Pre Finals Notes CONSTI LAW 1

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I | ADRIAN JEREMIAH VARGAS | ATTY GALEON
State Immunity
Tuesday, 5 September 2017
5:35 PM
State immunity from suit is exempt from being sued. It is articulated under Art. 16 Sec. 3.
Out court in Rep. v. Villasor quoted Justice Holmes's words, state immunity still attaches even
without constitutional provision. It is not by reason of formal conception. It is only proper that we
have no right against the authority that gives us our legal right.
State immunity from suit is for a practical purpose. If we allow the state to be sued without
consent then do not blame the govt if it cannot deliver basic services. Your government will be
preoccupied with suits.
Any private citizen may not file a case against the State without the consent of the State. The
state referred to is the Republic of the Philippines. That notwithstanding, foreign states cannot be
sued by our local courts.
USA v. Ruiz - Filed without consent of the US. Not under the constitution, but it was a principle of
international law. All states are regarded as equal. If we cannot sue the Philippine state without
its consent, then other states may not also be sued by our local laws.
Take note further that immunity from suit applies not just in favor of foreign states. It likewise
applies to foreign diplomatic agents like foreign ambassadors. If the American ambassador
commits a crime, he is also immune from suit because he is regarded as a legal extension of the
country - even if the acts done are not in performance of their duty. Consuls are likewise
regarded to some extent in this way as long as it is in performance of their official functions.
CASE - SC extended application state immunity to a foreign agent operating in the Philippines
and acted well within the scope. This was Arthur Scalzo -> sent on the Phils on a mission for
surveillance on "Menocare". He was suspected of being a member of the Iranian Liberation
Movement. "Menocare" filed action for damages. Scalzo countered with state immunity. But
"Menocare" said he was neither an ambassador nor a consul. But SC stated that state immunity
applies to Scalzo because he was sent on a mission by the government and was in performance
of his duty.
State immunity not only in foreign states. It likewise applies to foreign organizations. You cannot
file a case against the WHO or the UN. Nor can you file a local case against other foreign
organizations. They likewise enjoy state immunity. It is given a wide application in that the same
now extends to foreign organizations, not just foreign states.
Sec. 3 Art. 16 of the 1987 Consti. - State may not be sued without its consent. Conversely, we can
say that where the state gives its consent, the state can therefore be sued. Question is, how may
a state give its consent to be sued? How can this be done?
This can be done either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be had if the state through
Congress enacts a law authorizing a person to file a case against the government. Can be a
general law or a special law. We have a law on money claims arising from obligations. Must be
filed with Commission on Audit. Express consent is also in the special law - (Merritt v. Republic)
Act 2457 Allowing Mr. Merritt, and only him, to file a case against the government with the
physical injuries he sustained. Conversely, it is safe to say that only Congress can expressly give
consent on the part of the State to be sued.
Take a look at Republic v. Feliciano - It was contended by Feliciano that Magsaysay allowed the
State to be sued. Our SC disagreed holding that only Congress of the Phils. can only give
consent.
Republic v. Sandoval - Not even President Aquino could give consent to be sued. That can only
be given by Congress.
Consent may likewise be given impliedly. One instance where state impliedly gives it consent is
when it commences litigation. Where it commences litigation, it has impliedly given its consent
to be sued. The Phils can sue a person, and he can file a counterclaim against the plaintiff which
is the Republic of the Phils.
Rule: Where state commences litigation, the state has impliedly given its consent to be sued, but
not when the litigation is to interpose state immunity.
Lim v. Brownell 100 SCRA 345 - After the 2nd world war, it was noted by the US administration
that there were real properties in the Phils that were registered under a Japanese. It was
sequestered by the US admin, and it was placed under the Alien Property Administration of the
US. When Phils was given independence, title was transferred to the Philippine Alien Property
Administration under Brownell. But Benito claimed that the properties was owned by Absinya
Enriquez, a descendant of Asachi Kagawa. He filed against the Alien Property Admin. The
Republic of the Phils was not impleaded as a defendant. When the Rep knew, the Sol. Gen. filed
an intervention. The State sought for the outright dismissal, stating that the case Lim filed actually
took part of the nature of the Republic, and so it should be dismissed. The case was dismissed. It
was the Republic that actively intervened in the action. The purpose of such intervention to
interpose state immunity.
^ EXCEPTION TO THE RULE!!!
Other instance where the state is impliedly given its consent is when it enters into a contract with
a private corporation or individual in accordance with its proprietary function. The state is
therefore waiving its immunity from suit. In doing such, the state has descended to the level of
the private citizen or individual. Where the state enters into a contract for purely governmental
functions (jure imperii), state immunity still applies.
Case in point: US v. Ginto; US v. Rodrigo
USA v. Ginto = Dizon operated a barbershop in the Clark International Airbase in a contract with
the US. It was terminated against US. He filed a complaint for breach of contract. US wanted the
outright dismissal of the case, but the US cannot invoke state immunity because the contract
entered partook of a business nature such that the US entered into the contract in its proprietary
function. An operation of a barbershop under a contract of lease is a business contract.
Rodrigo was dismissed. He placed urine in the soup. After investigation, he was terminated from
service. However, Hinobe wasn't remorseful. He even filed a case for illegal dismissal. US wanted
its outright dismissal. But SC stated that operation of a restaurant partook of a nature of a
business transaction. Where the state enters in a contract with its proprietary functions, the state
can be sued because it impliedly given its consent to be sued. In doing so, it has descended
into the level of a private citizen.
In its governmental functions, state immunity still applies. This is in the case of US v. Ruiz.
Another case Rep of Indonesia v. Bengson (June 26, 2003) The embassy of Indonesia entered
into a contract for upkeep of its generator sets and etc. The contract was terminated and the
contractor filed a complaint for breach of contract. Rep of Indonesia wanted the outright
dismissal, but Bengson defended that it entered into a contract. SC ruled that the Rep of
Indonesia's contract was for governmental function; thus, it was still immune from suit.
How come in the case of DA v. Dept. of Agriculture, the SC sustained the case. This is because
our SC ruled that the DA entered into a contract in the exercise of its governmental functions.
Yet, the case that was filed against the DA partook of the nature of money claims. Such that the
case therefore was already governed by Act No 803 (or something). The decision could not be
enforced.
Even if the state takes private property but does not justly pay the people, it cannot invoke state
immunity. This is the case of Amigable v. Cuenca. A similar conclusion was reached in Santiago
v. Republic.
A certain stantiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Grant Industry (?). In the deed of
donation, the republic would also put a construction in the donated property. After it received
its property, the republic did not go with the project; thus, Santiago filed a case. It moved for the
outright dismissal stating that in its contract, it was performing governmental function. However,
our state said it cannot avoid suits to avoid consequences of its injustice. In other words, consent
may be given expressly or impliedly, such that where the case is filed against the Phils, it is only
needed to determine whether it has given its consent.
What if the case is not filed against the Phils. But it is against Dept. of Public Works and Highways.
How do we determine if the defendant, the agency concerned, can invoke state immunity from
suit. What are the parameters and guidelines?
The rule is that where the case is filed not against the Republic itself, but the agency. We have to
make a distinction between an incorporated agency or unincorporated agency.
An incorporated agency has a charter of its own. A law governing its existence. An
unincorporated agency is one without a charter.
UNINCORPORATED: DOJ. CABINET OF FINANCE. NO LAW GOVERNING THEIR RESPECTIVE

EXISTENCE.
Where the case is filed by Torregosa v. Cebu Normal College, we just need to look at the
charter. Where the agency concerned has the capacity to sue and be sued, the action cannot
be abated or dismissed. The charter of the agency has the capacity to sue and be sued, so it
cannot be dismissed outright. This is because there is a provision in their charter that states this
capacity.
However, what if there is no provision regarding the capacity to sue and be sued?
You look at the primary functions of that primary incorporated agency. If its primary function is
governmental in nature, then it cannot be sued without the consent of the government. But if its
primary function is proprietary in nature, then it can be sued.
HOWEVER, FIRST YOU MUST LOOK AT THE CHARTER! ONLY RESORT TO THIS WHEN IT IS SILENT.
What's the rule in regards to unincorporated agencies? There is no charter where they can be
sued or not sued. The rule is that where a suit is brought to an unincorporated agency, then you
look at the primary function that the agency concerned is performing. If the primary function is
governmental in character, then state immunity applies. If it is basically proprietary, then it can
be sued even without express consent of the State.
Nat Airforce Corporation v. Teodoro - Where NAC leased land to PAL for the landing of the
planes. The National Airforce Corporation did not pay the landowner the sum of money. Case
filed against the corporation. NAC said it cannot be sued because it is an unincorporated
agency. SC disagreed. SC said that while it is true that NAC was an unincorporated agency, yet
it was acting in a proprietary function. Thus, it could be sued without the express consent of the
Republic.
What matters most is that the governmental function is primary. Despite having incidental
functions being primary, what matters is its primary functions.
Where the handing of the cargos was taken by the Arastre Services. It was a unit of the Bureau
of Customs. Instead of delivering the complete number of rotary trees (?). Arastre said it could
not be sued because it was a unit of the Bureau of Customs, which was performing government
functions. However, they countered that they did incidentally perform proprietary functions. SC
ruled that it still enjoy immunity from suit because it was merely incidental, not primary.
WHAT IS CONTROLLING: PRIMARY FUNCTION.
State Immunity Second Discussion

