PART I
in Manila. He argues that since he and his late wife actually
A. VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES IS
JURISDICTIONAL
1. ISIP v PEOPLE
FACTS
Petitioner Manuel Isip (and his wife Marietta) were convicted
of Estafa before the RTC of Cavite City. Marites, however, died
during the pendency of the appeal before the CA. The
spouses were engaged in the buying and selling of pledged
and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitués.
However, in their dealings with Complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose, they failed to account for the jewelries given to them to
be sold on commission. Also, certain checks they’ve issued in
favor of Jose bounced. Procedurally, petitioner contends that
the RTC of Cavite has no jurisdiction over the case since the
elements of the crime did not occur there. Instead, he argues
that the case should have been filed in Manila where their
supposed transactions took place.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC of Cavite has jurisdiction over the
case.
RULING: YES. The concept of venue of actions in criminal
cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place where
the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts
in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly
take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.
Complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction
covered by the case took place in his ancestral home in
Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence from
the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue
was properly laid, it is now petitioner's task to prove
otherwise, since he claims that the transaction was entered
into in Manila. He who alleges must prove his allegations
applies.
1
Here, petitioner failed to prove that the transaction happened
resided in Manila, convenience suggests that the transaction
was entered there. The Court wasn’t persuaded. The fact that
Cavite is a bit far from Manila doesn’t necessarily mean that
the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will
not prevent any person from going to a distant place where
he can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a
living. It is not improbable or impossible them to have gone,
not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite if that is the number
of times they received pieces of jewelry from complainant.
Also, the fact that the checks issued were drawn against
accounts with banks in Manila or Makati doesn’t mean that
the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence.
2. LANDBANK of the PHILIPPINES v BELISATA
FACTS
Belista is the owner of 8 parcels of land placed by the Dept.
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (PD No. 27 & EO No. 228). He and DAR/LBP
disagreed on the amount of just compensation he deserved,
which caused him to file a Petition for Valuation and Payment
of Just Compensation before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator
for Region V (RARAD-V). The RARAD-V decided in his favor.
Aggrieved, LBP filed an original Petition for Determination of
Just Compensation at the same sala of the RTC sitting as SAC.
It was dismissed on the ground of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
ISSUE
Whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just
compensation under RA No. 6657 that the decision of the
Adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB before a
party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.
RULING
Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is
hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) x x x
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners,
and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x
x the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. She also claims that said
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further
exception to the DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction are
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC
sitting as a SAC. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases
for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the
courts.
Here, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over
Wycoco’s complaint for determination of just compensation.
It must be stressed that although no summary administrative
proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to
perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of
Wycoco's land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of
1990.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law,
primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands
taken under the agrarian reform program, but such
determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The
resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial
function.
B. JURISDICTION TO ISSUE HOLD DEPARTURE
ORDERS
1. MONDEJAR v BUBAN
2
FACTS:
Mondejar seeks to hold Judge Buban of the Tacloban City
MTCC administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law,
partiality, serious irregularity and grave misconduct, in
relation to a BP 22 case against Mondejar. Judge Buban
allegedly issued a “hold departure order” against her, in
violation of SC Circular No. 39-97, which says that “hold
departure orders” may only be issued in criminal cases within
order was issued without giving her an opportunity to be
heard.
The judge responded, stating that he was only made aware of
said order when he instructed his staff to secure a copy from
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Tacloban. After which, he
immediately issued an order setting aside and lifting the “hold
departure order”. As regards the supposed due process, he
sent a notice of hearing to her and her counsel, but neither
appeared.
Court Administrator recommended a severe reprimand with a
stern warning that should it happen again, he would be dealt
with more severely.
ISSUE:
W/N the judge is administratively liable?
HELD:
YES. The judge is administratively liable.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure
orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level
courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically
provides that “hold-departure orders shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional
trial courts.” Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of
the circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent
judge to have issued one in the instant case.
C. JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
1. FOZ v PEOPLE
Facts:
Vicente Foz (columnist) and Danny Fajardo (editor-publisher)
of Panay News were charged with libel for writing and
publishing an article against Dr. Edgar Portigo 1. The RTC found
them guilty as charged which was affirmed by the CA hence
this petition for review. Foz and Fajardo raised for the first
time that the information charging them with libel did not
contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Iloilo City.
Issue: W/N the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction over the offense
Held: NO
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.
The offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential elements took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. The jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information.
The rules on venue for written defamation are as follows:
1. When offended party is a public official or a private
person = filed in RTC of province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published
2. When offended party is a private individual = filed in
RTC of province where he actually resided at the
time of commission of offense
3. When offended party is a public officer whose office
is in Manila = filed in RTC of Manila
4. When offended party is a public officer holding office
outside Manila = filed in RTC of province or city
where he held office at the time of commission of
the offense
Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication
of the libelous article, the venue may be the RTC of the
province/city where the libelous article was printed and first
published OR where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
The Information [relevant to REM] states only that “x x x both
the accused as columnists and editor-publisher, respectively
of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region x x
x”. such did not establish that the said publication was printed
and published in Iloilo City. As cited in 2 other cases, the SC
held that if it would be held that the information sufficiently
vests jurisdiction on the allegation that the publication was in
1
That a certain Lita Payunan consulted with Dr. Portigo\ that she had rectum myoma
and had to undergo an operation. Even after surgery she still experienced difficulty in
urinating and defecating. On her 2nd operation, she woke to find that her anus and
vagina were closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side.\ she found out
she had cancer.\ they spent P150,000 for wrong diagnosis\
3
general circulation in [place where case is filed], there would
be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other
location where the publication is in general circulation. Such
was not the intent of RA 4363.
On residence – the information failed to allege the residence
of Dr. Portigo. While the information alleges that “Dr. Portigo
is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City”, it did not
clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in
Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It was
possible that he was actually residing in another place.
Residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no
particular length of time is required. Residence must be more
than temporary.
D. JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN
1. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time
pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to
get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under
a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses
of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection,
which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost
two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no
liquidation was made. Commission on Audit sent a report to
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, which then issued a
resolution recommending the filing of an Information for
violating the Auditing Code of the Philippines against
respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April
6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to
indict respondent Amante.
The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan
accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No.
1445 alleging that “with deliberate intent and intent to gain,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
liquidate said cash advances of P71,095.00.” The OSP filed an
Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria
Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445,
Amante countered by saying amongst others that
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case
because respondent Amante was then a local official who was
occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan
shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the
accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989, R.A. No. 6758.
ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on
May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997
by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as
shown in the Information was on or about December 19,
1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at
the time of the commission of the offense. The exception
contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it
expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present
case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the
opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions
states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other
offenses and felonies committed by public officials or
employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the
said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general
rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at
the time of the commission of the offense applies in this
4
present case. Since the present case was instituted on May
21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern.
This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in
the information is intimately connected with the office and
is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in
the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the
crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not
held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been
indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.
Note also that:
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that
they hold the positions thus enumerated by R.A. No. 3019.
Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial
governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city department
heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP
chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. In
connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides
that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their
office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
2. SERRANA v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Serana was a senior student and a government scholar of UP-
Cebu. She was appointed by then President Estrada as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term. She discussed
with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex
in UP Diliman.
With her siblings and relatives, Serana registered with the SEC
the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave P15M to the
OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
source of the funds, according to the information, was the
Office of the President.
However, the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize. Hence, the succeeding student regent, filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with
the Office of the Ombudsman. And the Ombudsman, after
due investigation, found probable cause to indict Serana and
her brother for estafa.
Serana moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP
student regent.
Issue:
Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try a government
scholar and a student regent, along with her brother (a
private individual), of swindling government funds? YES
Ratio:
1. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No.
1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. xxx
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xxx
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
2. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements
that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies.
3. Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary
Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade
that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
5
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be
of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of
law.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs
functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-
stock corporation. Moreover, it is well established that
compensation is not an essential element of public office. At
most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
4. The offense charged was committed in relation to public
office, according to the Information.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
averments in the information. In the case at bench, the
information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner,
being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance
of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to
her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to
gain…”
3. ESQUIVEL v SANDIGANBAYAN(borrowed from C)
FACTS:
PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan are assigned to
the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division of San
Fernando Pampanga. They filed their complaint-affidavits with
the CIDG against petitioners Antonio Esquivel (the municipal
mayor Jaen, Nueva Ecija) and his brother Eboy Esquivel. They
crimes complained of were illegal arrest, arbitrary detention,
maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats. Several
other police officers were accused with the Esquivels.
The initial investigation showed that on March 1998,
Eduardo was in his parents’ house, about to eat lunch when
Equivels arrived with other police officers. They disarmed
Eduardo and forced him to board their vehicle and brought
him to the municipal hall. On the way, Mayor Esquivel mauled
him and threatened to kill him while pointing a gun at
Eduardo.
Upon arrival at the town hall, Mayor Esquivel
ordered a certain SPO1 Espiritu to kill Eduardo but SPO1
Catacutan arrived to verify what happened to Eduardo. The
mayor threatened him as well. The mayor continued to
harass, threaten and inflict physical injuries upon Eduardo
until he lost consciousness. When he woke up, he was
released but no before he signed a statement in a police
blotter that he was in good physical condition. The alleged
motive for this was because the mayor believed Eduardo and
Catacutan were among the law enforcers who raided a
jueteng den connected to the mayor.
After investigation, the CIDG forwarded the findings
to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, which conducted a
preliminary investigation and required the submission of
counter-affidavits. In their counter-affidavits, the Esquivels
allege that Eduardo was actually a fugitive with a warrant of
arrest for malversation and they just confiscated his gun for
illegal possession.
In June 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman issued a
resolution recommending that both Esquivels be indicted for
less serious physical injuries and grave threats. As to the
charges against other petitioners, they were dismissed. Then
Ombudsman Desierto approved this. So, the separate
informations were filed against the Esquivels in the
Sandiganbayan.
Accused filed an MR but this was denied. Esquivels
were arraigned, pleaded not guilty. With the denial of their
MR, they elevate the matter to the SC alleging GADLEJ in the
issuance of the resolution of the deputy ombudsman.
Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded
in Republic Act No. 7975. As the positions of municipal
mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein,
they claim they are not covered by said law under the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases
against both Mayor Esquivel and Eboy Esquivel.
HELD/RATIO: Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Esquivels
are wrong!
Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs.
Sandiganbayan, we already held that municipal mayors fall
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony
Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is
outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides that it is only in cases
where "none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or
higher" that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended." Note that under
the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary
grade of 27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose
position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming
jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal
6
Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ of
certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.
E. JURISDICTION OF OMBUDSMAN
1. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE v LIWAG
FACTS:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary
Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on before the Ombudsman
against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael
Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and
several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to
separate cases involving different offenses imputed to
respondents Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found the
complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and
substance and thus required the respondents therein to file
their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001,
said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and
prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.
Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other
witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging
the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in
her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman. NBI Director
Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the
investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and
private individuals for the following alleged crimes:
kidnapping for ransom and murder of several individuals. On
May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a
subpoena to Lacson, et al named in the witnesses’ sworn
statements directing them to submit their counter-affidavits
and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary
investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI. However,
Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001
that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the
complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are
complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar
set of facts against the same respondents, and claimed that
the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases involving public officials, including police and military
officials such as private respondent. DOJ, which construed the
letter as a motion to dismiss, denied the motion.
Lacson, et al. filed before the RTC a petition for prohibition,
which the RTC granted, saying that the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction over the case, and directing the DOJ to desist from
conducting preliminary investigation. Thus, the DOJ filed a
Petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC.
ISSUE/RULING: W/N the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a
preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the
Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused,
facts, and circumstances – NO
RATIO:
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect
taken over the investigation of the case or cases in question
to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the
DOJ. Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of
the parties in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the
matter, respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary
investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a
shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the
resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself,
the other investigative agencies of the Government have no
power and right to add an input into the Ombudsman’s
investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative
agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make
preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the
investigation, subject to the final decision of the
Ombudsman.
The public respondents cannot find comfort in that provision
of the law that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage,
from any investigative agency of the Government, the
investigation of cases involving public officials, including
police and military officials such as the petitioners. That
situation presupposes the conduct by other Government
agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials
in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the
Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already
taken hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over,
at any stage of the proceedings, the investigation being
conducted by another agency. It has the case before it.
Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for power
and authority would thus require the respondents to desist
from interfering with the case already handled by the
Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they
are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so,
and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the
powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a
particular power and authority. The hierarchy of powers must
be remembered.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of
concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter, the settled rule is that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Thus, assuming
there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and
the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this
concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom
to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a
7
contest between these bodies as to which will first complete
the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman
before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has
the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to
the exclusion of the DOJ.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the
conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed
against the respondents would not promote an orderly
administration of justice. Although a preliminary
investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A
preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to be
filed successively before two or more investigative bodies
would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also
cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have
to appear and defend his position before every agency or
body where the same complaint was filed. This would leave
hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead
their cause or defense. There is yet another undesirable
consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two
bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come
up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the
respondents.
