given by the Code in dealing with liability arising under article 1902; although possibly
the same end is reached by courts in dealing with the latter form of liability because of the latitude
of the considerations pertinent to cases arising under this article.
As to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that it should be treated, as Separate Opinions
in Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), as a mitigating circumstance under article 1103
of the Civil Code. It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act
of appellant's motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A person boarding a moving car must
This appeal presents a hard case, whichever way it is decided.
be taken to assume the risk of injury from boarding the car under the conditions open to his view,
but he cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will
increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted safely on the platform. I read the entire record in this case before it was submitted to the second division for decision. I was
Again, the situation before us is one where the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the then the ponente. I was then convinced, as I am now, after a re-examination of the record, that the
negligent act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the proximate judgment of the lower court should be revoked for the following reasons:
cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which
is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, (a) That the motorman managed the car carefully and with ordinary prudence at the moment the
the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the alleged accident occured;
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences
of the negligence of the injured party (20 R. C. L., p. 139; Carr vs. Interurban Ry. Co., 185 Iowa, 872; (b) That the appellee acted with imprudence and lack of due care in attempting to board a street
171 N. W., 167). The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the accident and must car while the same was in motion; and
be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

With respect to the effect of this injury upon the plaintiff's earning power, we note that, although he
lost his foot, he is able to use an artificial member without great inconvenience and his earning
capacity has probably not been reduced by more than 30 per centum. In view of the precedents
found in our decisions with respect to the damages that ought to be awarded for the loss of limb,
and more particularly Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359); Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
Co. (38 Phil., 768); and Borromeo vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (44 Phil., 165), and in view
of all the circumstances connected with the case, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff will be
adequately compensated by an award of P2,500.
It being understood, therefore, that the appealed judgment is modified by reducing the recovery to
the sum of P2,500, the judgment, as thus modified, is affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the
appellant.
(c) That he contributed to his own injury, without any negligence or malice or imprudence on the
part of the defendant.
There is nothing in the record which even remotely justifies a contribution of damages between the
appellee and the appellant. The appellee should be required to suffer the damages which he himself,
through his own negligence, occasioned, without any negligence, imprudence or malice on the part
of the appellant.
Therefore, the judgment of the court a quo should be revoked, and the appellant absolved from all
liability under the complaint.
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966
LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23267-R, holding
it liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for
the death of his minor daughter Raquel Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are:
On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their minor
daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4½ years old, and Fe, over 2 years old,
boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and
operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At
the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their personal
belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano
Beltran, issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest
child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which
fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound
therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to the group
of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the first to get down
the bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the
left pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he
returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so
doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was
on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left
under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading,
suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the
conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still
attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again
placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs
had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running
board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in
front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people
beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed,
and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus
in which she rode earlier together with her parents.
For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit against the defendant
seeking to recover from the latter an aggregate amount of P16,000 to cover moral damages and
actual damages sustained as a result thereof and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the court
below rendered the judgment in question.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of contract of carriage
and sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the child and P400.00 as compensatory damages
representing burial expenses and costs.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a breach of contract
in the case, for the reason that when the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger of the
bus involved in the incident and, therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated. Although
the Court of Appeals sustained this theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty of
quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence of its driver, in accordance with
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the Court of Appeals did not only find the petitioner liable, but
increased the damages awarded the plaintiffs-appellees to P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00 granted
by the trial court.
In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding it liable for
quasi-delict, considering that respondents complaint was one for breach of contract, and (2) in raising
the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal from the
decision of the lower court.
Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the judgement holding
petitioner liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out that
although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the
deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated for disembarking or unloading of
passengers, it was also established that the father had to return to the vehicle (which was still at a
stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus. There can be
no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong
which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner
remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the
latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage
from the car.1 The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the
father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under
the contract of carriage also persisted.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the
moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point
of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting
from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger.2 So also, where a
passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's
premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger,
has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve
his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger
entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents.3
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded contention, therefore, that the Court of Appeals committed error in raising the amount of the award
when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. for damages is, evidently, meritorious.1äwphï1.ñët
However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to
hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by sentencing, the petitioner to
from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run pay to the respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00 for the death of the child, Raquel
over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the Beltran, and the amount of P400.00 as actual damages. No costs in this instance. So ordered.
"utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In
the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine.
Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and
while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family.
The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be
considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of
carriage.

But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner
can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads —

That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter,
was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person on the part of the defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their
daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle.

is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while
incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of
Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative,
be they compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be
resolved and determined.4

The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when
it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by
the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of
the defendants and their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was established during the
trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there
were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The
presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the
defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had
failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the
child Raquel Beltran.

The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of Appeals, however,
cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only pass upon and consider questions or
issues raised and argued in appellant's brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the
judgment of the trial court awarding them on P3,000.00 damages for the death of their daughter.
Neither does it appear that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in their
brief the inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was merely a clerical
error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to the general rule. 5 Herein petitioner's
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR
and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE
BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated
by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of
Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were
about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan
Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan,
another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,
apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia
Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning,
while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped
or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the
Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned
bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from
inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out
of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from
the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and
rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the
houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and
all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as
the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the
chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and
that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and
duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name
and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as
attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for
sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim
in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and
their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers
is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire,
the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City.
We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through
his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the
testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires
burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150
meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but
because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question
is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan
was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his
co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he
must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded,
not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition
of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the
plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows: bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been
telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front,
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal case
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint,
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. either failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the
several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect
of the said driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned
public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the
bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and
Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was
the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances
obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are
the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX
back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's
the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural
area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said
rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside
help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor
were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known
that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither
the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier
come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the
amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to
include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial
court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them,
the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of merchandise
carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence, one
of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the
hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA and
GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari, petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corporation seeks a review of the decision 1
of respondent Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 1988, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from as modified by the order of October 27, 1982, is hereby
affirmed with the modification that appellant Aboitiz Shipping is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-
appellees the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana; actual damages of P9,800.00;
P150,000.00 for unearned income; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's parents; P20,000.00 as
moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the court a quo and adopted by respondent court, are
as follows: .