Thursday, 7 September 2017
5:46 PM
What is the rule of the action is not the republic itself or a government like agency or
instrumentality. It is rather an LGU. It is performing governmental functions like barangay,
municipality, province, among others. Is it entitled to immunity from suit? After all, it performs
governmental functions. It has its executive government as the case may be, a legislative body,
etc. Local version of the national government.
NO. Under Sec 22 of the LGC an LGU, Barangay, City, and etc. is given the power to sue and be
sued. While an LGU performs a governmental functions, it cannot invoke state immunity from suit
because of the provision in the LGC.
There are cases in which the person made as defendant in the action is not necessarily the
state, LGU, and etc, but a public officer. The question is can the defendant public officer invoke
state immunity from suit?
Lansang v. CA - Where an action is brought against a public officer, we have to determine

whether or not he is sued in his official capacity (must further determine whether or not his
act was given authority, such that the action is brought to him and the same act is well
within his given powers, in that situation, he can invoke state immunity in his favor). Where
there is a need for the government to appropriate funds, the case filed against the public
officer is akin to a suit against the State. If it does not use appropriate funds, the case may
prosper.
Garcia v. Chief of Staff - Garcia participated in military training in Pampanga. He suffered

injuries. He filed a case against the Chief of Staff. The Republic was not directly impleaded,
but it was the Chief of Staff. The case was dismissed. It was noted that the AFP as sued in
an action was sued in his official capacity, and the act complained of was of the AFP in his
official capacity and it was within his powers. The SC ruled that there would be an
appropriation of funds, indirectly suing the state. Therefore, it was dismissed because it was
without the consent of the State.
There are also instances where the case of the public officer may prosper even without the
consent of the Republic.
1. When the action is an action for mandamus.
An action for mandamus is brought to compel the public officer to perform a job which is
duty bound under the law. For example, a bridge needed repair where funds were
appropriated for that purpose and a contractor was hired, but for one reason or another,
the DPWH did not proceed. The action may prosper even if it isn't consented by the state.
It was just to compel him to do the job.
2. The action partook of a nature of an action for injunction
One where the public officer is restrained from performing an act which is patently illegal.
Example, a need for a road expansion. Funds appropriated already, but Secretary of
DPWH wants to destroy your house without just compensation. If you file a case for
injunction, the action may prosper even if it is filed against the Secretary, and even if it isn't
without the consent of the State. It is to prohibit an act which is patently illegal.
3. An action is brought to compel the payment of a sum of money out of the funds that
were already allocated for that purpose.
Case: Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Administration - the Administrator was sued in his
official capacity, and he invoked State Immunity, but SC did not buy that argument
because funds were already allocated for that purpose. The SC did not uphold his
invocation in immunity from suit.
4. He is being sued on account on his tortuous (?) liability.
He is held accountable for his actions which were outside his capacity. Lansang v. CA: SC
held the action brought against Lansang not in his official capacity, but his personal
capacity. Action may prosper even without the consent of State. Republic v. Sandoval:
Public officers held to account for tortuous liability. They acted beyond their official
powers. The case was dismissed in so far as the republic was concerned.
5. The state has violated its own laws.
Amigable v. Cuenca: no payment of just compensation. No private property shall be

taken for public use without just compensation. The State cannot invoke state immunity
when it committed injustice against a private citizen. It cannot invoke its so called royal
prerogative.
As a rule, where a case is filed againt a state, generally, it has to be within the consent of the
State. Without such consent, it is doomed for dismissal, it having been filed without the consent.
Let us assume where the action is brought before the Republic and it has given its prior consent.
Before the action is brought, the State permitted that such action be allowed. The question is:
when the state gives its consent, does it mean that it is admission of guilt?
It is not to be taken as the state is admitting liability. When the state gives its consent to be
sued, it merely gives the supposed aggrieved party to prove his case against the same.
The state is simply giving the person the opportunity to prove his claims against the
republic. Precisely, the consent is given so that the person may present his evidence that
the state must likewise give its opportunity to refute. Simply put, when the state gives its
consent to its suit, it merely gives the person the chance to prove his claims against the
state. In other words, suability is one thing. Liability is another. It does not necessarily follow
that the state gives its consent, it is already admitting its liability.
Let's assume the State gave its consent to be sued such that a trial ensued and decision
rendered adverse to the state. It found the state liable. Judgment favorable to the plaintiff,
adverse to the republic. Can that decision now be enforced?
(Republic v. Villasor) No adverse decision against it can be adversely enforced. Where the
action is filed against the state or an unincorporated agency. Even if an action is rendered
therein adverse to the State, it does not necessarily follow that an execution can be made
against the State. It cannot garnish the funds of the State. The court cannot garnish the
funds because the funds are still public in nature. Much less the court, direct the sheriff to
garnish funds in the national treasury.
Does that mean therefore that when you file a case and win, would the decision be an empty
judgment because you cannot proceed with garnishment and execution?
When there is already a decision rendered in your favor and it has finality, you can file for
money claims under CoA PD1445 (Refers to money claims that are already established.) It
must be presented as a claim before the CoA. The Congress will appropriate the necessary
funds to satisfy the money adjudged in their favor. This is how you reconcile DA v. NLRC
and Republic v. Villasor. You file your claims using the judgment awarded in the CoA. It
APPLIES ONLY WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS THE REPUBLIC ITSELF OR AN UNINCORPORATED
AGENCY.
If you file a case against these two, you need to file a case with the consent of the
Republic, trial conducted, and the decision rendered. Consent must be given in the form
of a law to give funds to the judgment in your favor.
Suability is one thing, liability another, and award is another.
IF IT IS FILED AGAINST INCORPORATED: If it has the capacity to sue and be sued, and it is
judged against defendant. Any such decision after it attains finality may be enforced
without the need for consent from the Republic through an appropriation. After all, the
defendant has the capacity to sue and be sued. It is different when it is against an
incorporated and an unincorporated corporation.
PNB v. CIR - enforcement of a labor decision, and the PHHC said that the garnishment
should be quashed because it is a government fund. PHHC is an incorporated agency
which has the capacity to sue and be sued. The decision may be enforced without
another consent from the Republic.
What is the rule if the action is brought against an LGU?
Where the action is filed against the LGU, it may prosper after being sued. No appeal is
filed such that it attains finality. Can the decision be enforced without the consent of the
LGU? Can there be a writ of execution?
The rule is different. Such that there is a decision rendered agianst an LGU notwithstanding
the fact that the LGU has the capacity to sue and be sued, any decision cannot be
rendered against the LGU. It cannot be enforced against the LGU. The sheriff cannot
garnish the funds as deposited in the funds, nor can the sheriff levy the real properties of
the defendant LGU. The rule is similar of that of an action filed against the Republic or an
unincorporated agency. Any adverse decision against the LGU can only be taken or
enforced through consent of republic through appropriation.
(CASE) Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan - Ministerio filed a case for land she donated to
the Municipality of Bulacan. There was an alleged breach of contract. That widow won in
that case such that a court made a writ of execution. Acting on that, the sheriff served the
garnishment to garnish funds of San Miguel Bulacan and that was sequestered against the
Municipality Treasurer to release funds to satisfy the judgment. However, the treasurer did
not give it. She was cited with contempt, and the judge issued a warrant of arrest against
the treasurer. A case was filed for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The municipality of
Bulacan was sustained because it remained to be public funds. It could not be garnished.
What if they don't want to appropriate funds for this?
Municipality of Makati v. Ca - Where an action and you win, there is no appropriation

ordinance. You can compel them through mandamus.SO that a judgment in your favor
may be sustained.
(GR 207271 Sept 2003.)
State Principles and Policies

5:35 PM
Section 1 Article 2 provides that the Philippines is a democratic and republic state.
Philippines is a democratic state; a state that enjoys fundamental civil and political rights. That's
why we have freedom to travel, abode, and speech. But others it is considered freedom to
speak. Take note in Section 1 that the Philippines is not only democratic, but also republic. It
means it is for the people and by the people. But it has become a government of the people,
poor the people, by the money. When we speak of republic, it is a representative kind of
government. It is not a direct kind of democracy. That's why we have elections. That is a
republican form of government.
Take note that the officials do not need to get the majority of votes. It is enough to get the
highest number of votes. Mere plurality of the votes is sufficient. Only Erap got the majority of
votes. Take note that it provides all government authority emanates from the people. We are
the source of sovereign powers. That's why we have Art. 11 of the 1987 Constitution that public
office is a public trust, and that public officers are accountable to the people at all times. They
must observe loyalty, efficiency, and act with patriotism and etc. Sec. 2 Art. 11 that even the
President, Vice-President, etc. can be removed via impeachment on the ground of culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, and other high crimes +
betrayal of public trust. Indeed, public officials are accountable to the people.
Section 2 Art. 2 Provides that Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy.
It provides that the Philippines renounces war but we have the existence of the Congress that
they can declare the existence of state of war. The war contemplated in Congress is defensive
or declaring the state of war. The Philippines merely lodged a formal case to the UN because of
this. We are also not capable of waging war. Take note further that the Philippines adopts
general principles of international law. It is the incorporation clause in the Constitution. It is part
of the law of the land.
Two ways by which a local jurisdiction may adopt the general principles:
1. Transformation: The local state adopts the general principles by local enactment and
treaty ratification by the Congress. USA v. Purganan Extradition Law - Patterned to the US. It
was issued by Marcos because he was functioning as all forms of power. The Philippines
adopted generally accepted principles of international law. It is one way.
2. Incorporation: Even without a formal enactment of law by Congress, and even without a
treaty ratification, the Philippines may adopt it through incorporation. Grace Poe v.
COMELEC: Carpio stated that there were treaties not ratified by the Philippines, but it was
still used by the Court because of the doctrine of incorporation.
Corona v. Jalandoni (?): Objected to trial because it should not be governed by the
Hague Convention, but SC said otherwise because they invoked Sec 2 Art. 2.
Because of the doctrine of incorporation, we can adopt generally accepted
principles of international law. (In the book).
Republic v. Sandiganbayan: Ramas was said to be a crony of Marcos. His assets and
properties was taken by the government. He protested stating the 1973 Constitution.
SC disagreed because Aquino suspended the Constitution, but what saved Ramas
was the ICCPR. It contained similar provisions to the 1973 Constitution. It applied
these UN declarations through the doctrine of incorporation as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. (In the book.)
Section 3: Civilian authority is supreme over the military. The goal of the AFP is to secure the
sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the territory.
Civilian authority is supreme at all times. That's why Art. 17 Sec 18, the President is the
commander-in-chief of the AFP. Never mind if he has no military training or etc. he is
regarded as the CIC because he is the civilian. It accentuates that civilian authority is
supreme over the military. HOWEVER, take note that the goal of the AFP is to secure the
sovereignty and integrity. What did the administration do regarding the territories taken by
China?
Tatay Digong said never mind, they are merely guarding China's territories.
Section 4: The Prime duty of the government is to serve and protect people and may call on
citizens to defend the state. May be required to render service to the State.
People v. Lagman: Lagman refused to render service citing religious beliefs. It was against
his belief to kill or be killed. SC disagreed saying that the State should be given paramount
consideration.
People v. Zosa: Zosa was also convicted for his stubborn refusal to render service. He had a
need to support. But that is no reason to not render military service. Indeed, defense of the
State is of paramount importance.
It is mandatory, such that nobody can escape.
Section 6: Separation of church and state shall be inviolable.
In the past, there was intermingling. In the Spanish occupation, friars got to own vast tracks
of land because there was a fusion between state and religion. That is why there is a
separation of the church and state. It is only ordained by the Constitution and the Bible.
This provision is not the only provision highlighting the separation of church and State. Art. 3
Sec. 5 (Exercise of religious freedom. No laws should be made respecting religion or etc. -
Non-establishment clause. Do not sponsor religion or discriminate any. The State should
stay neutral. That fortifies the separation of the church and the State under Sec. 6 of Art 2.).
Sec. 2 Par 5 (Something 1987 Constitution) : Prohibit religious sectors as a political party.
The fact that there is separation is fortified under Sec. 29 Art 6: providing in essence that no
public money or property should be used for the benefit of a sect, church, delineation, or
sectarian etc. It should not be used for priests unless they are part of the AFP, penal
function, government orphanage or etc. Prohibits disbursement of funds for religious
reasons.
Question: What if the priest gets elected as a mayor? Can he receive? Or is that not a
violation of Art. 6 Sec. 29?
Yes, because the prohibition applies when the funds are given in his capacity as a
priest, but the payment was by reason of his being elected as a public official.
Section 29 prohibits disbursement for sectarian purposes. But what about funds for
Sinulog?
Support for that activity is justified by saying that Sinulog is for tourism and to promote
our culture and tradition. It is in that context that disbursement of public funds can be
justified even given the Section 29 Art. 6.
Take note however, while there is separation, it is not considered as a wall of hostility. They
are dealing with the same people such that the State supposedly while separate, they
recognize the valuable contribution of the Church to the State. To return the favor, the
State gives accommodation to the Church. In our Constitution, you can find pertinent
provisions where they give favor to the Church. They can disburse funds if the priest is part
of the AFP, etc. Another provision is Sec 28 Par 3 Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution by which the
State gives real property tax exemption for the Church.
Note: Sec 28 Par 3 Art. 6 Land actually, directly and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, and educational purposes shall be exempt from real property taxes. The real
property tax exemption is based on the actual use of the certain real property. How about
if the church two parcels of land, Lot A and C. Lot A is where the church building is
situated, but Lot C has Jollibee and etc. Is Lot C exempted? No, it must be used for
religious purposes, among others. Take note however that what is granted here is
exemption from the payment of real property tax. It does not grant income tax exemption,
much less donor tax exemption in what is donated in favor for the Church.
Is it liable for the payment of income? The church somehow generates income. Does it
need to pay for the donation to the Church?
Income tax exemption in favor of the church is given by the Sec 30 of the NIRC grants
income tax exemption. Last paragraph of Sec 30 states that any income derived by the
Church through the use of its properties and done for profit is not exempt from tax. When it
comes to donation, the exemption is given by Art. 101 of the Internal Revenue Code. The
Church does not just enjoy real property tax, but also income tax and donor tax
exemption.
Do educational institutions run by religious organizations likewise enjoy the same