2. LAZATIN v DESIERTO(borrowed from C)
FACTS:
The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-affidavit, charging
petitioners Lazatin et al. with Illegal Use of Public Funds as
defined and penalized under Article 220 of the RPC and
violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of RA 3019. The complaint
alleged that there were irregularities in the use of
Congressman Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund
(CDF) for 1996 (he was both proponent and implementer of
the projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and
supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as
Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18)
checks amounting to P4,868,277.08). Thus, Lazatin, with the
help of Morales, Pelayo, David, was allegedly able to convert
his CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB)
thereafter issued a resolution recommending the filing
against petitioners of 14 counts each of Malversation of
Public Funds and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. This
resolution was approved by Ombudsman Desierto. Hence, 28
informations were filed against petitioners in the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners Lazatin et al. filed their respective
Motions for reconsideration/reinvestigation which were
granted. The Office of Special Prosecutors (OSP)
recommended the dismissal of the cases for lack or
insufficiency of evidence. However, Desierto ordered the
Office of the Legal Affiars (OLP) to review the OSP resolution.
In a memorandum, the OLA recommended that the OSP
resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to
proceed with the trial. Desierto adopted the OLA
memorandum. The cases were then returned to the
Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings.
Hence, petitioners Lazatin et al. filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. They contend that the Ombudsman
had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution because,
under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch,
investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases against
erring officials, but it was not granted the power to
prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the
power to prosecute belongs to the OSP, which was intended
by the framers to be a separate and distinct entity from the
Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as
provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate and
distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and
authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A.
No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the
OSP an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman,
should be struck down for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether Ombudsman Desierto acted with GADLEJ –
NO.
HELD: Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled that the provisions
of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman
prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office
have no constitutional infirmity.
The Court cited the case of Acop v. Office of the
Ombudsman. In that case, the Court held that giving
prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance
with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI
8
provides that the Ombudsman shall “exercise such other
functions or duties as may be provided by law.” The
constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which
subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was
likewise upheld by the Court in Acop.
More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera,
the Court declared that the OSP is “merely a component of
the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control, and upon authority of the
Ombudsman” and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power
to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman
and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court's ruling in Acop that the
authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No.
6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the
foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where
it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the
power to authorize the filing of informations, which power
had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond
cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not
proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to
the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the
Ombudsman.
3. PRESIDENTIAL AD-HOC FACT FINDING COMMITTEE v
DESIERTO
Facts:
President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating the Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on
Behest Loans. Orlando S. Salvador, in his capacity as PCGG
consultant, executed three separate Sworn Statements stating
that among the loan accounts referred by the Assets
Privatization Trust to the Committee for investigation, report
and recommendation are those of the following corporations:
P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and Investment
Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation (Golden
River), and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation
(Filcarbon).
On different occasions, these three companies obtained
loans from the Development Bank of the Philippines (PRGS
and Golden River), and the National Investment Development
Corporation (Filcarbon), amounting to tens of millions of
pesos for various purposes in a period spanning from 1967 to
1982. Filcarbon’s loan in particular was favorably
recommended by the President of the Philippine National
Bank. Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submitted
to the Committee, these three corporations did not have
sufficient collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with
respect to the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and
1977. Salvador also alleged that the above-mentioned
corporations did not have adequate capital to ensure not only
the viability of their operations but also their ability to repay
all their loans. Accordingly, the Committee found the loan
accounts of the above-mentioned three corporations as
behest loans. The Committee submitted its report to
President Ramos who instructed then PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol Gunigundo, sitting as the Committee's ex-officio
Chairman, to file the necessary charges against the DBP
Chairman and members of the Board of Directors, the former
PNB President and former NIDC General Manager, together
with the respective stockholders/officers of the three
corporations. Salvador’s Sworn Statements were used by the
Committee as its bases in filing separate complaints with the
Office of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents
for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
Complaints were filed against the aforementioned parties in
the Office of the Ombudsman but upon the recommendation
of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau,
complaints against the respondents were dismissed. The
Ombudsman ruled that, except with respect to the two loan
transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the
offenses alleged by the Committee as having been committed
by herein respondents had already prescribed under the
provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019. As to the two 1982
transactions of Golden River, the Ombudsman found that,
contrary to the claims of the Commission, the loan accounts
obtained by the said corporation have sufficient collaterals.
The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman was empowered to dismiss
the complaint motu propio, without requiring the
respondents to file their counter-affidavit or conducting
preliminary investigation? (REM TOPIC)
Ruling:
Yes. The Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has
discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its
facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically
9
his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he
find it to be insufficient in form and substance or, should he
find it otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he may
proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is
in due and proper form and substance. Quite relevant is the
Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman and
reiterated in the case of The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto, to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by
public officers is vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from
outside pressure and improper influence,
the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has
endowed it with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers
virtually free from legislative, executive or
judicial intervention. This court consistently
refrains from interfering with the exercise
of its powers, and respects the initiative
and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, ‘beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrity of the public
service.’
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers, as provided in the Constitution, without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. The basis for this
rule was provided in the case of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman
where the Court held as follows:
The rule is based not only upon respect for
the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of
the Ombudsman but upon practicality as
well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts
will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints
filed before it, in much the same way that
the courts would be extremely swamped if
they would be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time
they decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, that it may
dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable merit. At
that point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a
preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. Should
the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit,
then he may recommend its outright dismissal. The
Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a
preliminary investigation is proper. It is only when the
Ombudsman opts not to dismiss the complaint outright for
lack of palpable merit would the Ombudsman be expected to
require the respondents to file their counter-affidavit and
petitioner, its reply.
4. CASTRO v DELORIA(Borrowed from C)
FACTS:
Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with
Malversation of public funds. The information alleged that
Castro was a revenue officer of the BIR who misappropriated
556K+ of collections. Castro pleaded NOT GUILTY on
arraignment. On Aug 31, 2001, Castro filed a Motion to Quash
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of
the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and
file the Information since it failed t to allege her salary grade
-- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner further argued
that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the
case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be
investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor,
and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was
limited to cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan.