The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia,
owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having
purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh. 'B'). On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived
at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been
provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto
Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had
landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded
on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 (Exh. '2') between
the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa
was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of said vessel had
disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was
being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously
remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and
it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were
loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was
thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three (3) days thereafter, on May 15,
1975, the cause of his death according to the Death Certificate (Exh. "C") being "hypostatic
pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder" (See
also Exh. "B"). For his hospitalization, medical, burial and other miscellaneous expenses, Anacleto's
wife, herein plaintiff, spent a total of P9,800.00 (Exhibits "E", "E-1", to "E-5"). Anacleto Viana who
was only forty (40) years old when he met said fateful accident (Exh. 'E') was in good health. His
average annual income as a farmer or a farm supervisor was 400 cavans of palay annually. His
parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana, prior to his death had been recipient of
twenty (20) cavans of palay as support or P120.00 monthly. Because of Anacleto's death, plaintiffs
suffered mental anguish and extreme worry or moral damages. For the filing of the instant case,
they had to hire a lawyer for an agreed fee of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos. 2
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint 3 for damages against petitioner corporation (Aboitiz,
for brevity) for breach of contract of carriage.
In its answer. 4 Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel
was completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation (Pioneer, for
short) as the exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes
from the vessel of Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of
Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule.
Thereafter, Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-party complaint 5 against Pioneer imputing
liability thereto for Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly caused by the negligence of the
crane operator who was an employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control and supervision.
Pioneer, in its answer to the third-party complaint, 6 raised the defenses that Aboitiz had no cause of
action against Pioneer considering that Aboitiz is being sued by the Vianas for breach of contract of
carriage to which Pioneer is not a party; that Pioneer had observed the diligence of a good father of
a family both in the selection and supervision of its employees as well as in the prevention of damage
or injury to anyone including the victim Anacleto Viana; that Anacleto Viana's gross negligence was
the direct and proximate cause of his death; and that the filing of the third-party complaint was
premature by reason of the pendency of the criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence
filed against the crane operator, Alejo Figueroa.
In a decision rendered on April 17, 1980 by the trial court, 7 Aboitiz was ordered to pay the Vianas
for damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount the
latter paid the Vianas. The dispositive portion of said decision provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plantiffs:
(1) ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay to plaintiffs the sum of P12,000.00 for
the death of Anacleto Viana P9,800.00 as actual damages; P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans
of palay computed at P50.00 per cavan; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; F 5,000.00, value of the 100
cavans of palay as support for five (5) years for deceased (sic) parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio
and Gorgonia Viana computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's parents
computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of the Civil Code;
P20,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; and
(2) ordering the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation to reimburse defendant
and third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping Corporation the said amounts that it is ordered to pay to
herein plaintiffs.
Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for reconsideration wherein they similarly raised the
trial court's failure to declare that Anacleto Viana acted with gross negligence despite the
overwhelming evidence presented in support thereof. In addition, Aboitiz alleged, in opposition to
Pioneer's motion, that under the memorandum of agreement the liability of Pioneer as contractor is
automatic for any damages or losses whatsoever occasioned by and arising from the operation of its
arrastre and stevedoring service.
In an order dated October 27, 1982, 8 the trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the
Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case of negligence against the crane operator which
the court a quo ruled is never presumed, aside from the fact that the memorandum of agreement
supposedly refers only to Pioneer's liability in case of loss or damage to goods handled by it but not
in the case of personal injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly invoke the fellow-servant
rule simply because its liability stems from a breach of contract of carriage. The dispositive portion
of said order reads:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby modified insofar as third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation is concerned rendered in favor of the plaintiffs-,:
(1) Ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P12,000.00
for the death of Anacleto Viana; P9,000.00 (sic) as actual damages; P533,200.00 value of the
10,664 cavans of palay computed at P50.00 per cavan; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; P5,000.00
value of the 100 cavans of palay as support for five (5) years for deceased's parents, herein
plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana,computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for
deceased's parents computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of
the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; and
(2) Absolving third-party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation for (sic) any liability for the
death of Anacleto Viana the passenger of M/V Antonia owned by defendant third party plaintiff
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation it appearing that the negligence of its crane operator has not been
established therein.
Not satisfied with the modified judgment of the trial court, Aboitiz appealed the same to respondent
Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as to the amount of damages
awarded to the Vianas.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner Aboitiz postulates that respondent court erred:
(A) In holding that the doctrine laid down by this honorable Court in La Mallorca vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. (17 SCRA 739, July 27, 1966) is applicable to the case in the face of the undisputable
fact that the factual situation under the La Mallorca case is radically different from the facts
obtaining in this case;
(B) In holding petitioner liable for damages in the face of the finding of the court a quo and
confirmed by the Honorable respondent court of Appeals that the deceased, Anacleto Viana was
guilty of contributory negligence, which, We respectfully submit contributory negligence was the
proximate cause of his death; specifically the honorable respondent Court of Appeals failed to
apply Art. 1762 of the New Civil Code;
(C) In the alternative assuming the holding of the Honorable respondent Court of Appears that
petitioner may be legally condemned to pay damages to the private respondents we respectfully
submit that it committed a reversible error when it dismissed petitioner's third party complaint
against private respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation instead of compelling the latter to
reimburse the petitioner for whatever damages it may be compelled to pay to the private
respondents Vianas. 9
At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals found the
victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but holding that it was the negligence of
Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes
which was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
I. Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed from the time Anacleto Viana
disembarked from the vessel and that he was given more than ample opportunity to unload his
cargoes prior to the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no longer reasonable e
and he consequently ceased to be a passenger. Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine in La Mallorca
vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 10 is not applicable to the case at bar.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed
at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the
relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely
alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance
are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is
to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage
and prepare for his departure.12 The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the
fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person
remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.13
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the aforesaid case of La Mallorca was
enunciated, to wit:
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the
moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the
point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting
from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a
passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the
company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow
passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty,
returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues
to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad company and its agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not
unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Racquel, the child that she was, must have followed
the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus waiting for the
conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had
to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the
bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had
exercised the 'utmost diligence' of a 'very cautious person' required by Article 1755 of the Civil
Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. ... The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are,
therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their
contract of carriage. 14
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the
fact of the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of
time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of
common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore
precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other factors.
It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable
interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an
interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. The primary factor to be
considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near
the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the
passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other
common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of
passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as
compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at
least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a
bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily,
petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time
entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case
at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we
cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident.
When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every
right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its
passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their
baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the victim had already disembarked
from the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was
taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In consonance with common
shipping procedure as to the minimum time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark,
it may be presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his
baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's
premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one (1)
hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's
vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the
foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the
time of his tragic death.
II. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. 15 More
particularly, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances. 16 Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently. 17 This gives rise to an action for breach of contract
of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage
and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely
to his destination, 18 which, in the instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its
passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation subsists.
