[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003.

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Complainant sought the disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyer's Oath relative to the criminal case for
estafa, which he filed against the latter's client. According to the complainant he withdrew his complaint against the
respondent's client in exchange for respondent's personal check which he later found to have been drawn on a closed account.
Complainant claimed that he refused to accept the said check as settlement of the civil liability of respondent's client, but the
respondent assured him that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. He alleged that the respondent
ignored his repeated demands for payment. When directed to comment on the administrative complaint against her, the
respondent refused to receive the notices served on her.

The Supreme Court found the respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath for which she was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. According to the Court, the breach of trust committed by
respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath for which she should be
accordingly penalized. Such an act constitutes gross misconduct. A lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt
validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer's professional and
personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. Moreover, respondent's persistent refusal to
comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct, which merits no
compassion. The Court cannot tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled "People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused." During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused,
tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine
National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but
respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer,
she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the
check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of
the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.

When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: "Account Closed."
On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check. However, his
demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September
22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against
respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit and
violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondent's given address at Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot,
Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice. 4 However, it was returned
unserved with the notation "Moved". The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of respondent as
274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed against her was
served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the notation: "Refused". Thus, the case was referred to
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years.

On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of settlement for the civil
liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment.
In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew
against a closed account.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a
violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized. Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties
for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. — A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this qualification is
a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer's moral character in
serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law.

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment, because it is
important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality. Any wrongdoing which
indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a
lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well
of a member of the bar, for a lawyer's professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion.

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful
character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of
respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly
questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her
profession.

Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of the
law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law
when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional
Responsibility could not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondent's persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation for
doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her
clients. We cannot tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5687. February 3, 2005.]

FELIX E. EDQUIBAL, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR., respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

In a letter-complaint under oath dated January 8, 2002, Felix E. Edquibal, complainant, charged Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr.,
respondent, with professional misconduct and neglect of duty.

Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of respondent to assist his mother Ursula Edquibal in cases she filed against his
sister Delia Edquibal-Garcia involving a certain real property in Masinloc, Zambales. His mother obtained favorable judgments in
four (4) out of the five (5) cases handled by respondent. However, in Civil Case No. RTC-1495-I (filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 70, Iba, Zambales), the trial judge rendered a decision adverse to his mother. Respondent then advised complainant to
appeal to the Court of Appeals and that the cost involved is P4,000.00. When complainant informed respondent that he does not
have enough money, the latter said P2,000.00 would be sufficient for the moment. After receiving the money from complainant,
respondent told him just to wait for the result. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65019.

When complainant failed to hear from respondent in January 2001, he went to the Court of Appeals to follow-up the appealed
case. He then learned that the appeal was dismissed for failure of the appellant to file the required appellant's brief.

In his comment dated June 2, 2003, respondent denied that he filed an appeal, on behalf of complainant's mother, with the
Court of Appeals or received P2,000.00. What happened was that complainant told him that there is someone in the Court of
Appeals who can help him regarding his appeal. Respondent claimed that he "did his best" for complainant's mother and did not
even ask for attorney's fees.

On July 30, 2003, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation dated March 19, 2004, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid, IBP Commissioner, made the following
findings:

"It is clear from the records of this case that per the records of CA-G.R. CV No. 65019, Respondent is the counsel of record of
defendants-appellants therein (including Complainant's mother). In the Resolution dated 31 August 2000, it was explicitly noted
that '(N)otice sent to counsel for defendants-appellants requiring him to file appellant's brief within forty-five (45) days from
receipt thereof was received by him on March 16, 2000.' If it is true that Respondent never agreed to handle the appeal, upon
receipt of said notice, Respondent should have immediately manifested to the Court of Appeals that he is not handling the
appeal on behalf of said defendants-appellants. Thus, Section 2, Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that '[T]he
counsel and guardians ad litem of the parties in the court of origin shall be respectively considered as their counsel and
guardians ad litem in the Court of Appeals.' By failing to do so, the Court of Appeals had every reason to assume that he was
likewise representing defendants-appellants in the appeal. Accordingly, his failure to timely file the required appellants' brief
resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.

The facts of this case clearly show that Respondent violated Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ('CPR').

Undoubtedly, Respondent's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of Complainant
(Complainant's mother) caused the latter material prejudice. It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's
cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due
diligence or abandons his client's cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed in him by the latter. . . ."

Atty. Villadolid recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be reprimanded "for failure to act with reasonable
diligence in representing the cause of complainant;" and that respondent be directed to "return the amount of P2,000.00 as and
by way of restitution to complainant."

In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-383 dated July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Atty. Villadolid, thus:

"RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of the Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the respondent's
failure to act with reasonable diligence in representing the cause of complainant, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr., is hereby
REPRIMANDED and Ordered to Return the amount of P2,000.00 by way of Restitution to complainant."

We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty recommended.
Records show that respondent was the counsel of record for the appellants, complainant's mother and other relatives in CA-G.R.
CV No. 65019. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2000 clearly states that the "notice sent to counsel for
defendants-appellants requiring him to file appellant's brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof, was received by him
on March 16, 2000." However, respondent failed to file the appellants' brief despite receipt of such notice.

Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 2. Counsel and guardians. — The counsel and guardians ad litem of the parties in the court of origin shall be respectively
considered as their counsel and guardians ad litem in the Court of Appeals. When others appear or are appointed, notice thereof
shall be served immediately on the adverse party and filed with the court.

If it were true that respondent did not agree to represent the appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019, why did he not file with the
Court of Appeals a motion to withdraw as their counsel? Obviously, his negligence, which resulted in the dismissal of the appeal,
caused prejudice to his clients. Likewise, respondent's failure to inform complainant of the status of his mother's appeal is
inexcusable.

It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a need for the client to be
adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be left groping in the dark, for to do so
would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in
general.

Respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:

"Canon 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.

Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to his
client's request for information."

Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence." A lawyer serves
his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to
the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill,
and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in
the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.

The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights." All that is required
is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard,
respondent's failure to attend to his client's appeal is clearly wanting.

In People v. Cawili, we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary period is an offense that
entails disciplinary action. People v. Villar, Jr. characterized a lawyer's failure to file a brief for his client as inexcusable neglect. In
Blaza v. Court of Appeals, we held that the filing of a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to
the court. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilaban reiterated Ford v. Daitol and In re: Santiago F. Marcos in holding that an
attorney's failure to file brief for his client constitutes inexcusable negligence.

In cases involving a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other pleading before an appellate court, we did not hesitate to suspend the
erring member of the Bar from the practice of law for three months, six months, or even disbarment in severely aggravated
cases.