Castro filed an MR which was denied so filed a petition for
certiorari w/ CA also dismissed. Filed 65 with SC.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file the
information in light of the ruling in the First "Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the prosecutorial
powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.
2. W/N the clarificatory Resolution in the Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Castro,
without violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto
laws and denial of the accused to due process.
RULING: YES to BOTH.
In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, similar
grounds were raised and the SC held that the Ombudsman
has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by
the regular courts. It held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to
the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any
act or omission of any public officer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable
by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal
act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or
employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the

The RTC denied & held that the (1) jurisdiction of the RTC over
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the
the case did not depend on the salary grade, but on the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged. It
Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special
also (2) sustained the prosecutorial powers of the
Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation
Ombudsman since in the cited case the court later overturned
and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
their decision in a clarificatory resolution. Finally, it said that
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the
the (3) Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for
scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
it was filed after Castro pleaded not guilty under the
Ombudsman to such cases.
Information.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman

Castro contends that the prevailing jurisprudence from Aug 9,
should not be equated with the limited authority of the
1999 til May 20, 2001 was that the Ombudsman had no
Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of
prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RT and
the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of
since the investigation and prosecution against Castro was
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and
conducted by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then
control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was applicable,
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited
notwithstanding that the decision was set aside in the March
to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
20, 2001 Resolution. So, the Information that was filed against
Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the
petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to
investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.
these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to
10
act on all complaints against officers and employees of the
government and to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants.
To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the
personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation
and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him work under his supervision and
control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special
prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
In the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, court held
that the March 20, 2001 Resolution, that the Ombudsman has
prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends
even to criminal information filed or pending at the time
when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on
the issue.
F. REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
1. ANTONINO v DESIERTO
FACTS
Petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit before the
Ombudsman against the respondents for violation of
Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of RA No. 3019 and for
malversation of public funds or property through falsification
of public documents. This concerns the alleged conspiracy
involving respondents to cheat and defraud the city
government of General Santos through the illegal disposition
of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park in violation of law and its
charter.
The Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the charges
against the respondents. Petitioner filed MR which was
denied by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman held that since
the criminal Informations were already filed and the cases
were already pending before the Sandiganbayan and the
regular courts of General Santos City, the Ombudsman had
lost jurisdiction over the said case. Petitioner filed this
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: w/n the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in the
exercise of his prosecutor functions, by dismissing the charges
against the respondents.
HELD: NO
11
1. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989) provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.
— (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective
and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of
any order, directive or decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman must be filed within five
(5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been
discovered which materially affects the
order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or
irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
The motion for reconsideration shall be
resolved within three (3) days from filing:
Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Petitioner failed to establish that her MR was indeed
filed on time, and thus, failed to refute the assertion of the
respondents based on the aforementioned Certification that
petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed
Resolution. There are a number of instances when rules of
procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice. However, in
this case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for
the late filing of the MR. We find no justification why the
Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration,
when, at the time of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.
2. (relevant topic)
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
and pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the
power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a
public officer or employee when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Well-settled is
the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate
otherwise. A contrary rule would encourage innumerable
petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Ombudsman, which would grievously
hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much
the same way that courts would be swamped by a deluge of
cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an
information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
 Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. This Court laid down the following exceptions to
the rule:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub
judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess
of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is
exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent
and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of
law. The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the
Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court
finds no reason to deviate from the general rule.
3.
Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the
conviction of an accused under Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019,
are as follows:
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private
person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) The said public officer commits the
prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties, or in relation to his or her public
functions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any
party, whether the government or a private party;
(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable neglect.
12
As found by the Ombudsman and based on the
records, there is no showing of evident bad faith and/or gross
negligence in the respective acts of the respondents. Finally,
petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and
those indicted. However, as found by the Ombudsman, such
conspiracy alleged in the complaint was not supported by
ample evidence. Conspiracy must be proved by direct
evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged
indicative of a common design. This, the petitioner sadly
failed to establish.
G. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE OMBUDSMAN
1. SESBRENO v AGLUGUB
FACTS:
This case involves a complaint filed by Sesbreño
(Complainant) against MTC Judge Aglugub (Respondent) for
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service relative to a
criminal case (entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al.). In
the said criminal case, Complainant filed three (3) separate
complaints against Marcelino, Nuñez, Tabazon, and
Carunungan who are all from the Traffic Management Unit of
San Pedro, Laguna. The criminal complaint was for
Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The
three (3) cases were assigned to respondent judge’s branch
and subsequently consolidated for disposition. In a
Consolidated Resolution, only the charge of Usurpation was
set for arraignment, the rest of the charges having been
dismissed. Thereafter, Complainant made a manifestation
that the complaint also charged the defendants with violation
of RA No. 10 accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of
warrants of arrests against the defendants. Respondent judge
found no probable cause and dismissed the charge for
violation of R.A. 10. She also denied complainant’s prayer for
the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused and
ordered the records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor’s
Office (PPO) for review. The PPO affirmed respondent’s order
and remanded the case to the court for further proceedings
on the sole charge of Usurpation of Authority. During the
hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon,
Carunungan and Nuñez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreño,
however, did not move for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against them. Neither did he object to the cancellation of the
scheduled hearing.
ISSUES:
1. Did Respondent err in not conducting a preliminary
investigation for the charge of Usurpation of
Authority?
2. Did Respondent err in not issuing warrants of arrest
for failure of the accused to appear during trial?
3. Did Respondent err in issuing her Order dismissing
the complaint for violation of R.A. 10?
4. Did Respondent err in transmitting the records of
the case to the PPO instead of the Office of the
Ombudsman?
HELD:
1. No. A preliminary investigation is required before the
filing of a complaint or information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without
regard to the fine. Thus, a preliminary investigation is
not required nor was one conducted for the charge
of violation of Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code
which is punishable by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or from six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months.
2. No. There is nothing in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which requires a judge to issue a warrant
of arrest for the non-appearance of the accused
during the trial. Hence, its issuance rests on the
sound discretion of the presiding judge. More so in
this case, the private prosecutor did not move for the
issuance of such warrant.
3. No. Respondent concedes that due to oversight, she
failed to rule on the charge of violation of R.A. 10 in
her initial Resolution. Nonetheless, she asserts in
her Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative
Complaint that she conducted a preliminary
investigation for the charge of violation of R.A. 10
and dismissed the charge after taking into
consideration the affidavits and evidence presented.