The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a passenger's death or injury the
operator of the vessel was at fault or negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and
it is incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State
to afford full protection to the passengers of common carriers which can be carried out only by
imposing a stringent statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this Court has likewise
adopted a rigid posture in the application of the law by exacting the highest degree of care and
diligence from common carriers, bearing utmost in mind the welfare of the passengers who often
become hapless victims of indifferent and profit-oriented carriers. We cannot in reason deny that
petitioner failed to rebut the presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining in the present case, it
cannot be gainsaid that petitioner had inadequately complied with the required degree of diligence
to prevent the accident from happening.
insufficient precautions which pale into insignificance if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of the danger
to which the deceased was exposed. There is no showing that petitioner was extraordinarily diligent
in requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to
subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation
can such perfunctory acts approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" to be
exercised "as far as human care and foresight can provide" which is required by law of common
carriers with respect to their passengers.
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still petitioner's aforesaid failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it could definitely have
prevented, the former's death. Moreover, in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar, 19 petitioner has
expressly conceded the factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals that petitioner did not present
sufficient evidence in support of its submission that the deceased Anacleto Viana was guilty of gross
negligence. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise.
No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by respondent court's declaration
that there was no negligence on the part of Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a confirmation of the
trial court's finding to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being absolved of any liability.
As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving the alleged gross negligence
of the victim, hence its present contention that the death of the passenger was due to the negligence
of the crane operator cannot be sustained both on grounds, of estoppel and for lack of evidence on
its present theory. Even in its answer filed in the court below it readily alleged that Pioneer had taken
the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears
to have been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise
inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten (10) months from the institution
of the suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary
diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers
like Aboitiz. This, of course, does not detract from what we have said that no negligence can be
imputed to Pioneer but, that on the contrary, the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence
for the safety of its passenger is the rationale for our finding on its liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums
around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the
alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably
established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that the victim and other
passengers were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with
serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the existence of the supposed cordon of drums loosely placed
around the unloading area and the guard's admonitions against entry therein, these were at most
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
G.R. No. L-82619 September 15, 1993
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO ZAPATOS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review in certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellant Court,1 now Court of Appeals, dated 28 February 1985, in AC-G.R. CV No. 69327 ("Pedro
Zapatos v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.") affirming the decision of the then Court of first Instance, now
Regional Trial Court, declaring Philippine Airlines, Inc., liable in damages for breach of contract.
On 25 November 1976, private respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract of
carriage2 against Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), before the then Court of First Instance, now Regional
Trial Court, of Misamis Occidental, at Ozamiz City. According to him, on 2 August 1976, he was among
the twenty-one (21) passengers of PAL Flight 477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City. The
routing of this flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato. While on flight and just about fifteen (15) minutes
before landing at Ozamiz City, the pilot received a radio message that the airport was closed due to
heavy rains and inclement weather and that he should proceed to Cotabato City instead.
Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their options to
return to Cebu on flight 560 of the same day and thence to Ozamiz City on 4 August 1975, or take the
next flight to Cebu the following day, or remain at Cotabato and take the next available flight to
Ozamiz City on 5 August 1975.3 The Station Agent likewise informed them that Flight 560 bound for
Manila would make a stop-over at Cebu to bring some of the diverted passengers; that there were
only six (6) seats available as there were already confirmed passengers for Manila; and, that the basis
for priority would be the check-in sequence at Cebu.
Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not accommodated because he checked-in as
passenger No. 9 on Flight 477. He insisted on being given priority over the confirmed passengers in
the accommodation, but the Station Agent refused private respondent's demand explaining that the
latter's predicament was not due to PAL's own doing but to be a force majeure.4
Private respondent tried to stop the departure of Flight 560 as his personal belongings, including a
package containing a camera which a certain Miwa from Japan asked him to deliver to Mrs. Fe Obid
of Gingoog City, were still on board. His plea fell on deaf ears. PAL then issued to private respondent
a free ticket to Iligan city, which the latter received under protest.5 Private respondent was left at the
airport and could not even hitch a ride in the Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel. 6 PAL neither
provided private respondent with transportation from the airport to the city proper nor food and
accommodation for his stay in Cotabato City.
The following day, private respondent purchased a PAL ticket to Iligan City. He informed PAL
personnel that he would not use the free ticket because he was filing a case against PAL.7 In Iligan
City, private respondent hired a car from the airport to Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, reaching
Ozamiz City by crossing the bay in a launch.8 His personal effects including the camera, which were
valued at P2,000.00 were no longer recovered.
On 13 January 1977, PAL filed its answer denying that it unjustifiably refused to accommodate private
respondent.9 It alleged that there was simply no more seat for private respondent on Flight 560 since
there were only six (6) seats available and the priority of accommodation on Flight 560 was based on
the check-in sequence in Cebu; that the first six (6) priority passengers on Flight 477 chose to take
Flight 560; that its Station Agent explained in a courteous and polite manner to all passengers the
reason for PAL's inability to transport all of them back to Cebu; that the stranded passengers agreed
to avail of the options and had their respective tickets exchanged for their onward trips; that it was
only the private respondent who insisted on being given priority in the accommodation; that pieces
of checked-in baggage and had carried items of the Ozamiz City passengers were removed from the
aircraft; that the reason for their pilot's inability to land at Ozamis City airport was because the
runway was wet due to rains thus posing a threat to the safety of both passengers and aircraft; and,
that such reason of force majeure was a valid justification for the pilot to bypass Ozamiz City and
proceed directly to Cotabato City.
On 4 June 1981, the trial court rendered its decision 10 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
Philippine AirLines, Inc. ordering the latter to pay:
(1) As actual damages, the sum of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) representing plaintiff's expenses
for transportation, food and accommodation during his stranded stay at Cotabato City; the sum of
Forty-Eight Pesos (P48.00) representing his flight fare from Cotabato City to Iligan city; the sum of
Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) representing plaintiff's transportation expenses from Iligan City to
Ozamiz City; and the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as loss of business opportunities
during his stranded stay in Cotabato City;
(2) As moral damages, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for plaintiff's hurt feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish and unkind and discourteous treatment perpetrated by
defendant's employees during his stay as stranded passenger in Cotabato City;
(3) As exemplary damages, the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to set a precedent to the
defendant airline that it shall provide means to give comfort and convenience to stranded
passengers;
(4) The sum of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) as attorney's fees;
(5) To pay the costs of this suit.
PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 28 February 1985, finding no reversible error,
affirmed the judgment of the court a quo. 11
PAL then sought recourse to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari 12 upon the
following issues: (1) Can the Court of Appeals render a decision finding petitioner (then defendant-
appellant in the court below) negligent and, consequently, liable for damages on a question of
substance which was neither raised on a question nor proved at the trial? (2) Can the Court of Appeals
award actual and moral damages contrary to the evidence and established jurisprudence? 13
An assiduous examination of the records yields no valid reason for reversal of the judgment on
appeal; only a modification of its disposition.
