Malayan Insurance Company vs. PAP Co.

Facts:

Petitioner Malayan Insurance Company issued Fire Insurance policy to PAP Co., Ltd. for the latter’s
machineries and equipment located at Sanyo bldg. PEZA, Rosario, Cavite and on which they procured for
RCBC, the mortgageee of the insured properties. It was covered for 15 Million pesos and effective for a
period of 1 year. That before its expiration PAP renewed the policy on an “as is” basis for another year.
During the effectivity of the renewal policy, a fire broke out at the PACE Factory, where the insured
machineries and equipment were totally lost by fire. Pursuant to this, PAP Co. Filed a fire insurance claim
with Malayan. However, Malayan denied the claim on the ground that, at the time of the loss, the insured
machineries and equipment were transferred by PAP Co., to a location different from that indicated in the
policy. Specfically, that the insured machineries were transferred from the Sanyo building to the Pace
Pacific building at PEZA, Rosario, Cavite. Moreover, it argued that the change of location of the subject
properties increased the hazard to which the insured properties exposed. PAP, on the other hand, argued
that Malayan cannot avoid liability as it was informed of the transfer by RCBC, the party- duty bound to
relay such information. RTC ruled in favor of PAP Co., on the ground of absence of proof that the
alteration of the thing insured increased the risk. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the transfer of machineries and equipment to another location different from what is
indicated in the policy increases the risk, thus, exonerating liabilities of Malayan ?

Held: Yes. SC ruled in favor of Malayan.

Evidently, by the clear and express condition in the renewal policy, the removal of the insured property
to any building or place required the consent of Malayan. That any transfer effected by the insured,
without the insurer’s consent, would free the latter from any liability. Here, PAP Co., failed to notify, and
to obtain the consent of, Malayan regarding the removal. The fact that RCBC referred PAP to Malayam
did not clothed it with authority to represent and bind the said insurance company. After the referral, PAP
dealt directly with Malayan.

The transfer from the Sanyo Factory to the PACE Factory increased the risk. The SC agrees with Malayan
that the transfer to the PACE Factory exposed the properties to hazardous environment and negatively
affected the fire rating stated in the renewal policy. The increasse in tariff rate put the subject properties at
a greater risk of loss. Such increase in risk would necessarily entail an increase in the premium payment
on the fire policy. Hence, Malayan is entitled to rescind the insurance contract under Section 68 of
Insurance Law. Considering that the original policy was renewed on an "as is basis," it follows that the
renewal policy carried with it the same stipulations and limitations. The terms and conditions in the
renewal policy provided, among others, that the location of the risk insured against is at the Sanyo factory
in PEZA. The subject insured properties, however, were totally burned at the Pace Factory. Although it
was also located in PEZA, Pace Factory was not the location stipulated in the renewal policy. There being
an unconsented removal, the transfer was at PAP’s own risk. Consequently, it must suffer the
consequences of the fire.

Sun Insurance Office Ltd., vs. CA

Facts:
Sun Insurance Office issued personal accident policy to Felix Lim, Jr. with a face value of 200k. 2
months later, he died with a bullet wound in his head. As beneficiary, his wife Nerissa Lim sought
payment on the policy but her claim was rejected. According to Sun Insurance Office the death of the
insured is not covered by the policy. They alleged the deceased Felix Lim, Jr. cause of death was due to
his negligence and not by suicide or accident. Meanwhile, according to the Secretary of Lim, the
deceased played with his handgun, from which he had previously removed the magazine. During that
time, the deceased pointed his gun to her but the latter pushed it aside. By assuring that it was safe and
unloaded he pointed the gun to his temple and pulled the trigger which caused the his death.

Issue: Whether or not there is an “accident”that will grant the claim of the wife of the insured to the
policy?

Held: Yes. The words "accident" and "accidental" have never acquired any technical signification
in law, and when used in an insurance contract are to be construed and considered according to
the ordinary understanding and common usage and speech of people generally. In-substance, the
courts are practically agreed that the words "accident" and "accidental" mean that which happens
by chance or fortuitously, without intention or design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen. The definition that has usually been adopted by the courts is that an accident is an
event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation — an event that proceeds from an
unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known case, and therefore not expected. An accident
is an event which happens without any human agency or, if happening through human agency,
an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual to and not expected by the person to whom
it happens. It has also been defined as an injury which happens by reason of some violence or
casualty to the injured without his design, consent, or voluntary co-operation.

