1sod Civil

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Case San Beda College of Law

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
RDigests
EMEDIAL LAW
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES
CIVIL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; As long as one (or more) of the accused is an official of the
executive branch occupying position otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive
original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officials whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees in relation to
their office
Public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice under
Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense alleged
to have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such that the offense may not have been
committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. What determines the
jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the information. The averment in the information that petitioner Rodriguez, as municipal mayor,
took advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the lumber to the municipal hall to obstruct
the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705 effectively vested jurisdiction over the
offense on the Sandiganbayan. [RODRIGUEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 141710. March 3,
2004]
RTC has no jurisdiction over cases involving seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods
The Supreme Court held that there is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of
any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings.
The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of
dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such
matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of
Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act Creating the Court of Tax
Appeals,” specify the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues
raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to
the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals. [R.V. MARZAN
FREIGHT, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 128064. March 4, 2004]
Jurisdiction; Under B.P Blg. 129, the RTC and the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction or in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari and prohibition; However there must still be compliance with the hierarchy
of courts; Compliance with the hierarchy of courts may be relaxed for special and important
reasons
The Court agrees that under B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC and the CA, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction or in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari and prohibition. However, People v. Cuaresma, it was emphasized that this
concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefore will be
directed. We added that:There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of
the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petition for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
REMEDIAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Jinky Uy EDP’S: Martessa Nuylan, Charissimae Ventura, Jocelyn Zabala, Kyle Vaflor, Alexander Flores, Edsel Duque, Victoria Ibaviosa,
Coleen Cometa SUBJECT HEADS: Jona Obiña (Civil Procedure), Alnaiza Hassiman (Special Civil Action and Special Proceedings), Jeenice de Sagun
(Criminal
Procedure), Elaine Masukat (Evidence) DIGEST POOL: Nina Abania, Sam Aceret, Joan Alas, Jinky Anarna, Bon Augustin, Aimee Baldo, Angeline Belza, Ian
Camara, Riz Cimafranca, Paul Cunano, Remegio Dayandayan, Legelyn de Asis, Christine Dionela, Joyce Domingo, Dalisay Esclamado, Joyce Gaballo, JB
Gayona, Bea Geronilla, Mean Gutierrez, Andre Jacobo, Ydang Kintanar, Yvette Labrador, Geoff Llarena, Don Luna, Mildred Mabanglo, Uella Mancenido,
Cres Mayor, Yoyie Mendita, Kla Natanauan, Roviel Nepomuceno, Mae Nery, Kang Pondemira, Jojo Rovero, Ronald Sandoval, Shirley Mae Tabangcura,
Cat Vanilla, Jerlyn Wong, Lynvic Wong.
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San Beda College of Law Case
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS RDigests
EMEDIAL LAW
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level court should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. The
compliance with the hierarchy of courts may be relaxed for special and important reasons, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. However, no such reasons were set forth in the petition to
justify the petitioner's filing thereof in the Court of Appeals instead of the RTC. That the latter
court had decided her appeal in the unlawful detainer case and affirmed the decision of the MTC
which, in turn, ordered the eviction of the petitioner from the property, is not a justification to
bypass the RTC and file the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. [ADVINCULA-VELASQUEZ
vs. COURT OF APPEALS G .R. No. 111387 and G. R. No. 127497, June 8, 2004]
LACHES
Laches; Though laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved
positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in
the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss.
The settled rule is that the purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it,
including the period of prescription, is to be determined by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint
unmistakably assail the extrajudicial settlement and deed of sale with respect to their share on the
ground of absence of consent. [FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORP. vs. HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO
BABA G.R. No. 138945. August 19, 2003.]
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own
right to speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It
is fair to assume that he would have continued to sleep on his right – a situation amounting to
laches. – had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion
of the record and of the ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case.
Petitioner herein failed seasonably to assert his constitutional right to a speedy disposition
of his case. During the 8-year period, prior to the April 19, 2002 conference between the parties,
petitioner did not complain about the long delay in deciding his case. It was only after the missing
TSN's were brought to his attention that petitioner showed an interest in the termination of his
case. [JAIME T. BERNAT vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 158018 May 20, 2004]
DUTY OF THE TRIAL COUT TO ISSUE WRIT OF POSSESSION
Duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial.

The SC has consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is
ministerial. Such writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left to the trial court. Any question regarding
the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be
determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act 3135. Such question cannot
be raised to oppose the issuance of the writ, since the proceeding is ex parte. The recourse is
available even before the expiration of the redemption period provided by law and the Rules of
Court. [SAMSON vs. RIVERA G.R. NO. 154355 May 20, 2004]
SUMMARY PROCEDURE
Enforcement of judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer case; Cases of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer are summary in nature; Technicalities or details of procedure which
may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided; No need for sheriffs and lawyer to
secure a break open order where the character of the writ in their hands authorized them if
necessary to break open the apartment, if they could not otherwise execute its command.
The name of the process commonly resorted to by the successful party in an action of
ejectment, for the purpose of being placed by the sheriff in the actual possession of the land
recovered is called a HABERE FACIAS POSSESSIONEM. No need for sheriffs and respondent lawyer to
secure a break open order where the character of the writ in their hands authorized them if
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

Maricel Abarentos (Over-all Chairperson), Ronald Jalmanzar (Over-all Vice Chair), Yolanda Tolentino (VC-Acads), Jennifer Ang (VC- Secretariat),
Joy Inductivo (VC-Finance), Elaine Masukat (VC-EDP), Anna Margarita Eres (VC-Logistics) Jonathan Mangundayao (Political Law), Francis
Benedict Reotutar (Labor Law),
Romuald Padilla (Civil Law), Charmaine Torres (Taxation Law), Mark David Martinez (Criminal Law), Garny Luisa Alegre (Commercial Law), Jinky Uy
(Remedial Law), Jackie Lou Bautista (Legal Ethics)
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necessary to break open the apartment, if they could not otherwise execute its command. Cases of
forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order
which must be restored as promptly as possible, and, accordingly, technicalities or details of
procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. Hence, when an officer
duly qualified to act under a writ of execution in an ejectment case should be obstructed by a lock
or a latch, he is not expected to lie in wait around the premises until such time as the tenants
arrive. He has the right to employ force necessary to enable him to enter the house and enforce
the judgment. If the rule were otherwise, and as experience has shown, the prevailing party will be
at the mercy of his adversary who will stop at nothing to thwart execution. It is only when there is
no occupant in the premises that the sheriff may lawfully cause a demolition without the need of
securing a “break-open order.” [SEVERINO NICDAO vs. SILVESTRE J. ESGUERRA, Sheriff IV. A.M.
No. P-03-1718. March 11, 2004]
AMICABLE SETTLEMENT
Generally, the rule is that where no repudiation was made during the 10-day period, the
amicable settlement attains the status of finality and it becomes the ministerial duty of the
court to implement and enforce it. However, such rule is not inflexible for it admits of certain
exceptions.
Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, an amicable settlement shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment of the court upon the expiration of 10 days from the date
thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to nullify the award has
been filed before the proper court
Generally, the rule is that where no repudiation was made during the 10-day period, the
amicable settlement attains the status of finality and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court
to implement and enforce it. However, such rule is not inflexible for it admits of certain
exceptions. In Santos v. Judge Isidro, the Court observed that special and exceptional
circumstances, the imperatives of substantial justice, or facts that may have transpired after the
finality of judgment which would render its execution unjust, may warrant the suspension of
execution of a decision that has become final and executory. In the case at bar, the ends of justice
would be frustrated if a writ of execution is issued considering the uncertainty of the object of
the agreement. To do so would open the possibility of error and future litigation. [PROCESO
QUIROS et.al. vs. MARCELO ARJONA et.al. G.R. No. 158901. March 9, 2004]
RULE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS
Litigation should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits.

Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. After all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to insure that the
substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided
on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. In
the case before the CA, what is involved is no less than the petitioner’s liberty. [FABRIGAR vs.
PEOPLE G.R. No. 150122. February 6, 2004]
Retroactivity of procedural rules; Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the
rules of procedure.
In Systems Factors Corporation v. NLRC, this Court declared that the amendment
introduced under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC is procedural or remedial in character, as it does not create
new or remove vested rights, but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
rights already existing. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
In the present case, when the amendment providing that when a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is filed, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion
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took effect on September 1, 2000, the petition for certiorari before the CA was still pending and
undetermined. Having thus concluded, the Court need not take up the other issues raised.
EMBASSY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND SIROS SOLATI vs. FOP CORPORATION et.al.
G.R. No. 145043. February 13, 2004]
RULE 2 CAUSE OF ACTION
Cause of action; The rule is that where the issues have become moot, there is no justiciable
controversy.
The petition is dismissed for being moot. Baggenstos does not dispute that the trial court's
judgment had become final and executory. This is so because Baggenstos failed to avail of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief to set aside the judgment. Neither
does Baggenstos question the levy on execution and subsequent sale at public auction of her lot
covered by TCT No. 171720 to Magno in satisfaction of the trial court's judgment. Baggenstos' sole
purpose in filing the petitions before the Court of Appeals and this Court is to protect and shield
her other property covered by TCT No. 96923 from the execution proceedings. [ELIZA FRANCISCO
BAGGENSTOS vs. CA G.R. No. 125560. December 4, 2003.]
Courts will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved.
An issue is said to have become moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. Considering
that it is petitioner that filed herein petition for review on certiorari for the ultimate purpose of
enforcing the final and executory decision of the Regional Trial Court and considering that the
subject property had been acquired by petitioner in view of the auction sale conducted by the City
Government of Makati for realty tax delinquencies, the issues raised in the petition had become
moot and academic. If there is any problem with the proceeds of the sale of the subject property
insofar as Philfinance and its creditors are concerned, the latter may raise and claim their
respective rights to the proceeds of the sale in an appropriate case and in the right forum, not in
the present petition. [BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK vs. HON. FLORENTINO A.
TUAZON, JR. G.R. No. 132795. March 10, 2004]
RULE 3 PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest;
definition.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. A real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. This means that the action must be brought by the person
who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced. [TAN vs. CA G.R. No. 127210
August 7, 2003] See Also SPOUSES PASCUAL vs. CA G.R.No. 115925, AUGUST 15, 2003.
Real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Regardless of the fact that the respondent was not the loan applicant with the UCPB and PDB,
as the registered owner of the property whose ownership had been unlawfully disturbed and limited
by the unlawful annotation of notice of levy on his TCT, the respondent had the legal standing to
file the said action for damages. [UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK vs. RAMOS, G.R. No. 147800
November 11, 2003]
Real party in interest; An association has standing to complain of injuries to its members
despite of its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action.

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In this case, the respondent filed a petition for declaratory relief for and in behalf of its eleven
(11) licensed and registered recruitment agencies which are its members, and which approved
separate resolutions expressly authorizing the respondents to file the said suit for and in their
behalf. The respondent is but a medium through which its individual members seek to make more
effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. However, the
respondent has no locus standi to file a petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers as it even
failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. [EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. CA G.R. No.
131719 May 25, 2004] See Also TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR vs. SPOUSES PABLO G.R. No.
150159. July 25, 2003.
Rule 3 Section 1; Capacity to sue; An association is considered a juridical person if the law
grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members.
Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Article 44 25 of the Civil Code
enumerates the various classes of juridical persons. Under said Article, an association is considered
a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members.
The members cannot represent their association in any suit without valid and legal authority.
Neither can their signatures confer on the association any legal capacity to sue. Mere allegations of
membership in a federation are insufficient and inconsequential. Facts showing the capacity of a
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or
the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred.
[GLORIA SANTOS DUEÑAS vs. SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION. G.R. No.
149417 June 4, 2004]
RULE 6 KINDS OF PLEADINGS
Compulsory counterclaim will not remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
The SC said that there was nothing for Aledo to appeal from, for the counterclaim of
petitioners, which was compulsory, hence, could not remain pending for independent adjudication
by the court, was, along with Aledo's complaint, dismissed on the counterclaimant-defendants'
motion on March 1, 1991. The trial court's Order of April 16, 1991 clarifying that only Alejo's
"original complaint" was dismissed and accordingly giving due course to petitioners' counterclaim
was thus null and void. It being void ab initio, the Order of April 16, 1991 had no legality from its
inception, and the decision of the trial court against the plaintiff Aledo was itself void as it
emanated from a void order. [SPS. ANGEL vs. SIMPLICIO ALEDO et.al. G.R. No. 145031. January
22, 2004]
General rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in
a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient; Except where it is highly
impractical to require all the plaintiffs to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping, signature
of one of the plaintiffs, acting as representative, is substantial compliance, provided that the
plaintiffs share a common interest in the subject matter of the case or filed the case as a
"collective," raising only one common cause of action or defense
The strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed
with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not thereby prohibit substantial
compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. [HLC CONSTRUCTION vs. EMILY
HOMES SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION. G.R. No. 139360. September 23, 2003.]
Answer; A counter- affidavit can be treated as an answer when the requirements of Rule 8 are
substantially complied with
The requirements of the Rules that the Answer shall set forth the defenses and the
objections of the defendants including the compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim (Section 4, Rule
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6; Sections 1 and 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) specifically denying the material
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit (Section 10, Rule 8, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) were substantially complied with by the counter affidavit filed by the petitioners on
time. This counter affidavit should have been considered as petitioners' Answer without giving
premium on matters of form thereby serving the interest of substantial justice. [SPS. ROGELIO &
CONCHITA JALIQUE vs. SPS. EPIFANIO & JULIETA DANDAN, et.al. G.R. No. 148305. November
28, 2003]
RULE 8 MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS
Rule 8 Section 10; Admissions or denials in the answer should be considered in their entirety
and not truncated parts
Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, as amended, require a defendant to specify each material
allegations of fact, the truth of which he does not admit, and whenever practicable, to set forth
the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires
to deny part of an averment for a qualification thereof, he is mandated to specify so much of the
averment as true and material and shall deny the remainder. If a defendant is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint,
he is bound to so state and this shall have the effect of a denial. In such a case, it is indispensable
that the matter regarding where lack of knowledge is alleged be clearly set forth so that the
adverse party is informed of what is denied. The purpose of requiring the defendant to make a
specific denial is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the complaint which he
succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he relied upon to
support the denial. [PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS. G.R. No. 126153.
January 14, 2004]
RULE 9 EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
Sec 3 (e) Rule 9 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure, as amended, where the defending party
fails to file his or her answer to the petition, the trial court should order the prosecutor to
intervene for the State by conducting an investigation the presence of collusion between the
parties
Also, pursuant to Sec 3 (e) Rule 9 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure, as amended, where
the defending party fails to file his or her answer to the petition, the trial court should order the
prosecutor to intervene for the State by conducting an investigation the presence of collusion
between the parties. And assuming arguendo that there was an answer filed by respondent, still,
the hearing of the case on May 2 and #, 2001 is a procedural flaw. As stated at the outset,
respondent received the notice of hearing only on May 8, 2001. So how could she be present in
court on may 2 and 3? A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or
collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding
where it was invoked. [JUDGE MARIANO MACIAS VS. MARGIE MACIAS. G.R. No. 149617,
September 3,2003]
Case for partition and an action for quieting of title have identical causes of action and can
therefore be the subject of res judicata
Petitioners filed an action to quiet title for the sole purpose of claiming for themselves
exclusive ownership of Lot 4389. On the other hand, in the case for partition filed by respondents,
petitioners set up the defense of sole dominion in order to frustrate the equal division of the
property between the heirs of Felix and Juana. Considering the similarity of petitioners’ defense in
this case with their main averment in the case for quieting of title, petitioners are barred by res
judicata from claiming sole ownership of Lot 4389. RES JUDICATA cannot be waived by a party
because the time and energy of the State and the taxpayers are wasted by the re-litigation of
settled issues. That is the reason why, under Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial
court may dismiss a case motu proprio on grounds of res judicata although it is not raised, and
apparently waived, in a motion to dismiss or answer. Conversely, a plaintiff, or the trial court
itself, may invoke res judicata to resist a defense barred by prior judgment even after trial on the

