Sunteți pe pagina 1din 15


- versus -



Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit facilities of herein respondent, Banque
Nationale de Paris (BNP). BNP and Proton subsequently entered into three trust receipt agreements.

Under the terms of the trust receipt agreements, Proton would receive imported passenger motor
vehicles for sale and hold them in trust for BNP. Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the
sale and return the unsold motor vehicles.

BNP, before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) filed a complaint against Proton praying that they be
ordered to pay some of money plus accrued interest. The Makati RTC Clerk of Court assessed the docket
fees based on the amounts prayed for which BNP paid.

To the complaint, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that BNP failed to pay the
correct docket fees to thus prevent the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
Furthermore, petitioners submit that pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 7 the complaint should
have been dismissed for failure to specify the amount of interest in the prayer. Additionally, petitioners
point out that the clerk of court, in converting BNPs claims from US dollars to Philippine pesos, applied
the wrong exchange rate

Makati RTC denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss, stating that although the payment of the proper
docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the
same within a reasonable time within the expiration of applicable prescription or reglementary period.
CA denied the petition for reconsideration.


W/N the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by BNP’s failure to pay the correct docket


The Court ruled that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which turned
out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing
what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.

Domingo Carabeo entered into a contract denominated with Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco
whereby petitioner agreed to sell his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of unregistered land situated
in Purok III, Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for ₱38,000.

Respondents were later to claim that when they were about to hand in the balance of the purchase price,
petitioner requested them to keep it first as he was yet to settle an on-going "squabble" over the land
and register it first.

Thereafter, respondents learned that the alleged problem over the land had been settled and that
petitioner had caused its registration in his name. They thereupon offered to pay the balance but
petitioner declined, drawing them to file a complaint for specific performance before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan.

Petitioner countered in his Answer to the Complaint that the sale was void for lack of object certain, the
kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the land. After the case was submitted for
decision, petitioner passed away. The records do not show that petitioner’s counsel informed the court,
where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper substitution was effected in accordance
with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court.

Thereafter, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents. Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial court.


W/N the proper substitution of parties after the death of a party should be effected before rendering


It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court
was not informed of petitioner’s death, it may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without
ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner’s legal representatives
or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned.

In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan, whereas
petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo,
however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return the
money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property rights, it survives.

In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice
of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased
client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial court’s
decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.


City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five parcels of land
located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels
of land, were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Manila RTC rendered its judgment declaring the
five parcels of land expropriated for public use.

The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution, but the RTC denied the motion for
having been "filed out of time." Hence, the petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage
constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents' loan. After holding the public auction,
the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder.

Claiming a deficiency amounting, the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such deficiency in the
Makati RTC. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint. Makati RTC denied the respondents'
motion to dismiss.

The respondents then filed their reply, in which they raised for the first time their objection on the
ground of improper venue. They contended that the action for the recovery of the deficiency, being a
supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was a real action that should have
been brought in the Manila RTC because Manila was the place where the properties were located.
Makati RTC denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration, since the said ground was not raised
in the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. CA granted the petition for certiorari of the respondents stating
that the venue of an action for recovery of deficiency must necessarily be the same venue as that of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.


W/N the case was filed in an improper venue.


It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The
determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court
and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that
affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action.

Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title
to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.

Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought Civil in the Makati RTC because Makati was the
place where the main office of the petitioner was located.
Moreover, the Makati RTC observed, that it would be improper to dismiss the case on the ground of
improper venue considering that the respondents had not raised such ground in their Motion to
Dismiss. We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be
waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section
1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
- versus -


Margarita Marquez Alma Jose sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by
deed of conditional sale two parcels of land.

After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendors
undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla
did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens
System, and, instead, began to improve the properties with the intention of converting the parcels of
land into a residential or industrial subdivision.

Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the in
Malolos, Bulacan RTC. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred
by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss. However, upon her motion for reconsideration,
the RTC reversed itself, opining that Javellana is not bound to comply with the terms of the deed of
conditional sale for not being a party thereto.

Javellana moved for reconsideration while Priscilla countered that the order was not appealable; that
the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping. It appears that
pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the grant of the motion
to dismiss and orders dismissing his complaint.

On his part, Javellana countered that he was not guilty of forum shopping because the issue of
ownership raised in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 was different from the issue of grave abuse of discretion
raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.


W/N Javellana is guilty of Forum Shopping.


NO. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties,
identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other,
there is forum shopping.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts
and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly,
it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues
were raised, and two objectives were sought.
Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his
judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC; but his
petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject
property and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved, as the CA
explicitly determined in its decision.