Accordingly and considering the circumstances of this case, we find a need to scale the recommended penalty upward. Here, we
are convinced that respondent deserves the penalty of suspension for three (3) months.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR. is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct and neglect of duty. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall
be dealt with more severely. He is further DIRECTED to return immediately to the complainant the amount of P2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 6788. August 23, 2007.]

DIANA RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, respondent.

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

THE COMPLAINT
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions
against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt
for P5,000 only.

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed
her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that
the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent
charged her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases
in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the
Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).

RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start. In fact, he first met
the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan,
Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses. Because he was with the
PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined. Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty.
Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner. Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was
unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon. Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly
remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the complainant
asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her to
account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping. Because the complainant was a friend, he
agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO. A few months later or in September 1994, the complainant again asked
respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare
the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.

RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the
complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and
recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.

The CBD noted that the receipt was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO. It also noted that
respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these
reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected
respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request. It found respondent guilty of violating the
prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries. The CBD
concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.
However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him to immediately return
to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of
P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount,
an additional suspension of six months.

THE COURT'S RULING

We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are
expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the
bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of
profession is prohibited. Section 7 (b) (2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official
and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict with their official function.

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the
work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still
connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent's admission
that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship
between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a
government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free
legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. . . .

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal,
civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the
office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1. — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions
blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his
legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's
counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also
surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place
he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses.
He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings
that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one
occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the
amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor
of the client) nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). Nevertheless,
respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept
them.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer's oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal
rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1062. July 31, 2000.]

MS. ALICE DAVILA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSELITO S.D. GENEROSO, respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1260. July 31, 2000.]

DR. LETICIA S. SANTOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSELITO S.D. GENEROSO, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Two letter-complaints were sent to the Office of the Court Administrator complaining of undue delay in the disposition of their
respective cases before the sala of respondent Judge Joselito S.D. Generoso Presiding Judge of Branch 34 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City. The Court issued several resolutions requiring respondent judge to comment on the complaints
against him, but respondent repeatedly failed to comply with the said resolutions. The Court Administrator recommended the
dismissal from the service of respondent judge, with forfeiture of all benefits and leave credits and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

The Supreme Court upheld the recommendation of the Court Administrator. According to the Court, the failure of respondent
judge to comply with the show-cause resolutions constitutes "grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness
of the honor and integrity attached to his office." The Court noted that respondent judge was afforded several opportunities to
explain his failure to decide the subject cases long pending before his court and to comply with the directives of the Court, but
he had failed, and continued to fail, to heed the orders of the Court; a glaring proof that he has become disinterested in his
position in the judicial system to which he belongs. Respondent judge's failure to decide the cases in question within the
reglementary period of ninety (90) days from their date of submission in itself constituted gross inefficiency and was violative of
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The separation of the respondent judge from the service is indeed warranted,
if only to see to it that the people's trust in the judiciary is maintained and speedy administration of justice is assured.

DECISION

The office of a judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors. A judge is required to decide cases before him
with dispatch, mindful that delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith of the people in the judicial system. A judge who
cannot comply with such a sworn duty should not serve the judiciary any longer.

Administrative Matter No. MTJ-95-1062 was commenced by a letter-complaint sent to the Court Administrator by Ms. Alice
Davila (complainant Davila), complaining of undue delay in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 12293 before respondent
Presiding Judge of Branch 34 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Complainant Davila alleged that subject criminal
case was deemed submitted for decision way back on February 16, 1993 but has remained undecided.

In a 1st Indorsement dated May 30, 1994, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis (DCA Abesamis) required the
respondent judge to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice. In view of the failure of respondent judge to
comply with the said 1st Indorsement, Reynaldo L. Suarez (DCA Suarez), successor of DCA Abesamis, sent a First Tracer warning
the respondent judge that should he fail to comment he (DCA Suarez) will recommend resolution of the Complaint without
respondent's comment.

On October 11, 1995, the Court Administrator received a letter from complainant Davila, dated September 7, 1995, requesting
information as to the status of her subject complaint against the respondent judge. Thereafter, DCA Suarez recommended to the
Court that respondent judge be made to explain his failure to decide subject Criminal Case No. 12293 and to comply with the
directives of the Court Administrator in connection therewith. HTDCAS

Acting thereupon, the Court issued the following Resolutions, to wit:

1. Resolution, dated December 11, 1995, requiring respondent judge to

"(a) EXPLAIN his failure to decide Crim. Case No. 12293; and (b) SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with
or held in contempt for failure to comply with the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator requiring him to inform said
Office of his comment/action on the complaint of Alice Davila, both within ten (10) days from notice hereof."

2. Resolution, dated October 7, 1996, requiring the respondent judge, anew, to comment on the subject complaint within fifteen
(15) days from notice;

3. Resolution, dated August 13, 1997, requiring, for the last time, the respondent judge to comply within ten (10) days from
notice with the aforesaid Resolution of December 11, 1995; otherwise, the same complaint will be decided on the basis of the
pleadings and records on hand;
4. Resolution, dated January 21, 1998, requiring the respondent judge to show cause why he should not be dealt with
disciplinarily or held in contempt for failure to comment on subject complaint of complainant Davila and to comply with the
resolution of August 13, 1997, within ten (10) days from notice;

5. Resolution, dated October 5, 1998, requiring respondent judge to comply with the resolution of January 21, 1998, within ten
(10) days from notice, under pain of appropriate disciplinary action; and

6. Resolution, dated March 17, 1999, requiring respondent judge to show cause why he should not be dealt with more severely
for failure to comply with the Resolution, dated December 11, 1995, and to file the required comment within ten (10) days from
notice.

Administrative Matter No. OCA IPI 97-251-MTJ was commenced by the letter-complaint of Dr. Leticia S. Santos complaining of the
delay in the resolution of her case pending before the respondent judge. She stressed that Civil Case No. 11072, a simple case of
ejectment, was submitted for decision on June 28, 1995 but as of June 17, 1996, the case had not been decided.

In a 1st Indorsement dated June 20, 1996, DCA Suarez required respondent judge to comment on the said complaint within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof. Absent any Comment filed, DCA Suarez sent a 1st Tracer, with the follow-up letter of Dr. Santos
thereto attached, requiring the respondent judge to comply with the 1st Indorsement of June 20, 1996 within five (5) days;
otherwise, the case would be submitted for the consideration of the Court.

On March 17, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate Administrative Matter No. OCA IPI 97-251-MTJ with Administrative Matter
No. MTJ-95-1062.

It bears stressing that, in the above-cited Resolutions dated August 13, 1997, January 21, 1998, October 5, 1998, and March 17,
1999, respectively, respondent judge was required to comment on the Complaint and to explain his failure to comply with the
directives of the Court. But as in the former case, the respondent judge utterly failed to heed the orders of the Court.