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merits. [HEIRS OF JUANA GAUDIANE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF FELIX GAUDIANE
G.R. No. 119879. March 11, 2004]
RULE 10 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Amendment to conform to evidence

As provided for in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, when issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. A scrutiny of the pleadings filed by
respondents reveal that none of them denied petitioner’s claim that said evidence was presented
before the trial court without objections having been raised by respondents. None of them claimed
that they raised any objections at the time when petitioner presented its evidence to prove its
payment to PNB. [PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION VS.
PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURES, INC. G.R. NO. 120384 JANUARY 13, 2004]
RULE 13 FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS, AND OTHER PAPERS
Rule 13, Section 8, of the Rules of Court provides that service by registered mail is complete
upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office
within five (5) days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect
at the expiration of such time.
In the case at bar, there is no postmaster's certification that the registered mail was
unclaimed by the addressee and thus returned to the sender, after first notice was sent to and
received by addressee on a specified date. Absent such notice, the disputable presumption of
completeness of service does not arise and by implication, respondent judge could not presume
actual receipt by addressee.[TY vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK G.R. Nos.
149797-98 February 13, 2004.]
Rule 13,Section 13: Affidavit of Service; Although the petition filed before the Court of Appeals
was not accompanied by an affidavit of service, petitioners were able to confirm that indeed
copies of the petition were served on the;
In the case at bar, although the petition filed before the Court of Appeals was not
accompanied by an affidavit of service, petitioners were able to confirm that indeed copies of the
petition were served on the respondents as shown in the registry receipts attached opposite their
names. They attached the certified true copies of the Decision and Order of the Ombudsman when
they filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dismissing their petition. [AÑONUEVO,
JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 152998. September 23, 2003]
RULE 14 SUMMONS
Rule 14, Section 7;To resolve whether there was valid service of summons on respondents, the
nature of the action filed against them must first be determined;
When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the State is essential
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person; exception;
Rule 14, Section 5; Alias summons may be issued when the original summons is returned
without being served on any or all of the defendants
Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and, when the
proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the
parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional
requirement of due process.

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When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the State is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This cannot be done if the defendant
is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An EXCEPTION
was accorded in Gemperle vs. Schenker wherein service of summons through the non-resident’s
wife, who was a resident of the Philippines, was held valid, as the latter was his representative and
attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by the non-resident, and the second case was merely an
offshoot of the first case. [GOMEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS. G.R. No. 127692. March 10, 2004]
RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS
Res Judicata; Elements; For res judicata to apply, all the elements must exist
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on
all points and matters determined in the former suit.
The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be
final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there must be, between the first
and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.
There is identity of parties where the parties in both actions are the same or there is privity
between them or they are successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. [LUZ
TAGANAS AND ALENTIN TABBAL VS. HON. MELITON EMUSLAN G.R. No. 146980, September 2,
2003]
Forum shopping; Simultaneous resort to the SC by means of their Petition for Review on
Certiorari and the CA through their Manifestation and Motion constitutes forum shopping;
forum shopping is consummated although the court in which one of the suits was brought has
no jurisdiction over the action.
Sec. 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the CA explicitly provides that “no motion for
reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has already filed in the SC a
petition for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such action. If such
action is subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court (CA) shall be
deemed abandoned”. Verily, although a motion for reconsideration is still before the CA, the
motion is deemed vacated once the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked. Parenthetically, forum
shopping is consummated although the court in which one of the suits was brought has no
jurisdiction over the action. [TOP RATE CONSTRUCTION VS. PAXTON DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION G.R. No. 151081. September 11, 2003]
Forum shopping; Admission in the certification against forum shopping of the pendency of the
certiorari case with the Court of Appeals will not remove her petition from the effects of res
judicata or litis pendentia
In the case at bar, the parties to the instant petition and in the one filed with the Court of
Appeals are identical. The rights asserted are the same, i.e., to maintain peaceful possession of the
disputed lot pending final adjudication of the case. Likewise, similar reliefs are prayed for — to
nullify the order of execution pending appeal and the writ of demolition, such reliefs being founded
on the same facts — the ejectment case filed with the trial court. A judgment in the present
certiorari case on the validity of the order of execution pending appeal and the writ of demolition
will pre-empt and amount to res judicata on the petition for review before the Court of Appeals,
questioning, inter alia, the legality of the same order and writ with prayer for an award of
damages. [PARADERO vs. ABRAGAN G.R. No. 158917. March 1, 2004] See Also UNITED SPECIAL
WATCHMAN AGENCY vs. CA G.R. No. 152476 July 8, 2003.

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Forum shopping; The rule on forum shopping applies where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Res
judicata applies only where judgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first. Preliminary
injunction: Case law has it that a writ of preliminary injunction will not issue if the act sought
to be enjoined is a fait accompli.
The rule on forum shopping applies where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Res judicata applies
only where judgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first. In this case, the RTC dismissed
outright the private respondents’ petition for certiorari for failing to append certified copies of the
assailed orders of the MTC in the unlawful detainer case. Hence, there was as yet no judgment of
the case on the merits. Moreover, the respondents did not file a second petition or complaint, but
merely an URGENT MOTION with the CA in the action for annulment of the deed of conditional sale
for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the
MTC. [DAVID VS. SPOUSES ROD G. R. No. 145284. February 11, 2004] See Also SK REALTY, INC.
vs. UY G.R. No. 144282. June 8, 2004.
Forum shopping; Well-settled is the rule that litis pendentia requires only substantial, and not
absolute, identity of parties. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community
of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter
was not impleaded in the first case.
Well-settled is the rule that LITIS PENDENTIA requires only substantial, and not absolute,
identity of parties. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of
interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter
was not impleaded in the first case. We have also held that the fact that the position of the
parties was reversed, the plaintiffs in the first case being the defendants in the second case or vice
versa, does not negate the identity of parties for the purpose of litis pendentia.
In this particular intra-corporate dispute, notwithstanding absence of absolute identity of
parties, the contending parties represent the interests of the same block of stockholders on
opposing sides. Regardless of which party would be ultimately successful in this case or in Civil Case
No. 01-207, the issue of the validity of TF Ventures, Inc.'s increase in capital stock would be
threshed out in both cases, and the decision therein would amount to res judicata in the other
case, on that particular issue. [TF VENTURES, INC vs. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA. G.R. No. 154177.
June 9, 2004]
Forum shopping; requisites; It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. The three ELEMENTS FOR LITIS
PENDENTIA as a ground for dismissal of an action are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties who represent the same interest in both; actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity, with respect
to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, is such that any judgment that may be rendered
in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other. [DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. PINGOL LAND TRANSPORT SYSTEM COMPANY, INC G.R. No.
145908. January 22, 2004]
RULE 18 PRE-TRIAL
Rule that pre- trial is mandatory admits of exceptions

Pre-trial in the new rules of civil procedure is now mandatory such that the failure of a
party to appear at pre-trial is deemed to be a waiver of his right to present evidence in his behalf.
The seeming severity of the rule notwithstanding, it, nevertheless, is not unyielding. Like all rules
of procedure, it admits of exceptions for valid and justifiable reasons.

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An out-of-town hearing, expending, as it so does, more than the usual time, energy, resources and
personnel than would ordinarily be required, might indeed make it prudent for the law firm to first
ascertain and confirm, as much as it can be helped, the court schedule and trial. The firm’s
counsel, through long-distance telephone communication, was able to converse the branch clerk of
court, who, after conferring with respondent judge, confirmed the postponement of the pre-trial
and the filing of the pre-trial brief in view of the motion to defer the proceedings and the pending
appeal of petitioner. Such was confirmed by the respondent judge himself. [BAHIA SHIPPING
SERVICES, INC. vs. MOSQUERA G.R. No. 153432. February 18, 2004]
RULE 19 INTERVENTION
Rule 19; Intervention; In exceptional cases intervention may be allowed despite rendition of
judgment by the Supreme Court
The RULE ON INTERVENTION, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the
powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a
comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the
filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding
the rendition of the judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when
the petition for review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme
Court. [ALBERTO PINLAC VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 91468, September 10,
2003]
RULE 35 SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment; To forestall summary judgment, it is essential for the non-moving party to
confirm the existence of genuine issues where he has substantial, plausible and fairly arguable
defense
Summary judgment “is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of the litigation.” The crucial question in a motion for summary
judgment is whether the issues raised in the pleadings are genuine or fictitious, as shown by
affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion. A genuine issue means “an issue of
fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious
or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.” [SPOUSES EVANGELISTA vs.
MERCATOR FINANCE CORP G.R. No. 148864. August 21, 2003]
Summary judgment may be rendered after a summary hearing if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that (1) except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment is a procedural device designed for the prompt disposition of actions
in which the pleadings raise only a legal, not a genuine, issue regarding any material fact.
Consequently, facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is yet no admission,
disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are set forth in the answer,
but the issues are fictitious as shown by the pleadings, depositions or admissions. A summary
judgment may be applied for by either a claimant or a defending party. [GARCIA vs. LLAMAS. G.R.
No. 154127. December 8, 2003]
RULE 37 NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
Rule 37; A motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new evidence
It is implicitly clear from Rule 37 that a motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a
vehicle to introduce new evidence. Petitioners correctly contend that if respondents wanted to
present further evidence, they should have filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. HOWEVER, for newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial, (a) it must have been
discovered after trial, (b) it could not have been discovered or produced at the trial despite
reasonable diligence, (c) it must be material and not merely collateral, cumulative, corroborative

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or purely for impeaching a witness, merely important evidence being not enough, and (d) if
presented, would probably alter the result of the action. [CANSINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.
No. 125799. August 21, 2003]
Rule 37, Section 1; A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence may indeed be
filed after judgment, but within the period for perfecting an appeal.
Rule 37, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides that a motion for
new trial should be made "within the period for taking an appeal." Instead, what the record shows
is that petitioners, in effect, only asked for a new trial after the appellate court had rendered its
decision on appeal. Such a situation is definitely not permissible under the Rules. It is well
accepted that a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence may indeed be filed after
judgment, but within the period for perfecting an appeal. [SPOUSES ALFARERO vs. SPOUSES
PETRA G.R. No. 142974. September 22, 2003]
RULE 38 RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS
Rule 38; MISTAKE as ground for petition for relief from judgment; refers to a mistake of fact,
not of law
Mistake, to constitute a ground for petition for relief, refers to a mistake of fact, not of
law. Relief from judgment or order is premised on equity. It is granted only in exceptional cases. It
is an act of grace. It is not regarded with favor. For relief to be granted the petitioner must show
that the judgment or final order was entered, or the proceeding thereafter against him was taken,
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, as the Court of Appeals
correctly held, pertains generally to one of fact, not of law. In Guevara v. Tuason & Co., the Court
held that the "word 'mistake,' according to its signification in the act referred to, does not apply,
and never was intended to apply, to a judicial error which the court in question might have
committed in the trial referred to. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. The act in
question can not in any way be employed as a substitute for the said remedy. [PHILADELPHIA
AGAN vs. HEIRS OF SPS. NUEVA G.R. No. 155018. December 11, 2003.]
RULE 39 EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of
the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must
frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies. The only EXCEPTIONS to the general rule are
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. [GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 128967.
May 20, 2004.]
Judgment; In an ejectment suit, judgment is binding against a trespasser or squatter although

not impleaded in the case
It is well settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the
judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be
heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has NOT been impleaded if he or she is:
(a) a tresspasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to
frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the
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defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or; (f) a member of the
family, relative or privy of the defendant. [SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION VS. CA
G.R. No. 136274, September 3, 2003]
Execution pending appeal; Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order after due hearing
There are THREE REQUISITES FOR THE EXECUTION OF A JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL: a) a
motion must be filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; b) there must be
good reasons for execution pending appeal; and c) the good reasons must be stated in a special
order.
Execution pending appeal is, of course, the exception to the rule. Normally, execution
cannot be obtained until and UNLESS (a) the judgment has become final and executory; (b) the
right of appeal has been renounced or waived; (c) the period for appeal has lapsed without an
appeal having been filed; or (d) having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the records of
the case have been returned to the court of origin — in which case, execution shall issue as a
matter of right.
On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the execution of a
judgment should not be allowed except if, in the court's discretion, there are good reasons
therefor. [CITY OF ILIGAN vs. PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT GROUP G.R. No. 145260 July 31, 2003]
RULE 41 APPEAL
Period to appeal; Appeal must be filed within the reglementary period provided for by the
Rules of Court.
The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the questioned
resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be interrupted only by the filing of a motion
for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution and shall continue to run
from the time the resolution denying the motion shall have been received by the movant or his
counsel. [RODNEY HEGERTY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 154920 August 15, 2003]
Rule 41 Section 2;Certification against forum shopping vis a vis verification; The certificate of
non-forum shopping must be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification of
counsel renders the petition defective.
A party's failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the party's
failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed
by the party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional
requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are
true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A party's representative,
lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign
the verification. [COLITO T. PAJUYO vs. COURT OF APPEALS et.al. G.R. No. 146364. June 3,
2004.]
RULE 42 PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE RTC TO THE CA
Perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law; Mandatory and
jurisdictional
Jose Castillo failed to sign the “Certification on Non-Forum Shopping.” Thus, he failed to
comply with the requirement ordained by Section 2, Rule 42 and made mandatory by Section 5,
Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that failure to comply with the
certification on non-forum shopping requirement is not curable by mere amendment, but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. [CASTILLO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
159971. March 25, 2004]