exemption? Yes. Exempt from property tax and income tax.
Sec. 3 Par 2 Art 14 which allows the teaching of religion in elementary and public schools
provided that it has the consent of the parents and etc. All educational institutions must be
wholly owned by Filipinos except those established by mission boards and religious
organizations. These provisions provide or give due accommodation to the church among
others, notwithstanding the separation.
State Principles and Policies Second Discussion

5:43 PM
Section 8 Art. 2 The Philippines consistent with national interest pursues freedom from nuclear
weapons.
Two views:
a. The Philippines absolutely prohibits the storage of nuclear weapons in its territory.
b. If it is consistent with our national interest to have nuclear weapons, it can be done.
The two views have yet to be decided. Atty. Galeon: consistent with second view. If it is
consistent with national interest, it is allowed. But how about activating the nuclear plant?
Is it consistent?
It may be a nuclear facility, but it is not a nuclear weapon. It is still consistent with national
interest.
Section 10 Art. 2 The State shall promote social justice in all places of nation.
As was somehow defined in Calalang v. William, social justice means humanization of laws
and equalization of social and economic forces so that justice is properly applied. Those
who have less in life should have more in law.
That's why we should give land to the farmers who are landless. That explains also why we
have a Labor Code favorable to the working class.
Section 12: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life etc. Equally protect life of mother and
child.
Civil personality at birth. The fetus is given provisional civil personality. That law should be
read in conjunction with this section where the State protects the life of the mother and the
unborn in conception. This is why we don't allow abortion. In fact, this was used against the
RH bill.
Emphasizes that the state recognizes the sanctity of family life. Does this prohibit the
Congress from enacting a divorce law? Does it prohibit Congress from allowing same-sex
marriage? Does it define what a family is or is it only a provision about the family?
It's only in the family code. It provides that it is between man and woman. If Congress
enacts a law by same-sex or divorce, then it cannot be disallowed on the basis of
Section 12.
Section 13 Art. 2 Recognize the vital role of the youth and promote their well-being. Further
provides that it inculcates in the youth patriotism and etc.
That explains why we have your SK Elections. Supposedly to provide a good training
ground for the youth for governance. But it has become a training ground for vote buying
and etc. Our politicians would want to influence the minds of the youth, which is why there
is vote buying.
The State shall protect the physical, social, spiritual, etc. RA 9344 (Juvenile Welfare Act -
Exempts a person from incurring a criminal liability if it is under 15). However, the children
are now the drug mules and etc. because they were exempt from criminal liability.
Section 14 The State likewise recognize the role of women in national building, and shall
guarantee equal protection… (Provision).
Clamor for women to be equal to men. It was held upheld as valid in Garcia v. Drilon.
There, the SC ordained that the law (RA) enacted was to protect women as if there were
no battered husbands. Ateneo Report on VAWC stated that VAWC is violative of equal
protection clause. Men should also be allowed to avail for TTO.
Section 16 The State shall protect the rights (provision).
Criticized by Justice. Zosa v. Factura: In an actual review, there must be an actual

standing. The petition was filed on behalf of the children and also the generations of future
children. They are guardians of the children. International principle of inter-generational
responsibility.
Section 18 - The State affirms labor as the primary social force for the rights of the workers.
Primary social economic force. State shall protect interest of working class. Labor cases are
won by the complainants of the workers. They usually decide in favor of the management.
Advice of Atty. Galeon: If you have a labor case and you are the management, it's
better to settle the case at the Labor Arbiter. Your client may be liable to pay for
backwages of the time the case has been going on. Even if the complainant has
found work, the client or management still is required to pay for backwages. Settle
the case quickly. Even if employee is terminated, if it is not for moral turpitude, he can
still be awarded payment - even if the termination is valid. Obligations of the state to
promote the welfare of the workers.
Section 25 Art 2. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
We already have the LGC giving local autonomy to LGUs. They can exercise police power,
eminent domain as delegated, and the power of taxation (It does not come from
Congress but the Constitution itself.) Both of the other two powers are delegated by the
Congress. It is done all in the name of local autonomy.
Section 26 The State shall guarantee equal access to public office and prohibit political
dynasties as provided by law.
We have what is known as multiparty system. But why not copy the US election where
there is a two-party system? (Atty. Galeon's opinion: much better). We instead have
politicians voted just because of their popularity.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution left it to Congress to define what would constitute as
political dynasty. Of course, the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 1987, but there is
no law as of yet that define what political dynasty is. It will not be approved because it
would be political suicide. That explains why we have places where the governor,
barangay captain, etc. belong from the same family because political dynasty has not
been defined.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Under the Presidential government, three branches have distinct and separate powers,
thus the doctrine of separation of powers.
Primary function of Congress to enact laws. Primary duty for executive to enforce. Primary
duty of judiciary to interpret laws. The beauty of this is that we prevent a concentration of
governmental powers on one department or person. Look at the case of Marcos. There
was consolidation of powers. He not only performed executive function, but he also
usurped legislative powers. We had the judiciary, but it was controlled by Marcos. These
departments are supposedly independent bodies and perform distinct and separate
powers.
These three branches operate under the checks and balances principle whereby each
department or branch has the power or prerogative to prevent any unwarranted intrusion
into its domain and check the possible abuses committed by the other departments. One
department may have the power to resist any possible intrusion and check the excesses or
abuses committed by the other branches.
Example of Checks and Balances
Executive department can check the excess and abuses of legislative branch in exercise
of its veto powers. But if the legislative sees abuse too, it can override the veto of the
President. There is an application of the checks and balances principle. This is in so far as
the legislative and executive department are concerned.
In between executive and judiciary, judiciary decides cases, but the President may
provide pardon, amnesty etc. for those who were convicted by the judiciary. How can the
judiciary check the possible excesses committed by the executive? It can be through the
exercise of judicial review. It operates vice-versa to check each other.
Legislative department and judiciary: How can they check? Impeachment and limiting the
jurisdiction of the judiciary. Congress has the power to define and limit the apportion of
these. The judiciary can also declare a law made by Congress as unconstitutional in
exercise of judicial review. While it is mentioned that the three branches operate under the
principle of checks and balances and perform distinct functions, there are instances where
these branches will have blending of powers.
These branches are supposedly independent from each other, but there are also situations
where there are close coordination, which is commonly called blending of powers.
Under what instances may there be a blending of powers between executive and
legislative?
Preparation of appropriation act. President normally prepares budget for ensuing