In light of these definitions, the Court is convinced that the incident that resulted in Lim's death
was indeed an accident. The petitioner, invoking the case of De la Cruz v. Capital
Insurance, says that "there is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some
additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings
about their injury or death." There was such a happening. This was the firing of the gun, which
was the additional unexpected and independent and unforeseen occurrence that led to the insured
person's death. To repeat, the parties agree that Lim did not commit suicide. Nevertheless, the
petitioner contends that the insured willfully exposed himself to needless peril and thus removed
himself from the coverage of the insurance policy.

It should be noted at the outset that suicide and willful exposure to needless peril are in pari
materia because they both signify a disregard for one's life. The only difference is in degree, as
suicide imports a positive act of ending such life whereas the second act indicates a reckless
risking of it that is almost suicidal in intent. To illustrate, a person who walks a tightrope one
thousand meters above the ground and without any safety device may not actually be intending
to commit suicide, but his act is nonetheless suicidal. He would thus be considered as "willfully
exposing himself to needless peril" within the meaning of the exception in question.
The petitioner maintains that by the mere act of pointing the gun to hip temple, Lim had willfully
exposed himself to needless peril and so came under the exception. The theory is that a gun
is per se dangerous and should therefore be handled cautiously in every case. However, as the
secretary testified, Lim had removed the magazine from the gun and believed it was no longer
dangerous. He expressly assured her that the gun was not loaded. It is submitted that Lim did not
willfully expose himself to needless peril when he pointed the gun to his temple because the fact
is that he thought it was not unsafe to do so. The act was precisely intended to assure Nalagon
that the gun was indeed harmless.

Lim was unquestionably negligent and that negligence cost him his own life. But it should not
prevent his widow from recovering from the insurance policy he obtained precisely against
accident. There is nothing in the policy that relieves the insurer of the responsibility to pay the
indemnity agreed upon if the insured is shown to have contributed to his own accident. Indeed,
most accidents are caused by negligence. There are only four exceptions expressly made in the
contract to relieve the insurer from liability, and none of these exceptions is applicable in the
case at bar.

Accident insurance policies were never intended to reward the insured for his tendency to show
off or for his miscalculations. They were intended to provide for contingencies.

Finman General Assurance vs. CA

Facts:

Deceased, Carlie Surposa was insured with Finman General Assurance Corporation for personal
accident insurance policy with his parents, spouses, and brothers, all surnamed, Surposa, as
beneficiaries. While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie
Surposa as result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the three unidentified men without
provocation and warning on the part of the former as he and his cousin were waiting for a ride on
their way home after attending the celebration of the “Maskarra Annual Festival.””

Thereafter, the beneficiaries of the deceased filed a written notice of claim with the Finman
General Assurance which denied said claim contending that murder and assault are not within
the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy.

Issue: Whethter or not the murder and assaul can be considered as an accident to be covered in
the policy?

Held: Yes. The terms "accident" and "accidental" as used in insurance contracts have not
acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common
acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happen by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An
accident is an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation — an event that
proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not
expected.

The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury does not result from accident or accidental
means within the terms of an accident-policy if it is the natural result of the insured's voluntary
act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death or injury. There is no accident
when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and
unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. In
other words, where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's
voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the
injury, the resulting death is within the protection of the policies insuring against death or injury
from accident.

Here, it cannot be pretended that Carlie Surposa died in the course of an assault or murder as a
result of his voluntary act considering the very nature of these crimes. In the first place, the
insured and his companion were on their way home from attending a festival. They were
confronted by unidentified persons. The record is barren of any circumstance showing how the
stab wound was inflicted. Nor can it be pretended that the malefactor aimed at the insured
precisely because the killer wanted to take his life. In any event, while the act may not exempt
the unknown perpetrator from criminal liability, the fact remains that the happening was a pure
accident on the part of the victim. The insured died from an event that took place without his
foresight or expectation, an event that proceeded from an unusual effect of a known cause and,
therefore, not expected. Neither can it be said that where was a capricious desire on the part of
the accused to expose his life to danger considering that he was just going home after attending a
festival.

Furthermore,the failure of the petitioner insurance company to include death resulting from
murder or assault among the prohibited risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not
intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.

Biagtan vs. Insular Life Assurance

Facts:

Juan Biagtan was insured with Insular Life Assurance under Life Policy where there is an
attached supplemetary contract containing an Accidental Death Benefit Clause stating that if the
death of the insured resulted directly from bodily injury effected solely throught external and
violent means sustained in an accident and independently of all other causes.” The clause,
however, expressly provided that it would not apply where death resulted from an injury
intentionally inflicted by another party.