From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with
medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the
respondent's hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent has unpaid purchase. Both parties
entered into an agreement, whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim and allowed the latter to pay
on installment basis.

However, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new administration had reviewed their
contracts and declined to recognize the agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of
Trustees. Due to the respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum
of money in the RTC.

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Thereafter,
respondent filed and answer admitting and denying the allegations in the complaint but did not tender
any issue as to such allegations. Hence, the petitioner filed his reply after which a filed its Motion for
Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of
its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations.

RTC issued the order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings of the petitioner opining
that the allegations stated on the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, are evidentiary in nature,
the Court, instead of acting on the same, hereby sets the case for pre-trial, considering that with the
Answer and the Reply, issues have been joined. The petitioner assailed the denial in the CA on certiorari.
CA affirmed RTC’s judgment.


W/N the petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted because of the
respondent’s failure to tender an issue.


YES. The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when
the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are
considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the
defending party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.

The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there are
issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not depends on how
the defending party's answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. The defending
party's answer either admits or denies the allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate facts the answer admit, being undisputed, will not
require evidence to establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations of ultimate facts the answer
properly denies, being disputed, will require evidence.
We should emphasize that in order to resolve the petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the respondent, the answer was the sole basis
for ascertaining whether the complaint's material allegations were admitted or properly denied. The
CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled
through trial on the merits.


The Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) is a domestic corporation operating as a

business development and investment company.

In 2000, several stockholders of STRADEC executed Pledge Agreements whereby they pledged a certain
amount of their stocks in the said company to United Resources Asset Management, Inc. (URAMI) to
secure a loan. One of the stockholders of STRADEC who so pledged his shares in STRADEC was
petitioner Aderito Z. Yujuico. Apparently, STRADEC had not been able to comply with its payment
obligations under the Loan Agreement.

STRADEC and its stockholders received a notice informing them about an impending auction sale of the
stocks pledged to satisfy the loan. The notice was sent and signed by respondent Atty. Richard J.
Nethercott (Atty. Nethercott), who claimed to be the attorney-in-fact of URAMI.

In the complaint, petitioner questioned the planned auction sale because of the supposed lack of
authority of Atty. Nethercott. More than a year later, URAMI later on admitted in its answer filed with
the RTC that Atty. Nethercott had no authority. URAMI, however, pointed out that it similarly cannot be
held liable to the petitioner for any prejudice that may be caused by the conduct of such auction sale

Petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for summary judgment, in view of the admissions made by
URAMI. The resolution of petitioner's motion for summary judgment, however, was deferred by a TRO.

On 26 January 2009, URAMI changed its counsel of record with Atty. Edward P. Chico (Atty. Chico).
Under the counsel of Atty. Chico, URAMI filed, with the RTC an amended answer with compulsory

In its amended answer, URAMI claimed that the auction sale was valid and that it duly authorized Atty.
Nethercott to initiate such sale on its behalf.

Petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration of the order allowing admission of
URAMI's amended answer. RTC issued an order granting petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
setting aside its earlier order allowing admission of URAMI's amended answer. In the said order, the
RTC explained that the amended answer could not be admitted just yet as the same had been filed by
URAMI without first securing leave of court.


W/N URAMI is allowed to file an amended answer.


We rule in favor of allowing URAMI's amended answer. Hence, we deny the present appeal.
Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long
as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading
sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party can only amend
his pleading upon prior leave of court.

Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding and will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion. Matters involving the
amendment of pleadings are primarily governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 10 and not by
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rule of Court. To our mind, a consideration of the evidence that URAMI
plans to present during trial indubitably reveals that the admissions made by URAMI under its original
answer were a product of clear and patent mistake.

The mere fact that URAMI filed its motion for leave years after the original answer is also not reason
enough in itself to discredit the amended answer as a sheer dilatory measure. Readily observable from
the established facts is that the perceived delay between the filing of the motion for leave and the filing
of the original answer is not purely attributable to URAMI. It must be remembered that some time after
the original answer was filed, we issued a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 177068 that
effectively suspended the proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027 for more than a year. Thus, even if it
wanted to, URAMI really could not have filed a motion for leave to file amended answer sooner than it
already had.

vs. JACKSON TAN, respondent.


Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation, executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over its real
property in favor of respondent Jackson Tan. The mortgage was executed to secure payment of
petitioner's indebtedness to respondent in the amount of P2 million

Respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage in the RTC, Branch 6, Cebu
City. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner through a certain Lynverd
Cinches, described in the sheriff's return.

Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid service of
summons upon it, as a result of which the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Petitioner
invoked Rule 14, 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and contended that service on Lynverd Cinches, as
alleged in the sheriff's return, was invalid as he is not one of the authorized persons on whom summons
may be served and that, in fact, he was not even its employee.

Petitioner objects to the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance in the service of summons
for two reasons: (1) the enumeration of persons on whom service of summons on a corporation may be
effected in Rule 14 13, is exclusive and mandatory; and (2) even assuming that substantial compliance
is allowed, its alleged actual receipt of the summons is based on an unfounded speculation because
there is nothing in the records to show that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any
of the officers of the corporation.

Trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on appeal.


Whether or not service of summons upon a mere draftsman who is not one of those upon whom
summons may be served in case of a defendant corporation as mentioned in the rules is valid.


We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by
the corporation through the person served must be shown. Where a corporation only learns of the
service of summons and the filing of the complaint against it through some person or means other than
the person actually served, the service of summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in
the present case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of
summons was effected, is in fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there is
nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.

Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action against
him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the defendant
is corporation, Rule 14, 13 requires that service of summons be made upon the corporations president,
manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The rationale of the rule is that service must
be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable
that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers received by
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the requisites for the application of
the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the
person served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person
served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual
receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on whom the summons was actually
served. The third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the
rule on service of summons is attained.



Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement
concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the
former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the
payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160.

Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. On November 15, 2012, the
COA issued its decision denying the petition,

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed for (a)
the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration;
and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.

The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari complied with
the requirement on proof of service.


W/N the petitioner complied with the proof of service under the RC.


NO. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types
of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt

Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of
the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be
appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no
proof of service if either or both are not submitted.

Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua,
Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail under Registry Receipt
Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458, 70498 and 70524 attached to the appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65
of the petition. The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry
receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be
appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially
comply with the rule.


The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Document filed by
respondents against petitioners. In their Amended Complaint respondents Spouses Cosmilla alleged
that the sale of their share on the subject property was effected thru a forged Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) and is therefore null and void.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint of the respondents for
failure to prove by preponderance of evidence that the signatures of the respondents in the SPA were
forged. Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking for the reversal of the earlier
RTC Decision

For failure of the respondents, however, to comply with the requirement of notice of hearing as required
under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo denied the Motion for
Reconsideration in Order.

Court of Appeals dismissed the petition filed by the respondents. On MR, Court of Appeals reversed its
earlier Resolution and allowed the relaxation of the procedural in a Resolution.


W/N the respondents needs to comply with the notice and hearing and service to the adverse party
upon motion of reconsideration.


Yes. The requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the
time and place for the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the
motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to
receive and which the court has no authority to act upon. The logic for such requirement is simple: a
motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to the court which is usually in the interest
of the adverse party to oppose. The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due
process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the

It is important, however, to note that these doctrines refer exclusively to a motion, since a motion
invariably contains a prayer, which the movant makes to the court, which is to repeat usually in the
interest of the adverse party to oppose and in the observance of due process, the other party must be
given the opportunity to oppose the motion. In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a
motion which does not afford the adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be
disregarded. Failure to comply with the required notice and hearing is a fatal defect that is deleterious
to respondents cause.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA, accused-appellant.


On January 22, 1997, the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales filed an Information
charging appellant with the crime of rape. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. At the pre-trial, the prosecution and defense stipulated on the the identity of the accused; The
accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity thereof; The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca,
was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her birth certificate.

After trial, accused Jesus Perez y Sabung is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Statutore Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code with the qualifying
circumstance that the victim was only 6 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.

In his Reply Brief, appellant contends that even assuming that the guilt of appellant has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. Appellant maintains that
the death penalty cannot be imposed on him for failure of the prosecution to prove Mayia’s age by
independent evidence. Appellant points out that while Mayia’s birth certificate was duly marked during
the pre-trial, it was not presented and identified during the trial. Appellant asserts that Mayia’s minority
must not only be specifically alleged in the Information but must also be established beyond reasonable
doubt during the trial.


W/N the age of the victim was established beyond reasonable doubt during the trial.


YES. During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayia’s birth certificate. The prosecution
submitted its Offer of Evidence which included a certified true copy of Mayia’s birth certificate. The trial
court admitted it without any objection from the defense.

The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c)
marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes lawful
defenses; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the parties. Section 4,
Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as
to her age.