Complainant does not dispute the fact that indeed a
preliminary investigation was conducted for this
charge. Thus, when respondent judge dismissed the
complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she merely did so
to correct an oversight. It was the dismissal of the
charge for violation of R.A. 10 that was elevated to
the PPO for review. It was imprudent, however, for
respondent judge to transmit the entire records of
the case to the PPO knowing that the charge for
13
Usurpation of Authority was included in the records
of the case. Respondent judge should have ensured
that at least one complete set of the records
remained in her sala so that the prosecution for
Usurpation of Authority would not be held up.
Injudicious though her actuation was, Respondent
judge was not motivated by an evil intent to delay
the case.
4. No. This issue is answered by Administrative Order
No. 8 entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules
of Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides
"that all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors." Moreover, "[R]esolutions in
Ombudsman cases against public officers and
employees prepared by a deputized assistant
prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or
City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn,
forward the same to the Deputy Ombudsman of the
area with his recommendation for the approval or
disapproval thereof.”
Thus, Respondent did not err and was, in fact,
merely acting in accordance with law when she
forwarded the case for violation of R.A. 10 to the
PPO. The fact that the PPO remanded the case to the
court for further proceedings instead of forwarding
the same to the Deputy Ombudsman as required by
Administrative Order No. 8 is quite another matter.
In any event, respondent judge should have taken
the necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to
preclude delay in the disposition of the case.
Complaint dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent
was nonetheless admonished to be more
circumspect in the performance of her duties in the
future.
H. POWER OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
OVER PROSECUTORS
1.PUNZALAN v DELA PENA(Borrowed from C)
FACTS:
Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors. On
Aug. 13, 1997, Dela Peña, a house boarder of the Platas, was
in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier
Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio,
Alex “Toto” Ofrin, and others arrived. Eugenio shouted at Dela
Peña, “Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili ang sumbrero mo?” Dela
Peña replied, “Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo
ako.” Irked by the response, Gregorio slapped Dela Peña while
Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group then ganged up
on him. Somebody shouted, “Yariin na ‘yan!” Thereafter,
Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him with
a balisong but missed.
 While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara,
the Platas’ family driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed
the gun and pointed it to the group chasing him to scare
them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to
wrestle the gun away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally
went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. The group ran
after them and when they got to the Platas’ house, shouted,
“Lumabas kayo d’yan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin
kayo!”
Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against
Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide and against Robert
Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm.
In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Peña filed several
counter-charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats,
robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries against
the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by
Dela Peña against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen
others and one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Peña against
Ofrin.
In their counter-affidavit, the Punzalans argued that
the charges against them were fabricated in order to dissuade
them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal
Possession of Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata
and Cagara, respectively.
Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral
Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier,
alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached him,
and within hearing distance of other people, told him, “Hoy
Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa
pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng
trabaho.” In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the
alleged defamatory statements.
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral
Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, holding that Cagara
failed to show that the alleged defamatory statements would
cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon him. He also found
that the statements were uttered by Rosalinda in a state of
distress and were not actionable. The charge of Attempted
Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also
dismissed because complainant Dela Peña’s claim that he
accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense of Michael
Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by
Rainier against the latter.
14
Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the
DOJ. On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio
Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint
Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor.
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan,
together with their co-respondents, filed separate MR. On
June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23,
2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the
Informations against the movants, Punzalan et al. (Reason:
Oral Defamation case should be dismissed because the
alleged defamatory statements were uttered without malice
as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger. Anent
the Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Peña against
Rainier, the Secretary held that the allegations in support
thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the
Attempted Homicide case filed by Rainier against Michael
Plata. He added that Dela Peña failed to prove that Rainier,
Randall and his companions intended to kill him.)
Respondents’ MR was denied. Hence, they filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA, which reversed June 6,
2000 Resolution where Secretary of Justice directed the
withdrawal of informations for slight oral defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against the
respondents.
Petitioners’ MR was denied. Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the resolutions of
the Secretary of Justice –YES
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave
abuse of discretion to justify interference by the Courts.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when
any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion in his Resolutions dated
June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the Revised
Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the
power of direct control and supervision over the decisions or
resolutions of the prosecutors. “Supervision and control”
includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to
direct the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or
modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.
In the case of People v. Peralta, we reiterated the
rule that the right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a
wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what
and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
variety of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.
In the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, we
declared that: A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office,
is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where
no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient
evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by
the petitioner.
We need only to stress that the determination of
probable cause during a preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function
exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is
under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is not
convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to
support the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the
duty not to prosecute when after investigation or
reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced
was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the
determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily
with the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the
discharge of this function.
Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a
complaint is within the purview of the functions of the
prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.
The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing
the City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations for slight
oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted
homicide against the other respondents other than Rosalinda
Punzalan is determinative of whether or not he committed
grave abuse of discretion.
First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the
records show that the defamatory remarks were uttered
within the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City.
The CA in its Decision stated the settled rule that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the
trial court in view of its opportunity to observe the demeanor
and conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The City
Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the occurrence of
the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and
conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine
15
probable cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances
were made within the hearing distance of third parties. The
investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence
existed. The Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed
the decision of the City Prosecutor.
As to the charge of attempted homicide against the
herein petitioners other than Rosalinda Punzalan, the
Secretary of Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because
it was in the nature of a countercharge. The DOJ in a
Resolution had already directed that Dela Peña be likewise
investigated for the charge of attempted homicide in
connection with the shooting incident that occurred on
August 13, 1997 making him a party to the case filed by
Rainier Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice that the complaint of Dela Peña should be
threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the shooting
incident that resulted in the serious injury of Rainier
Punzalan.
In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did
not commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the
finding of the CA. It is well-settled in the recent case
of Samson, et al. v. Guingona that the Court will not
interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as
will establish probable cause for the filing of information
against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not
subject to review unless shown to have been made with
grave abuse.
I. ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL IN CRIMINAL CASES
1. PEOPLE v DUCA
FACTS
It was in 1999 that Pedro Calanayan filed an action for
ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. Duca and several of
her relatives. The case was decided in favor of Calanayan.
Decision became final and executory.
Ultimately properties belonging to Cecilia hit the auction
block to satisfy judgment and a certificate of sale was issued
in favor of Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder in the auction
sale.
Cecilia Duca went on fighting. She filed an action for the
Declaration of Nullity of Execution and Damages with prayer
for Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining order.
