Diego vs People

An Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of qualified theft

Consequently, the RTC rendered a Decision dated August 20, 2001, finding petitioner Grace San Diego
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

Dispositive portion read " GRACE SAN DIEGO y TRINIDAD guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT as defined and penalized under Article 310, in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the
Revised Penal Code, and accordingly, sentences her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty
years without pardon before the lapse of 40 years"

The CA then affirmed the decision of the RTC

petitioner appeals to SC

This Court finds the present petition partially with merit.

ISSUE was the ruling of denying pardon valid?

Held NO. Modify the ruling

There is now a need to modify the penalty imposed by the lower court and affirmed by the CA. Verily,
the proper penalty imposable is, thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but it was incorrect for the R
TC to sentence the accused to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty ( 40) years without pardon
because that would be a limitation on the part of the power of the Chief Executive. The exercise of the
pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be controlled by the legislature or
reversed by the court, save only when it contravenes the limitations set forth by the Constitution.

In re Torres

where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts to
proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefor by final judgment, in order
to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison. The grant of pardon, the determination of
the terms and conditions of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and
the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial
scrutiny. We have so ruled in the past, and we so rule now.

the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray for his immediate release from
prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in
violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence,
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before
1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on
November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of
the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. " Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from
confinement.

Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this court. Unfortunately,
there is no adequate basis for us to oblige him.

A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive
and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition
that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 10 By the pardonee's consent to the terms
stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief
Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and
conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is
authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail
to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a
well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial
scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional
pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts,
however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 11

It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal
cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending
for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.

Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or
unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not
for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the
determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first
conviction until November 2, 2000.

Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the
conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own
judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the
same. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted
criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee
is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the
terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement
of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and
absolutely lodged in his office.

Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice

FACTS:

On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on
that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the
action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of
the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered…
that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function.

HELD:

No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of
an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the
three branches of our government.

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the
subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening
the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of
appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has
been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial
authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the
execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any
event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over
the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of
a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events
may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the
litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts
have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make
them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by
law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said
law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own
Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as
alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a
law enacted by Congress

Garcia vs. Sesbreno

Melvyn filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Raul Sesbreno before the Office of the Bar
Confidant. According to him, he was separated from his wife Virginia, with whom he had two daughters,
Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. Their marriage was later annulled. In 2005, while he was in Japan,
Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, represented by Atty. Raul, and who were then already 39 and 35 years
old, filed an action for support against him, which was dismissed. When he returned in 2007 from Japan,
Atty. Raul files a Second Amended Complaint against him. He then learned that Atty. Sesbreno was
convicted of homicide by the RTC of Cebu, and is presently on parole; homicide is a crime against moral
turpitude, hence he should not be allowed to practice law. Commenting, Atty. Sesbreno alleged that
Melvyn filed a similar complaint against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
complaint was motivated by resentment and revenge when he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth. The case was referred to and consolidated with the IBP Case, and the parties
agreed on one issue: whether homicide is a crime involving moral turpitude. In his answer to the
complaint, Atty. Sesbreno averred that his sentence was commuted, and the phrase “inherent accessory
penalties provided by law” deleted; even if not deleted, the same applies only during the duration of the
sentence; and homicide does not involve moral turpitude. In its decision, the IBP-CBD reviewed the
conviction of Atty. Raul for homicide handed down by the Court, downgrading it from murder; and ruled
that the attendant circumstances leading to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude. Applying
the case in Soriano vs. Atty. Dizon where an accused convicted of frustrated homicide was disbarred, it
recommended that Atty. Sesbreno be disbarred, which was concurred in by the IBP Board of Governors.
In his motion for reconsideration, Atty. Sesbreno alleged that the facts in Soriano vs. Atty. Dizon are
separate and distinct from the facts of his case; that he was restored to full civil and political rights as
there was no condition set on the grant of executive clemency to him; and that Melvyn already
withdrew the complaint against him. The IBP Board denied his motion for reconsideration and the case
was eventually elevated to the Supreme Court, on the issue of whether homicide is a crime involving
moral turpitude.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political
rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was
granted “an absolute and unconditional pardon” which restored his “full civil and political rights,” a
circumstance not present in these cases. Here, the Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon
was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties were not mentioned when the original
sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation and they were also not mentioned in stating the
commuted sentence. It only states:
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the
Board of Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by
the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term
of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of
P50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to
10 years imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of P50,000.00.

Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and restored
Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In
this case, the executive clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6
months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbreño. Commutation is a mere reduction
of penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbreño’s crime
was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released
from prison. More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge stated that “[i]t is understood that such
x x x accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist.” Hence, the
Parcasio case has no application here. Even if Sesbreño has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the
records that shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good moral character. A violation of the high
moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a
lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.

Risos-Vidal vs COMELEC

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007,
however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to
former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the
disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this
time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that
Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek
public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second
highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of
Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime
of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?

Held:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording
of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President
Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former
President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and
to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive
clemency, to wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.

xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules,
and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President
may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a
final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there
was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act
of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted
the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we
apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of
the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms,
Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In
other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty
after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes
the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation,
considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence
educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause
that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make
its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope
of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent
or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its
text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to
seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon
itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the
Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition
to the pardon extended to former President Estrada.