The Court Administrator recommended the dismissal from the service of respondent judge, with forfeiture of all benefits and
leave credits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporation.

After a careful study, and considering the failure of respondent judge to explain the undue delay in the disposition of subject
cases before his court and his repeated failure to comply with the orders issued in connection therewith, the Court finds merit in
the recommendation of the Court Administrator.

The failure of respondent judge to comply with the show-cause resolutions aforecited constitutes "grave and serious misconduct
affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office." It is noteworthy that respondent judge was
afforded several opportunities to explain his failure to decide the subject cases long pending before his court and to comply with
the directives of the Court, but he has failed, and continues to fail, to heed the orders of the Court, a glaring proof that he has
become disinterested in his position in the judicial system to which he belongs.

It is beyond cavil that the inability of respondent judge to decide the cases in question within the reglementary period of ninety
(90) days from their date of submission, constitutes gross inefficiency 18 and is violative of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides that "[a] judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods."

The separation of the respondent judge from the service is indeed warranted, if only to see to it that the people's trust in the
judiciary be maintained and speedy administration of justice be assured.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Joselito S.D. Generoso is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and
leave credits, and with disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any office in the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 6249. October 14, 2004.]

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, complainant, vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J p:

In a Verified Complaint filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on January 25, 1993, complainant Social Security
Commission (hereafter the Commission, for brevity) sought to disbar respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral for preparing, notarizing,
and filing with the Commission's Regional Office in Bacolod City two complaints allegedly executed and verified by people who
have been long dead.

The Commission alleged that respondent filed the first spurious complaint on April 18, 1986, on behalf of one Hermogenes
Bareno. The complaint was signed by respondent himself, but appeared to have been verified by Bareno with a thumbmark and
acknowledged before respondent on April 16, 1986. Later, upon investigation, it was discovered that Bareno had died two years
earlier.

The second spurious complaint, for its part, was filed on September 10, 1987, on behalf of one Domingo N. Panadero, under
similar circumstances. The complaint was likewise signed by respondent himself and likewise appeared to have been verified by
Panadero with a thumbmark and acknowledged before respondent shortly prior to filing. When this complaint was investigated,
it was discovered that Panadero had also died long before.

Adding to these charges, the Commission filed on May 16, 1994, a Supplemental Complaint. The Commission added that on July
12, 1990, respondent had filed a third similarly spurious complaint. Like the other two complaints, the third complaint was
signed by respondent himself and likewise appeared to have been subscribed and sworn to before him in Bacolod by the
purported complainant, one Catalino de la Cruz, who, upon being investigated, declared in an affidavit that he had never been to
Bacolod City for the last ten years, that he had never verified any such complaint, and that he did not even know who
respondent was.

Claiming that respondent was liable for misconduct and unethical practice of law, the Commission prayed in both its Verified
Complaint and Supplemental Complaint that respondent be disbarred and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys.

In his Comment, respondent argued that since Hermogenes Bareno's impostor had Bareno's Social Security System (SSS) card,
Domingo Panadero's impostor had Panadero's SSS FORM E-1, and Catalino de la Cruz's impostor had an ID, he could not be
faulted for not investigating further into their identities. He argued he had sufficiently complied with his obligations as notary
public when he relied only on what they had presented, especially since they sought only the preparation of simple, but justified,
complaints for remittance of unpaid SSS premiums.

After investigating the matter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued on September 27, 2003,
Resolution No. XVI-2003-175 recommending that respondent be disbarred. The IBP resolution reads:

RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-175

CBD Case No. 232
Social Security Commission vs.
Atty. Napoleon Corral

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering Respondent's violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by failure to fulfill his duties
and responsibilities as a lawyer and as a Notary Public, Atty. Napoleon Corral is hereby DISBARRED.

The Resolution, now before the Court for final action pursuant to Sec. 12 par. (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, is well taken.

Respondent failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his duty under Section 1(a) of Public Act No. 2103, which
requires a party to any document notarized by a notary public to personally appear before the latter. Bareno, Panadero, and de la
Cruz did not personally appear before respondent. The death certificates presented show that both Bareno and Panadero had
long been dead, while de la Cruz's unrebutted affidavit proves he had never been to Bacolod City where he supposedly verified
the complaint. It is a mystery, then, how respondent, in notarizing the complaints, could have certified that Bareno, Panadero
and de la Cruz personally appeared before him and swore to the truth of the facts stated in the complaints.

Respondent did not clarify whether the forms of identification presented to him and on which he relied were valid IDs. He never
expounded on what documents Bareno's impostor presented or on what kind of ID de la Cruz's impostor showed him. An
examination of said SSS Form E-1, presented to him by Panadero's impostor, also shows that it is only a statement of a member's
beneficiaries and does not, in any way, tend to prove that the bearer is the member whose name appears on said form.
Respondent did not even state what precautions he took to ascertain the identities of those who appeared before him. He
asseverated that it was sufficient that he relied on some form of identification, especially since he was merely notarizing simple
complaints for remittance of unpaid SSS contributions. Respondent failed to realize that the complaints he had prepared and
carelessly notarized would haul the prospective defendants in those complaints to the Commission and cause them to spend
valuable time and incur expenses in their defense. Such jaunty indifference betrays his deplorable failure to heed the importance
of the notarial act and observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties as a notary public. It is
noteworthy to stress here that a notary public is duty bound to require the person executing a document to be personally
present, to swear before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same.

Respondent is reminded that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or
jurat is sacrosanct. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Being a lawyer, respondent has a graver
responsibility because of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is
mandated to discharge his duties, which are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest, with accuracy and
fidelity.

By recklessly notarizing the complaints without ascertaining that Hermogenes Bareno, Domingo Panadero, and Catalino de la
Cruz were indeed personally appearing before him to attest to the contents and truth of what were stated in the complaints he
prepared, respondent undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents. He breached Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Serious doubts exist in his fitness to continue as a member of an esteemed and honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, for violating Public Act No. 2103, Section 1(a) and the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty.
Napoleon Corral's notarial commission, if still extant, is INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED.

Respondent is further DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of copy of this Resolution why he should not
be disbarred.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004.]

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON B.
MELGAR, complainants, vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and
Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.

Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court Judge, abandoned his legal wife,
Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G. Marcos; respondent
and Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente
declared in the birth certificates of their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that their two
children are legitimate, while in respondent's Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections,
respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondent's certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections, he
declared his civil status as separated; such declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy
are acts constituting falsification of public documents; and respondent's acts betray his lack of good moral character and
constitute grounds for his removal as a member of the bar.

Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who are his political opponents in Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them; complainants illegally
procured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence;
respondent did not participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of subject birth certificates;
respondent never declared that he had two wives, as he has always declared that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V.
Valderia; and complainants have used this issue against him during elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still
elected him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the public's sense of morality.