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Rule 42; Failure to attach the MTC decision does not affect the sufficiency of the petition
It was inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to deny the petition on the ground alone that
the petitioner failed to attach to the said petition a duplicate original or true copy of the MTC
decision because it was supposed to review the decision not of the MTC but of the RTC,
notwithstanding that the latter affirmed in toto the judgment of the MTC. In short, the failure to
attach the MTC decision did not adversely affect the sufficiency of the petition because it was, in
any event, accompanied by the RTC decision sought to be reviewed. [WILFREDO SILVERIO vs. CA
G.R. No. 143395. July 24, 2003]
RULE 43 APPEALS FROM THE CTA AND QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES TO THE CA
Rule 43, Section 6; What is mandatory is that clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true
copies of the judgment or final orders of the lower courts be attached to the petition.
The attachment of the final decisions of these quasi-judicial agencies are sufficient in order
for the Court of Appeals to give due course to the petition, instead of dismissing the same on the
ground of petitioners’ failure to attach copies of the pleadings and other supporting documents.
Nevertheless, even if the pleadings and other supporting documents were not attached to the
petition, the dismissal was unwarranted because the entire records of the case will eventually be
elevated to the appellate court, pursuant to Rule 43, Section 11 of the Rules of Court. [DIAZ vs.
CARLOS MESIAS, Jr. G.R. No. 156345. March 4, 2004]
Perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law; Mandatory and
jurisdictional
The NLRC Rules, akin to the Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law, have the
force and effect of law; and such NLRC rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Thus, petitioners are
mandated to perfect their appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law and failure
to do so renders the judgment of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. [CORPORATE INN HOTEL
vs. JENNEVIE H. LIZO G.R. NO. 148279 MAY 27, 2004 ]
Rule 43; Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Based on such findings, the Supreme Court held that Considering that the computations, as
well as the propriety of the awards of the Arbitral Tribunal, are unquestionably factual issues that
have been discussed and ruled upon by Arbitral Tribunal and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we
cannot depart from such findings. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
[MEGAWORLD GLOBUS ASIA, INC. vs. DSM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 153310. March 2, 2004]
RULE 45 APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SC
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
Certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 should be distinguished from certiorari as an
original action under Rule 65. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition is based on questions of
law which the appellant desires the appellate court to resolve. In certiorari as an original
action, the only question that may be raised is whether or not the lower court acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
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Certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 should be distinguished from certiorari as an

original action under Rule 65. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition is based on questions of law
which the appellant desires the appellate court to resolve. In certiorari as an original action, the
only question that may be raised is whether or not the lower court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. [MACKAY vs. ANGELES G.R. No. 144230
September 30, 2003]
Rule 45, Sec. 4 [a]; While the Court unquestionably has the discretion to dismiss the appeal for
being defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on the merits,
rather than on a technicality as the latter approach may result in injustice
While the Court unquestionably has the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being defective,
sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on a
technicality as the latter approach may result in injustice. Moreover, no prejudice will be caused to
Cabever as it was an original party before the lower courts and had been furnished all the pleadings
and resolutions in this petition. [ASIA TRADERS INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. CA G.R. No.
152537. February 16, 2004]
Findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and
conclusive upon the Supreme Court; exception
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. However, when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to consider certain relevant facts
that would lead to a completely different conclusion, a review of its factual findings may be made.
[PROPERTIED AND HOLDINGS, INC., vs. JUDGE COBARDE, et al. G.R. No. 156200. March 31,
2004] See Also MIGUEL DANOFRATA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 143010 September 30, 2003.
RULE 45; Questions of facts may not be raised in the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court; exceptions
Questions of facts may not be raised in the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court unless there is clear and convincing proof that the judgment of the CA is based on a
misapprehension of facts; or when the CA failed to notice and appreciate certain relevant facts of
substance which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion; and when there is a
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts in the light of the evidence on record.
Anything less will not suffice to overturn the decision of the CA affirming on appeal the decision of
the trial court. It bears stressing that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonial evidence of the parties and the assessment of the credibility and probative weight of
the evidence of the parties and its conclusion anchored on its findings are given high respect if not
conclusive effect by this Court, especially if affirmed by the CA because of the unique advantage of
the trial court of observing and monitoring the demeanor, conduct and deportment of the witnesses
as they regale the court with their testimonies. The exception to this rule is when the trial court
ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misappreciated cogent facts and circumstances of substance
which if considered would alter the outcome of the case. [RAMON ARCILLA vs. CA and PEOPLE
G.R. No. 135270. December 30, 2003.] See Also ELI LUI vs. SPS. EULOGIO G.R. No. 141176
May 27, 2004.
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; The well-settled rule is that the findings of fact of the
trial court are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless the
trial court ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance,
which if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.
The well-settled rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court as well as its calibration
of the evidence of the parties, its assessment of the credibility and probative weight of the
witnesses, and its conclusion based on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect,
if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted facts and
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circumstances of substance, which if considered, will alter the outcome of the case. [FERNANDO
MANANGAN vs. CA G.R. No. 139908. March 10, 2004]
RULE 45 is not the proper remedy if the issue involves an error of jurisdiction.
In this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 45 is inapplicable considering that the present
petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is "patently illegal" and was issued
with "grave abuse of discretion" and "beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona's)
jurisdiction" when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996
which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves
an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43.
Thus, the approximate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done.
[JUSTINA ADVINCULA-VELASQUEZ vs. CA G.R. No. 111387. June 8, 2004.]
RULE 46 ORIGINAL CASES
Rule 46, Section 3; While a petition for certiorari must be accompanied by a duplicate original
or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject thereof, there is no
requirement that all other relevant documents attached to the petition should be certified true
copies as well.petition must be certified as true copy
In a case of recent vintage, we held that while a petition for certiorari must be
accompanied by a duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution or
ruling subject thereof, there is no requirement that all other relevant documents attached to the
petition should be certified true copies as well. The CA nevertheless outrightly dismissed the
petition on account of the petitioners' failure to append certified true copies of certain relevant
documents referred to therein.
In any event, we agree with the petitioners that even assuming that the Rules require all
attachments to a petition for certiorari to be certified true copies, the CA should have nevertheless
taken cognizance of the petition. It has been the consistent holding of this Court that cases should
be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections [VAN MELLE PHILS., INC.
vs. VICTOR M. ENDAYA. G.R. No. 143132. September 23, 2003.]
RULE 47 ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
When petition under Rule 47 is grounded on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner need not allege in
the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration are no longer available.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in
the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment
or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a
judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be
assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final
order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches. [MARIETTA B.
ANCHETA vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004]
Annulment of judgment; Extrinsic fraud requires that the losing party be prevented by the
prevailing party from fully exhibiting his defense before the court
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him
away from court, by giving a false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had any
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat. These instances show that there was never
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really a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case so that the former judgment should be
annulled and the case set for a new and fair hearing. [LEONARDO vs. S.T. BEST, INC. G.R. No.
142066. February 6, 2004]
Annulment of judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction; The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. There must then be a law
expressly granting such right. This legal axiom is also applicable and even more true in actions
for annulment of judgments which is an exception to the rule on finality of judgments.
An ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT is a remedy in law independent of the case
where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. The concern that the remedy could so
easily be resorted to as an instrument to delay a final and executory judgment, has prompted
safeguards to be put in place in order to avoid an abuse of the rule. Thus, the annulment of
judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and the
remedy may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost therefrom, or (2) where he has
failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence. [MACALALAG vs.
OMBUDSMAN, et.al. G.R. No. 147995. March 4, 2004] See Also LAZARO vs. RURAL BANK OF
FRANCISCO BALAGTAS INC. G.R. No. 139895 August 15, 2003.
RULE 57 PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
Preliminary attachment; Attachment is a juridical institution intended to secure the outcome of

a trial- specifically, the satisfaction of a pecuniary obligation; it would be erroneous to order
the withdrawal of a cash deposit before judgment is rendered.
To prevent the sheriff from levying an attachment on property, the defendant (also called
the adverse party) may make a deposit or give a counter-bond in an amount equal to that fixed in
the order of attachment. Such deposit or counter-bound is intended to secure the payment of any
judgment that the plaintiff (also called the attaching party or the applicant to the writ) may
recover in the action. After a writ has been enforced, however, the adverse party may still move
for the discharge of the attachment, wholly or in part, by also making a deposit or giving a counter-
bond to secure the payment of any judgment the attaching party may recover in the action. The
property attached shall then be released and delivered to the adverse party; and the money
deposited shall be applied under the direction of the court to the satisfaction of any judgment that
may be rendered in favor of the prevailing party.
In the instant case, respondent judge had ordered the withdrawal of the cash deposit of the
defendant and released it in favor of the plaintiff, even before judgment was rendered. This action
was clearly in violation of the Rules mandating that after the discharge of an attachment, the
money deposited shall stand in place of the property released. We have already ruled that as long
as the judgment remains unsatisfied, it would be erroneous to order the cancellation of a bond
filed for the discharge of a writ of attachment. In like manner, it would be erroneous to order the
withdrawal of a cash deposit before judgment is rendered. [VILLANUEVA-FABELLA vs. Judge
RALPH S. LEE A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518. January 15, 2004]
RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Injunction; Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases
involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases; on issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of
law, courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
administrative acts.
Clearly then, what is at issue in this case is not the propriety or the wisdom of entering into
the Contract for the construction of the capitol building, which is beyond the power of this Court to
enjoin, but the Sanggunian’s compliance with the requirements prescribed under the LGC before it
may grant the Governor authority to enter into the Contract, which issue falls under the exception

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to the proscription against injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, as held in Malaga.
[ZAMORA VS. CABALLERO G.R. No. 147767. January 14, 2004]
The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case can be heard
The assailed injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits of the case, contrary to the
submission of petitioner, for a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial
and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not
conclusive or complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. As such,
the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are
interlocutory in nature and made before the trial on the merits is commenced or terminated.
[LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN AGENCY INCORPORATED G.R.
No. 136114. January 22, 2004]
Rule 58 Section 4 [b-c-d], SC-A.C. NO, 20-95; Summary hearing is mandatory before issuance of
a TRO; there are differences in the requisites for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and in the life of a TRO when it is issued by an Executive Judge and when it is issued by a
Presiding Judge of a court
“If the temporary restraining order was issued by respondent in his capacity as Executive
Judge, the TRO was good for 72 hours only. Within that period he was required to summon the
parties to a conference before issuing the TRO and then assign the case by raffle. Thus, par. 3 of
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:
If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two
(72) hours from issuance but shall immediately summon the parties for conference and immediately
raffle the case in their presence. Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the
Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned shall conduct a summary hearing to determine
whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing in the pending application for
preliminary injunction can be conducted. In no case shall the total period of the TRO exceed (20)
days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the Executive Judge.
On the other hand, if the TRO was issued after Civil Case No. 3391 had been raffled to
Branch 32 and respondent judge issued it in his capacity as Acting Judge, then he should have
complied with the following provision of Administrative Circular No. 20-95, par. 2:
The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary
hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch
selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle.[BORJA vs. JUDGE
ZORAYDA H. SALCEDO. A.M. No. RTJ-03-1746. September 26, 2003.]
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Rule 65 CERTIORARI, Rule 3 REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST
Resolution of Comelec and Commission on Audit may be brought to the SC on certiorari.

The contention of the OSG that government instrumentalities like the DBP cannot raise
decisions of the COA to the SC on certiorari is untenable. It is mandated in Section 7, Article IX of
the Constitution that aggrieved parties may bring decisions of the COA to the SC on certiorari. It is
also stated in the Government Auditing Code that a government agency aggrieved by a COA
decision, order, or ruling may raise the controversy to the SC on certiorari in the manner provided
by law and in accordance with the Rules of Court. An important requirement is that it must be
pursued by the real party in interest and in this case, DBP is the real party in interest. [DBP VS.
COA. G.R. No. 144516 February 11, 2004]
Rule 65 CERTIORARI

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Procedural rules are created not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It is far better to dispose of the case on the merits rather than on
mere technicality if that will result in injustice.
The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in
general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Although the court has absolute discretion
to reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, in general, it does so only (1) when the petition fails
to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or (2)
when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court Circulars.
It is sufficient that petitioner attached to his motion for reconsideration copies of the pertinent and
relevant pleadings and documents. [ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALANT MARITIME SERVICES. G.R.
No. 151833 August 7, 2003]
A person not a party to a civil case cannot assail the writ of preliminary injunction through a
petition for certiorari before the CA.
Felipe committed a procedural blunder in filing a special civil action for certiorari to assail
the Order and the Writ. Since he was not a party to the civil case he cannot assail the writ of
preliminary injunction through a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Felipe does not possess the requisite standing to file such suit.
Felipe could have simply intervened in the trial court proceedings to enable him to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. A motion to intervene may
be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. The purpose is merely to
afford one, not an original party but possessing a certain right or interest in the pending case, the
opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interest. Indeed,
Felipe could have easily joined his parents as defendants in resisting the claim of Gothong Lines.
[FELIPE C. DUNGOG VS. CA. G.R. No. 139767 August 5, 2003]
Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies are accorded with finality if supported by substantial
evidence.
Only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari
of the CA decisions. Questions of fact are not entertained. The Court is not a trier of facts, and in
labor cases; this doctrine applies with greater force. Factual questions are for labor tribunals to
resolve. The findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are accorded with respect,
even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. Particularly, when passed upon and upheld by
the CA, they are binding and conclusive upon the Court and will not normally be disturbed.
[SHOPPES MANILA, INC. VS. NLRC. G.R. No. 147125 January 14, 2004]
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper recourse for the reversal of the
assailed decision and resolution of the CA.
These findings are mere errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, correctible by a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence,
the petitioner should have filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
within the period therefor, and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. The
petitioner received a copy of the decision of the CA on November 18, 1996. It had until December
3, 1996 within which to file its motion for reconsideration of the decision. The petitioner did so on
the said date and received on April 18, 1997 the resolution of the CA denying its motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner filed its petition at bar only on June 17, 1997, well beyond the
period therefor. Patently then, the decision of the CA had become, in the interim, final and
executory, beyond the purview of this Court to act upon. [LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. CA. G.R.
No. 129368 August 25, 2003] See also Antonio Donato vs. CA G.R. No.: 129638. December 8,
2003.
The settled rule is a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the filing of a petition for