While the said life policy and supplementary contract were in full force and effect, the house of
the insured Juan Biagtan was robbed by the band of robbers. Juan Biagtan died on the said event
when the robbers stabbed a sharp- pointed instruments causing wounds on the body of the Juan
Biagtan which died afterwards.

Thereafter, the beneficiaries of the insured filed a claim under the policy which the Insular Life
Assurance partially denied, it only paid the basic amount of 5k of the policy but refused to pay
the additional sum of 5k under the accidental death benefit clause, on the ground that the
insured’s death resulted from injuries intentionally inflicted by third parties and therefore was
not covered.

Issue: Whether or not the wounds received by the insured at the hands of the robbers were
inflicted intentionally

Held: Yes. The trial court committed a plain error in drawing the conclusion it did from the
admitted facts. Nine wounds were inflicted upon the deceased, all by means of thrusts with
sharp-pointed instruments wielded by the robbers. This is a physical fact as to which there is no
dispute. So is the fact that five of those wounds caused the death of the insured. Whether the
robbers had the intent to kill or merely to scare the victim or to ward off any defense he might
offer, it cannot be denied that the act itself of inflicting the injuries was intentional. It should be
noted that the exception in the accidental benefit clause invoked by the appellant does not speak
of the purpose — whether homicidal or not — of a third party in causing the injuries, but only of
the fact that such injuries have been "intentionally" inflicted — this obviously to distinguish
them from injuries which, although received at the hands of a third party, are purely accidental.
This construction is the basic idea expressed in the coverage of the clause itself, namely, that
"the death of the insured resulted directly from bodily injury effected solely through external and
violent means sustained in an accident ... and independently of all other causes." A gun which
discharges while being cleaned and kills a bystander; a hunter who shoots at his prey and hits a
person instead; an athlete in a competitive game involving physical effort who collides with an
opponent and fatally injures him as a result: these are instances where the infliction of the injury
is unintentional and therefore would be within the coverage of an accidental death benefit clause
such as thatin question in this case. But where a gang of robbers enter a house and coming face
to face with the owner, even if unexpectedly, stab him repeatedly, it is contrary to all reason and
logic to say that his injuries are not intentionally inflicted, regardless of whether they prove fatal
or not. As it was, in the present case they did prove fatal, and the robbers have been accused and
convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide. Thus, nine wounds inflicted with bladed
weapons at close range cannot conceivably be considered as innocent insofar as such intent is
concerned. The manner of execution of the crime permits no other conclusion.

Paramount Insurance vs. Sps. Remonduelaz

Facts:
Sps. Remonduelaz insured with Paramount Insurance their Toyota Corolla Sedan under a
comprehensive motor vehicle insurance policy for 1 year. During the effectivity of the said
insurance, the insured car was unlawfully taken by Ricardo Sales. As result, Sps. Remonduelaz
notified Paramount Insurance to claim for the reimbursement of their lost vehicle which was
denied by the latter. According to the insurer, the loss of the vehicle is not a perial covered by the
policy since the car cannot be classified as stolen as Sps. Remonduelaz entrusted the possession
thereof to another person. However, Sps. Remonduelaz alleged the loss vehicle is covered by the
policy’s provision on “Theft Clause.

Issue: Whether or not the loss of Sps. Remonduelaz vehicle falls within the concept of the “theft
clause” under the insurance policy.

Held: Yes. In People v. Bustinera, explained the "theft clause" of an insurance policy. In this
case, the Court explained that when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the latters
consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft there being intent to gain as the
use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain. Also, in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, this Court held that the taking of a vehicle by another person without the permission
or authority from the owner thereof is sufficient to place it within the ambit of the word theft as
contemplated in the policy, and is therefore, compensable. Moreover, the case of Santos v.
People is worthy of note. Similarly in Santos, the owner of a car entrusted his vehicle to therein
petitioner Lauro Santos who owns a repair shop for carburetor repair and repainting. However,
when the owner tried to retrieve her car, she was not able to do so since Santos had abandoned
his shop. In the said case, the crime that was actually committed was Qualified Theft. However,
the Court held that because of the fact that it was not alleged in the information that the object of
the crime was a car, which is a qualifying circumstance, the Court found that Santos was only
guilty of the crime of Theft and merely considered the qualifying circumstance as an aggravating
circumstance in the imposition of the appropriate penalty. The Court therein clarified the
distinction between the crime of Estafa and Theft, to wit:

x x x The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in
estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there
may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the
material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing his conversion of the
same constitutes embezzlement or estafa. In the instant case, Sales did not have juridical
possession over the vehicle. Hence, it is apparent that the taking of repondents vehicle by Sales is
without any consent or authority from the former. Records would show that respondents
entrusted possession of their vehicle only to the extent that Sales will introduce repairs and
improvements thereon, and not to permanently deprive them of possession thereof. Since, Theft
can also be committed through misappropriation, the fact that Sales failed to return the subject
vehicle to respondents constitutes Qualified Theft. Hence, since repondents car is undeniably
covered by a Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Policy that allows for recovery in cases of
theft, petitioner is liable under the policy for the loss of respondents vehicle under the "theft
clause." All told, Sales act of depriving respondents of their motor vehicle at, or soon after the
transfer of physical possession of the movable property, constitutes theft under the insurance
policy, which is compensable.

Tiu vs. Arriesgado

Facts:

A vehicle mishap happened between a cargo truck and a passenger bus, among the passengers of
the bus were the Sps. Arriesgado. Pedro Arriesgado, the husband suffered fractures while his
wife, Felise, died because of the accident. Thereafter Pedro Arriesgado filed a complaint for
breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorneys fees against the petitioners D Rough
Riders bus Operator , William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspias. On the other hand,
petitioners, for their part, filed a third- pary complaint alleging that the said cargo truck was
parked in a slanted manner and did not have any warning devices displayed while it was left by
the driver which resulted to the collision and would therefore make, Benjamin Condor, the owner
of the cargo truck liable as well. Also, the Petitioner included that he was covered by Philippine
Phoenix Surety and Insurance at the time of the incident which would therefore make the same
liable for part of the damages that may arise as well. PPSI, however argued that it already
attended to and settled claims of those who were injured in the collision and that it could not
accede to the claim of Arriesgado because it was beyond the terms of the insurance.

Issue: 1. In third-party liability insurance, would it be possible for a third party to sue the insurer
directly?
Would it be possible for an insurance company to be held jointly and severally liable with the
insured?

Held:
Yes. 1. This is an exception to the rule on mutuality of contract. Whenever a contract contains
stipulation for the benefit of a third person and the moment the third person communicates his
assent thereto, the contract becomes binding upon him. The fact that a third person demands
fulfillment of the insurance policy may be reasonably construed as an assent on his part to the
benefit provided in the policy. This provision arms him with the requisite legal personality to
bring an action on the insurance policy. (stipulation pour artrui)

2. No. The basis of cause of action is different. The cause of action against the insurer is based
on contract while the cause of action against the insured is based on torts. Considering that there
are two different causes of action, it will be legally impossible for them to be made as jointly and
severally liable to the injured third party.

Villacorta vs. Insurance Commission

Facts:

Villacorta was the owner of a Colt Lancer, insured with Empire Insurance Company under
Private Car Policy. The vehicle was brought to the Sunday Machine Works, Inc., for general
check-up and repairs. While it was in the custody of the Sunday Machine Works, the car was
allegedly taken by six persons and driven out to Montalban, Rizal. While travelling the car
figured in an accident, hitting and bumping a gravel and sand truck parked at the right side of the
road going south. As a consequence, the gravel and sand truck veered to the right side of the
pavement going south and the car veered to the right side of the pavement going north. The
driver, Benito Mabasa, and one of the passengers died and the other four sustained physical
injuries. The car, as well, suffered extensive damage. Villacorta, thereafter, filed a claim for total
loss with the Empire Insurance Company but claim was denied. Villacorta then file to the
insurance commission. The comprehensive motor car insurance policy for P35,000.00 issued by
respondent Empire Insurance Company admittedly undertook to indemnify the petitioner-insured
against loss or damage to the car (a) by accidental collision or overturning, or collision or
overturning consequent upon mechanical breakdown or consequent upon wear and tear; (b) by
fire, external explosion, self-ignition or lightning or burglary, housebreaking or theft; and (c) by
malicious act.

Respondent insurance commission, however, dismissed petitioner's complaint for recovery of the
total loss of the vehicle against private respondent, sustaining respondent insurer's contention
that the accident did not fall within the provisions of the policy either for the Own Damage or
Theft coverage, invoking the policy provision on "Authorized Driver" clause. Respondent
commission likewise upheld private respondent's assertion that the car was not stolen and
therefore not covered by the Theft clause.