year, and Congress enacts the general appropriations act bill. There is a blending of
powers between executive and legislative, notwithstanding the separation of
powers.
Executive and Judiciary
The judiciary would review acts of the President, but there are instances of blending
of powers. It is the President who appoints the Chief Justice (appointment power).
There is politics in appointing the members of the judiciary. Appointment is done by
the President. He will ask his allies in Congress whether or not this person is affiliated
with their political party. Why not lead the appointment of lower court judges to the
judiciary?
In this respect, there was a blending of powers. Is there an instance whereby we can
say that there is blending of powers between legislative and judiciary?
Legislative and Judiciary
One way is HRET or SET (Senate Electoral Tribunal) Decide election protests. We have
three justices to settle election protests. Impeachment of Erap, CJ Davide sat down
for this. CJ would act as the presiding officer. While they are distinct and separate
and operate under checks and balances, there are permissible times where there is
blending of powers. It is said the best way to characterize is to say that they are co-
equal, interdependent.
BLENDING OF POWERS: PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION OF POWERS.
Government authority emanates from the people. The government authority that we
delegate as a rule cannot be further delegated. We pose our trust to them for them
to delegate what we delegated to them.
Delegation of Powers
5:36 PM
When we discussed section 1 Article 2, we learned that we are the source of sovereign powers.
We delegated this power to the legislative dept, and etc. We need to know when we delegate
government powers to the members of Congress to the persons of the government branches,
that carries with it duty.
When our delegates accept this, they assume the obligation to perform or execute the authority
we impose on them. That's why we have the doctrine that is a prohibition on further delegation.
This is in congruence with the doctrine of separation of powers. In reposing the powers to our
delegates, the same is founded on trust. Such that if they further delegate, it is akin to betrayal
of trust. That is why it is a prohibited rule.
We take into consideration that it does not just apply to Congress but also judiciary and
executive. This doctrine, because of many instances where Congress is permitted to delegate,
that is why in so far as Congress is concerned, delegation is the rule. Non-delegation is the
exception.
That explains why Congress is allowed to delegate legislative powers under our jurisdiction. One
such instance is when Congress delegates tariff powers to President. When Congress delegates
legislative powers to President in emergencies. When Congress gives legislative power to the
people. Where Congress delegates to the LGUs and administrative bodies. For better
understanding, we will try to discuss these circumstances where Congress can validly delegate
its powers.
As mentioned earlier, Congress is allowed to delegate tariff powers to the President. If you read
our Consti. It is under Section 28 Art. 6 of the 1987 Constitution. All these things pertain to the
movement of taxable tools in and out of the country. It is only tried to give tariff power to the
President because if we delegate it to Congress, then we know how Congress works. The
process is cumbersome. For one, the bill has to originate from either house, undergo three
separate readings, transferred to the Senate, and then undergo 3 more separate readings. It is
only proper to delegate this power to the President, because it is easier for the President to
adjust tariff rates. Section 28, Par 2 Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, Congress can delegate
this because it is sanctioned by the Constitution.
Another permissible instance is when Congress delegates emergency powers unto and in favor
of the President. We should be guided by Sec 23 Paragraph 22 Art 6, Congress may by law
authorize the President for a limited period and subject to restrictions to carry out and declare
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn, such powers will cease upon adjournment (?). What is
this thing that is in purview of national emergency? Calamity, as long as it is considered of
nationwide proportion.
Take note that while there is delegation, in effect, the President would be a constitutional
dictator. He may enforce decrees that have the force and effect of laws. Of course, there are
safeguards in granting emergency powers. It can only be done in times of war and national
emergency. There must be a law. Such grant is only for a limited period and subject to
restrictions by the Congress. It is Congress which will define the authority of the President.
National policy must be defined by Congress for which the President may be able to use his
powers.
UNDERSCORE THE FACT: even when there is war or national emergency, the President cannot
automatically exercise emergency powers. There must be a law by which Congress delegates
emergency powers. Otherwise stated, in times of calamity, Congress may hold onto its powers. It
is advisable however for Congress to delegate powers in these times because they will not be
able to properly meet. It is up to Congress to delegate even when there is war or a national
emergency.
David v. Arroyo: When President Arroyo declared a state of national emergency, the police
authority did things. It was contended by the respondents said that it was authorized because it
was in accordance with the Constitution that in times of national emergency when public
interest so requires, temporarily take over publicly owned vehicles. SC ruled that Sec 17 Art 12 in
effect is nothing but a subspecie of Section 23 Paragraph 2 Art 6 that before the President can
exercise this power, there must be a law empowering the President to exercise this power
provided for.
There is an emergency, then Congress enacted a law for President to exercise emergency
powers. Under the law, it is stated that the President can exercise emergency powers for one
year. But for one reason or another, the emergency situation only lasted for six months. Can he
still exercise emergency powers?
No, it is self-liquidating. The President cannot anymore validly exercise emergency powers,
notwithstanding that under the law, he is given 1 year. The grant of power is co-terminus, or self-
liquidating. It ceases the moment the emergency situation ceases.
Another situation: It only delegates the President six months of emergency powers, yet the
emergency situation lasted for more than one year. Can the President continue exercising
emergency powers when under the law, he is only given six months?
No, because the law is clear that the President can only exercise this power for six months. So,
unless there is another law passed, he cannot exercise these powers further.
Situation: There is an emergency and Congress enacted a law authorizing the President
emergency powers. But then by design, Congress did not specify duration which President can
validly exercise powers. It is silent on duration. Then, the emergency situation lasted for a couple
of years. Until when can the President validly exercise powers?
Situation in the First Emergency Powers Case: After 1941, CA 671 (?), these emergency powers
were exercised by Quirino that were delegated by the Congress to President Quezon, it was
questioned. It was argued that Quirino could not validly exercise these powers granted to
President Quezon. Any president for that matter can validly exercise these powers if it was not
given a duration. SC disagreed. To cater to such argument is to defeat the grant of emergency
powers. The 1973 Constitution said that it must be for a limited period only. In the old
Constitution, the grant of powers may only be for a limited period. The President has the veto
power, such that even if Congress enacts a law revoking the power, the President can veto this.
Congress has the power to override the veto through 2/3 vote, but SC said that that situation
must be ludicrous. In enacting a law delegating emergency powers, it would only need a
majority vote to enact a law. It would now require Congress to revoke what was granted with
majority vote using a 2/3 vote.
Quirino vetoed the HB 727. That is why in the second Emergency Powers case, SC made it clear
that when Congress re-convened, the grant of authority for the President had thereby ceased. It
ceased when Congress re-convened sometime in May. Taking a cue from the ruling from the
two Emergency Powers case, the 1973 Constitution put unless withdrawn by Congress, it shall
cease on the next adjournment. Such grant may cease upon the next adjournment. It can be
withdrawn with a simple resolution. Where there is none, it shall cease upon the next
adjournment. This provision meets some criticism. Next adjournment refers to the end of the
session that was called after that session where there was a grant of power to the President.
Example: Congress convened July 2016 up to March 2017. Then, there was a recess. It
reconvened again in July 2017 to March 2018.
Assume it was during the first session that Congress enacted a law granting emergency powers
to the President. If this grant is not revoked, then according to Sec 23 Par 22 of Art 6, it shall
cease upon the next adjournment. It refers though to the end of the following session after that
following session where there was a grant of powers. It would readily appear that the President
exercises powers even when Congress has re-convened for its next regular session. It was not in
line with the second Emergency Powers case. (It would end in March 2018). THIS HAS NOT BEEN
AMENDED IN 1987 CONSTITUTION.
Another permissible instance is when Congress delegates the same in favor of the people
themselves. We can enact local ordinances (RA 6735 - Dealing with initiative and referendum).
When Congress delegates legislative powers upon the LGUs. This does not call for a lengthy
discussion. We have LGC for which LGUs can exercise eminent domain and police power. LGUs
now could enact local ordinances as if it is exercising the powers of Congress. They can now
exercise eminent domain. Take note that while LGUs can exercise the power of taxation, such
power is not a delegated authority from Congress. It is directly conferred upon them by no less
than the Constitution Sec 5 Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution.
TAXATION EXERCISED BY LGUs = CONFERRED BY CONSTITUTION.
Delegation of authority is given to various administrative bodies. Government has become so

complex like the power to regulate telcos, you take Congress who is unable to deal with the
problem. It would need specialized legislation. It is in this sense that Congress is to delegate
powers to admin bodies that have expertise in a given situation. That's why we have LTFRB,
MTRCB. Such delegation of authority is permissible in our jurisdiction. These admin bodies may
execute policies that may fill in the gap through subordinate legislation. They can enact laws but
in the form of rules and regulations. These would only provide for the manner by why the law is to
be enforced.
In order that there may be a valid delegation of powers or further delegation, any such
delegation must be compliant with the two tests that are employed in our jurisdiction.
1. Completeness Test
It is required that the law must be complete in all respects, such that when it reaches the
delegates, they can do nothing but implement the law. After all, it is already complete.
Case in point: Ynot v. IAC - carabeef to the national authority is given discretion deemed
fit. Secretary is given discretion on how to distribute. SC nullified the law because it was
incomplete.
2. Sufficient Standard Test
It should be accompanied by sufficient standards, which must be indicated by law and