In its petition, PAL vigorously maintains that private respondent's principal cause of action was its
alleged denial of private respondent's demand for priority over the confirmed passengers on Flight
560. Likewise, PAL points out that the complaint did not impute to PAL neglect in failing to attend to
the needs of the diverted passengers; and, that the question of negligence was not and never put in
issue by the pleadings or proved at the trial.
Contrary to the above arguments, private respondent's amended complaint touched on PAL's
indifference and inattention to his predicament. The pertinent portion of the amended complaint 14
reads:
10. That by virtue of the refusal of the defendant through its agent in Cotabato to accommodate
(sic) and allow the plaintiff to take and board the plane back to Cebu, and by accomodating (sic)
and allowing passengers from Cotabato for Cebu in his stead and place, thus forcing the plaintiff
against his will, to be left and stranded in Cotabato, exposed to the peril and danger of muslim
rebels plundering at the time, the plaintiff, as a consequence, (have) suffered mental anguish,
mental torture, social humiliation, bismirched reputation and wounded feeling, all amounting to a
conservative amount of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos.
To substantiate this aspect of apathy, private respondent testified 15
A I did not even notice that I was I think the last passenger or the last person out of the PAL
employees and army personnel that were left there. I did not notice that when I was already
outside of the building after our conversation.
Q What did you do next?
A I banished (sic) because it seems that there was a war not far from the airport. The sound of guns
and the soldiers were plenty.
Q After that what did you do?
A I tried to look for a transportation that could bring me down to the City of Cotabato.
Q Were you able to go there?
A I was at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening more or less and it was a private jeep that I boarded. I
was even questioned why I and who am (sic) I then. Then I explained my side that I am (sic)
stranded passenger. Then they brought me downtown at Cotabato.
Q During your conversation with the Manager were you not offered any vehicle or transportation
to Cotabato airport downtown?
A In fact I told him (Manager) now I am by-passed passenger here which is not my destination what
can you offer me. Then they answered, "it is not my fault. Let us forget that."
Q In other words when the Manager told you that offer was there a vehicle ready?
A Not yet. Not long after that the Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel was passing by going to
the City of Cotabato and I stopped it to take me a ride because there was no more available
transportation but I was not accommodated.
Significantly, PAL did not seem to mind the introduction of evidence which focused on its alleged
negligence in caring for its stranded passengers. Well-settled is the rule in evidence that the protest
or objection against the admission of evidence should be presented at the time the evidence is
offered, and that the proper time to make protest or objection to the admissibility of evidence is
when the question is presented to the witness or at the time the answer thereto is given. 16 There
being no objection, such evidence becomes property of the case and all the parties are amenable to
any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. 17
PAL instead attempted to rebut the aforequoted testimony. In the process, it failed to substantiate
its counter allegation for want of concrete proof 18 —
Atty. Rubin O. Rivera — PAL's counsel:
Q You said PAL refused to help you when you were in Cotabato, is that right?
Private respondent:
A Yes.
Q Did you ask them to help you regarding any offer of transportation or of any other matter
asked of them?
A Yes, he (PAL PERSONNEL) said what is? It is not our fault.
Q Are you not aware that one fellow passenger even claimed that he was given Hotel
accommodation because they have no money?
xxx xxx xxx
A No, sir, that was never offered to me. I said, I tried to stop them but they were already riding
that PAL pick-up jeep, and I was not accommodated.
Having joined in the issue over the alleged lack of care it exhibited towards its passengers, PAL cannot
now turn around and feign surprise at the outcome of the case. When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 19
With regard to the award of damages affirmed by the appellate court, PAL argues that the same is
unfounded. It asserts that it should not be charged with the task of looking after the passengers'
comfort and convenience because the diversion of the flight was due to a fortuitous event, and that
if made liable, an added burden is given to PAL which is over and beyond its duties under the contract
of carriage. It submits that granting arguendo that negligence exists, PAL cannot be liable in damages
in the absence of fraud or bad faith; that private respondent failed to apprise PAL of the nature of his
trip and possible business losses; and, that private respondent himself is to be blamed for
unreasonably refusing to use the free ticket which PAL issued.
The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Being imbued with public interest, the law requires
common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. 20 In Air
France v. Carrascoso, 21 we held that —
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. And this, because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it
offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty . . .
. ( emphasis supplied).
The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting standard
required by law. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous
event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in
the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to
deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e.,
the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the carrier's premises. 22 Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise
extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded
passengers until they have reached their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed
considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City
and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place. As the appellate court correctly
ruled —
While the failure of plaintiff in the first instance to reach his destination at Ozamis City in
accordance with the contract of carriage was due to the closure of the airport on account of rain
and inclement weather which was radioed to defendant 15 minutes before landing, it has not been
disputed by defendant airline that Ozamis City has no all-weather airport and has to cancel its flight
to Ozamis City or by-pass it in the event of inclement weather. Knowing this fact, it becomes the
duty of defendant to provide all means of comfort and convenience to its passengers when they
would have to be left in a strange place in case of such by-passing. The steps taken by defendant
airline company towards this end has not been put in evidence, especially for those 7 others who
were not accommodated in the return trip to Cebu, only 6 of the 21 having been so
accommodated. It appears that plaintiff had to leave on the next flight 2 days later. If the cause of
non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a fortuitous event, it has to be the sole and only cause
(Art. 1755 CC., Art. 1733 C.C.) Since part of the failure to comply with the obligation of common
carrier to deliver its passengers safely to their destination lay in the defendant's failure to provide
comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using extra-ordinary diligence, the cause of
non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to fortuitous event, but due to something which
defendant airline could have prevented, defendant becomes liable to plaintiff. 23
While we find PAL remiss in its duty of extending utmost care to private respondent while being
stranded in Cotabato City, there is no sufficient basis to conclude that PAL failed to inform him about
his non-accommodation on Flight 560, or that it was inattentive to his queries relative thereto.
On 3 August 1975, the Station Agent reported to his Branch Manager in Cotabato City that —
3. Of the fifteen stranded passengers two pax elected to take F478 on August 05, three pax opted
to take F442 August 03. The remaining ten (10) including subject requested that they be instead
accommodated (sic) on F446 CBO-IGN the following day where they intended to take the surface
transportation to OZC. Mr. Pedro Zapatos had by then been very vocal and boiceterous (sic) at the
counter and we tactfully managed to steer him inside the Station Agent's office. Mr. Pedro Zapatos
then adamantly insisted that all the diverted passengers should have been given priority over the
originating passengers of F560 whether confirmed or otherwise. We explained our policies and
after awhile he seemed pacified and thereafter took his ticket (in-lieued (sic) to CBO-IGN, COCON
basis), at the counter in the presence of five other passengers who were waiting for their tickets
too. The rest of the diverted pax had left earlier after being assured their tickets will be ready the
following day. 24
Aforesaid Report being an entry in the course of business is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. Private respondent, apart from his testimony, did not offer any controverting evidence. If
indeed PAL omitted to give information about the options available to its diverted passengers, it
would have been deluged with complaints. But, only private respondent complained —
Atty. Rivera (for PAL)
Q I understand from you Mr. Zapatos that at the time you were waiting at Cotabato Airport for
the decision of PAL, you were not informed of the decision until after the airplane left is that
correct?