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certiorari. A petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to certiorari.
An exception to this rule arises if the petitioner raises purely legal issues.
Contrary to PILTEL's view, the issues raised in its petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals were mainly factual in nature. Since PILTEL disputes NTC's factual findings and seeks a re-
evaluation of the facts and evidence on record, the issues PILTEL raised are not proper subjects for
certiorari. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction and does
not include a review of the NTC's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. [PILIPINO TEL.
CORP. VS. NTC. G.R. No. 138295 August 28, 2003]
Complaints for specific performance with damages, by a lot or condominium unit buyer against
the owner or developer fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner's
active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that
it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse. Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the
trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court's
jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial
court's jurisdiction. [MANILA BANKER’S LIFE INSURANCE CORP., VS. EDDY NG KOK WEI]
Certiorari will issue ONLY TO CORRECT ERRORS OF JURISDICTION, not errors of judgment.
Instead of appealing the decision by writ of error, the respondent filed their petition for
certiorari with CA assailing the decision of the trial court on its merits. In a petition for certiorari,
the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction.
Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and
of error or via a petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of
judgment. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the
exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by
an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whether or not the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt rests entirely within the sound discretion and judgment of the lower court. The
appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere of its
authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived
errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion. [PEOPLE VS. CA. G.R. No.
144332 June 10, 2004]
Certiorari CANNOT BE AVAILED OF AS A SUBSTITUTE for the lost remedy of an ORDINARY

APPEAL.
It is evident from the averments of material dates that the remedy of certiorari under Rule
65 was resorted to by the petitioners as a substitute for a lost appeal. The CA promulgated the
assailed Decision on September 5, 2001, a copy of which was received by the petitioners on
September 12, 2001. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof on September 29,
2001 but the CA denied the same in the assailed Resolution of November 29, 2001, a copy of which
was received by the petitioners on December 6, 2001. The petitioners' remedy would have been to
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before this Court, and, reckoning the fifteen-
day period to file the same from receipt of the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration,
the petitioners had until December 21, 2001 to file a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court. Instead, the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on January 21, 2002, a month
after the lapse of the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.
Apparently, the petitioners resorted to this special civil action of certiorari after failing to appeal
within the fifteen-day reglementary period. This cannot be countenanced. The special civil action
of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which the petitioners already lost.
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Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. [PRES. OF PDIC VS. CA. G.R. No. 151280 June 10, 2004] See Also PEOPLE
VS. SANDIGANBAYAN. G.R. No. 145951 August 12, 2003.
RULE 68 FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
There is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure of mortgage.

Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right
of redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriff's certificate of foreclosure
sale. But no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the
mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale,
‘when confirmed by an order of the court…’ shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to
the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.' There then exists only what is known as the
equity of redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period
after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale
but prior to its confirmation. [SPS. ROSALES VS. SPS. SUBA. G.R. No. 137792 August 12, 2003]
The right of redemption must be exercised within the period provided for by law.
It is acknowledged that the redemption period expired on May 31, 1985, exactly one year
after the registration of the certificate of sale in favor of respondent bank, and the same had
elapsed without petitioners exercising their right of redemption. As a result, ownership of and title
to the property was consolidated in favor of respondent bank. Petitioners offered to redeem the
subject property only on December 1990, more than six (6) years after the foreclosure sale of May
15, 1984. Evidently, that was a belated attempt at exercising a right which had long expired. To
allow redemption at such a late time would simply be unreasonable and would work an injustice on
respondent spouses. [SPS. DE ROBLES VS. CA. G.R. No. 128053 June 10, 2004]
RULE 71 CONTEMPT
A charge for contempt must stem from disobedience of a party to a lawful order of the court; a
person merely in the performance of his duties is not guilty of contempt.
However, it is not lost upon this Court that the complainant was not a party to any of the
cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the
traffic violation incident involving the respondent judge's son. Furthermore, the record shows that
when the complainant filed his reply to the charge as required by the respondent judge, the same
was refused by some staff members in the latter's sala. [SISON VS. CAIOBES, JR.]
To comply with the procedural requirements of indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, there must be (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt
filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his
conduct, and (2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct.
The trial court complied with these requirements in this case. When RMC filed motions for
contempt, the trial court gave petitioners' officers an opportunity to explain their side. Petitioners'
officers filed oppositions to the motions for contempt and even filed motions to reconsider the
orders of the trial court requiring them to return the sewing machines. The contempt involved in
this case is civil since it arose from petitioners' act of defying the trial court's writ of preliminary
injunction, which clearly ordered petitioners' officers to return all the sewing machines taken from
the Leased Premises. Petitioners continued to defy the trial court's orders to return the sewing
machines until they manifested in 1997 that a fire destroyed the sewing machines in 1991. An
injunction duly issued must be obeyed, however erroneous the action of the court may be, until a
higher court overrules such decision. As affirmed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, the trial
court properly issued the injunction order directing petitioners to return the sewing machines.
[ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS VS. CA. G.R. No. 137326 August 25, 2003]

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Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing; After a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt; xxx xxx xxx
The statement that respondent Judge was grossly ignorant of the rules of law and
procedure does not constitute improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. The phrase "gross ignorance of the rules of law and procedure" is
ordinarily found in administrative complaints and is a necessary description to support a petition
which seeks the annulment of an order of a judge wherein basic legal principles are disregarded. In
this connection, it bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory
idea of punishment. [SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE VS. MAJADUCON. G.R. No. 138378 July
29, 2003. See Also PIMENTEL, JR. VS. MAJADUCON. G.R. No. 136760 July 29, 2003]
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
RULE 105 VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment
of the child, and no further court action is required.
Rosalina attempts to mislead the Court by representing that this case is one for compulsory
recognition, partition and accounting for damages. What was filed is one for partition and
accounting with damages only. The filiation or compulsory recognition was never put in issue. The
parties had already admitted their relationship in the pre-trial brief. Vicente himself signed Ma.
Theresa’s birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. Vicente has thereby
acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. [ECETA VS. ECETA. G.R. No. 157037 May 20,
2004]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
The pleadings of the accused and copies of the orders or resolutions of the trial court are
served on the people of the Philippines through the provincial prosecutor. However, in appeals
before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court either (a) by writ of error; (b) via petition
for review; (c) on automatic appeal; or, (d) in special civil actions where the people of the
Philippines is a party, the general rule is that the office of the Solicitor General is the sole
representative of the people of the Philippines.
A copy of the petition in such action must be served on the People of the Philippines as
mandated by Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, through the Office of the Solicitor General.
The service of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Provincial
Prosecutor would be inefficacious. The petitioner’s failure to have a copy of his petition served on
the respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition as provided in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court. Unless and until copies of the petition are duly served on the respondent, the appellate
court has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. [SALAZAR vs. ROMAQUIN. G.R. No. 151068
May 21, 2004]

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Once the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show
that the killings was justified and he incurred no criminal liability.
In this case, appellant clearly failed to discharge his burden. His uncorroborated, self-
serving declaration of self-defense pales in the light of the testimonies of two impartial
eyewitnesses as well as the medical evidence presented by the prosecution. As observed by the
Solicitor General, when the appellant claimed self-defense, he must prove that the killing was
justified clearly and convincingly on the strength of his own evidence. Appellant can not rely on
the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. To say that the prosecution should have rebutted
appellant’s claim of self-defense, when appellant failed in his task of proving it, would be a
procedural heresy. [CATALINA SECURITY AGENCY vs. ALICIA B. GONZALEZ-DECANO G.R. No.
149039 May 27, 2004]
Section 8 does not require the words “qualifying” or “qualified by” to refer to the
circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It is not the use of the words
“qualifying” or “qualified by” that raises a crime to a higher category, but specific allegation of
an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher
category.
It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to apprise the
accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding
surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specifically alleges in the Information the
circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law. This
includes the death penalty in proper cases. In the present case, the Information alleged that the
circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime which would qualify the killing to
murder. [CATALINA SECURITY AGENCY vs. ALICIA B. GONZALEZ-DECANO, ET AL. G.R. No. 149039
May 27, 2004]
As long as the pertinent and significant allegations are enumerated in the Information it would
be deemed sufficient in form and substance.
The qualifying circumstance of relationship of the accused to the victim being father and
daughter is so alleged in the Information. The Information subject of the instant case stated “The
Undersigned Prosecutor, at the instance of the offended party, Reseilleta C. Villanueva, accuses
Rogelio Villanueva, her father, of the crime of Rape xxx” There is no law or rule prescribing a
specific location in the Information where the qualifying circumstances must "exclusively" be
alleged before they could be appreciated against the accused. Nothing in Secs. 6 and 8 of Rule 110
mandates that material allegations should be stated in the body and not in the preamble or caption
of the Information. [PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO VILLANUEVA. G.R. No. 138364
October 15, 2003]
Information must state the acts or omissions so complained of as constitutive of the offense.
The validity of information may still be questioned even after plea of not guilty is entered.
The test in determining whether the information validly charges an offense is whether the
material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered.
[GRACIANO DELA CHICA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 144823 December 8,2003]
Failure of accused to assert any ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the
information shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash.
It is true that pursuant to Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, the failure of
the accused to assert any ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the information shall be
deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash. Respondents, however, may have
overlooked that the same section admits of certain exceptions, as when: (1) no offense was
charged, (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, (3) the offense

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or penalty has been extinguished, and (4) the accused would be twice put to jeopardy. In the
present case, given that the information failed sufficiently to charge the offense, petitioners are
not precluded from attacking its validity even after their arraignment. [GRACIANO DELA CHICA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 144823 December 8,2003]
The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated for the court to pronounce judgment.
The crime was aggravated by dwelling. However, the same cannot be appreciated against
the appellant because dwelling was not alleged in the information as mandated by Section 9 of Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crime was committed before the
effectivity of the Rule, the same should not be applied against the appellant because it is not
favorable to him. [PEOPLE vs. JOSELITO D. DELA CRUZ. G.R. Nos. 138931-32 July 17, 2003] See
Also PEOPLE vs. LAMBERTINO PRIETO. G.R. No. 141259 July 18, 2003
The findings of facts of the trial court, its conclusions anchored on the said findings, its
calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties and the probative weight thereof, are
accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect.
It has been the constant ruling of this Court that the findings of facts of the trial court, its
conclusions anchored on the said findings, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties
and the probative weight thereof, are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not
conclusive effect precisely because of its unique advantage of being able to observe and monitor,
at close range, the demeanor, conduct and deportment of the witnesses as they testify, unless the
trial court ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, would alter the outcome of the case.[ PEOPLE vs. LAMBERTINO PRIETO G.R. No.
141259. July 18, 2003.]
INFORMATION
Aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information, otherwise, they cannot be

considered against the accused even if they are proven during the trial.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling attended the commission of the crime. This circumstance was not specifically alleged in
the information. Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure now provides that
aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information, otherwise, they cannot be
considered against the accused even if they are proven during the trial. [PEOPLE vs. DOMINADOR
R. WERBA G.R. No. 144599 June 9, 2004] See Also PEOPLE vs. FREDINEL R. YAMUTA G.R. No.
133006 June 9, 2004.
Every complaint or information should state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances.
In the case at bar, the information did not specifically allege that appellant employed
means to weaken the defense nor show how the act which resulted in the death of the victim was
committed. The said aggravating circumstance cannot thus be appreciated. [PEOPLE vs.
GERRYMEL P. ESTILLORE. G.R. No. 140348 July 18, 2003]
It is settled that when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of
lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Justice, the
bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such
motion.
Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution
but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial and should embody such

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assessment in the order disposing the motion. [ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC. vs. HON. ZEUS
ABROGAR G.R. No. 137010 August 29, 2003]
The GENERAL RULE is that the denial of a motion to withdraw information, just like a motion to
dismiss a complaint, is an interlocutory order and therefore it cannot be the proper subject of
an appeal or certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered. HOWEVER,
there are certain situations where recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered
appropriate.
There are certain situations where recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered
appropriate, to wit: a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b)
where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to
be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from
the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and
compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets
by another futile case. [ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC. vs. HON. ZEUS ABROGAR G.R. No. 137010
August 29, 2003]
OBJECTION
It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged
to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
The Information in this case alleged that the crime was committed "sometime in March
1998" which, according to private complainant, was more or less at the closing of the school year.
Being reasonably definite and certain, this approximation sufficiently meets the requirement of the
law. After all, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court merely requires that the information must
state, among others, the approximate time of the commission of the offense. [PEOPLE vs. LARRY
CACHAPERO. G.R. No. 153008 May 20, 2004]
Rule 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who,
under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision
over said prosecutors, hence, has power of review over their resolutions. He may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Upon petition by a proper party under such Rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned to
file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to
dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.[SPS.
FREDDIE & ELIZABETH WEBB vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE G.R. No. 139120. July 31, 2003.]
With the filing of Information, the trial court could then issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused as provided for by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The issuance of the warrant was not only procedurally sound but it was even required
considering that respondent had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of complainant.
Consequently, complainant's charge that respondent Judge failed to act on the omnibus motion
before issuing the arrest warrant is untenable. Whether respondent correctly disregarded the
omnibus motion in view of the alleged fatal defects is a judicial matter, which is not a proper
subject in an administrative proceeding. It bears noting that respondent court immediately
deferred the execution of the warrant of arrest upon issuance by the Court of Appeals of the TRO.
Incidentally, although the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, it eventually
sustained the issuance by respondent of the arrest warrant and dismissed the petition for certiorari.
[WILFREDO M. TALAG vs. JUDGE AMOR A. REYES A.M. No. RTJ-04-1852. June 3, 2004]