indicate circumstances where policy is pursued or implemented. It does not need to be
stated in an elaborate manner. Vague terms such as public interest would already suffice.
When we speak of public standard, it means the legislative standard that is to be
implemented.
Ego v. Erecta: Such standard need not be stated in the law. It can be inferred from other
legislation. The sufficient standard could not be found in the law as implemented by
Erecta, but such standard was found in a related law. It need not be stated in the law
itself, but it can also be inferred by other laws of the same subject matter.
Ynot: EO 626-A, the Secretary of Animal Industry was not accompanied sufficient standards
because they were given the discretion of when and how to divide them.
IS IT ENOUGH FOR ONE TEST TO SUFFICE? IS IT ENOUGH THAT WE ONLY USE ONE TEST? OR DO
THE TWO TESTS HAVE TO PASS BEFORE DELEGATION OF POWERS IS LEGITIMATE?
In all cases, it would appear that one of the two tests was met. If you take note of the
recent cases like Tatad, it could readily appear that the SC stated that both tests must be
met. Compliance with the two tests must be met before the delegation is valid. The rule is
that delegated authority cannot be further delegated, unless Congress is allowed to
delegate its legislative powers.
Legislative Department
Wednesday, 27 September 2017
3:36 PM
There is that age qualification. One has to be 35 years old. One must be able to read and
write. It is not required that one is a holder of a college degree. It's enough that he is able to
read and write.
That is why we had Senators like Lito Lapid and etc. Ramon Revilla. What is required is one
knows to read and write.
Added qualification is a registered voter of the Philippines and a resident for 2 years prior to
the date of the election. This qualification of the members of the Senate as prescribed in the
Constitution are considered to be continuing qualification. For example, senator was
granted naturalization in another state, he will have to discontinue his senator position. One
of the qualifications is that he must be a Filipino.
Mutually exclusive doctrine: Social Justice Society v. 137870 Nov 10 2015. Under Dangerous
Drugs Act, those aspiring to become a member of a Senate, one has to undergo a
mandatory drug test. The SC said that that provision is unconstitutional because that
provision sought to amend the qualifications of the Senate. The Constitution can never be
amended by a simple law or legislation. In that respect, the qualification of the Senate is
mutually exclusive. You cannot add a qualification that is not found under the Constitution.
What is the term of office? Six years. It is provided under Section 4 Art. 6 that the term shall
be six years. It shall commence unless otherwise provided at noon following the day of
election. June 30 is not exactly a holiday, but it is the start of the term of the Senate. We
need to factor in the provision under Section 2 Art 18 of the 1987 Consti. Transitory Provision.
1st paragraph - the Senators and members of the HOR and the local pub officials elected
under 1987 Consti shall serve office until noon of June 30 of 1992. That was for purposes of
having synchronized elections in 1990. It would readily appear (conducted in May 1987) that
the Senators elected in May 1987 elections only served office for 3 years when he should
have served for 6 years.
2nd paragraph provides that of the senators elected in the 1992 elections where the first 12
shall serve for 6 while the last 12 are for 3 years. This is the staggering of terms of the members
of the Senate.
May 1987 -------------> June 30, 1992 (election term)
Senators in 1992 who got highest number of votes up the 12th shall serve for 6 years. Bottom
half should only serve for a period of 3 years or until 1995. There was an election for Senators
in 1995 and served for 6 years or 2001. Another election in 1998 elections and served office
until 2004. As you can see there is now staggering of terms. Every after 3 years, we would
have to elect new Senators because of the transitory provisions. It actually started in the
1992 elections.
What is the purpose of having staggering terms?
To provide continuity of the policy of the Senate and the old Senators may provide
guidance to the neophyte senators. What is important is that we now have the staggering
of senators. Started in 1992.
Second paragraph of Sec 4 Art 6 of the 1987 Consti provides that no senator can serve for
more than 2 consecutive terms. Such that for example, if your professor ran for and got
elected in the senate in 1998, he would have to serve until 2004. In 2004, he sought for
service again and was elected until 2010. Of course, there would be or there was election
for the 2010 election. Could Senator T run in the 2010 elections?
No, because no Senator shall serve office for more than two consecutive terms. If it is for
another position, he can run for that position after two consecutive terms as a senator.
He ran for senate in 1998. Ran for re-election in 2004. Served until 2010. Cognizant of the
term limit, Torregosa did not run in the 2010 elections. 2013 elections 12 senators. 2016, 12
senators. He did not run for 2010 elections. Could he run for Senate in the 2013 elections? Or
must he wait until 2016?
Yes, the 2013 election is not the immediate elections. Socrates v. COMELEC - SC discussed
that the prohibition against re-election would only apply to the immediate proceeding year.
If not in the 2004 elections T ran, he could go in 2010.
T ran for Senate and won in 1998, won in 2004, got re-elected and served until 2010. Mindful
of the provision of the two term consecutive limit, what he did is that he tendered his
resignation halfway. In 2007, he resigned. Could he run in the 2010 elections when he
resigned in 2007 when it readily appeared that he did not go through two consecutive
terms?
Voluntary renunciation shall not be considered as an interruption for the full term. So, he
voluntarily resigned. Applying the provision, he could not run in the 2010 elections.
Same facts, that he ran in the 1998 elections and won a seat, sought for re-election in 2004
up until 2010. Now, let's assume that in connection with the 1998 elections, a disqualification
case was filed against T because he did not comply with one of the requirements of
becoming a Senator. Let's say for discussion that he was still 34 in 1998. Disqualification case
was filed against him, and it was decided in 2003. It was found out that indeed T was not
qualified for Senate. He got disqualified. That was in 2003. He ran again in 2004 and got re-
elected and served until 2010. Question is, in this situation, could T run again in the 2010
elections when he got disqualified in 2003?
Yes because he was disqualified, so his separation from office was involuntary on his part. In
the case of 135150 July 1999, SC maintained that if someone is disqualified, it was as if that
person was never qualified at all. That was the import in the ruling of Lunzaneda v. Comelec.
He got separated from Senate rather involuntarily. It was not of his volition. He could run in
2010 elections following the ruling of the case above.
T ran in the 1998 elections, ran in 2004, served until 2010. Disqualification was filed against
him in conjunction of 1998 elections, lacking the age requirement. For one reason or
another, it was not decided until 2004 elections. Disqualification case pertains to 1998, but it
was only decided in 2006. After the 2004 elections where T ran for and got elected again.
The ruling is against T. Could he run in 2010? Could he invoke Lunzaneda?
No, because the fact remains that the decision could not be implemented anymore. He
already ran from 1998 to 2004. Different from Lunzaneda because the DQ case was
decided during his first term. The decision was actually implemented. In the example above,
the decision could no longer be enforced since the term has already prescribed. This was
Rivera v. COMELEC May 9, 2007. Ruling could no longer be enforced or implemented.
SAME BASIC SITUATION. While serving second term, case filed against him in sandiganbayan.
Preventive suspension for 3 months. Could he run for Senate in 2010 elections?
No. What was merely imposed was suspension. He was not totally ousted from his position in
Senate. He cannot run in 2010 elections. Aldovino v. COMELEC - Effect of suspension on a
member of HOR or Senate. Consider these rulings.
Lower House Qualifications and Etc.
It is the HOR. Under Sec 5 Art 6, provided that there shall be no more than 250 District Reps.
There is a proviso, un less provided for by law. In other words, the membership of the HOR
may be more than 250 if there is a law increasing membership thereof. Such that when
Congress would put a general reapportionment law, there may be an increase in the
membership of the HOR pertaining to district representatives. This would mean the ordinary
Congressmen and women. It is provided that within 3 years following every census, Congress
has to make a reapportionment that may increase HOR #.
Rule in Tobias v. Abalos and Mariano v. COMELEC - SC ordained that the increase of # need
not always be through enactment of general reapportionment law. In case of Tobias and
etc, it ordained that when Congress enacts a special law creating a city and it has a
minimum of 250k people or creation of a province, there will be an increase in the number
of HOR. Each city with a population of at least 250k or a province should have at least one
rep in Congress.
For a city to be entitled to representation in HOR, it must have at least 250K people. This
minimum population should be based on actual population, as it could not be based on
projection or stipulations.
In case of Mariano v. Comelec, SC ruled that for as long as city meets minimum population
requirement, it is not necessary for the city to double its population to have an additional
city. SC said after all, under Sec 5 Par 3 Art 6 in the Consti, it is provided that each city with a
minimum of 250k population shall have AT LEAST a representative in HOR.
Aquino v. COMELEC: SC decreed that the minimum population requirement is only required
of cities, not provinces. Where a law is passed creating a province, that province is entitled
to a representation in Congress. THE REQUIREMENT ON POPULATION IS ONLY FOR CITIES, NOT
PROVINCES.
Sema v. COMELEC: SC emphasized and ordained that only Congress can create a
province. For when a province is created, then that province is entitled to representation. By
creating a province, you increase the HOR. All of Congress has the power to reapportion
legislative districts, which can increase the number of representatives.
(remember ARDABA v. COMELEC)
Under Sec 5 Par 2 Art 6 of the 1987 Consti, it is provided that the HOR consists of not only
district reps, but also party list reps. In fact, it is provided that party list must account for 20%.
Check formula in previous notes. Veterans and Banat case: 25% allocation in the HOR was
merely considered not need to fully be done.
Under 2nd sentence of Sec 5 Par 2 Art 6, that within 3 terms following ratification of the 1987
Constitution, 1/3 must be filled by appointment or election. Provision under Sec 7 Art 17 (?)
president has powers to appoint sectoral representatives to fill up the vacancy. Before RA
7141, President appointed sectoral reps to fill up 1/2 of the HOR that was reserved for party
list. After the RA, President no longer empowered to appoint sectoral reps.
This could not be found under 1935 Consti (Party-List Requirement). What's it purpose for
having this election?
To allow the underrepresented and marginalized groups to have a representation in

Congress, particularly in the HOR. How can org actively participate under party list reps? You
need to apply a verified petition with the constitution, by-laws, list of officers, and etc. Mst be
filed within 90 days before elections. It should be posted in 2 separate newspapers, check
transcript. CONSTI: Labor, indigenous, elderly, hadicapped, youth, women, professionals,
OFWs, veterans.
Ang LADLAD LGBT case, ordained that the enumeration of the above for registration of
party lists is not exclusive. Any group or sector that belongs to underprivileged may
participate in the party list.
Sec 6 of RA 7141 enumerates rules where it can deny registration.

1. Those adheres to the use of violence.

2. Foreign Organizations
3. Violated election rules
4. Ceased to exist for 1 year
5. Paid to garner at least 2% in the last two preceding elections.
6. Etc.
How about political parties? May they be allowed participation under party list system?
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC: Yes. Take note that in this case, SC laid down eight
parameters before a political party may be allowed participation under the party list
election. (CHECK THE CASE PLS). Among the 8 parameters, such pol party must align itself
with the underprivileged or underrepresented. The nominee/s would have to come from the
underprivileged sector.
Take note that Ang Bagong Paglaom which provided for six parameters modified the ruling
in Bagong Bayani. Paglaom is the controlling case. Political parties need not align
themselves to the underprivileged. Paglaom case says that there is no need to align. It is
enough that the nominees have track records in advancing the cause of the
underrepresented and etc. You need not belong.
If an organization is accredited under party list, it is required to submit a list of 5 nominees

done at least 60 days before the election. In the event that one is unavailable, then there
will be succession.
How about qualifications of those aspiring to be ordinary Congressmen.
1. 25 years old at least.