A Yes.
COURT:
Q What do you mean by "yes"? You meant you were not informed?
A Yes, I was not informed of their decision, that they will only accommodate few passengers.
Q Aside from you there were many other stranded passengers?
A I believed, yes.
Q And you want us to believe that PAL did not explain (to) any of these passengers about the
decision regarding those who will board the aircraft back to Cebu?
A No, Sir.
Q Despite these facts Mr. Zapatos did any of the other passengers complained (sic) regarding
that incident?
xxx xxx xxx
A There were plenty of argument and I was one of those talking about my case.
Q Did you hear anybody complained (sic) that he has not been informed of the decision before
the plane left for Cebu?
A No. 25
Admittedly, private respondent's insistence on being given priority in accommodation was
unreasonable considering the fortuitous event and that there was a sequence to be observed in the
booking, i.e., in the order the passengers checked-in at their port of origin. His intransigence in fact
was the main cause for his having to stay at the airport longer than was necessary.
Atty. Rivera:
Q And, you were saying that despite the fact that according to your testimony there were at least
16 passengers who were stranded there in Cotabato airport according to your testimony, and later
you said that there were no other people left there at that time, is that correct?
A Yes, I did not see anyone there around. I think I was the only civilian who was left there.
Q Why is it that it took you long time to leave that place?
A Because I was arguing with the PAL personnel. 26
Anent the plaint that PAL employees were disrespectful and inattentive toward private respondent,
the records are bereft of evidence to support the same. Thus, the ruling of respondent Court of
Appeals in this regard is without basis. 27 On the contrary, private respondent was attended to not
only by the personnel of PAL but also by its Manager." 28

In the light of these findings, we find the award of moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) unreasonably excessive; hence, we reduce the same to Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00). Conformably herewith, the award of exemplary damages is also reduced to five
Thousand Pesos (5,000.00). Moral damages are not intended to enrich the private respondent. They
are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action.
29

With regard to the award of actual damages in the amount of P5,000.00 representing private
respondent's alleged business losses occasioned by his stay at Cotabato City, we find the same
unwarranted. Private respondent's testimony that he had a scheduled business "transaction of shark
liver oil supposedly to have been consummated on August 3, 1975 in the morning" and that "since
(private respondent) was out for nearly two weeks I missed to buy about 10 barrels of shark liver
oil,"30 are purely speculative. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be duly
proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they
have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. 31

WHEREFORE the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification however that the award of
moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is reduced to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
while the exemplary damages of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is also reduced to Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00). The award of actual damages in the amount Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
representing business losses occasioned by private respondent's being stranded in Cotabato City is
deleted.

SO ORDERED.
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – FORCE MAJEURE
G.R. No. 85691 July 31, 1990
BACHELOR EXPRESS, INCORPORATED, and CRESENCIO RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division), RICARDO BETER, SERGIA BETER, TEOFILO
RAUTRAUT and ZOETERA RAUTRAUT, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City dismissing the private respondents' complaint
for collection of "a sum of money" and finding the petitioners solidarily liable for damages in the total
amount of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00). The petitioners also question the
appellate court's resolution denying a motion for reconsideration.
On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by Cresencio Rivera was
the situs of a stampede which resulted in the death of passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut.
The evidence shows that the bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City passing
Butuan City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger; that about
fifteen (15) minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused
commotion and panic among the passengers; that when the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio
Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of
head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. The
passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by the police.
Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein (Ricardo
Beter and Sergia Beter are the parents of Ornominio while Teofilo Rautraut and Zoetera [should be
Zotera] Rautraut are the parents of Narcisa) filed a complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor
Express, Inc. its alleged owner Samson Yasay and the driver Rivera.
In their answer, the petitioners denied liability for the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut. They alleged that ... the driver was able to transport his passengers safely to their
respective places of destination except Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off the
bus without the knowledge and consent, much less, the fault of the driver and conductor and the
defendants in this case; the defendant corporation had exercised due diligence in the choice of its
employees to avoid as much as possible accidents; the incident on August 1, 1980 was not a traffic
accident or vehicular accident; it was an incident or event very much beyond the control of the
defendants; defendants were not parties to the incident complained of as it was an act of a third
party who is not in any way connected with the defendants and of which the latter have no control
and supervision; ..." (Rollo, pp. 112-113).i•t•c-aüsl
After due trial, the trial court issued an order dated August 8, 1985 dismissing the complaint.
Upon appeal however, the trial court's decision was reversed and set aside. The dispositive portion
of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
finding the appellees jointly and solidarily liable to pay the plaintiffs-appellants the following
amounts:
1) To the heirs of Ornominio Beter, the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) in
loss of earnings and support, moral damages, straight death indemnity and attorney's fees; and,
2) To the heirs of Narcisa Rautraut, the amount of Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) for
straight death indemnity, moral damages and attorney's fees. Costs against appellees. (Rollo, pp.
71-72)
The petitioners now pose the following questions
What was the proximate cause of the whole incident? Why were the passengers on board the bus
panicked (sic) and why were they shoving one another? Why did Narcisa Rautraut and Ornominio
Beter jump off from the running bus?
The petitioners opine that answers to these questions are material to arrive at "a fair, just and
equitable judgment." (Rollo, p. 5) They claim that the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension
of facts and its conclusion is grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures.
As regards the proximate cause of the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, the petitioners
maintain that it was the act of the passenger who ran amuck and stabbed another passenger of the
bus. They contend that the stabbing incident triggered off the commotion and panic among the
passengers who pushed one another and that presumably out of fear and moved by that human
instinct of self-preservation Beter and Rautraut jumped off the bus while the bus was still running
resulting in their untimely death." (Rollo, p. 6) Under these circumstances, the petitioners asseverate
that they were not negligent in the performance of their duties and that the incident was completely
and absolutely attributable to a third person, the passenger who ran amuck, for without his criminal
act, Beter and Rautraut could not have been subjected to fear and shock which compelled them to
jump off the running bus. They argue that they should not be made liable for damages arising from
acts of third persons over whom they have no control or supervision.