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The only instance where an information for an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation may be filed directly with the court is when an accused is lawfully detained
without a warrant and he expressly refuses to waive in writing the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code.
If the accused refuses or fails to sign the requisite waiver, an Information shall forthwith be
filed against him, subject to his right to move for reinvestigation within five (5) days from the time
he learns of the filing of said information. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense and hence at the risk of incarceration or
some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right but a substantive right. [PROSECUTOR
JAIME E. CONTRERAS vs. JUDGE EDDIE P. MONSERATE. A.M. No. MTJ-02-1437 August 20, 2003]
The Provincial Prosecution Office has the authority to order the respondent judge to conduct a
preliminary investigation.
Respondent judge must be reminded of the duty imposed upon him by Section 1(a), Rule
110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Said provision speaks of the "proper officer" who
shall conduct the "requisite preliminary investigation." Under Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, a municipal court judge, like herein respondent, is a "proper officer"
authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation. Further, a preliminary investigation is not a
judicial function, and as such the findings of the investigating judge are subject to the oversight
powers of the public prosecutor. [PROSECUTOR JAIME E. CONTRERAS vs. JUDGE MONSERATE.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1437 August 20, 2003]
WARRANTLESS ARREST
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense
The absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust
operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to
the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.
Furthermore, if a police operation requires immediate implementation, time is of the essence and
only hasty preparations are sometimes possible. It was clear that the police officers arrested
appellant in FLAGRANTE DELICTO. Appellant has committed the offense charged in the presence of
the police officers. Delos Santos inspected the shabu inside the back seat of appellant’s borrowed
car immediately before appellant’s arrest. Pastrana confiscated the shabu immediately after
arresting appellant. Appellant’s arrest without a warrant is therefore authorized under Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. [PEOPLE vs. LI YIN CHU alias ROBERT LI G.R No. 143793.
February 17, 2004 ]
OMBUDSMAN
Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not.
It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be
insufficient in form or substance or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the
complaint is in due and proper form and substance. To insulate the Office from outside pressure
and improper influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude
of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention. This Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and
respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman. [SALVADOR vs. DESIERTO.
G.R. No. 135249. January 16, 2004]
Rule 113 ARREST

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It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any formula but is to be

resolved according to the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, the
Court finds the search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, not violative of his
constitutional rights.
When the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is
deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana obtained in the
course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant. [PEOPLE vs. HEDISHI
SUZUKI. G.R. No. 120670 October 23, 2003]
A clear and convincing evidence is required to prove the defense of “frame up” because in
absence of any intent on the part of the police and police authorities to falsely impute such
crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
stands.
Allegations of frame-up are easily fabricated, making it the common and standard line of
defense in prosecutions involving the Dangerous Drugs Law. [PEOPLE vs. HEDISHI SUZUKI. G.R. No.
120670 October 23, 2003]
The Court understands the importance of BUY-BUST OPERATIONS as an effective method,

sanctioned by law, of apprehending drug peddlers. At the same time, it is aware that it is
susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. For this reason, the Court must be
extra vigilant in trying drug cases.
The Court understands the importance of buy-bust operations as an effective method,
sanctioned by law, of apprehending drug peddlers. At the same time, it is aware that it is
susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. For this reason, the Court must be extra
vigilant in trying drug cases. The elements necessary successfully to prosecute an accused for the
illegal sale of shabu are: 1) Identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration;
and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. To prove that these elements were
present in the case at bar, the prosecution relies on the testimony of the poseur-buyer, Tupil, as
the other witnesses who testified for the prosecution were incompetent to testify on these facts. In
short, the prosecution's case crucially depends on the strength of the testimony of Tupil. While the
Court concedes that a single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an
accused, it does not hold true in this case. Tupil's credibility has been seriously eroded by the fact
that, in another drug-related criminal case, he was found to have framed-up the accused therein
for illegal sale of shabu. [PEOPLE vs. WILLIAM TIU G.R. No. 142885 October 22, 2003] Correlate
with PEOPLE vs. DE GUZMAN G.R. No. 151205. June 9, 2004.
Rule 114 BAIL
When evidence of guilt is strong, a person shall not be admitted to bail if charged with a capital
offense; or with an offense that — under the law — is punishable with reclusion perpetua at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail.
As a general rule, a person “in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a
matter of right.” Bail is a security given for the release of a person under custody of the law, as a
guarantee for his or her appearance before any court as required under specified conditions. The
right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence. In the present case, private respondent is
undergoing trial for murder. Is he entitled to bail? His case falls within the exception to the
aforesaid general rule on bail. [PEOPLE and Heirs of ESTEBAN LIM JR. vs. PRESIDING JUDGE of
the RTC of MUNTINLUPA CITY (Branch 276) and RICARDO TOBIAS G.R. No. 151005. June 8,
2004]
The respondent judge could not validly order the release of the accused without the submission
of a valid bail bond.
The failure of respondent judge to explain why no property bonds could

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be found in the records of the case cast doubt as to the existence of the property bonds at the time
the accused were ordered released. The respondent judge could not validly order the release of the
accused without the submission of a valid bail bond. In thus ordering the release of the accused
without the requisite bail bond, the respondent judge violated the law and committed grave
misconduct. [HELEN GAMBOA-MIJARES vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR. A.M. No. MTJ-03-
1509 September 23, 2003]
Rule 115 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the RIGHT TO CONFRONT and cross-examine
the witness against him.
The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III, §14(2) of the
Constitution which provides that the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to
face and in Rule 115, §1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witness
against him. [PEOPLE vs. MARLON ORTILLAS. G.R. No. 137666 May 20, 2004]
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense has, among other rights, the
right to COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL preferably of his own choice.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in
evidence against the accused. The allegation that appellant was deprived his right to counsel, even
if true, would not alter the outcome of this case for it does not appear that the prosecution offered
in court any confession or admission obtained as a consequence of an un-counseled custodial
investigation.[PEOPLE vs. CRISPIN BILLABER y MATBANUA G.R. Nos. 114967-68. January 26,
2004.]
For DOUBLE JEOPARDY to exist, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition be convicted of estafa
under Article 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no problem of jeopardy because illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is
malum in se in which the criminal intent of the accused is necessary. The claim of double jeopardy,
therefore, is patently without merit. [PEOPLE vs. CRISPIN BILLABER y MATBANUA G.R. Nos.
114967-68. January 26, 2004]
Rule 116 ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
Alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed and

enlightened. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple and unconditional.
Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally on April 22, 1999. No unusual ceremony
punctuated his arraignment. The SBN itself found this simple process inconsistent with its studied
manner of "conditionally" arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation in other cases. Under
Sec.11(c) of R116, the arraignment shall be suspended for a period not exceeding 60 days when a
reinvestigation or review is being conducted at either the Department of Justice or the Office of
the President. However, we should stress that the court does not lose control of the proceedings by
reason of such review. Once it had assumed jurisdiction, it is not handcuffed by any resolution of
the reviewing prosecuting authority. Neither is it deprived of its jurisdiction by such resolution.
[PEOPLE vs. MARIO K. ESPINOSA G.R. Nos. 153714-20 August 15, 2003]
The holding of a court session on a Saturday is a blatant violation of Administrative Circular No.
3-99, which provides that "[t]he session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

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Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall be from 8:30 in the morning to noon and from
2:00 to 4:30 in the afternoon, from Monday to Friday."
Worse, respondent failed to send a written notice of said arraignment to the offended
party. Sec. 1(f), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires such notice.
Considering that the offended party is the State, its representative, in this case, are the deputized
Municipal Fish Wardens. Respondent had no justifiable reason why he failed to notify them. Their
names are mentioned at the bottom portion of the complaint. Further, as correctly pointed out by
the investigating judge, if indeed the complaint was duplicitous, respondent could have given the
prosecution a chance to amend its complaint, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. [SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF GUINDULMAN vs. JUDGE MANUEL A. DE
CASTRO. A.M. No. MTJ-03-1487 December 1, 2003]
Rule 117 MOTION TO QUASH
The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to reinforce
the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar under
the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of
the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused
only.
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph
5 of the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter
alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under
Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if in
its opinion their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the
former procedure shall apply. The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective
application only does not proscribe the prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the
Court intended the new rule to be given retroactive and prospective effect.[PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. PANFILO M. LACSON. G.R. No. 149453 October 7, 2003]
Rule 118 PRE-TRIAL
Pre-trial in criminal cases is now mandatory

Under Sec. 4, Rule 118 of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, after the pre-trial
conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and
evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and
control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest
injustice. Pre-trial in criminal cases is now mandatory. The purpose of entering into a stipulation or
admission of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs
of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
reasonable inquiry. These admissions during the pre-trial conference are worthy of credit. Hence, a
birth certificate or any other official documents is no longer necessary to establish the minority of
the victim since the same was admitted during the pre-trial, and never disputed, by the accused.
[PEOPLE vs. PEPITO. G.R. No. 147650-52. October 16, 2003]
Relationship of the victim and the offender was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, appellant
can only be convicted of simple rape.
The said birth certificate shows that Ginalyn was born on July 22, 1986, thus, making her
only less than twelve years old when she was raped on July 13, 1996. the fact that appellant
admitted that he is the father of Ginalyn during the pre-trial, thus dispensing with the need to
present evidence to prove the same, will not justify the trial court’s appreciation of the qualifying
circumstance of relationship. A perusal of the pre-trial order would readily show that the said
stipulation was not signed by the appellant and his counsel. Hence, it cannot be used as evidence
against him. Rule 118, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “all
agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the

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accused.” This requirement is mandatory. Thus, the omission of the signature of the accused and
his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence. Considering that the relationship of the victim and the offender was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt, appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion
perpetua. [PEOPLE VS. ANCHETA]
Rule 122 APPEAL
If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases
a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life
and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be
accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior
determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the
possibility of an error of judgment.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however,
has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise
and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to
determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the
facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the
factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals
should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render
judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from
entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final
disposition. [THE PEOPLE vs. EFREN MATEO y GARCIA G.R. No. 147678-87 July 7, 2004]
Rule 125 PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted.
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding
of probable cause. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge
must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3)the
examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. [ALFREDO
Y. CHU vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN. A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786. August 28, 2003]
Rule 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first name of petitioner
does not invalidate the warrant because the additional description sufficiently enabled the
police officers to locate and identify the petitioner. What is prohibited is a warrant against an
unnamed party, and not one which, as in the instant case, contains a descriptio personae that
will enable the officer to identify the accused without difficulty.
The failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first name of petitioner,
which is "Bernard" and not "Romulo" or "Rumolo", does not invalidate the warrant because the
additional description "alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnon" sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and identify the petitioner. What is
prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in the instant case,
contains a descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused without
difficulty. [BERNARD R. NALA vs. JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR. G.R. No. 153087 August 7,
2003]
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Where entry into the premises to be searched was gained by virtue of a void search warrant,
prohibited articles seized in the course of the search are inadmissible against the accused.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, they
were not validly seized because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a
warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. Moreover, it does not follow
that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
[BERNARD R. NALA vs. JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR. G.R. No. 153087 August 7, 2003]
The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. In
determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must examine
the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3)
the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
The records only show the existence of an application for a search warrant and the
affidavits of the complainant's witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona, we held:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be
able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the
Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching
them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid. [PEOPLE vs. BENHUR MAMARIL. G.R. No.
147607 January 22, 2004]
EVIDENCE
RULE 129 JUDICIAL NOTICE
Judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in the
course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It
is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a party's attorney during such judicial
proceedings, including admissions in pleadings made by a party. It may occur at any point
during the litigation process. An admission in open court is a judicial admission. A judicial
admission binds the client even if made by his counsel.
The respondent's contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in the
CA cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the course of a different proceeding
does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings before the Court was by way
of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as
such, the present recourse is but a mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court.
This is not a new trial, but a review of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which
later passed through the CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA,
and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings before this Court. [PEOPLE VS. PANFILO
LACSON. G.R. No. 149453 October 7, 2003]
Courts shall take judicial notice of the decisions of the appellate courts which become final and
executory.
Sec 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that “ a court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of…the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines… Courts are required to take judicial notice of the decisions
of the appellate courts as these are facts capable of unquestionable demonstration. Thus, even in
the absence of other substantiation, ruling in CA GR No. 65913 can be a strong basis for the assailed
decision in Civil Case No. 86-36794. Also, it bears emphasis that respondent’s second complaint

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under Civil Case No. 86-36794 in the RTC was instituted within the 5 year period form finality of
judgment thus, present recourse is actually a motion for revival of judgment under Sec 6, Rule 39
of the same Rules. CA ruled that Industrial Horizons is the alter ego of herein petitioner thus, the
latter can be held personally liable for the outstanding obligation of the former. Such ruling, which
has become final and executory, is conclusive upon the parties. It follows that the issue involved
can no longer be litigated. We have held that an action to revive judgment is not meant to retry
the case all over again. Its cause of action is the judgment itself and the merits of the original
action. [OLIVERIO LAPERAL VS. PABLO OCAMPO. G.R. No. 140652, September 3, 2003]
RULE 129; Judicial Notice

Petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration before
it, the Court of Appeals should have taken mandatory judicial notice of this Court’s resolution in
A.M. Matter No. 00-02-03 SC. The resolution did not have to specify that it had retroactive effect as
it pertains to a procedural matter. Contrary to private respondent’s allegation that the matter was
no longer pending and undetermined, the issue of whether the petition for certiorari was timely
filed was still pending reconsideration when the amendment took effect on September 1, 2000,
hence, covered by the its retroactive application. The amendatory rule in their favor
notwithstanding, petitioners’ petition fails as stated early on. The order of the trial court granting
private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the complaint was a final, not interlocutory, order and as
such, it was subject to appeal, 5 not a petition for certiorari. At the time petitioners filed before
the appellate court their petition for certiorari on the 60th day following their receipt of the
October 20, 1999 Order of the trial court denying their Motion for Reconsideration of its dismissal
order, the said October 20, 1999 Order had become final and executory after the 15th day
following petitioners’ receipt thereof. [SIENNA REALTY CORPORATION VS. GAL-LANG. May 13,
2004]
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides; Court should have allowed the parties
to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis.
The trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural
lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice
thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence. Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of
Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have allowed the parties to
present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market
value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily
arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of
the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape,
location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a
remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of
land. [LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. WYCOCO]
RULE 130 ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Admissibility of Evidence; POLICE BLOTTER was admitted under Rule 130, Sec. 44 of the Rules
of Court; Great weight, and even finality, is given to the factual conclusions of the Court of
Appeals which affirm those of the trial courts
We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly
admitted as they form part of the official records. Entries in the police records made by a police
officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the
fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other
competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. In this case, the entries in the police blotter
reflected the information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo
Anit was driving the insured truck with plate no. FCG-538. Furthermore, the police blotter was
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identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries was likewise
presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The
information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any
inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise was given by the
investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names. [RUDY LAO vs. STANDARD INSURANCE
CO., INC. G.R. No. 140023, August 14, 2003]
Admissibility of Confession; Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters

during a TELEVISED INTERVIEW ARE VOLUNTARY AND ADMISSIBLE in evidence
The TV news reporters’ testimonies on record show that they were acting as media
professionals when they interviewed appellant. They were not under the direction and control of
the police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The record also shows that
the interviews took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, the appellant did not
protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even
supplied details of Keyser’s killing. As held in Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect
to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence. Thus, we
have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of appellant’s alleged confession to
the police, the prosecution has amply proven the appellant’s guilt in the killing of Victor F. Keyser.
The bare denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in contrast to the spontaneous and vivid
out-of-court admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas
and David. The positive evidence, including the instruments of the crime, together with the
medical evidence as well as the testimonies of credible prosecution witnesses, leaves us no doubt
that appellant killed his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, in the gruesome manner vividly
described before the trial court. [PEOPLE VS. GUILLERMO. G.R. NO. 147786 January 20, 2004]
Requisites for the admissibility of out-of-court identification of suspects; Paraffin test is not
conclusive proof to prove that a person found positive has fired a gun.
The value of the in-court identification made by Lydia, however, is largely dependent upon
the out-of-court identification she made while appellant was in the custody of the police. In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. As for
the circumstances surrounding the identification process, they were clearly tainted by improper
suggestion. While there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification,
as even without it there could still be proper identification as long as the police did not suggest the
identification to the witness, the police in the case at bar did even more than suggest to Lydia.
As for the positive paraffin findings on appellant, it is well settled that nitrates are also
found in substances other than gunpowder. Thus, in a number of cases, the Court acquitted the
accused despite the finding of gunpowder nitrates on his hand, noting that scientific experts concur
in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. While it can establish the presence of
nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites
were caused by the discharge of firearm.But even assuming that paraffin test is conclusive, that is
only one circumstance which is insufficient to prove guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt.
[PEOPLE vs. RUEL BACONGUIS. G.R. No. 149889. December 2, 2003.]
Rule 130, Section 26; Confession; VALIDITY OF CONFESSION; Test for the validity of confessions
is - was it voluntarily and freely made.
Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission as an "act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact." A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the
same Rule is the "declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein." Both may be given in evidence against the person