2. Natural born Filipino.
3. Able to read and write.
4. Resident voter and resident of place where he is to be elected 1 year prior to
election.
5. (PARTY LIST) member of org he seeks to represent at least 90 days before election.
6. As for representative of youth sector, below 30 years old. If he happens to be
more than 30 after elections, he can still complete his term.
Term office: 3 years. Commence unless otherwise provided in June 30 following the
year afer the elections. However, 1987 elections served until 1992. In effect, the house
of reps elected in 1987 elections actually served office for longer than 3 years. Allowed
to stay until 1992.
Maximum full term can serve office: 3 consecutive terms. Just like a member of Senate,
there is a provision where voluntary renunciation is not an interruption of term of
service.
There may be a law changing the date of election. Otherwise, second Monday of may. If
there is vacancy, there is special election that may be had to fill in such vacancy as
provided by law. Sec 9 Art 6, provided that the one to be elected should only finish the term
of the predecessor.
Guingona v. Honasan (?): Honasan had to serve office for the remainder of unserved term
of Guingona.
Tolentino v. COMELEC: RA 7166 amending 6645 that where there is vacancy for at least 1
year prior to the next election, there shall be a special election. Amended that in so far as
vacancy is concerned, it should be filled in the next elections. SC said that in as much as
7166 ordained that such shall be conducted for purposes of filling in the Senate in the next
election, then there is no need for a special election because the date is already fixed by
law.
If it is to fill a vacancy in the HOR, we do not need to wait until the conduct of the next
election. A district rep shall be representing a legislative district. UNLIKE in the case of Senate,
where the Senate are to be elected nationally.
What if vacancy occurs in HOR and it pertains to PL representatives?
Will there be a special election? No. The reason why PL orgs are supposed to send 5
nominees, the next in rank shall become the next representative to replace the first.
The appropriation for Congress cannot be increased, and if there is an increase, it should
not be effective until the end of term of Congress that it shall become effective. If there is
any consolation, there is no prohibition in giving allowances.
Another privilege is the privilege of immunity from arrest and speech. Art 6 of the 1987
Constitution. On immunity from arrest, a senator or a member of HOR shall in all offenses
punishable by not more than 6 years, shall be immune from arrest as long as Congress is
convening. If it is more than 6 years, then he can be punished. Conversely if the crime for
which the member of Congress is facing has a penalty not exceeding six years, then he
enjoy immunity from arrest. This immunity holds true only while Congress is in session.
Convenes in July 2017 until March 2018, within that period is the immunity. This may only be
availed of if it is imprisonment not exceeding 6 years.
Take note: what is granted under the first sentence sec 11 Art 6, merely immunity from arrest,
but not immunity from suit. Such that where a member of Congress is below 6 years of
imprisonment, you can still file a criminal case against that member of Congress even if the
penalty does not exceed 6 years. What is granted is immunity from arrest, not from suit. The
moment his term expires, he can no longer enjoy immunity from arrest. Only available in
incumbency.
Other privilege under second sentence of above provision is immunity from suit. In essence,
that no member of Congress shall be questioned or be held liable in any other place for
speech or debate in Congress or committee thereof. What is provided in the sentence is
immunity from suit such that a member of Congress that delivers a privilege speech that is
libelous, it is immune from suit. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH. To apply, such speech must be given
while Congress or committee is in session and in performance of official functions.
JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG: Cabangbang wrote an open letter to President imputing a crime

against Jimenez. He accused Jimenez in engaging as military adventurism. He was sued for
libel by Jimenez. Cabangbang imposed his immunity from suit. He cannot avail of this
because Congress was not in session, wrote in his personal capacity, not done in the halls of
Congress.
This privilege subsists even after stepping down from Congress. Even after it expires. It is
important that any privileged speech is made while he is still in Congress. So even after
stepping down, he cannot be prosecuted for that speech he made in the past in his official
function and etc. But immunity from arrest is only there if the member is still incumbent.
As worded, stated therein that no member of Congress shall be questioned or held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in Congress. Import of that is that while the
person delivering the speech can be disciplined in the halls of Congress or colleagues in
Congress, not in the courts of justice.
Osmena v. Garcia: Pardon for sale. Osmena could not prosecuted for libel, but sustained
the imposition of penalty by his peers. Members of Congress cannot be held liable outside
the halls of Congress, but held liable or disciplined by Congress. Under sec 16 Par 3 Art 6,
each house of Congress shall have the power to promulgate its own proceedings and
discipline any of its members. It shall not exceed 6 days, however. Member of Congress
delivering privilege speech can be disciplined by his peers because of the provision in this
paragraph. This allows each house of Congress to discipline any of its members for disorderly
behavior.
Osmena v. Pindaton: SC ordained as to what would constitute a disorderly behavior, it is a

political question. Where question pertains to manner of discipline (alleged that if it does not
get 2/3 vote, SC has the right to rule on it). Sec 16 {Par 3 Art. 6, each house may suspend of
expel any member. Can it only be Congress that expels and etc? Is this power only exclusive
to Congress?
NO. Case of Santiago v. Sandiganbayan: Santiago was placed on preventive suspension.

She objected, arguing that under Sec 16, only Senate could suspend her from membership.
SC disagreed. There is nothing there that provides that only Congress can discipline,
suspend, or expel its members.
Restriction: members of Congress shall make full disclosure of assets and interests. Read in
conjunction with Section 17 Art 6 to file SALN. What is required is to make fully disclosure of
assets and business interests. They are not mandated to divest themselves of these interests,
unlike President, member of Cabinet, and etc.
Sec 12 provides that each member shall inform Congress of possible conflict in interest in
connection with a proposed legislation.
Limitation: Sec 13 of Art 6 providing that no member of Congress shall hold any other office
or etc of the government without forfeiting his seat, such that a member of C cannot hold
any other office in government if he is a senator or congressman. First sentence of this
provision is prohibition of holding another office or etc. in the government, then he has to
forfeit his seat in Congress. INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE/OFFICES.
THERE IS A SITUATION WHERE CONGRESS PERSON CAN HOLD ANOTHER OFFICE. If it is an

extension of his being a member of Congress, then it is allowed. Senator and also part of SET.
Holding another office, but it is an extension of being a member of Congress. It is plainly
permissible. Where second office is incompatible, then you need to forfeit membership in
Congress.
Prohibition imposed in second sentence is absolute. No member of Congress shall be

appointed to an office for the term in which he is elected.
T got elected in Congress in 1998 to 2004. Law enacted to create office of CBH (Commission
on Battered Husbands), then the salary of chairman is lucrative such that T communicated
his intention to occupy the post. In CBH, it would have to be that the chairman is appointed
by the President. Can he be appointed?
He cannot. Prohibition imposed is absolute. Unlike prohibition under first sentence. In this
situation, Congress cannot be appointed to become chairman of CBH. What if position is to
be filled by election? T ran for chairman in CBH. Would it be allowed?
Yes but he has to forfeit his position in Congress. What is prohibited is appointment.
Same basic situation for T. CREATION OF CBH WAS CREATED IN FIRST TERM. He was not
appointed in first term, but during 2004 to 2010 term, he was appointed to be CBH. Valid?
Yes. It only applies to the office that was created during the term of the senator. He can be
appointed in the next term to that office with the condition that he/she relinquish his senate
position for the chairman position.
Limitation: No member of Congress can appear as legal counsel in court or in quasi-judicial

bodies, or in administrative bodies. He can possibly influence judge or court. What is
prohibited is PERSONAL APPEARANCE. A member of Congress is not prohibited from
practicing profession, only that he is prohibited from appearing personally in the courts.
Limitation: Cannot be interested with any contract or special privilege etc. provided by the
government. What is prohibited is contract where the member stands to have pecuniary
privilege. If the contract has the senator donate his properties to government, it is valid.
Because there is no pecuniary advantage. What is prohibited is when the member stands to
be benefitted in monetary terms.
Limitation: Prohibits influence of pending. Section 14 check.
Section 15: Regular session of Congress. Unless different date is fixed by law, Congress shall
hold a session once a year on 4th Monday of July and continue to hold session until 30 days
before its next regular session excluding Saturday Sunday and legal holidays. Where there is
no law fixing this, they shall follow this section. There is a mandatory break in Section 15.
July 2017 commencement of section. Sec 15 provides break before July 2018. They are to
adjourn in the month of March or April. At least 30 days prior to next opening of session. They
are mandated to take the much needed rest. Two houses of Congress should conduct
separate session. Course of business. Instances where two houses are mandated to conduct
joint sessions, voting separately.
1. Canvass the votes of the Presidential and VP bets. Tie such that they will have a
voting. It shall be conducted jointly voting separately. What is needed is majority vote
of Senate and Congress.
2. Congress has to confirm nomination of the VP made by the Pres where there is
permanent vacancy in the VP office. Provided in Sec 9 Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Decide on the perceived incapacity of the President. Transmit a communication
to Congress that the President is temporarily incapacitated and the President argues
against this. To decide, joint session and separate voting. Needs 2/3 vote of both
Senate and the Congress.
4. Declaration of existence of war. Session joint, separate voting. Required votes 2/3
of HOR and the Senate.
5. Consider the idea of amending or revising the Constitution. Same procedure as
above. (3/4)
6. Congress decides to revoke declaration of ML or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus MAJORITY VOTE ONLY.
PRESIDENT may call for special session. Even without that, they are to be mandated to
conduct a special session.
1. Impeach President. Special session even without the President.