Furthermore, the petitioners maintain that the driver of the bus, before, during and after the incident
was driving cautiously giving due regard to traffic rules, laws and regulations. The petitioners also
argue that they are not insurers of their passengers as ruled by the trial court.
The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of
carriage. The applicable provisions of law under the New Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
 xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
There is no question that Bachelor Express, Inc. is a common carrier. Hence, from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy Bachelor Express, Inc. is bound to carry its passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to
petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. and, while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries which caused
their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, petitioner Bachelor Express,
Inc. is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary
diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
Bachelor Express, Inc. denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut on its posture that the death
of the said passengers was caused by a third person who was beyond its control and supervision. In
effect, the petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault or negligence under the law,
states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused
by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common carrier did not have any control.
Article 1174 of the present Civil Code states:
Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulations, or when
the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable.
The above-mentioned provision was substantially copied from Article 1105 of the old Civil Code
which states"
No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were
inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those
in which the obligation itself imposes liability.
In the case of Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657 [1924]), we defined "events" which cannot be foreseen
and which, having been foreseen, are inevitable in the following manner:
... The Spanish authorities regard the language employed as an effort to define the term 'caso
fortuito' and hold that the two expressions are synonymous. (Manresa Comentarios al Codigo Civil
Español, vol. 8, pp. 88 et seq.; Scaevola, Codigo Civil, vol. 19, pp. 526 et seq.)
The antecedent to Article 1105 is found in Law II, Title 33, Partida 7, which defines caso fortuito as
'occasion que acaese por aventura de que non se puede ante ver. E son estos, derrivamientos de
casas e fuego que enciende a so ora, e quebrantamiento de navio, fuerca de ladrones' (An event
that takes place by incident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of
houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers ...)
Escriche defines caso fortuito as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be
foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning, compulsion,
insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other occurrences of a similar
nature.
In discussing and analyzing the term caso fortuito the Enciclopedia Juridica Española says: 'In a
legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the following
essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It
must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free
from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. (5) Enciclopedia
Juridica Española, 309)
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the
will of the obligor or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. ...
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a
commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole
exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing
them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is
within the context of force majeure.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it
is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove
that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. Thus, as early as 1912,
we ruled:
From all the foregoing, it is concluded that the defendant is not liable for the loss and damage of
the goods shipped on the lorcha Pilar by the Chinaman, Ong Bien Sip, inasmuch as such loss and
damage were the result of a fortuitous event or force majeure, and there was no negligence or
lack of care and diligence on the part of the defendant company or its agents. (Tan Chiong Sian v.
Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. 152 [1912]; Emphasis supplied).
This principle was reiterated in a more recent case, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (167 SCRA 379 [1988]), wherein we ruled:
... [F]or their defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper the accident must be due to natural
causes and exclusively without human intervention. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the next question to be determined is whether or not the petitioner's common carrier
observed extraordinary diligence to safeguard the lives of its passengers.
In this regard the trial court and the appellate court arrived at conflicting factual findings. Q When you said the conductor opened the door, the door at the front or rear portion of the
bus?
The trial court found the following facts: A Front door.
Q And these two persons whom you said alighted, where did they pass, the fron(t) door or rear
door?
The parties presented conflicting evidence as to how the two deceased Narcisa Rautruat and
A Front door.
Ornominio Beter met their deaths.
xxx xxx xxx
(Tsn., p. 4, Aug. 8, 1984)
However, from the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, the Court could not see why the two xxx xxx xxx
deceased could have fallen off the bus when their own witnesses testified that when the Q What happened after there was a commotion at the rear portion of the bus?
commotion ensued inside the bus, the passengers pushed and shoved each other towards the door A When the commotion occurred, I stood up and I noticed that there was a passenger who was
apparently in order to get off from the bus through the door. But the passengers also could not sounded (sic). The conductor panicked because the passengers were shouting 'stop, stop'. The
pass through the door because according to the evidence the door was locked. conductor opened the bus.'
(Tsn. p. 3, August 8, 1984).
On the other hand, the Court is inclined to give credence to the evidence adduced by the
defendants that when the commotion ensued inside the bus, the two deceased panicked and, in Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the deceased passengers jumped from the
state of shock and fear, they jumped off from the bus by passing through the window. window when it was entirely possible for them to have alighted through the door. The lower
court's reliance on the testimony of Pedro Collango, as the conductor and employee of the
It is the prevailing rule and settled jurisprudence that transportation companies are not insurers common carrier, is unjustified, in the light of the clear testimony of Leonila Cullano as the sole
of their passengers. The evidence on record does not show that defendants' personnel were uninterested eyewitness of the entire episode. Instead we find Pedro Collango's testimony to be
negligent in their duties. The defendants' personnel have every right to accept passengers absent infused by bias and fraught with inconsistencies, if not notably unreliable for lack of veracity. On
any manifestation of violence or drunkenness. If and when such passengers harm other passengers direct examination, he testified:
without the knowledge of the transportation company's personnel, the latter should not be
faulted. (Rollo, pp. 46-47) xxx xxx xxx
Q So what happened to the passengers inside your bus?
A Some of the passengers jumped out of the window.
A thorough examination of the records, however, show that there are material facts ignored by the COURT:
trial court which were discussed by the appellate court to arrive at a different conclusion. These Q While the bus was in motion?
circumstances show that the petitioner common carrier was negligent in the provision of safety A Yes, your Honor, but the speed was slow because we have just picked up a passenger.
precautions so that its passengers may be transported safely to their destinations. The appellate Atty. Gambe:
court states: Q You said that at the time of the incident the bus was running slow because you have just
picked up a passenger. Can you estimate what was your speed at that time?
A critical eye must be accorded the lower court's conclusions of fact in its tersely written ratio Atty. Calo:
decidendi. The lower court concluded that the door of the bus was closed; secondly, the No basis, your Honor, he is neither a driver nor a conductor.
passengers, specifically the two deceased, jumped out of the window. The lower court therefore COURT:
concluded that the defendant common carrier is not liable for the death of the said passengers Let the witness answer. Estimate only, the conductor experienced.
which it implicitly attributed to the unforeseen acts of the unidentified passenger who went Witness:
amuck. Not less than 30 to 40 miles.
COURT:
There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that the solitary door of the bus was
Kilometers or miles?
locked as to prevent the passengers from passing through. Leonila Cullano, testifying for the
A Miles.
defense, clearly stated that the conductor opened the door when the passengers were shouting
Atty. Gambe:
that the bus stop while they were in a state of panic. Sergia Beter categorically stated that she
Q That is only your estimate by your experience?
actually saw her son fall from the bus as the door was forced open by the force of the onrushing
A Yes, sir, estimate.
passengers.
(Tsn., pp. 4-5, Oct. 17, 1983).