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admitting or confessing. On the whole, a confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a
declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement,
stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime. As
far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court makes no distinction
whether the confession is judicial or extrajudicial. Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a
confession is — was it voluntarily and freely made. The term "voluntary" means that the accused
speaks of his free will and accord, without inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete
knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession, and when the speaking is so free
from influences affecting the will of the accused, at the time the confession was made, that it
renders it admissible in evidence against him.The admissibility of a confession in evidence hinges
on its voluntariness. On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age,
character, and circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must be considered.
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by
whom it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be
proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to
be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when
uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest. Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not
support a conviction where it is uncorroborated. There must be such corroboration that, when
considered in connection with confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a confession. It is not necessary
that the supplementary evidence be entirely free from variance with the extrajudicial confession,
or that it show the place of offense or the defendant's identity or criminal agency. All facts and
circumstances attending the particular offense charged are admissible to corroborate extrajudicial
confession. [PEOPLE vs. HERMINIANO SATORRE. G.R. No. 133858. August 12, 2003.]
Sec 44, Rule 130; OFFICIAL RECORDS of governmental agencies are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
The masterlist of eligibles is kept by petitioner for records and verification purposes. It is
precisely against it that the entries in the certificate of eligibility are counter-checked and
verified, specifically whether the score stated therein is true and correct. We therefore hold the
masterlist to be the primary record of eligibles. It is the list officially prepared and kept by
petitioner pursuant to its constitutional and statutory mandates. It is what petitioner utilizes to
verify the eligibility of applicants in government service. If we consider the certificate, held by the
appellate court, to be the primary record of one’s eligibility, there will no way by which petitioner
can countercheck the veracity of the entries therein. In effect, Government offices would be
bound to accept a certificate as conclusive and incontestable, without any means of validation,
notwithstanding that the certificate may have spuriously manufactured or that an item therein may
have been erroneously or irregularly entered. The masterlist of eligibles is an official record, as
such, every entry made therein is presumed genuine and accurate unless proven otherwise. Sec 44,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides: “Entries in official records in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
especially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. [CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION VS. EVELYN CAYOBIT. G.R. No. 145737, September 3, 2003]
Admissibility of Evidence; Admissibility of OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION of suspects, courts

have adopted the totality of circumstances test; Section 34, Rule 130 - Similar acts of evidence.
In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST where they consider the following factors: (1) the
witness’ opportunity to view the perpetrator of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at
the time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
shown by the witness of his identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Although showing mug
shots of suspects is one of the established methods of identifying criminals, the procedure used in
this case is unacceptable. The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a
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series of photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second rule directs
that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way
suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect. Where a photograph has been identified
as that of the guilty party, any subsequent corporeal identification of that person may be based not
upon the witness’s recollection of the features of the guilty party, but upon his recollection of the
photograph. A recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to the conclusion that
where a witness has made a photographic identification of a person, his subsequent corporeal
identification of that same person is somewhat impaired in value, and its accuracy must be
evaluated in light of the fact that he first saw a photograph. In the present case, there was
impermissible suggestion because the photographs were only of appellant and Sison, focusing
attention on the two accused. The police obviously suggested the identity of the accused by
showing only appellant and Sison’s photographs to Ferrer and Ramos.
Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is instructive on this point. A man may be a
notorious criminal, and may have committed many crimes, and still be innocent of the crime
charged on trial. Section 14, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that “in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” An
accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
has failed to discharge its burden of proof. We hold that appellant is entitled to a mandatory
acquittal. [PEOPLE vs. ROLANDO PINEDA y MANALO. G.R. No. 141644. May 27, 2004.]
Res Inter Alios Acta; Dying Declaration; When a person is at the point of death, every motive of
falsehood is silenced. The mind is induced by the strongest of reasons to speak the truth – the
declarant’s impending meeting with his Creator; complete in the sense that it was a full
expression of all that he wanted to say with regard to the circumstances of his death.
These attacks on Naty’s character and reputation are too flimsy and irrelevant to deserve
serious consideration. The fact that a witness is a person of unchaste character or even a drug
dependent does not per se affect her credibility. Character is frequently used to refer to one’s
reputation in the neighborhood. It means the estimate attached to the individual by the community
and not the qualities of the individual as conceived by one person.With respect to a witness in both
criminal and civil cases, evidence of his character, in order to affect his credibility, must refer to
his “general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity.” Thus, testimonies attacking the character
of a witness for the purpose of impugning his credibility must relate and be confined to the general
reputation which such witness has in the community or neighborhood where he lives or has lived.
Personal opinions on the moral character of a witness, being usually too general, sweeping or
subjective, are excluded.
Under Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, the declaration of a dying person with
the consciousness of impending death may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject
of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of such death. There are
four requisites which must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible: (1) it must
concern the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (2) at the time it was
made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) the declarant was
competent as a witness; and (4) the declaration is offered in any criminal case for homicide,
murder or parricide in which the declarant was the victim. Indubitably, PO3 Pastor’s dying
declaration is complete in the sense that it was a full expression of all that he wanted to say with
regard to the circumstances of his death. An ante-mortem statement is evidence of the highest
order. It is doctrinal that, when a person is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood is
silenced. The mind is induced by the strongest of reasons to speak the truth – the declarant’s
impending meeting with his Creator. [PEOPLE vs. MAJOR EMILIO COMILING. G.R. No. 140405.
March 4, 2004]
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Parole Evidence; Presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial
of truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and
abandoned.
The parol evidence rule does NOT apply in this case. We held in Tarnate v. Court of

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Appeals, that where the parties admitted the existence of the loans and the mortgage deeds and
the fact of default on the due repayments but raised the contention that they were misled by
respondent bank to believe that the loans were long-term accommodations, then the parties could
not be allowed to introduce evidence of conditions allegedly agreed upon by them other than those
stipulated in the loan documents because when they reduced their agreement in writing, it is
presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of truth, and whatever
is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned. [SPOUSES
EDUARDO B. EVANGELISTA vs. MERCATOR FINANCE CORP. G.R. No. 148864. August 21, 2003]
Best Evidence as to age of the victim; the minority of the complainant may be established by
the presentation of the birth certificate or other documentary evidence such as a baptismal
certificate, school records and documents of similar nature.
Appellant laments that in rendering a judgment of conviction for two counts of rape against him,
the trial court relied merely on the testimony of Marilou. Appellant’s contentions are not
meritorious. We have to bear in mind that in incestuous rape, the minor victim is at a great
disadvantage because the assailant, by his overpowering and overbearing moral influence, can
easily consummate his bestial lust with impunity. As a consequence, proof of force and violence is
unnecessary unlike where the accused is not an ascendant or blood relative of the victim. Thus,
the failure of the victim to explicitly verbalize, as in this case, the use of force, threat, or
intimidation by the accused should not adversely affect the case of the prosecution as long as there
is adequate proof that sexual intercourse did take place. It is settled that the minority of the
complainant may be established by the presentation of the birth certificate or other documentary
evidence such as a baptismal certificate, school records and documents of similar nature. [PEOPLE
vs. CEA. January 14, 2004]
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
Qualification of witness; Mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a

psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born,
what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the
matter.
The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows
the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and
what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. Eufrecina, being Maryjane's
mother, has had all the opportunity to bear witness to the manifestations of the mental
abnormality afflicting Maryjane since birth, hence, her statements thereon can be believed. And
Dr. Saez corroborated the actuality of her mental retardation. Her feeble-mindedness did not,
however, hamper her ability to communicate her experiences but even provided a spontaneous,
unrehearsed element to her manner of recalling the incident. [PEOPLE vs. SONNY CANON alias
"POGI," . G.R. No. 141519. January 22, 2004.]
Child victim’s testimony is given credence in rape cases; Sweetheart Defense

We have consistently ruled that where, as here, the rape victims are young and of tender
age, their testimonies deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere
fabrication, especially where they have absolutely no ill-motive to testify against the accused. It is
doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court which are supported by evidence,
especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal. This is because the trial court has the advantage of observing the victim’s
demeanor, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie,
the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it,
or the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath. Neither are we convinced by appellant’s
claim that he and Janice were then sweethearts and that when no one was around in their house,
she would oftentimes enter his room and have sex with him. A “SWEETHEART DEFENSE,” to be
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credible, should be substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of the relationship – live
mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. Here, no such evidence was presented by
appellant. Clearly, his alleged romantic relation with Janice was just a figment of his imagination.
However, only reclusion perpetua instead of death penalty must be imposed upon Limos since the
Informations failed to specifically allege the presence of the qualifying circumstance of minority of
the victim and her relationship with the offender. [PEOPLE VS. LIMOS. G.R. NP. 122114-17
January 20, 2004 ]
Child-victim is given full weight and credence, considering that when a woman, specially a
minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was committed; Qualifying Circumstances of minority and relationship must be alleged in the
complaint.
It is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a child-victim is given full weight and
credence, considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. The trial court correctly found that appellant committed
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.The Court likewise sustain the trial court’s imposition
of the death penalty upon appellant being in accordance with Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, quoted earlier. The qualifying circumstances of minority of the
victim and her relationship to the appellant have been specifically alleged in the Amended
Information and duly proved during trial with equal certainty as the crime itself. [PEOPLE vs.
CESAR GLORIOSO LAGRONIO PADILLA. G.R. No. 142899. March 31, 2004] See Also PEOPLE vs.
LOU G.R. NO. 146803 JANUARY 14, 2004 ; PEOPLE VS. RODOLFO ZABALA. G.R. Nos. 140034-
35, August 14, 2003
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION where categorical and consistent and WITHOUT ANY SHOWING OF ILL
MOTIVE on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law.
The denial of the appellant of the crime charged cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses that he and his cohorts killed the victim. Like the defense
of alibi, a denial is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that the appellant was at the scene of the incident
and was one of the victim's assailants. Moreover, denial, being a negative defense, must be
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Otherwise, it would merit no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial
which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Settled is the rule that where there is no
evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit. Moreover, the weight of the testimony of witnesses is not impaired
nor in anyway affected by their relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper
motive on their part. [PEOPLE vs. LACHICA G.R. No. 131915 September 3, 2003]
With the positive identification by eyewitness as being the perpetrator of the crime, the non-
presentation by the prosecution of the weapon used in committing the crime would not at all
be fatal; A medical certificate would be hearsay and inadmissible in evidence without the
affirmation or confirmation on the witness stand of the physician who prepared it and
corroborated by the testimony of the physician who had examined the patient.
It would only show that it was not appellant's service revolver which was used in the
commission of the crime. With the positive identification by eyewitness Joelyn of appellant as

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being the perpetrator of the crime, the non-presentation by the prosecution of the weapon used in
committing the crime would not at all be fatal. Joelyn witnessed at close range the killing of her
sister. Her testimony, an eyewitness account, was found credible by the trial court.The relationship
of Joelyn to the victim would not be a reason to either discredit her or disbelieve her testimony; in
fact, it should be unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone else other than the
actual culprit himself. Nothing was shown to indicate in any way that Joelyn was impelled by
improper motive in testifying against appellant that should thus add to her credibility. A medical
certificate would be hearsay and inadmissible in evidence without the affirmation or confirmation
on the witness stand of the physician who prepared it and corroborated by the testimony of the
physician who had examined the patient. [PEOPLE vs. PO3 ROGER ROXAS y CABASAG. G.R. No.
140762. September 10, 2003.]
RETRACTIONS ARE SUBJECT TO THE TEST OF CREDIBILITY; Qualifying circumstances of

relationship and minority must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the
courts. Like any other testimony, they are subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant
circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand. Courts, therefore,
should devise all the necessary means to ascertain which of the contradictory testimonies
represents the truth. This includes not only noting the demeanor of the witness on the stand but
also the demeanors of those persons present in court. The trial court attributed it to the fact that
when the recantations were made, the victim was under the custody of her mother. They were
tainted testimonies due to pressure from the mother who wanted the appellant
exculpated.Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself, otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its
qualified form. In the case at bar, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was
presented and offered in evidence to prove Michelle's age. Moreover, there is no evidence that said
certificate of birth was lost or destroyed or was unavailable without the fault of the prosecution.
The testimony of Michelle as to her age, even if corroborated by her mother, is not sufficient proof
of minority. Likewise, the relationship between appellant and Michelle was not established with the
same degree of proof. For appellant to be considered the stepfather of the victim, he must be
legally married to her mother. The testimony of Lutgarda and the admission of the appellant
regarding their marriage do not meet the required standard of proof. The best evidence of their
marriage is the marriage certificate itself, absent any showing that the same was lost or destroyed.
Therefore, the appellant can be convicted only of simple rape. [PEOPLE vs. ALEJO. G.R. No.
149370. September 23, 2003.] See Also PEOPLE vs. FONTANILLA. G.R. Nos. 147662-63 August
15, 2003.
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony, REFERRING TO MINOR DETAILS and not upon
the basic aspect of the crime, do not diminish the witnesses’ credibility.
It must be stressed that the situs criminis is not an essential element in rape. The gravamen of the
felony is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private complainant under any of the
circumstances provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Richelle’s mistake
was only minor and collateral to the gravamen of the crime charged. Where the inconsistency is not
an essential element of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing
on the essential fact testified to. It has been held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
testimony, referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime, do not diminish
the witnesses’ credibility. [PEOPLE vs. DOMINGO SABARDAN. G.R. No. 132135. May 21, 2004]
See Also PEOPLE vs. PELOPERO PNP. G.R. No. 126119 October 15, 2003 ; PEOPLE vs.
VILLANUEVA. G.R. No. 139177. August 11, 2003.
Testimonial Evidence; Inconsistencies on minor and TRIVIAL MATTERS SERVE TO STRENGTHEN,