The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.

Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo, submitted their affidavits as their direct testimony and were
subjected to cross-examination by respondent's counsel.

Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows: He knows respondent for they both reside in Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has been cohabiting
openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife, and from their cohabitation,
they produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza. Sometime in 1995, he (witness Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing him that respondent was
married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his wife to cohabit with
Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil Register attesting to the
marriage between respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also received information from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela
Fuente is also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a Certification from the Office of the Civil Register.
Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas
Valderia. In respondent's Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his civil status as separated.
Respondent has represented to all that he is married to Marilyn dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where
respondent holds the position of Chairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as
husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.

On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He was the former mayor of Naujan and he and respondent belong to
warring political parties. It was not respondent who told him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of the present case.
Although he received the letter of a concerned citizen regarding the immoral conduct of respondent as far back as 1995, he did
not immediately file a case for disbarment against respondent. It was only after respondent filed a criminal case for falsification
against him that he decided to file an administrative case against respondent.

On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people who were against the open relationship between
respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent had been publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact that they
are both still legally married to other persons, and so someone unknown to him just handed to their maid copies of the birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.

The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony, is practically identical to that of witness Melgar.
On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as somebody just
gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a concerned citizen regarding
respondent's immorality was sent to Melgar, but he did not take any action against respondent at that time.
Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted by respondent's
counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudez
informing Nelson Melgar of respondent's immoral acts, the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan,
attesting to the celebration of the marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia, the Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza, the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent dated March 9, 1995, the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 25, 1998, Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated between
Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos, and the editorial page of the Naujanews (February–March 1999 issue), wherein it was
stated that respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.

Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a memorandum expounding on his
arguments that the testimonies of complainants' witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary
evidence have no probative weight.

On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY
from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and
has abandoned such immoral course of conduct.

Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, upon which the above-quoted Resolution
was based, read as follows:

FINDINGS:

The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a) the testimonies of Nelson Melgar and Romeo
Laygo given by way of affidavits executed under oath and affirmed before the Commission and b) their documentary evidence
consisting of their Exhibits "A" to "H".

Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or offer any evidence. Respondent opted not to
present his evidence anymore because according to him "there is none to rebut vis-à-vis the evidence presented by the private
complainants." Respondent instead submitted a memorandum through counsel to argue his position. As can be seen from the
comment and memorandum submitted, respondent's counsel argues that the complaint is politically motivated since
complainants are political rivals of respondent and that the birth certificates Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which were offered to show
that respondent sired the children namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza out of his cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible because they were allegedly secured in violation of
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to respondent.

The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand, categorically state in their affidavits [Exhibits "A"
and `B"] particularly in paragraph 2 that "Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente,
representing themselves to be husband and wife." In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the witnesses also categorically state that
"respondent has even represented to all and sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife." These categorical statements made
under oath by complainants are not hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not to rebut them.

Exhibit "E," the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows that respondent is married to one, Felicitas V. Valderia. As
shown by Exhibit "H", a marriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G. Marcos. Duly certified true copies
of said exhibits have been presented by complainants.

With respect to Exhibits "D" and "D-1", we believe that they are competent and relevant evidence and admissible in this
proceedings. The exclusionary rule which bars admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to evidence
obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. The instant case cannot be analogous to an illegal search or seizure. A person
who violates Rule 24 of Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty of imprisonment or
payment of a fine but it does not make the document so issued inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present
case. Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore competent evidence to show paternity of said
children by respondent in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and
corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a certain Marilyn
de la Fuente who is not his wife and that out of said cohabitation respondent sired two children. These facts we repeat have not
been denied by respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the basis of the improper motivations and the
inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of the documents presented. Complainants have presented evidence sufficient
enough to convince us that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not his wife. The evidence
taken together will support the fact that respondent is not of good moral character. That respondent chose not to deny under
oath the grave and serious allegations made against him is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped his position
before the Commission. As between the documents and positive statements of complainants, made under oath and the
arguments and comments of respondent submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under oath by respondent
himself, we are inclined and so give weight to the evidence of complainants. The direct and forthright testimonies and
statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente is not hearsay.
The witnesses may have admitted that respondent Mendoza did not tell them that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his
paramour (for why would respondent admit that to complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their affidavits under
oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is not respondent's wife. Again their categorical statements
taken together with the other documents, are enough to convince us and conclude that respondent is not of good moral
character.

Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral character is a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining
in the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181
SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage" [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)].

In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the fundamental institution of marriage. Respondent in
fact even so stated in Exhibit "F" that he is separated from his wife. This fact and statement without any further explanation from
respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral character which good moral character we repeat is a continuing condition
for a member to remain in good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent has violated this rule against engaging in immoral conduct.

We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs. Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts
should not be used by private persons particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar through
unjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case the charges can hardly be considered as unfounded or unjust
based on the evidence presented. The evidence presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral
character necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He is therefore not entitled to
continue to engage in the practice of law.

We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the pleadings and evidence on record, and, hence,
approve and adopt the same.

The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings which is only
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conviction.

Witness Melgar's testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife is corroborated by the
contents of an article in the Naujanews, introducing respondent as one of Naujan's public servants, and stating therein that
respondent has been blessed with two beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente. 13 It should be noted that said
publication is under the control of respondent, he being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it could be reasonably
concluded that if he contested the truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did not wish to publicly
present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered that the damning portions of said article to be edited out.

With regard to respondent's argument that the credibility of witnesses for the complainants is tainted by the fact that they are
motivated by revenge for respondent's filing of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses Melgar and Laygo
are so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be discounted as they are fully supported and corroborated by
documentary evidence which speak for themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and
Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza
and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in
its records of an entry of a marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public
documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as provided for under Article 410 14 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.

Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn
Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1993, which provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. —

(1) The records of a person's birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information relating thereto shall be issued except on
the request of any of the following:

a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;

b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or other official proceedings to
determine the identity of the child's parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and

c. in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.

(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at least two months or a fine in an amount
not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue.
The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for
having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on
confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render
said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of
evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In
People vs. Hipol, we explained that:

The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of
Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by
any department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The
alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the
ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures. CDAHIT

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against
respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the
exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be
properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.

Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela
Fuente Mendoza and respondent's Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself declared he was
married to Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public documents sufficiently prove
that he fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that
time.

In Bar Matter No. 1154, 17 good moral character was defined thus:

. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.

In Zaguirre vs. Castillo, we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:

. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a
conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit with a
woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent should keep in
mind that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is
also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr., we emphasized
that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at
all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of
the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he
has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.

Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last known address and entered in his record as attorney.
Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the Court Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for their information and
guidance as well as for circularization to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 6441. October 21, 2004.]