Pedro Collango, on the other hand, testified that he shut the door after the last passenger had
At such speed of not less than 30 to 40 miles ..., or about 48 to 65 kilometers per hour, the speed
boarded the bus. But he had quite conveniently neglected to say that when the passengers had
of the bus could scarcely be considered slow considering that according to Collango himself, the
panicked, he himself panicked and had gone to open the door. Portions of the testimony of
bus had just come from a full stop after picking a passenger (Tsn, p. 4, Id.) and that the bus was
Leonila Cullano, quoted below, are illuminating:
still on its second or third gear (Tsn., p. 12, Id.).
xxx xxx xxx
 In the light of the foregoing, the negligence of the common carrier, through its employees,
consisted of the lack of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, in exercising vigilance
and utmost care of the safety of its passengers, exemplified by the driver's belated stop and the
reckless opening of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an appreciably fast speed.
At the same time, the common carrier itself acknowledged, through its administrative officer,
Benjamin Granada, that the bus was commissioned to travel and take on passengers and the public
at large, while equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its size and loading capacity, in
contravention of rules and regulations provided for under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code (RA 4136 as amended.) (Rollo, pp. 23-26)
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop the
bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the
bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked
and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly
equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome
the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves no
merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were
exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary
diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as warranted by law. (See
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra).
The petitioners also contend that the private respondents failed to show to the court that they are
the parents of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut respectively and therefore have no legal
personality to sue the petitioners. This argument deserves scant consideration. We find this
argument a belated attempt on the part of the petitioners to avoid liability for the deaths of Beter
and Rautraut. The private respondents were Identified as the parents of the victims by witnesses
during the trial and the trial court recognized them as such. The trial court dismissed the complaint
solely on the ground that the petitioners were not negligent.
Finally, the amount of damages awarded to the heirs of Beter and Rautraut by the appellate court is
supported by the evidence. The appellate court stated:
Ornominio Beter was 32 years of age at the time of his death, single, in good health and rendering
support and service to his mother. As far as Narcisa Rautraut is concerned, the only evidence
adduced is to the effect that at her death, she was 23 years of age, in good health and without
visible means of support.
In accordance with Art. 1764 in conjunction with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, and established
jurisprudence, several factors may be considered in determining the award of damages, namely:
1) life expectancy (considering the state of health of the deceased and the mortality tables are
deemed conclusive) and loss of earning capacity; (2) pecuniary loss, loss of support and service;
and (3) moral and mental suffering (Alcantara, et al. v. Surro, et al., 93 Phil. 470).
In the case of People v. Daniel (No. L-66551, April 25, 1985, 136 SCRA 92, at page 104), the High
Tribunal, reiterating the rule in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (31 SCRA 511), stated that
the amount of loss of earring capacity is based mainly on two factors, namely, (1) the number of
years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate at which the losses
sustained by the heirs should be fixed.
As the formula adopted in the case of Davila v. Philippine Air Lines, 49 SCRA 497, at the age of 30
one's normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years based on the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
(2/3 x 80-32).i•t•c-aüsl By taking into account the pace and nature of the life of a carpenter, it is
reasonable to make allowances for these circumstances and reduce the life expectancy of the
deceased Ornominio Beter to 25 years (People v. Daniel, supra). To fix the rate of losses it must be
noted that Art. 2206 refers to gross earnings less necessary living expenses of the deceased, in
other words, only net earnings are to be considered (People v. Daniel, supra; Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, supra).
Applying the foregoing rules with respect to Ornominio Beter, it is both just and reasonable,
considering his social standing and position, to fix the deductible, living and incidental expenses at
the sum of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) a month, or Four Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos
(P4,800.00) annually. As to his income, considering the irregular nature of the work of a daily wage
carpenter which is seasonal, it is safe to assume that he shall have work for twenty (20) days a
month at Twenty Five Pesos (P150,000.00) for twenty five years. Deducting therefrom his
necessary expenses, his heirs would be entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
representing loss of support and service (P150,000.00 less P120,000.00). In addition, his heirs are
entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as straight death indemnity pursuant to Article
2206 (People v. Daniel, supra). For damages for their moral and mental anguish, his heirs are
entitled to the reasonable sum of P10,000.00 as an exception to the general rule against moral
damages in case of breach of contract rule Art. 2200 (Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75). As attorney's
fees, Beter's heirs are entitled to P5,000.00. All in all, the plaintiff-appellants Ricardo and Sergia
Beter as heirs of their son Ornominio are entitled to an indemnity of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00).
In the case of Narcisa Rautraut, her heirs are entitled to a straight death indemnity of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), to moral damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) and Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees, or a total of Forty Five
Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) as total indemnity for her death in the absence of any evidence that
she had visible means of support. (Rollo, pp. 30-31)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision dated May 19, 1988 and
the resolution dated August 1, 1988 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TRANSPO – COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS – DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
G.R. No. 113003 October 17, 1997
ALBERTA YOBIDO and CRESENCIO YOBIDO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LENY TUMBOY, ARDEE TUMBOY and JASMIN TUMBOY, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the issue is whether
or not the explosion of a newly installed tire of a passenger vehicle is a fortuitous event that exempts
the carrier from liability for the death of a passenger.
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children named Ardee and Jasmin,
bearded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido Liner bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop Road in
Km. 17, Sta. Maria, Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus exploded. The bus fell into a ravine
around three (3) feet from the road and struck a tree. The incident resulted in the death of 28-year-
old Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers.
On November 21, 1988, a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney's fees
was filed by Leny and her children against Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio
Yobido, its driver, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. When the defendants therein filed
their answer to the complaint, they raised the affirmative defense of caso fortuito. They also filed a
third-party complaint against Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. This third-party
defendant filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim. At the pre-trial conference, the parties
agreed to a stipulation of facts.1
Upon a finding that the third party defendant was not liable under the insurance contract, the lower
court dismissed the third party complaint. No amicable settlement having been arrived at by the
parties, trial on the merits ensued.
The plaintiffs asserted that violation of the contract of carriage between them and the defendants
was brought about by the driver's failure to exercise the diligence required of the carrier in
transporting passengers safely to their place of destination. According to Leny Tumboy, the bus left
Mangagoy at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The winding road it traversed was not cemented and was
wet due to the rain; it was rough with crushed rocks. The bus which was full of passengers had
cargoes on top. Since it was "running fast," she cautioned the driver to slow down but he merely
stared at her through the mirror. At around 3:30 p.m., in Trento, she heard something explode and
immediately, the bus fell into a ravine.
For their part, the defendants tried to establish that the accident was due to a fortuitous event.