When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the
effect that the house erected on the lot subject of the
ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca. This is the
core of the controversy: Cecilia (Mother) and Arturo (Son)
Duca feloniously prepared a Declaration of Real Property over
a bungalow type residential house by making it appear that
the signature appearing on the sworn statement of owner is
that of her other son Aldrin F. Duca. This was false of course,
as the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the
Philippines only long after the dastardly deed.
Accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature thereon
and by doing so caused damage to private complainant Pedro
Calanayan. Because of the isrepresentation, Cecilia and
Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such that they were able
to get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen
ordering them to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the
property in question.
Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of
Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she had no participation in
the execution as she was in Manila at that time. Arturo
insisted there was no falsification. The MTC found him guilty.
RTC affirmed. Duca filed petition for review at the CA.
The CA ruled that Arturo was empowered by Aldrin to issue
that tax declaration, hence no crime had been committed.
Aggrieved, the SolGen declared that the CA should have given
the Republic a chance to be heard before ruling such.
ISSUE: w/n the CA gravely abused its discretion and acted
without discretion by resolving the appeal without giving the
SOLGEN a chance to be heard.
HELD: CA abused its discretion.
Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due
process when the CA resolved the respondent’s appeal
without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same and without
requiring the Solicitor General to file his comment.
Petitioner also asserts that once the case is elevated to the CA
or this Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized
to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the
CA gravely abused its discretion when it acted on
respondent’s appeal without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of the
CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for being
violative of due process.
16
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code explicitly provides, viz.:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. –
The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents
in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x
x It shall have the following specific powers
and functions:
(1) Represent the Government
in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his
official capacity is a party. (emphasis
supplied)
The CA also failed to follow Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for
filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may file a verified petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, paying at
the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees,
depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs,
and furnishing the Regional Trial Court
and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition. The petition shall be filed and
served within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the decision sought to be reviewed or of
the denial of petitioner’s motion for new
trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after judgment. Upon proper motion and
the payment of the full amount of the
docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of
the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of
 fifteen (15) days only within which to file
the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to
extend fifteen (15) days.

Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with

requirements. – The failure of the petitioner
to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit
for costs, proof of service of the petition,
and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent Duca appealed to the CA from the decision of the

RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules
of Court. The respondent was mandated under Section 1,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for
review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the
Philippines through the OSG.

Respondent Duca failed to serve a copy of his petition on the

OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Dagupan City. The service of a copy of the
petition on the People of the Philippines, through the
Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason that the
Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of
the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme
Court.

Certiorari was thereby granted and the SC remanded the

case to the CA

17

PART II
A. COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
A. SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT or INFORMATION
1. PEOPLE v DIMAANO
FACTS:
Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano, with
2 counts of rape and 1 count of attempted rape in the
complaints which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality
of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned Maricar Maricar Dimaano y Victoria,
who is his own daughter, a minor 10 years of age,
against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 96-150
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in
the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned Maricar Maricar
Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor
12 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 96-151
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the
Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape
one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing
the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by
overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the
acts of execution which would produce it, as a
consequence by reason of cause other than his
spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely
arrival of the complainant’s mother. CONTRARY TO
LAW.
18
The trial court found Edgardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of rape (2 counts) and the crime of attempted
rape. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modifications as to the award of damages. In accordance with
Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review of
Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 15
October 2004), the case was CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court
for review.
ISSUE:
W/N the complaint for attempted rape was sufficient?
RULING: NO.
RATIO:
We affirm the trial court's conviction for the crimes of rape.
However, we acquit Edgardo for the crime of attempted rape
for failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts
constitutive of attempted rape.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling
is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment.
No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.
The above-cited complaint upon which Edgardo was
arraigned does not allege specific acts or omission
constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it
constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other
than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the Edgardo 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the
complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a
complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by
the one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency
therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of
conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of
Edgardo to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against him.
2. SASOT v PEOPLE
Facts:
NBA Propeties Inc. is a foreign corporation which owns
trademarks and names of certain basketball teams registered
with the Bureau of Trademarks and Patents and Technology
Transfer. On the basis of its complaint filed, the NBI conducted
an investigation on possible unfair competition under RPC Art
189 against petitioner for the unauthorized use of the
trademarks and names owned by NBA Props. Inc.
In its report, the NBI discovered that petitioner is engaged in
the manufacture , printing, sale and distribution of
counterfeit “NBA” garment products and recommended
prosecution of petitioner for unfair competition.
In the meantime, a Special Power of Attorney(SPA) was drawn
by Welts, President of NBA Prop. Inc. which authorized the
Ortega law firm to file cases in their behalf in the Phils.
Accompanying it is the complaint-affidavit made by Welts.
The SPA and complaint-affidavit were notarized abroad which
were authenticated by the Philippine Consul.
On the basis of the complaint filed by Welts and the report of
the NBI, an Information was filed against the accused with the
following accusatory portion:
That on or about May 9, 1997 and on
dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above named accused
ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of
Allandale Sportslines, Inc., did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
manufacture and sell various garment products
bearing the appearance of "NBA" names,
symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to
believe that the goods offered by them are
those of "NBA" to the damage and prejudice of
the NBA Properties, Inc., the trademark owner
of the "NBA".
19
Petitioner now filed a motion to Quash Information on the
basis that the facts charged does not constitute an offense
and that the court has no jurisdiction of the offense charged
and the person of the accused. This was denied by RTC and
now under a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint is sufficient and the denial of
the motion to quash information should be sustained.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner harps on the insufficiency of the charge
based on the following circumstances: formal defects such
that complainant has not personally sworn before the
investigating prosecutor; complainant’s lack capacity to sue
such that there was no board resolution authorizing
Welts(president) to institute the action; and other exculpatory
defenses against the crime.
However, under Rule 112 Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if
it states the known address of the respondent, it is
accompanied by complainant’s affidavit and his witnesses
and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to
before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or
unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All
these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before
Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be
noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint
does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere
defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights
of the defendant on the merits.
In this case, the basis of the information is Welt’s complaint
affidavit which though subscribed abroad before a foreign
notary public, it bears the authentication of the Phil. Consul.
Although what was initially presented was just presented was
a photocopy, there was an offer to produce the original which
was in the hands of another prosecutor. Moreover, there are
other basis such as the report of the NBI and the Ortega law
firms letter asking NBI’s assistance and the affidavit of a
consulting service commissioned by the prosecution to
conduct investigation.
(Only if sir asks)
With regard to other defects, Section 3, Rule 117 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force
at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed,
enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to wit:
 a) That the facts charged do not constitute an
offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged or the person of the
accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or
in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the
offense charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any
mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal
and the complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds for a
motion to quash.