VIOLETA R. TAHAW, complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS P. VITAN, respondent.

TINGA, J p:
A lawyer must at all times comport himself in a manner befitting a member of this noble profession and worthy of his esteemed
position in society. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the Bar. Thus, any indicia of erosion in the dignity of the profession will be dealt with accordingly by this Court.

In a Complaint dated 11 March 2002, Violeta R. Tahaw claimed that she secured the services of respondent for filing the
appropriate action for the partition of a real property located in Makati City sometime in 1999. As agreed upon, petitioner
delivered to respondent four (4) checks in the total amount of P30,000.00 representing payment of the latter's professional fee.
However, after almost a year without petitioner hearing from respondent about the case he would file in court, petitioner sent
respondent a letter-inquiry as to the status of the case. Respondent assured complainant that he had already filed the
appropriate case in Makati. Not convinced by her counsel's assurance, complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of Court of
Makati City to check if a case was indeed filed by respondent for and in her behalf.

A Certification dated 15 August 2000 issued by the assistant Clerk of Court of Makati City confirmed complainant's suspicion that
respondent did not file the case as agreed upon. She wrote respondent informing him that she is terminating the latter's services
as counsel and demanded the refund of the P30,000.00. Respondent failed to refund the aforesaid amount, and complainant
was thus prompted to seek the assistance of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The IBP, responding to complainant's predicament and wrote respondent two (2) letters, informing the latter of complainant's
grievance and asking his position thereon. Respondent, through a letter to the IBP, claimed that the problem arose from a
miscommunication between client and counsel. In addition, respondent insinuated that the case he was supposed to file for the
complainant was complicated by the filing of other earlier complaints which he was not privy to. He promised to refund the
complainant the P30,000.00.

The IBP acknowledged receipt of respondent's response and instructed him to issue six (6) postdated checks, each in the amount
of P5,000.00 and dated a month apart, and to deliver the same to the IBP's office to facilitate the return of the P30,000.00 to
complainant. Despite the instruction, respondent failed to refund the amount to complainant, and succeeded only in having
complainant go back and forth to his office. Complainant once more wrote to respondent regarding the checks, only to be told by
respondent that he will just send the checks through his secretary. Complainant then filed a complaint for disbarment or
suspension with the IBP.

For his part, respondent denied that he obligated himself to file the partition case upon receipt of the P30,000.00 as claimed by
complainant. He averred that the said amount represents consultation fees, research fees, and minimal acceptance fees. He
stated that complainant failed to disclose to him circumstances which would have adverse effects on the case sought to be filed
and that when he confronted complainant about these, the latter became "lukewarm." Furthermore, he claimed that he asked
complainant for the filing fees but the latter "dilly-dallied" and after a while he received a letter terminating his services. In fact,
complainant had already affixed her signature to the complaint but was probably swayed by other advisers not to proceed with
the case and instead pursue the refund of the P30,000.00.

On 27 November 2003, IBP Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommendation to the IBP Board of
Governors. As per the report, respondent's agreement to represent complainant in the partition case intended to be filed was
established. Likewise, the report pointed out the inconsistency between respondent's statement in his Answer denying that he
obligated himself to file the case upon receipt of P30,000.00 and complainant's dilly-dallying in giving him the amount for filing
fees, as against his assurances to complainant that the case was already filed. The report noted that respondent's failure to reply
to or deny complainant's allegation in her letter terminating his services was an admission that he miserably failed to diligently
attend to the latter's case. Finally, the report stated that respondent failed to comply with his commitment to return the
P30,000.00. Considering that the amount was paid by the complainant for his professional services which he miserably failed to
perform, the same must be returned to complainant without delay. The report recommended that respondent be reprimanded
and admonished to be more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

On 27 February 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A;" and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, considering that a lawyer should
refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him
by his client, Atty. Jeremi[as] P. Vitan is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the
performance of his duty to his clients and Ordered to Immediately Return the amount of P30,000.00 to complainant.

After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, the Court agrees with the IBP in its findings and conclusion that
respondent has been remiss in his responsibilities. However, this Court holds that the appropriate sanction should be a
suspension for a period of six (6) months.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." In the case of Aromin v. Atty. Boncavil, this Court held:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client save, by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.

The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in a lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them.
To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that complainant wanted to partition a parcel of residential land owned in part by
her deceased husband, Simeon Tahaw, Sr. Allegedly, Simeon owed complainant sums of money which the former failed to pay, as
a result of which, complainant filed a case against him. To settle the case, the spouses entered into an agreement dated 27 May
1987 wherein Simeon Tahaw, Sr. and complainant agreed that a specific forty (40) square meter portion of the same parcel of
land "shall pass on to complainant as her exclusive property to the exclusion of all other heirs." When Simeon died, complainant
went to respondent to seek the partition of the same parcel of land with the forty (40) square meter portion thereof awarded to
her.

It is an elementary principle in civil law that every donation between the spouses during the marriage is void. The agreement
relied upon by complainant for the proposed partition case partakes the nature of a donation by Simeon of a part of his
undivided share in the property. Hence, the agreement is void and cannot be the source of any right in favor of complainant. The
partition case was premised on a void agreement and thus could not prosper.

Even if complainant did not disclose the previous litigation and agreements between her and her deceased husband, respondent
would eventually find out, as in fact he did, about it in the course of drafting the proposed complaint. Any lawyer worth his salt
would know that the partition case sought to be filed would have no basis and would not prosper. Respondent should have
immediately appraised complainant on the lack of merit of her case. Instead, he asked for money for filing fees, and worse,
pretended to have filed the complaint.

Clearly, respondent's protestations that the delay and eventual non-filing of the case for complainant was due to the latter's fault
fall flat in view of the circumstances surrounding the case. Complainant's assertion that respondent reassured her that the case
had already been filed remains uncontroverted by the latter. Why would respondent lead complainant to believe that a case has
been filed, and why would the latter expect that it be filed, if as respondent claims, he was still waiting for the filing fees from the
complainant? Moreover, in his letter to the IBP dated 29 November 2000, respondent stated that he was willing to arrange for
the refund of the P30,000.00 as he "in conscience cannot file a case merely just for the sake of filing a case to earn [a] few
bucks." If respondent believes that complainant's case appeared hopeless, why did he not advise her so? Why did he let the
matter drag until this very proceeding before he explained the non-filing of the proposed case?

When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion.
Thus, when respondent's services were engaged by complainant, the former took it upon himself to perform the legal services
required of him. In the instant case, however, respondent seemed to have forgotten his sworn duty after he received the money
from his client.