Abundio Salce, who was the bus conductor when the incident happened, testified that the 42-seater
bus was not full as there were only 32 passengers, such that he himself managed to get a seat. He
added that the bus was running at a speed of "60 to 50" and that it was going slow because of the
zigzag road. He affirmed that the left front tire that exploded was a "brand new tire" that he mounted
on the bus on April 21, 1988 or only five (5) days before the incident. The Yobido Liner secretary,
Minerva Fernando, bought the new Goodyear tire from Davao Toyo Parts on April 20, 1988 and she
was present when it was mounted on the bus by Salce. She stated that all driver applicants in Yobido
Liner underwent actual driving tests before they were employed. Defendant Cresencio Yobido
underwent such test and submitted his professional driver's license and clearances from the
barangay, the fiscal and the police.
On August 29, 1991, the lower court rendered a decision2 dismissing the action for lack of merit. On
the issue of whether or not the tire blowout was a caso fortuito, it found that "the falling of the bus
to the cliff was a result of no other outside factor than the tire blow-out." It held that the ruling in
the La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v. De Jesus3 that a tire blowout is "a mechanical defect of the
conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected
to a more thorough or rigid check-up before it took to the road that morning" is inapplicable to this
case. It reasoned out that in said case, it was found that the blowout was caused by the established
fact that the inner tube of the left front tire "was pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel
and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel." In this case, however, "the cause of the explosion
remains a mystery until at present." As such, the court added, the tire blowout was "a caso fortuito
which is completely an extraordinary circumstance independent of the will" of the defendants who
should be relieved of "whatever liability the plaintiffs may have suffered by reason of the explosion
pursuant to Article 11744 of the Civil Code."
Dissatisfied, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. They ascribed to the lower court the
following errors: (a) finding that the tire blowout was a caso fortuito; (b) failing to hold that the
defendants did not exercise utmost and/or extraordinary diligence required of carriers under Article
1755 of the Civil Code, and (c) deciding the case contrary to the ruling in Juntilla v. Fontanar,5 and
Necesito v. Paras.6
On August 23, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision 7 reversing that of the lower court.
It held that:
To Our mind, the explosion of the tire is not in itself a fortuitous event. The cause of the blow-out,
if due to a factory defect, improper mounting, excessive tire pressure, is not an unavoidable event.
On the other hand, there may have been adverse conditions on the road that were unforeseeable
and/or inevitable, which could make the blow-out a caso fortuito. The fact that the cause of the
blow-out was not known does not relieve the carrier of liability. Owing to the statutory
presumption of negligence against the carrier and its obligation to exercise the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons to carry the passenger safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, it is the burden of the defendants to prove that the cause of the blow-out was a fortuitous
event. It is not incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the cause of the blow-out is not caso-
fortuito.
Proving that the tire that exploded is a new Goodyear tire is not sufficient to discharge defendants'
burden. As enunciated in Necesito vs. Paras, the passenger has neither choice nor control over the
carrier in the selection and use of its equipment, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not
necessarily relieve the carrier from liability.
Moreover, there is evidence that the bus was moving fast, and the road was wet and rough. The
driver could have explained that the blow-out that precipitated the accident that caused the death
of Toto Tumboy could not have been prevented even if he had exercised due care to avoid the
same, but he was not presented as witness.
The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is set aside and another one entered ordering
defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Tito Tumboy, P30,000.00 in
moral damages, and P7,000.00 for funeral and burial expenses.
SO ORDERED.
The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision which was denied on November
4, 1993 by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant petition asserting the position that the tire
blowout that caused the death of Tito Tumboy was a caso fortuito. Petitioners claim further that the
Court of Appeals, in ruling contrary to that of the lower court, misapprehended facts and, therefore,
its findings of fact cannot be considered final which shall bind this Court. Hence, they pray that this
Court review the facts of the case.
The Court did re-examine the facts and evidence in this case because of the inapplicability of the
established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be
reviewed on appeal by this Court. This general principle is subject to exceptions such as the one
present in this case, namely, that the lower court and the Court of Appeals arrived at diverse factual
findings.8 However, upon such re-examination, we found no reason to overturn the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks incidental to the mode of
travel he has taken. After all, a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not bound
absolutely and at all events to carry them safely and without injury.9 However, when a passenger is
injured or dies while travelling, the law presumes that the common carrier is negligent. Thus, the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1755 provides that "(a) common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a
due regard for all the circumstances." Accordingly, in culpa contractual, once a passenger dies or is
injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This disputable
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier had observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733,10 1755 and 1756 of the Civil Code or that the death or injury
of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.11 Consequently, the court need not make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for damages sought by
the passenger.12
In view of the foregoing, petitioners' contention that they should be exempt from liability because
the tire blowout was no more than a fortuitous event that could not have been foreseen, must fail.
A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be
independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as
to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obliger
must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.13 As
Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire
exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.14
Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a
fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire was new
did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted
on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name
noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days' use. Be that
as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the
negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for
damages.15
Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous
event alone. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or
injury resulting from an accident.16 This Court has had occasion to state:
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were
still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence
was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions
were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The
sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the
tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the
accident.17
It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor, Salce, that the bus was
running at "60-50" kilometers per hour only or within the prescribed lawful speed limit. However,
they failed to rebut the testimony of Leny Tumboy that the bus was running so fast that she cautioned
the driver to slow down. These contradictory facts must, therefore, be resolved in favor of liability in
view of the presumption of negligence of the carrier in the law. Coupled with this is the established
condition of the road — rough, winding and wet due to the rain. It was incumbent upon the defense
to establish that it took precautionary measures considering partially dangerous condition of the
road. As stated above, proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not sufficient proof that it
was not negligent. Petitioners should have shown that it undertook extraordinary diligence in the
care of its carrier, such as conducting daily routinary check-ups of the vehicle's parts. As the late
Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:
It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the strength of
each and every part of its vehicles before each trip; but we are of the opinion that a due
regard for the carrier's obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate
periodical tests to determine the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the
failure of which may endanger the safety of the passengers.18
Having failed to discharge its duty to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and
convincing evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for damages. Article 1764 19 in relation to
Article 220620 of the Civil Code prescribes the amount of at least three thousand pesos as damages
for the death of a passenger. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award of damages under Article
2206 has been increased to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).21
Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except when bad faith had been
proven. However, the same damages may be recovered when breach of contract of carriage results
in the death of a passenger,22 as in this case. Exemplary damages, awarded by way of example or
correction for the public good when moral damages are awarded,23 may likewise be recovered in
contractual obligations if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner.24 Because petitioners failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of
a common carrier, which resulted in the death of Tito Tumboy, it is deemed to have acted recklessly. 25
As such, private respondents shall be entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification
that petitioners shall, in addition to the monetary awards therein, be liable for the award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.