3. LASOY v ZENAROSA
FACTS: In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor
Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero ,accused Marcelo Lasoy and
Felix Banisa were charged of selling prohibited drugs
(42.410 GRAMS of dried marijuana fruiting tops). The case
was presided by Judge Jaime Salazar. Upon arraignment, both
accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced on July 16, 1996
to suffer a jail term of 6 months and 1 day. Both accused
applied for probation.
On August 28 1996, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora
Escasa-Ramos filed two separate motions, first, to admit
amended Information and second, to set aside the
arraignment of the accused, as well as the decision of the trial
court. The prosecutor alleges that the accused should rather
be charged for transportation and delivery, with intent to sell,
45 pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops (42.410 KILOS) and
that it is imperative to file an amended information in order
to make it conformable to the evidence on hand.
The trial court denied the first motion. However, it granted
the second motion for rearraignment it appearing from the
published resolution in Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen
Bobares vs. Hon. Francisco Escano, Jr. it is said that the
jurisdiction over drug of small quantity as in the case at bar
should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court, although
under the statute of R.A. 7659, the penalty for possession or
use of prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision
[correccional] to reclusion temporal which indeterminate
penalty and under the rule on jurisdiction the court which has
jurisdiction over a criminal case is dependent on the
20
maximum penalty attached by the statute to the crime. This
second information was assigned to Judge Monina Zenarosa.
Both accused filed a Motion to Quash before the trial court
which was denied and subsequently, a petition for certiorari
before the CA which was also denied. Hence this Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for injunction and TRO.
ISSUES brought before the Supreme Court:
(1) W/N there was valid information filed and therefore
double jeopardy sets in? YES
(2) W/N the original court already obtained jurisdiction over
the case? YES
ISSUE further addressed by the ponente:
(3) W/N after conviction and application for probation,
information may still be amended and the accused arraigned
anew on the ground that the information was allegedly
altered/tampered with? NO.
RATIO:
(1) To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3)
the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been
convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. If the offense is stated in such a way that
a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what
is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to
law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid.
It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the
information. The information will be sufficient if it describes
the crime defined by law.
The first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges
the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the
purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the
nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied
with. Applying Rule 110Section 6, shows on its face that it is
valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein
the offense was committed.
Further, we cannot overlook the fact that accused were
arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the
first information. Granting that alleged alteration/tampering
of information took place and the accused had a hand in it,
this does not justify the setting aside of the early decision.
The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by
the accused may well be the subject of another inquiry.
(2) On the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and
Bobares v. Escano, Jr., upon which both trial courts justified
their claim of jurisdiction was already superseded by a later
resolution where the RTC is exclusively designated try and
decide cases of Kidnapping For Ransom, Robbery In Band,
Robbery Committed Against A Banking Or Financial
Institution, Violation Of The Dangerous Drugs Act, and
Violation Of The Anti-Carnapping Act, and other heinous
crimes penalized under Rep. Act No. 7659 committed within
their respective territorial jurisdictions. This issue is further
settled inPeople v. Velasco where it is stated that “[A]ll drug-
related cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the
penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, still fall within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts, in
view of Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972). “
(3) The belated move on the part of the prosecution to have
the information amended defies procedural rules, the
decision having attained finality after the accused applied for
probation and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed
at that stage. Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is
emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. – The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any
time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during
the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with
Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Even appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence
will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present
its case or where the trial was a sham.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accused
Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith ordered
released from detention.
B. SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
1. SALUDAGA v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
21
The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses,
MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for
the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December,
1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high
ranking public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares,
Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged
while in the discharge of his official administrative function,
conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a
member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the late
OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give
unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua,
a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, through
evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there
entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the
Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays
Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the
amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the benefit
of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the
Government and public interest.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation dated
June 4, 2008 which was strongly opposed by the prosecution
in its Opposition dated June 18, 2008.
Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to
conduct a new preliminary investigation before the filing of
the second Information constituted a violation of the law
because the latter charged a different offense–that is,
violation of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to
private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first
Information. They argue that assuming that no substitution
took place, at the very least, there was a substantial
amendment in the new information and that its submission
should have been preceded by a new preliminary
investigation. Further, they claim that newly discovered
evidence mandates re-examination of the finding of a prima
facie cause to file the case.
The graft court found that there is no substituted information
or substantial amendment that would warrant the conduct of
a new preliminary investigation. It gave the following
ratiocination:
The re-filed information did not change the nature of the
offense charged, but merely modified the mode by which
accused committed the offense. The substance of such
modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of
another preliminary investigation.
Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the
criminal liability of the accused upgraded in the re-filed
information. Thus, new preliminary investigation is not in
order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
refused to order the preliminary investigation of the case a
quo, when the second Information in the instant case
constituted substituted Information whose submission
required the conduct of preliminary investigation. - NO
RULING:
There is no substitution of information there being no change
in the nature of the offense charged.
While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory
and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, the
denial of petitioners’ claim for a new investigation, however,
did not deprive them of their right to due process. An
examination of the records of the case discloses that there
was a full-blown preliminary investigation wherein both
petitioners actively participated.
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as
alleged in the first Information, and conferring unwarranted
benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct
violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue
injury to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the
very least, a substantial amendment. It should be noted that
the Information is founded on the same transaction as the
first Information, that of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for
the construction of barangay day care centers for barangays
Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus,
the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense
remain the same.
A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from
the original accused, other persons are charged under a new
criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily
included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the
original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal
complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded
from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused
must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and
evidence.
No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there
was no modification in the nature of the charged
22
offense.1avvphi1 Consequently, a new preliminary
investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the
petitioners.
C. AMENDED INFORMATION
1. BONIFACIO v RTC
FACTS:
Planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned
subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also
owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who
had previously purchased traditional pre-need educational
plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the
benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed
for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of
payments before the Makati RTC, formed PEPCI.
PEPCI manages and controls the following websites
that served as a forum to seek redress for their pecuniary loss
under their policies; www.pepcoalition.com,
www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-
group[7] at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites
are easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to
the internet and were alleged to contain libellous statements
against the Yuchengcos.
Gimenez, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family and of the
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), a criminal
complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, for
thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against
petitioners.
The Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, found probable cause
and caused the issuance of the information which was
eventually reversed on appeal by the Secretary of Justice. The
Justice Secretary opined that the crime of “internet libel” was
non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with
libel under Article 353 of the RPC.