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a "lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession." The strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. For this reason, this
Court has been exacting in its demand of integrity and good moral character of the members of the Bar. As explained in Sipin-
Nabor v. Atty. Baterina:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of the members of the Bar. A lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in
the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar must
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to
the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, members
of the legal fraternity can do nothing that might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the profession.
Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care, and if he should do any less, then
he is not true to his lawyer's oath. 28 The records of the case clearly show that respondent failed to live up to the duties and
responsibilities of a member of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias P. Vitan is hereby found GUILTY of violation of Canons 7 and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for his failure to file the necessary pleading for his client's case and for the failure to return and
immediately deliver the funds of his client advanced for the purpose of filing the said case, upon demand, and even after his
commitment with the IBP to do so. The respondent is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months effective from the date
of promulgation hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same and similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Vitan is ORDERED to immediately RETURN the amount of P30,000.00 to complainant.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Vitan's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 6442. October 21, 2004.]

HON. MARIANO S. MACIAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALANIXON A. SELDA, respondent.

PUNO, J p:
For violation of the lawyer's oath, Judge Mariano S. Macias, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga
del Norte, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Petition for Administrative Discipline against Atty. Alanixon A.
Selda.

The facts are undisputed. On January 24, 2000, respondent Selda withdrew as counsel for one Norma T. Lim, private protestee in
Election Case No. SE-01 entitled Ruth Maraon v. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, Salud, Zamboanga del Norte, and Norma T.
Lim for Annulment of Election, etc. He basically submitted as ground for his withdrawal that he could not cope up with the pace
of the proceedings in view of his workload. He claimed that the hearings of the election protest case would run from 2:00 p.m. to
5:00 p.m. and he still had to attend to his other cases including classes at Philippine Advent College, which start at 5:30 p.m. on
Mondays and Wednesdays.

In light of these representations, complainant granted the Motion and ordered respondent relieved of all his responsibilities as
counsel for private protestee. However, on May 22, 2000, respondent executed an affidavit disavowing his grounds for
withdrawing as counsel for private protestee. He swore that he only filed the Motion on account of the pre-judgment of the case
by complainant, who, on several occasions insinuated to him that his client would lose in the protest. He stated that he was
convinced that chaos would result if his client were unseated, and withdrawal from the case was his best recourse.

On the basis of respondent's affidavit, his former client and private protestee in subject election protest case, moved for the
inhibition of complainant. On June 2, 2000, complainant granted the motion for his inhibition if only to disabuse any doubt on his
impartiality. But on August 23, 2000, this Court set aside complainant's inhibition after finding no strong and valid reason
therefor, and directed him to continue hearing the case and to resolve it with reasonable dispatch.

Deploring the act of respondent as "serious deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct as a lawyer and in utter violation of the
lawyer's oath," complainant requested the IBP to investigate the matter and recommend to the Court an appropriate penalty
against respondent. On January 30, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to answer. He failed.

On November 21, 2003, after several postponements filed by the parties, their failure to personally appear before the IBP
investigating commission, and the request of complainant to resolve the case on the basis of the pleadings, Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

The Board, in its Resolution No. XVI-2004-122 dated February 27, 2004, adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Maala. It reduced the suspension of respondent to six (6) months; hence, the transmittal of
the case and its records to this Court for final resolution pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court, viz:

Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. — . . . (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,
determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

We affirm the findings of the IBP on the culpability of respondent.

All members of the legal profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia, "do no falsehood" and "conduct [themselves] as [lawyers]
according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients." These
particular fundamental principles are reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically:

Canon 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by an artifice.

When respondent executed his affidavit of May 22, 2000 retracting his reason for withdrawing as counsel for Norma T. Lim, he
acknowledged, under oath, his misrepresentation. He misled the court in clear violation of his oath as lawyer and failed to abide
by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer. In fact, this obligation to the bench for candor and
honesty takes precedence. Thus, saying one thing in his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Private Protestee and another in his
subsequent affidavit is a transgression of this imperative which necessitates appropriate punishment.

The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts
of the case. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, viz:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The circumstances in this case demand that respondent be imposed suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. This
serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the court, the legal profession and the public. For indeed, "if respect for the
courts and for judicial process is gone or steadily weakened, no law can save us as a society."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the February 27, 2004 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 02-921 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Alanixon A. Selda is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, to commence
upon receipt of this Decision. He is further sternly warned that a repetition of a similar offense will call for a more severe
consequence.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of respondent with the Office of the Bar Confidant. Likewise, let
copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all its chapters, and to all the courts in the land.

[A. C. No. 3523. January 17, 2005.]

RASMUS G. ANDERSON, JR., petitioner, vs. ATTY. REYNALDO A. CARDEÑO, respondent.

AZCUNA, J p:
For resolution is an administrative case against Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeño for malpractice and neglect of duty, stemming from his
alleged neglect or deliberate mishandling of a case involving herein petitioner, resulting to the latter's prejudice.

After receipt of the complaint and the corresponding comment thereto, this Court, on October 17, 1990, referred the matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 6, 1998, this Court received a Manifestation from the IBP Investigating Commissioner Victoria Gonzales de los Reyes
stating that when the case was referred to the IBP, the same was initially handled by Commissioner George Briones. In view of
the fact that the case had only been recently re-assigned to her, she needed time within which to investigate as well as prepare
the required report and recommendation.

Thereafter, on March 13, 2001, Commissioner de los Reyes submitted her Report and Recommendation to the IBP Board of
Governors. In turn, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIV-2001-187, dated April 29, 2001, remanding the Report
and Recommendation to the Investigating Commissioner, requiring the latter "to make the recommendation clearer and review
the report."

Upon review of the records, the Investigating Commissioner affirmed her findings and maintained her recommendation. In turn,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted the said report, with a modification of the recommended penalty of three months
suspension, to a penalty of six months suspension, from the practice of law.

The records show the following antecedent facts:

Complainant Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., an American citizen from Kodiak, Alaska, USA, filed an action before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), to recover title and possession of a parcel of land against the spouses Juanito Maybituin and Rosario
Cerrado, and Fernando Ramos. The case was dismissed by the trial court, which declared the defendants the true and lawful
owners of their respective portions of the land in question.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), 3rd Civil Cases Division, in AC-G.R. CV No. 68459, modified 1 the decision of the trial court,
stating:

WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby modified by ruling that the respective Torrens Titles in the names of the defendants spouses
Maybituin and Fernando Ramos are maintained at this stage but without prejudice on the part of the plaintiff to institute an
action for reconveyance thereof after determining his rightful share from the estate of his late father.

Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

The CA judgment was not appealed and, thereafter, it was duly entered.

On February 16, 1985, Anderson, Jr., through his counsel Atty. Cesar S. de Guzman, filed an Amended Complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, docketed as Civil Case No. 0110-B, entitled "Rasmus Anderson, Jr.,
Plaintiff v. Spouses Juanito Maybituin and Rosario Cerrado, et al., Defendants."