2. Vacancy of VP and P office.
3. Consider idea of revoking ML or the suspension of writ of habeas corpus.
Sec 16: There shall be active and close coordination between the two houses. Under this
section paragraph 5, if the venue is normally done in Quezon, the HOR cannot hold a
session in Baguio without the consent of Senate. Also cannot adjourn for more than 3 days
without the consent of Senate. It must be read in conjunction with par 5.
Adrian Jeremiah Vargas at 05/10/2017 7:04 PM
House Compositions and Other Bodies

Formulated
5:39 PM
After elections, each house shall elect officers.
Senate pre.
Speaker of the house
Tempore
Minority floor leader for both houses, and each of them have their separate house and
secretaries. Each house may not be members of Congress. They should not be elected as
Congressmen. How many members of each house are required to legally conduct a
quorum?
Section 16 Par 2 Art. 6 Majority of house = quorum to legally conduct business. It means 1/2 +
1. Take note that as provided for under Sec 16, a smaller number may be allowed to
convene day to day to affirm the absence of members and penalties under each house. To
transact business, majority is required. A smaller number, a quorum, may transact business to
affirm absence and issuance of letters and subpoena to absent members.
Avelino v. Cuenco: one senator was confined in the hospital, another was out of the
country. The quorum was decided by a majority of 23. What should be excluded is the one
outside the country. He cannot be compelled by a subpoena. The one in the country should
be added in the count since he is still in the country.
Art 6 Sec 16 deals with the power of each house to discipline its members. It is even given
the power to suspend or expel a member. If what is given is suspension, it should not exceed
60 days.
Par 4 of Sec 16 of the Art 6 - Each house of Congress is required to maintain a journal of the
proceedings and a record. What is the distinction between these two other than the
spelling?
Record of proceedings has the blow by blow account of what transpires in the House. It
contains everything such as the statements and etc. Journal recites the summary of the
proceedings. Record proceedings is detailed. These two documents must be maintained by
house of Congress.
Conflict by and between the journal and recording of what transpired in Congress. What is
the rule where there is a conflict between these two? Which shall prevail?
Astorga v. Villegas: The Vice Mayor complained. In the law, it was provided that the mayor
has the power to appoint who would be the acting mayor in cases where he is unable to
govern. VM stated that under the enrolled bill, it would readily appear that the intent of
Congress is that the Vice Mayor should be the acting mayor in the incapacity of the mayor
of Manila. In this case, when the case was brought to the attention of Congress, the Senate
President withdrew his signature and the others, too. SC said in that situation that they should
give way to the journal. There was a seeming conflict between journal and enrolled bill. They
gave way to journal because there was no enrolled bill to speak of because the signatures
were withdrawn.
Casco v. Jimenez: It paid under protest because under to Casco. Clerical error that what
was exempted was the exemption of formaldehyde product thing. It was a clerical error.
Resolved by SC by saying the enrolled bill that prevails because that was what was signed
by the Senate President and etc. It should be remedied by amendment, otherwise, it would
be an encroachment of powers. WHAT PREVAILS IS ENROLLED BILL.
Where there is a conflict between the journal and enrolled bill, an enrolled bill prevails
mostly.
EXCEPT: Where issue pertains to matters which under the Constitution that should be
recorded in the journal. It is mandated. We need to know what these things are, the things
which ought to be recorded the journal. These are:
1. Yeas and no votes in the final reading of the bill.

2. Yeas and no votes in the request that it should be recorded in the journal. 1/5 of
the members present in the deliberation.
3. President vetoes the bill such that the veto message should be recorded as
mandated under Sec 27 Par 1 Art 6.
4. When Congress decides to override the President's veto by 2/3. The names of
those who overrode the President must be recorded. Also, the yeas and nos.
Where there is conflict in these situations, journal will prevail.
Mandated under Constitution that they elect their respective officers, but then almost
always, there are questions or cases filed against any of the members of either House or
Senate concerned with the elections. Question is, who will resolve any such election contest
involving HOR or Senate?
Under Sec 17 Art 6, each house shall have its own electoral tribunal to resolve and has
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve electoral questions and etc. HRET and SET. WHAT IS
COMPOSITION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL?
• 3 Justices of SC designated by Chief Justice

• 6 members of HOR (HRET)
• 6 members of Senate (SET) chosen on the basis of representational proportion.
HRET: 3 SC Justices, 6 Congressmen chosen on proportion of representation. (Judicial

component + Legislative Component)
SET: 3 SC Justices, 6 chosen from the various political parties on the basis of
proportional representation. (Judicial component + Legislative Component)
Tanada v. Cuenco: The issue was under the old Constitution, the legislative component shall
be apportioned by the majority party and minority party. OLD PROVISION. NOW IT IS ON THE
BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Tanada being the only lone opposition, he
nominated himself. Majority appointed two more from itself so that the 6 members shall be
fully realized. It was questioned by Tanada. Argument of majority party is that it is mandatory
to fill up the 6 members of the SET under Consti. SC disagreed. What should be given
paramount importance is not the filling up of the 9 members, but the proportional
representation of the party composing that electoral tribunal. It may not be fully filled up if it
defies the proportional representation.
Abbas v. SET: Abbas was defeated senatorial candidate. Filed election protest against the
winners. It so happened that among the protestees were the ones appointed to act as
members of the SET. Abbas moved for a dissolution of the legislative component, such that it
should only be decided by the judicial component. SC disagreed by saying that legislative
component is an indispensable component in deciding these things.
SET is given original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide cases where election concerns are
filed. When will the case be taken cognizance by the SET or HRET when normally, before
election, any disqualification case before a candidate for Congress has to be filed first with
Comelec?
The moment the winner takes the post and swore, it will now be heard by the HRET or
the SET. Decided by the case of Limkaichong. Grace Poe case v. Limkaichong.
Election protests in the Poe case impliedly said that the election protests regarding
qualifications could not be tried by COMELEC. Case of Poe is the latest case. Poe v.
Arroyo: even disqualification cases by Presidents and etc. should be heard by
Comelec first. Only after that should it be filed with the SET. But this was abandoned in
the Poe (2016) case.
Bondoc v. Pineda: Congressman Camasora was nominated to be a representative in HRET.

Camasora belonged to LBP. Election protest regarding the Nacionalista v. member of LDP of
which Camasora was a member. It was tried and heard in HRET. His decision was in favor of
NP, such that the parties moved to change the member. Camasora's decision was
sustained. When they vote or decide the case, they should proceed on the basis of their
personal conviction and the consideration of the facts and merits of the case. While they
come from the party in dispute, they should decide in accordance to the election import.
While there are 2 Electoral Tribunals, there is another body that is to be created inside the
Congress other than SET or HRET. This is the Commission on Appointments. This is a body
which shall confirm nomination made by President before the President may appoint a
member of his Cabinet, ambassador, or any other officer like a consul. President is vested
with power to delegate executives of his departments, like the secretary of DOF, DOJ, and
etc. It is enough to say that the task of the commission is to confirm nominations. There are
appointments that need confirmation.
CoA members: (25 members) Section 18 Art 6.
1. Senate President - ex-officio President

2. 12 Senators
3. 12 Congressmen - both chosen on proportional representation of political parties
or party lists.
• Still given paramount importance in the proportional representation. How do we

go about allocation in so far as Senate is concerned when there are many political
parties comprising Senate.
EXAMPLE: 5 political parties are part of Senate (PDP-Laban - 15 senators [3%], Nacionalista- 3
[1.5%], LP-2 [1%], UNA-2 [1%] TP-1 [0.5%], IND- 1 [0.5%]). Total # = 24. Only 12 may be
appointed to CoA. THIS WILL BE DECIDED TO RATIO AND PROPORTION.
15:3:2:2:1:1 = 12
12/24 = 0.5
Only 10 Senators that will be part of the Senate. Paramount importance is only the
proportional representation. This would be PDP-LABAN, NP, LP, UNA.
Guingona v. Gonzales: SC said political party in Senate is to have two members of Senate to
have representation. SC said here that where only 10 get there, the advice is political
realignment in the form of coalition because naturally, the composition in CoA would be
changed.
Senate President not allowed to vote except to break a tie. Ruling must have majority vote
of CoA. In cases of tie, SP can cast a vote. CoA should be constituted within the 3 days
following the organization of Senate and HOR. Under Consti, CoA would hold sessions only
when Congress is in session. The President if he needs to appoint, must have ad interim
appointments.
Sec. 20 Art. 6 mandates that it keeps records and book of accounts audited by Commission
on Audit. In respect to Napoles (PDAF), it was already found out by CoA that there was an
anomaly, but it was not published contrary to this section. The findings of Audit should be
published for guidance of the people.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
Congress has a lot of powers. Basic is to legislate Congress making power. Congress vested
with legislative power under Sec 1 Art 6 provides that legislative powers shall be vested in
Congress consisting of Senate and HOR.
Main function: Legislate, enact, propose, amend, repeal law.
Is there no limit? Or are there limitations to that?
Yes, there are limitations on the power of Congress to enact laws. These limitations may be
categorized as implied limitations and express limitation in so far as substantive limitations
are concerned. We have substantive restrictions - pertain to intrinsic validity of the law or
contents of statue enacted by Congress vis-a-vis procedural restrictions - procedures
concerned with manner of enacting laws.
2 SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS:
1. Implied substantive restrictions (example: doctrine of non-delegation of

legislative powers, doctrine that there shall be no enactment of irrepealable laws).
2. Express substantive restrictions (example: Art. 3 such as the prohibition of