Issue: Whether or not Villacorta is entitled to the proceeds of the policy

Held: Yes. The main purpose of the "authorized driver" clause, as may be seen from its
text, supra, is that a person other than the insured owner, who drives the car on the insured's
order, such as his regular driver, or with his permission, such as a friend or member of the family
or the employees of a car service or repair shop must be duly licensed drivers and have no
disqualification to drive a motor vehicle.

A car owner who entrusts his car to an established car service and repair shop necessarily
entrusts his car key to the shop owner and employees who are presumed to have the insured's
permission to drive the car for legitimate purposes of checking or road-testing the car. The mere
happenstance that the employee(s) of the shop owner diverts the use of the car to his own illicit
or unauthorized purpose in violation of the trust reposed in the shop by the insured car owner
does not mean that the "authorized driver" clause has been violated such as to bar recovery,
provided that such employee is duly qualified to drive under a valid driver's license. The
situation is no different from the regular or family driver, who instead of carrying out the owner's
order to fetch the children from school takes out his girl friend instead for a joy ride and instead
wrecks the car. There is no question of his being an "authorized driver" which allows recovery of
the loss although his trip was for a personal or illicit purpose without the owner's authorization.

Secondly, and independently of the foregoing (since when a car is unlawfully taken, it is the theft
clause, not the "authorized driver" clause, that applies), where a car is admittedly as in this case
unlawfully and wrongfully taken by some people, be they employees of the car shop or not to
whom it had been entrusted, and taken on a long trip to Montalban without the owner's consent
or knowledge, such taking constitutes or partakes of the nature of theft as defined in Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code, viz. "Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person
who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent," for purposes of
recovering the loss under the policy in question. The Court rejects respondent commission's
premise that there must be an intent on the part of the taker of the car "permanently to deprive
the insured of his car" and that since the taking here was for a "joy ride" and "merely temporary
in nature," a "temporary taking is held not a taking insured against."

Malayan Insurance vs. Alberto

Facts:

An accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving 4
vehicles, to wit: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit; (2) an Isuzu Tanker; (3) a Fuzo
Cargo Truck; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant. Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot
investigator, SPO1 Dungga, the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the
Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before the vehicular incident. All three (3) vehicles were at
a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously
bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus.
Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved forward and the front left portion of
the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker.

Before the accident happened, Malayan Insurance issued Car Insurance in favor of First Malayan
Leasing and Finance Corporation (the assured), insuring the Mitsubishi Galant against third party
liability, own damage and theft, among others. Having insured the vehicle against such risks,
Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint that it paid the damages sustained by the assured
amounting to PhP 700,000. Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of
the assured by operation of law upon its payment to the latter, Malayan Insurance sent several
demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto and Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the registered
owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring them to pay the amount it
had paid to the assured. When respondents refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance
was constrained to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence against respondents.
Malayan Insurance contends that since Reyes, the driver of the Fuzo Cargo truck, bumped the
rear of the Mitsubishi Galant, he is presumed to be negligent unless proved otherwise. It further
contends that respondents failed to present any evidence to overturn the presumption of
negligence. Contrarily, respondents claim that since Malayan Insurance did not present any
witness who shall affirm any negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo truck before and
after the incident, there is no evidence which would show negligence on the part of respondents.
The RTC ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance and declared respondents liable for damages. On
appeal, the CA reversed the decision and ruled in favor of the respondents. The CA held that the
evidence on record has failed to establish not only negligence on the part of respondents, but also
compliance with the other requisites and the consequent right of Malayan Insurance to
subrogation. It noted that the police report, which has been made part of the records of the trial
court, was not properly identified by the police officer who conducted the on-the-spot
investigation of the subject collision.

Issue: Whether or not Respondents are guilty of gross negligence entitling Malayan Insurance to
claim?

Held: Yes. One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary
evidence is absent or not available.

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of
the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is
grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is
practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.

In the case at bar, aside from the statement in the police report, none of the parties disputes the
fact that the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the
rear end of the vehicle in front of it. Respondents, however, point to the reckless driving of the
Nissan Bus driver as the proximate cause of the collision, which allegation is totally unsupported
by any evidence on record. And assuming that this allegation is, indeed, true, it is astonishing
that respondents never even bothered to file a cross-claim against the owner or driver of the
Nissan Bus.

As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the
following: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi
Galant unless someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive control
of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus
driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally, no contributory
negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites
for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a reasonable
presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.