It was at this stage of the proceedings when Atty. Cesar S. de Guzman died. Anderson, Jr. was now without a counsel to represent
him. Upon referral by a friend, Anderson, Jr. engaged the services of herein respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeño.

On July 19, 1990, Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., filed an administrative complaint before this Court wherein he alleged that
respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeño caused "the loss" or the adverse ruling against him in the aforementioned case before the
RTC, Civil Case No. 0110-B. Specifically, complainant alleged the following:

1.) That when the respondents in the civil case filed a Demurrer to Evidence, Atty. Cardeño did not file an opposition thereto and
did not appear at the formal hearing set for the purpose of considering the merits of the demurrer. Thus, in addition to finding
merit in the demurrer, the trial court, noting the non-appearance of Atty. Cardeño, assumed that even he, the plaintiff's counsel,
appeared convinced that there was merit, validity and reasonableness in the demurrer filed;

2.) That after the trial court issued an Order finding the respondents' demurrer to evidence meritorious, Atty. Cardeño did not
even file a Motion for Reconsideration thereof, which in turn caused the same order to become final and executory;

3.) That even prior to the above events and in view of what the complainant perceived to be respondent lawyer's loss of interest
in the case, complainant verbally told Atty. Cardeño to withdraw as his counsel. However, Atty. Cardeño allegedly insisted on
continuing to represent the complainant as the case was already in its closing stage.
Complainant concludes that Atty. Cardeño abused his client's trust and confidence and violated his oath as a lawyer in failing to
defend his client's cause to the very end. Complainant prays that Atty. Cardeño be disbarred.

When asked to comment, Atty. Cardeño replied:

1.) That complainant was being ungrateful to him. In the first place, he was only asked by a good friend of the complainant
Anderson, Jr., to step into the shoes of the latter's deceased counsel. He accommodated the request and took the case, even
without personally meeting the complainant, as the latter was residing in the United States;

2.) That as a client, complainant Anderson, Jr., did not give him full cooperation. Although voluminous records were turned over
to him, they were "in disarray". Atty. Cardeño alleges that when he began representing the complainant in court, he had to
"proceed and appear with only half the information[] and background[] of the case, and not knowing the person he was
representing." He allegedly did his best to familiarize himself with the case, although there were several questions left
unanswered by the complainant's good friend;

3.) That their first meeting happened at the time he was about to present their last witness. At that time, Anderson, Jr.'s
deposition had already been taken by his former counsel, now deceased. Atty. Cardeño then asked Anderson, Jr., about the
regularity of the taking of said deposition, and the latter assured him that his former counsel had exhaustively examined him and
that said deposition had been regularly taken;

4.) That the same was the first and only occasion when he personally met complainant. At no time during said meeting did
complainant ask him to withdraw from the case;

5.) That from the records he had on hand, and based on the reputation of complainant's deceased counsel, Atty. Cardeño saw no
need to present complainant again to testify in court. This was also in view of the fact that complainant was then in a hurry to
leave the country, and also because of complainant's assurances that the deposition previously made would suffice;

6.) That it was a "big surprise" for him later to discover that the taking of the deposition was irregular as it was done without the
presence of counsels and parties, and without the proper notices. This led the other party to file a demurrer to evidence;

7.) That the "biggest blow and surprise" to him was when he was approached by "good friends" of the complainant and these
friends told him that "they have good access and have made arrangements with the Presiding Judge." He was asked by these
friends to prepare the motion for reconsideration, which he "obligingly did" and thereafter he gave said motion to these friends,
for them to file. However, these friends did not furnish or return a copy of said motion for his files and reference;

8.) That true to his oath as a lawyer, Atty. Cardeño considers the representations of the complainant's good friends to be in bad
taste; that he "could not join complainant's good friends in their plans to corrupt" the judge; that he considers this course of
action of these friends of the complainant to imply that "he is no longer needed as a lawyer and that they have made their own
ways";

9.) That because of these actions of the friends of the complainant which respondent considers contrary to his duty as an officer
of the court, and also against the respect due to the courts, respondent asked to be relieved of his duties as counsel but said
request was refused.

Thus, respondent Atty. Cardeño concluded that complainant cannot accuse him of deliberately causing their defeat in the case
when he, Atty. Cardeño, did his best with such little information, support and cooperation given by the complainant and the
latter's friends. It was in fact complainant and his friends who chose to take "another path" to deal with the case. Complainant,
he claims, erroneously thinks that a lawyer must do everything, even crooked or illegal acts, in order to win a case. Atty. Cardeño
then asserted that he has to uphold his oath as a lawyer and so he refused when complainant's friends proposed to employ acts
to corrupt the judge or proceed with the case in dubious ways.

In the aforesaid Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Victoria G. de los Reyes, it was found:

After having considered the position taken by each party in the instant case, this Commission has arrived at a conclusion that
there is apparent lack of interest on the part of the Complainant to further pursue his case. The complainant could have
appeared personally and present his evidence or could have his deposition taken to support the allegations contained in his
complaint. What he did was just to send a representative by the name of Bienvenido Maregmen. Clearly, this is not sufficient to
show the needed enthusiasm and interest to support his accusations against the respondent.

We sustain the respondent in his position that he should be given the opportunity to confront the complainant and cross-
examine him. Here, the complainant failed to appear despite the several settings of hearings in this case. Based on this alone,
this Commission could have recommended the dismissal of the instant complaint for failure of the complainant to substantiate
his charges against the respondent.
However, the respondent has indubitably failed to perform an obligation which he owed to his client, the herein complainant.
The respondent himself categorically stated in his Comment filed with the Honorable Supreme Court on October 2, 1990 that he
prepared a Motion for Reconsideration in the case entitled "Rasmus Anderson v. Juanito Maybituin, et al.", Civil Case No. 0110-B,
then pending in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 67-Binangonan. But that certain "good friends" of the complainant made
representations to him that they already made arrangements with the presiding judge who they claimed had already been
"bought". Respondent allowed these persons to take over in the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration and did not even bother
to check with the Court if the same has been filed or not.

Clearly, the respondent was guilty of neglect of duty and this is a violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Ethics, which
provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence; particularly, Rule 18.03 thereof which states that "a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable". He
likewise breached his duty to the Honorable Supreme Court to report "corrupt" judges for appropriate disciplinary action with
the aim of improving the quality of justice and in helping restore the people's faith in our judicial system.

As aforestated, the IBP Board of Governors thereafter issued Resolution XVI-2004-68 dated February 27, 2004, which ". . .
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner . . . , finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondent's
violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility . . ." recommended that Atty. Reynaldo Cardeño be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be warned that a graver penalty would be imposed should he
commit the same offense in future.

This Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.

It is undisputed that Atty. Cardeño was engaged by the complainant as counsel. By accepting the case, respondent should have
known the attendant responsibilities that came with the lawyer-client relationship.