RATHER THAN DESTROY, the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes which
shock the conscience and numb the senses.
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A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony, considering

the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. Thus we have followed the rule in accord
with human nature and experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to
strengthen, rather than destroy, the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes
which shock the conscience and numb the senses. The defense of alibi and denial interposed by
appellant must likewise fail. For alibi to serve as a basis of acquittal it must be established with
clear and convincing evidence, with the requisites of time and place strictly observed. Where the
accused fails to convincingly show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission, as in the instant case, alibi must altogether be rejected.
More importantly, it is long settled that the defense of alibi is the weakest of all defenses and the
same cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. In the instant case, Marilyn
categorically and positively identified appellant as the man who entered their house and, without
any remorse, sexually assaulted her. She could not have been mistaken as to the identity of the
appellant because he was a long-time neighbor. [PEOPLE VS. BALLESTER]
This Court has held that delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults on them
does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. Fear of reprisal
or social humiliation are sufficient explanations. Aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the
information, otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if they are proven
during the trial.[PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO SATIOQUIA G.R No. 125689. October
23, 2003]
Credibility of witnesses; All the persons who obtained and received the CONFISCATED STUFF
did so in the performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence
that the members were inspired by any improper motive.
The appellant contends that contrary to the collective testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, Oliver instigated him to buy marijuana. The trial court erred in not giving credence and
probative weight to his testimony and in considering the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal
unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. The reason for this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide
thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
the proof that the sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti as evidence. In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant sold one (1) kilo of marijuana to poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the entrapment
operation. The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a
complete picture of how the appellant’s illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and how
the sale led to his apprehension in flagrante delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond doubt that
dangerous drugs were in the possession of the appellant who had no authority to possess or sell
the same. More importantly, all the persons who obtained and received the confiscated stuff did
so in the performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit.
[PEOPLE VS. DOMINGCIL. G.R. NO. 140679 JANUARY 14, 2004]
The testimony of a SINGLE WITNESS, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.

Unshaken by rigorous cross-examination, Rocky’s testimony would have been more than
enough to convict Castillo. The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient
to convict. Castillo insists that she took Rocky simply because she missed him, and wanted to spend
time with him. At the same time, in her brief Castillo claims that what spurred her to take Rocky
was her desire to get her unpaid wages from the Cebreros. Castillo also points out that Rocky came
along freely with them, was not harmed, and was even cared for during his detention. This

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argument is pointless. The essence of kidnapping is deprivation of liberty. For kidnapping to exist,
it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where
the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender
forcibly restrained the victim. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home,
even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to
deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the child’s freedom remains at the mercy and
control of the abductor. [PEOPLE vs. ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG. G.R. No.
132895. March 10, 2004]
COMPETENCY OF CHILD WITNESS; Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he
or she can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his or her perception to others, that is,
he or she is capable of relating truthfully facts for which the child is examined.
It is well-established that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he or
she can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his or her perception to others, that is, he or
she is capable of relating truthfully facts for which the child is examined. The requirements of a
child's competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection and
(c) capacity of communication. A child may be a competent witness where he or she has sufficient
capacity to understand the solemnity of an oath and to comprehend the obligation it imposes, and
where he or she has sufficient intelligence to receive just impressions as to the facts of which the
child is to testify and relate them correctly, although he or she is very young.[PEOPLE vs. MAURO
DE JESUS y MAGNAYE. G.R. No. 127878. July 25, 2003.]
Credibility of witness; BIAS; Its presence should be supported by satisfactory proof.

For personal motives on the part of a witness to testify against the accused to be
appreciated as showing bias, its presence should be supported by satisfactory proof. The records do
not yield any satisfactory proof, however, of any such motives on the part of Mariaca. His alleged ill
motives against appellant have been correctly assessed and brushed aside by the trial court, which
had ample opportunity to observe him. [PEOPLE vs. RANIL DUETES. G.R. No. 144598. February 6,
2004]
Rape victim’s are credible witnesses for being “candid, plain, and straightforward.
Appellant argues that Mysan’s claim that he raped her on 3 January 1998 does not jibe
with the results of the medical examination conducted on Mysan on 5 January 1998. The physical
examination of Mysan reveals that she has two hymenal lacerations. One is a “superficial healed
laceration” and the other is a “deep healed laceration.” Appellant’s pretense cannot prevail over
the testimony of Mysan which the trial court found to be “candid, plain, and straightforward.” The
testimony of victims who are of tender age are credible. Besides, we note that Mysan could not
hold back her emotions and cried profusely at certain points during the trial. The spontaneous
crying of a young victim while recounting her heart-rending experience is evidence that speaks well
of her credibility. [PEOPLE vs. ALBERTO LUCERIANO. G.R. No. 145223. February 11, 2004] See
Also People vs. Larry Cachapero G.R. No. 153008. May 20, 2004.
BUY-BUST OPERATION; Testimony of the police officers is accorded full faith and credit because
of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly.
In buy-bust operations, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the
accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have
performed their duties regularly. The presumption is overturned only if there is clear and
convincing evidence that they were not properly performing their duty or that they were inspire by
improper motive. The courts, nonetheless, are advised to take caution in applying the presumption
of regularity. The Court find the testimony of the poseur-buyer clear and credible. He recounted in
full detail how the deal was set by the informant, their initial meeting with De Guzman, their
agreement, the actual exchange and the apprehension of the two accused. Morever, the arguments
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raised by the appellants deserve scant consideration. [PEOPLE vs. MARLOW DE GUZMAN. G.R. No.
151205. June 9, 2004] Correlate with People vs. Tiu G.R. 142885. October 22, 2003.
Testimonial Evidence; The TRUE MEANING OF ANSWERS TO ISOLATED QUESTIONS is to be

ascertained by due consideration of all the questions propounded to the witness and her
answers thereto.
In rape cases, the testimony of the private complainant must be considered and calibrated
in its entirety and not merely by truncated portions or isolated passages. The true meaning of
answers to isolated questions is to be ascertained by due consideration of all the questions
propounded to the witness and her answers thereto. The testimonies of witnesses must no be
merely selected to conveniently suit the claim of a party. It is sound policy that self-contradictions
in testimonies should be reconciled, if possible, the rule being the same as that which obtains
where witnesses apparently contradict each other. These contradictory statements should be
considered in light of explanations and attending circumstances, and whether inconsistencies or
incongruities result from misconception of an innocent witness or willful and corrupt
misrepresentation. [PEOPLE vs. LEONITO LORENZO. G.R. No. 133759-60. October 17, 2003 ]
The victim’s inability to recall the precise dates when the offense was committed is not an
indicia of a false testimony.
The victim’s inability to recall the precise dates when the sexual assaults occurred is not an
indication of false testimony for even discrepancies regarding the exact dates of sexual abuses are
inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness. Date
is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be
accurately stated. This Court has upheld complaints and information in prosecutions for rape which
merely alleged that a rape has been committed "sometime in the month of April 1993," for a rape
committed sometime in 1993; "on or about May 1998," for a rape committed sometime in the first
week of May 1998; and "sometime in the month of September 1998," for a rape committed on an
evening in September 1998. There is no cogent reason to deviate from these precedents. Thus, the
allegations in the Information which stated that two (2) incidents of rape were committed in July
and August 1996 are sufficient to sustain the conviction of appellant. [PEOPLE vs. CIRILO
MACABATA. G.R. Nos. 150493-95. October 23, 2003. ]
This Court has held that delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults on them
does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. Fear of
reprisal or social humiliation are sufficient explanations.
This Court has held that delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults on
them does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. Fear of
reprisal or social humiliation are sufficient explanations. Moreover, Filipinas, especially those in the
rural areas, are by nature shy and coy, and rape stigmatizes the victim, not the perpetrator. A
victim of rape cannot be expected to have the courage to immediately report a sexual assault
committed against her especially when accompanied by a death threat. [PEOPLE vs. SATIOQUIA
G.R No. 125689. October 23, 2003]
Credibility of witnesses; There is no rule that a witness should immediately name the suspect in
a crime.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is in question, the findings of facts of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded by the appellate court
high respect if not conclusive effect, precisely because of the unique advantage of the trial court in
observing and monitoring at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the witnesses as
they testify, unless the trial court has overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts of
substance which if considered might affect the result of the case The credibility of the prosecution
witnesses Ellyn and Roselyn is not adversely affected by their failure to immediately report the

41
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identities of the perpetrators to the responding authorities immediately after the incident.
Indubitably, fear stifled the witnesses from voicing their knowledge of the identities of the
perpetrators. There is no rule that a witness should immediately name the suspect in a crime.
Nevertheless, the delay was not that long as when the police authorities investigated the witnesses
in the afternoon of June 14, 1993 at Brgy. Agutayan, Sta. Barbara, Iloilo, they named appellant and
accused Ronnie Abolidor as two of the perpetrators. [PEOPLE vs. RONNIE ABOLIDOR. G.R No.
147231. February 18, 2004.]
Credibility of witness; Trial judge, having seen and heard the witnesses and observed behavior
and manner of testifying, is in a better position to determine their credibility; Exception is
when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances.
At the outset, we reiterate the well-constructed rule that in reviewing rape cases, the
appellate court is guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (b) due to the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (c) evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Consequently, it is the primordial duty of the
prosecution to present its case with clarity and persuasion to the end that conviction becomes the
only logical conclusion.
The legal aphorism is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration and assessment of
the testimonial evidence of the witnesses, and its conclusion based on its findings, are accorded by
the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial judge, having
seen and heard the witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, is in a better
position to determine their credibility. An exception to this rule is when the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered,
would alter the outcome of the case.After careful review of the records, we find no reason to
reverse the findings of the trial court. Lovely Faith, who was only six (6) years old when the
appellant ravished her, testified in a positive, spontaneous, straightforward and consistent manner
that the appellant satisfied his bestial desires. [PEOPLE vs. ROLANDO LEONOR Y ANDANTE G.R.
No. 132124. June 8, 2004] See Also PEOPLE vs. JUAN G. ESCOTE. G.R. No. 151834. June 8,
2004 Davide Jr.; PEOPLE vs. BERNARDO CORTEZANO G.R. 123140. September 23, 2003 Callejo
Sr.
RULE 131 BURDEN OF PROOF and PRESUMPTION
Burden of Proof; Test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an
action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis
for the relief he seeks to obtain and which party would be successful if he offers no evidence.
The private respondents had the burden of complying with the statutory requirement of serving the
Director of the Bureau of Lands with a copy of their application and amended application, and to
show proof of their compliance because the burden of proof is, in the first instance, with the
plaintiff who initiated the action. The TEST for determining where the burden of proof lies is to
ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts
averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain and which party would be successful if he
offers no evidence.In this case, the personnel of the Land Registration Commission and the CFI are
presumed to have performed their duty of serving a copy of the application and its appendages to
the petitioner. Unless admitted by the respondents, the petitioner should have adduced evidence
the relevant portions of the records. A careful perusal of the records reveals that in its complaint,
the petitioner alleged that the survey plan, Plan (LRC) SWO-150 was not submitted to the Director
of the Bureau of Lands for re-verification and approval as required by law, notwithstanding which
the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the applicants. The private respondents failed to
specifically deny the petitioner’s averment in its complaint that LRC Plan SWO-150 had not been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. The private respondents thereby impliedly
(Criminal
42
EMEDIAL LAW
admitted that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had not approved any survey plan as required by
Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239. [REPUBLIC vs. VDA. DE NERI GR No 139588 March 4, 2004]
RULE 131; The basic rule is for the prosecution, upon which lies the onus, to establish all the
elements of a crime to thereby hold him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Such burden does not
shift as it remains with the prosecution. Tasked with the burden of persuasion, the prosecution
must thus rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; ; A
presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who would be
disadvantaged by a finding of the presumed fact but in criminal presumptions should be taken
with caution
While courts have consistently looked upon alibi with suspicion not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable as a defense, but because it can easily be fabricated, the basic rule
is for the prosecution, upon which lies the onus, to establish all the elements of a crime to thereby
hold him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Such burden does not shift as it remains with the
prosecution. Tasked with the burden of persuasion, the prosecution must thus rely on the strength
of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. Admittedly, the evidence for the
prosecution is circumstantial. On the sole basis of the presumption laid down under above-quoted
Section 3(j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the appellate court affirmed the
conviction of appellant. A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made
from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. It is an “inference
as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with another
which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course of human affairs
ordinarily take.”
A presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who would be
disadvantaged by a finding of the presumed fact. The presumption controls decision on the
presumed fact unless there is counter-proof that the presumed fact is not so. In criminal cases,
however, presumptions should be taken with caution especially in light of serious concerns that
they might water down the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. As special
considerations must be given to the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, there should be
limits on the use of presumptions against an accused.Although possession of stolen property within
a limited time from the commission of the theft or robbery is not in itself a crime, it being possible
to possess the same and remain innocent, such possession may be sufficient for the formation of an
inference that the possessor is the thief unless the evidence satisfactorily proves that the property
was acquired by the accused by legal means. [MODESTO MABUNGA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 142039.
May 27, 2004.]
Presumption of truthfulness engendered by NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS is rebuttable, yielding as it

does to clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Naguiat questions the findings of facts made by the Court of Appeals, especially on the
issue of whether Queaño had actually received the loan proceeds which were supposed to be
covered by the two checks Naguiat had issued or indorsed. Naguiat claims that being a notarial
instrument or public document, the mortgage deed enjoys the presumption that the recitals therein
are true. Naguiat also questions the admissibility of various representations and pronouncements of
Ruebenfeldt, invoking the rule on the non-binding effect of the admissions of third persons. Surely,
there are established exceptions to the rule on the conclusiveness of the findings of facts of the
lower courts. But Naguiat's case does not fall under any of the exceptions. In any event, both the
decisions of the appellate and trial courts are supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws. Moreover, the Court of Appeals, however, is correct in ruling that the presumption
of truthfulness of the recitals in a public document was defeated by the clear and convincing
evidence in this case that pointed to the absence of consideration. This Court has held that the
presumption of truthfulness engendered by notarized documents is rebuttable, yielding as it does
to clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, as in this case. On the other hand, absolutely no
evidence was submitted by Naguiat that the checks she issued or endorsed were actually encashed
or deposited. The mere issuance of the checks did not result in the perfection of the contract of
loan. [NAGUIAT vs. CA G.R. No. 118375. October 3, 2003.]