enactment of ex post facto laws).
Manner of enacting a bill:
1. Originates from either house. General rule: either house has power to enact or
propose the bill.
2. Calendared for first reading. (Reading of title and bill #). There is a requirement
under Sec 26 par 1 Art 6 to the end that a bill enacted by Congress shall embrace only
one subject, one title rule.
Ligasang v. Comelec: There was a bill that was enacted and became a law creating a
municipality in Lanao del Sur, then the Congressman of the neighboring province voted, not
knowing that the municipality consisted of the other barangays containing part of his
barangays. Title of the bill must be expressed in title thereof.
Mariano v. Comelec: Import was the creation of additional legislative district. SC said while
the legislative district is not mentioned, requirement was not violated. Title of the bill need
not index or catalogue contents of the law, as long as it is germane to the purpose or matter
of the law. Bill should not index everything. It is enough that the title has everything that is
germane to the purpose of the law.
3. Bill calendared for second reading. (Most important stage. During this reading,
the bill will be read in its entirety, discussion, and debate on provisions thereof. It is also
here that amendments may be introduced by house concerned).
4. Bill calendared for third reading. Final stage for HOR and also for Senate. Before
the reading, the printed copy of the bill from 2nd must be given to the members
before 3 days before the 3rd reading.
5. If approved, it must be transmitted to Senate (if coming from HOR.). If coming
from Senate, it goes to HOR. It undergoes the 3 readings again. It is conducted on
three separate days for the 3 readings.
What happens when there is somehow a disagreement between HOR and Senate in
respect to the bill?
• Bicameral conference with the HOR and Senate coming together. Tolentino v.
Sec. of Finance: they can make new provisions. If committee agreed and has
common ground, it will be transmitted to the HOR and copy given to Senate. It has to
be voted upon by HOR and Senate in plenary session.
Where there is an approved bill, it is transmitted to the President for approval. And if the
President acts on the bill within 30 days and approves the same, it shall be a law. But if the
President does not act on the bill, after 30 days, it will become a law even without the
signature of the President. WE DO NOT HAVE A POCKET VETO. Another action is to veto the
bill or disapprove the bill. If that happens, then the bill has to be transmitted to the house
where the bill originated. It shall be returned to that body. Members of house concerned
has this power to override veto power of President. Sec 27 Par 1 Art. 6 - where President
vetoes, he gives it back to the house where it originated and it should be recorded.
Members of house concerned has the power to override, but to override it, the House needs
at least 2/3 votes of the members.
If the HOR has 2/3 vote but Senate does not have 2/3, then the bill does not become law. If
both of them have 2/3 voting separately, then the bill will become a law without the
President's signature.
It would readily appear that based on the provision under Sec 27 Par 1 Art 6 there are two
instances where bill becomes law without President's signature.
• President does not act on the bill within 30 days.
• President vetoes bill, but Congress by 2/3 votes decides to override veto power of
President.
3. Sec 10 Art 7 - Permanent vacancy in the office of the President and in the office
of VP, such that Congress will have to convene and enact a law within 7 days to call
for a special election. It shall become a law upon third and final reading.
There are bills which should originate from the HOR. These are the bills mentioned under Sec.
24 of Art 6 referring to:
1. Tariff bill
2. Bill of local application/local bills
3. Private Bills
4. Appropriation bills
5. Revenue Bill
One of those bills should originate from HOR, however, Congress may propose or concur
with amendments. While these bills shall originate from HOR, it doesn't follow that the Senate
is powerless over those bills. Senate may concur or propose amendments.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: Even if those bills originate exclusively from HOR, Senate
can amend by substitution. The Senate should await the bill coming from HOR to transmit to
Senate. For example, appropriation bill. There is no provision for Senate to prepare its own
version of the bill, but it has to deter from doing so until HOR transmits the bill to them. So,
they can amend by substitution. What is important is that the bills mentioned are initiated in
the HOR.
1, 2, 3 readings - President certifies calamity or state of emergency, then the separate days
may be dispensed with. The copies requirement may also be dispensed. President certifies
emergency, then the three separate readings and distribution at least 3 days prior to third
and final reading may totally be dispensed with. It can be approved in just one day IF he
certifies a calamity or emergency.
Another instance: Bill is for purposes of calling special election of President and VP pursuant
to Sec 10 Art 7. There is a permanent vacancy therein.
The President has the power to exercise veto power. Rule is that the President approves it in
its entirety or disapproves. General rule. Either approved or disapproved in its entirety.
However, there are bills where President may exercise partial veto on.
Provided for under Sec 27 (2) Art 6.
1. Appropriation Bills
2. Revenue Bills
3. Tariff Bills
Bolinao v. Valencia: The bill, President exercised partial veto. In simple terms, what
happened was that there was a law appropriating a sum of money for the aid of
legislations. There were conditions attached to each and every item. What President did
was disapprove of the conditions attached to amount. SC said that is not a valid item veto.
If the President vetoes the item, then he must also veto the appropriation to which that
condition was attached. He cannot veto a condition attached to an appropriation without
vetoing the appropriation. Otherwise, the veto is not valid.
POWERS OF APPROPRIATION
Congress has the so-called appropriation power. This emanates from the provision of Sec 29.
No public money shall be taken out of treasury unless appropriated by law. It must be made
in pursuance of an appropriation law. The power to enact.
Appropriation Law = What? -> A law allowing disbursement of money from national treasury.
General appropriation v. Special Appropriation
1. General appropriation law - appropriation for the whole year. It is the operation
of the entire government.
2. Special Appropriation Law - xxx.
Limitations: Implied limitations and Constitutional Limitations.
Implied Limitations: Disbursed only for a public purpose. Cannot be done to advance
private interest.
Pascual v. Public Roads and Highways: Congress enacted a law to put a road in a private
subdivision. It was invalid because it was not enacted for a public purpose.
2. Amount appropriated must be determinable. Capable of exactitude. Must have

an actual figure.
Guingona v. Carague: Provision for the automatic debt servicing. This money is allotted for
the principal loan + bank charges and etc. Invalid because it was not exact and not easily
determined. SC disagreed. You could just do the math to determine it.
Constitutional Limitations: General appropriation law - originate from lower house. Another is
imposed under Sec 25 providing that budget set by President to the Congress may not be
increased. However, they can decrease the budget. However, they cannot lower the
budget for the judiciary as it runs contrary to the Constitution.
2. Budget prescribed by law. There is a regulation for the procedure in prescribing

budget.
3. No proviso or enactment shall be embraced in the GAA, except where it relates
to some appropriation therein. Any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation where it is related.
Garcia v. Marta: Provision that was inserted to re-activate the military reserve officers. SC
said it has nothing to do with a specific appropriation in the GAA. It was violative.
4. Sec 25 Par 3 Art 6, procedure for approving shall strictly follow the approval of
appropriation for other agencies. No special treatments.
5. Sec 25 Par 5 Art 6, prohibiting realignment of funds. No law shall be passed
authorizing realignment of funds. HOWEVER, the President, Senate Pres, Speaker, CJ,
Chairmen of various commissions may by law be authorized to augment any items in
the GAA for their respective departments from the savings in any items of the
respective appropriation. It must be for augmentation purposes and comes from
savings and funds.
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez: SC said it was invalid because only officers mentioned above could
be authorized to make realignment of funds. In this case, SC sustained the power of the
members of Congress to make or suggest realignment of funds. After all, it should be
approved by the Senate President or House President. It declared constitutional the
discretionary funds (Pork Barrel). Old case. SC justified it by saying after all, any proposed
realignment is to be approved. It is just a proposal.
Bellica v. Ochoa: New case where SC declared invalid the giving of PDAF to members of
the Congress. SC said invalid na because by allowing members of Congress to identify
projects is to resort the powers belonging to the executive department. It is their duty to
implement laws. Such giving of PDAF would be violative of Sec 29 of Art 6. It is imposed on
Congress as a collegial body. PDAF would make it seem that every member of Congress
can make projects as an individual, not a collegial body.
Realignment cannot be done unless there is a law to realign the funds. Those who are
allowed are the officers enumerated in #5 above. It should be for augmentation purposes.
Any such fund transfer should come from savings belonging to the same department. No
crossover from one department to another. DAP violated this.
The case of Araullo v. Aquino, it did not violate requirement of a law. Next requirement is
that such funds must be augmentation purposes. It was also followed. Third element was
violated. Realignment should come from savings from other items belonging to a specific
department. What happened here was that funds for slow-moving departments were
shifted to another department to make it faster. Requirement that there shall be no cross
realignment was also violated. It should have only been made within a particular
department. (Judicial, legislative, executive department - Fund transfers should only be

within their own departments).
Limitation: Sec 25 Art 6 - in the event that Congress fails to pass an appropriation act for the
year. The previous GAA shall be enforced until they make a new one.
Limitation: Sec 29 Par 2 Art 6 - prohibiting disbursement of funds for sectarian purposes.
Sec 25 Par 4 Art 6 - must be given a reason for its spending.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I | ADRIAN JEREMIAH VARGAS | ATTY GALEON

^ EXCEPTION TO THE RULE!!!

Case in point: US v. Ginto; US v. Rodrigo

UNINCORPORATED: DOJ. CABINET OF FINANCE. NO LAW GOVERNING THEIR RESPECTIVE

WHAT IS CONTROLLING: PRIMARY FUNCTION.

State Immunity Second Discussion

Lansang v. CA - Where an action is brought against a public officer, we have to determine

Garcia v. Chief of Staff - Garcia participated in military training in Pampanga. He suffered

1. When the action is an action for mandamus.

2. The action partook of a nature of an action for injunction

4. He is being sued on account on his tortuous (?) liability.

5. The state has violated its own laws.

Amigable v. Cuenca: no payment of just compensation. No private property shall be

Suability is one thing, liability another, and award is another.

What is the rule if the action is brought against an LGU?

What if they don't want to appropriate funds for this?

Municipality of Makati v. Ca - Where an action and you win, there is no appropriation

(GR 207271 Sept 2003.)

State Principles and Policies

It is mandatory, such that nobody can escape.

Section 6: Separation of church and state shall be inviolable.

Do educational institutions run by religious organizations likewise enjoy the same

State Principles and Policies Second Discussion

Section 16 The State shall protect the rights (provision).

Criticized by Justice. Zosa v. Factura: In an actual review, there must be an actual

Example of Checks and Balances

Preparation of appropriation act. President normally prepares budget for ensuing

Executive and Judiciary

Legislative and Judiciary

BLENDING OF POWERS: PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION OF POWERS.

TAXATION EXERCISED BY LGUs = CONFERRED BY CONSTITUTION.

Delegation of authority is given to various administrative bodies. Government has become so

2. Sufficient Standard Test

It should be accompanied by sufficient standards, which must be indicated by law and

May 1987 -------------> June 30, 1992 (election term)

What is the purpose of having staggering terms?

Lower House Qualifications and Etc.

(remember ARDABA v. COMELEC)

To allow the underrepresented and marginalized groups to have a representation in

Sec 6 of RA 7141 enumerates rules where it can deny registration.

1. Those adheres to the use of violence.

If an organization is accredited under party list, it is required to submit a list of 5 nominees

How about qualifications of those aspiring to be ordinary Congressmen.

1. 25 years old at least.

What if vacancy occurs in HOR and it pertains to PL representatives?

JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG: Cabangbang wrote an open letter to President imputing a crime

Osmena v. Pindaton: SC ordained as to what would constitute a disorderly behavior, it is a

NO. Case of Santiago v. Sandiganbayan: Santiago was placed on preventive suspension.

THERE IS A SITUATION WHERE CONGRESS PERSON CAN HOLD ANOTHER OFFICE. If it is an

Prohibition imposed in second sentence is absolute. No member of Congress shall be

Limitation: No member of Congress can appear as legal counsel in court or in quasi-judicial

Limitation: Prohibits influence of pending. Section 14 check.

1. Impeach President. Special session even without the President.

Adrian Jeremiah Vargas at 05/10/2017 7:04 PM

House Compositions and Other Bodies

1. Yeas and no votes in the final reading of the bill.

Where there is conflict in these situations, journal will prevail.

• 3 Justices of SC designated by Chief Justice

HRET: 3 SC Justices, 6 Congressmen chosen on proportion of representation. (Judicial

Bondoc v. Pineda: Congressman Camasora was nominated to be a representative in HRET.

CoA members: (25 members) Section 18 Art 6.

1. Senate President - ex-officio President

• Still given paramount importance in the proportional representation. How do we

Main function: Legislate, enact, propose, amend, repeal law.