Hence, Petitioners, filed a Motion to Quash the Information
on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati
RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not
punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article
353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for
failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Motion granted.
Motion for reconsideration granted and accordingly ordered
the public prosecutor to “amend the Information to cure the
defect of want of venue. The prosecution thereupon moved
to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of
August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the trustees of Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition and as such
trustees they hold the legal title to the
websitewww.pepcoalition.com which is of
general circulation, and publication to the
public conspiring, confederating together
with John Does, whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and publicly and maliciously
with intention of attacking the honesty,
virtue, honor and integrity, character and
reputation of complainant Malayan
Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family
particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco
and Helen Dee and for further purpose
exposing the complainant to public hatred
and contempt published an article imputing
a vice or defect to the complainant and
caused to be composed, posted and
published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a website
accessible in Makati City, an injurious and
defamatory article, which was first
published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and
underscoring in the original; italics
supplied)
ISSUE: whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public
respondent’s admission of the Amended Information.
RULING: YES
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place
where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction.[33] This principle acquires even greater import in
libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically
provides for the possible venues for the institution of the
criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
Venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1)
where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
23
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published.2 The
Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the
venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the
offending article “was first published and accessed by the
private complainant in Makati City.” In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite
allegation of printing and first publication.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first
published are used by the offended party as basis for the
venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed
and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for
instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in
the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This
pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it
pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on
the internet as there would be no way of determining
the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit
Gimenez’s premise of equating his firstaccess to the
defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with
“printing and first publication” would spawn the very ills that
the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to
discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination
to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts
messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in
the Philippines that the private complainant may have
allegedly accessed the offending website.
D. FILING OF INFORMATION IF THERE IS
PENDING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. RAMISCAL v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
2
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal
action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of
where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618).
Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured
party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the
offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by
laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant
place.
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was
enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the
criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written
defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means
of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote
municipal courts
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, retired Brigadier General of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), was President of the
AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)
for almost 4 years. During his term as president, AFP-RSBS’
board of trustees approved the acquisition of a parcel of land
in General Santos City for development as housing projects.
Thus, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, executed bilateral
deeds of sale over the subject property (at the agreed price
of P10,500.00 per square meter) with Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano,
representing the 12 individual sellers.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed unilateral deeds of sale over
the same property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a
purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of
the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter.
These deeds of sale were presented for registration and later
on became the basis for the TCTs issued by the Register of
Deeds.
Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the
first district of South Cotabato, filed in the Ombudsman a
complaint-affidavit against petitioner, along with 27 other
respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
and (2) malversation of public funds or property through
falsification of public documents.
In a Resolution, the Ombudsman found petitioner probable
guilty of the 2 offenses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman filed
with the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of RA
3019 and 12 informations for falsification of public documents
against Petitioner Ramiscal and the other respondents.
Petitioner Ramiscal then filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the prosecution to evaluate its
evidence and report its recommendations on the MR filed.
Initially, the prosecution recommended the dropping of
petitioner in the cases filed. However, the prosecution’s final
recommendation was that the MR filed by Petitioner should
be denied. Upon receipt of this finding/recommendation, the
Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of Petitioner.
Afterwards, Petitioner filed his 2nd MR of the Ombudsman’s
finding of probable cause against him.
Petitioner’s arraignment nevertheless followed. He filed a
motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his
2nd MR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to set aside arraignment
should be granted due to the pending MR?
RULING: No. The motion should not be granted even though
the resolution of the MR was still pending.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001 ,
24
sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper
court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II
of the Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for
Reconsideration. –
a) Only one motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be
allowed, the same to be filed within five
(5) days from notice thereof with the
Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper
Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be,
with corresponding leave of court in
cases where the information has already
been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not
bar the filing of the corresponding
information in Court on the basis of the
finding of probable cause in the
resolution subject of the
motion. (Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the
corresponding information, then neither can it bar the
arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of
criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the
information.
Moreover, any of grounds for suspension of arraignment as
provided for under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
is not present in this case (i.e. accused of unsound mind,
prejudicial question, etc.)
Lastly, the Court also said that Petitioner cannot anymore file
a 2nd MR questioning again the same finding of the
Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.
E. PRESCRIPTION
1. PANAGUITON v DOJ(lifted from net)
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo
Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to
P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and
his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in
favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said
loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of
both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on
18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for
insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the
checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26
June 1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili
and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his
counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been
unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since
petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal
capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases
against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that
he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several
documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were
purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He
also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein
Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business
associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III
Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and
dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a
partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even
while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper
court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding
that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced
checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in
the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation,
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but
his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S.
Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against
Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief
State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga
held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized
25
by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through
Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same,
stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to
Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then
Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his
favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and
that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco
v. Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ,
presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already
prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3)
informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In
justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act
No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not
provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No.
3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code
which governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ.
The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition,
petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave
error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in
ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit
and the questions are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did
not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the
Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law
which does not provide for its own prescriptive period,
offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No.
3326.
Issue: Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P.
Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the
institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and
punishment?
Held: It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was
passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace,
thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed
with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the
prescription of the offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within
the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner
filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued
the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years
had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's
control. After all, he had already initiated the active
prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to
suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions
and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their
rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed
to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's
delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet
prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before
the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified
the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of
the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg.
22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable
cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is
no longer any impediment to the filing of the information
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
26
F. CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF CRIMINAL
ACTION
1. PINOTE v AYCO
FACTS:
State Prosecutor Pinote filed an administrative case against
RTC Judge Ayco for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority, and grave misconduct. In a criminal case being
handled by Pinote, Judge Ayco allowed the testimony of 2
witnesses in court, despite the absence of Pinote. Pinote, at
that time, was undergoing medical treatment in the
Philippine Heart Center.
In the following hearings, despite orders of Ayco, Pinote
refused to cross examine the witnesses due to his being
absent during their direct examinations, contending that the
proceedings were void. Pinote filed a Manifestation stating
such, but Judge Ayco ruled that the prosecution was waiving
its right to cross-examine the 2 witnesses instead.
The Court Administrator found in favor of Pinote, stating that
Ayco violated Rule 110, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
ISSUE:
W/N Ayco should be held administratively liable?
HELD:
YES. Ayco should be held administratively liable.
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted
under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit,
however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private
prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to
prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court.
Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to
prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in
the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is
revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Ayco’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense
witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or
a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear
transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by
subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-
examine the witnesses.