These imperatives were pointedly explained in Pariñas v. Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto:

Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of his client. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is
an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has
the duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and
ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case.

A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the
task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept only as
much cases as he can efficiently handle, otherwise his clients' interests will suffer. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the
qualification to handle the legal matter. He must also give adequate attention to his legal work.

The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost learning and ability in handling his cases. A license to practice law is a
guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee possesses sufficient skill, knowledge and diligence to manage [his] cases.
The legal profession demands from a lawyer the vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family. 7

Thus, respondent's defenses that the complainant was "uncooperative" as a client, that the voluminous records turned over to
him were in disarray, and that the complainant did not disclose to him certain particulars of the case, are all unavailing.

First, it was incumbent upon Atty. Cardeño to insist on his client's participation in the proceedings in the case. While the
complainant shares the responsibility for the lack of communication between lawyer and client, Atty. Cardeño should not have
depended entirely on the information his client gave or the time his client wished to give them. As a lawyer representing the
cause of his client, he should have taken more control over the handling of the case. Knowing that his client was based in the
United States should, with more reason, have moved him to secure all the legal means available to him either to continue
representing his client effectively or to make the necessary manifestation in court, with the client's conformity, that he was
withdrawing as counsel of record. That his client did not agree to terminate his services is a mere allegation that has not been
substantiated.

Thus, in view of the fact that he remained counsel of record for the complainant, it was highly irregular for him to entrust the
filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to other people who did not lawfully appear interested in the subject litigation.

In the same case of Paguinto, citing Gamalinda v. Alcantara, this Court stated:

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He shall serve
his client with competence and diligence, and his duty of entire devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but entitles him
to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to
enable the latter's cause to succeed. An attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer until his
effective release from the case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. During that period, he is
expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's interests may require.

The Court therein declared that a lawyer's failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code. It added that the said rule is clear in its
mandate that a lawyer should not undertake a legal service that he is not qualified to render, nor should a lawyer handle any
legal matter without adequate preparation. A lawyer has the duty to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed and he
should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, for his negligence shall render him liable.

From the records it is evident that Atty. Cardeño has fallen short of the professional standards this Court has set for members of
the Bar. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty subjects him
to disciplinary action. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar
always to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence of the public.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeño is hereby found guilty of violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his lawyer's oath. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice and is
WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5580. June 15, 2005.]

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by REBECCA V. LABRADOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B.
ROMANILLOS, respondent.

This is a Petition for disbarment against Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for using
the title "Judge" despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.
The facts are as follows:

In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation
Commission (HSRC) in a case against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's
Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI
submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a
school site.

While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAI's conformity to
construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano.

When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in
behalf of Montealegre. Petitioner's Board of Directors terminated respondent's services as counsel and engaged another lawyer
to represent the association.

Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014 entitled "San Jose
Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc." filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a
disbarment case against respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4783. iatdc2005

In her Report 4 dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made the following findings:

. . . Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well that the Montealegre case
was adverse to the Complainant wherein he had previously been not only an active board member but its corporate secretary
having access to all its documents confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the implementation of the writ of
execution against its developer and owner, Durano and Co. Inc.

Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant Durano and Co. Inc., Lydia Durano-Rodriguez; the
conflict of interest between the latter and the Complainant became so revealing and yet Respondent proceeded to represent the
former.

xxx xxx xxx

For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasn't controverted by the Complainant which was his first
offense; Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error subject to the condition that should he commit
the same in the future; severe penalty will be imposed upon him.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that respondent should observe
extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold its dignity and integrity beyond reproach.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which we
noted in a resolution dated March 8, 1999.

Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of Appeals and
this Court and even moved for the execution of the decision.

Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and
for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge" although he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct.

Respondent used the title "Judge" in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which was erected in several areas
within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001.

In his Comment and Explanation, respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against petitioner
despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the second disbarment case was filed. He maintained
that the instant petition is a rehash of the first disbarment case from which he was exonerated. Concerning the title "Judge",
respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition he had ceased to attach the title to his name. CaAcSE

On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. reported that respondent did not violate the admonition because it referred
to future cases only and not to cases subject of A.C. No. 4783. Besides, petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent's
continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez on appeal until the case was terminated.
The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed that respondent was deceitful when he used the title "Judge", thus creating a
false impression that he was an incumbent.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus:

In view of the foregoing considerations, this Commissioner respectfully recommends the following penalty range to be
deliberated upon by the Board for imposition on Respondent: minimum penalty of reprimand to a maximum penalty of four (4)
months suspension. It is further recommended that in addition to the penalty to be imposed, a stern warning be given to
Respondent in that should he violate his undertaking/promise not to handle any case in the future where the Complainant would
be the adverse party and/or should he again use the title of "Judge" which would create an impression that he is still connected
to the judiciary, a more severe penalty shall be imposed on him by the Commission.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

The IBP Board of Governors approved with modification the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondent's violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Roberto
Romanillos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that should he violate his
undertaking/promise a more severe penalty shall be imposed against him.

Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted by Lydia Durano-Rodriguez and the
Montealegres. Respondent was admonished yet he continued to represent Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI. SDEHIa

It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent's continued representation of Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2)
or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically
mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.

We agree with the IBP that respondent's continued use of the title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement or
claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge
is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when
he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege. AIDTSE

Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge
Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been dismissed from the
service had he not resigned.

In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. We, ruled thus:

Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of grave and serious misconduct
affecting his integrity and honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal. However, respondent, in an obvious attempt to
escape punishment for his misdeeds, tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case. . . . Consequently, we are now
precluded from dismissing respondent from the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People v. Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]),
wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before the case could be resolved, finds application in this case. Therein it was
held that the rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an administrative case renders the case moot and
academic, is not a hard and fast rule. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave and serious misconduct
which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case, and it
appearing that respondent has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent with the
penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra.), hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to
which herein respondent Judge Romanillos may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations.

SO ORDERED.
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he
may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including
government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title 'Judge' is one of such privileges.

We have previously declared that the use of titles such as "Justice" is reserved to incumbent and retired members of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any other official of the Republic, including
those given the rank of "Justice". By analogy, the title "Judge" should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and retired, and not
to those who were dishonorably discharged from the service. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the
right to retain and use said title applies only to the aforementioned members of the bench and no other, and certainly not to
those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent.

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not
only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession.

To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be
overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law," it is
imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in
the legal profession.

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. We are mindful that the power to disbar must always be exercised
with great caution, for only the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar.

This is not respondent's first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal profession. He was stripped of his
retirement benefits and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos. In A.C. No. 4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition.
Considering his previous infractions, respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra fervor and
vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the
laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer
of the court. His disbarment is consequently warranted.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in respondent's record as a, member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.