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The POLICE OFFICERS ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES IN ACCORD WITH
LAW. While such presumption is not conclusive, the appellant was, however, burdened to
dispose of the same by clear and convincing evidence.
The appellant’s reliance on Campos’ answers to questions propounded by his counsel on
cross-examination to support a plea for acquittal is unacceptable. It is hornbook doctrine that a
witness’ testimony must be considered in its entirety and not by truncated portions or isolated
passages thereof. This Court has held that even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and
may even make confused and inconsistent statements. Evidently, the testimony of Campos on
rebuttal, that the buy-bust operation against the appellant on September 11, 1997 was launched
past 1:00 a.m. on to 2:00 a.m., is inconsistent with the testimonies of Aspe, Castro, Aquino and
even Campos himself on the prosecution’s evidence-in-chief that the buy-bust operation against the
appellant on the said date took place at 5:30 a.m. But after calibrating the testimonies of the
witnesses of the prosecution on its evidence-in-chief, vis-à-vis the testimony of Campos on
rebuttal, we find the testimony of Campos on rebuttal unreliable and cannot prevail over his
previous testimony and those of Aspe, Castro and Aquino on the evidence-in-chief of the
prosecution. An allegation of frame-up and extortion by the police officers is a common and
standard defense in most dangerous drugs cases. It is, however, viewed by this Court with disfavor,
for such defenses can be easily concocted and fabricated. To prove such defenses, the evidence
must be clear and convincing. The police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in
accord with law. While such presumption is not conclusive, the appellant was, however, burdened
to dispose of the same by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the evidence of the
appellant is utterly insufficient and unconvincing. [PEOPLE vs. YONG FUNG YUEN. G.R No.
145014-15. February 18, 2004.]
RULE 132 PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
SEC. 9 RULE 132; After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the
witness CANNOT BE RECALLED WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT. The Court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require.
Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that appellant had not
been given the opportunity to cross-examine the lone prosecution witness. In the absence of cross-
examination, which is prescribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept, the direct
examination of the witness should have been expunged from the records, in which case, the trial
court would have had no valid basis to deny the demurrer to evidence. [PEOPLE vs. MARLON
ORTILLAS. G.R. No. 137666 May 20, 2004]
Section 22 of Rule 132; The court may validly DETERMINE FORGERY from its own independent
examination of documentary evidence at hand.
The finding of forgery was based on a comparison of the deceased's purported signatures on
the assailed Special Powers of Attorney and the latter's signature appearing on a private document.
Indeed, the factual conclusion of forgery could have drawn more support from other corroborating
evidence such as testimonies of handwriting experts or witnesses familiar with the deceased's
handwriting. It must be emphasized, however, that the lack of such evidence is the result of the
agreement of petitioners and respondent to submit the case for decision on the basis of their
pleadings and documents. There is, therefore, a clear attempt by petitioners to capitalize on what
was a mutual agreement to dispense with a trial on the merits. The same, however, is unavailing,
because the lack of testimonial evidence by no means disturbs the finding of forgery. It bears
stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own independent examination
of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without necessarily
resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or
dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned
signatures with those of the currently existing ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or

(Criminal
44
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proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.” [LEON AND LOLITA ESTACIO vs. ERNESTO
JARANILLA. G.R. No. 149250. December 8, 2003.]
FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE; Waiver of this procedural error by failing to make a timely
objection.
The time-tested rule is that alibi cannot prevail over the positive assertions of prosecution
witnesses, more so in this case where appellant failed to prove that he was at another place at the
time of the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
crime scene. It is apparent that appellant's defense rests mainly on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. It is settled, however, that, when the issue of credibility of a witness is
involved, the appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering
that the latter was in a better position to resolve the matter, having heard the witness and
observed his deportment during trial, unless certain facts of value were plainly ignored, which if
considered might affect the result of the case.
What made their testimonies even more credible was the fact that both Alfredo and
Virgilita had no ill-motive to testify against appellant and his co-accused. It has been our consistent
ruling that a witness' testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to
show any improper motive why he should testify falsely against the accused, or why he should
implicate the accused in a serious offense. Further, the relationship of Alfredo and Virgilita to the
victims all the more bolstered their credibility as they naturally wanted the real culprits to be
punished. It would be unnatural for the relatives of the victims in search of justice to impute the
crime to innocent persons and not those who were actually responsible therefor. [PEOPLE vs.
WILLIAM ANCHETA. G.R. No. 143935. June 4, 2004]
RULE 133 WEIGHT and SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Denials are self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the positive,
straightforward and unequivocal testimony of the victim.
The credibility of Ivee's testimony cannot be assailed by the inconsistency between her
testimony during the preliminary investigation, that she was made to lie down before the appellant
ravished her. There is evidence on record that the appellant enveigled Ivee into having sexual
intercourse with him by assuring her that because he was already too old, she would not get
pregnant, and even offered to give her money. The appellant's denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of Ivee. Denials are self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the
positive, straightforward and unequivocal testimony of the victim. When the offended parties are
young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence
to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the
shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which
they testified is not true. Considering that the victim was of tender years and not exposed to the
ways of the world, it is improbable that she would impute a crime as serious as rape to the
appellant, her maternal grand uncle. [PEOPLE vs. FLORENTINO BASCUGIN. G.R. No. 144195. May
25, 2004] See Also PEOPLE vs. NESTOR G. SORIANO alias "Boy,". G.R. No. 142565. July 29,
2003.
Self defense is as weak as alibi.

Like alibi, self-defense is a weak defense because it is easy to fabricate. When the accused
interposes self-defense, he thereby admits having killed the victim. The burden of proof is shifted
on him to prove with clear and convincing evidence the confluence of the essential requisites of a
complete self-defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution; because even if the
prosecution’s evidence is weak, the same can no longer be disbelieved. The appellant failed to
discharge his burden. The trial court found the collective testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution to be credible, while those of the appellant and Evangelista, incredible and barren of

45
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probative weight. The legal aphorism is that the factual findings of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight is given high
respect if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which if considered will alter the
outcome of the case. We have meticulously reviewed the records and found no reason to deviate
from the factual findings of the trial court. The flight of the appellant, his throwing away the knife
used to stab the victim, his failure to report the stabbing and to surrender himself to the police
authorities and to thereafter claim that he killed Betita in self-defense, all these belie his claim
that he killed the victim in self-defense. [PEOPLE VS. CAJURAO. G.R. NO. 122767 January 20,
2004]
Defense of Alibi is inherently weak; Specifics of the alibi dovetail together too neatly to
deserve credence.
It is doctrinal that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of testimonies is accorded the
highest respect, for it has the untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the
witnesses and thus to determine whether they are telling the truth. As against the positive
identification by Brazal, all that Homer and Manuel could offer in defense were alibi and denial.
After a careful review of the records, we agree with the trial court that their version of the
incident is far from credible. Such defense is considered inherently weak and constitutes an
"unstable sanctuary for felons" because of the facility with which it can be concocted. Between the
positive and categorical narrations of Brazal and the negative averment of appellants, the former is
entitled to greater evidentiary weight. This principle holds true especially in this case, in which the
specifics of the alibi dovetail together too neatly to deserve credence. Furthermore, the alibi is
supported solely by appellants themselves. [PEOPLE vs. HOMER MAGDARAOG. G.R. No. 151251
May 19, 2004] See Also PEOPLE vs. CARAANG; PEOPLE VS. AÑORA. G.R. NO. 136741. JULY 17,
2003; PEOPLE vs. PRIETO G.R. No. 141259 July 18, 2003.
Positive identification prevails over the defense of alibi or denial; Jurisprudential rules and
precepts guide this Court in assessing the proffered defense.
His narration of how he had opened the window after hearing two shots was clear and
straightforward. This was a natural human reaction under the circumstances, especially since
Pactor was seated right next to the window. It is axiomatic that positive identification — when
categorical, consistent and showing no ill motive on the part of the witness testifying on the matter
— prevails over the alibi and the denial proffered by the accused.
Jurisprudential rules and precepts guide this Court in assessing the proffered defense. One,
alibis and denials are generally disfavored by the courts for being weak. Two, they cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. Three, for alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the crime was
committed, but also that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission. Fourth, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply
corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses. Fifth, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on
the credibility of witnesses, and the assessment made by the trial court — unless patently and
clearly inconsistent — must be accepted. [PEOPLE vs. LOLITO ESTOYA. G.R. No. 153538. May 19,
2004.] See Also PEOPLE vs. ANTONIO COMADRE. G.R. No. 153559. June 8, 2004.
Evidence gives rise to two possibilities, one consistent with the accused's innocence and the
other indicative of his guilt, that which favors the accused should be properly considered.
It is constitutionally mandated that the accused be accorded the presumption of innocence.
The burden of proof rests on the State to establish every circumstance which proves his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. This exacting standard of proof acquires more relevance in rape charges
which are easy to make but hard to prove and harder still to defend by the party accused who may
be innocent. In the present case, however, a careful review of the evidence compels us to take
exception to the aforesaid rule.
(Criminal
46
EMEDIAL LAW
We have repeatedly stressed that the resolution of a rape case often hinges on the
credibility of the victim. If her testimony does not meet the test of credibility, the acquittal of the
accused is inevitable. Complainant's failure promptly to report her agonizing experience to the
authorities, or at the very least to her family, despite all the opportunities to do so, also seriously
affects the veracity of her narration. She stated that it took her four months before divulging the
incident because she feared threat to kill her elder sister. However, she admitted that she had
many relatives living in the same neighborhood where she resided. Furthermore, she kept silent and
did not protest when appellant slept overnight in their house on the same floor where she slept,
while her parents slept downstairs. In view of the foregoing, we find the prosecution's evidence
insufficient to prove appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court, in holding for
conviction, relied on the praesumptio hominis that no young Filipina would cry rape if it were not
true. However, its decision totally disregarded the paramount constitutional presumption that an
accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise. Where the evidence gives rise to two
possibilities, one consistent with the accused's innocence and the other indicative of his guilt, that
which favors the accused should be properly considered. [PEOPLE vs. ROEL MENDIGURI.NG.R.No.
127128, August 15, 2003]
RULE 133, SEC. 2; Burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The guilt of an accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the cardinal rule in our
adversarial system of justice. Before he is convicted, there should be moral certainty - a certainty
that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it. Absolute
guarantee of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person of a criminal charge but there
must, at least, be moral certainty on each element essential to constitute the offense and on the
responsibility of the offender. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is meant to be that, all things given,
the mind of the Court can rest at ease concerning its verdict. In criminal cases, the burden is on the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. It must do so on the
strength of its own evidence and not merely rely on the weakness of the defense. In this case,
while defense evidence merely consisted of denial and alibi, we find that the prosecution also
failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of appellants’ innocence. [PEOPLE vs. LINO
ABUJAN alias “EKE” . G.R. No. 140870. February 11, 2004]See Also PEOPLE vs. VICTOR B.
AÑORA. G.R. No. 136741 July 17, 2003.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction.

Direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime
charged; it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The prosecution is burdened to prove the
essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each
being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to
but one conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to
be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the
prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the
prosecution. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
[PEOPLE vs. DARILAY G.R. Nos. 139751-52 January 26, 2004.] See Also PEOPLE
vs.MAGALONA.G.R. No. 143294. July 17, 2003 ; PEOPLE vs.ESTILLORE. G.R. No. 140348. July
18, 2003 ; PEOPLE vs. VILLANUEVA. G.R. No. 138364 October 15, 2003.
Circumstantial Evidence; The pieces of circumstantial evidence must also constitute an

unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion: that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.

47
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To be sufficient for a conviction, circumstantial evidence must prove that (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The pieces of circumstantial evidence must also constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion: that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is
the guilty person. The circumstantial evidence in the instant case is not sufficient to show that
appellant is guilty of carnapping. On the contrary, the records and the transcripts of stenographic
notes of the proceedings cast doubt on the correctness of the trial court’s conclusion that after
stabbing Payla, he fled on board the motorcycle or was the last person seen with it. Thus, appellant
should not be held liable for carnapping. It is settled that procedural rules are applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time they were approved, especially when they are more
favorable to the accused. In the absence of any qualifying circumstance, appellant may be
convicted of homicide only. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal [PEOPLE vs. ELGIN LATAYADA G.R No. 146865. February 18,
2004]

(Criminal

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1

Case San Beda College of Law

DUTY OF THE TRIAL COUT TO ISSUE WRIT OF POSSESSION

Duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial.

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

RULE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

Litigation should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits.

RULE 2 CAUSE OF ACTION

RULE 3 PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

RULE 6 KINDS OF PLEADINGS

RULE 8 MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS

RULE 9 EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

RULE 10 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

Amendment to conform to evidence

RULE 13 FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS, AND OTHER PAPERS

REMEDIAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

Rule that pre- trial is mandatory admits of exceptions

REMEDIAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

RULE 35 SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RULE 37 NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

RULE 38 RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS

RULE 39 EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS

Judgment; In an ejectment suit, judgment is binding against a trespasser or squatter although

RULE 42 PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE RTC TO THE CA

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

RULE 43 APPEALS FROM THE CTA AND QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES TO THE CA

RULE 45 APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SC

Certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 should be distinguished from certiorari as an

RULE 47 ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS

RULE 57 PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

Preliminary attachment; Attachment is a juridical institution intended to secure the outcome of

RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Resolution of Comelec and Commission on Audit may be brought to the SC on certiorari.

REMEDIAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

Certiorari CANNOT BE AVAILED OF AS A SUBSTITUTE for the lost remedy of an ORDINARY

RULE 68 FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE

There is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure of mortgage.

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

REMEDIAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

Aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information, otherwise, they cannot be

REMEDIAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

Rule 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

Rule 113 ARREST

REMEDIAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any formula but is to be

The Court understands the importance of BUY-BUST OPERATIONS as an effective method,

Rule 114 BAIL

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS

Rule 115 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Rule 116 ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

Alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed and

REMEDIAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

Rule 117 MOTION TO QUASH